'That' in that-clauses

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Innholdsfortegnelse:

1.1 Introduction

I am presenting my motivation for writing an article on the that-clause in this introduction. In the article "Knowing How" Timothy Williamson and Jason Stanley mention an account by William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen that takes 'knows how' as a syntactic unit in an account of the syntactic structure of sentences. They maintain that it is 'knowing that' and 'know how' that demand complementation, respectively by propositions and infinitive terms specifying an activity (e.g. 'to ride). Williamson and Stanley claim however that the account presented by Bechtel and Abrahamsen conflicts with what is said about structure in resent syntactic theory. Williamson and Stanley describe the account made by Bechtel and Abrahamsen:

> One this view, in sentences such as (Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle), 'knows how' forms a constitution, which takes as a complement the expression 'to ride a bicycle', which is a description of an action. 'Know' has no clausal complement in (Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle). In (Hannah knows that penguins waddle), on the other hand, 'that penguins waddle' is the causal complement of 'knows', and denotes a proposition, which is the object of the knowledge relation. Such accounts of the syntactic structure of sentences like (Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle), however, are inconsistent with what is said about such structures in recent syntactic theory. (Stanley Williamson 417)

Williamson and Stanley claim that according to recent syntactic theory in these knowing-how sentences it is 'know' that is the attitude constitution and not 'know how' and that 'know' takes an embedded question as a complement. And the standard analysis shows that know-how sentences are not at all like know-that sentences. Know-how sentences like 'Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle' are similar too and have syntactic counterparts in for example 'Hannah knows [where to find a nickel]', 'Hannah knows [why to vote for Gore]'. These are sentences that have embedded questions as complementing 'know' and are similar to know-how sentences. Williamson and Stanley mention that if know-how sentences are analysed like this, the complement clause can with a revised and developed version of Lauri Karttunens work on embedded questions be taken as denoting a set of true answers and this will be a set of propositional knowledge (Stanley Williamson 420). Williamson and Stanley's main

argument in the article is that all knowledge is fundamentally propositional knowledge, and so this suggestion of treating these knowing-how sentences as containing embedded clauses like this is supporting their main claim. This is taken as supported by current syntactic analysis that claims that 'know how' sentences have embedded questions and that they contain *untensed* clauses. And according to Williamson and Stanley this makes 'know how' sentences primarily embedded question sentences like 'Hannah knows [where to find a nickel]' which has derivative propositional knowledge, and not typical propositional knowledge sentences like 'John knows [that the house is red]. A typical knowledge-that sentence does not contain embedded questions and have *tense* clauses. Williamson and Stanley claim that one can also have embedded questions with tense clauses in different types of verb sentences that have a remarkable resemblance to these knowing-how sentences; 'Hannah learned [how to ride a bicycle]', Hannah asked [how to ride a bicycle]', Hannah wonders [how to ride a bicycle]'. All this suggests that 'know' and 'how' do not form a syntactic unit that denotes a specific type of knowledge. According to current syntactic analysis 'know' takes an embedded question starting with a 'how' as its compliment. Williamson and Stanley conclude that there are no relevant differences between a typical 'know how' sentence and the other types of sentences containing a verb together with the term 'how' therefore: "This suggests that it is incorrect to take 'know how' as a constituent in sentences such as (2: Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle)" (Stanley Williamson 418).

In the account made by Bechtel and Abrahamsen it is claimed that it is 'know how' that forms a syntactic constitution that takes a complement clause. The complement clause specifies an activity (e.g. 'to ride', 'to jump'). The arguments presented by Williamson and Stanley concludes that to take 'know how' as a constituent is wrong in respect to current syntactic analysis. What Bechtel and Abrahamsen actually say in the section paraphrased is: "…the expression 'knowing that' requires completion by a proposition, whereas the expression 'knowing how' is completed by an infinitive…" (Stanley Williamson 417). The apparent difference between the two claims made me interested in current syntactic analysis. They disagree on the parsing of knowing-how and knowing-that sentences. Williamson and Stanley claim that 'know' is the constituent that is complemented by either an embedded question or a that-clause (e.g. 'that penguins waddle') while Bechtel and Abrahamsen claim according to this forgoing paraphrase that 'know that' and 'know how' is the syntactic unit that takes a complement. This made me want to investigate the foundation for the syntactic parsing of sentences like this. I do not believe in any way that the parsing is the most interesting or

fundamental subject in philosophy but just when if comes to this debate the parsing is quite important.

A point that is not explicit mentioned in the account by Williamson and Stanley but which interests me is whether it is likely or plausible to maintain that 'know' is the unit that takes a complement in knowing-that sentences and that 'know how' is the unit that takes a complement in knowing-how sentences. Is it implausible that they would be so grammatically different if the difference between them is simply that they denote different types of knowledge? From what Bechtel and Abrahamsen actually says they think that 'know how' and 'know that' is the terms referring to knowledge, but in Williamson and Stanley's interpretation of what Bechtel and Abrahamsen said it's claimed that: "On this view…'knows how' forms a constitution… on the other hand, 'that penguins waddle' is the clausal complement of 'knows', and denotes a proposition…" (Stanley Williamson 417). That means that there is a grammatical difference between knowing-that sentences and knowing-how sentences can amount to a problem for the supporters of parsing 'know how' as a constitution.[1] I think that the account of knowing-how sentences and knowing-that sentences that Williamson and Stanley present is plausible. I doubt that one should parse 'knowledge how' as a syntactic unit. That's why instead of finding arguments for the parsing of sentences with 'know how' as a constitution I'll attempt to find arguments denying that 'knowledge' takes that-clause as a complement. This because it seems as an interesting subject, and because the difference between Bechtel and Abrahamsen's account and Williamson and Stanley's account made me interested to find out what's the real parsing and what foundation that supports it. I have problems accepting the that-clause as a valid singular term that refers to propositions. My goal in the paper is to weaken the claim of the standard syntactic analysis and thereby keeping the opportunity of treating 'know how' and 'know that' as syntactic constituents. I can not focus on all different levels related to this subject and so I will try to constrain the level of argumentation to parsing, grammatical structure and logical structure and evaluate on this level.

When Williamson and Stanley talk about syntactic units and complements they talk about the units in linguistic expressions and their relation and roles in the expression. A constitution is as syntactic unit and a complement is the clause that follows. The syntactical units are

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[1] David Carr is a philosopher that Williamson and Stanley mentions that maintain that 'know how' is a constitution. He takes action descriptions as the complement of 'know how' (Stanley Williamson 416).

sometimes the same as tokens of the grammatical classes in the language. For example will a proper name ('John') often be a single syntactic unit that refers to John. A problem is that we as philosophers want to find "that which is universal" and the logical fundament included and supported by our claims and our sentences. But our data and tools are linguistic entities for example sentences, utterances, terms etc. and language as a whole is a specific system based on axioms with rules and with certain supposed abilities to connect to the world (like referring, denoting, expressing etc). It is possible to find different descriptions of the function or purpose of communicative signs all according to the system it is a part of, but we intend with them to reflect the world and not only the world but something in the world that is hopefully universal. Another thing that makes it trouble is that we have grammar and this as single claims and as a system do not pay much attention to the fundamental logic and universality of the world, but still when seeing it as a system it seeks to be coherent and descriptive and in that sense it probably has some aspects that correspond with fundamental logic as we suppose the world also to be coherent. However this does not mean that the coherence of grammar needs to reflect the coherence of the truths in the world, but it is constructed by language and hopefully language pays credit to something fundamental.

1.2 Specifications

To begin the discussion of the that-clause; I will assume that there is a widespread consensus about 'that' belonging to the subordinate part of Propositional Attitude Ascriptions (Short PAA). The consensus is extensive but not all-embracing. There are a few philosophers who do not think that that-clauses are the self evident last part of all PAAs. Donald Davidson and Prior are philosophers that have presented theories that support a competing view and both present different reasons for why the 'that' belongs outside the subordinate clause in PAAs. One can also find people who in writing about attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports parse their examples with the term 'that' outside the subordinate-clause (see section 3.1.2, Edward N Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/frege/). This might be just a unfortunate mistake but it does not lead to any real philosophical contradictions because those who do this still assume everything about this subordinate clause they would assume about the that-clause;

for example that it refer to propositions, that it is a singular term, that it denotes a proposition etc.[2] The reason one can still assume all this is because there have not to my awareness been presented any arguments explaining actually how the term 'that' is contributing in the subordinate-clause of propositional attitude ascription thus making it a that-clause (that-clause e.g. a subordinate clause starting with a 'that' which is syntactically seen as a singular term that refers to or denotes propositions) and why a subordinate clause without a 'that' is not a singular term and can therefore not refer to or denote a proposition. To me the choice of the that-clause as the subordinate clause in propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports seems arbitrary. This is a controversial claim but after having trouble finding arguments supporting the that-clause and with this explaining the contribution of the 'that' in the subordinate clause of propositional attitude ascriptions, the claim seems defensible. Gottlob Frege, the philosopher credited for first presenting a version of the that-clause, do not present any argument for why the 'that' makes the last syntactic unit of PAAs into a singular term that can refer to propositions and vice versa, but he does call the that clause an abstract noun phrase introduced by 'that' (Frege 66).

The upshot is that when comparing arguments there is no difference between those who parse the that-clause with the 'that' outside the subordinate clause and those who parse it according to current standards with the 'that' inside.[3] So the philosophers get the same conclusions in their respective substantial arguments regardless of where the 'that' is parsed and then it seems to me that if the 'that' is outside the subordinate clause it does not really have any impact on the arguments presented. It is however not right of me to assume this, for supposedly there are reasons supporting why 'that' needs to be a part of the subordinate clause of propositional attitude ascriptions. These are the reasons I want to look closer at. I will investigate arguments supporting that the term 'that' contributes something semantically or syntactically that is necessary for making the subordinate clause of propositional attitude ascriptions into a singular term and thereby making it refer to or in some other way denote propositions. It is perhaps not possible to leave the term 'that' out of the subordinate syntactical part of propositional attitude ascriptions, for the arguments supporting this might

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[2] I do not mean to say that they explicit would claim that these subordinate clauses are singular terms, but they treat the subordinate clause without the 'that' if it was a singular term. Like when Bechtel and Abrahamsen say that "…the expression 'knowing that' requires completion by a proposition…" (Stanley Williamson 417).

[3] What I suggest here is if what makes 'that the earth is round' a singular term referring to proposition is the mere stipulation of this, then one could also chose to take 'the earth is round' as the singular term referring to a proposition if one stipulated this. This entity would perhaps appear surface similar to a sentence (which is not to be taken as a singular term) but it would be different from a sentence by functioning differently.

be providing some foundation and conditions for other claims and arguments. This will be evaluated. The claim that the term 'that' is contributing semantically in that-clauses in propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports is something that is in need of argument, and I will try to find these arguments. I am also especially interested in finding and considering what is the foundation for the claim that a that-clause, that being the subordinate clause in propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports which starts with the term 'that', is in fact a singular term. I will present theories that give alternative ways of parsing propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports and look closer at the reasons supporting the conflicting claims these present for why the term 'that' should not be a syntactic part of the subordinate clause. It is important for me to consider what kind of arguments exists that supports the that-clause. This is perhaps taken as an unimportant discrepancy in language philosophy but becomes important when considering the difference between knowledge-that and knowledge-how sentences, or at least for those who hold that 'know how' forms a syntactic unit.[4]

In the passing section I have mentioned some terms that need definition and clarification and some of this must come naturally when describing the theories. Among other things there will be an extensive explanation of the that-clause and propositional attitude ascription later and this will be presented mainly in connection to the consideration of the standard syntactic analysis and the relational theory. PAA is short for propositional attitude ascription and ISR is short for indirect speech reports and both are names of certain types of sentences. Propositional attitude ascription sentences describe a psychological attitude relation between a person and content. Here is an example; 'John believes that Mary is having an affair'. In this case we have someone (John) who happens to have an attitude relation (believe) with something and this something is the content part that he believes (that Marry is having an affair). In indirect speech report sentences is it claimed that someone once said something. For example; 'John said that the bear was large, 'Jenny said that he was nice'.

