

Sweden and the University of Oslo

*An analysis of Swedish reactions to events at the
University of Oslo during the Second World War*

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Janne Cathrin Lyngnes Lillenes,
Blindern, 07.05.2012.

List of names

Names that are used frequently throughout the thesis

The German occupational force in Norway:

Joseph Terboven – Reich Commissar of Norway.

Wilhelm Rediess – Leader of SS and the police.

Dr. Werner Knab – Leader of Gestapo.

Nasjonal Samling (the Norwegian National Socialist/fascist party):

Vidkun Quisling – Leader of Nasjonal Samling.

Ragnar Skancke – Minister of Department of Church and Education from September 1940.

Jonas Lie – Minister of the Police Department from September 1940.

Sverre Risnæss – Minister of the Justice Department from September 1940.

The Swedish government:

Per Albin Hansson – Prime Minister.

Christian Günther – Foreign Minister.

The University of Oslo:

Didrik Arup Seip – Rector.

Georg Monrad-Krohn – Dean of the Medical Faculty.

Adolf Hoel – became pro-Rector after Seip was arrested in September 1941, and from February 1943, he became Rector.

List of events

This is a list over certain events in Norway that affected the University of Oslo during the Second World War.

- 9. April 1940 – Germany invades Denmark and Norway. Sweden stays neutral.
- 24. April 1940 – Joseph Terboven is appointed Reich Commissar of Norway.
- 25. September 1940 – The Commissariat Council is established. This Council would consist mainly of members from NS. NS was also made the only permitted political party in Norway.
- 26. September 1940 – Det norske studentersamfund (DNS) at the University of Oslo is dissolved by the German occupational force.
- 11. September 1941 – Rector Didrik Arup is arrested by the German occupational force. The Minister of Department of Church and Education, Ragnar Skancke appoints himself as Rector, whereas Professor Adolf Hoel is made pro-Rector a few days later.
- 1. February 1942 – Vidkun Quisling is made Ministerial President. He establish a government with the former Commissariat Council.
- 26. February 1943 – The students at the University of Oslo creates a letter of protest against NS's labour mobilisation.
- 14. September 1943 – The professors at the University of Oslo creates a letter of protest against NS's involvement in the admission procedure.
- 15. October 1943 – Sixty-three professors and ten students were arrested because of the protest in September.
- 15. November 1943 – The students protests against the arrestees being kept imprisoned without a trial.
- 30. November 1943 – The University of Oslo is closed.

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Presentation

On April 9, 1940 Germany invaded Norway and Denmark. For the next five years the German occupational force would try to transform the Norwegian society, including the University of Oslo, to better fit the Nazi ideology.¹ The unwillingness of its students and professors to surrender to the demands of the occupation soon led the university into a protracted conflict with Nasjonal Samling and the German occupational force. The first conflict concerned the occupational force's dissolution of Det norske Studentersamfund (the student union) in September 1940. The second conflict occurred when the occupational force arrested Rector Didrik Arup Seip in September 1941. A third conflict occurred when the students protested against NS's labour mobilisation in February 1943. The fourth conflict began with a letter of protest from the professors against NS's interference with the university's admission procedures. It all ended on November 30, 1943 when the German occupational force closed the University of Oslo and arrested its professors and students. These conflicts will throughout the thesis be referred to as «events» at the University of Oslo.

The conflicts at the University of Oslo did not go unnoticed in Sweden; In fact, there was a reaction from Sweden to each conflict at the university during the war. This thesis will focus on the reactions of six Swedish newspapers; the daily newspapers Dagens Nyheter, Arbetet, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning, as well as the student newspapers Gaudeamus, Ergo and Lundagård.² These newspapers would in many cases be the opposition to the Swedish government's policies to keep Sweden out of the war. This opposition was influenced both by the Nordic Idea, and by the changing relationships of the Swedish government with the German government in Berlin and the Norwegian exile government in London.

¹ Note: Joseph Terboven was appointed Reich Commissar of occupied Norway on April 24, 1940. Terboven was to have the executive power, but Berlin intended that a council of Norwegians, "Administrasjonsrådet", would deal with the day-to-day governance of Norway. Terboven did not succeed in cooperating with Administrasjonsrådet, and on September 25 1940 he appointed a Commissariat Council consisting both of members from Nasjonal Samling (NS) and others (Vidkun Quisling was left out). NS was made the only legal political party. This was the starting point of Nyordning (New Arrangement), an attempt to arrange the Norwegian society in accordance with German ideology. From December 1940, the Führerprinzip was introduced in all Norwegian municipalities and counties, with a Mayor elected by the Commissariat Council. Terboven wanted to apply this new arrangement to the University of Oslo. Berti Nøkleby, *Josef Terboven: Hitlers mann i Norge*, (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2008), 160.

² Note: The student newspapers come from Uppsala University (Ergo), Lund University (Lundagård) and Stockholm University College (Gaudeamus). The translation of the names of the daily newspapers: Arbetet – Work, Dagens Nyheter – Daily News, and Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning – Gothenburg Trade and Maritime Journal. This thesis will use the actual names of the newspapers and not the translations.

The Nordic Idea was rooted in the emergence of Scandinavism in the 1830s.³ This idea was based on the notion that the Scandinavian countries were «brothers», in the sense that they shared a common history, culture and language. This idea was very much present in the Sweden of the Second World War, and especially amongst its students. Therefore, the Nordic Idea that is used in this thesis is representative only for Sweden, and not all of the Nordic countries, i.e. Norway, Denmark and Finland.

1.1.1 Main questions

This thesis has two main questions, though some of the answers given to one question will also apply to the other. The reason for division of the subject into two questions was the desire to draw sufficient attention to both aspects. The first question is: Regarding the events at the University of Oslo during the Second World War, was there a difference between the reactions of the Swedish student newspapers and the reactions of the Swedish daily newspapers? How did they word their reactions and protests? The second is: What determined whether the newspapers reacted to the events at the University of Oslo or not? Is it possible to argue that the relations of the Swedish government with Berlin and the Norwegian exile government influenced these reactions? Were the reactions and protest influenced by the Nordic Idea? Were there differences and similarities between the student newspapers and the daily newspapers?

1.1.2 Delineation

The subject of this thesis is the Swedish reactions to conflicts at the University of Oslo during the Second World War. This makes the Second World War the main historical area for the thesis, and more specifically that of the Nordic countries during the war. The subject also falls under the studies of university history, and, as the analysis will look at the reactions from Swedish newspapers, it is linked to media studies.

This thesis has been divided up chronologically; it follows the events at the University of Oslo and the Swedish reactions to them between September 1940 and December 1943. September 1940 was chosen as the starting point as this was the month when the University of Oslo was deprived of its Student Union (hereafter known as DNS). The Swedish student newspapers considered this event the start of the conflict between the University of Oslo and the new regime in Norway. Chronologically, the thesis ends with the closure of the University

³ The Nordic Idea will be examined in Chapter 2, subchapter 2.1.

of Oslo on November 30, 1943 and the Swedish reactions through December 1943.⁴ To understand the lack of reaction from the Swedish students in February 1943 and September 1943, two additional events had to be included: a protest over a conflict between NS and the Norwegian clergy and teachers in May 1942 and the influx of Danish students to Sweden in October 1943.⁵ It has to be kept in mind that this is the only mentioning of the Danish students in this thesis, since this thesis' purpose is to look at the relations between Sweden and Norway.

The sources of this thesis have not been delineated geographically, but after their cultural and political position in the Swedish society during the war. More information on the sources will be given in subchapters 1.3.3 and 1.3.4, but a short introduction will be given here. The student newspapers from Uppsala University and Lund University were chosen because these are the oldest and most distinguished universities in Sweden. The student newspaper from Stockholm University College was chosen because it was positioned in the capital Stockholm. Each daily newspaper was chosen because of its political stance towards the war. Dagens Nyheter and Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning were both politically independent, but differed in their views: GHT criticised the Swedish government's policies from the start of the war, whereas Dagens Nyheter only started criticising the government from 1942/1943. Arbetet had close ties with the Social Democrats, the political party that made up the government majority.

When discussing the Swedish student newspapers, it is important to understand that this thesis has not tried to establish the political stance of the university administrations towards the events at the University of Oslo. The thesis uses the term «Swedish students» or «Swedish student newspapers» as an umbrella term for the student newspapers used in the thesis, and not every student newspaper in Sweden. If another educational institution is being used, this will be mentioned. It will be used in this way: «why did the Swedish students not react to the events?». Still, it should be stressed that not all students shared the views expressed in the articles in of the student newspapers, as many students were politically indifferent to the events of the war. The term has been used simply because it would serve no purpose to name every student who wrote about the events in Oslo and about the Nordic Idea, nor would it be possible or desirable.

⁴ Several events at the University of Oslo have been left out of this thesis, simply because the Swedish students newspapers and daily newspapers did not react to them.

⁵ These events will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 4.

This thesis will examine how the relations of the Swedish government with Berlin and the Norwegian exile government affected the reactions of the Swedish student newspapers and daily newspapers towards the violations at the University of Oslo. In this regard, it must be mentioned that the term «Norwegian government» in this thesis is used exclusively about the Norwegian exile government in London. During the German invasion the Norwegian government with the king to London, where they stayed until the end of the war. The terms «The German government» and «Berlin» refer to the German government in Berlin, while the German government in Oslo is referred to as «The German occupational force» or «The Reich Commissariat». NS will be used to reference both the political party NS and the Commissariat Council Terboven established in September 1940 and eventually from February 1942, the government under the leadership of Vidkun Quisling.

The reason for looking into the Swedish government's relations with the Norwegian and German governments is because of Sweden's precarious position after the invasion of Norway and Denmark on April 9, 1940. Germany now posed a threat to Sweden's independence and integrity. In reality, the Germans wished for Sweden to stay out of the war, as it had no strategic position towards either the Soviet Union or Great Britain.⁶ Still, the threat posed by Germany made the Swedish government adopt a submissive attitude towards Berlin, a choice that strained the relationship with the Norwegian exile government. Not all nuances of the relationships between the governments will be examined; the point of including them is simply to better understand the reactions of the daily and student newspapers to the events in Oslo.

Finally, in this thesis the terms «pro-Nazi» and «anti-Nazi» have been replaced with the terms «pro-German» and «anti-German». This decision was made because the terms pro- and anti-Nazi are widely used without considering that the individual or group in question may have beliefs that contradict the Nazi doctrine. Therefore, it is felt that the terms pro-German and anti-German allow for more varying views on Germany, because, as will be seen in Chapter 2 concerning the German Nordic Idea, several individuals that supported Germany did not support the Nazi ideology.

⁶ By keeping Sweden out of the war, Germany could spare troops to be sent elsewhere. Further, they feared that the Swedish miners would destroy the iron-ore mines if the Germans invaded. Germany was only able to produce approximately 10m tons of iron ore a year, and the German ore was of low quality. The Swedish iron-ore was of high quality, and so Berlin were eager to keep on friendly terms with Sweden. The Swedish ore trade with Germany ended in November 1944. Wilhelm Carlgren, *Swedish Foreign Policy during the Second World War*, Translated by Arthur Spencer, (London: Ernest Benn, 1977), 13.

1.2 Historiography

There is little to no historiography on this subject, since there has not been done any extensive research on the Swedish reactions to events at the University of Oslo during the Second World War.

The only historian that has written a larger work concerning one of the Swedish educational institutions used in this thesis, is Sverker Oredsson's, Associate Professor in History at Lund University. He has written about Lund University during the Second World War in his work *Lunds universitet under andra världskriget: Motsättningar, debatter och hjälpinsatser*. His focus was the conflict between pro-German and anti-German sentiments that emerged at the university during the war. He has placed the conflicts at Lund University in both a national and an international context. His work has been of great importance for this thesis, and even though he has not solely focused upon the reactions towards happenings in Norway, it has been possible to use his work to see the reactions of the students at Lund University from another perspective. On Uppsala University only shorter works exist, such as *Världen i Uppsalaperspektiv: Uppsala Studentkår 1930-1990* edited by Torgny Neveus. This work have given an insight into Uppsala University's student newspaper, Ergo, and a short introduction to the political leanings at the university. Regarding Stockholm University College there are no works that can give insight into the student union or the student newspaper, Gaudeamus. There are, however, two major works about the development of Stockholm University College, *Stockholms universitet 1878-1978* by Fredric Bedoire and Per Thullberg, and *Stockholms Högskolas historia före 1950* by Sven Tunberg. They have been imperative for understanding how the University College endured the war. The lack of works on the three institutions during the war means that this thesis has had to focus almost solely on primary sources. The difficulties and possibilities related to this approach will be examined in subchapter 1.3.1.

Works written on the Swedish daily newspapers during the war has mostly focused on the newspapers' political leanings and how these were influenced by the events of the war. the political leanings of the newspapers have been important for this thesis, and therefore *Den svenska pressens historia, volumes II and III* have been used to discover what they were. *Den svenska pressens historia* describes the development of the Swedish press from before 1830 and up to modern times, and through volumes II and III it has been possible to follow the development of the three daily newspapers used in this thesis. Volume III has been the volume that has been used the most, because it concentrates upon the period between 1897 and 1945. However, the works cannot be used to find how the daily newspapers reacted to the

events at the University of Oslo. Therefore, as with the student newspapers, the focus has been on the primary sources and the information they may give.

The focus of this thesis is the Swedish reactions to violations at the University of Oslo during the Second World War, and the historiography available on the University of Oslo during the war is extensive. Here can only be given a short introduction to this historiography, as it would be impossible to include every work that has been written on the subject. The earliest works on the university during the war, were published shortly after the war, and were written from a personal point of view. The work of Didrik Arup Seip's work, the Rector of the university from 1937 until 1945, published in 1946, focuses on his own experiences from the invasion in April 1940 until his arrest in September 1941.⁷ The second major work published, was in Volume III in *Norges Krig: 1940-1945*, written by Sverre Steen, a historian at the University of Oslo. Steen's work was the first work done by a historian, but it is possible to see that his personal experiences during the war contributed greatly to how he viewed the events that had taken place. A change emerged with Leif Heggen's Master Thesis in 1972. Whereas the works of Steen and Seip had dealt with their own experiences within the larger events at the university, Heggen examined only the issue of resistance at the university during the war. In 1978 Adolf Hoel's book about his involvement at the university during the war was published.⁸ Hoel's book was an attempt to defend his actions during his position as pro-rector from September 1941, and after he had been appointed Rector in early 1943. In 1994 Gordon Spangelid's finished his Master Thesis, and as with Heggen, Spangelid's narrowed his research, and examined only the student population's resistance to the occupation. In 2004 Jorunn Sem Fure edited a pamphlet marking the 60 year anniversary of the closure of the university in November 1943. Former students that had been studying during the war contributed to the pamphlet, as did was historians such as Ole Kristian Grimnes. In 2007, Jorunn Sem Fure published her book *Universitetet i kamp: 1940-1945*, a new and broader view of the many events at the university during the war.

In addition to the reactions from the academics and daily newspapers, this thesis looks at the influences that the Nordic Idea and the Swedish government's relations with the Norwegian exile government and Berlin might have had on the reactions. Therefore, a short

⁷ Note: The Rector was seen as the legitimate Rector of the university after his arrest, and deportation to Germany. The Rector's experience of being sent to Sachsenhausen in Germany is included in this work as well, but it is of no importance for this thesis.

⁸ Note: Adolf Hoel was appointed pro-Rector by NS at the University of Oslo after Rector Didrik Arup Seip had been arrested in September 1941, and was given the title Rector by NS in early 1943.

presentation of the historiography of both the Nordic Idea and the communication between the governments can be useful.

It has been written so extensively about the Swedish government during the war that it is impossible to mention all the books written about the subject. As early as 1945 the Swedish Foreign Department published a book about the Swedish government's connections with Denmark and Norway during the war. This book gives a detailed description of these connections, and as it contains the Swedish Foreign Department's own account of the war, it can almost be viewed as a primary source. In 1948 Volume II of *Norges krig: 1940-1945* was published. It contains a contribution from Jens Schive, a Norwegian press attaché who was in Stockholm during the war, where he examines the relationship between Norway and Sweden. Since the 1940s many books have been published on the subject. 1977 saw the publishing of Wilhelm Carlgren's book *Swedish Foreign Policy during the Second World War*, and in 1983 Henrik S. Nissen edited the work *Scandinavia during the Second World War*. For this thesis two works on the subject have been especially important. The first is a chapter written by Wilhelm Carlgren in the book *Broderfolk i ufredstid: Norsk-svenske forbindelser under annen verdenskrig*, (edited by Stig Ekman and Ole Kristian Grimnes). Carlgren's chapter is detailed and useful for the understanding of the Swedish governments relations with the Norwegian exile government. The other important work is Alf W. Johansson's book about the Swedish war experience of Swedish Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson. This book covers the entire spectrum of the Swedish government's relations with both the Norwegian exile government and the German government in Berlin.

1.3 Sources

The Discourse Analysis is the theoretical foundation of this thesis, and will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 2. In this subchapter, the theories about media and how they can be used in this thesis will be presented. So will the difficulties and possibilities by using newspapers as sources in a historical analysis be. The reason for presenting theories about media here and not in Chapter 2 with the other theoretical approach, is that it is important to understand the theory about newspapers before the difficulties and possibilities of using them are presented in subchapter 1.3.2, and eventually the discourse analysis itself in Chapter 2. Finally the sources used in this thesis will be presented in subchapters 1.3.3 and 1.3.4.

1.3.1 Media theory

Media theory tends to focus upon how media, i.e. newspapers, television and internet can influence a reader and how the reader uses the information provided by the media. It is, however, difficult to know how articles that were published seventy years ago were received by the public. Therefore, this thesis will use media theory in a different way. Instead of trying to use it to figure out how the articles were received by the public, this thesis will use media theory to examine how the Swedish government's relations with the German and Norwegian governments influenced the newspaper's reactions to the events in Oslo. Even though it is difficult to know how an article was received by the public, one can get a notion of how of the importance of an event by considering the amount of articles published about it.

There are several theories about media. The «diffusion of innovation» theory argues that such innovations as new ideas, stories, products and policies can have an affect upon a newspaper's readers.⁹ Instead of using this theory to understand the effect the newspapers had on their readers, it can be used to review how the Swedish government's policies on press censorship and distribution affected the newspapers. In September 1939, the Swedish government presented a decree that encouraged the Swedish newspapers, as John Gilmour puts it, «to show care when expressing opinions which could be regarded as offensive to foreign governments or bring into question Sweden's neutrality».¹⁰ This encouragement was not enough, because in January 1940 the State Information Board (Statens Informationsstyrelse, SIS) was established with the task to inform, restrict, survey and direct public opinion, and combat foreign propaganda.¹¹ The Swedish government had decided to use a paragraph in the Freedom of the Press law of 1812, which stated that in case of war, the government could stop articles that could threaten the independence and integrity of the country.¹² In addition to the employment of this paragraph, a decree was introduced in March 1940, hindering newspapers that wrote about such matters that could threaten Sweden's independence from distributing their issues.¹³

⁹ Mark Balnaves, Stephanie Hemelryk Donald and Brian Shoesmith, *Media Theories and Approaches: A Global Perspective*, (England: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 65.

¹⁰ John Gilmour, *Sweden, the Swastika and Stalin: the Swedish experience in the Second World War*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 159.

¹¹ *Ibid*, 160.

¹² Jörgen Weibull, «Censur och opinionsutveckling», in *Norden under 2.verdenskrig*, by Karl Molin, Henrik S.Nissen, Magne Skodvin, Hannu Soikkanen and Jörgen Weibull, (Copenhagen: Nordisk Ministerråd/Gyldendal, 1979), 141.

¹³ *Ibid*, 142.

Another media theory is «agenda setting» which argues that a certain amount of exposure to a subject can alter a reader's opinion of it.¹⁴ It is not possible to know how a contemporary reader reacted to articles regarding the conflict at the University of Oslo during the war, but it can be argued that in discussing a subject in several articles over a period of time, the newspaper could have answered the public's desire for information. This theory overlaps with the thought that the media has a social function, an integrative and disintegrative function, and that readers are active, not passive, when reading newspapers. The integrative function means that the media provides channels of information and symbols, while the disintegrative function means that media can destroy relationships and social bonds.¹⁵ The integrative theory is important in relation to the usage of the Nordic Idea, and how it was used as a symbol in the support of the Norwegian academics. The disintegrative theory can be applied to explain how the Swedish government's relations with the German government could strain the connection between the Swedish and Norwegian governments.

1.3.2 The difficulties and possibilities of using newspapers as sources

Danuta Raeh states that the term newspaper «indicates that the content of the newspaper will be primarily devoted to the news of the day, and some analysis and comment on this news».¹⁶ This was not always the case when the Swedish student newspapers and daily newspapers wrote about the events at the University of Oslo during the war. Sometimes events were reported without comment or analysis. In this subchapter the difficulties and possibilities associated with using newspapers as sources will be examined.

It is easy to argue that in the absence of individuals who can be interviewed about past events, newspapers can be good sources for understanding the reactions to these events. Hans Peter Clausen argues «a historian can never know when the press is portraying the opinion of the public, or when the press is the source behind this public opinion».¹⁷ Clausen also mentions a second problem, namely that there could be several errors and mistakes in a newspaper's accounts, and if no secondary sources are present to verify the information, the errors can be accepted as facts. What Clausen does not consider is that newspapers can be used as both primary and secondary sources. The distinction follows the subject the newspaper is used to explain. If this thesis had used the Swedish newspapers to explain what

¹⁴ Balnaves, Hemelryk Donald and Shoemith, *Media Theories and Approaches*, 68.

¹⁵ Ibid, 73.

¹⁶ Danuta Raeh, *The Language of Newspaper*, The Second Edition, (London: Routledge, 2002), 2.

¹⁷ Hans Peter Clausen, *Aviser som historisk kilde*, (Århus: Institut for presseforskning og samtidshistorie, 1962), 2.

had happened in Oslo, the newspapers would be considered a secondary source because they based their accounts on information from Norway. Yet, as this thesis uses the newspapers to understand the Swedish reception of the events in Oslo, the newspapers are considered primary sources.

A third problem Clausen mentions associated with using newspapers is that in many cases the articles have no signatory. This has been encountered when writing this thesis, and it has made it difficult to get a full and complete understanding of why the student newspapers and daily newspapers used certain arguments. This problem has been more prominent with the daily newspapers than the student newspapers, and has resulted in the use of the newspaper's own names being used in the thesis, such as «Dagens Nyheter argued» or «GHT stated».

A few difficulties were encountered while researching this thesis. The initial purpose of the thesis was to compare and contrast the way the student newspapers *Lundagård*, *Ergo* and *Gaudeamus* reacted to and wrote about the events at the University of Oslo. After an extensive examination of the reactions in the student newspapers, it was concluded that the sources obtained from the three papers would not make a good analysis. It was therefore decided that the three daily newspapers, *Göteborgs Handels – och Sjöfartstidning*, *Arbetet* and *Dagens Nyheter*, would be included in the analysis.

It became clear quite early that there were questions that could not be explained only by examining the student newspapers and the daily newspapers, for example: Why did the Swedish students choose not to comment upon the Norwegian students' letter of protest in February 1943 and the Norwegian professors' protest letter in September 1943? It was therefore decided that the meeting records from the student unions at Lund University, Uppsala University and Stockholm University College had to be examined, and in September 2011 a last trip to the archives in Sweden was carried out to examine these. The archive of the student union at Uppsala University was located at the University Library in Uppsala, whereas the archives of the Student Unions at Lund University and Stockholm University College were found in the local archives of their respective cities. It was decided that the meeting records were to only be used as a means to explain why the student papers did not write about certain events in Oslo, and to give a more detailed explanation of the events the students actually reacted to. The inclusion of the meeting records greatly strengthens the analysis of the students reactions.

There are many difficulties associated with the use of newspapers as sources, but if one takes these problems into account, newspapers can open up for new possibilities to

understand a society. Through the analysis of their reactions, this thesis will look for the political stance of the different newspapers. That the newspapers expressed their political opinions will rather be viewed as a positive than a negative aspect. The use of Swedish student newspapers also opens up for a better understanding of the relationship between the Norwegian and Swedish students. Below a short presentation of the student newspapers and daily newspapers used will be given.

1.3.3 The student newspapers

Ergo and Lundagård were chosen because they belong to the oldest universities in Sweden; Uppsala and Lund. Uppsala University was founded in 1477 and Lund University in 1666. As the oldest educational institutions in Sweden, Uppsala and Lund were known for their conservative outlook. Therefore, Gaudeamus, the newspaper of the more liberal-minded Stockholm University College was chosen as a counterweight. Stockholm University College was founded in 1878, was a young institution compared to Lund and Uppsala.

Ergo – Uppsala University

Ergo was founded in 1924 and was from 1926 until 1940 privately owned by Thorsten Eklann, a journalist and editor. That Ergo was privately owned meant that the student union had no economic responsibilities regarding the student newspaper, but this changed when they bought the newspaper in 1940. No remarkable changes occurred when Ergo changed owners; it continued to write independently of the student union, and about matters concerning the general student population, such as student union questions, student sports, education, anniversaries and student health.¹⁸

The student newspaper communicated many ideas and discussions emerging at the university, including the rightwing oriented. In February 1939 the Uppsala and the Lund students announced that they were against whether Sweden should allow Jewish physicians of German heritage to enter the country.¹⁹ Despite this protest being directed against labour

¹⁸ Svante Nycander, "Världen i Fyrsperspektiv: Uppsalastudenterna 1930 – 1945", in *Världen i Uppsalaperpektiv, Uppsala Studentkår 1930-1990*, ed. by Torgny Neveus, (Uppsala: Uppsala Studentkår, 1998), 18.