The subordinate clause in all types of sentences is stipulated as the last syntactic part. There is no unified agreement about what is the last syntactic part in propositional attitude ascriptions. It is possible to syntactically parse sentences the way one want but then one must have a theory to support this. There are options that would be implausible and one would need a

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[4] David Carr

theory and arguments for the suggested parsing to be a plausible solution. I also believe there are ontological and metaphysical criteria that must be reckoned with when determining the syntactic parsing of sentences. Linguistic understood as a non-philosophical subject is perhaps not determined by ontological criteria but then parsing can become a part of a philosophical investigation and then the general ontological criteria and suppositions about language would be counted as relevant for the parsing of sentences. It is true that language as a system can be treated as independent from other considerations, and that this is common in non-philosophical science, but given a philosophical outlook the core structure of language and the systems stand in a close relation to ontology and metaphysic.[5] I mentioned that there was no agreement as to what was the last syntactic part of propositional attitude ascriptions; this is sort of supporting my writing about this topic because many supporters of propositionalism believe that that-clauses are in fact the subordinate clauses in all propositional attitude ascription sentences.[6] But I am not convinced. I can not see that it is obviously true that 'that' is a part of the last syntactic unit of propositional attitude ascriptions and I have not been presented with any good arguments for this statement either. This is why I am writing this paper and looking into this subject. I will of course change my opinion on that-clauses if there are compelling arguments for it. In the preceding section I mentioned indirect reports and propositional attitude ascriptions as if they were interchangeable and the same thing. In fact they are different types of sentences, however, relevant to what I am discussing in this paper they are united in a single group. I can mention in advance; Donald Davidson deals with indirect report sentences and not attitude ascriptions. His arguments will still be relevant for attitude ascriptions because it is plausible to assume that what goes for the syntax of indirect reports also goes for the syntax of propositional attitude ascriptions.

I will treat the standard syntactic analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions as my opponent in this paper. This is where Williamson and Stanley find support for their claims on parsing and syntax. There is another alternative and that is the relational theory. But I am using the standard syntactic analysis mainly because the standard analysis is supposed to be a neutral ground for this debate, even if it is difficult to assume that everyone agrees with the premises

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[5] Among other things is the construction of terms as *single units* (ball car rock etc) correspondent with our general outlook on the ontology in the world; we see individual things, being of types of things, but primarily the focus is on single objects. Mass confined in a space that is independent from other masses confined in a space. Terms have the same structure and property in our sentences.
[6] Some that believe this; Stephen Schiffer, Moltmann.

for this. There are many similarities between the claims of the relational theory and the standard syntactic analysis, so they are probably taken as the same by some philosophers.[7] The relational analysis is similar to the standard analysis, and it is what Moltmann calls "…the traditional view" (77). I want to avoid claims that are difficult to prove but it seems like both the standard analysis and the relational analysis have features that must be characterised as initially plausible or pre-philosophically plausible regarding the logical structure of propositional attitude ascriptions.[8] This makes them a natural place to start in any investigation. In the core of the relational theory is the claim that the predicate or verb in all propositional attitude ascriptions picks out an attitude that describes a relation between a person and a proposition and this is why it is called the *relational* analysis. In propositional attitude ascriptions examples like 'John *knows* that the earth is round' and 'Jim *loves* that it snows in the winter' the main focus is the predicate, which describes a relation between an agent and a proposition. When the relational analysis supposes that propositional attitude ascriptions describe a relation between agents and propositions then it seems that one can be a supporter of a relational analysis if one does not believe that there is an expression in PAAs that refers to propositions and that propositions exist. Both the relational analysis and the standard syntactic analysis entail structured-propositionalism. Structured-propositionalism says that what we in common sense terms call 'the object of thought' is mind and language independent propositions. This will be explained further at a later stage.

In standard syntactic analysis one says that the predicate is a two-place relation predicate that stands between the name of a person, which refers to a person, and a that-clause which refers to a proposition. It is clear that the relational theory and the standard analysis are in effect saying the same thing. In my opinion there are two differences but these concerns the theories and not the substantial claims in the analysis. First the former is the standard analysis therefore it can be changed according to what is the current norm or presumptions about the syntax of propositional attitude ascriptions.[9] This statement is perhaps somewhat a normative claim. I would hope that everyone would have a conception of a standard syntactic analysis as actually representing the standard. The use of the standard syntactic analysis in philosophy sometimes implies that it is a theory and not a changing account of the current assumptions.

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[7] Their claims have the same implications and therefore do not pose a problem.
[8] Davidson calls it a familiar structure (Davidson 96).
[9] In other words, the relational analysis is a name of a theory, and the standard syntactic analysis is a function taking whatever is the standard syntax of sentences.

The optimal would be if everyone would treat the standard syntactic analysis as the combined claims of what is the current norm. Then the standard analysis is the name of the combined claims at present moment while the relational analysis would be a specific theory. It is useful to have theories too and not just collective assumptions representing the current norm. It is possible to change a theory while keeping the name also but this could create problems for sciences that compare ideas, theories and thoughts in history. I believe the best would be to keep the relational analysis as a theory that could be referred to, and if the supporters of the theory felt the theory needed extensive changes the result should be that one also changed the name of the theory.

I find that the fact that one is a specific theory and the other describes roughly the current holding about parsing to be an important reason to prefer using the standard syntactic analysis. The second difference between the standard and the relational theory concerns there terminology. I prefer the standard syntactic analysis as it seems to have more specified claims and an explicit and definite terminology. In my experience the relational analysis is unfortunately apt for different understandings and interpretations of what the theory involves. This could be because it is stated quite vaguely and because its tools, that being the terminology in the analysis, is not as specific as in the standard analysis.

What could be an example of this is that in describing the relational analysis Moltmann describes that-clauses as standing for a propositions that "…act as an argument of the predicate" (79). But what does it mean to say that that-clauses act as arguments of predicates? Moltmann is describing the relation between the predicate and propositions using a term with specific association and understandings. She is saying that that-clauses stand for propositions that act as arguments of predicates. But she is still using a description of a relation which is connecting to another context than those which the relational analysis pro-claimers will be content to agree with, and so the debate gets confused by the parties describing what takes place in different words with different connotations. However, I am not in a position to assert that describing *being an argument of* is a problematic and wrong property and description of a relation between predicates and propositions and therefore I cannot say that this is wrong. I prefer the standard syntactic analysis because it has a clear terminology and its constrictions of usable terms are constrained more severely than in the relational analysis. I hope my account and version of the standard syntactic analysis is accepted. This account is a skeleton

that can be a reference point when trying to make sense of the specific theories that deals with propositional attitude ascriptions or indirect speech reports. But first one must know what propositional attitude ascriptions are and what are the basis for this type of sentences and the historical problems associated with them.

1.3 Propositional attitude ascriptions

Propositional attitude ascription is a type of sentence that has received a lot of philosophical attention. Described straightforwardly one could say they are ascriptions one gives of a person that cite an attitude that person happens to have and that this attitude contains a propositional content. Some examples of propositional attitude ascriptions; Jane believes that roses are red, Henry knows that strawberries taste like this, Mona loves that it snows in the winter, Phil knows that doing the right thing is good and Bill believes that cats are mammals. The majority of these examples are unproblematic examples but some of them have problematic aspects that make them difficult for reasons not relevant for the subject in this paper. Since it is syntax and the logical form which interest me these don't substitute a problem. As my arguments and claims are to be relevant for all types of propositional attitude sentences, in that respect the actual content of the sentences is irrelevant. Still, to avoid unnecessary complication non-ethical examples will be focused on.

If one considers the history of propositional attitude ascriptions it becomes apparent that it has been deemed an interesting class of sentence in philosophy for a long while. The philosopher Gottlob Frege is assumed to be the philosopher that introduced these sentences as a special problematic class. He showed a troublesome puzzle concerning propositional attitude ascriptions, he demonstrated that in these types of sentences the principle of identity substitution is not workable.[10] The puzzle is one of conflicting assumptions; we suppose that it is viable to exchange names whenever they are referring to the same object (e.g. co-referring names) and we expect this not to alter the truth value of the sentence. The problem is that we have intuition telling us that the conclusion from applying the substitution principle in

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[10] To be correct he never explicitly mentioned propositional attitude ascriptions as a specific type of sentence. What he did mention was assertoric sentences that contain a thought (Frege 62).

attitude contexts is untrue. The upshot of this discrepancy between the applying of substitution principle in attitude contexts and the implausible conclusions makes it necessary to find the cause to this puzzle and resolve it. However one can not just dismiss the principle of substitution as it seems valid. The principle of identity substitution says that we can substitute co-referring names. That means that the principle says that if two terms refer or denote the same object then one can exchange terms without altering the truth value of the entire sentence, and this principle works in most contexts apart from attitude contexts. So it seems as the puzzle must be connected to something special in attitude contexts. In attitude contexts the truth value can change if one exchanges a proper name with another proper name, even if the proper names refer to the same individual. Some examples illustrating this will be presented. And the substitution principle applied to attitude contexts or propositional attitude ascriptions lead to what people would maintain are wrong conclusions. The substitution principle seems intuitively a true principle, but we have strong belief in our opinions about the attitudes of others and our selves. Some examples illustrating Frege's puzzle:

(1) Peter knows that the cat is on the mat
(2) The cat is Rambo
(C) Peter knows that Rambo is on the mat

(1) John knows that Mark Twain is his favourite author.
(2) Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens
(C) John knows that Samuel Clemens is his favourite author.

In arguments like these the conclusions (C) seem to follow logically but they are in fact invalid. To take Peter as an example; he would probably not agree with this and consent that Rambo was on the mat, did he not already know that the cats name was Rambo. And in the case of John, he would not know that Samuel Clemens is his favourite author did he not know that Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens is the same person. Jon Barwise and John Perry when presenting innocent semantic in the article " Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising Situations" claim that Frege's puzzle about attitude ascriptions is created from considerations

assuming that a person cannot believe something X if that person would not agree to 'It is true that X' (Barwise Perry 397). This is then seen as the underlying criteria for claiming that the conclusions in these cases are wrong. John would not agree to 'It is true that Samuel Clements is my favourite author'. If one were to accept an innocent semantic one could hold that it is true that Peter knows that Rambo is on the mat, because Peter sees the cat sitting on the mat and that is all that is needed for Peter to know that Rambo is on the mat. The fact that Peter would not assent to 'Rambo is on the mat' is indifferent. But accounts like these will not be considered, as I will assume that the puzzle about attitude ascriptions is genuine. The puzzle shows that in the context of attitudes like belief, knowledge, love, etc. it is impossible to exchange names of objects or persons even if they seemingly refer to the exact same object. This is a problem for we expect sentences to be true and we expect that they are stating something true about the world, and truth is not supposed to be context changeable. Then how is it possible that exchanging names which supposedly refers to the same object can lead to untrue conclusions? Frege introduced this and some other puzzles in language philosophy and the way these were resolved has influenced many philosophical theories and current views in standard syntactic analysis. Freges theory provided an answer to the puzzles and that was that names and descriptions have *sense* and that words or terms in attitude contexts do not refer to the objects they normally designate but to their normal *sense*. He introduced *sense* as a concept and this can explain problems regarding identity statements and attitude ascriptions in philosophy of language.[11]

The new technical concept *sense* was according to him a second semantic notion besides reference or designating. He also presented other terms to described the relation: "A proper name (word, sign, sign combination, expression) express its sense and means or designate its meaning. " (Frege 61). His last technical term in this paraphrase, *meaning,* is a different notion than our present notion of meaning. His concept of *meaning* is synonymous to object. Frege's account features two fundamental semantic notions that functions in language. Terms can refer or denote an object; this was a familiar function before Frege. But he presents the function of *expressing* and that what is being expressed is *sense* and this was a novelty. His term *sense* stands for a semantic entity that is independent from reference or denotation, and according to Frege *sense* is "...a mode of presentation of the thing designated" (57). With this Frege introduced a new division between language and world thereby abolish innocent

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[11] Frege 56

semantic. To visualize and explain his concept *sense*: it is thought of as an abstract entity or a concept or a cluster of content associated with objects. The term 'sense' is equivalent to what we would label 'meaning', 'concept' or as Frege called it 'a mode of presentation'. This notion also explains the problem with identity statements; how it can be a novelty that two terms that refer to the same object are identical, and that terms that apparently contributes semantically in sentences still do not refer to an existing objects (Santa Clause, unicorn etc.). These terms can have *sense* without referring to actual existing objects. Frege meant that proper names and descriptions express senses in all contexts, not simply in attitude contexts. But there is something special happening in attitude contexts and that is the fact that what one expresses, that comes after the attitude in propositional attitude ascriptions, is a *thought*. He says:

> That in the case of the first kind the meaning of the subordinate clause is in fact the thought can also be recognized by seeing that it is indifferent to the truth of the whole whether the subordinate clause is true or false….The main clause and the subordinate clause together have as their sense only a single thought…
> (Frege 66-67).

Frege meant the terms following the attitude term in propositional attitude ascriptions referred to their normal sense and only in an indirect fashion to their material objects.[12] I would say that there is a context shift that happens in all propositional attitude ascriptions. The terms in the first part of propositional attitude contexts, for example 'John believes', refers in a regular and normal fashion. This is the normal context where truth value is determined by the objects and relations in the world corresponding with the description given. The last part of propositional attitude ascriptions on the other hand, for example 'that snow is white' are referring to objects of a different kind. In this context the referent of the words is a thought that can be true or false, but this semantic value will not matter in determining the truth value of the whole sentence. What is important is that John actually believes that snow is white, not that snow *is* white. And it seems as according to Freges account the way to verify and affirm that John thinks that snow is white is if he would assent to the claim: 'It is true that snow is white'. According to the claims in the paraphrase it seems as Frege thinks that the whole

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[12] If they have any.

sentence is a thought as he says that the main and the subordinate clause together have a single thought as their sense. But it is remarked by philosophers that Frege meant that names and descriptions refers to their sense as opposed to simply denotation in all sentences, but it is not maintained that every word in the language refers to their sense. If the main clause *and* the subordinate clause together form a sense and a single thought, what prohibits every sentence in the language having a sense as a single thought? If the entire sentence 'John believes that snow is white' expresses a specific thought then how could I conclude from this that 'John believes something' if they express single thoughts? It would be like concluding B from A and this is not a logical conclusion. I cannot make sense of the claim that the main *and* the subordinate clause express a single thought. I will just ignore this and assume that he claims that what comes after the attitude predicate expresses a thought by having a definitive common sharable sense. This is Frege's solution to why it is implausible to accept the conclusion when applying the substitution principle in propositional attitude ascriptions. To illustrate this; in the situation where the conclusion is that John knows that Samuel Clements is his favourite author, and this is a claim that John would not assent to. In this situation the thought 'that Samuel Clements is my favourite author' is not the same as 'that Mark Twain is my favourite author'. Firstly, all proper names have sense so it is likely that 'Samuel Clements' don't encompass the same sense as 'Mark Twain'. Secondly, since terms inside the attitude contexts don't refer to their ordinary objects because they refer to their sense, one can conclude that in all terms in propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports including 'Samuel Clements' and 'Mark Twain' express different senses. The basis for applying the substitution principle was the assumption that these were co-referential but this turned out to be a wrong assumption. This explains the puzzle and it presents a solution. Frege's introduction of another semantic concept *sense*, and the suggestion that was what referred to after the attitude term in propositional attitude contexts was a complete thought is what have inspired current standards for analysing propositional attitude ascriptions.

In Freges view sense and thoughts are not subjective ideas; they are rather commonly shared *mode of presentation*. Freges concept of thought and sense was of something abstract, universal and true. He said: "They are not prevented form grasping the same sense; but they cannot have the same idea." (Frege 60). His solution to the puzzle is the beginning of the claims of standard syntactic analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions. This because his

concept of thought and how terms could refer to something other than material objects is a past version of the concept of propositions and foregoer for the claim that that-clauses refer to mind and language independent propositions.

1.4 The standard syntactic analysis

According to the standard syntactic analysis the correct syntactic way to analyse propositional attitude description is to take the predicates like believes, knows, loves, thinks, etc. as two-place relation predicates standing in between two singular terms. This means that a predicate in syntactic analysis can be described as a function to truth that takes two objects. It is true that 'John believes that snow is white' if John exists and the proposition refers to by 'that snow is white' exist and John actually stand in a belief relation to this proposition. The name refers to a person, the verb refers to an attitude relation like believe, know, love etc., and the that-clause which syntactically is seen as a singular term refers or denote a proposition. A that-clause is the subordinate clause in all propositional attitude ascriptions which starts with and includes the term 'that'. These expressions are to be taken according to the standard syntactic analysis as singular terms, like names are singular terms, and referring to existent propositions. It is worth noticing; it is not the that-clause in itself that is the proposition. This is important because the role that the concept of propositions is supposed to occupy cannot be engaged by anything that is mind and language specific like a that-clause. To illustrate this see that it is implausible to think that the English words 'that snow is white' can be the universal referent of all that-clauses in all languages as one must say if one hold that 'that snow is white' is the actual proposition. Mind and language independent propositions act as what is common regardless of what sentences one takes as expressing the proposition. For example; 'Snow is white' and 'Snø er hvitt' both express the same thing because both express the same proposition. And a that-clause by it selves is not mind and language independent.

Sententialism is a thesis that presents an alternative to structured-propositionalism, and structured-propositionalism is as said before implied in the standard syntactic analysis. Sententialism, as opposed to structured-propositionalism, claims that the object of thought is a linguistic entity and not a proposition. This makes it problematic explaining and accounting for the supposed universality of our thoughts, that which is common for all rational beings. This is something that the construction of propositions contributes in philosophy; propositions are mind and language independent and there existence is taken as justifying the claim that sentences are true or false. According to propositionalism propositions are true and that means that sentences that express propositions are true. And by expressing a true proposition we are making a true claim or by saying that something is a fact, this is validated. This was just a little on the background of propositions for as a subject this is beside the focus of this paper. I

will mention these kinds of arguments again anyhow, especially as they become relevant when mentioning alternative parsing theories. And they are an important part in many alternative theories reason for presenting an alternative to the standard analysis.

The standard syntactic analysis thinks that that-clauses refers to propositions by functioning as a singular term, which means that it is a unit with the same functional operation as a name. Here one can see the influence from Frege as he held that what comes after the attitude term in opaque contexts was a single unit, a thought. In syntactic analysis this singular term refers to mind- and language- independent propositions. In standard analysis when given an example of an ordinary propositional attitude ascription as for example:

[1] Bill believes that cats are mammals.

The standard syntactic analysis claims that 'believes' is a two-place relation predicate that stands between the name of a person who believes, in this case 'Bill', and a singular term 'that cats are mammals' which is referring to the proposition which is what Bill believes in this specific situation. Therefore there are three major syntactical components in the initial analysis of a propositional attitude ascription; a) a name referring to a person, b) a singular term, operating much like a name, referring to a proposition, and c) the predicate stating the relation between the person and the proposition. This is the standard way to analyse propositional attitude ascription sentence and indirect reports sentence syntactically. There are only three syntactic components in the analysis and if the that-clause was not stipulated as a unit, as a singular term, this number would be different as it is obvious that the that-clause includes semantic terms and many other possible syntactic units. An analysis of propositional attitude ascription will give [1] the parsing and schematic form of;

[1x] aBp

In this case *a* stands for the normal proper name, *B* stands for the predicate and *p* is the singular term, which is acting like a name referring to a mind and language independent proposition. This is the schematic form of any proposition attitude ascriptions which has a predicate that takes two objects.

I find it difficult to automatically accept the claims of the standard syntactic analysis. But I will accept them if there are valid and substantial reasons for these claims. The disagreement here is also ontological; I admit that I do not think there is something real, existing, true etc. in the world that corresponds to what is supposedly being designated by 'proposition' at least not how the concept propositions is conceived by the defenders of the standard syntactic analysis in this paper. I could accept it as an explicit theoretical construction while awaiting another account of truth. It would be almost impossible make me accept it as an ontological entity. But the main focus in this paper is not the ontological disagreements. Independent from these ontological considerations I find 'that' an unnatural part of the subordinate clause. And I am not convinced by the support of the claim that that-clauses are singular terms. The advocates of the that-clause think that the contribution of 'that' is needed in the subordinate clause to make it a singular term, as opposed to a sentence or utterance, and that only then can it refer to propositions. This seems as a fundamental claim and opponents of the syntactic analysis also rely on this claim and use this to argue against the that-clause. A.N Prior claims that by taking 'that' out of the that-clause one can thereby eliminated it as a name and make it impossible for it to refer to propositions (Prior 17). That-clauses are obviously semantically complex, as is seen in for example 'that cats are mammals'. And they are not like the other two components in propositional attitude ascriptions; it is no unified agreement as to what grammatical type of expression they are and they are not tokens of a standard grammatical class like 'believe', 'know' etc. are predicates and 'John' is a proper name. Philosophers that support the that-clause can say that that-clauses were originally complex noun phrases. 'That snow is white' is a subordinate clause that could be a complex noun phrase. I wish to investigate that-clauses and the support and explanation it is possible to give for them being singular terms. But first I'll present a theory which claims the same as the standard syntactic analysis, and presents reasons for why 'that' belongs in the subordinate part of PAAs. I will also see if there are explanations of the that-clause and how it functions as a singular term. After this I'll investigate what type of linguistic expression that-clauses can be. The function of being a singular term is something that can be stipulated and validated by use, thereby making an expression a singular term. I think that if one cannot place the that-clause as a

normal type of singular term in the language then this will make *the account* of that-clause as a singular term less plausible. I will use the method of exclusion to exhaust the possibilities in determining what type of singular term the that-clause can be. It is plausible that that-clause advocate must specify what and why that-clauses are singular terms, and explain the supposition that 'that' is needed in the subordinate clause to make it a singular term referring to propositions.

1.5 Stephen Schiffer

Stephen Schiffer's description of a typical Fregean view shall represent a theory which supports the standard syntactic analysis. I will concentrate on what he takes to be the core of *Fregeanism* as he describes it in his article "Pleonastic Fregeanism". In this article he makes explicit some defining points on the Fregean view of propositional attitude ascriptions. In addition to this, he also writes about his own Fregean theory which he calls *Pleonastic Fregeanism*. I will not argue against the theory Pleonastic Fregeanism in a direct way. It is a development of a Fregean theory and in that sense it does not part from the *Fregean* notion that it is the that-clause which is the subordinate clause of propositional attitude ascriptions. What is special with Pleonastic Fregeanism is that it claims that the relation between that-clause and the concept of proposition is a constitutive relation. Schiffer says that for anyone to know the concept of propositions is for them to engage in a that-clause-involving practice (Schiffer 10). There are not many contemporary philosophers who think that the relationship between that-clauses and proposition is of such a nature. Claims like these are not directly influenced by my conclusions regarding the syntactic parsing of PAAs. Still, if the term 'that' is not a part of the subordinate-clause of PAAs, then this is something that will be relevant for all who parse propositional attitude ascriptions in the traditional or the standard syntactical manner, and this includes Stephen Schiffer's Pleonastic Fregeanism.

Schiffer says in the article *"Pleonastic Fregeanism"* that Fregeans and others assert that propositions are mind- and language- independent and that ordinary that-clauses refer to these mind- and language- independent propositions (1). The claim is metaphysical and ontological

in virtue of claiming that propositions are existing entities with certain properties, the second statement expresses that it is that-clauses that refers to these propositions. Fregeans specifically are mentioned as holding these claims. He mentions two motivating reasons for why Fregeans should maintain that predicates like believe etc. are two place relation predicate which is true of believers and the thing they believe and that the that-clause are singular terms referring to what the person in question believes. He says:

> It's arguably the best way to account for the way [*a given propositional attitude ascriptions*] truth value is determined by its semantically relevant parts. Second, it's arguably the best way to account for the evident validity of such derivations as the following [2]: Ralph believes that George Eliot adored groundhogs, and so does Hilda. Thus; there is something that they both believe – to wit, that George Eliot adored groundhogs. (Schiffer 2).