¹⁹ In February 1939 similar meetings were held at Uppsala University and Lund University. The question that was raised at the two universities was whether the students should support ten German Jewish Doctors who wished to work in Sweden. In Uppsala 548 voted against, and 349 voted for, whereas in Lund 724 students voted against, and 342 voted for. Both universities were viewed as hostile to labour immigrants. Sverker Oredsson, *Lunds universitet under andra världskriget: Motsättningar, debatter och hjälpinsatser*, (Lund: Lunds universitetshistoriska sällskap), 219.

immigration and the effects of such immigration on the students' future access to work, the protest was not well received in the Swedish population. According to Svante Nycander, the psalm writer Torsten Fogelqvist, stated that «'A cloud has covered up the enlightenment of our country'». ²⁰

However, with the German invasion of Norway and their violation of Norwegian society, the students at Uppsala University demonstrated their support for their neighbouring country through articles in *Ergo*. The support of Nazism started to diminish with Hitler's rise to power in 1933, and with the invasion of Norway, an outright criticism of Germany materialised. Svante Nycander argues that the few students that supported the new German ideas made no attempt to hinder the democratic discussions in *Ergo*, nor did they express any form of anti-Semitism in the student newspaper. ²¹ It will be of interest to see whether *Ergo* was as conservative as the university it belonged to.

Gaudeamus – Stockholm University College

“*Gaudeamus Igitur*” Latin for «Let us therefore rejoice», is the title of a medieval student song still used by some universities today. ²² The student newspaper at Stockholm University College, was founded in 1924, and quickly integrated into the student union. As with *Ergo* the editorial was independent of the student union, which only had influence over the content they themselves contributed to the newspaper. The political direction of the articles and discussions that emerged in *Gaudeamus* during the Second World War was influenced by the occupation of its Nordic neighbours.

Gaudeamus had since 1924 been the newspaper connected to Stockholm University College, but in early 1942, a discussion emerged at the student union whether *Gaudeamus* was to become the student newspaper for the other student unions in Stockholm. ²³ On February 6, 1942 the president of the student union argued that *Gaudeamus* would benefit «greatly» if the student newspaper could speak for the entire student population in Stockholm. ²⁴ Yet, by May 1942, after many meetings between the student unions at the different university colleges, it was decided that a new student newspaper was to be

²⁰ Nycander, ”Världen i Fyrsperspektiv”, 31.

²¹ *Ibid*, 44-45.

²² Reverso Online Dictionary, *Gaudeamus Igitur*, Reverso Online Dictionary, <http://dictionary.reverso.net/english-definition/gaudeamus%20igitur> (20.04.2012)

²³ Stockholm University College was not the only university college in Stockholm: Stockholm School of Economics (1909), the Karolinska Institute (Medicine, 1810), the Royal Institute of Technology KTH (1827), Sophia House University College (nursing, 1884), and Veterinary Association (1868).

²⁴ Stockholm University College Student Union, ‘§16 *Gaudeamus*’, 6 February 1942.

established. This decision was made because of the extensive criticism that had been directed towards Gaudeamus. The representative from the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm argued that the student newspaper had certain political tendencies that were not in accordance with the views and ideas held at the Institute.²⁵ The political tendencies he was referring to were regarded the articles that had occurred in relation to the dissolution of DNS, the arrest of Rector Seip, and the May 1942 letter of protest in relation to the conflict between NS and the Norwegian teachers and clergy.

Lundagård – Lund University

Lundagård is the oldest student paper used in this thesis. It was founded in 1920, and was from the very beginning owned by the student union. The editorial board was elected through the student union elections, but once elected they were independent and free to make their own decisions about the content of the paper.²⁶

During the Second World War Lund University would be known for its many pro-German professors and students, but Lundagård was still influenced by events in Sweden's neighbouring countries. The editorials under Ove Möller (1940) and Per Eckberg (1941) were very much concerned with the occupation of Norway, and were at one point even criticised for their pro-Norwegian stance.²⁷ One would think that the students at Lund University would have been affected by their geographical proximity to mainland Denmark. Yet, in Chapter 4 it will be demonstrated that the Swedish students did not mention Denmark or the Danish students, as they hoped that the presence of the Danish King and government would spare the country from such grave conditions as experienced in Norway.

The major event at Lundagård during the war, was the pro-German article in January 1942, on the arrest of Rector Didrik Arup Seip of the University of Oslo.²⁸ This article caused quite a stir at Lund, and the student union had no other choice than to dismiss the editorial board. The next editorial board, elected in March 1942, returned to the pro-Norwegian attitudes of Möller and Eckerberg. It will be of interest to see whether the pro-German students and sentiments got any space in the student newspaper.

²⁵ Stockholm University College Student Union, "§9 Gaudeamus", 27 March 1942.

²⁶ Oredsson, *Lunds universitet under andra världskriget*, 13-14.

²⁷ Paul Lindblom, "Neutralitet till döds – aldrig!", *Lundagård*, Volume Number 22, No.13, 13 December 1941.

²⁸ This article will be discussed in more detail in under-chapter 3.2.2.

1.3.4 The daily newspapers

The daily newspapers that were selected for this thesis, were chosen because of their political stance. Below a short presentation of the daily newspapers will be given.

Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning

Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning (hereafter referred to as GHT) was a liberal daily newspaper which was published in Gothenburg in the period between 1832 and 1973.²⁹ The paper was initially founded as a magazine for trade and shipping messages, but in 1852 the magazine was transformed into one of the leading political daily newspapers.

The newspaper had always been politically independent. This meant that during the Second World War, under the leadership of editor Torgny Segerstedt (1917-1945), the newspaper became the foremost critic of the Swedish government's submissive policies towards Berlin. Germany had been interested in GHT since 1933 because of the newspaper's critical discussion of Adolf Hitler and his political ambitions. Elisabeth Sandlund argues that the war came as a blessing for Segerstedt and GHT, because it was then confirmed that the new German regime was "barbaric". GHT viewed the invasion of Denmark and Norway in April 1940 as an unprovoked attack, and the newspaper soon criticised the government's passivity in helping its Nordic neighbours.³⁰ Even if the newspaper received several warnings and several of its issues were confiscated, Segerstedt refused to stop the criticism of the German warfare.³¹

The last issue of the newspaper was published in September 1973. It re-emerged as a weekly newspaper in the years 1975-84; the final closure came in 1985 after a short period as a daily newspaper.³²

²⁹ John Solheim, *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, Store Norske Leksikon, 02.12.2009, http://snl.no/G%C3%B6teborgs_Handels-_och_Sj%C3%B6farts-Tidning (20.04.2012).

³⁰ Torgny Segerstedt argued that the German regime was a form of "barbaric repression". See Elisabeth Sandlund, "Beredskap och repression (1936-1945)", in *Den svenska pressens historia III: Det moderna Sveriges spegel (1897-1945)*, ed. by Karl Erik Gustavsen and Per Ryden, (Stockholm: Ekerlids Förlag, 2001), 338.

³¹ John Solheim, *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, Store Norske Leksikon, 02.12.2009, http://snl.no/G%C3%B6teborgs_Handels-_och_Sj%C3%B6farts-Tidning (20.04.2012).

³² John Solheim, *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, Store Norske Leksikon, 02.12.2009, http://snl.no/G%C3%B6teborgs_Handels-_och_Sj%C3%B6farts-Tidning (20.04.2012).

Dagens Nyheter

Dagens Nyheter was established in 1864 by Rudolf Wall, and is today one of the largest subscription newspapers in Sweden. It was and still is published in Stockholm.

Wall's ambition with Dagens Nyheter was to create a newspaper that would publish any news of importance both domestically and abroad. He proclaimed that «in all questions freedom is our solution and our goal. The road will be long and the obstacles many».³³ With freedom, Wall meant religious, educational, political and economic freedom, and with these ambitions Dagens Nyheter became a liberal, but politically independent newspaper.

In 1924 Bonnier publishing became the major shareholder of Dagens Nyheter.³⁴ Even though the Bonnier family declared in 1924 that Dagens Nyheter would write independently of the family's own political stand, this principle would not be observed during the Second World War. The Bonnier family wanted the newspaper to take a firmer stand against Germany's policies, but the editorial board was unwilling to succumb to this demand.³⁵ With the invasion of Norway and Denmark in April 1940 the conflict would flare up once again, but the editorial board would not succumb to the Bonnier family's wishes that the newspaper take a firmer stand against German violations of the neighbouring countries. This changed in 1942/1943, when Germany started to lose ground in Europe and the pressure on Sweden started to diminish. It was now easier for the editorial board to take a firmer stand against the German warfare and its occupational politics.

Arbetet

Arbetet was established in 1887 by Axel Ferdinand Danielsson, and was issued in Malmö until it went bankrupt in August 2000.³⁶ Arbetet started as a weekly newspaper, and from 1888 it would be issued three times a week. From 1890 the newspaper was issued every afternoons, except on Sundays.³⁷

Arbetet had since it was established in 1887 been a socialistic newspaper with the slogan «an forum for the class conscious workers movement», and would in 1888 be the first

³³ Dagens Nyheter, *Historia*, Dagens Nyheter, <http://info.dn.se/info/om-oss/historia/> (21.04.2012).

³⁴ Bonnier was established in 1804 as a small publishing house/ book store. Today it is an international media group that deals with everything that media has to offer: books, TV, magazines, movies, music and radio. It has 180 companies in 25 countries, but its headquarter is situated in Stockholm. It is still fully owned by the Bonnier family. Berit Røhne, *Bonnier AB*, Store Norske Leksikon, 16.11.2011, http://snl.no/Bonnier_AB (21.04.2012).

³⁵ Elisabet Sandlund, "Beredskap och repression", 330-331.

³⁶ Kunnskapsforlaget papirleksikon, *Arbetet*, Store Norske Leksikon, 14.02.2009, <http://snl.no/Arbetet> (21.04.2012).

³⁷ Birgit Petersson, "Tidningar som industri och parti (1880-1897)", in *Den svenska pressens historia II: Åren da allting hände (1830-1897)*, ed. by Karl Erik Gustavsen and Per Ryden, (Stockholm: Ekerlids Förlag, 2001), 285.

weekly *worker's* newspaper. It was therefore one of the many newspaper in Sweden during the 1890s that supported the Social Democrats when the party was established in 1889.³⁸

Therefore, *Arbetet* supported the Swedish government's submissive politics towards Germany when the Second World War erupted.³⁹ This support of the government was mainly due to *Arbetet's* chief editor Allan Vougt's (1924-1944) position in the party leadership of the Social Democrats'.⁴⁰ The editor was aware of the threat which Germany posed towards Sweden's neutrality, and supported the idea of giving in to some of Germany's demands to maintain Sweden's independence and integrity. With the war turned in favour of the Allies with Germany losing ground in Egypt during the summer of 1942 and the Soviet Union in February 1943, *Arbetet* changed its stand towards Germany and became quite critical of the its warfare.

1.4 Structure

Chapter 2 will discuss the development of the Nordic Idea and why it is used in this thesis, and so will the second theoretical foundation, the discourse analysis, be.

In Chapter 3 the discussion will concentrate upon the Swedish reactions to the dissolution of DNS in September 1940, and the arrest of Rector Didrik Arup Seip in September 1941. The analysis will focus upon whether the students newspapers and daily newspapers believed it to be NS or the German occupational force that dissolved DNS in September 1940, and whether the newspapers had changed their minds about who was the aggressors in Norway by the time Rector Seip was arrested in September 1941.

Chapter 4 will look at two events at the University of Oslo that the Swedish student newspapers chose not to comment upon; the Norwegian students' letter of protest in February 1943 and the Norwegian professors' protest letter in September 1943. The discussion will be centred upon the notion that the silence of the Swedish students was unusual. This will be demonstrated by looking at a protest in May 1942 regarding events in Norway, and their willingness to help the Danish students who fled to Sweden in October 1943. It is in this

³⁸ The Social Democrats was established by August Palm in 1889, and was introduced at the Swedish Parliament in 1896. After the right to vote for all men was introduced in 1914 (women in 1919), the political party got the national assembly's largest group of voters, a position they managed to maintain for years because of their support of the workers. Under the leadership of Hjalmar Branting, the party was reformed into a reformist and parliamentary direction. This direction was adopted by Per Albin Hansson, who became the leader of the party in the 1930s, and Prime Minister from the early 1930s until his death in 1946. Knut Are Tvedt, *Socialdemokraterna*, Store Norske Leksikon, 21.01.2012, <http://snl.no/Socialdemokraterna> (21.04.2012).

³⁹ More about this resilient politics in under-chapter 1.4.1.

⁴⁰ Elisabet Sandlund, "Beredskap och repression", 333.

chapter that the differences between the student newspapers and daily newspapers will become apparent, because the daily newspapers chose to comment these events that the student newspapers did not care for.

The analysis in Chapter 5 will concentrate itself upon the protests and demonstrations from the Swedish population in relation to closure of the University of Oslo on November 30, and the arrest of its students and professors. The extent of the reactions in December 1943 would exceed the responses to the violations at the university in previous years, as even the Swedish government and other groups in Swedish society reacted. This chapter will therefore differ from the others, because it is necessary to include these responses in order to get a bigger picture of the extent of the Swedish reactions.

The final chapter, Chapter 6, will sum up and conclude on the basis of the arguments that have been made throughout the thesis.

Chapter 2: The Nordic Idea and Theory

The reason why an subchapter has been devoted to the explanation of the Nordic Idea is due to how this was a concept used during the period on which this thesis concentrates. The idea will be used in the analysis to understand why the student newspapers and daily newspapers reacted or did not react to events at the University of Oslo during the war.

The discourse analysis has been brought into this thesis as a theory because it is a useful tool to determine why and how the student newspapers and daily newspapers reacted to the events in Oslo. The discourse analysis has been important when trying to determine whether the Swedish government's policies had any effect upon the reactions and protests from the student papers and daily newspapers. The context and the culturally and social environment in which the papers fell under had a lot to say for how their protests were formulated.

2.1 The Nordic Idea.

The Swedish historian Mikael Byström, stated in his book *En Broder, gäst och parasit* about the Swedish perceptions about Nordic refugees in 1942-1947, that he had not linked the Nordic Idea to its Scandinavism origin. He stated that he had rather used the term as a tool to explain the perceptions and ideas the Swedish had about Nordic refugees, and the Scandinavian Jews.⁴¹ This thesis will however, link the Nordic Idea back to its origin, «Scandinavism». The first reason for this is that only through the development of Scandinavism can one truly understand the Nordic Idea, and how it can help explain why the Swedes wanted to help their Nordic neighbours. The second reason for linking the Nordic Idea to its origin is that the term Scandinavism, had been embraced by the academic world since its emergence in the 1830s. The third reason for using the Nordic Idea in this analysis is because the idea as a concept was widely used during the war.

⁴¹ Mikael Byström, *En broder, gäst och parasit: uppfattningar och föreställningar om utlänningar, flyktingar och flyktningspolitik i svensk offentlig debatt 1942- 1947*, (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 2006), 25.

2.1.1 Scandinavism and the Nordic Idea.

The Swedish academics had been the first to embrace Scandinavism when it appeared in the 1830s. When the Nordic Idea emerged as Scandinavism's successor in the 1920s, it became popular amongst the Swedish academics, and by the 1940s the term was widely used by students and professors alike.

Scandinavism emerged in the 1830s. Its goal was to unify the three countries Denmark, Sweden and Norway in a political union; a union which was arguably similar to the Kalmar-union which had emerged at the end of the 1300s.⁴² The ideas behind Scandinavism were quickly embraced by both politicians and academics in Denmark and Sweden, but the Norwegians were less willing to discuss a ideas that would entwine them even more with their two neighbouring countries. Norway had long been united with their neighbours, first with Denmark from 1380 till 1814, and from 1814 with Sweden. This made the Norwegian academics reluctant to discuss ideas of a national union with its neighbouring academics. This certainly put a strain upon the work around Scandinavism, but it did, however, not stop the students in Sweden and Denmark from trying to create better relations between the three countries. According to Ruth Hemstad, the students saw themselves as the natural representatives of their own nations.⁴³

The period between the 1830s and 1864 saw a high frequency of student meetings concerning Scandinavism, but the actual movement behind Scandinavism was on the other hand unorganised, undeveloped and not institutionalised. Still, the first associations with a Scandinavian program and the first Scandinavist journals were established in this period. In 1864, however, a war between Denmark and Germany erupted, and the work concerning Scandinavism suffered. Denmark had hoped that the Swedish- Norwegian union would come to its aid, but the union did not answer Denmark's call for help, and as a result Denmark boycotted any future Scandinavian cooperation.⁴⁴ This was the first time that these governments had any major disagreement since Scandinavism's emergence in the 1830s. The

⁴² The Kalmar- union was a unification of Sweden, Norway and Denmark under one king between 1389 until 1521. It all began in 1387 when Olav Håkonssen died, and his mother, Queen Margarete of Denmark took over the national control over Denmark and Norway. From 1389, Sweden was included in this unification, and when Queen Margarete's sister's grandson became of age in 1397, he was crowned king in Kalmar, the first king of the Kalmar-union. This union would last until 1521, when Gustav Vasa in Sweden managed to make the Swedish population oppose the Danish rule. Gustav Vasa was crowned king of Sweden. Helge Salvensen and Per G. Norseng, *Kalmarunionen*, Store Norske Leksikon, 22.11.2011, <http://snl.no/Kalmarunionen> (27.04.2012).

⁴³ Ruth Hemstad, *Fra Indian Summer til nordisk vinter: Skandinavisk samarbeid, Skandinavisme og Unionsoppløsning*, (Oslo: Akademisk Publiserings, 2008), 51.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 51.

academics demonstrated that disagreements between the governments did not stop academic cooperation between the countries.

These events would eventually change Scandinavism from a politically oriented movement in the years before the war to a more culturally based.⁴⁵ Another reason for the move away from a political union was done because of the union between Norway and Sweden. Norway did not hold the independence required to discuss the political ambitions of Scandinavism, meaning that political discussions would end up restrained and limited. Instead, Scandinavism took different directions: economic Scandinavism, educational Scandinavism and New Scandinavism. Nevertheless, the Norwegians were still sceptical of the ideas surrounding Scandinavism; they feared that the two other countries, and especially Sweden, still had political ambitions hidden behind their wish for a cultural cooperation.⁴⁶ This cultural Scandinavism would come into full bloom in the 1890s, when a surge of new ideas concerning Scandinavism occurred.

The new cultural Scandinavism denounced the political Scandinavism, because it was argued that the old movement's political goals were unrealistic and would have been difficult to achieve, even if all three countries had been positive to a political union.⁴⁷ The new Scandinavism would work for better connections between the Scandinavian countries based on the cultural heritage the countries shared; such as language, history and culture. These supporters of the cultural Scandinavism would be called «new Scandinavists».

The student meetings that had occurred during the «old» Scandinavism were both criticised and supported by the new Scandinavists. The critics argued that the meetings had been founded on a idea that would never come true; the political unification of the three countries.⁴⁸ The supporters of the student meetings had themselves attended the student meetings. They argued therefore that student meetings would create a feeling of community between the new Scandinavists. Ruth Hemstad argues that the student meetings, contrary to what the new Scandinavists beliefs, had had a good impact on the promotion of Scandinavism.⁴⁹ For their part, the students and professors were on the other hand not concerned with what the new Scandinavists thought about their propagation of Scandinavism; a sentiment which would follow the academics all the way into the Second World War.⁵⁰ This

⁴⁵ Hemstad, *Fra Indian Summer til nordisk vinter*, 51.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 117.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 89.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 130.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 131.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 233.

did not mean that the academics were brought closer to each other. Only through learning from one another could the academics understand each other, but the knowledge obtained from lectures and meetings did not bring the academics of the three countries closer to each other. Their nationalism was too strong and their actual wish to cooperate with each other too weak. Still, these academic meetings at the turn of the century held potential for future cooperation, especially for creating a common platform for the universities in Denmark, Norway and Sweden.⁵¹ All such efforts ended with the the split of the union between Norway and Sweden in 1905.

The Swedish reactions towards how the union ended were immense, and the fact that Denmark had supported Norway, made matters even worse. The work concerning Scandinavism was completely paralysed. It is interesting to note that the newly independent Norwegians were the first to approach the now hostile Sweden about Scandinavian cooperation.⁵² Whereas the Swedish now viewed Scandinavism as a negative term, the Norwegians saw Scandinavism as a way to show their newly won independence. However, several other factors, such as Norway's wish to enter an integrity agreement with Great Britain, made the relations between Norway and Sweden plummet.⁵³ Even the academic work saw a decline, and it actually seemed as the relations between the Scandinavian countries would not improve at all.

Ruth Hemstad argues that Scandinavism experienced a «Nordic winter» with the split between Norway and Sweden. Yet, the devastating First World War would turn out to be the warm wind that Scandinavism needed. Tensions had started to relax in 1912, and when the three kings met in Malmö in 1914, it was the start of a new era for Scandinavian cooperation.⁵⁴ However, when the war ended, the term Scandinavism and the new term «Nordism» adopted. Nordism, which will be referred to as the Nordic Idea in this thesis, built upon cultural Scandinavism. However, the similarities ended here: the Nordic Idea was based on the notion that the countries were to an extent equals. Also, the Nordic Idea was more inclusive than Scandinavism had ever been: in addition to Denmark, Sweden and Norway, it embraced Finland, Iceland and the associated territories Åland, Greenland and the Faeroe Islands.

⁵¹ Hemstad, *Fra Indian Summer til nordisk vinter*, 257.

⁵² *Ibid*, 369.

⁵³ Roald Berg, *Norge på egen hånd 1905-1920*, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1995), 72-80

⁵⁴ Roald Berg, "Nordisk samarbeid, 1914-1918", *Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies*, Info 4, (1997), 8-9.

The 1920s proved a difficult period for the Nordic Idea, with old conflicts and grudges coming back to life. Some argued that Norway would gain nothing through better connections with their Nordic neighbours. In the decade after 1905, Norway's politics had focused upon defending their spoils from the break of the union with Sweden.⁵⁵ This made any connection with Sweden difficult, though the Swedes had reappointed themselves the sole promoter of cooperation between the Nordic countries. The Norwegians attitude lasted well into the 1930s, but still, the Nordic countries managed to grow a little closer, largely due to the economic crisis that emerged in 1929 and the fear of a Second World War.⁵⁶ In 1939 Mauritz Enander, the editor of the journal *Mellanfolkligt samarbete*, published his article 'Den nordiska tanken i praktisk tillämpning', which discussed the many meetings that had occurred between different professions, such as teachers, worker's unions and farmers, from the Nordic countries.⁵⁷ In his article, Enander argued that the Nordic Idea had become popular in the Nordic countries because it could be used as a tool to support each other when needed.⁵⁸ The Swedish wish to help the Norwegians during the Second World War might have arisen from this idea, but as the Norwegians refused any form of Nordic cooperation, there should not have been any reason for the Swedish to actually help. However, it can be argued that the Swedish wanted to help because it was felt, as Byström argues, that it was their duty to help, even if their attempts to help might be met with resistance.⁵⁹

During the Second World War a strong nationalism emerged in Sweden that embraced the ideas of the Nordic countries sharing a history, language and culture, with the Swedish students being its main users. In a time when two of the Nordic countries were occupied, a third joining the war on Germany's side and Sweden in the middle of these events, the Swedish students used the Nordic Idea to support its Nordic neighbours. That the Swedish students used the Nordic Idea, can be demonstrated through, Arne Haugh, a Norwegian student in Lund, who stated in March 1942 that «it is of immense value for the Norwegians to know that the brother population on the other side of Kjölen, understands them and their battle for freedom and independence».⁶⁰ Haugh had a year earlier argued that the Nordic

⁵⁵ Roald Berg, "Nordisk samarbeid, 1914-1918", 14.

⁵⁶ Svein Olav Hansen, *Drømmen om Norden: den norske Foreningen Norden og det nordiske samarbeidet 1919-1994*, (Oslo: Ad Notam Gyldendal, 1994), 56-57.

⁵⁷ Maurtiz Enander, "Den nordiska tanken i praktisk tillämpning", in *Mellanfolkligt samarbete: tidskrift utgiven av Informationsbyrå för fredsfrågor och mellanfolkligt samarbete*, Volume Number 9, (1939), 271-276.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 271.

⁵⁹ Byström, *En broder, gäst och parasit*, 78.

⁶⁰ Arne Haugh, "Norsk mentalitet og svensk-norsk forståelse", *Lundagård*, Volume Number 23, No.4, 23 March 1942.

countries had to fight for a unified and free North, because «Together we will stand, apart we will fall».⁶¹ It has to be noted that Haugh's arguments were not representative for the students in Oslo, since he had been influenced by his Swedish colleagues use of the Nordic Idea. It will be argued throughout this thesis that this usage of the Nordic Idea would be the reason for why the student newspapers and daily newspapers showed support to the Norwegian students and professors, because as Philip Houm, a lecturer in Litterateur in Sweden, stated as early as May 1940 «it is in Sweden that the Nordic Idea lives the freest and the clearest».⁶² The Nordic Idea used in this thesis is therefore from a Swedish viewpoint, and not representative for the other Nordic countries.

The development of the Nordic Idea clearly shows that it is of importance to link the idea to its origin, because only this way one can truly understand why the Swedish student newspapers and daily newspapers used this idea to react towards the infringements committed against the University of Oslo during the Second World War. There is however, another concept of the Nordic Idea, which has to be looked into: the German Nordic Idea. This has been included in the discussion so as to exclude it in the analysis.

2.1.2 The German Nordic Idea/ pangermanism

The idea of pangermanism emerged in Scandinavia in the 1830s, simultaneously with Scandinavism. While Scandinavism argued for closer relations, even a political union, between the Scandinavian countries, pangermanism argued for closer relations between Germany and the Nordic countries. With Hitler's rise to power in 1933, pangermanism became a part of Heinrich Himmler's Schutzstaffel (SS) rhetoric and eventually a part of the ideology of the German National Socialism.⁶³ The German pangermanism and the Scandinavian pangermanism soon separated and took on different outlooks. The German pangermanism embraced the National Socialist idea of race and biology, claiming that the Germanic (or Nordic race) was superior to all others and that in order to preserve this «pure» race, the Germanic peoples had to be united into one state, «Das grossgermanische Reich».⁶⁴ The idea about race and purity of blood set the German pangermanism apart from the

Note: Kjölen was a word commonly used for the mountains that creates a natural division between Norway and Sweden. Kunnskapsforlaget papirleksikon, *Kjølen- Høydedrag*, Store Norske Leksikon, 14-02.2009, <http://snl.no/Kj%C3%B8len/h%C3%B8ydedrag> (24.04.2012).

⁶¹ Arne Haugh, "Et enig og fritt Norden", *Lundagård*, Volume Number 22, No.4, 22 March 1941.

⁶² Philip Houm, "Håll den nordiska tanken levande", *Gaudeamus*, Volume Number 17, No.5, May 1940.

⁶³ Øystein Sørensen, *Hitler eller Quisling?: ideologisk brytninger i Nasjonal Samling 1940-1945*, (Oslo: Cappelen, 1989), 46.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 47

Scandinavian pangermanism, which was built on the idea of relations based on a cultural dividend; the word «blood» had no place in the Scandinavian pangermanistic rhetoric. Before the Second World War, the Scandinavian pangermanism led Swedish and Norwegian intellectuals to seek relationships with their German counterparts, but during the war, the German pangermanism turned the same group away from any collaboration with Germany.

During the 1800s and well into the 1900s, German culture was treasured in Norway and Sweden for its language, science, art and its sophistication. Many students from Norway and Sweden travelled to Germany in order to benefit from the country's excellent university system and groundbreaking research. Scandinavian pangermanism emerged as an answer to this demand amongst Norway and Sweden for a closer relationship with Germany. This idea was embraced by Norway in particular, probably because many Norwegians felt no need for Norway to get any closer relations with the other Scandinavian countries. In 1872, the cultural leader Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson stated that only through Germany would Norway have a future.⁶⁵ On the other hand, the Swedish admiration for Germany was based on admiration of its culture, language and research. Interestingly, Denmark did not admire Germany the same way as Norway and Sweden. This was because of the Danish-German war in 1864. Compared to the admiration Sweden and Norway had for Germany, Denmark saw Germany as a threat to the country's independence and integrity.⁶⁶

The affinity towards Germany and German culture continued to play an important role in Sweden even after the First World War. When Hitler came to power in 1933, some individuals, such as Professor Karl Olivecrona at Lund University, started supporting the new ideas presented by the Nazis. Not all of Germany's Swedish supporters were admirers of Hitler's ideas, but a great affinity for the old Germany remained. It would be easy to argue that the Swedish government succumbed to the German demands during the war, due to this historic affinity, but the decision to do so was rather based on a fear of an German invasion if their demands were not met. Germany's ideological transformation weakened much of the Swedish attraction to Germany, and the affinity for the Nordic Idea grew.

The Norwegian attraction to the German Nordic Idea was strengthened by some of NS's ministers', such as Minister Sverre Riisnæs, wanted closer relations with the German occupational force. The nationalistic ideology had been prominent in NS since 1933, but with

⁶⁵ Øystein Sørensen, "Drømmen om det storgermanske rike: Pangermanismen i Norge ca.1850-1945", in *Jakten på Germania: Fra nordensvermeri til SS-arkeologi*, ed. by Terje Emberland and Jorunn Sem Fure, (Oslo: Humanist Forlag, 2009), 65.

⁶⁶ Knut Are Tvedt and Morten Moi, *Den dansk-tyske krig*, Store Norske Leksikon, 16.03.2009, http://snl.no/den_dansk-tyske_krig (03.05.2012).

the invasion of Germany in April 1940, a pangermanism that argued for a unification with Germany got an influential position within NS. This was not the same pangermanism that Bjørnson had supported, because as already argued, it was a pangermanism that embraced the Nationalist Socialists' ideas about race and biology.

2.2. Theory: Discourse Analysis

Before a review of the use of discourse analysis in this thesis, an examination of what a discourse analysis entails is of great consequence. It is often said that no one can dictate how a person should think, talk or act, but in fact the social codes of society and its different groups greatly affect the individual's way of thinking, talking and acting. Such socially and culturally guidelines are neither universal nor are they natural.⁶⁷ But after a while these guidelines become norm, and are reflected in the language and writing of a text; it becomes a discourse. In other words, a discourse is a way of thinking; a pattern or a context in which to interpret the world. Discourse can be found in all situations, because every group has its way of thinking. A person who is left wing oriented thinks in completely different terms than a right wing oriented person. It is, however, impossible to map out every existing discourse there is, because they differ from situation to situation. What can be done is to make use of a discourse analysis to find how certain expressions and genres have been communicated to create a point of view.⁶⁸ These can direct both the writing and the reading of a text, as well as targeting a particular audience. For example, a journalist can assume that the reader of an article about stock market can assume that the reader knows the meaning of the different terms used, such as «commodity exchanges», «shares» and «liquidity». If such text norms are not followed, the text will not be viewed as meaningful or relevant. Also, discourses change over time; most texts written today will probably not be held as important 100 years ahead, because by then, new discourses have been created and with them, new text norms.⁶⁹

The discourse which surrounds a group determines how and why a text is written, but the context in which the text is written is just as important. A context is the situation, the society and the world which surrounds, has surrounded or will surround a text.⁷⁰ Further, it is possible to distinguish between cultural context, situational context and textual context. The first, cultural context, is the general cultural environment in which a text is written. The

⁶⁷ Yngve Benestad Hågvar, *Å forstå avisa: innføring i praktisk presseanalyse*, (Bergen: Fagbokforlag, 2007), 18.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 20.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 25.

⁷⁰ Ibid, 30.

second, cultural context, is the situation the text is read in at any given moment. This means that the text was in a different context when it was written than it is when it read today. When considering newspaper articles, it is crucial to know the importance a text was regarded with in the media at the time it was published. Whether the newspaper was alone in writing about a certain subject or not, gives an inclination of the perceived importance of the subject by the journalists of the time. Also important as a situational context was the reception of an article by its readers; but because many years have passed since the publishing of the articles used in this thesis, it is difficult to know how they were received. In terms of situational context, then, it is better to analyse the amount of articles written about the events at the University of Oslo during the Second World War, and conclude from this how important the subject was for the Swedish students or the daily newspapers. When analysing an article from a newspaper it is important to choose a situational context in which to analyse the text. The third, textual context, regards the text's relation to other texts which fall within the same discourse. This context determines how a text is written and whether it will be received by the members of the discourse as meaningful and relevant.

How then, has the discourse analysis been used in this thesis? As mentioned in the introduction the discourse analysis was brought in to see how and why the student papers and daily newspapers reacted to the events at University of Oslo, but before the analysis is carried out it is of great importance to determine the discourse the sources is part of. This thesis's main source is the newspaper (student union meeting records not included). The student newspapers and daily newspapers fall under the journalistic discourse, and what is interesting about this discourse is how the journalists employ society's discourses to write for a certain audience. Is it possible to see a difference between the students use of the academic discourse compared to the daily newspapers use of other discourses in the society? It becomes crucial to try and find these discourses, because through them it will be possible to find out who the writer was directing his article to, whether it was a scientist or the government. It is possible that some of the newspapers used fall under a certain political discourse, such as being pro-German or anti-German. Possibly the student newspapers could fall under these discourses as well, but pro- or anti-German leanings are more pronounced in the daily newspapers. This thesis has chosen three very different daily newspapers that are diverse, so that it will be possible to get a more varied take on events.

The social context plays a crucial part in how and why a text is written. Yet, the context in which the student papers and daily newspapers wrote was manifold. The articles used for this thesis were written in a context where NS or the German occupational force had

violated the academic freedom of the University of Oslo, but they were also written in the context of a Europe at war and German demands to the Swedish neutrality. This certainly influenced how the articles were worded, and how they eventually would be received by their readers. An example of a badly received article could be Lundagård's article about the arrest of Rector Didrik Arup Seip in September 1941. Students at Uppsala University and Stockholm University College were disappointed because of this article. The article was branded as supporting the German occupational force's violation of the university, and was not considered meaningful or relevant in a climate of support for the Norwegian students and academics.⁷¹

The discourse analysis has been used as a tool for finding the common denominators (the Swedish government's politics or the Nordic Idea?) which determined why the two groups reacted to the events at the University of Oslo during the war. Subsequently, these findings have been used to determine the differences in the reactions of the student newspapers and the daily newspapers. The use of discourse analyse has made it clear that the Nordic Idea was present, directly or indirectly, in the Swedish reactions to the events in Oslo. Some critics discourse analysis argue that it is impossible for a persons every move to be determined by discourse, but for this thesis discourse analysis has been a crucial tool for determining the differences between the two groups of newspapers.

⁷¹ This will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 3, under-chapter 3.2.2.

Chapter 3: «Dignity, Peace and Discipline. The opposite will harm us all»⁷²

September 1940 – September 1941.

The focus of this chapter will be the Swedish reactions to the dissolution of the student union at the University of Oslo, DNS, in September 1940 and the arrest of Rector Didrik Arup Seip in September 1941. These events took place on the directions of the German occupational force.

The Swedish government had feared a German invasion ever since Norway and Denmark were invaded in April 1940. Due to this fear, it is of interest to see whether the Swedish student newspapers and daily newspapers considered the German occupational force or NS to have disciplined the University of Oslo in September 1940 and September 1941. Is it possible to detect a change in who was perceived to have violated the university in the year separating these two events? Did the Swedish government's relations with the German government and the Norwegian exile government have an impact on whom the student newspapers and the daily newspapers portrayed as the prosecutor?

It is of importance to keep in mind the main questions of this thesis. Is it possible to detect a difference between the student newspapers' and daily newspapers' coverage of these two events? Were there any similarities? These events were the first events at the University of Oslo that the Swedish student newspapers and daily newspaper mentioned since the invasion of Norway. How did the Nordic Idea manifest itself?

3.1 The Student Union at the University of Oslo is dismantled

On September 21, 1940, DNS held a meeting where the ideas of creating a Norwegian front against NS and the occupational force, were to be discussed.⁷³ The 70 year old Dr. Johan Scharffenberg held a speech about the bold decisions made by King Haakon in 1905 and 1940 respectively; the first being his decision to become king of Norway, the second his refusal to submit to the German demands for his abdication.⁷⁴ Approximately 600 students attended the

⁷² This parole was formulated by the student leaders and Rector Didrik Arup Seip, and would be displayed in lecture halls and auditoriums for several years. Jorunn Sem Fure, 123

⁷³ NS had been founded upon the idea that the Norwegian society had to «find new life in the national foundation». With the national foundation NS meant the Norwegian heritage, i.e. Norse history, Harald Fairhaire, and other characters from Medieval history such as Olav the Holy. The idea was that through the use of history and old national symbols, NS would arouse national feelings within the Norwegian peoples, and eventually create a national unity. DNS Norwegian front wanted to differ from NS national unity. Sørensen, *Hitler eller Quisling?*, 27-28.

⁷⁴ Jorunn Sem Fure, *Universitetet i kamp 1940-1945*, (Oslo: Vidarforlag, 2007), 115.

meeting, and Scharffenberg's speech was very popular. The meeting was a success because it showed that the dominant student groups were against the German occupation of Norway.⁷⁵ That the meeting had discussed political questions harmonised with the idea in which the union had been created under in 1813.

DNS had been established in 1813, with the goal of creating an arena where students could discuss the on-goings at the university, but also political events in Norway and abroad.⁷⁶ By the 1930s there were a variety of organisations and groups at the university which gave the students plenty of opportunities to express their political opinions, but the union had not lost its place as the main podium for political discussion.⁷⁷ The discussions at DNS were influenced by the fact that many of the groupings represented in DNS were either oriented to the far left or the far right. The Marxist oriented group «Mot Dag» won most of the discussions at the student union, largely due to their debating technique, and their knack for mobilisation, which was made easier by the positions that members of Mot Dag held in different organisations, offices and editorials.⁷⁸ Mot Dag's dominance made DNS less attractive for other political groups. In the autumn of 1933 a few groups, including NS student group, mobilised to overthrow Mot Dag from its leading position within the student union. This move was unsuccessful, but a similar mobilisation managed to create a more diverse DNS in 1936. However, the fascist views held by the NS students did not get a prominent

The consequence of Haakon, by birth Prince Carl of Denmark, becoming king of Norway in 1905 was that it alienated the Swedish royal house and government. Another problem was that there was always the fear that other governments might not recognise Norway's new-found independence; the German government and Kaiser, were at first unwilling to recognise Norway's independence. Prince Carl and his wife Maud, daughter of the British king, were chosen because it was hoped that a connection with Great Britain could be beneficial for Norway. In Chapter 2, it was argued that the split of the union between Norway and Sweden in 1905 harmed the work concerning Scandinavism. Andreas Kolle, "Tysklands reaksjoner på unionsoppløsningen mellom Norge og Sverige", in *Norsk-tyske forbindelser gjennom hundre år: Ikke bare laks og pølser: bok til utstillingen*, published by Bernd Henningsen, edited by Frauke Stuhl and Jan Hecker-Stampehl, (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2005), 74-76

⁷⁵ Sem Fure, *Universitetet i kamp*, 115.

⁷⁶ The union was concerned with political happenings abroad. In November 1938 DNS arranged a meeting concerning the happenings which had occurred during the night between November 9 and 10 in Germany, the November pogrom. Before this meeting, an appeal had been made that urged students and academics in all European countries to express their aversion to any form of racism and intolerance in their own countries. The appeal argued that tolerance and respect for other human beings beliefs was fundamental to any academic work. Even though DNS was seen as Mot Dag's own personal propaganda distributor, the union did create debate amongst academics, and the importance of the student union can be clearly seen in how NS saw it as crucial to control it. The union was seen as the ideal place to recruit new members, but as already mentioned above, the NS had to find other arenas to recruit its members and distribute its propaganda. Sem Fure, *Universitetet i kamp*, 63-65

⁷⁷ Sem Fure, *Universitetet i kamp*, 63.

⁷⁸ Sem Fure, *Universitetet i kamp*, 63.

place in the student union. These political views had to be expressed at other platforms than DNS.

John Sannes was elected president of DNS during the autumn of 1940, and his goal for the union was to create an organisation where all groups and organisations, except NS, were represented. By the autumn of 1940 Norway had been occupied for about six months, and even though there was as of yet no organised resistance movement, people had started to silently resist the German advances, and DNS was no exception. The new board of DNS, with Sannes as president, spoke of creating a Norwegian front, that would differ from NS's idea of a national unity. As stated above, a meeting was held on September 21, 1940. The outcome of this meeting was devastating; Sannes and Scharffenberg were arrested and the student union was dissolved by the German occupational force. Jorunn Sem Fure argues that this meeting has been recognised as one of the important events in DNS's history. That 600 students attended the meeting demonstrates the importance of the meeting within the student population at the university.⁷⁹

The Swedish students reacted to these violations. In November 1940, *Gaudeamus'* editorial stated that «The Norwegian students, who we see as our close friends and colleagues, have been discriminated against, because of their decision to protect Norway's political and cultural independence».⁸⁰ Further on, *Gaudeamus* reported that «It is to the Norwegian students' imperishable honour that they have not thrown out their ideals for some temporary advantages». *Gaudeamus'* statement was followed up in *Lundagård*, with Per Eckerberg, a left-wing student at Lund University, stating that the Norwegian students' honour was undefiled because of their reluctance to surrender to the threat which was presented by the arrest of Sannes and Scharffenberg.⁸¹ On October 19, 1940, doctoral student Eva Wennerström-Hartmann stated in *Ergo* that «No one can argue that the events do not concern us».⁸² That the dissolution of DNS would concern the Swedish students was not surprising, considering that the students had created good relations with the Norwegian students through pursuing the Nordic Idea. With the invasion of Norway and Denmark the Nordic Idea had gained new meaning, because it became even more important to protect the idea of a Nordic bond founded upon a common language, history and culture. As the sole promoters of the Nordic Idea, the Swedish students saw the dissolution of DNS as a blow against the future

⁷⁹ Sem Fure, *Universitetet i kamp*, 115.

⁸⁰ Editorial, "Oslo-Lund", *Gaudeamus*, Volume Number 17, No.7, November 1940.

⁸¹ Per Eckerberg, "Nationellt och internationellt", *Lundagård*, Volume Number 19, No.8, 9 November 1940.

⁸² Eva Wennerström-Hartmann, "Erinran", *Ergo*, Volume Number 17, No. 9 and 10, 19 October 1940.

relations between the Nordic countries. Yet, with the opposition that the Norwegian students had formed against the new regime, there was still a hope that the relations between Norway and Sweden would be possible to rebuild after the war, because as Gaudeamus stated «they (Norwegian students) could win the whole world, but not forfeit their souls».⁸³ It is clear that the Swedish students saw the dissolution of DNS as important, but to whom did the Swedish students believe that the Norwegian students were not losing their soul? Did they see NS or the German occupational force as the aggressors?

Wennerström-Hartmann stated that DNS had been dissolved because of «demonstrations and organised resistance towards NS».⁸⁴ Gaudeamus reasoned that Quisling had seen no other option than to dissolve the student union, because threats about arrests and regulations had not had an effect upon the student population.⁸⁵ Sverker Oredsson has argued that Eckerberg stated in clear text that it was the Germans that had violated the University of Oslo's student union; but an examination of Eckerberg's article reveals that he never stated whether he believed NS or the Germans to be the perpetrators.⁸⁶ It can be reasoned that Oredsson builds his argument upon the assumption that Eckerberg meant the German occupational force, which is interesting since Oredsson stated simultaneously that Lund University published a text from the Swedish news agency Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå (the daily newspapers news agency, T.T) that the students union in Oslo had been dissolved because it had opposed NS.⁸⁷ Due to this text from T.T it is feasible to reason that Eckerberg meant NS also. Is it possible that the reason why the Swedish students did not mention the occupational force was because of the Swedish government's fear of a German invasion?

The Germans never had any specific plans about invading Sweden, because they thought it best that Sweden stayed neutral. However, the Swedish government fear of an invasion was present, and in the months after the invasion of Denmark and Norway, the Swedish government adopted a form of policies adjusted to Berlin's warfare. In order to stay neutral, the Swedish government saw that it had to give in to some of the demands presented by the government in Berlin. This was made clear when, as the war in Norway was concluded

⁸³ Editorial, "Oslo-Lund", *Gaudeamus*, Volume Number 17, No.7, November 1940.

Note: The student paper extracted this statement from the Bible, Mark's Gospel 8:34 «For what will it profit a man if he gains the whole world, and loses his own soul?» Biblegateway, *the Bible, Mark's Gospel 8:34*, Biblegateway, <http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Mark+8%3A34-9%3A1&version=NKJV> (23.04.2012).

⁸⁴ Eva Wennerström-Hartmann, "Erinran", *Ergo*, Volume Number 17, No. 9 and 10, 19 October 1940

⁸⁵ Editorial, "Oslo-Lund", *Gaudeamus*, Volume Number 17, No.7, November 1940.

⁸⁶ Oredsson, *Lunds universitetet under andra världskriget*, 100-101.

⁸⁷ Oredsson, *Lund universitet under andra världskriget*, 100.

during the summer of 1940, the Swedish government permitted the German government the use of the Swedish railway system to transport German soldiers to Norway.⁸⁸ In Chapter 1 it was mentioned that to stay neutral the Swedish government urged the press to show care when writing about the war, so as to avoid that foreign governments felt that they were criticised or that Sweden's neutrality was brought into questioning.⁸⁹

It is therefore feasible that in not mentioning that it was the German occupational force that had dissolved the students' union, the students had taken into consideration the government's request to show care when writing about the war. Indirectly this gives an indication of the influence the government had upon how the student newspapers wrote about the events in Oslo. Even Oredsson argues that the students at Lund University had supported the government's submissive politics towards the German government in the first years of the war.⁹⁰ Yet, if the students had followed the government's policies rigorously, then there would not have been any comment about the dissolution of the student union in Oslo; for if one is to take into account Jörgen Weibull's argument that the Germans in Stockholm commented on any article critical of either Germany and its allies, then the student newspapers were in danger of aggravating the Germans when they wrote of the events at the University of Oslo, since NS and Quisling was under German control.⁹¹ Interestingly, Jens Schive argues that the Germans did not care for the criticism of NS in the Swedish press. Yet, the outcome of this meant that many Swedes started to believe that the German occupational force in Norway was well behaved, whereas NS was the aggressors.⁹²

In this subchapter it has been argued that the Swedish students reactions to the dissolution of DNS was based upon the idea that it was the honour of the Norwegian students that they had not given in to the threats from NS or the German occupational force. It was also argued that the Swedish students had blamed NS for the dissolution of DNS, even though it had been the occupational force. That the Swedish daily newspapers did not comment on this

⁸⁸ This transportation of soldiers began when the war ended in Norway in the summer of 1940. This transportation would not cease before September 1943, and by then approximately two million German soldiers had been transported through Sweden. This transportation would damage the relationship between the Swedish government and the Norwegian exile government. Wilhelm Carlgren, "Svensk-norska regeringsrelationer under andra världskriget", in *Broderfolk i ufredstid: Norsk-svenske forbindelser under annen verdenskrig*, ed., by Stig Ekman and Ole Kristian Grimnes, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1991), 47-48.

⁸⁹ Gilmour, *Sweden, the Swastika and Stalin*, 159.

⁹⁰ Oredsson, *Lunds universitet under andra världskriget*, 147.

⁹¹ Weibull, "Censur och opinionsutveckling", 142

⁹² Minister Jens Schive, "Sverige og Norge", in *Norges krig 1940-1945*, Volume II, ed., by Sverre Steen, (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1948), 360.

event gives an indication of what was seen as important for the two groups of newspapers. In the following subchapter it will be demonstrated that the differences between the newspapers will be more unclear, and the similarities more prominent.

3.2 The arrest of Rector Didrik Arup Seip

Didrik Arup Seip was born August 31 1884 in Østfold. Seip became interested in the Norwegian language quite early, especially dialects. In 1911 he finished his last exam in language history, and went on to pursue a career in research.⁹³ In 1937, Seip was elected as rector at the University of Oslo, and three years later Germany invaded Norway. Seip was one of a few men that were appointed to be a part of the Administrasjonsråd, a council given the task of easing the Norwegian people into the occupation. This council had been established by the Supreme Court to take care of the Norwegian people's interests during the occupation. Before the Administrasjonsråd was dissolved on September 25, 1940, Rector Seip had been responsible for the Department of Church and Education. His role on this council did not mean that Seip supported the Germans. On the contrary, he was seen as a man of resistance, and one would speak of «the spirit of Seip». When the Administrasjonsråd was dissolved Seip went back to leading the university through the difficult war situation. This was not an easy job, but with the parole «Dignity, Peace and Discipline. The opposite will harm us all», Seip managed to keep the university under control.⁹⁴

Joseph Terboven was, however, not pleased with Seip's control over the university, and on September 11, 1941 Seip was arrested. The day before, a strike at the city harbour had led to the declaration of a state of emergency, and the two workers' union leaders Viggo Hansteen and Rolf Wickstrøm were executed.⁹⁵ The next day, the students and professors at the university were summoned for a meeting in the Assembly Hall where the minister of the Church and Education Department, Ragnar Skancke, was to give an orientation about the

⁹³ Trygve Knudsen, with introduction to *Didrik Arup Seip: En bibliografi*, by John Tueld, (Oslo: Bymålslaget, 1981), 9.

⁹⁴ Note: After the Administrasjonsråd had been dissolved, the university experienced a few interventions from the newly appointed ministers. In September 1940 DNS was dissolved, and in October the same year, Ragnar Skancke, the newly appointed minister of the Department of Church and Education, appointed three professors that had clear links with NS. The three were: Adolf Hoel, professor in the Arctic countries' geography, Gudmund Schnitler, History, and Herman Harris Aall, Law. Sem Fure, *Universitetet i kamp*, 126

⁹⁵ Note: A state of emergency can be declared if the government or a military authority, fears that the inner and outer security of the country is in danger because of war, revolt or other extraordinary conditions. A state of emergency also means that the government has the authority to introduce measures that challenges the laws, such as censorship, limitation in the freedom of speech, movement and assembling. Individuals that are seen as a threat can also be arrested without cause. Ole T.Berg, *Unntakstilstand*, Store Norske Leksikon, 15.02.2009, <http://snl.no/unntakstilstand>, (26.03.2012).

situation Oslo was in. When the students and professors entered the hall, German soldiers and police officers were lined up along the walls.⁹⁶

SS- Sturmbannführer Dr. Werner Knab, the leader of the Gestapo in Norway, was the first to speak on behalf of the Höhrerer SS – und Polizeiführer Wilhelm Rediess.⁹⁷ After a long and aggressive speech where he demonstrated his furry over the Norwegian ill will that was shown towards the German generosity, he dismissed the rector and the Academic Collegiums.⁹⁸ Skancke had been given the authority to act as rector, and after the speech by Dr. Knab, Skancke addressed the attendees with the statement «It is a University's task to illuminate the ideas of truth for the people».⁹⁹ The ideas of truth in which Skancke was referring to, was represented by Dr. Knab and the German soldiers. How did the Swedish students and daily newspapers react to this second blow against the University of Oslo? Almost a year had passed since DNS had been dissolved and its president arrested. Had the sentiments of who were to be blamed for the violations changed? How did the Swedish daily newspapers, which had not reported about DNS, write about the events, and was the students newspapers, influenced by how the daily newspapers wrote about the events in Oslo or did they, still follow the policy of the government? In Chapter 2 it was mentioned that the article concerning the arrest of Rector Seip was not received well by the student population at Lund University, because of the article's pro-German outlook. The editorial had since it was elected in November 1941 been accused of being pro-German. Was the editorial pro-German, and if not, why had the article been published? Is it possible to argue that the editorial had been accused of being pro-German by its opponents at Lund University?