Since the standard syntactic analysis is highly influenced by Frege and since Schiffer thinks that these are reasons for Fregeans to maintain the standard analysis I assume that these should be reasons for all to agree with the claims of the standard syntactic theory. The second reason he presents is reckoned as the main reason for why one should take that-clause as a singular term and therefore as a syntactic unit. This is an important argument for those that support the parsing of propositional attitude ascription as it is presented by the standard syntactic analysis. The first point he mentions is that the practice of taking predicates as two-place relation predicates and taking that that-clauses as singular terms referring to a proposition, is the best explanation we have of the truth value of these sentences and their parts relation to truth value. This is interference to best explanation argument. The argument is claiming that the standard syntactic parsing is comparative best in explaining sentences syntactic and semantic parts contribution to the truth value. I suppose that what he has in mind here is specifically the explanation of the parts contribution to truth value when one apply the substitution principle in propositional attitude ascriptions. The introduction of a that-clause referring to a thought and the introduction of sense to accommodate apparently co-referential objects gives the advocates of this parsing an opportunity to avoid the puzzle about attitude contexts. I do not think that he is right in claiming that this gives the *best* explanation. Donald Davidson has presented an alternative parsing of indirect speech reports and this has been

modified and accommodated to propositional attitude ascriptions by Ernest LePore and Barry Loewer. The paratactic theory is a well formed theory that present a competing analysis with the same standard as the standard syntactic analysis. It can accommodate the troublesome implausible consequence that steams from the substitution principle in attitude contexts. This theory, the paratactic theory, will be presented later. Personally I am not content with the solution to the puzzle which Frege introduced and which have been developed by the standard syntactic analysis. I think that the creation of a that-clause as a special unit which refers to propositions is implausible. This part of sentences is said to be noun phrases. Well, if 'that the earth is round' were a noun phrase before it was thought that these noun phrases could be what referred to these existing propositions, what kind of noun phrase would look like this with two determiners (that and the) before the noun (earth) and with a description of the noun (is round)? That the that-clause is a noun phrase is a claim soon to be focused on. Someone might point to the fact that if propositions explains a vide range of facts and problems then maybe it refers to something that is true, after all we believe the world we live in is inert coherent. And this is true, but the problem with the concept of proposition is that it is complex and entails quite different things all according to what is believed. And besides this, there is nothing suggesting that it refers to something true just because it can explain a multiple of concepts and problems, for example sentences, truth, facts etc. Because all of these concepts are not independent from each other, and one can in advance assume that if there is something that gives an explanation of for example truth it could probably explain facts etc. too.

The second argument is also interference to best explanation argument. This is viewed as one of the fundamental reasons for why you should believe in propositions and takes that-clauses as singular terms referring to propositions. The support comes from the logical form and logical interferences in arguments revolving attitudes. Schiffer says that treating the that-clause as a logical unit gives the best explanation of derivations in attitude arguments. Here are some examples to illustrate that there must be something that can be common and function as or constitute a unit when reviving arguments about attitudes.

If Ralph believes X and Hilda believe what Ralph believes, one can conclude that Hilda and Ralph both believe X. If Ralph believes [that John is sad] and Hilda believes whatever Ralph believes then Hilda believes [that John is sad]. The possibility to treat the that-clause as a logical unit in arguments like these entails that the that-clauses can replace X and suggests

that the that-clause refers to something that is common and constitutes a natural unit. It is short ways from stating that it refers to something that more than one person can believe too argue that the thing they believe must be mind independent e.g. something like propositions. This argument shows that we logically conclude that the that-clause functions as a singular term. But does this argument entail that if there are other expressions that can function as a logical unit in arguments these must be singular terms?

What if I said; John believes [Martha is going home] and Jenny believes everything that John believes, then Jenny believe [Martha is going home]. Isn't this also a valid argument? In this case the logical unit is a sentence and not a that-clause. Does this entail that all sentences are singular terms with an ability to refer to something as a unit? I'll admit that the exclusion of the term 'that' in these examples makes the arguments less pleasing to the ear than the latter example, but this does not make the argument invalid. One can still conclude that Ralph believes X and Hilda believe what Ralph believes, thus they both believe X, and assert that in some of these cases X is not a that-clause but a sentence. The upshot from this is that it seems as the term 'that' don't need to be a part of the subordinate clause for there to be an explanation of the logical structure in arguments revolving attitudes. Besides this, I think the reason why one naturally want to include the term 'that' with the subordinate clause in examples like this can be partly explained by pragmatic considerations. There are pragmatic and not syntactic reasons for keeping the term 'that' connected to the belief aspect in ordinary talking situations and in the conclusion of the argument Schiffer presents. In examples like;

[3] "What du you believe?" Answer: "That the earth is round."

The 'that' seems to link a belief aspect into the answer and imply that the statement one is expressing is a belief, whiteout having to state the tidies and obvious 'I believe that…' or 'I believe…'. If one where simply to state the belief 'The earth is round' this would seem to violate some communication and normative rules for then this statement would occupy the property of truth and not invite the other person to reflect upon the statement. The person saying this will not show a satisfactory degree of self awareness; that it is in ones opinion that the earth is round. If one on the other hand were in a social setting where social norms where unimportant relevant to truth then one probably would exclude 'that' thereby signalling that this statement actually occupies truth. What I am suggesting is that "That the earth is round" is just a pragmatic shortening of 'I believe that the earth is round' or 'I believe the earth is

round'. After having said this, I admit that this is not a sufficient argument for settling the case. I will therefore move on. This was just an alternative explanation of why it is natural to include 'that' in the conclusion of reporting what both Ralph and Hilda believed. It has become the norm and we think that which parts from the norm is unnatural.

I am not committed to claim that the term 'that' belongs syntactically with the predicate in PAAs, but the that-clause advocate must claim that 'that' it is a part of the subordinate clause and this therefore imply that the term 'that' contributes something to making the expression a singular term that refers to propositions. What I want to investigate are claims like these; that 'that' contributes and makes the expression a singular term and that-clauses are singular terms. The subordinate clause was perhaps seen as a noun phrases originally. I wonder what explanation of the that-clause as a singular term it is possible for the that clause advocate to give. Ian Rumfitt who will be presented later takes that-clauses as the subordinate clause of indirect report sentences and he assumes that that-clauses are noun phrases (Rumfitt 430). This is not controversial as it is common to think that that-clauses are noun phrases. I will see if they can be noun phrases given the other claims of the that-clause advocate and find out what type of noun phrase that-clauses can be. I hope to conclude that they can not be noun phrases, and that this then will weaken the support of the claim that they are singular terms. It will not make it impossible for that-clauses to be singular terms; they can be singular term making up a unique type of singular term. But what I suggest is that this will weaken the *account* as they would have to say that that-clauses are singular terms but not of any familiar type. I assume that there should be some account or explanation of the that-clause as a singular term possible to give, for it to be a liable account. I will start by investigating if that-clauses are singular terms like proper names, complex names or complex noun phrases are singular terms. I think that if that-clauses are neither of these types this weakens the account of that-clauses.

2.1 The that-clause as a complex name

The possibility I will be considering now is whether a that-clause is a singular term like a proper name or a complex name. This is one of the possibilities the that-clause advocate has to explain how that-clauses are singular terms. He could say that they are singular terms in the same way complex names are. Since it is reasonable to see the that-clause as complex singular terms the major comparison will be between the that-clause and complex names. But the argument is relevant for both those that would compare the that-clause with a complex name and those who would compare it with a singular proper name. Why this is so will be explained in what follows. Complex names as for example 'Big Ben', 'The Bill of Rights, 'Mount Everest' are proper names in spite of that they are made up of parts that if taken separately would be meaningful. They function like proper names do and therefore the complex expression which makes up the name does not at the same time have an operational meaningful content. The meaningful parts they would have as an expression and not a name are neither what determine or make them proper names. What make them proper names are co-determined by functioning the way a name in the language is supposed to function and their reference. Ordinary proper names as 'Jane', 'Peter' have semantic value and they function as proper names regardless of not being made up from parts that if taken separately can be said to have a meaning[13]. That means if complex names are names at all this is because they function syntactically and semantically like these ordinary simple proper names does and used in the same way as ordinary proper names are used.

A proper name significant semantic property is that it denotes or refers to an object. What makes ordinary names and complex names different from each other is that the latter happens to be made up from words that apart from in some cases functioning like a name also can express a meaningful content if not functioning like a name. In this respect the parts that would be meaningful if the words are taken separately are similar to the pragmatic effect of names like these; 'Joy', 'Apple', 'Paradise' etc. These names have nothing semantically to do with the condition 'joy', the noun 'apple' or the name of a place 'paradise'. To see this; the semantic meaning of the name 'Joy' does not involve semantic reference either to the condition joy or to the sense of the expression 'joy' when it is referring to the condition of having fun. This can be proved easily for if someone claimed; "Joy is not a joy" and the first

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[13] The contribution from a letter is different from the semantic contribution of a word. One does not claim that it is the semantic value of 'J' that makes the name 'Joy' into a name, as said before letters do not have meaning, this semantic property is constrained to words.

word in the sentence in fact is a proper name referring to a person there would be nothing in the semantics or syntax of that proper name that would in any sense make this sentence claim a contradiction true. The effect of naming your child with a word that also has another meaning is solely a pragmatic effect and it does not have a meaning in semantic and syntactical theory. The reason that I have mentioned this is to make it clear that in the case of complex names, what could have been a complex meaningful expression were the term not in fact a name, example the 'The Bill of Rights', the would-be-meaning of this is a pragmatic effect. If one has a case of a term function like a name then what would be meaningful part becomes inoperative. The semantic character or property of the word 'right' does not contribute in the name 'The Bill of Rights' in the same way the condition of being happy does not contribute to the name 'Joy'. The result is in the comparison between proper names and the complex names; meaningful parts in these two groups can have some pragmatic effect and this can be confusing, but in respect to the semantic character of them as names this meaning is irrelevant. If there were complex expressions that would function in use sometimes as a description and sometimes as a name, one would say that in the use when it functions like a description it is not a name, and vice versa. Just like when 'Joy' is used as a proper name, it is effectively marked by writing it with a big capital, and then it is clearly not at the same time a noun phrase referring to the condition of having fun, and when 'joy' is used as a noun phrase referring to the condition of having fun it is not at the same time also referring to a person named Joy and this is marked by not writing it with a big capital. These exclude each other. And complex names do not have an operational meaningful content.

Where I am going with this specification of having an operational meaningful content and the condition of being a proper name is that this little fact will make it impossible for the advocates of the that-clause to claim that the that-clause is a singular term like a complex name is a singular term. He can say that the that-clause is like a complex name and with this intend to say that they both are singular term.[14] But this claim then is neither an explanation nor anything that can function like epistemic support for the claim that that-clauses are singular terms. The difficulty with a claim that the that-clause is a singular term like a complex name is a singular term is that there is an internal contradiction between the upcoming two statements, of course given that what I have said about proper names and complex names is true;

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[14] Or a proper name. This will be the same, as I have explained.

1) The that-clause is a singular term that functions as a complex name of propositions.

2) The term 'that' is contributing semantically in the that-clause.

These two statements and what have been explained about complex names and how they function are not compatible. I have tried to show that if something is a complex name or a proper name its meaningful parts are necessary irrelevant and not operational. What the that clause advocate which thinks that the that-clause is a singular name in the same way proper names or complex names are singular terms wants to say, apart from claiming this, is that the term 'that' is contributing semantically in the that-clause, and making the that-clause a singular term. According to my arguments this last claim is impossible. In Etymology the semantic property of words in complex names is relevant, but we are considering words form a philosophical view and then it is the universal properties not contingent features that are relevant. Also, in a name like 'Joy' there is a contribution of the letter 'J' but this is not comparable to the contribution a semantic character 'that' would have to contribute. The contribution from a letter is different from the semantic contribution of a word. One does not claim that it is the semantic value of 'J' that makes the name 'Joy' into a name because letters do not have meaning, this is constrained to words. It has been shown that complex names do not take semantic contribution from their parts in determining the semantic of the expression. An advocate of the that-clause want to claim that 'that' is contributing to and that it is a part of the subordinate clause of PAAs. But claiming that there is a semantic part in the singular term of any given proposition which content contributes semantically is inconsistent with ordinary understanding of how complex and proper names function. So it is impossible that the that-clause can be a singular term like a complex name is a singular term while at the same time that 'that' can contribute semantically in the that-clause.