⁹⁶ Sem Fure, *Universitetet i kamp*, 150.

⁹⁷ Sem Fure, *Universitetet i kamp*, 150.

⁹⁸ Ibid, 149- 151.

⁹⁹ Ibid, 150.

3.2.1 A reaction

«The University has failed the Germans», a heading in *Dagens Nyheter* read on September 12, 1941.¹⁰⁰ This indicates that the daily newspaper was aware about who had made the arrest in Oslo. The article that followed contained a detailed article of what had taken place in Oslo; that the rector had been overthrown and Academic Collegiums dissolved, and that both Dr. Knab and Skancke had held individual speeches. The exact same article was printed in *GHT* and *Arbetet*. It was stated that Knab had said that Terboven had expected to find individuals with an intellectual understanding at the university, but that this had not been the case.¹⁰¹ The excerpt from Skancke's speech included the statement that «I have to urge the university's students and teachers to become aware of the responsibility the university has in guiding the Norwegian people».¹⁰² Skancke's statement was in complete accordance with Dr. Knab's proclamation that «A student that will not cooperate, opts out for the rest of his or hers life». That *Dagens Nyheter* had such a strong heading, and that *Arbetet* wrote this strongly about the event, does not coincide with arguments that the two newspapers did not take a firm stand against Germany before 1942/1943. It is feasible that the daily newspapers wrote about the arrest because of the pro-Norwegian opposition that had emerged in Sweden as a result of the shootings of Hansteen and Wickström, and the arrest of Rector Seip in Oslo.¹⁰³ There is no direct connection between the emergence of the pro-Norwegian opposition and the articles in the daily newspapers, but it can be reasoned that since the Swedish daily newspapers wrote about the shootings as well as the arrest of Rector Seip, they were helping to enhance the importance of the pro-Norwegian opposition. The fact that the daily newspapers did not themselves comment on the arrest of Rector Seip can give an indication that the newspapers were hoping that the publishing of excerpts from the speeches would allow the Swedish population themselves interpret what was event in Norway.

The pro-Norwegian opposition was also an answer to the Swedish government's attitude towards the Norwegian exile government. In deciding in 1940 that the only way to

¹⁰⁰ »Universitetet svek tyska förväntningar», *Dagens Nyheter*, No.247, 12 September 1941.

¹⁰¹ »Norska organisationer upplöses av tyskarna», *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, No.210, 12 September 1941.

¹⁰² »Oslo-universitetets rektor, professor Seip, entledigad», *Arbetet*, Volume Number 55, No.210, 12 September 1941.

¹⁰³ Note: The pro-Norwegian opposition had its base within the anti-German opposition in Sweden, with the daily newspaper *Trots Allt!*, and the organisations *Kämpande Demokrati* and *Nordens Frithet* as its sole promoters. The opposition opposed the Swedish government's submissive attitude towards the German government and its hostile move towards the Norwegian exile government. It claimed to be the protectors of the Norwegian people's interests. Louise Drangel, *Den kämpande demokratin: En studie i antinazistisk opinionsrörelse 1935-1945*, (Stockholm: LiberFörlag, 1976).

keep neutral was to succumb to German demands, the Swedish government had alienated the Norwegian exile government. The Norwegian exile government had never proposed for the Swedish government to enter the war on the Allies side, but the exiled government had hoped that the Swedish government would be receptive of any Norwegian wishes. Issues such as the transit of German soldiers through Sweden, the Norwegian ships in Gothenburg, the diplomatic representation through an envoy and the Norwegian government's decision to cut all contact with Finland, who had entered the war on Germany's side, made the relations between the Swedish and Norwegian government drop to such a low point that it was said that not even peace would repair the relations.¹⁰⁴ These bad relations were probably the reason why the Swedish Prime Minister, Per Albin Hansson, and the Foreign Minister, Christian Günther in Sweden, feared a pro-Norwegian opposition; it was impossible to predict what the German reaction would be if the Swedish population started criticising the German warfare. Germany had several interests in Sweden, most importantly the ore supply (crucial for the German metal production), and the transportation of soldiers to Norway. Therefore, the Germans wanted the Swedes to stay positive to the German warfare in both Europe and Norway. Yet, the Swedish government did not view the German interest in Sweden as positive, but rather as a threat. Therefore, when the Swedish national organisation for workers' unions published a strongly worded letter concerning the executions of the two workers' union leaders in Oslo, the two ministers tried to stop the statement. However, the effort was fruitless, because the BBC managed to get hold of the letter and broadcasted it all over the world.¹⁰⁵

Whereas the student newspapers had reacted to the dissolution of DNS in September 1940 because of their academic relations to the Norwegian students, the daily newspapers reacted to the events of September 1941, because a pro-Norwegian opposition had emerged in Sweden. This opposition claimed to protect the interest of the Norwegians and their desire for

¹⁰⁴ Note: When Germany invaded Norway, there were Norwegian ships anchored up in Gothenburg that both the Norwegian government in London and the German occupational force in Norway wanted. The first five ships sailed from Gothenburg on January 1942, but they were sunk by the Germans. In March 1942 ten more ships sailed from Gothenburg, and of these ten, two reached Great Britain, three returned to Sweden and the rest were sunk and its crew were arrested by the Germans, in total 227 individuals.

Note: The diplomatic representation was a tense issue between the two governments. A Swedish envoy at the Norwegian government was not appointed before May 1943, and a Norwegian envoy at the Swedish government was not appointed before December 1943. Carlgren "Svensk-norska regeringsrelationer under andra världskriget", in *Broderfolk i ofredstid*, 40 and 48-50.

¹⁰⁵ Alf W. Johansson, *Per Albin och kriget: samlingsregeringen och utrikespolitiken under andra världskriget*, (Stockholm: Tiden, 1984), 285.

a free and peaceful Norway, built upon the Nordic Idea.¹⁰⁶ Did the Swedish students argue from a pro-Norwegian oppositional point of view? It has to be reasoned that the student newspapers had in September 1940, not argued from a oppositional point of view since they supported the government's careful politics, but certainly from a pro-Norwegian standpoint due to mentioning of the Nordic Idea. In September 1941 *Ergo* would continue to argue from a pro-Norwegian point of view after September 1941, but then with a more oppositional streak. *Gaudeamus* would be at first be hindered by its student union to make a comment, and in *Lundagård* the initial purpose of the article in January 1942 had been to argue from a pro-Norwegian standpoint, but was hindered by a publisher that wanted to follow the Swedish government's careful politics. The student newspaper *Ergo* was the first to make a comment.

In its issue on September 20, 1941, *Ergo* published an interesting article concerned with the arrest of Rector Seip. The writer Ingemar Hedenius argued that it was difficult to know whether it had been the German occupational force or NS that had issued the state of emergency and made the arrest of Rector Seip, because as the writer stated, the name Quisling had become the word for ambiguity.¹⁰⁷ Yet, the writer made clear that it had been the German occupational force that had announced the state of emergency and arrested of Rector Seip. Hedenius argued that the fight between Quisling and the Norwegian people had reached a new culmination point, and the Germans had therefore decided that they could not let Norwegian politicians get in the way of their efforts to control the population.¹⁰⁸ What the writer meant by Quisling's culmination point, and the German effort to get the Norwegian population under its control, is not explained, but it is possible that Hedenius meant Quisling's failure to suppress the Norwegian resistance movement, which had blossomed during 1941. It is feasible that Hedenius, in his statement about the German efforts to gain control of the population, referred to the German fear that the war would be decided in Norway. In case of an invasion from Great Britain, the German would need Norway to stay stable because no extra troops could be spared. Ohto Manninen argues that Hitler «feared that this country would be the object of a joint Anglo-Soviet assault», which caused him to order reinforcement of the troops in Norway and a strengthening of the coastal defences, so as to hinder an invasion.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, 285.

¹⁰⁷ Ingemar Hedenius, "Undantagstillståndet", *Ergo*, Volume Number 18, No.10, 20 September 1941.

¹⁰⁸ Ingemar Hedenius, "Undantagstillståndet", *Ergo*, Volume Number 18, No.10, 20 September 1941.

¹⁰⁹ Ohto Manninen, "Operation Barbarossa and the Nordic countries", in *Scandinavia during the Second the Second World War*, ed., by Henrik S. Nissen, translated by Thomas Munch-Petersen, (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 140

Hedenius continued to argue that the Swedish students had not been able to do anything for their «brother», i.e. the rector, in Norway. The fact that he used the word brother about the rector, demonstrates how the Nordic Idea was used during the war. The word brother was as a reference to the ideas that the Nordic countries were unified through a bond that was founded upon the idea of a common history, language and culture. As argued in Chapter 2, the Norwegian student Arne Haugh argued that it was of immense value to know that the «brother population» understood the Norwegians battle for freedom. The next sentence in Hedenius' article is even more interesting, because he argued that «In contrast to the Swedish workers, we are not able to formulate a protest in the form of an appeal to our German colleagues' legal consciousness».¹¹⁰ «Where are now the great German student unions?» Hedenius enquired. The explanation to Hedenius' question lies in the fact that after Hitler's rise to power in 1933 the German universities had been purged of all Jewish and politically unwanted lecturers and students.¹¹¹ The universities had been reorganised after the Führer principle, which meant that the leader of a group or an organisation had the authority to make any decisions without the consent of the members in a group or organisation. Many students started as well to wear uniforms and many had become members of Nazi groups such as Sturm Abteilung (SA) and SS. It is therefore unlikely that the German students would have reacted to such a plea in a way that the Swedish students would find satisfying. On the contrary, it is feasible that the German students saw the arrest of the rector as the only way to execute the German political ideas upon the Norwegian population. With this article, Ergo had showed that they did not always follow the government's policy. It would however take a few months before it became clear where Gaudeamus stood on this issue. The reason it took almost six months before Gaudeamus commented the arrest of Rector Seip, was the indecisiveness of the student union at Stockholm University College.

In February 1942 the student union at Stockholm University College discussed what they should do in relation to the arrest of Rector Seip. It is mentioned in the meeting records that someone had contacted some political parties (it is not mentioned which ones) to ask how the students should react to such a violation. The advice that was given to the student union was that they should react in their own way, because, it was argued, a response for such a

¹¹⁰ Ingemar Hedenius, "Undantagstillståndet", *Ergo*, Volume Number 18, No.10, 20 September 1940.

¹¹¹ Jorunn Sem Fure, "Universitetenes struktur i Norge og Tyskland: Likheter, forskjeller og påvirkninger", in *Norsk-tyske forbindelser gjennom hundre år: Ikke bare laks og pølser: bok til utstillingen*, published by Bernd Henningsen, edited by Frauke Stuhl and Jan Hecker-Stampehl, (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2005): Heinrich August Winkler, Germany: *The Long Road West, Volume 2: 1933-1990*, Translated by Alexander J. Sager, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 27-28.

cause, would be more of a humanitarian reaction than a political one. However, the president of the union did state that it could be difficult for a third party to distinguish between a humanitarian and political protest, since a letter of protest had to be based upon the Nordic Idea.¹¹² Several members of the union agreed with the President. It was stated that «through such a remonstrance, it will eventually make it easier to bring the Norwegian and Finnish students together in the future». Yet, the discussion at Stockholm University College ended with the union not making any statement, because as it was argued «If the risk of being misinterpreted after making a statement was that great, it was better not making any protest at all».¹¹³ Who did the student union imagine the misinterpreted to be? It is feasible, considering the government's fear of a German invasion, that the student union believed that the Germans could misinterpret the protest as one of politics instead of humanitarianism. Even though the student union had decided that no statement was to be made due to the risk of it being misinterpreted, the student paper *Gaudeamus* published an article in March 1942 where it was argued that the students had waited for a statement on the arrest from higher instances, but that had never arrived.¹¹⁴ It is feasible that the student paper was referring to its own student union's unwillingness to make a statement on the issue, as well as the university's administration's silence.

In this subchapter it has been demonstrated that compared to the reactions to the dissolution of DNS in September 1940, both the Swedish daily newspapers and the student newspapers reacted to the arrest of Rector Seip. It has as well been demonstrated that the support of the Norwegian rector was shown through the pro-Norwegian opposition and the Nordic Idea. It was also argued that the student newspaper *Ergo* had a strongly written article by Ingemar Hedenius where it was made clear that it was the Germans that had made the arrest of the rector, and that *Gaudeamus* did not comment upon the arrest before March 1942. In the subchapter following, it will be looked at the article that was published in *Lundagård* in January 1942 and the accusations that the editorial publishing it was pro-German.

¹¹² Stockholm University College Student Union, “§17. Prof. Seip”, February 1942.

¹¹³ Stockholm University College Student Union, “§17. Prof. Seip”, February 1942.

¹¹⁴ “Spridda röster från Lund”, *Gaudeamus*, Volume Number 19, No. 2, March 1942.

3.2.2 Lundagård

In January 1942 Lundagård published perhaps the most controversial of all of the articles written about the arrest of Rector Didrik Arup Seip.

From Norway we have received an announcement which states that the Rector at Oslo University, Didrik A. Seip – who was dismissed on 12 September 1941 and brought to Grini concentration camp – has been sentenced to 30 days of water and bread in a dark cell. If this is true, then the “discipline” of the Norwegian academics and students has reached a new culmination point. We understand that the war creates measures that could seem hopelessly unnecessary. We are also able to conceive a sense of irritation over the passive resistance that has forced the government in Norway to send a number of students and academic teachers to concentration camps, as well as restricting the academic freedom. Yet, the mentality that can allow for the torture that the almost 60- year old rector is going through, will never create a reasonable reorganisation of the Norwegian society.¹¹⁵

In the previous subchapter the discussion was centred on the question of whether Ergo and Gaudeamus had argued that it had been the occupational force or NS that had arrested Rector Seip. The discussion in relation to Lundagård will be concentrated on the question of whether the editorial board that published the article about Rector Seip was pro-German or not. Was this article published because the editorial board was pro-German, or was the article merely an act of bad judgment? If the editorial board was not pro-German, where did the idea of it being pro-German originate from?

In the first hours after it had been elected in November 1941, the editorial board that was considered pro-German. This was due to a belief that the election had been a coup staged by Per Gunnar Nordin, a right wing student, and Eric Starfelt, the President of the Christian Society.¹¹⁶ The Christian Society was one of the strongest societies at Lund University when it came to memberships, and by aligning himself with Starfelt, Nordin had secured that during the election his nominated editorial board would be elected. On the day of the election, when the offices of the student union had been elected and the voting participants were few, Nordin saw his chance to nominate Sten Gagnér (Law), Bertil Nosslin (Medicin), Gudmund Smith (Philosophy), Magnhild Rydén (Philosophy) and Håkan Strömberg (Law) for the 1942 Lundagård editorial board.¹¹⁷ Did the election mean that the editorial board was pro-German?

¹¹⁵ ”Våra norska bröder”, *Lundagård*, Volume Number 23, Issue No.1, 30 January 1942.

¹¹⁶ Oredsson, *Lund universitet under andra världskriget*, 135.

¹¹⁷ Anna Alsmark, ”Krig och Fred i Lundagård”, in *Lundagård 75*, ed. by Anna Alsmark, Per Lindström, Petter Lönegård, Jan Mårtensson, Akademiska Föreningens Årsbok 1994, Lund, 73

Håkan Strömberg, a pro-Norwegian student, had been elected to be the leader of the editorial board, but he withdrew shortly after the election had been completed. Magnhild Rydén became his replacement. Strömberg's reason for withdrawing was because he had been put on the victorious editorial board's list without his consent. Further, Strömberg stated that the composition of an editorial board had to be homogeneous, and since the new editorial was in opposition to the pro-Norwegian and pro-Nordic ideas of the previous editorials, he had no other choice than to withdraw.¹¹⁸ Strömberg's argument that the new editorial board was in opposition to the previous editorial boards was to some extent true, because Gudmund Smith and Sten Gagnér had certain pro-German features. Smith was the son of chemistry Professor Lennart Smith at Lund University, who was known for his pro-German sentiments. Smith might have been influenced by his father, when he in 1939 supported the student union's decision to protest against the immigration of Jewish doctors from Germany. Gagnér was an acquaintance of Professor in procedural law, Karl Olivecrona, a lawyer, legal philosopher and supporter of Germany. Also, Gagnér wrote for the right-wing newspapers' *Den svenske folksocialisten*, and *Student Forum*.¹¹⁹ On the other hand, the other two members, Magnhild Rydén and Beril Nosslin, had no pro-German views. Rydén had been one of the few that had opposed the student union's decision to protest against the Jewish doctors.¹²⁰ It can therefore be argued that Rydén and Nosslin outweighed the sentiments held by Gagnér and Smit. Also, it is likely, as Oredsson argues, that the purpose with the editorial board was not to make the student newspaper pro-German, but rather to remove the strong anti-German, pro-Norwegian and left-wing sentiments that had influenced the student paper during the editorials of Ove Möller and Per Eckerberg.¹²¹ If this was the case, why then, had the editorial board been portrayed as pro-German?

The answer to this question can be found by looking at Per Eckerberg. Anna Alsmark argues that under Eckerberg's editorial leadership in 1941, Lundagård was turned into a

¹¹⁸ Ibid, 68.

¹¹⁹ Oredsson, *Lunds universitet under andra världskriget*, 136.

Note: *Den svenske folksocialisten* was published by the political party Folksocialistisk, which had been established in 1933, but then under the name Nationalsocialistiska Arbetarpartiet, NSAP. Yet, in 1938, the party changed its name, so as to emphasize that the party was not controlled by the German NSDAP. Stanley G. Payne, *A History of Fascism 1914-1945*, (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 306.

Note: Karl Olivecrona arguments about supporting Germany was based on intellectual argumentation. He argued that Germany was the leader of a transformation in the political structure in the world, and that Germany, not England, would produce peace, order, good working atmosphere and stable economy for the European populations. Oredsson, *Lunds universitet under andra världskriget*, 98.

¹²⁰ Oredsson, *Lunds universitet under andra världskriget*, 135-136.

¹²¹ Ibid, 136.

forum where only one form of opinions were allowed to be articulated.¹²² Views that went against the pro-Norwegian and anti-German ideas of the editorial board were not welcome. This makes his reactions towards the new editorial board with its pro-German members, nothing out of the extraordinary. It is feasible that his political left wing views, and his fear that through a pro-German editorial board at Lundagård, Lund University would solely be known for its pro-German views and not its pro-Nordic beliefs. It can therefore be argued that the new editorial board was not initially pro-German, but that Eckerberg had because of his political beliefs, led a personal crusade against the editorial board. He was arguably not able to see that the editorial wanted to open up for more than just one point of view. That he was not able to see this, would be the downfall of the editorial.

If the editorial was not pro-German, why then was the article published? This was due to bad judgment during the editing of the initial article:

From Norway we have received an announcement which states that the Rector at Oslo University, Didrik A. Seip – who was dismissed on 12 September 1941 and brought to Grini concentration camp – has been sentenced to 30 days of water and bread in a dark cell. If this is true, then the persecution of the Norwegian academics and students has reached a new culmination point. We understand that the war creates measures that could seem hopelessly unnecessary. We are also able to conceive a sense of irritation over the passive resistance that has forced the German occupational force in Norway to send a number of students and academic teachers to concentration camps, as well as restricting the academic freedom. Yet, Rector Seip's "disciplinary punishment" demonstrates a brutality that could never be excused nor defended. You may talk ever so much about a new Europe and a new culture, but the mentality that can allow for the torture which the almost 60-year old Rector Seip is going through, will never create a reasonable reorganisation of the Norwegian society.¹²³

When Oscar Bjurling, the responsible publisher of the student newspaper, proofread the initial article he urged the editorial board to cut the reference to the new regime being «brutal», as well as the reference to the «new Europe». That the editorial board had planned to publish the article as shown above, can give an indication that the editorial board had no plans to turn Lundagård into a forum for pro-German sentiments. This demonstrates also that the pro-German sentiments of Smith and Gagnér was not of relevance when their Nordic colleagues had their rights violated. When asked about why he had changed the article, Bjurling stated that a publisher's duty was to stop any articles that were not in accordance

¹²² Alsmark, "Krig och fred i Lundagård", 64

¹²³ "Spridda röster från Lund", *Gaudemaus*, Volume Number 19, No.2, March 1942.

with the Press Law at any given moment.¹²⁴ This demonstrates that he wished to follow the government's encouragement to not criticise foreign country's warfare or to bring Sweden's neutrality into question. Yet, in his eagerness the publisher managed to make the article sound as it supported the arrest of the rector. If one is to take into account Rydén's argument from her first editorial, the editorial board supported the rector. «It is of importance for the new editorial to support the Finnish, Danish and Norwegian students in their hardship», and she concluded «the North is our homeland».¹²⁵ It is apparent that the editorial was more concerned with supporting the Norwegian students and its rector, than to support the German warfare. Yet, since it was the edited article that was published, this gave the opposition to the editorial board a reason to contact the student union

At a student meeting on February 12, 1942, Jöran Mjöberg and Paul Lindblom, students at the university and close acquaintances of Eckerberg, argued that the article showed a lack of judgment from the editorial board.¹²⁶ The editorial board tried to argue before the student union that it had not been the intention of the editorial to support the arrest of Rector Seip. Yet, because of strong reactions from the students at Lund the editorial board was dismissed.¹²⁷ Through the dismissal of the editorial board, the student union made clear that there was no room at the university for sentiments that supported a «brutality that could never be excused nor defended». It was as well an indication that the student union supported the arrested Rector Seip. Had it not been for the publisher's wish to change the article, the Lundagård editorial board would have contributed with an article that would have showed that the newspaper supported the rector and not his violaters. The initial article would as well contributed to bettering Lund University's reputation.

In this subchapter it has been argued that the editorial that published the allegedly pro-German article about the arrest of Rector Seip, was not pro-German, but that this had been a rumour set out by the opposition to the editorial. The article was also merely a act of bad judgment from the editorial in question, and can therefore not be argued to have been published because the editorial was pro-German.

¹²⁴ Oredsson, *Lunds universitet under andra världskriget*, 141.

¹²⁵ Alsmark, "Krig och fred i Lundagård", 81.

¹²⁶ Lund University Student Union, "§4. Förslag av led. i Lundagårdsutskottet", 12 February 1942

¹²⁷ Lund University Student Union, "§4. Förslag av led. i Lundagårdsutskottet", 12 February 1942 : Lund University Student Union, "§8. Uttalande betr. artikel i Lundagård", 25 February 1942.

3.3 Summary

The reactions from the Swedish student papers and daily newspapers differed in connection to the dissolution of DNS and the arrest of Rector Didrik Arup Seip.

The daily newspapers did not comment upon the dissolution of DNS, but the student papers did. The reactions were many, and the Swedish students showed that they respected the Norwegian students, because they had not left their ideals for some temporary advantages. Gaudeamus stated that the Norwegian students could win the whole world, and never lose their souls. It was the overall impression of the Swedish student newspapers that it had not been the Germans, but NS that had dissolved DNS and arrested Sanness and Scharffenberg. This belief was probably due to the Swedish government's wish to not encourage a German attack on the Swedish independence and integrity. The fear of a German invasion was in September 1940 alive in Sweden.

By September 1941 the fear of an German invasion was still present, but the daily newspapers was not stopped by this and mentioned that the German occupational force had ordered the arrest of the rector. It was argued that the daily newspaper mentioned the arrest because of the emergence of the pro-Norwegian opposition in Sweden. It was reasoned that by commenting upon the violations towards the University of Oslo, the daily newspapers opened up for the Swedish population to interpret the events in Oslo themselves.

The reaction to the arrest of Rector Seip differed in the three student papers. Ergo was clear in its statement that the Germans had made the arrest of the rector. The student paper in Stockholm, on the other hand, was at first stopped by the student union that was not willing to make a statement in connection with the arrest of the rector, because it was feared that a statement could be misinterpreted by a third party to be a political letter of protest, and not a humanitarian. Gaudeamus did make a comment upon the arrest, where it was argued that the students in Stockholm had waited for a statement from the union that had not come.

The Lundagård article caused quite a stir at Lund University in January and February 1942. It was concluded that the editorial was not pro-German because of the article, but that this idea was a rumour set out by the editorial board's opposition. The article had been published after specific amendments of the publisher, who had a wish to follow the government's careful politics towards foreign governments. The article was simply an unfortunate streak of bad judgment from the editorial board. Had the initial article been published, Lundagård would have had the strongest protest against the arrest of Rector Seip.

Was the Nordic Idea present at these reactions? In Ergo it was argued in September 1940 that «No one can argue that the events does not concern us», which can be an indication that the Swedish students felt they had a duty to protect the interests of the Norwegian students. In September 1941 the daily newspapers showed that the Nordic Idea was present through the support of the pro-Norwegian opposition. The student newspapers support of the Nordic Idea in September 1941 differed. In Ergo, Hedenius used the word «brother» when arguing that the students had not been able to aid the rector. Stockholm University College's student union was afraid that a protest of a humanitarian calibre would be misinterpreted, and resigned therefore from making a statement. The article in Lundagård had no signs of the Nordic Idea, even though the editorial board argued in the aftermath that the initial purpose of the article had been to show support of Seip. It can be argued though that the student union's decision to dismiss the editorial board was a demonstration of that the student union supported Rector Seip.

Finally, the differences amongst the student papers were clear, with Ergo being the strongest advocate for supporting the Norwegian students and rector. Amongst the daily newspapers it is better to speak of a similarity, since the newspapers did not comment upon the dissolution of DNS, but did comment upon the arrest of the rector. Therefore, the differences between the student papers and daily newspapers were that the student papers commented upon both events, whereas the daily newspapers joined in when Rector Seip was arrested.

Chapter 4: «With Concern and Indignation – Norway and We»¹²⁸

May 1942 – October 1943.

This chapter will look at two protests at the University of Oslo that took place in February and September 1943. The February protest letter was an initiative from the students, and the one in September 1943, a statement from the professors. The Swedish students did not react to these events, and finding the reasons for this is of interest.¹²⁹ Why did the Swedish students not react to these events, and it is of interest to find the reason for this. Why did the Swedish students' not react to these events, when the daily newspapers did? It will be argued throughout the chapter that the lack of reaction from the Swedish students was out of the ordinary, and to demonstrate this an analysis of the Swedish students' letter of protest in May 1942 in relation to the conflict between NS and the Norwegian clergy and teachers, has been included.

The protest in May 1942 was the most powerful protest in which the students had created, due to it being a cooperation between the Lund University, Uppsala University, Gothenburg University, Stockholm University College and the Agricultural University College. Was this protest based on the Nordic Idea? What had occurred between May 1942 and February 1943 that made the Swedish students not react to the Norwegian students protest? Is it possible to talk of a change in the Swedish students view of the Norwegian academics? Or was the lack of reaction, a response to the Swedish government's relations with the Norwegian government in London and the German government in Berlin? If these relations had an impact, why did the daily newspapers report about the events at the University of Oslo? Did the daily newspapers report about the events because of the pro-Norwegian opposition in Sweden?

It will be argued in subchapter 4.3 that the silence in September 1943 was out of the ordinary, since the Swedish students reacted to the events in Denmark and the arrival of Danish students in Sweden. How did the daily newspapers write about the letter of protest by the Norwegian professors?

¹²⁸ "Med oro och harm", *Gaudemaus*, Volume Number 19, No.5, May 1942.

¹²⁹ Stockholm University College, Student Union, "§15", 29 October 1943.

4.1 A protest against the violations in Norway

In May 1942 the student unions at Uppsala -, Lund -, and Gothenburg University, as well as Stockholm University College and the Agricultural University College published a letter of protest which demonstrated the solidarity of the Swedish students with the Norwegian students and culture bearing professions.¹³⁰

It is with great concern and indignation that we see how the regime in Norway, which is lacking any form of resonance with the Norwegian population, is step by step, destroying the basic values that have made the Nordic countries nations of culture. Especially, we will as students direct a protest towards the dissolution of the cultural life in Norway, which is demonstrated by the abuse towards representatives of church, school and university. It is our belief that a political system that praises brutality over culture, will not be able to create a future for its people.¹³¹

Interestingly, the regime the students protested against was not the Germans, but the regime of NS. At an Uppsala Student Union meeting in April 1942 it had been stressed that the protest was to be directed towards Quisling, and not against the German occupational force.¹³² The student union hoped that «the remaining unions will agree with this statement».¹³³ Why did the Swedish students direct their protest towards NS instead of the Germans? NS and Quisling were the aggravators in the conflict in Norway that emerged in

¹³⁰ Note: The conflict between the Norwegian Church and the NS regime had been a semi-open battle since the Kristent Samråd (a Christian Consultation board) was established in the autumn of 1940. Kristent Samråd had refused to cooperate with NS and the occupational regime. The conflict between the two would come to open battle in February 1942 when Minister Skancke received a letter from the clergy that argued that Norway had become lawless. The conflict would end when Vidkun Quisling dismissed Bishop Dr. Eivind Berggrav. With the bishop being dismissed, and in total 797 clergymen, of 858 put down their work on March 1 1942. This was the only major resistance that the Norwegian Church demonstrated towards the new regime, but they continued to resist the regime by not working. Professor, Dr. Einar Moland, "Kirkens Kamp" in *Norges krig 1940-1945*, Volume III, ed. by Sverre Steen (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1950), 43, 48-49 and 50.

Note: The teachers' conflict began with Quisling issuing two laws of February 1 1942, demanding that all teachers become members of the Norges Lærersamband (the Norwegian Teacher Association), and that all Norwegian youths between 10 and 18 years of age had to serve in Nasjonal Samlings Ungdomsfylking (NS's Youth Organisation). These laws forced the teachers to teach in accordance with NS's ideology, and through NS's Youth Organisation, the children would also be indoctrinated. On February 20, the teachers sent a letter of protest to Minister Ragnar Skancke, declaring that they were not willing to teach after NS's ideology. It all culminated with the parents protest in March, with approximately 200.000 letters of protest sent to Skancke. To stabilize the society, Terboven urged Quisling to have the Norwegian police arrest 1000 teachers, which were to be handed over to the German Gestapo. On March 20, 1100 teachers were arrested and sent to various concentration camps in Norway. Rector Magnus Jensen, "Kampen om Skolen", in *Norges Krig 1940-1945*, Volume III, ed. by Sverre Steen, (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1950), 85-86: Sem Fure, *Universitetet i kamp*, 218.

¹³¹ "Med oro och harm", *Gaudeamus*, No.5, May 1942: 'Norge och vi', *Ergo*, 16 May 1942.

¹³² Uppsala Student Union, No title, April 1942.

¹³³ Uppsala Student Union, No title, April 1942.

1942, and as seen with the arrest of Rector Seip in September 1941, the Swedish students were well informed about any events taking place in Norway. Even if this had not been the case in September 1940, it seems as the students were concerned with getting the details correct concerning the occupation of Norway. That the student newspapers were not afraid to protest against NS is in accordance with Schive's argument from Chapter 3, that the Germans did not react on criticism directed towards NS. The student newspapers had found a way to support its Norwegian colleagues without making the Germans question Sweden's neutrality.

In Chapter 3 it was mentioned that there were several issues that hindered the cooperation between the Swedish government and the Norwegian exile government. These issues were still hindering any cooperation between the two governments' in May 1942. First, it was the continuing transit of German soldiers through Sweden. Secondly, it was the issue of Finland entering the war with Germany in June 1941, and the Norwegian exile government's decision to end any future cooperation with the country. Finally, the unsolved matter of the Norwegian ships in Gothenburg, and the continuing question of diplomatic representation was still unresolved by the beginning of 1942. The two government's had different ideas about the future of Europe and the North in case of a peace. The Swedish government wanted to restore the status-quo of the pre-war North, and a better cooperation between the Nordic countries. The Norwegian exile government, on the other hand, wanted to seek better relations with the western countries, i.e. Great Britain and United States of America.¹³⁴ However, it appears as the Swedish students were not affected by these relations, because it seems as they were rather occupied with demonstrating their support of the Norwegian population. That the students had mentioned the cultural life can be brought back to the idea that Norway and Sweden was sharing a common culture. This demonstrates that even if the relationship between the Swedish government and the Norwegian exile government was at a standstill, the Swedish students viewed the relationship between Norway and Sweden as highly important. This was why the Swedish students showed their discontent when learning that T.T had removed the mentioning of the Norwegian regime's destruction of the Nordic from the protest it sent to the daily newspapers.

Gaudeamus argued «when the students has finally made a protest it is the duty of the newspapers news agency to publish the correct wording of the protest».¹³⁵ Further, it was argued that there had been no reason for the news agency to leave out parts of the protest. Gaudeamus reasoned «when it comes to such a protest, which has been signed by a great

¹³⁴ Carlgren "Svensk-norska regeringsrelationer under andra världskriget", in *Broderfolk i ufredstid*, 44-46

¹³⁵ "Äntligen", *Gaudeamus*, Volume Number 19, No.5, May 1942.

number of names, it is of importance that the entire protest is included, or the meaning can be misunderstood». ¹³⁶ The meaning of the protest was, however, not misunderstood, because shortly after the protest, Dagens Nyheter stated that the protest was speaking on behalf of the entire Swedish population. The newspaper continued «Now that trade unionists, teachers, the clergy and academics are on the same page, the circle is closed with strong Swedish iron». ¹³⁷ It can therefore be reasoned that T.T was not on accord with the rest of the population when leaving out parts of the protest. It is likely that the news agency was following the Swedish government's encouragement to not criticise the warfare of any foreign governments, or to bring into question Sweden's neutrality.

Even though the students were still careful in how they worded their protest and who they directed it to, it was the most powerful and coincided protest made by any academic up until then. As Sverker Oredsson argues «by May 1942, the Swedish students had left the careful politics of the Swedish government». ¹³⁸ It is therefore interesting that the students in Sweden did not show the Norwegian students any support when they protested against NS's Labour Mobilisation in February 1943.

This subchapter has looked at the Swedish students protest letter to NS's violation of the cultural bearers in Norway. It was a protest letter that had been created by five of the major educational institutions in Sweden. The daily newspapers were criticised when they had left out parts of the protest. In the following subchapter it will demonstrated that the Swedish students were quiet when the Norwegian students protested against NS's Labour Mobilisation.

¹³⁶ «Äntligen», *Gaudeamus*, Volume Number 19, No.5, May 1942.

¹³⁷ »Pressen om Norgeuttalandet», *Ergo*, Volume Number 19, No.8 16 May 1942.

¹³⁸ Oredsson, *Lunds universitet under andra världskriget*, 147.

4.2 The Norwegian students take a stand against NS's Labour Mobilisation

The press have portrayed the (Norwegian) student population as supporters of the Norwegian Studentsambandet. It is therefore my duty to make known that I do not recognise the Norwegian Student Association as a representative for the student population.¹³⁹

This statement was signed by approximately 2600 students at the University of Oslo in February 1943. The prelude to this statement had begun with Adolf Hitler's demand for a total labour mobilisation in both Germany and the occupied countries. On February 22, 1943, Quisling followed suit by announcing the introduction of a new law stating that all men between the age of 17 and 55, and women between the age of 17 and 35 were to serve the German warfare through work service. Only State Officials and a few other groups, such as doctors, and pregnant women and women with young children, were excepted from the work service.¹⁴⁰

On February 23 the students of the University of Oslo were asked to attend a meeting at the Assembly Hall concerning the Labour Mobilisation. The students were concerned about the effect the labour mobilisation would have on their studies. At the meeting, Studentsambandets office manager Carl Martin Kramer, proposed that the students would collect firewood for the university, thereby avoiding being sent home to complete the required labour.¹⁴¹ The students who supported the proposal were asked to stand up, and as almost everyone did, Kramer considered the meeting a success. Jorunn Sem Fure argues that Kramer had expected that the students would support his proposal, and had therefore arranged for a press conference.¹⁴²

Kramer had, however, forseen the massive reaction from the student population who suffered negative publicity because of this press conference. In the days after the meeting the Norwegian population could read in *Aftenposten*, a daily newspaper in Oslo, that the students at the university through their support of Studentersambandet had finally stopped resisting the occupational regime. The students' immediate reaction to this bad publicity was to stay away from the university, but they soon felt the need to express their feelings more vocally; only

¹³⁹ Adolf Hoel, *Universitetet under okkupasjonen*, (Oslo: John Grieg, 1978) 124.

Note: The Norwegian Student Association (Norsk Studentsamband) had been established in 1942 as a replacement of DNS, and was run by NS students at the University of Oslo.

¹⁴⁰ Molland, "Kirkens Kamp", 63

¹⁴¹ Sem Fure, *Universitetet i kamp*, 235.

¹⁴² *Ibid*, 235.

days after the meeting at the Assembly Hall, 2600 individual, but identical letters of protests were delivered to the university's secretaries.¹⁴³ When the exact rules concerning the Labour Mobilisation were announced, the students realised they would not be the first to be conscripted, but the damage was already done; the Norwegian students had made their most powerful protest ever. Yet, the Swedish students did not show the Norwegian students any form of support. Why did the Swedish students newspapers not mention the protest?

There is no exact answer to why the Swedish students did not mention the protest. It has not been possible to find any meeting records or articles concerning this letter of protest at any of the student unions used in this analysis. Such documents could have explained why the Swedish students chose not to react to such an important event at the University of Oslo, and the absence of such documents makes a conclusion much more difficult to reach. Considering that the Swedish students had mounted their own protest in reaction to the Norwegian grievances in May 1942, one would think that they would support the Norwegian students again in February 1943. By then the relations between the Swedish and the Norwegian exile government had started to thaw, while in May 1942 the governments had been at a standstill. It is interesting to note that the Swedish students chose to protest when relations between the two governments were bad and refrained from protesting when the relations had improved. The reason for this can be found in the fact that the Swedish government was under from both the Allies and the pro-Norwegian opposition in Sweden to end the transportation of soldiers to Norway, as well as the iron-ore supply that were sent to Germany.¹⁴⁴ That there was someone else to fight for the Norwegians and put pressure on the Swedish government, could be the reason why the Swedish students put down their arms.

This, however, does not sufficiently explain why the Swedish students chose not to show the Norwegian students support. Earlier in the war, the Swedish students had responded and made statements regardless of the state of relations between the Swedish government and the Norwegian government. Nor had they been stopped by the threat of imminent German invasion. In February 1943 the fear of a German invasion was nowhere near what it had been in 1940. The Germans had recently experienced big setbacks: first with the battle of El Alamein in the summer of 1942, then the surrender at Stalingrad in February 1943. The Swedish government then allowed itself to become stricter in their relations with its neighbour in the south. In April 1943, the Swedish government could report that the transportation of

¹⁴³ Professor Sverre Steen, "Universitetet i ildlinjen", in *Norges Krig 1940-1945*, ed. by Sverre Steen, (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1950), 173.

¹⁴⁴ Carlgren, "Svensk-norska regeringsrelationer under andra världskriget", in *Broderfolk i ufredstid*, 46-47

German soldiers through Sweden had been reduced by 30-40% compared with April 1942. The Swedish government had also started to evaluate how the Swedish-German relations had been damaging the Swedish neutrality.¹⁴⁵ This meant that there was no reason for the Swedish students to feel that they would oppose their government if they showed the Norwegian students support. Was the lack of reaction from the student unions a way to prevent that the student newspapers were filled with articles that could bring Sweden's neutrality in to question?

For the Swedish student population, politics were a unification of the larger events in the war and matters that touched the future relations between the Nordic countries. This was probably because the students had seen that the progress of the war could influence the relations between the Nordic countries.¹⁴⁶ This can be demonstrated by a few comments made in the three student papers. Paul Lindblom, a student at Lund University, argued in *Lundagård* in December 1941 that «Students are – or should at least be – opinion formers».¹⁴⁷ Lindblom continued to reason that since Finnish, Norwegian and Danish students had played a part in shaping the student newspaper *Lundagård*, it was only natural to write about politics. Lindblom found it difficult to accept that the student newspaper were to focus solely on academics when Europe was at war.¹⁴⁸ Law student Igor Holmstedt argued in *Ergo* that the major questions of the war were of interest everyone, and especially «when it touches our inner and outer freedom, our peoples' survival and the future of the Nordic countries».¹⁴⁹ In March 1942, editor of *Lundagård*, Håkan Strömberg stated that «the majority of the student population feels that a student newspaper should be un-political, and that it should only focus on questions of studies», and further on «Yet, with the many events occurring out in the world, no academic can stand indifferent to these matters».¹⁵⁰ It is difficult to argue that it was a wish to avoid discussing politics that held the students from mentioning the February

¹⁴⁵ The government came to the conclusion that there were three issues that was damaging the Swedish neutrality. The first was the Germans storage opportunities in Luleå and Norrland, in relation to the transition of German soldiers through Sweden. The second was the submarine hindrance that the Swedish government had put down in Öresund in May 1940 after the Germans wishes. This was a breakage of the principal of free passage between two free oceans. The third, and perhaps the most important, was the question of non-Germans on the transportation trains going from Norway and to Germany. This became an important issue, because of Quisling's Labour Mobilisation. Johansson, *Per Albin och Kriget*, 312-313.

¹⁴⁶ This is a reference to the war splitting the Nordic countries. Denmark and Norway was occupied, whereas Finland had since the summer of 1941 been on Germany's side of the war. This did, as argued in Chapter 3, damage the relationship between Finland and Norway in particular.

¹⁴⁷ Paul Lindblom, "Neutralitet till döds –aldrig", *Lundagård*, Volume Number 22, No.13, 13 December 1941.

¹⁴⁸ Paul Lindblom, "Neutralitet till döds –aldrig", *Lundagård*, Volume Number 22, No.13, 13 December 1941.

¹⁴⁹ Igor Holmstedt, "Studenter och politik", *Ergo*, volume Number 18, No.7, 26 April 1941.

¹⁵⁰ Håkan Strömberg, "Nordisk fest till fäderns mine", *Lundagård*, Volume Number 23, No.4, 23 March 1942.

protest, because the students had already established their position in relation to Norway and the Norwegian students with the protests of September 1940, September 1941 and May 1942. This is clear when reading *Gaudeamus* from March 1943, where it was stated that the Nordic countries must «through our historic traditions and academic commitments, with the help of the truth and the law, work for a free and unified North».¹⁵¹ There is no clear answer to why the Swedish students did not react in February 1943, but in light of their reactions to the events of May 1942 it was clearly atypical. Why then, did the daily newspapers mention the Norwegian students' protest?

The reports written by *Dagens Nyheter* and GHT about the events in Oslo were short, and contained only the basic details about what had occurred in Oslo: that the Norwegian students had been asked to attend a meeting at the Assembly Hall, that they had been asked to support Kramer's suggestion, and that the outcome of the meeting was that the students had protested. The reason for why they wrote about the protest can be linked to the pro-Norwegian opposition's interest in the transportation of German soldiers through Sweden; one could argue that by writing about the events in Oslo, the newspapers were trying to make their own government aware of the Norwegian population's hardship so that they would end the soldier transport.¹⁵² This argument is based on the turn in *Dagens Nyheter* stand against the Swedish government's submissive politics towards the German government. By 1943 *Dagens Nyheter* had with GHT become one of a few daily newspapers that were critical to the Swedish government's resilient politics towards Germany, and in particular the transportation of German soldiers through Sweden.¹⁵³

Did *Arbetet* support the pro-Norwegian opposition? It is difficult to conclude whether the newspaper actually did support it, because of the editor's position in the Social-Democrats. Yet, it is possible that indirectly *Arbetet* wanted to help the opposition, because the newspaper's article differed from the other two newspapers articles, because it was filled with more details about events taking place after the protest, and understanding for why the students had protested. Can it be reasoned that the newspaper had a journalist in Norway, and had not just used T.T's article? It has not been possible to verify this, but compared to the other two newspapers articles, the discussion around the event is more detailed in *Arbetet*. The newspaper was the only paper that mentioned that Kramer had posted a placard that

¹⁵¹ "Nordisk hälsning", *Gaudeamus*, Volume Number 20, No.2, March 1943.

¹⁵² Johansson, *Per Albin och kriget*, 307

¹⁵³ Sandlund, "Beredsakp och repression", 331.

urged the students to withdraw their protest.¹⁵⁴ Kramer did put up a placard, which demonstrates how well informed the newspaper was, and can only create a debate of whether the newspaper had someone in Oslo to experience the events firsthand or not. The newspaper could further on report that it was impossible to know the consequences the students would face if they did not revoke their protests. The consequences of the letter of protest were that the State Police seized the protests and four students at the philological study hall was arrested and sentenced to six months in prison.¹⁵⁵ The University of Oslo suffered arrests, dismantling of both DNS and the Collegiums of Deans and now a protest from the students, and the Swedish students had responded every time up until the student protest. The Swedish students would continue to keep quiet as the professors of the University of Oslo protested in October 1943. However, this could have been caused by the influx of Danish students to Sweden the same month.

In this subchapter it has been looked at the Swedish students quietness in relation to the Norwegian students letter of protest in February 1943. It has not been possible to make a conclusion upon why the Swedish students did not react, since it has not been possible to find any primary sources upon why they did not react. It was demonstrated that the daily newspapers commented the protest, and it was argued that this could have been because of the newspapers wish make the Swedish government more aware about the German violations in Norway. In the following subchapter it will be demonstrated that the Swedish students continued to keep quiet in relation to a protest made by the Norwegian professors in September 1943.

¹⁵⁴ “Oslostudenterna acceptera intet nyordningsorgan”, *Arbetet*, Volume Number 57, No.51, 3 March 1943.

¹⁵⁵ The State Police was a political police force with a direct connection to NS. It had been established in June 1941 as part of the Police Department, which was governed by Jonas Lie. The State Police could get direct orders from the Gestapo. The force’s headquarters were situated in Oslo, with offices in Aker, Bergen, Trondheim, Stavanger, Tromsø and Kirkenes. Police inspector Lars L’Abée- Lund, “Politiet over og under jorden”, in *Norges Krig 1940-1945*, Volume III, ed., by Sverre Steen, (Oslo: Gyndendal Norsk Forlag, 1950), 278.

4.3 The Norwegian professors take a stand against NS's intervention in the admission process at the University of Oslo

In September 1943, the Norwegian professors followed in the footsteps of their students and protested against NS's intervention in the university's admission procedure. This protest would produce a different outcome than the students' protest in February: ten professors and sixty-three students were arrested.

NS had shown interest in the admission procedure at the Medical Faculty in 1940, but it was not until January 1942 that they actually introduced a rule that stating that the Department of Church and Education could admit students into the medicine program without the faculty's consent.¹⁵⁶ This became a conflict at the university throughout 1942, and by 1943 the relationship between NS and the university was tense.¹⁵⁷ By January 1943 Adolf Hoel, the former pro-rector, had officially become rector of the university. The Dean at Medicin Faculty, Georg Monrad-Krohn had hoped that by Hoel becoming rector, it would stop Skancke's many interventions at the university.¹⁵⁸ and even though the minister's interventions at the institution were reduced, the university had to deal with a new threat to the institutions independence; its rector. During the summer of 1943, the new Rector took the initiative to change the admission regulations. These changes were to benefit students that had taken their examen artium as private candidates due to difficult circumstances and students

¹⁵⁶ Note: The Medical Faculty had since the 1930s had problems with long queues from preclinical studies to clinical studies. This was the reason why the faculty decided that for the 1940-1941 School year, the admission to the medicine program would be controlled by «*numerus clausus*» and the grades from Secondary School. This made it even more difficult for many to get admitted. NS viewed the difficulty to be admitted to the faculty as a factor they could use to benefit their own party. NS hoped that by giving loyal students admittance to the studies at the Medical Faculty, other students would see that a NS membership would become beneficial for a future career. Sem Fure, *Universitetet i kamp*, 221.

¹⁵⁷ Note: During the spring and autumn of 1942 Minister Ragnar Skancke tried to get NS supporters accepted to Medical studies. During the spring of 1942 ten students were accepted outside of the admission procedure, and during the autumn of 1942, Minister Skancke ordered sixteen students to be admitted to Medicine studies and two additional to the Pharmacy studies at the Mathematical and Science Faculty. The Deans of the two faculties tried to make the pro-Rector Adolf Hoel change the minister's mind, but the Minister's argument was that Norway needed more doctors. The Deans did not disagree with the Minister, but argued that the two faculties lacked the capacity to admit more students than those accepted in the ordinary admission process. The solution in the Autumn of 1942 was that the sixteen students were not to be formally admitted to the closed lectures, such as clinical studies, but that they could follow the open lectures in physiology and anatomy. All faculties accepted the agreement, which meant that the conflict had been temporarily solved. Sem Fure, *Universitetet i kamp*, 223: Hoel, *Universitetet under okkupasjonen*, 98.