We then have to consider the possibilities of changing some of the claims. The most certain assumption out of these three is the assumption that proper names and complex names function the way it have been presented. This is therefore not something that will be revised. A possibility is to abandon the claim that 'that' is contributing semantically in that-clauses. This would be a satisfactory outcome for me because this would take me further along in proving that 'that' is not a part in the subordinate clause of PAAs at all. However this is

probably not the claim that will be adjusted first. The statement in this argument that is most likely to be wrong is the claim that the that-clause is a singular term in the same way that proper names or complex names are singular terms. The nearest I have got to finding philosopher claiming this is those who claim that that-clauses are like names, but this can be a simplification, a way of describing the property of being a singular term for the sake of communication. I will therefore move on to the next alternative.

2.2 The that-clause as a complex noun phrase

What I will be considering now if it is possible for the that-clause to be a complex noun phrase. If it were established that it were a complex noun phrase it is possible that the support of it being a singular term would come from it being a noun phrases. At least this explanation of the that-clause would give some explanation of it as a singular term, and make it seem less constructed. It would not automatically need a special account for why this is a syntactic unit or an explanation of how it functions like a singular term since it would be assumed that it would function as a singular term like a noun phrase would. Previously, I have considered if that-clause are singular terms in the same way complex names and proper names are singular terms. Proper names, and this includes complex names are a subcategory, are nouns but there are other types of terms that denote objects that are nouns too. *Nouns* can be defined as those terms that denote object/s; this object can include a more than one thing as is seen when a group is referred to as an object. According to English Grammar: Theory and Use; "…noun phrases are referring units: they identify what we are talking or writing about." (Hasselgård, Johansson, Lysvåg. 82). Most common is it perhaps to regard nouns as terms that denote single entities for example a boy, a book, the school. It could be claimed that these nouns denoting entities is the archetype of nouns. However, proper names are another contender for being the archetype of nouns but since proper names are such an important category it will probably always be considered as a single category, if it were not, then there would be a good chance for proper names to be a defining type. What I shall be considering in this section is if

that-clauses are like *complex noun phrases*. Proper names and pronouns are sometimes described as *noun phrases* but then this term means the same as *nouns,* what will be considered now are noun phrases that are apparently complex. *A complex noun phrase* is a compound expression; it is a unit made up of a noun or a pronoun and some supplementary terms. The supplementary terms are either contributing in determining the noun (**the, a**) or complementing it (**that-clauses, the so-and-so of his father**) or help specify the reference of the noun (**the red so-and-so, the big so-and-so**). Here are some examples of *noun phrases*; '**the** king **of Norway'**, '**the** claim **that the earth is round**', '**the** girl **wearing a big hat**', '**the** book **on the table**', '**a** table, and '**that** book'. The nouns in these examples are; 'king', 'claim, 'girl', 'book', 'table' and 'book' and the terms remaining, which is highlighted are supplementary terms.

As a curiosity I can mention that in current grammar the that-clause by it self is held as something that complements a noun. One of the examples just given of noun phrases was a noun phrase with a that-clause as a complement (e.g. the claim **that the earth is round**). In current grammar the that-clause is seen as a declarative content clause which functions as a complement to a noun in a noun phrase. I hope this will not be a confusing curiosity because this is something else than what I am considering. What is to be considered in this section is if that-clauses can be noun phrases, the fact that a that-clause *together* with a noun can form a noun phrase does not imply that the that-clause by it selves is a noun phrase. On the other hand, the that-clause is mentioned as a grammatical class and this makes it appear established. If my considerations are right and propositional attitude ascriptions are wrongly parsed this will be in conflict with current grammatical holdings. This therefore gives the support of the that-clause an extra dimension and raises the demand of arguments needed to support my view.[15]

As said before, because the advocates of the that-clause are determined to claim that the that-clause is a singular term then one can investigate whether they are singular terms like noun phrases are singular terms. This will be my intention in this section, but not all philosophers think this is a subject that needs much consideration. According to Matthew McGrath in his

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[15] Having said that, I think grammar for a huge part is a descriptive science and that if the that-clause is treated by people as a unit it will be reflected in current grammar without there being more substantial arguments in support of taking it as a unit. Another point to mention is that there is no good reason to assume that the entailments from grammatical assumptions are coherent with logical and underlying structure- considerations.

internet article "Propositions" from Stanford Encyclopaedia it is plainly evident that that-clauses can neither be proper names nor noun phrases. To explain this he says in a footnote;

> "…they [that-clauses] are neither nouns themselves nor phrases headed by a noun. The word 'that' in 'that snow is white' is not a noun which is modified by the words following, but rather a complementizer, like 'whether"
> (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/notes.html#2).

In this passage from an article on propositions McGrath mention some types of singular terms which the that-clause can not be, specific he says that that-clauses neither can be nouns nor noun phrases. Here he also gives a positive account of what type of term 'that' is in that-clauses; he says that 'that' is a term that functions like a 'complementizer' in that-clauses. This last claim e.g. the possibility of taking the term 'that' as a 'complementizer' and what this explanation could mean for the that-clause advocate is something that will be considered later. When we come to that part it will be defined what it means to label a term 'complementizer'. However, McGrath is not the only philosopher mentioned in this paper who describes the term 'that' in that-clauses as a 'complementizer'. Ian Rumfitt in the article "Content and Context: The Paratactic Theory Revisited and Revised" starts his paper by introducing some claims of the philosopher A.N. Prior. When presenting Priors claims about the parsing of propositional attitude ascriptions he says;

> "…the particle that" in (1) - the complementizer" in the linguists' argot - belongs semantically with the verb…"
> (Rumfitt 430).

According to this statement Rumfitt believes that Prior asserts that the term 'that' is a semantic "complementizer" to verbs in propositional attitude reports and indirect speech reports. However, the difference might be obvious but it is an important difference to stress the point; it is important to notice that the that-clause advocate claims that the term 'that' is a complementizer in the subordinate clause of PAAs thereby making it a that-clause. In contrast Prior apparently thinks that 'that' is a complementizer to the predicate or verb. They will therefore disagree on the parsing of propositional attitude ascriptions while at the same time will both say that the term 'that' functions as a complementizer. The possibility of explaining

'that' as a complementizer and what this would entail for the that-clause advocate and Priors theory will be considered later in the paper.

At present time what interests me about the explanation given by McGrath is his uncomplicated and non-comprehensive argument for why that-clauses cannot be noun phrases. If he is right, then perhaps I should not investigate this possibility any further. I do not want to waste time on something that is obvious. Let us return to his arguments on this point. First he claims that that-clauses cannot be proper names because they are not nouns, and secondly he claims they can not be noun phrases because they are not phrases headed by a noun and this last claim is supported by him saying in the next sentence:"…the word 'that' in 'that snow is white' is not a noun which is modified by the words following…" (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/notes.html#2).

I do not believe that the question of whether the that-clauses are nouns or noun phrases can be dismissed as an option just by stating what he is stating here. But to be fair to McGrath, his article is on propositions and he did not, and probably did not intend to, say much about what type of singular term the that-clause could be. However I think that this last claim is unwarranted. He seem to assume that 'that' must be taken as the head of the noun phrase and he claims that this is not possible because evidently the term 'that' is not a noun which gets modified by the other words following, as he says. I believe that this argument is partly wrong. It is wrong because in noun phrases it is accepted that both nouns and pronouns can be the head of the phrase. According to English Grammar: Theory and Use: "Noun phrases are of two main types: noun-headed phrases (or full noun phrases) and Pronoun-headed phrases." (Hasselgård, Johansson, Lysvåg, 1998, s.82). The term 'that' is usually a distal demonstrative, it is a *pronoun* which usually refers to a distal object (ref). Therefore there is nothing impossible with 'that' being the head of the noun phrase, making it a pronoun-headed phrase. But this is only one of his claims and he could be right in his other statements. He can be right in claiming that the following words do not function as a supplement or what he called modifiers of the possible referent of the 'that' term. This will be similar to my approach when denying that the that-clause is a noun phrase. And another point regarding his arguments; he seems to assume that the term 'that' needs to be the head of the noun phrase, this is wrong. Whatever is the head of a compound expression is the word that determines the syntactic type of the expression, but the head need not be the first chronological word in the phrase and so there is more than one term that can be the noun or pronoun in the supposed noun phrase. He

might be right in his main claim; that that-clauses are neither nouns nor noun phrases. However, he is not right simply from the fact that 'that' is not a noun, because there is a possibility for 'that' to function as the head, as a pronoun, and there is also the possibility that some other term in the that-clause could be the head of this noun phrase.

Now it is time to investigate if that-clauses can be noun phrases and be singular terms like noun phrases are singular terms. When comparing an example of a that-clause, for example 'that dogs are mammals', with the noun phrase 'the book on the table' what do these two straight off have in common? What they have in common is that;

a. they are both supposed to work as a single unit within a main sentence.
b. they both begin with a term that is a typical modifier in a noun phrase (e.g. that, the).
c. they both appear as complex expression and they function syntactically like singular terms.

These are three important similarities and there are thereby some similarities between the that-clause and the typical noun phrase. But is it enough to give support for the hypothesis that that-clauses are noun phrases? If one looks as the surface similarities of a that-clause, for example 'that dogs are mammals', and a noun phrase, for example 'the book on the table', they seem very much alike. I however do not think that this comparison can be supplemented and I will present my arguments for why the that-clause cannot be a noun phrase. The arguments if successful will be arguments of exclusion. That means that I will investigate if that-clauses can be a noun phrases by analysing them as noun phrases. If the analysis and account of that-clauses as noun phrases lead to consequences which are internal incoherent or unmistakably wrong this is reason not to accept that that-clauses are singular terms like noun phrases are singular terms. So I am aiming at excluding them from this possibility. When I present a analyse of the that-clause as noun phrases is it not because I believe this gives a true account of the that-clause, but because it is a possible account of the that-clause and therefore I wish to investigate it. I hope to exclude the possibility of plausible explaining the that-clause as a noun phrase.

As stated, a noun phrase is a composite expression made up of a noun, or a pronoun, and terms that specify, complement or help determine the referent of the noun. If noun phrases are complex expressions then the that-clause also would have to be complex expressions made up from a noun and some supplementary terms. Of course, one cannot claim that the that-clause is a singular term just like a noun phrase is a singular term and intend this to mean that they only have one thing in common and that is that both have the property of being a singular term. There has to be some similarities between the that-clause and complex noun phrases that makes the that-clause a type of noun phrase. When presented with a that-clause one must analyse the that-clause to find the components that define a noun phrase then. Complex noun phrases include a noun and some supplementary terms. The first possibility to consider is if the term 'that' in for example 'that dogs are mammals' is the noun in the supposed noun phrases, or to be correct, in this case it would have to be a pronoun in a pronoun-headed complex noun phrase. This is one of the possibilities. But when considering the function of that-clauses; they are supposed to refer or denote propositions. This is what one takes that-clauses to refer to, that means that if 'that' is the noun in the noun phrase then 'that' would have to be the main term that refers to propositions in this expression. And this will make the following terms 'dogs are mammals' supplement terms to the noun. For some this will already been dismissed as a viable analyse of the noun and supplementary terms in that-clauses. According to common assumption in philosophy today 'that' cannot be the main referring noun phrase because it is a pronoun and it is therefore too dependent on the remaining expression to refer. But to go along with this possibility, one could specify what kind of supplement terms the remaining words would be and it would be obvious that they are helping to specifying the referent of the noun.[16] In the case of 'that' as the noun; 'that' is supposed to refer to the proposition and what follow are just a specification and a description of this proposition. But then, what about examples of propositional attitude ascriptions where the term 'that' is not explicitly mentioned? It is not the norm but it is common enough to exclude 'that' in propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports to make this suggestion that the term 'that' is what function as the noun in the noun phrase seem implausible. Some examples where 'that' is excluded; 'John said Marry is a princess', 'He believes the earth is round' and 'I know Peter is having an affair'. If the term 'that' is the head of the complex noun phrases and it therefore is the noun referring to propositions in that-clauses and indirect speech reports, then how can one account for the plausible and common possibility of

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[16] The other possibilities; determining, modifying, complementing.

excluding the term 'that' from propositional attitude ascriptions all together? 'That' can not be the head of the phrase if it is not a necessary term in the phrase. I think this argument is so strong that this settles the case. This suggests that this picture of the that-clause as a noun phrase where 'that' is the noun and the rest is supplementary terms is wrong.