¹⁵⁸ The appointment of Hoel as rector had happened because the two deans at the Medical Faculty and the Mathematical and Science Faculty felt that to keep the university peaceful, Skancke had to step down from his position as rector. Hoel was seen as a man that one could work with, but the minister had a tendency to overrule any agreements he had made with the university. Hoel, *Universitetet under okkupasjonen*, 30-31: Sem Fure, *Universitetet i kamp*, 239.

from the three northernmost counties.¹⁵⁹ The new regulations stated as well that the rector, not the faculties, was to decide who were to be admitted. Sem Fure argues that after two years as pro-Rector Hoel should have known that making a change to the regulations without the faculties knowledge would not be well received by the employees at the university, and that such a change would be viewed as just another way for NS to get their loyal students enrolled at programs it was difficult to get accepted to.¹⁶⁰

The reactions from the Faculties were twofold. First, Monrad-Krohn and Halvor Solberg, the Dean of the Mathematical and Science Faculty, made known to Hoel, even before the changes had reached the faculties, that the new regulations were unacceptable. The second reaction came from the illegal Aksjonsutvalget (the Action Committee), a secret group consisting of professors with links to all five Faculties at the university, and aiming with any means necessary to hinder NS and the German occupational force from taking over the university.¹⁶¹ The majority of the Deans would never have approved of the Committee if they had been aware of it, because the Committee had close links to Hjemmefronten, the Norwegian resistance movement. Hjemmefronten wanted action instead of negotiation, whereas Monrad-Krohn sought to negotiate before acting. Finally, the Deans wanted to attract as little attention as possible on the on-goings at the university, whereas the Committee were would rather have a closed university than a conquered one.¹⁶²

The Committee succeeded in its efforts to make the professors act and not negotiate with NS or the occupational force, because on September 14, a letter of protest was sent to the Church and Education Department.¹⁶³ This protest stated that the professors could not accept the new regulations because it was feared that the Rector would hinder more academically qualified students to be admitted in his eagerness to help students in need. Further on it was argued that the new regulations would hinder the university from being an institution based on free research and open lectures. As a result, minister Skancke was summoned to attend a

¹⁵⁹ Examen artium was the final examination of Secondary School, and the criteria in which universities used for admitting students. The exam was dismissed in 1974, when Vitnemål was introduced in the Norwegian Secondary School. Kunnskapsforlaget papirleksikon, *Examen atrium*, Store Norske Leksikon, 14.02.2009, http://snl.no/examen_artium (20.04.2012).

¹⁶⁰ Sem Fure, *Universitetet i kamp*, 240.

¹⁶¹ Sem Fure, *Universitetet i kamp*, 202.

¹⁶² Since the Committee had strong ties to the faculties, it managed to create faculty committees that were to prepare a letter of protest in relation to the new regulations which were to be sent to the Department. To make sure that the statements were identical, the faculty committees consisted of members from the Action Committee and individuals that were associated with the Committee. Still, Monrad-Krohn and Hoel tried to influence the making of the protest letters, because it was feared that NS and the German occupational force would react negatively if the protest was too critical. Sem Fure, *Universitetet i kamp*, 242-243.

¹⁶³ Hoel, *Universitetet under okkupasjonen*, 142.

meeting at the Reich Commissariat, where the Commissariat informed the minister that if the new regulations were not introduced, the lack of action had to be viewed as sabotage, and Terboven would be informed about the conflict at the university.¹⁶⁴ Minister Skancke had no other option than to summon the Deans and question them about the meaning of the letter of protest and whether the professors would go on strike if the new regulations were introduced. To hinder both a strike and a German intervention at the university, the Faculties were asked to come up with a suggestion for regulations that would better suit the Faculties. This overruling of Hoel's decisions was not well received by Quisling, who demanded that the new regulations be forcefully introduced. When they were not, Quisling ordered the arrest of ten employees and sixty-three students on October 15. The reactions from Sweden came from the daily newspaper *Dagens Nyheter* and not the Swedish students.

On October 17 *Dagens Nyheter* could report that eight professors and approximately forty students had been arrested.¹⁶⁵ It was a detailed article where every aspect about the prelude to the arrests and the actual arrests were discussed, and included in this discussion the newspaper stated that «the State Police's action towards the university is due to an inner conflict between the moderate and aggressive wings in NS».¹⁶⁶ What did *Dagens Nyheter* mean with these wings in NS, and who belonged to them? In Chapter 2 it was mentioned that the nationalistic ideology had held a hegemony in the politics within NS since the party was founded in 1933, but that with the German invasion in 1940, a pangermanism that argued for a unification with German got a more influential position within NS. By 1943 NS was split in two: an aggressive pangermanist wing and a more moderate nationalistic wing. It is feasible that *Dagens Nyheter* meant these two wings within NS, especially when keeping in mind that Rector Hoel was linked to the moderate wing.¹⁶⁷ The newspaper reported that the moderate wing had tried to listen to the ideas that the professors had presented in relation to the new regulations, whereas the aggressive wing had no wish to do so. Adolf Hoel had tried to listen

¹⁶⁴ The Reich Commissariat consisted of three departments that were subjected to Terboven's power. The complex organisational conditions in Hitler's Germany would be reflected in Terboven's Norway, but still Terboven tried to make a clean organisational Commissariat. The Administrative department was led by Hans Reinhard Koch, the Press and Propaganda department was led by Georg Wilhelm Müller, and the Industry department was led by Carlo Otte. When Terboven was not able to attend a meeting the leaders of the departments would represent the Reich Commissar. That the Reich Commissariat did not inform Quisling about this meeting, gives an indication that the Commissariat held the final power in Norway. Nøkleby, *Josef Terboven: Hitlers mann i Norge*, 116-117.

¹⁶⁵ "Åtta professorer, 40 studenter häktade i Oslo", *Dagens Nyheter*, No.282, 17 October 1943.

¹⁶⁶ "Inre strid inom N.S. föregick aktionen", *Dagens Nyheter*, No.282, 17 October 1943.

¹⁶⁷ "Åtta professorer, 40 studenter häktade i Oslo", *Dagens Nyheter*, No.282, 17 October 1943.

to the ideas presented by the faculties, but that this was fruitless when Quisling had made the arrest of the students and professors. Was Quisling therefore the aggressive part of NS?

Interestingly, Dagens Nyheter had no mentioning about who the newspaper believed to belong to the aggressive part of NS. Quisling had embraced the ideas of pangermanism, but he was no promoter of the idea. Øystein Sørensen argues that there was no immediate «leader» of the aggressive wing. The members of NS that could have been viewed as promoters of closer links with Germany became in the end supporters of the moderate and national wing. Jonas Lie, minister of the Police Department, had from 1940 worked for closer relations with Germany, but in 1941, he had demonstrated a lack of strong pangermanistic foundations that was needed to be a part of the more aggressive part of NS. Sørensen even argues that at the end of the war, Lie showed leanings towards the nationalistic and moderate part of the party.¹⁶⁸ Minister of Justice in the NS government, Sverre Riisnæs had as well worked for closer relations with Germany, but his admiration for Quisling hindered him from adopting a strong pangermanistic foundation. It is therefore feasible to argue that since Dagens Nyheter knew about the inner discussions in NS, the newspaper also knew that there was no strong «leader» of the aggressive wing in the party and had therefore some difficulties in mentioning anyone by name.

It is interesting that Dagens Nyheter was able to see that Hoel was a part of the more moderate part of the party, since he was not the leader of this wing. Gulbrand Lunde, the minister of Department for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, had been the main promoter of a nationalistic mindset since 1940, and after his death in October 1942, Rolf Jørgen Fuglesang, Cultural Minister, took over the position as leader of the nationalistic wing.¹⁶⁹ It can be argued that in relation to the events at the University of Oslo it was easy to reason that Hoel was a part of the moderate and nationalistic part of the party, but in light of the fact that the newspaper had not been informed about the rectors own part in the new regulations, questions are raised whether the wording of the article would have been different if the newspaper had been informed about this. Even the British Intelligence had been able to pick up on Hoel's position within the party: «'Professor Hoel, the head of the university and a moderate element in the party, desires a peaceful solution, while the extremists wish to close the university entirely'».¹⁷⁰ Would Hoel still have been a part of the moderate part of NS since

¹⁶⁸ Sørensen, *Hitler eller Quisling?*, 298.

¹⁶⁹ Sørensen, *Hitler eller Quisling?*, 217.

¹⁷⁰ The British Intelligence cited in Frode Skarstein, *"- men så kom jo den 9.april i veien..." Adolf Hoel: Den glemte polarpioneren*, (Bergen: Happy Jam Factory), 219.

he tried to work with the professors and not against them, or would he have been situated amongst the more aggressive? In light of the newspaper's unwillingness to mention by name the individuals that belonged to the more aggressive part of NS, it is likely that if Hoel was seen as aggressive, there would not have been any mentioning of his role in creating the new regulations.

It is clear that the Dagens Nyheter were aware of the part in which NS played in the events at the University of Oslo, and that the daily newspapers was well informed about the inner conflict in NS. It is possible that this can be credited to the newspaper's position as a pro-Norwegian newspaper, but it can also be reasoned that Dagens Nyheter's willingness to report about this conflict within NS demonstrates that the Swedish press felt freer to criticise Germany warfare because of said country's weakened position in the war. By September 1943 the Swedish government had taken a clear stand against Berlin by cancelling the transportation of German soldiers through Sweden.¹⁷¹ During the autumn of 1943, a Norwegian police troop, which would take charge in case of a German surrender, was established in Sweden. This willingness from the Swedish government to help the Norwegians, meant that the relationship between the Swedish government and the Norwegian exile government grew stronger. Considering the great improvement in relations between Sweden and the Norwegian exile government, as well as Germany's weakening position in the war, it is highly interesting that the Swedish students did not mention the Norwegian professors' protest; a response from the Swedish might not have provoked any reactions from Germany, but would perhaps have been praised by the Norwegians. Still, no comment was made, and the possible reason was the influx of the Danish students in Sweden from October 1943.

In this subchapter it has been demonstrated that the Swedish students continued to be quiet in relation to the events occurring at the University of Oslo. It was also made clear that Dagens Nyheter was aware of the inner conflicts in NS. In the following subchapter it will be made known that the influx of the Danish students in October 1943 made the Swedish students not comment upon the letter of protest from the Norwegian professors.

¹⁷¹ Carlgren, "Svensk-norska regeringsrelationers under andra världskriget", in *Et broderfolk i ufredstid*, 47-48

4.3.1 The influx of Danish students

On October 16, 1943, Thord Plaenge Jacobsen stated in *Ergo* that «it is admirable that the Danish population are able to, even when the Danish ideals are militarised, to be irrevocable in their determination for a peaceful living».¹⁷² What Jacobsen meant by the Danish ideals being militarised is not explained, but it is likely that it was a reference to how the German occupation had turned the Danish society from an open and free society, to a closed and militarised one. This statement was made after a series of sabotages and strikes had occurred all over Denmark.

On August 7, 1943 a state of emergency was declared in Esbjerg, a city located on the west coast of Jylland. This state of emergency was a result of several acts of sabotage and collisions between Danish citizens and German soldiers, and was supposed to show the workers what would happen if they opposed the occupational force.¹⁷³ However, the Germans were not prepared for the Danish workers' reaction to the state of emergency. The workers went into an immediate strike, which did not end before the Germans lifted the state of emergency on August 12.¹⁷⁴ The civil unrest was, however, not over, because on August 15 and 16, several workers went into strike in Odense, a city situated on the island Funen in Southern Denmark. Several workers were hurt and a German officer killed, and even though a settlement was reached between the workers and the occupational force, it was only the beginning of what would turn out to be a series of strikes. The next strike occurred in Aalborg, and spread out to cities like Fredrikshavn, Skagen and Sæby, all situated in the North of Denmark. On August 28 the Germans reacted by urging the Danish government to declare the entire country to be in a state of emergency, so as to stop the sabotage.¹⁷⁵ However, the Danish government was not willing to succumb to the German demands, and on August 29 the parliament and the government disabled themselves.¹⁷⁶ The Germans were now

¹⁷² Thord Plaenge Jacobsen, "Danmarks studenter", *Ergo*, Volume Number 20m No.11, 16 October 1943.

¹⁷³ Note: When the invasion of Denmark was a reality on April 9th, at 04.15 in the morning, King Christian X and the government of Prime Minister Thorvald Stauning, urged the Danish population not resist the invasion. This decision had been made on April 8th, when the Danish government received information from Berlin that an invasion of Denmark was imminent. In order to protect the country's sovereignty it was therefore decided that the country would surrender to the German invasion. This resolution was based on the allies' unwillingness to aid Denmark's in the case of an invasion. Hans Kirchhoff, *Kamp eller tilpasning: Politikerne og modstanden 1940-1945*, (Copenhagen: Gyendal, 1987), 25.

¹⁷⁴ Redogörelser avgivna till den svenska utrikesnämnden av ministern för utrikes ärendena 1941-1945, *Sveriges förhållande til Danmark och Norge under krigsåren*, (Stockholm: P.A Norstedt & Söners, 1945), 241-242.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 242.

¹⁷⁶ In Denmark the elected government continued to govern the country and it was the German Foreign Department that handled Danish matters, not the SS or NSDAP (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei). The German plenipotentiary in Denmark therefore had less power than the Reichkommissar in Norway, who

the only authority in Denmark. As a result, the Danish army was disbanded by the Germans, the Danish fleet was sunk by its own crew and several professors from the University of Copenhagen were arrested.

It has been difficult to obtain any secondary sources that can explain why the professors were arrested, but it is possible that they, as their Norwegian counterparts, reacted to the violations that the Germans had implemented upon the Danish population. Further, it is possible that the Danish professors, as their Norwegian colleagues, had close links to the resistance movement and that this was the reason for their arrest in August 1943. This argument is strengthened when considering that the Danish students protested strongly against the persecution of the Danish Jews in October 1943. This protest gave the Germans a reason to make the arrest of professors and students. Throughout October several rumours stated that the students would be sent to mandatory work service in Germany.¹⁷⁷ As a result, the many Danish students fled to Sweden.

Since the invasion of Denmark and Norway, the Swedish students had focused more on the severe situation of the Norwegian students than the situation of the Danish students. The reason was as Gaudeamus mentioned «for a long time it has been the belief that Denmark was to escape the experience which other occupied countries have gone through», but as Gaudemaus continued to reason «because of the occupational force continuing nervousness, our southern neighbour have come under the reign of terror».¹⁷⁸ According to Gaudeamus, the Danish had played an important role in keeping the Danish public conscience intact. This argument was supported by the other student newspapers. In *Ergo* it was stated that «we Swedish students have an sincere admiration for what the Danish students have accomplished these last years».¹⁷⁹ The influence of the Danish students is clearly visible at Uppsala University where at a meeting concerning events in Denmark the students decided not to comment the Norwegian professors' protest letter.¹⁸⁰

could issue his own orders. Denmark had become an occupied country, but not a conquered one, and was therefore in the eyes of the Danish government a neutral state. To preserve this neutrality an agreement was made between the Germans and the Danish government, stating that the occupational force should neither was not to interfere in Denmark's internal affairs, nor violate its neutrality. This agreement was not always respected, but both Germans and Danish officials preferred to uphold this fictional idea that everything was fine. Kirchhoff, *Kamp eller tilpasning*, 34.

¹⁷⁷ Palle Roslyng – Jensen, *Danskerne og Besættelsen: holdninger och meningar 1939-1945*, (Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 2007), 254.

¹⁷⁸ "Danmark", *Gaudeamus*, Volume Number 20, No.6, October 1943.

¹⁷⁹ Thord Plaenge Jacobsen, "Danmarks studenter", *Ergo*, Volume Number 20, No.11, 16 October 1943.

¹⁸⁰ Uppsala University, Nordiska Utskottet, "§15", 25 October 1943.

In *Lundagård* and *Ergo* it is possible to observe some awareness about the significance of the influx of the Danish students to Sweden. *Lundagård* was particularly interested in keeping the Danish students in Lund, because they argued «as Uppsala University has become the centre for the Norwegian students, Lund University has to become the centre for the Danish students».¹⁸¹ On October 16 *Ergo* stated that factions within Uppsala University were trying to get some of the Danish students to Uppsala, with the argument that it was only through the fleeing students that the Swedish students could understand the events in Denmark.¹⁸² The reason why both *Lundagård* and *Ergo* wanted the Danish students at their own university, was the respect these student newspapers held for the battle that the students had fought against the German occupation. In *Lundagård* it was reasoned that the Swedish population looked up to the Danish culture because of its mature development.¹⁸³ This sentiment was not shared by everyone at Lund University, because on October 15 and October 16, *Arbetet* and *GHT* could report that a poster had been hung in the vestibule at Lund University, protesting against the Danish Jews coming to Sweden.¹⁸⁴ The poster was quickly removed, and on November 9, *Lundagård* published an article by student Allan Ekberg, in which he clearly stated that even though the majority of the students were politically indifferent, they disagreed with the poster's message.¹⁸⁵ Interestingly, Ekberg did argue in this article that «barely has our country become independent enough that it dares to protest regarding to the violation our neighbours are going through...».¹⁸⁶ This demonstrates that at least Ekberg was aware that the Swedish government, and consequently the Swedish people, were now freer to respond to any German violations in occupied countries. This feeling of freedom is clearly demonstrated in *Gaudeamus*' choice to write that it was the Germans who had committed the violations against the Danish students.¹⁸⁷ Such an outspoken reaction had not occurred since the responses against the arrest of Rector Seip in September 1941, and was a clear sign of the changes that had occurred in Sweden during 1943.

Was the Nordic Idea present in how the Swedish students viewed and described the events in Denmark? As mentioned above, that the two student newspapers *Lundagård* and *Ergo* wrote about the respect and admiration the Swedish students had for their colleagues in

¹⁸¹ »Inför händelserna i Danmark», *Lundagård*, Volume Number 24, No. 9, 11 October 1943.

¹⁸² Thord Plaenge Jacobsen, «Danmarks studenter», *Ergo*, Volume Number 20, No.11, 16 October 1943.

¹⁸³ »Danmark och norden», *Lundagård*, Volume Number 24, No.8, 27 September 1943.

¹⁸⁴ »Lunds nazistiska studenter i aktion», *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, Volume Number 112, 15 October 1943: »Fullt tilltag av nazistiska lundastudenter», *Arbetet*, 14 October 1943.

¹⁸⁵ »Svenska folket undrar», *Lundagård*, Volume Number 24, No.11, 9 November 1943.

¹⁸⁶ »Svenska folket undrar», *Lundagård*, Volume Number 24, No.11, 9 November 1943.

¹⁸⁷ »Danmark», *Gaudeamus*, Volume Number 20, No.6, October 1943.

Denmark. It can be argued that this admiration came from the long traditions the two countries had of working for better connections between the Nordic countries, first through Scandinavism and later through the Nordic Idea. In Chapter 2, it was stated that it was easier for Denmark and Sweden to work for these ideas, while Norway for long periods opposed any cooperation with its neighbouring countries. It is clear that the long relationship between the Sweden and Denmark heavily influenced the way the Swedish students wrote about the Danish students' protests. The way in which they wrote about the Danish students showed that the Swedish students had waited for a chance to write about their colleagues in Denmark. As a consequence of the increased attention the Swedish students gave Denmark was that the Norwegian professors' protest letter was left out. It would, however, not be long before the Norwegian students and professors had regained the attention of the Swedish students; on November 30, 1943, the University of Oslo was closed.

In this subchapter it was demonstrated that the reason for why the Swedish students did not comment upon the letter of protest from the Norwegian professors, was because of the influx of Danish students in Sweden from October 1943.

4.4 Summary

The main argument of this chapter has been that the Swedish students lack of reaction to the Norwegian students protest letter in February 1943 and the Norwegian professors protest letter was out of the ordinary. This argument was made after the examination of the Swedish students reactions in both May 1942 to the conflict between NS and the Norwegian clergy and teachers, and in October 1943 when the students supported the Danish students.

The protest in May 1942 was a protest against NS and not the Germans, which can demonstrate how well informed the Swedish students were about the events in Oslo. The protest was the first sign that the students were moving away from the government's careful politics, because by protesting against NS the students were protesting against the German occupational force in Norway. This went against the Swedish government's encouragement to protect Sweden's neutrality.

It could have been possible to argue that the Swedish students' were protecting Sweden's neutrality in February 1943 when they did not react to the Norwegian students protest letter. Yet, the relationship between the Swedish and Norwegian governments had started to thaw by February and the immediate threat of an German invasion had diminished.

Dagens Nyheter and GHT's articles about the protest by the Norwegian students were short but detailed. It was argued that this might have had something to do with the newspapers support of the pro-Norwegian opposition's pressure on the Swedish government to end the transit of German soldiers through Sweden. If Arbetet wanted to help the pro-Norwegian opposition, is difficult to say, since its editor was a part of the Social-Democratic party. Yet, as it was mentioned in Chapter 1, the newspaper did change its perspective on the war in 1942/1943, and it can therefore be reasoned that through its detailed article, the newspaper wanted to indirectly help the opposition. It was also, argued that Arbetet most likely had a reporter in Oslo, because of the details the newspaper had about the events.

Dagens Nyheter was the only daily newspaper that mentioned the protest in September in 1943. Interestingly, the newspaper had a conclusion to why the arrests had taken place; the inner conflicts in NS. It was concluded by the newspaper that Hoel was a part of the moderate wing, which was interesting since Hoel was not the "leader" of the moderate wing within NS. No name was mentioned in connection with the aggressive wing, which was argued to have been because there was no immediate leader of this wing.

The Swedish students did not mention the Norwegian professors protest, which was due to the arrival of the Danish students in Sweden. It was argued in subchapter 4.3.1 that the Swedish students had hoped that Denmark would survive the war without coming under any form of reign of terror. Yet, since Denmark did at the end of August the Swedish students expressed their respect and solidarity with the Danish students. It was also argued that the presence of the Nordic Idea in the Swedish students articles, they had perhaps waited for a chance to demonstrate their support for the Danish students.

The Nordic Idea was present in the Swedish students protest in May 1942. It was also a testimony of how the Swedish students felt about the Norwegian population. It is, however, difficult to argue that the Nordic Idea was present amongst the Swedish students in February 1943 and September 1943, since there was no reaction to the protests. Yet, with the reactions in connection with the influx of the Danish students in Sweden, it can be argued that the Swedish students had not abandoned the ideas of the Nordic Idea behind. The Nordic Idea was present in the daily newspapers through the pro-Norwegian opposition.

The differences between the daily newspapers and student newspapers are clear in this chapter. Whereas the daily newspapers mentioned both the Norwegian students protest in February 1943 and the Norwegian professors protest in September 1943, the student newspapers did not.

Chapter 5: «The Norwegian students cause is our cause»¹⁸⁸

November 1943- January 1944.

This chapter will focus on the reactions of the Swedish students, the daily newspapers and the Swedish government upon learning that the German occupational force had closed the University of Oslo on November 30, 1943, and arrested its students, professors and lecturers. The chapter has been divided into three main parts: the reason for these events, the reactions to them, and the consequences.

Part two, concerning the reactions, will itself be divided into three: the Swedish government's appeal to the German government in Berlin, the reactions of the daily newspapers, and finally the reactions of the Swedish academics. The aim is to see how these three institutions of Swedish society may influenced each other. How was the Swedish government's appeal to Berlin received by its population? Did the government, as the highest political instance in Sweden influence whose/which reactions the Swedish newspapers could report on? What were the reactions from the Norwegian exile government to the Swedish appeal to Berlin, and even more importantly, how did the Norwegian exile government react when the Swedish government withdrew its appeal and stated that no measures were to be taken against Germany? Also, can an examination of the daily newspapers reveal why the Swedish population felt so strongly about the closing of the University of Oslo? Did the government and the daily newspapers influence the Swedish academics' reactions to the arrests, or was the academics reaction a testimony to the old relationship between the university institutions of Norway and Sweden? How were the reactions received by the Norwegian students? And finally, regarding all three reactions and protests: Was the Nordic Idea the driving force behind these protests and reactions? How did the Nordic Idea manifest itself?

The third part, concerning the consequences, will look at the result of these reactions, namely the cancellation of the Swedish-German cultural connections. This issue became important for the Swedish students, but even the daily newspapers would view this as an important issue. How did the Swedish students defend their decision to end these connections? Was the Nordic Idea the motivation behind the decision? And how did the daily newspapers, other Swedish students, and students in Great Britain and USA react?

¹⁸⁸ ””Norska studenternas sak är vår”, *Aftonbladet*, Volume number 114, No. 330, 4 December 1943.

5.1 The University of Oslo is closed

The many conflicts that had occurred at the University of Oslo during the occupation culminated with the students being blamed for the fire that had erupted in the university's Assembly Hall during the night of November 28, 1943.¹⁸⁹ On November 29, Reich Commissar Terboven informed the leader of the German Sicherheitsdienst in Norway, Herbert Noot, and the leader of the Sicherheitspolizei (SIPO) in Norway, Heinrich Fehlis, how he planned to resolve the conflict at the university. The Reich Commissar's plan was to order the arrest of the students at the University of Oslo and the University College of Trondheim, excepting loyal students and females. The two German officials were able to change Terboven's mind about the students in Trondheim, but he was adamant about arresting the students in Oslo. It was decided they would act the next day, November 30. The reason for their hurry was the wish to stop students or individuals connected to them from being tipped off. Even the Ministerial President Quisling and minister Skancke were informed of the plan only hours before it was implemented. Quisling had no objections to the plan, because, as Sem Fure argues, «he had already used the State Police against the university and had shown great resentment towards the institution».¹⁹⁰ Minister Skancke had failed in his university politics, and therefore had no authority to oppose the German decision. Gestapo was given the main responsibility for the arrest and the interrogations, but due to the high number of arrestees it became necessary to use the Wehrmacht's material and personnel. 300 men and several trucks were prepared for the arrests due to take place the next day at 11.00 a.m.

Despite Terboven's efforts to keep the plans a secret, the Wehrmacht's transport leader, Lieutenant Colonel Theodor Stelzer informed Arvid Brodersen, a Research Fellow at the university, with connections both to the resistance movement and the university, about the impending arrests. Stelzer belonged to a circle of officers that conspired against Hitler, and played a key role in the failed assassination attempt on the Führer on July 20, 1944. Stelzer's tip allowed, Brodersen to contact other students to discuss how best to inform the student population and when to do it. The timing was crucial, as informing the students too early might make them believe the warning to be a false alarm and return to the university.¹⁹¹ It was decided not to inform the students of the exact time of the arrest, as the leaking of such

¹⁸⁹ Note: Historians have to date not been able to figure out who set the Assembly Hall on fire. The Germans blamed it on Communistic elements, whereas NS oriented newspapers blamed the students at the University of Oslo. Others argued that it had been the German occupational force that had set the Hall on fire so as to have a reason to persecute political fractions within the Norwegian society. Sem Fure, *Universitetet i kamp*, 263-265.

¹⁹⁰ Sem Fure, *Universitetet i kamp*, 266

¹⁹¹ *Ibid*, 268.

precise information might imperil Stelzer. Another difficulty was the fact that the Faculties were spread all over Oslo, making it difficult to inform all the students. Further, many students had seminars, exams or clinical studies, which prevented them leaving the university's premises. The law students, who were in the middle of an exam when the rest of the student population was informed, were arrested. Many other students were arrested because they lingered too close to the university buildings as the Gestapo surrounded the university grounds.

5.2 the immediate reactions from the Swedish population

5.2.1 The Swedish government takes a stand

The Swedish reactions to the events of November 30, 1943, exceeded any previous Swedish response to wartime violations at the University of Oslo. When they were notified about the closing of the University of Oslo, the rectors from Uppsala University, Lund University and Stockholm University College immediately conferred with each other over the telephone on how to react to the news.¹⁹² The outcome of this telephone call was that the Rector of Uppsala University and the President of Svenska Föreande Studentkårer (Swedish United Student Unions) met with the Swedish Prime Minister, Per Albin Hansson, in order to make him aware of where the academics stood on the issue. *Aftonbladet*, a governmental oriented daily newspaper, reported that the meeting had lasted for half an hour, but that it was not known how the Prime Minister had viewed the statement of the academics, or what promises he had given them.¹⁹³ However, the academics must have influenced the Foreign Minister, Christian Günther, because on December 2, he sent an appeal to the German minister in Stockholm:

The Swedish government have been notified about the measures that has been carried out towards students and teachers at the University of Oslo. The government is hoping that the process will be stopped. Especially the intention of sending the students out of Norway. In the best interest of the future relationship between Sweden and Germany, the Swedish government is appealing to the German government to succumb to the Swedish population's wishes.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹² "Protestaktioner från de svenska universiteten och studentkårerna", *Arbetet*, 1 December 1943.

¹⁹³ "Telefonkonferens mellan rektorerna", *Aftonbladet*, Volume Number 114, No.327, 1 December 1943.

¹⁹⁴ "Svensk vädjan i Berlin för norgestudenterna", *Arbetet*, Volume Number 57, No.279, 2 December 1943.

The Swedish government's initiative was well received by both the Swedish population and the Norwegian exile government. The city of Gävle sent its support to the government, stating that they were pleased with the government's reactions towards the arrests in Oslo.¹⁹⁵ At a protest meeting that attracted 12.000 Swedes in Linköping, it was stated that «We, the citizens have no other choice than to make our government understand that we are willing to suffer to the restrictions that might come if the trade relations are broken with Germany».¹⁹⁶ Clearly, the Swedish population had waited for their government to take a stand against Germany, and when they finally did, the people's support was profound. Yet, no one was more appreciative of this statement than the Norwegian exile government.

On December 6, 1943 Arbetet included a speech held in London by Education Minister Nils Hjelmtveit of the Norwegian exile government. The minister spoke of the Swedish population's protest against the transgressions at the University of Oslo, and stated that «what has now occurred only shows that the feeling of Nordic solidarity and spiritual friendship is still present amongst the Nordic countries». However, what pleased him most was the fact that their protest against Berlin demonstrated that the Swedish government valued Nordic solidarity in cultural questions.¹⁹⁷ Even the Norwegian resistance movement showed its appreciation for the appeal from the Swedish government. «Sweden is with us», the resistance movement stated, and they argued that «(...) if Sweden wants friendship and unity after the war, it should be made known that this appeal has contributed greatly. The Swedes have acted, and it is now for the Germans to decide on the consequences».¹⁹⁸ The reason behind the Norwegian governmental officials' appreciation of the Swedish government's appeal can be found in the relatively good relationship that had been established between the two governments. By December 1943, the Swedish government had ended the transportation of German soldiers through Sweden. They had also allowed the establishment of a Norwegian police troop in Sweden (though they did not admit this to the Germans) and the Norwegian exile government was officially acknowledged through diplomatic representation at the Swedish government. But when Germany's Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, answered the Swedish appeal, the Norwegian exile government finally understood that the Swedish government would not openly support them until Germany was no longer a threat.

¹⁹⁵ »Protest för Norge i Gävlefullmäktige2, *Dagens Nyheter*, 7 December 1943.

¹⁹⁶ »12.000 mötte upp i Linköping till protest mot tyska aktionen», *Dagens Nyheter*, 6 December 1943.

¹⁹⁷ »Norsk tillfredsställelse i London över det svenska initiativet», *Arbetet*, 6 December 1943.

¹⁹⁸ »Ett tack från Norge skall gå över Kölen», *Dagens Nyheter*, 7 December 1943.

On December 4, von Ribbentrop informed Stockholm that the German government declined the Swedish request for a discussion of the recent violations in Norway. He demanded that «the Swedish government (should) refrain from interfering in matters of Norwegian-German nature in the future».¹⁹⁹ This reply was not well received by the Swedes, particularly the Prime Minister. Alf W. Johansson argues that the appeal sent of December 2, must have been published without Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson's full knowledge of its content, because when discussing whether to respond to von Ribbentrop's answer, Hansson particularly criticised the sentence where the Swedish-German relations had been mentioned.²⁰⁰ The Prime Minister did not wish to create conflict between Stockholm and Berlin, because he did not think such a disagreement would benefit the Norwegian population. The Swedish press was expecting the government's answer to finally establish Sweden's support of the Allies. Yet, the press were disappointed with the Prime Minister's statement in the Social Democrats newspaper *Social-Democraten* that «Sweden will not take out any measures against Germany».²⁰¹ Then why was a reply given on December 17 to Ribbentrop's answer?

At the end of December 1943 GHT and the pro-Norwegian newspaper *Trots Allt!* reported that the Swedish government had replied to Ribbentrop on December 17.²⁰² They stated that the government had proclaimed that «the Swedish government cannot accept the German argument that it (Swedish government) has no right to intervene on behalf of the Norwegian people». Further it was stated that «the development in the Nordic countries, countries that Sweden has strong ties to, is not irrelevant to the Swedish government and population».²⁰³ The reply concluded that the arrest of the Norwegian students and professors would harm Swedish-German relations. Yet, according to Alf W. Johansson, the Swedish government did not discuss the adoption of stricter policies towards Germany until a few

¹⁹⁹ Redogörelser avgivna till den svenska utrikesnämnden, *Sveriges förhållande till Danmark och Norge under krigsåren*, 212.

²⁰⁰ Johansson, *Per Albin och Kriget*, 332.

²⁰¹ *Ibid*, 333.

Note: The newspaper *Social-Democraten* was established in 1885 by August Palm, the same man that would establish the political party the Social Democrats. Petersson, "Tidningar som industri och parti", 277.

²⁰² "Sverige svarar", *Trots Allt!*, Volume Number 5, No.52, 24-30 December 1943: "Utvecklingen i Norge ej ovidkommande för svenska folket", *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, Volume Number 112, No.294, 20 December 1943.

²⁰³ "Utvecklingen i Norge ej ovidkommande för svenska folket", *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, Volume Number 112, No.294, 20 December 1943: "Sverige svarar", *Trots Allt!*, Volume Number 53, No.5, 24-30 December 1943.

months later, and then in relation to other German demands.²⁰⁴ Where then did this statement come from? Lennart Oldenburg argues that the government had published the article. But when keeping in mind the Prime Minister's unwillingness to answer Ribbentrop, it seems likely that the answer of December 17, like Günther's appeal, had been distributed without Hansson's consent. So, who then within the government might have written this reply? During 1943 a slight split in the government had become apparent. Prime Minister Hansson and Foreign Minister Günther preferred a pragmatic neutrality lenient toward German demands. They were opposed by the Minister of Finance Ernst Wigforss, the Minister of Trade Herman Eriksson and the Social Minister Gustav Möller, who wanted the government to adopt a stricter attitude towards Germany.²⁰⁵ It is therefore feasible that the statement had come from the more radical wing of the government. But why would Günther send an appeal to the German government if he supported a pragmatic neutrality?

Since his inauguration as Foreign Minister in 1939, Günther had been charged with both the protection of Swedish-German relations and keeping up with the state affairs in the Nordic countries, especially Norway. Most likely, his interest in Norway was due to many years spent as the Swedish envoy in Oslo. Protecting the Nordic interests and the Swedish-German simultaneously was no easy task, and when the fear of a German invasion became too strong, his protection of the Nordic interests faltered. It is therefore feasible that Günther's appeal of December 2 was an attempt to repair the Swedish relations with Norway after years of neglect. Günther had published his appeal with the best of intentions, but as argued above, this appeal had no authority without the Prime Minister's consent. This development was not well received in London. This was demonstrated by Dagens Nyheter on December 14.

Dagens Nyheter reported that on December 10 a comment about the Swedish government's change of mind had been on London radio. Who had made the comment was not amplified, but the comment had argued that the Swedish appeal had increased the anticipation of the Allies that the Swedish government would join them, and «bravely and finally have put themselves in the company of the nations that have decided to fight against tyranny, and slavery oppression».²⁰⁶ But, the comment argued, as the Swedish government had changed its mind it would have been better if the appeal had never been made, because then «the whole world would not have become aware of the Swedish government's

²⁰⁴Johansson, *Per Albin och kriget*, 333.

²⁰⁵ Johansson, *Per Albin och kriget*, 333-334.

²⁰⁶ "Ny Sverigekritik i brittiska radion", *Dagens Nyheter*, No.340, 14 December 1943.

ambiguity». ²⁰⁷ It is important to note that these negative statements were directed towards the government, and not the Swedish population itself. Just a couple of days earlier, *Dagens Nyheter* had reported that a spokesman for the Norwegian exile government announced the thankfulness of the Norwegian people to the Swedish population for their support regarding the November 30 violations in Oslo. ²⁰⁸

In this subchapter it has been looked at how the Swedish Foreign Minister sent an appeal to Berlin with the request to stop the deportation of the Norwegian students. The answer from the German government was negative, and as a result the Swedish Prime Minister refused to take out any measures against the Germans. The reactions from the Swedish population and Norwegian exile government was at first positive, but turned negative with the Prime Minister's answer. In the following subchapter the daily newspapers reactions will be looked at.

5.2.2 The daily newspapers reactions

On December 1, the Swedish population could read all about the events which had taken place at the University of Oslo the day before. Including the details about the actually arrests, which *Arbetet* also printed, *Dagens Nyheter* and *GHT* could report that the arrested students had been held in the Assembly Hall for a few hours before being visited by Wilhelm Rediess, leader of both the German SS in Norway and the police force. ²⁰⁹ The three newspapers stated that Rediess had held a speech proclaiming that the arrests had been made because of the disobedience the university had showed the German occupational force and NS; the arrests were a measure taken to protect the state, and to maintain the peace of the Norwegian society. ²¹⁰ The inclusion of this speech clearly demonstrates that the daily newspapers were well informed, and yet they were unaware that the Reich Commissar Terboven had been present. The Reich Commissar had only made a short appearance, but this presence clearly indicates the importance of the arrests to the German occupational force in Norway. However, Berlin viewed the arrests differently. Upon learning learning about the arrests, German

²⁰⁷ "Ny Sverigekritik i brittiska radion", *Dagens Nyheter*, No.340, 14 December 1943.

²⁰⁸ "Sveriges vänner djupt besvikna", *Dagens Nyheter*, No, 338, 12 December 1943.

²⁰⁹ "Alla Oslos studenter häktade, de flesta till läger i Tyskland", *Dagens Nyheter*, No.327, 1 December 1943: "Oslostudenterna arresteras och deporteras", *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, Volume Number 112, No.278, 1 December 1943.

²¹⁰ "Alla Oslos studenter häktade, de flesta till läger i Tyskland", *Dagens Nyheter*, No.327, 1 December 1943: "Oslostudenterna arresteras och deporteras", *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, Volume Number 112, No.278, 1 December 1943.

Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels stated that the arrests were « an obvious mistake».²¹¹ The Propaganda Minister was clearly concerned that the arrests could damage the relations between Germany and Sweden. Berlin was undoubtedly aware of the pro-Norwegian opposition in Sweden, and was probably conscious that this opposition would exploit this new violation of the Norwegian population. Germany could not afford a hostile Sweden, because the German war industry needed the Swedish iron ore. Still the German government had to agree with Terboven's decision. The Swedish population was not pleased.

In early December the Swedish Authors Association stated that the arrests were a «decapitation of the Norwegian people».²¹² On Sunday December 5, a Church meeting was held in the Katarina Church in Stockholm, as a tribute to «our Norwegian brothers».²¹³ In Chapter 2 it was mentioned that the Nordic Idea and Scandinavism was based on the idea that the Nordic countries shared a bond through their shared language, history and culture; in a sense they were brothers. The Swedish protests were clearly built upon the idea of a Nordic brotherhood, which itself built upon the Nordic Idea . This was made evident at the big protest meeting in Linköping on December 5. The meeting had been arranged by the local Swedish-Norwegian Association in Linköping, and among the attendees were the President of the student union at Stockholm University College and a representation of Uppsala University, professor Per Ölof Ekelöf.²¹⁴ On the day after the meeting in Linköping and at Katarina Church, a meeting was held at Gävle city council, held a meeting in the «...hope that it might be found possible to avert the continuing campaign against our Norwegian blood kin, which threatens their freedom, and thus our Nordic rule of law and culture».²¹⁵

It is clear that that the Swedish reactions were founded upon the Nordic Idea. But, this was hardly extraordinary keeping in mind the long relationship between the two countries. The fact that the Germans were losing ground in Europe and that the Swedish government had taken a stand against the violations, made it easier for the Swedish population to react in relation to any events in Norway. This change is evident when comparing the reaction in December 1943 to the complete lack of reaction when Norway was invaded in April 1940. The silence of the Swedish population's in 1940 was not due to hard feelings towards the Norwegians, but rather the Swedish government's fear of a German invasion. Alf W.

²¹¹ Sem Fure, *Universitetet i kamp*, 271.

²¹² "Med sitt våld har ockupationsmakten blottat sin svaghet", *Arbetet*, Volume Number 57, No.281, 4 December 1943.

²¹³ "Kyrkligt opinionsmöte i Katarina", *Aftonbladet*, No.329, 3 December 1943.

²¹⁴ "12.000 mötte upp i Linköping till protest mot tyska aktionen", *Dagens Nyheter*, 6 December 1943.

²¹⁵ "Protest för Norge i Gävlefullmäktige", *Dagens Nyheter*, 7 December 1943.

Johansson argues that during the invasion of Norway, the Swedish government saw it as embarrassing that they did not to help their neighbour in the west, when they had helped Finland during its war with Russia.²¹⁶ *Gaudeamus* had as early as May 1940 brought to mind Sweden's responsibility to help its Norwegian neighbours in their battle for their freedom.²¹⁷

It has to be argued that the government did have an influence upon the reactions in the newspapers, as the protesters wanted the government to take firmer stand against the Berlin after Ribbentrop's reply to the appeal. This is demonstrated by the statement that was made in Linköping that «we are willing to suffer the restrictions that might come if the trade relations are broken with Germany». The Swedish population press and population were waiting for the Swedish government to join the Allied side, and they were ready to face the consequences of such an action. That the daily newspapers were the media to report about these sentiments can demonstrate the importance of newspapers in distributing information and including a response. It is the newspaper's duty to inform the population about events occurring at home and abroad, but the interpretation of this information is solely up to the reader. It can be argued that if it had not been for the newspapers or T.T., then the Swedish population would not have received any information about the conflict in Oslo; perhaps there would have been simply a rumour which could not have been acted upon unless verified by the government. It is interesting to note that the Swedish students were informed about the conflict in Oslo through T.T., clearly indicating that if not for the news agency not even the students would have known about the arrests.²¹⁸ It is clear that the Norwegians noticed the importance of the Swedish press in inducing a strong reaction, because on December 8, NS member Dagfinn Gjessing, an NS-man, wanted to teach the Swedish press about the «law of war».²¹⁹ Gjessing argued that since the Swedish population still lived in peace, they thought about the war in a peaceful manner, and never about the fact that other countries were in a different situation. The Swedish press, Gjessing reasoned, helped to maintain this idea, which caused the Swedish population to react negatively when the German occupational force in Norway had to deal with the realities of war and force its will upon the Norwegian population. The fact that

²¹⁶ Johansson, *Per Albin och kriget*, 149.

During the war in Finland Swedish men and women had made an effort to help the Finnish troops with food and clothing, and many Swedish young men had gone to war on Finland's side. Even the Swedish government, who had proclaimed that they would not intervene, aided the Swedish voluntaries with clothes and weapons from the army, but when Norway was invaded in April 1940, the Swedish government got their hands tied by German demands concerning Sweden's neutrality. Johansson, *Per Albin och kriget*, 103-111.

²¹⁷ L.H, "Andra akten", *Gaudeamus*, Volume Number 17, No.4, April 1940.

²¹⁸ "En vecka vi aldrig glömmet", *Gaudemaus*, No.9, December 1943.

²¹⁹ "Svenskarna måste lära krigets lag", *Aftonbladet*, No.335, 9 December 1943: "Quislingsman lär svenskarna krigets lag", *Dagens Nyheter*, No.335, 9 December 1943.

Gjessing viewed Sweden as peaceful, demonstrates his lack of knowledge about the real sentiments of the Swedish people.

In this subchapter it has been demonstrated that the daily newspapers reported about the reactions from the Swedish peoples. It was also argued that through the daily newspapers it is possible to argue that both the newspapers and the Swedish population had been influenced by the protest from the Swedish government. In the following subchapter it will be looked at the Swedish academics reactions.

5.2.3 The Swedish academics reactions

«A week we will never forget» was the headline in *Gaudeamus*'s December issue in 1943.²²⁰ *Gaudeamus* was referring to the week in which the Swedish students had learned about the arrest of their Norwegian colleagues and their risk of being deported to Germany. The daily newspapers might not have had an impact on the Swedish students' protest, but the daily newspapers were the medium where the Swedish population could read about the students protests.

On December 2, *Aftonbladet* reported that to respond against the recent violations in Oslo, the students at Uppsala would march from the University Library towards Uppsala University On December 4.²²¹ Further, it was mentioned that at the end of the demonstration, the President of the Student Union and the Rector of the university would hold speeches. After the event, *Aftonbladet* wrote that the Rector had proclaimed that it was not a time for hate, because there was already too much hatred in the world. It was however, a time to show the world that the Nordic countries stood together, and express that the Norwegian students' were more than welcome to Sweden.²²² The reactions from the students was strong, and for the first time since the beginning of the war, it included the professors and lecturers. It has not been possible to find any indication that the professors had supported the students' protests in previous years. It has to be argued, however, that it was the magnitude of the conflict now occurring in Oslo, that made the professors want to support the students; as the Rector of Uppsala University put it, «the Norwegian students cause is our cause».²²³ The student union president had proclaimed that «No stone will be left unturned – the deportation to

²²⁰ "En vecka vi aldrig glömmert", *Gaudemaus*, Volume Number 20, No.9, December 1943.

²²¹ "Uppsalastudenterna demonstrera", *Aftonbladet*, Volume Number 114, No.328, 2 December 1943.

²²² "Norska studenternas sak är vår!", *Aftonbladet*, No. 330, 4 December 1943.

²²³ "Norska studenternas sak är vår", *Aftonbladet*, Volume number 114, No. 330, 4 December 1943.

Germany cannot happen».²²⁴ The demonstration in Uppsala clearly built upon the Nordic Idea, which was important for the Swedish students and academics. The prominence of the Nordic Idea was present in *Gaudeamus*, where it was stated that the reaction had not occurred because demagogy, but because it had felt natural and right to respond on the behalf of the Norwegian students.²²⁵ The usage of the word «natural» can be traced back to the natural bond which Scandinavism and the Nordic Idea perceived to exist between the Nordic countries, based on the common language, history and culture.

The protests created by Lund University and Stockholm University College had also this aspect of the Nordic Idea. On December 2, approximately 700 to 800 students had attended a meeting at Lund University, where a resolution had been created. This resolution stated that drastic measures had to be taken to protect the relationship between Sweden and Norway, and by that working for the Nordic Idea.²²⁶ This indicates the importance the Swedish students placed on Sweden's relationship to its neighbouring countries and the perception of the Nordic countries as brothers. As *Lundagård* put it «the newest German violation is not only an infringement towards Norway, Norwegian citizens and Norwegian culture, but a violation towards the Nordic countries».²²⁷ On December 3, a demonstration organised by the Stockholm University College attracted 3000 students. The demonstration in Stockholm had started at the premises of the university college, and ended up in front of the building of the Norwegian Legation. Here, the demonstration had ended after the crowd had sung the Norwegian and Swedish National Anthems, and a speech by the Secretary of the Norwegian Prime Minister in exile, Hans Christian Berg. The minister had stated that «on behalf of my countrymen I would like to direct a heartfelt thank you to the Swedish students, because of the support you have shown your Norwegian brothers, this have deeply moved us».²²⁸ The Prime Minister's Secretary was not the only Norwegian to express gratitude towards the Swedish students, because on December 13 *Dagens Nyheter* could report that the Swedish students had received a telegram of gratitude from the Norwegian students in London.²²⁹ «It is not an utopian idea that we have to take a firm stand in today's situation, but rather the reality ... the Swedish students have with the rector of Uppsala University showed that they have taken a stand, and I will like to present my gratitude to all of you, as well as the

²²⁴ ””Norska studenternas sak är vår!””, *Aftonbladet*, No.330, 4 December 1943.

²²⁵ ”En vecka vi aldri glömmet”, *Gaudeamus*, No.9, December 1943.

²²⁶ ”Lunds studenter avge protest”, *Arbetet*, 3 December 1943.

²²⁷ ”Oslostudenterna”, *Lundagård*, Volume Number 24, No.13, 14 December 1943.

²²⁸ ”Stor hyllning vid norska legationen”, *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, No.281, 4 December 1943.

²²⁹ ”Norsk studentsamband sänder tacktelegram”, *Dagens Nyheter*, No.339, 13 December 1943.

entire Swedish population». Even students from other countries wanted to praise the Swedish students, and the International Council of Students in Britain stated that «We send our gratitude with the message that we have to stand together in the defence of a free university system and free research».²³⁰ From the United States the President of both the United States Student Association and the International Student Association proclaimed that «The students in the free world are deeply impressed by the protests that the Swedish students has achieved in relation to the arrests of the students and professors in Oslo».²³¹

The Swedish students were committed to the Nordic Idea and to protecting it from any threats from the outside world. This is demonstrated by the discussion that emerged at Uppsala University, in relation to the Danish and Norwegian students' unwillingness to let the Finnish students attend the demonstration. The demonstrations in both Stockholm and Uppsala had the Norwegian, Swedish and Danish flags at the front of the procession. The reason for the absence of the Finnish flag, at least in Uppsala, due to the fact that Finland was fighting on Germany's side of the war. This created a conflict between the Finnish students and the students from Norway and Denmark, and the animosity between them caused quite a stir at the Nordiska Utskottet (the Nordic Association) in Uppsala. The Association reasoned that this attitude from the Norwegian students came not from their own personal beliefs, but had been forced upon them by the Norwegian Legation in Stockholm. The members of the Association were clearly avid promoters of the Nordic Idea, because at a meeting the Norwegian students' views of the Finnish students were labelled frightening. This demonstrates that the Swedish students were so eager to promote for the Nordic idea that they were unable to understand the conflict the Norwegian students saw between remaining loyal to the Norwegian exile government and cooperating with the Finnish students towards a new future. It was argued that it was the Swedish students' duty to be neutral and to bring the other countries together. The solution presented by Utskottet was to send a delegation to the Legation to let the officials know their point of view.²³² It has not been possible to discover whether the students did actually send this delegation to the Legation, but considering that they even approached Prime Minister Hansson to have him to take a stand in the matter it is highly likely that they actually sent a delegation to the Legation.

²³⁰ »En hälsning från studenter i Storbritannien», *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, No.288, 13 December 1943.

²³¹ »Sveriges studenter får U.S.A-beröm», *Dagens Nyheter*, No.334, 8 December 1943.

²³² Uppsala University, Nordiska Utskottet, » §8», 16 December 1943.

The reaction to the arrests was a way for the Swedish population to show solidarity with the Norwegian students and professors. The result of the protest was a Swedish attempt to break all cultural connections with the Germans.

In this subchapter it has been demonstrated that the reactions from the Swedish academics was the strongest reaction from the Swedish population. The demonstrations that were set up at the universities attracted hundreds of students. Below it will be looked at the consequence of these reactions.

5.3 The consequence- the cancellation of the Swedish-German cultural relations

«We hope to see a result» Gustaf Liden argued in *Ergo* in December 1943.²³³ Liden was mainly referring to the protest that the Swedish government had sent to Berlin, but it is possible that he also meant the students' resolution to cancel the cultural connections with Germany.