I have now presented one version of how the that-clause can be a noun phrase and fulfilling the criteria of what makes something a noun phrase. This is not the only possibility for how the that-clause can be a noun phrase. I mentioned that there is no need for the noun in the noun phrase to be the first chronological word in the phrase.[17] So there is a possibility of claiming that another term than 'that' is the noun in the supposed noun phrase. Someone could hold for example that the term 'dogs' in 'that dogs are mammals' is the noun in the supposed complex noun phrase. In this case 'that' would be the modifier in the noun phrase (like the function of a, the etc.). However it is obvious that 'that dogs' is an ungrammatical expression and that this therefore can not be a right analysis. It seems like 'that' can not function as a supplement for 'dogs' or any other term that hypothetically would be the noun in the phrase because 'that' does not work as supplement for any of these grammatically. If the term 'that' is to be taken as a supplement term and contributing in determining the noun in the noun phrase, then it has to be that 'that' is a noun phrase modifier for the entire remaining phrase and that this entire remaining phrase must be the noun. This would be the third suggestion of a complex noun phrase analysis of the that-clause. To give an example, this would mean that a that-clause like 'that dogs are mammals' must have two main components and those two are the supplement term 'that' and the noun phrase 'dogs are mammals'. This obeys the criteria of having minimum two syntactic components which is the amount that complex noun phrases should have if they are to be called complex noun phrases. This makes that-clauses for example 'that dogs are mammals' a complex noun phrase which in syntactic form or parsing is equivalent to noun phrases like 'that book' or 'this chair' etc.[18] According to this suggestion the term 'that' functions as to determinate the noun. This seems as a reasonable suggestion as to the function of 'that'. This means that 'that' functions as a demonstrative in this analysis and to speak in images; pointing to the referent of the noun. But

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[17] Just see 'this book', 'this mighty school' etc.
[18] 'That/dogs are mammals' is equivalent to 'That/book'.

there are some problems with this suggestion. According to common assumptions in philosophy is wrong to classify what follows 'that' in that-clauses, for example 'Dogs are mammals', as a noun. There it is no reasonable suggestion as to what would be the object that can serve as the referent of this noun phrase. As it stands it is simply not the name of an object. Then why can it not be stipulated as the name of an object while we await some decision as to what is the referent? The verdict as to what is the referent is determined by other considerations than parsing, it has to do with languages connection to the world, ontology, metaphysics or consciousness etc. The suggestion that that-clauses refers to mind and language independent propositions is an example of construction of an entity that can explain not only what we think of as the 'content part' in our thoughts or claims but explain related concepts like truth, fact, sentence etc. Not all agree that propositions is the referent of the content part of PAAs and ISR, some think that we cannot transcendent our language and that what we think in language and that what is the subject related to truth is sentences.[19] But there are other possibilities; the referent might be hold to be facts, if one is satisfied with the concept of 'fact' and one think that this concept don't rely one anything that is more fundamental in describing truth and the like, or one can claim that the referent is in fact a physical brain state. [20] It all depends on what concept one thinks is most right and which can do the job of justifying our use (but not all use is valid data) and explaining the other concept and statements one thinks are related and gives a satisfying description of the world. And then there is the demand that our concept actually describe something that is true. The problem with the forgoing suggestion of the that-clause as a noun phrase was that it made the noun in the noun phrase a sentence that can not be the noun. Therefore one can conclude that that-clauses are not noun phrases and that some other explanation of the that-clause is needed.

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[19] (Utterances in Davidson's case) Some might think that truth is a concept belonging with sentences and language and for that reason decline the concept of proposition and that-clauses.
[20] Brain state would lead to some difficulties, they would probably have to be constructed as token types of each individual thought, and it would not obey the criteria of universality and objectivity.

2.3 'That' as a complementizer

A suggestion that have been mentioned earlier in the texts is that the term 'that' in that-clauses functions as a complementizer. According to Matthew McGrath: "The word 'that' in 'that snow is white' is not a noun which is modified by the words following, but rather a complementizer, like 'whether" (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/notes.html#2). And there are also other persons who think of 'that' as a complementizer.[21] What makes this account of the that-clause different from the forgoing is that in claiming this one claim that the that-clause functions as a singular term but with straight of a recognition that there are different functioning words in the singular term. The problem with claiming that the term 'that' is contributing something in making the that-clause a singular term seems to have a clear explanation in this suggestion. It is claimed that 'that' is a complementizer and therefore that it contributes like a complementizer. It was not a commitment to treat 'that' as contributing something special in the suggestion that that-clauses are noun phrases, and therefore it was not necessary that the contribution of 'that', which supposedly makes the clause a singular term, would be explained. This account seems much more promising in this respect. I understand that making the term 'that' included in the subordinate clause will make the that-clause surface different from an ordinary claimed sentence ('that snow is white' vs. 'Snow is white'), but I think that this cannot be the only reason to include 'that' with the subordinate clause. It would in that case be an idiosyncratic cause. There have to be a valid reason in support of this inclusion and that means that 'that' will either have to be seen as contributing something semantically to the subordinate clause or 'that' must be seen as a term that syntactically is unable to stand on its own and that it is not the case that it belongs syntactically with the verb in propositional attitude ascriptions or indirect speech reports. This exhausts the likely possibilities as to where and how to syntactic pars 'that'.

A complementizer is according to LinguaLinks: "A complementizer is a conjunction which marks a complement clause."
(http://www.sil.org/linguistics/GlossaryOfLinguisticTerms/WhatIsAComplementizer.htm).

According to this definition of a complementizer is the syntactic contribution of a complementizer minimal. It appears to have two possible functions. It can function as a

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[21] A.N Prior, Ian Rumfitt

conjunction and as an indicator of a complement clause. If it simply functions as a marker of a complement clause will the semantic contribution of the term to the sentences as a whole be limited. If it functions as a conjunction and as a marker will the semantic contribution be of a larger degree. A conjunction is, according to LinguaLinks: "A conjunction is a word that syntactically links words or larger constituents, and expresses a semantic relationship between them." (http://www.sil.org/linguistics/GlossaryOfLinguisticTerms/WhatIsAConjunction.htm).

When complementizers are conjunctions they are therefore a term with the purpose of linking or connecting constitutions and expressing a semantic relationship between the constitutions. According to LinguaLinks a complementizer is a type of conjunction but is also a term that marks a complement clause (e.g. 'that he said that', 'that the door is closed') and it should be obvious that the function of marking something is not the same as that of connecting something. This holds even if a single term can do both these things in a sentence. The extended explanation of a complement clause in LinguaLinks says among other things that it is a nominal sentence that is extra linguistic and that it can express a thought. As this stands it is merely a stipulation and it contributes nothing to the arguments whether that-clauses should be taken as referring to propositions or if there should be that-clauses at all. I do not wish to dependent to much on the grammatical claims for the reason that I have mentioned before; it is not only a normative but also a descriptive discipline. And besides this I do not think that the claims of grammar have sufficient degree of coherence and correct connection to the world and/or fundamental logical structure. What all philosophers want is a language in where the subsequently arguments and conclusions do not state something untrue. This is not always as easy to attain or produce, and the reason for this is that language follows its own inner rules and rationale. The problem is deciding what claims to believe in and what claims to reject. There is a structure in language and if a theory demands a bending of structure to accommodate it to the theory this is not happily welcomed, on the other hand, the grammatical structure and the applied rules does not necessarily reflect the logic behind language and so there have to be an evaluation of what is right.

Then if we do accept the term 'that' in propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports as a type of conjunction this means that 'that' is sort of a term that operates as to connect parts of sentences. And that would say that this is not an account one can give that

will justify placing 'that' inside the subordinate clause as apposed to leaving it as a independent term in these sentences.

2.4 The that-clause as a singular term

There is a further possibility for the that-clause advocate. He can claim that the that-clause is a singular term simply because it functions as a singular term, and this is supported by its possibility to function as a logical unit in valid arguments about attitudes. The logical arguments revolving attitudes and the implications form this supported the that-clause as a singular term. The that-clause advocate could claim that there is no need to specify what type of singular term that-clauses that refers to propositions are because they make up a new class. I accept this claim as long as the taking of the that-clause as a singular term is supported by something else than the mere stipulation of this reference relation. The argument showing that that-clauses function as a logical unit in arguments revolving attitude ascriptions is supportive of the that-clause account. But it was the question if everything that can be exchanged with a singular term in logical arguments also must be a natural singular term? This conclusion that the that-clause advocates seem to assume must also count for sentences if they to can be exchanged with an X, standing in the place of a singular term, in valid arguments. This is apparently related to the object-reading of sentences and propositions. This is a problem that is an important motivation for Priors alternative theory. I am not sure whether fundamental logical implications really are implied by these types of logical arguments. However, granted that there is a possibility of stipulation the that-clause as a singular term, this is a viable possibility. I would be more content with an account of a singular term that could place the expression taken as a singular term inside the established and ordinary singular terms. This concludes my main argumentative part of the 'that' in the that-clause. I will now be viewing alternative account on how to parse propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports.

3.1 The theory of A.N Prior

I want to start the explication of the philosopher A.N Prior and his account by paraphrasing another philosopher who also is relevant for this subject. The reason for this is that the description and interpretation which Rumfitt gives of Priors theory is interesting and will be analyzed in what's to come. Rumfitts own theory will be addressed later because he presents his own version of Davidson's paratactic theory. Davidson creates the paratactic theory that does not include terms which refer to propositions, while Rumfitt present a paratactic theory that includes reference to propositions. Both will be presented later. In the start of Rumfitts article "*Content and context: the paratactic theory revisited and revised*" he mentions a philosopher who holds that 'that' is a particle that belongs semantically with the predicate. He says:

> Even in speaking of this string of words as a constituent [*an example of a that-clause*], I am making an assumption that some would deny. A. N. Prior,(4) for example, held that the particle that" in (1) - the complementizer" in the linguists' argot - belongs semantically with the verb, so that (1) is to be divided along the lines:
>
> Galileo / said that / the earth moves.
>
> On this view of the matter, "to say" is precisely not a transitive verb; rather, it is a part of speech that takes a noun-phrase at one end and a complete clause at the other. This view is interesting, but it would take me too far from my theme to examine it properly. So I will simply assume that the words "that the earth moves" form a phrase as they appear in (1); also, that the phrase they form is a noun-phrase.
>
> (Rumfitt 430).

It is worth noticing that what Rumfitt is talking about is the structure of indirect reports, and does not mention propositional attitude ascriptions. But as we have said before most philosophers (Stephen Schiffer among them) take propositional attitude ascriptions and propositional speech acts, like indirect reports, as the same when it comes to their parsing. I

will therefore assume that this does not create a problem. Actually there could be relevant differences between propositional attitude ascriptions and propositional speech acts that would have an effect on the conclusions drawn about their parsing. But without anyone pointing to these differences for the present time, this does not amount to a substantial problem. And even if PAA and indirect reports are not alike in the way we assume here, there would still be good reasons for doubting the picture that includes 'that' with the subordinate clause in PAAs if it ever were established that in indirect reports the 'that' is to be seen as a syntactic part of the predicate. There are therefore good reasons for treating propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports as a single group regarding their syntactic units.

In the segment paraphrased from Rumfitt he mentions the philosopher A.N. Prior and his thoughts on how parse propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports. He said that 'that' was a complementizer and that it belonged semantically with the verb in PAAs. This makes Prior especially interesting as he presents an alternative to the standard syntactic analysis. I am especially interested to see the reasons he takes that support this parsing or if there are any; reasons not to accept the traditional parsing. His account makes up a competing account and present a parsing that initially seem to be close to some of my assumptions or suggestions. I want to understand why the term 'that' belongs with the subordinate clause in PAA and ISR. I do not which to argue for a claim saying that the term 'that' and the predicate in propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports belong together. I would welcome such a claim because it entails my goal, but it is not my intention to present any pro-reasons for this claim. I have tried to do the opposite and discover weaknesses in the claim supporting that 'that' belongs in the subordinate clause of PAAs. It will be interesting to see the reasons presented by Prior. I expect reasons that either supports that 'that' belongs with the predicate, or reasons explaining why it doesn't belong with the subordinate clause. It is in the book "Objects of Thought" that Prior makes his claims. Prior claim that the term 'that' forms a syntactic unit with the verb or predicate in propositional attitude ascriptions. He did not accept the traditional view claiming that it is the that-clause that is the subordinate clause in propositional attitude ascriptions. This is what Prior expresses in this segment from his book where he says:

So we eliminate the apparent name 'that there will be a nuclear war' and the suggestion it carries that the complete sentence expresses a relation between X and the

'proposition' designate by this name, simply by ceasing to parse the whole as 'X fears / that there will be a nuclear war' and parsing it instead as 'X fears that / there will be a nuclear war'

(Prior 19).