As early as December 2, GHT had an article that cited a statement from the Rector at Lund University; «The violations that we are reading about, is of such graveness that it is difficult to defend any future contact with German scientists».²³⁴ The day before, the Rector at Gothenburg University College had proclaimed that «Germany has directed a deathblow towards the scientific and cultural organisation of Norway. Protests is in this situation of little or no value. The only action that will be understood in Germany is a cancellation of all scientific and cultural connections with Germany».²³⁵ The notion was strong among the Swedish academics that the Germans by closing the University of Oslo had rendered any future cooperation with German academics impossible. This was demonstrated at Uppsala University, when students protested against that the Swedish-German Society at the university had invited the German scientist Albert Meyer-Abich to hold a lecture on the origin of life.²³⁶ GHT stated on December 2, that an appeal had been sent to the society by several students,

²³³ »Vi hade velat se ett resultat», *Ergo*, Volume Number 20, No.15, 11 December 1943.

²³⁴ »Kontakt med tysk vetenskap hämmad för lång tid», *Goteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, Volume Number 112, No.279, 2 December 1943.

²³⁵ »Bryt de kulturella förbindelserna med Tyskland!», *Goteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, No.278, 1 December 1943.

²³⁶ »Tysk i talarstolen i Uppsala», *Goteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, No.279, 2 December 1943.

Albert Meyer-Abich was an supporter of the biological sciences. Primarily a philosophical proponent of holistic thought in biology. During the rule of Adolf Hitler he both supported the regime and opposed it. Cited by Olivier Rieppel, MIT Press Journal, *Biological Theory*, MIT Press Journal, 11. May 2011, <http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/biot.2008.3.4.357?journalCode=biot> (19.04.2012).

urging them to postpone the lecture because it would feel like «a smack in the face for the Norwegian students at the university», and no less for the Swedish students, that a German should lecture in Uppsala when his countrymen were destroying the foremost institution of higher education in the neighbouring country.²³⁷ The answer from the society was that they regretted the recent events occurring in Norway, but that this did not hinder the society from welcoming the scientist, because as the president of the society argued «our society does not deal with any form of politics (...) we have as a goal to spread knowledge about the culture of the German speaking countries».²³⁸ The consequence of the society's unwillingness to postpone the lecture was that approximately one hundred students demonstrated outside of the location where the lecture was held. The demonstrators sang two songs, the Norwegian and Swedish national anthems, and gave a cheer to «our Norwegian friends and the freedom of the Nordic universities».²³⁹ Why was it this important for the Swedish academics and students to demonstrate for the Germans that the actions in Norway were unacceptable?

It can be reasoned that the academics built their wish to show the Germans the unacceptability of their actions both on the Nordic Idea and the principle of free universities and research. As has been argued both in this chapter and previous chapters, the students had reacted to the violations at the University of Oslo on the grounds that the Nordic countries sharing a common language, history and culture. This meant that by attacking the University of Oslo the Germans were not only violating the freedom of the Norwegian academics; they were also attacking the Swedish academics and students because of their association through the Nordic Idea. In the eyes of the Swedish academics and students, this made any future cooperation between Germany and Sweden impossible. In GHT it was reported that the Gothenburg School Association had stated «We hope that any Swedish citizen will cut any link they have with the German citizens to a minimum, for as long as the Nazi regime lasts».²⁴⁰ This demonstrates how important it was for the Swedes to show the Germans their indignation over what had taken place in Oslo on November 30, 1943. The insistence upon a cancellation of all connections with Germany is interesting, because the Swedish population had been heavily influenced by Germany both culturally and scientifically since the beginning

²³⁷ »Tysk i talarstolen i Uppsala», *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, No.279, 2 December 1943.

²³⁸ »Studenterna ville inte höra tysk vetenskapsman», *Aftonbladet*, Volume Number 114, No.328 2 December 1943.

²³⁹ »Studenterna ville frysa ut tysk professor», *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, No.280, 3 December 1943.

²⁴⁰ »Nedskära de tyska förbindelserna till ett minimum!», *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, No.282, 6 December 1943.

of the 1800s. Cutting all cultural connections with Germany was therefore a bold move for the Swedish.

On December 16, the Rector at Uppsala University stated that the Swedish-German cultural exchanges had now been cancelled. The Student Union President at Uppsala elaborated, saying that «The opponents of these ideals (the freedom of research and a free university) is our common enemy, and our patience with a regime that preaches tyranny and intolerance has reached its limit» and he concluded «The representatives of these ideals are no longer welcome in our country».²⁴¹ On December 15, GHT and *Arbetet* had reported that there had been hectic activity at several universities and university colleges concerning the possible severing of cultural and scientific connections with Germany. GHT stated that discussions had already been held at Uppsala University, and that meetings had been scheduled at Lund University and Stockholm University College. The meeting at Lund University created the basis for the Lund reaction, and the meeting in Stockholm defined how the institution would cancel its connections with Germany.²⁴² In Gothenburg the Rector of the university college had stated that this reaction had not appeared as a concerted idea between the institutions, but rather as individual ideas at each university and university college.²⁴³ It is clear that it was important for the Swedish academics to show its support to its Norwegian colleagues, as well as demonstrating to its German colleagues that such behaviour was unacceptable. Yet, while many argued for a cancellation of the Swedish-German relations, others were protesting against this decision.

On December 17, GHT reported that the Nazi students at Stockholm University College had held a meeting the day before, protesting against the cancellation of the Swedish-German connections. The newspaper reported that «several of the Nazi students had emphasized upon the influence Germany had on Swedish research».²⁴⁴ One of the technology students had argued that 50 percent of the textbooks used in their studies were from Germany, and only 20 percent were Swedish. A student from the Veterinary University College had argued that 90 percent of the textbooks used were either from German or of German origin. That some students and academics were not pleased with the cancellation of the Swedish-German relations was made apparent in *Ergo*. The student paper had taken time to question

²⁴¹ »De svensk-tyska kulturförbindelserna», *Ergo*, Volume Number 21, No.1, 29 January 1944.

²⁴² »Universitetsaktioner för att avbryta tyskförbindelserna», *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, Volume Number 112, No.290, 15 December 1943.

²⁴³ »Våra akademier säga upp tysk kulturgemenskap», *Arbetet*, Volume Number 57, No.290, 15 December 1943.

²⁴⁴ »Nazistudenter gadda ihop sig», *Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning*, Volume Number 112, No.292, 17 December 1943.

several students and teachers whether they felt the cancellation to be justified or if it would be the downfall of Swedish research.²⁴⁵

Associate Professor Carl-Martin Edsman argued that «A boycott of German science and its representatives is partly impossible, and to the extent that it can be realised is something that should not occur», because, he continued «we will then embrace the retaliation politics that we ourselves detest».²⁴⁶ For the student Bertil Lauritzen a cancellation of the Swedish-German cultural connections meant that the Swedish population would not be able to watch German movies, because as he stated «we criticised in the mid-30s the Germans import prohibition of American and British movies. Are we to do the same now?». Another student, Anders Lidström argued that the cancellation would affect the old German intelligentsia, that had for years fought a silent battle for freedom of speech and research within the German borders. Sanctions, Lindström argued would isolate them even further.²⁴⁷ The ideas behind these arguments was that the Swedish academics should not lower themselves to the same levels as the German occupational force had done in Norway. If the Swedish academics did that, how then could they speak of the freedom of research and a free university. The argument went that even if the German occupational force in Norway did not respect the freedom of research, did not mean that every academic and artist had the same belief. In Lund it was stated by the three pro-German professors, Gottfrid Carlsson, Erik Rooth and Hugo Odeberg that «the impact of the cancellations can be severe, to such an extent that it would be difficult to restore the relations».²⁴⁸ Notary Erik Anners at Uppsala University, however, defended, on the other hand the decision of terminating the Swedish-German relations by arguing that «to cancel the relations is the only political weapon the Swedish academics have to collectively show our colleagues in Denmark and Norway the extent of our resentment towards the occupational force's violations». Politics can be defined as a process where a group of people makes collective decision. In their position as the country's intelligentsia the Swedish academics had the opportunity to make statements that would not go unnoticed in governmental offices, because even though they had no power over the government, they were the ones who were forming the future leaders, poets, artists and writers of the Swedish society.

²⁴⁵ »De svensk-tyska kulturförbindelserna», *Ergo*, Volume Number 21, No.1, 29 January 1944.

²⁴⁶ »De svensk-tyska kulturförbindelserna», *Ergo*, Volume Number 21, No.1, 29 January 1944.

²⁴⁷ »De svensk-tyska kulturförbindelserna», *Ergo*, Volume Number 21, No.1, 29 January 1944.

²⁴⁸ Oredsson, *Lunds universitet under andra världskriget*, 190.

In this subchapter it has been demonstrated that after the events in Oslo, the Swedish academics cancelled all cultural and scientific contact with Germany. This was well received by the majority of the Swedish students, but some argued that the cancellation would harm Sweden. The cancellation was an expression of the respect that the Swedish academics had for its Norwegian colleagues.

5.4 Summary

The Swedish reactions to the closure of the University of Oslo and the immediate arrests of its students and professors were extensive.

The Swedish government's protest was well received by the Swedish population and the Norwegian exile government, and the hope was that the Swedish government would finally join the Allied war effort. Ribbentrop's reply, however, made the Prime Minister state that no measures would be taken against Germany. The Prime Minister was afraid of the consequences if the Swedish government should act against the will of Berlin. In his opinion this would lead to nothing. Yet, there were some within the Swedish government that thought that it was time for the government to change its course, because on December 17 a reply to Ribbentrop's answer was published. It was the opinion of the newspapers that this reply had come from the government, and historians have supported this claim. Yet, since the Swedish government did not verify this claim, one can only speculate about who published the reply, though the assumption is that Eriksson, Wigforss and Möller might have published it, because of their opposition to the Prime Minister's and Foreign Minister's pragmatic neutrality.

The Norwegians in London felt that the Swedish government had showed its ambiguity by not taking any measures against the Germans. The Norwegians were, however, pleased with the Swedish students and the rest of the reactions of the general Swedish population. In subchapter 5.2.2 it was stated that the daily newspaper was the medium through which the population's protests were spread to the rest of the population. The largest protest that occurred besides from the students' protest, was the meeting in Linköping on December 5, which drew 12.000 attendees. It is difficult to know whether these reactions had been influenced chiefly by the daily newspapers coverage of the arrests, or the government's protest, but it can be stated that without T.T and the daily newspapers the majority of the Swedish population would not have been informed of the government's protest. The big difference between the reactions of the daily newspapers and the student newspapers to the events of November 30, 1943, was that the student newspapers were concerned mostly with

their own protest and the government's, whereas the daily newspapers reported on a broader scale of the many Swedish reactions and protests.

The reactions and protests of the Swedish students and academics were perhaps the most powerful responses violations at the University of Oslo, and was not influenced by the government's politics. Their reactions and protests were founded upon the idea that the Germans had violated their «brothers» freedom to study and do research undisturbed. It is interesting that the Swedish professors supported their students' reactions in December 1943. This support was of great consequence, as on December 16, it was stated that Uppsala University had cancelled their cultural connections with Germany. This was something that would be followed up by Lund University and Stockholm University College. This decision was ill received by some at the three institutions used in this discussion. Their main argument was that the cancellation of the relations would be so devastating that it would be impossible to restore them after the war. The general reaction to the cancellation was positive, however, as was argued that a cancellation was the only way that the Swedish academics could show support with their Norwegian colleagues.

The Nordic Idea was either openly used or an underlying factor in all of the reactions mentioned in this chapter. In subchapter 5.2.2 it was argued that the meetings in Linköping, Gävle and the Katarina Church had used the words «brother», «brotherhood» or «bloodkin» to explain their reactions. In Gaudeamus the word «natural» was used to explain the students' instinctive reaction upon learning about the events in Norway. The debate that occurred at the student union of Uppsala University concerning the Norwegian students' unwillingness to allow the Finnish flag be in the demonstration parade, indicates to the extent to which the students in Uppsala were willing to go in order to protect the Nordic Idea.

The differences between the student newspapers and the daily newspapers are not too clear in this chapter, because they both commented on the event in Oslo. The daily newspapers coverage of the Swedish reactions was more extensive than the student newspapers' coverage. Still, the students demonstrations and protests was arguably more widespread than the daily newspaper's coverage, since the students did end all cultural connection with Germany.

Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusion

This chapter will sum up the reactions from the student papers and daily newspapers under the two main questions «How did the student newspapers and daily newspapers react?» and «Why did the student newspapers and daily newspapers react?». It has to be kept in mind that some of the answers given to one question will also apply to the other. Then finally, a few concluding remarks will be made.

6.1 How did the student newspapers and daily newspapers react?

The student newspapers

In September 1940 the Swedish students reacted with disbelief when Det Norske Studentersamfund (DNS) was dissolved and its president being arrested. In Gaudeamus it was argued that «The Norwegian students, who we see as our close friends and colleagues, have been discriminated against, because of their decision to protect Norway's political and cultural independence». All three of the student papers used in this thesis believed it to be NS that had dissolved the union and not the Germans.

In September 1941 in relation to the arrest of Rector Didrik Arup Seip the reactions from the three student papers differed. Ergo had an article where it was mentioned that it had been the Germans that had made the arrest of the rector. In Ergo, Ingemar Hedenius was shocked that the German academics allowed this to happen to their colleagues in Norway. Gaudeamus was hindered by its own Student Union from making a comment since the union feared that a statement would be misinterpreted. This meant that the student newspaper did not make a comment before six months after the actual arrest. The article that was published in Lundagård in January 1942 was seemed as pro-German by the student population at Lund. The discussion concerning this article was not on whether the article was pro-German or not, but whether the editorial board that published the article was pro-German or not. It was concluded that the editorial board was not pro-German, but that this was a rumour set out by the opposition to the editorial board. The publishing of the article had been a streak of bad judgment during the editing of the initial article.

In May 1942 a letter of protest was created by five of the largest educational institutions in Sweden, in relation to NS's violations of the Norwegian teachers and clergy. «It is with great concern and indignation that we see how the regime in Norway, which is lacking any form of resonance with the Norwegian population, is step by step, destroying the basic values that have made the Nordic countries nations of culture» stated one part of the protest.

That the student papers did not comment upon the Norwegian students protest in February 1943 was in Chapter 4 argued to be out of the ordinary, when keeping in mind that the students had made a statement in September 1940, September 1941 and May 1942. It was not possible to conclude upon why the student papers had not commented upon this event. In relation to the students silence to the Norwegian professors' protest in September 1943 it was argued that this was caused by the influx of Danish students in Sweden.

The reactions from the student papers in relation to the closure of the University of Oslo in November 1943 were extensive. The three educational institutions had meetings and held demonstrations in support of the Norwegian students and professors. It was for example argued that «the Norwegian students cause is our cause», and «No stone will be left unturned – the deportation to Germany cannot happen». In December 1943 the three educational institutions ended all cultural and scientific connection with Germany. It was argued that «We hope that any Swedish citizen will cut any link they have with the German citizens to a minimum, for as long as the Nazi regime lasts». This was not well received by several at Uppsala University, because as it was argued «we will then embrace the retaliation politics that we our selves detest».

The daily newspapers.

The daily newspapers did not mention the dissolution of DNS, but in September 1941 the newspapers commented on the arrest of Rector Seip. It was argued in Chapter 3 that the reason for this was that by September 1941 the Swedish population had become aware of these travesties the Norwegian population was experiencing under the new regime. The pro-Norwegian opposition emerged independently to the daily newspapers articles, but it was argued that since the newspapers wrote about the arrest of Rector Seip, they were helping to enhance the importance of the opposition.

In Chapter 4 it was demonstrated that when the Swedish students did not comment upon events at the University of Oslo, the daily newspapers did. All three papers commented upon the events in February 1943, and it was argued that this was because of the pro-Norwegian opposition's wish to make the Swedish government become aware of the violations in Norway and through this, stop the transportation of German soldiers. In September 1943 Dagens Nyheter was the only newspaper that commented upon the events in Oslo, and it was of interest that the newspaper linked the protest with the conflict within NS.

When the University of Oslo was closed on November 30, 1943, the daily newspapers commented on every event that took place in Sweden; especially the appeal from the Swedish

government. In connection with the Swedish government's appeal, the daily newspapers commented on the reactions from the Norwegian exile government. One statement from the Norwegian exile government was «what has now occurred only shows that the feeling of Nordic solidarity and spiritual friendship is still present amongst the Nordic countries».

Differences and similarities.

From the findings in this thesis it is clear that compared with the student newspapers, the daily newspapers had the broadest coverage of the events at the University of Oslo, with only one event in which they did not report upon. Yet, it has to be argued that the student newspapers coverage of the events in Oslo showed a greater understanding of what had occurred. This had a lot to do with the Nordic Idea.

It has been possible to see a difference within the student newspapers in relation to how strong their reactions were to the events taking place in Oslo. Ergo always had strong articles in relation to the dissolution of Rector Seip, as well as the dissolution of DNS. Even though the newspaper had a short break during the Norwegian students and professors protests in February and September 1943, Ergo and Uppsala continued its strong reactions in December 1943. It is possible to speak of Ergo perhaps being less conservative than the university it was to represent. Gaudeamus lived up to its reputation of being liberal. Lundagård did comment on every event that took place in Oslo, except from the protests in February and September 1943. Yet, the differences from the other two student newspapers, was that the article in January 1942 would damage Lundagård's reputation.

Amongst the daily newspapers one can rather speak of similarities in how they reacted. The articles about the events in Oslo were in many cases short, but detailed. This could have had something to do with both the pro-Norwegian opposition as well as the Swedish government.

6.2 Why did the student papers and daily newspapers react?

The Nordic Idea

The main reason for why the Swedish student newspapers reacted to the events in Oslo had a lot to do with the old traditions within the student population to cooperate through the Nordic Idea. In September 1940 and September 1941 the Nordic Idea was present in Gaudeamus in the argument «of their decision to protect Norway's political and cultural independence». It seems as it was important for the Swedish students that the Norwegian cultural independence

was not threatened, because if it was, then it meant that the Swedish culture was under threat as well. As Eva Wennerström-Hartmann argued in Ergo «No one can argue that the events do not concern us».

In September 1941 Ingemar Hedenius argued in Ergo that the Swedish students had not been able to help its «brother» in need. This had a clear references to the use of the word brother in the Nordic Idea when relating to the neighbouring countries. The article in Lundagård was initially based upon a support of the rector through the Nordic Idea, but because of several amendments it came out as supportive towards why the arrests had happened. This was as already argued a streak of bad judgment during editing. In Stockholm, Gaudeamus was hindered by the student union, because it was feared that a protest based on the Nordic Idea would be misinterpreted by

As mentioned above the daily newspapers did not comment upon events at the university before September 1941, and then it had clear links to the pro-Norwegian opposition that emerged in Sweden with the state of emergency in Oslo. This idea was founded on the ideas of the Nordic Idea.

In May 1942 the protest by the Swedish students was well received by the daily newspapers, and it was argued by Dagens Nyheter that «Now that trade unionists, teachers, priests and academics are on the same page, the circle is closed with strong Swedish iron». The students were however not pleased with the daily newspapers coverage of the protest, because T.T had left an important part of the protest where the students had stated that «Especially, we will as students direct a protest towards the dissolution of the cultural life in Norway». It can be argued that this was indication that the students felt that through violating the Norwegian society, NS was violating the Swedish society as well.

Interestingly, the Swedish students did not mention the Norwegian students protest in February 1943 or the protest from the Norwegian professors in September 1943. Where was the Nordic Idea then? It was not possible to conclude on why the students did not comment on the protest in February, but in relation to the protest in September, it was possible to conclude that the Swedish students were too occupied with supporting the Danish students.

The daily newspapers coverage of the Norwegian students and professors protests in February 1943 and September 1943 demonstrated that the pro-Norwegian thought was still present in their coverage of events at the university.

When the University of Oslo was closed on November 30, 1943, the Swedish students were the first to demonstrate their support of the Norwegian students and professors. Lundagård argued this «the newest German violation is not only an infringement towards

Norway, Norwegian citizens and Norwegian culture, but a violation towards the Nordic countries». Another way the Swedish students supported its Norwegian colleagues was through the cancellation of the cultural connections with Germany. Notary Erik Annars at Uppsala University argued that «to cancel the relations is the only political weapon the Swedish academics have to collectively show our colleagues in Denmark and Norway the extent of our resentment towards the occupational force's violations».

Was the Nordic Idea present in the daily newspapers? As already argued the daily newspapers reported any protest and demonstration that took place in the days after the arrests of the Norwegian students and professors. What the daily newspapers emphasised on when writing about the demonstrations can give an indication about what they thought about the arrests themselves. *Arbetet* reported that the Swedish Authors Association had stated that the arrests were a «decapitation of the Norwegian people». *Dagens Nyheter* could report that Gävle city council had held a meeting in the «...hope that it might be found possible to avert the continuing campaign against our Norwegian blood kin, which threatens their freedom, and thus our Nordic rule of law and culture».

The Swedish government's relations with the German government and the Norwegian exile government.

Did the Swedish government's relations with the German government and the Norwegian influence the reactions from the student newspapers and the daily newspapers?

The reaction from the student papers in September 1940 was influenced by the government's fear of a German invasion. This manifested itself in the student newspapers mentioning NS as the reason why DNS was dissolved. Whether these relations dominated the reactions from the student newspapers in September 1941 is difficult to say. Hedenius in *Ergo* was clear that he viewed the German occupational force to have made the arrest of Rector Seip, whereas the student union in Stockholm was afraid that a protest would be misinterpreted. Who the student union believed could misinterpret the protest was not specified, but it was argued that it might have been the Germans. The article in *Lundagård* was influenced by Oscar Bjurling's wish to follow the Swedish government's wish to not make foreign government's question Sweden's neutrality. The initial article had not been influenced by this at all.

During these two events it seems as though the Swedish students were not influenced by the Swedish government's plummeting relations with the Norwegian exile government. The relations between the two governments had started to worsen when the Swedish

government had allowed for Germany to transport soldiers on the Swedish railway system. It would decrease with the Norwegian ships in Gothenburg, and the unsolved question of diplomatic representation through an envoy. That the Norwegian exile government would cancel its connections with the Finnish government did not make matters any better.

In May 1942 the Swedish students protested against the conflict between NS and the Norwegian clergy and teachers. This protest was not influenced by the relations the Swedish government had with the two governments. It was rather a protest based upon facts about who had violated the rights of the clergy and teachers. That the protest was not influenced by the Swedish government's relation with the Norwegian exile government can be demonstrated by the fact that by 1942 the relations between the two governments were at a standstill. The daily newspapers also showed that they were not on terms of what the Swedish government wanted to be printed. A sentence from Dagens Nyheter can give an indication of what the newspapers felt «Now that trade unionists, teachers, priests and academics are on the same page, the circle is closed with strong Swedish iron».

Was the Swedish students influenced by these relations in February 1943 and September 1943? This has been difficult to conclude upon, but when keeping in mind that the relations between the Norwegian exile government and the Swedish government had started to thaw in February and was quite good in September, it is not possible that the students reacted because this connection was bad. It is as well not possible to argue that the students were influenced by a threat from Berlin, since the Swedish government had since the beginning of 1943 started to show a stricter attitude towards this government. That the daily newspapers were direct when commenting on these two protests demonstrates even further that the Swedish government had started to relax in terms of what and what was not allowed to be printed in newspapers.

In December 1943 the students and the daily newspapers were not influenced by any connection the government had with the other two governments. It became a question of supporting the Norwegian academics than to follow any policies from the Swedish government. It is interesting to note that even the government's own protest was influenced by its own connection with the German government. The Swedish Prime Minister had no wish to take out any measures against Berlin after Ribbentrop's answer to the Swedish Foreign Minister's appeal. Still, an answer was given Ribbentrop, but it was not possible to conclude upon who had done this. It was argued that it might have been Minister of Finance Ernst Wigforss, the Minister of Trade Herman Eriksson and the Social Minister Gustav Möller.

It is evident that in relation to the Swedish government's wishes during the war collided with the opinion of the Swedish population.

Differences and similarities?

The similarities between the student papers and daily newspapers in relation to the Nordic Idea was that they reacted because of a feeling of solidarity with the Norwegians, which was manifested through the Nordic Idea and the pro-Norwegian opposition. The differences were how the use of the idea manifested itself in the two groups of newspapers. In the student papers it was in many cases clear that it was argued from a Nordic Idea point of view, but with the daily newspapers the discourse analysis has been used to find these answers.

The Swedish government's relations with the German government and the Norwegian exile government influenced both the student newspapers and the daily newspapers, but in different ways. In the early war years, the student newspaper were more inclined to follow the government's encouragement to not criticise foreign country's warfare. That it was seen as not dangerous to criticise NS in Norway was probably why the student newspaper blamed NS during the dissolution of DNS in September 1940. During 1942 this changed, and the student newspapers started to be more bold in their statements. This was demonstrated with the strong protest in May 1942. The daily newspapers were stopped by the restrictions from the Swedish government, but it did not halt them completely, because compared to the student newspapers the daily newspapers were not afraid to mention the German occupational force in their articles.

6.3 Concluding remarks.

All things considered, the reactions from the Swedish student newspapers and daily newspapers to the events at the University of Oslo were sometimes strong, sometimes less so. The political beliefs and leanings of the student newspapers and daily newspapers did play a crucial role in how they reacted. This had a lot to do with the influence both by the Nordic Idea and the Swedish government's relations with Berlin and the Norwegian exile government. The conclusion is that in relation to the Swedish government it became a question of the Swedish society's wishes and the government's. The idea of Norway being the «brother» country became in many cases more important than to follow the Swedish government's encouragement to not make foreign countries question Sweden's neutrality.

This became evident in December 1943 when the Swedish academics cancelled their cultural connections with Germany.

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