In this segment is it expressed that if one for example parse 'fears that' as a unit the consequence is that the subordinate sentence can no longer be seen as a singular term and he says that it thereby has been "eliminated" as a name. According to the standard syntactic analysis a that-clause is a syntactic unit that will function like a name and refer to propositions, this is something that according to Prior gets 'eliminated' when one change the syntactic units. He says that when this parsing is held one have eliminated the possibility of the subordinate clause referring to a proposition. This must mean that he believed that it could not refer to propositions if it weren't syntactically like a name or a singular term. Prior is disagreeing with a view on propositional attitude ascriptions which is the same as that of standard syntactic analysis. That's why I will call it the standard syntactic analyse or the traditional view when mentioning the syntactic analysis that Prior is arguing against, In the standard syntactic analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions sentences are formed from two names and a predicate term which is usually in the middle, in contrast to Priors theory where sentences are formed from a name, a expression and another sentence (17). He accepts that there is nothing wrong in taking 'believes that' as a two-place belief predicate when there is a name in the first and in the subordinate place. But he disagrees with the standard syntactic analysis that will take it to be a name in the subordinate place after the predicate in propositional attitude ascriptions. He holds that there is a sentence in the subordinate place in these propositional attitude ascriptions. He says:

…they [predicates/connectives] do not express relations between the object designated
by the name attached at the left and the object designated by the name attached at the
right, because what is attached at the right isn't a name but a sentence, and so doesn't
designate anything whatever.
(Prior 19).

What motivates the claim, e.g. that the last syntactic part is in fact a sentence will be explained later. This is connected to him being a proponent of sententialism. At first I had

trouble finding the basic arguments supporting his theory on propositional attitude ascriptions. I was wondering whether he claimed that what comes last syntactically in PAAs are sentences and if it was this that supported his other statements, or if he thought as I did in the beginning that there might be foundation for claiming that the predicate and 'that' form a semantic and syntactic unit with the predicate or perhaps that 'that' does not belong in the subordinate clause. I believe now that it is the first that is true. He would primary claim that what come last in PAAs is a sentence and not a singular term referring to a proposition. The reasons for his claims about parsing are partly determined by the fact that he can not support the traditional alternative. Perhaps they also rely on the assumption that what he experiences as problematic with the standard view can not be explained or amended to in a different way than changing the standard parsing of PAAs. This could possibly be a wrong assumption.[22] His theory also leads to some problematic entailments and so there is no easy choice of theory here. However this is an argument that is due later; now I want to see if it is possible to find some other reasons for his claims.

A general fact that Prior seems to be convinced of is that the parsing and systematization of the structure of sentences is something that is open for discussion and not something that has been given a definite answer. The general reason here presented, that parsing is not something that is absolute, is something most philosophers would agree with. Claims about parsing are determined by more substantial claims and the substantial claims involve entailments about parsing. I would say that it is important to always explicate what supports the parsing and make this explicit knowledge to avoid untrue and or conflicting claims in theories. As said, Prior was aware of the many possibilities of parsing that this was connected to the fundamental logic of sentences, language, utterances etc. He gave examples of unorthodox ways of formatting sentences; like making a two place predicate of a conjunctive sentence 'Grass is green and sky is blue'. This can be formatted as a two place predicate '_is green and_ is blue' (Prior 133). And this can be done regardless of this being a commonly used predicate or a relation that one would described e.g. the colour relation between green and blue. It is a relation one would not normally have a need to express and therefore it is not a commonly used predicate. But concerning his claims about propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports; he says that from the same example; 'Grass is green and the sky is

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[22] Philosophers that claim that that-clauses must have a content reading and not a object reading: King ?

blue' there is possible to parse it with a noun, a sentence and a middle link that includes a connective which is '_is green and_'. And he thinks that this example is equivalent in form to what he takes as the correct parsing of PAA and ISR. He says:

> …expressions like '_ fears that _' and '_ thinks that _' have precisely this function of forming sentences from other expressions of which the first is a name and the second another sentence. They are as it were predicates at one end and connectives at the other. (Prior 19).

The comparison between the constructed '_is green and_' and attitude expressions is that they are a middle expression that takes a name and a sentence on each side and that is a composed unit made from a predicate and a connective. This parsing represents the real form of propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports according to Prior and that means that the supporters of the standard syntactic analysis have got the parsing wrong. Prior's suggestion about how to parse propositional attitude ascriptions and these include syntactically; a) a name, b) an expression with a predicate and a connective on each side and c) a subordinate clause which is a sentence.

But does he simply presented an alternative analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions or does he give some substantial reasons in support of his account, or at least reasons that go against the traditional parsing. If you remember, according to Ian Rumfitt Prior held that: "…the particle that" in (1) - the complementizer" in the linguists' argot - belongs semantically with the verb" (Rumfitt 430). Maybe these claims have some supporting reasons that supports Prior's parsing. The two claims relevant in this context are that 'that' is a complementizer and that 'that' belongs semantically with the verb. First I will concentrate on the claim that the term 'that' is a complementizer. It seems as a correct statement for according to LinguaLinks Library a 'complementizer' is: "… a conjunction which marks a complement clause." (http://www.sil.org/linguistics/GlossaryOfLinguisticTerms/WhatIsAComplementizer.htm).

Rumfitt claimed that 'that' functions as a complementizer in Priors theory and this seems apparently to be correct. There is only one trouble and that is that according to the statement form LinguaLinks it is true that complementizer is a conjunction. But is it a connective? This was what Rumfitt called the function of the term 'that' in his analysis.[23] This argument

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[23] Prior 19

depends on the assumption that a connective is most reasonable a conjunction. Prior held that the expressions '_is green and_' was syntactic comparable to for example '_believes that_' and he believed that 'that' functioned as a connective. And it is reasonable to assume that if something functions like a connective it must imply that the term connects other terms and this is the ordinary function of conjunctions. According to LinguaLinks: "A conjunction is a word that syntactically links words or larger constituents, and expresses a semantic relationship between them."

(http://www.sil.org/linguistics/GlossaryOfLinguisticTerms/WhatIsAConjunction.htm).

I take it to be reasonable to assume that a conjunction was what Prior had in mind and that this then justifies the claim that he meant that 'that' was a complementizer. The only thing that makes this uncertain is that Prior had opportunity to call 'that' a conjunction like 'and' but he did not, he called it a connective. The uncertainty from this is not enough though to make me unwilling to assume that 'that' functions as a conjunctive and state that Rumfitt is right in his claim since a complementizer is a conjunction. The other claim; that Prior maintain that 'that' belongs semantically with the verb was more difficult finding arguments in support of. Prior theory at least amount to a competing account on how to parse propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports, but it has not been mentioned any substantial pro reasons for why the term 'that' and the predicate in these sentences should be taken a unit syntactically, or semantically. What has been established is that taking the predicate and 'that' as a syntactic unit is a workable possibility. Then perhaps Rumfitt assumed that because Prior claim that they belong together syntactically therefore ipso facto it meant that they make up a semantic unit? The claim that the predicate and 'that' belong together semantically does not seem true according to some of Priors other claims. He says about the middle expression in propositional attitude ascriptions, like for example 'believes that' and 'thinks that', that "…they are as it were predicates at one end and connectives at the other." (Prior 19). He claims that this expression is composed from a term functioning as a predicate and a term functioning as a connective. This combination is not naturally perceived as forming a semantic unit. He does not explain the function of them as a semantic unit. It seems that the two terms in these sentences could function just as well as independent units, because one of them is a conjunction and the other a verb and independent terms. What kind of reference they could make as a single unit. They seem as two singular syntactic and semantic units and combining them seems arbitrary and unreasonable. One could claim that they are a semantic unit but it would be strange if one would treat them as two single

independent units. While the predicate and connective might be stipulated as forming a syntactic unit semantically, it seems as they operate separately in propositional attitude ascriptions as a connective and as a predicate. At least, there is no reason for taking them to function as a semantic unit in what has been presented until now. However, nothing is easy dismissed, and there is a possibility that an explanation of this compound expression as a semantic unit is correct according to some of Prior sayings about his theory. He says:

> The verb "believes" here ceases to be a term and becomes part of an operator "believes that", or "believes [ ]", which, applied to a sentence, produces a composite absolute general term whereof the sentence is counted an immediate constitution. This is precisely my own proposal: it is one of the two points in the philosophy of logic on which Quine seems to me dead right.
>
> (Prior 20).

He is paraphrasing Quine in the first part. He claims that he is in agreement with Quine in that verbs like 'believe' belong together with 'that' and becomes an operator in sentences. If the predicate and connective expressions in his theory shall function as an operator this will be reasons for claiming that in the underlying logical form of PAAs the two terms; a verb and the term 'that' will function as a unit. Is this enough to claim that they are a semantic unit? This again brings focus to the differences between syntactic structure and logical structure and the connection between these associated concepts. This is interesting but not the subject here. I will have to look at Quine's arguments to say something about the semantic unit of the verb and 'that'. Quine's motivation for this is that he wants to explain the Fregean problem about opaque contexts without adding something to the ontology of the world. He thinks that 'believes that' is an operator that takes Fa as its content, where *a* is the person and F is a complex sentence. Quine main focuses is on the information being communicated or stated, because of this he thinks that a theory that tries to explain away the ambiguity or the puzzling aspect in these situations is portraying something wrong. He also thinks that the right way to view this is not to focus on *attitude ascriptions* as a special class with distinct problems, he says that it is not just attitudes ascription that easy falls into this structure, he would rather

label the problematic cases as cases where one have an opaque construction. The class of opaque contexts is a much wider class than that of attitude ascriptions. In an opaque construction one cannot supplement a singular term by a codesignative term or a coextensive term or a sentence with same truth value, without possibly changing the truth value of the entire sentence. He takes it that theories are not supposed to explain away the ambiguity of opaque contexts, this ambiguity is inert in our language and theories should try to describe it not resolve it. Prior says that Quine is right in treating the attitude predicate and the connective as a unit but he also has his one reasons for supporting an alternative analysis. I mentioned before that Prior supports sentientialism and he rejects propositionalism; that means that he thinks the object of thought is a linguistic entities and not as propositions. I will claim that his main reasons for parsing propositional attitude ascriptions as he does is that he thinks that the subordinate clause is a sentence, and not that he thinks the attitude term and the term 'that' makes a semantic unit. He thinks that the last syntactic unit is a sentence because he is unwilling to accept some of the consequences of the standard analysis and structure-propositionalism. The problem with the standard syntactic analysis, and the implicit structured-propositionalism, as he sees it is that their claims entail something wrong. It is the unintuitive and apparent wrong claim that we as persons stand in a direct relation to propositions. What one normally would accept is that we as thinking persons stand in relation to an object of thought as content etc. But since propositionalism and the standard analysis claim that the object of thought is a proposition and that that-clauses are singular terms this entails that the relation is between us and the actual proposition and not the content of the proposition.

He thought that the consequences of this parsing were unintuitive and that people would not accept that they stood in relations to propositions when they had attitudes about things. If the traditional parsing was correct then it would be correct to describe someone as fearing propositions, knowing propositions, thinking propositions etc. and this would be the norm. But it is not and people don't believe they are related to propositions. This problematic entailment is according to Prior a direct consequence of the standards syntactic analysis claim. The standard syntactic analysis claim that what comes after the predicate in propositional attitude ascriptions is a singular term, or something that functions as a name of a proposition. That means that standard syntactic analysis claims that there are two names and that the two-place predicate expresses a relation between the objects designated by the names (Prior 17).

The objects designated by the names in these contexts are persons and propositions, and that implies that the relation PAAs are describing is the relation between the person and the proposition, thus implying that persons are related to proposition in the way described by the predicate. This apposed to describing a relation between the person and a content of a proposition or a sentence or the state of affair etc. This entailment from the standard syntactic analysis created from holding the subordinate clause as a singular term like a name is unintuitive and treating the that-clause as a syntactic unit referring to propositions is therefore wrong. That is why his theory entails the 'elimination' of the subordinate clause as a name referring to a proposition. His suggestion is that the relation described by the predicate is a relation between a person and a linguistic entity. In his theory is the linguistic entity a sentence. He is not to content with this suggestion either. He says:

We do not fear, hope, desire, or think sentences – we must stick fast to that….Nevertheless, if we are to bring out the difference between *what X thinks* when X thinks that there will be a nuclear war, and *what X breaks* when he breaks his leg – the difference, if you like, between 'objects of thought', in sense (1), and 'objects of breaking' – we do have to talk about sentences, we do have to engage in 'linguistic analysis'.
(Prior 17).

Sentences when seen as the object of attitudes can have the same problem as propositions. Prior mentions this in the beginning of the chapter, he says, among other things: " It is at all events clear as regards *thinking* that even if we do always think *in* sentences, we do not think sentences (Prior 14). This is a problem if they are taken as referring to an object, or being an object, but then again sentences are not singular terms as that-clauses are supposed to be and then there is not an entailment saying that we as persons stand in an attitude relation to the object designated by the singular term in propositional attitude ascriptions. Prior thinks that his theory and his parsing will be a way to dispense of 'propositions' in belief contexts and that this is the reasons for presented an alternative parsing and an alternative syntactic analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions (Prior 20). The supporters of structured-propositionalism and standard syntactic analysis might think that the unintuitive entailment is a small price to pay for the possibilities opened by the construction of propositions. But they cannot deny the fact that their claims and analysis entail the claim that people stand in relation to propositions, and that this is a divergence from the explanation or description that the persons themselves would give of their situation. However, as Prior agrees with Quine, he

agrees with the claim of sententialism and it entails that the relation expressed in propositional attitude ascription is a relation between a person and a linguistic entity. Prior claimed that the subordinate clause in propositional attitude ascriptions was a sentence and so he thought that the linguistic entity was a sentence. But this explanation has some weaknesses that are perhaps just as unintuitive as the one entailed by the standard syntactic analysis. Sententialism can explain how people from different languages can think the same thing, but not in the direct fashion propositionalism can explain this. If John believe that snow is white, and I believe that 'snø er hvitt' then sententialism has no theory internal claim or assumption that make it possible to explain that we are thinking about the same thing. This is one problematic aspect, another is that there are situations where we would want to claim that animals have an object of thought, and then we would have to say that the animals stood in a relation to a sentence or another linguistic entity. This is wrong in the sense that animals do not have language, and supposedly they do not think in structured sentences, but sententialism have no way of appealing to anything else than sentences or linguistic entities as object of thoughts. It seems like a ethnocentric view on objects of thought. I think that Priors reasons for parsing are good, but perhaps not good enough when contrasting them to the imperfections of his own view.

3.2 Davidson's Paratactic Theory

I am still looking at some alternative theories and accounts on how to syntactically parse propositional attitude ascription sentences and indirect speech report sentences. One alternative theory is developed by Donald Davidson. He presented a theory called the Paratactic theory. This theory entails claims that are in conflict with the claims of standard syntactic analysis and especially relevant for this paper are the claims about how to analyse indirect speech reports and propositional attitude ascriptions. In the article 'On Saying That' Donald Davidson concerns himself with what he describes as the logical form of indirect speech reports. Davidson thinks that 'logical form' stand for any sentence internal structures contribution to truth conditions and also the logical entailments or inferences possible of sentences. I will assume that his first notion of logical form is the same as the notion of

syntactic parsing. There are differences between these concepts but they share the important features necessary for treating them as approximately the same in this paper. The problem with Davidson's concept of logical form is that he defines it directly to a Tarskian theory of truth.[24] His claims on the logical form of indirect speech reports is just a small part in his language philosophy in which he is influenced by Alfred Tarskis philosophy and which is dominated by a Tarskian theory of truth. That means that the notion 'logical form' is a theory specific notion and not a generally accessible and useful notion. It is it defined directly in connection to a Tarskian truth theory. Nevertheless it is connected to claims in which more people than Davidson agrees. Davidson says that it is the structured contribution from combining the elements and the elements in them selves in sentences that make the logical form of sentences.[25] This is the same presumptions of those who are concerned with a philosophical view on syntactic parsing, so there is no problem taking syntactic parsing and logical form as dealing with the same object and to have many of the same assumptions. This is very Davidsonian as he claimed that descriptions of objects may differ but that this does not suggest that one is not trying to describe or explain the same objects. Worth noticing; this does not mean he presents a sceptical view, he would say that there are descriptions that are true and descriptions that are not. I believe that syntactic parsing, logical form and even grammatical form can be categorised as concepts belonging in the same subject family. Syntactic parsing, logical form and the grammar of sentences aims at describing systems that are coherent and logical and that reflects some fundamental truths, or connects to fundamental truths, not by making statements which are coherent with other known truths, but by dealing somewhat with ontology and metaphysic, and besides virtues as coherence: it suffices to be easy understood systems of formatting and order of language.[26] It seems as logical form is the level of analysing sentences that is closest to ontological and metaphysical considerations, then syntactic parsing is sort of in a middle position between logical, metaphysical and ontological considerations on one side and the system of grammar and language on the other, and then grammar is the class most removed from ontology but perhaps it still bears some

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[24] He says; *"…the structure with which a sentence is endowed by a theory of truth in Tarski`s style deserves to be called the logical form of the sentence."* (Davidson 94).

[25] He says about an account of logical form; *"…such an account must lead us to se the semantic character of the sentence – its truth and falsity – as owed to how it is composed, by a finite number of applications of some finite number of devices that suffice for language as a whole, out of elements drawn from a finite stock (the vocabulary)…"* (Davidson 94).

[26] Grammar seems as the class that is most independent from ontological and fundamental logical considerations; it is maybe just derivative connected through *it as a systems* connection to the system of syntactic parsing and logical form. The relation between logical structure, grammatical structure and parsing would be an interesting topic.

features from these types of considerations. Then again the connection to a supposed universal logic could in fact be a connection to the structure and formation of consciousness, either if one takes it rationally-normative or as descriptive. This would be interesting to explore. But this is the beginning of an analysis of concepts, theories and systems and if one where to do an investigation at this level there assumedly would be many differences to find. This is not the topic for this paper and seeing 'logical form' and 'syntactic parsing' as notions' belonging to different systems of explaining is not relevant for this.

As I said before, the concept of logical form will be seen as approximately the same as syntactic parsing and this is justifiable related to context of this paper. The reason for this is that they aim to describe the same object; which I loosely would describe as the underlying structure of sentences and their ontological and theory implications. A philosophical view of syntax will have to relate it selves to considerations beside those of the languages inner rules and so considerations like these are similar to trying to find the logical structure in sentences. The different notions do this in different conceptual frameworks. However, as mentioned, it is only one of the conceptions of logical form that Davidson mentions that can be taken to describing the same subject as syntactic parsing. As said he gives two different notions and the notion excluded is that of 'logical form' as sentences logical inferences, this is not the same as syntactic parsing but connected to it in a derivative way. But now I want to resume the explication of the paratactic theory. Davidson meant that the logical form of sentences is the structure and elements that determines truth conditions. Davidson says that: "… by discovering an articulate structure that permits us to treat each sentence as composed of a finite number of devices that make a stated contribution to its truth conditions." (Davidson 96). The articulated structure is the explication of structure and parts that contribute to the truth condition of sentences and these two determine the logical form of sentences. This means, when we see this together with his other statements, that he thinks there are systematic contribution coming directly from the form and rules of compositionality that makes contributes to the truth condition of sentences or utterances and that there are combined elements of a finite stock. After this he says: "As soon as we assign familiar structure, however, we must allow the consequence of that assignment to flow, and these, as we know, are in the case of indirect discourse consequences we refuse to buy." (Davidson 96). He thinks that we wrongly construe indirect speech reports as having a familiar structure. He is talking about indirect speech reports and our presupposing opinion that indirect speech reports have a familiar structure. The familiar structure is the standard syntactic analysis structure of these

sentences. He says that the belief in familiar structure is what consequently leads to the famous Fregean puzzle, in that there are consequences we refuse to accept, or as he say refuse to buy.

In the analysis of what is wrong in indirect discourse he says that the familiar structure of indirect speech reports makes us want to treat the content part of ISR as if it contribute semantically in a normal fashion and we therefore treat the sentence as if it has familiar logical consequences. However this is not possible for our intuition suggest that the content part of ISR is semantically inert precisely because the familiar logical entailment does not intuitively seem to hold. It seems impossible to hold the familiar logical entailments meaning that that we can not exchange nouns that refer to the same objects in attitude contexts because this is unintuitive (Davidson 96). This is seen when our intuition tells us not to accept that John knows that Samuel Clemens is his favourite author even if he thinks Mark Twain is his favourite author for as a matter of fact John does not know that Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens. When he speaks about familiar structure what I take him to mean is the standard or current syntactic attitude towards sentences structure. In the case of indirect speech report is for example 'He said that John was a man' equivalent in form to 'I broke my leg'. There are two objects that stand in a relation and both terms are a name of something.[27] He thinks that taking indirect speech reports as having a familiar form gives a wrong analysis of the logical form and that he in fact has found the actual logical form. The logical form he presents can appear surface similar to the familiar form or the standard form, but there is difference in what is being referred to and there are also differences in structure even if it is not so apparent in his revised logical form. He thinks that the logical form of indirect speech reports sentences is shown if they are presented like;

(1) The earth moves. Galileo said that.

But according to him it makes sense to switch the two expressions, thereby making the hearer understand faster and more efficiently that this is an indirect speech report and not something else. This is important because the sentence that expresses the talkers interpretation of what was originally said ('the earth moves') is nonassertoric. It would not be conceived as non-claimed it was first uttered or written. It seems efficiently and smart to change the order to

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[27] The same understanding of the standard syntactic analysis of PAAs that Prior presents. The example 'I broke my leg' is taken from A.N Prior (Prior 17).

avoid misunderstanding. So Davidson assert that the right way to present the logical form of ISR (indirect speech reports) is like:

(2) Galileo said that. The earth moves.

In the standard syntactic analysis of indirect speech reports is it just one sentence and not two like in this theory. According to Davidson the assumed familiar form does not reflect the actual logical form of ISRs though he welcomes a familiar reading of the form of the same saying utterance, e.g. the last sentence in (2) (Davidson 108). Traditionally, indirect speech reports are analysed as sentences describing a saying relation between a person and a content of saying. It is not the exactly the same but equivalent in syntactic structure to the traditional way to analyse PAAs with a person, an attitude relation and content. There are philosophers that have converted and made a revised edition of Davidson's paratactic theory so that it applies to propositional attitude ascriptions.[28] According to the paratactic theory the traditional ISR analyse gives a partly correct presentation of the logical form; what is correct is that there is a person, a saying relation and a singular term. But according to Davidson this is true of only the first sentence in theory (e.g. Galileo said that) and in this utterance or sentence the singular term is the demonstrative term 'that'. In the standard syntactic analysis the singular term was the that-clause. In the paratactic theory the term 'that' refers to a utterance and not a proposition, however they both agree that there is a singular term after the predicate in ISR. Davidson says regarding the term 'that' in indirect speech reports "…the 'that' is a demonstrative singular term referring to an utterance (not a sentence)." (Davidson 105). Davidson takes there to be good reasons for taking 'that' as a demonstrative in ISR. He says:

 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, The use of that is generally said to have
 arisen out of the demonstrative pronoun pointing to the clause which it introduces Cf.
 (1) He once lived here: we all know that; (2) That (now this) we all know: he ones lived
 here…
 (Davidson106).

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[28] Ernest Lepore and Barry Loewer.

The Oxford English Dictionary claims that the term 'that' have originated in language as a demonstrative pointing to the clause it which it introduces. This is the same function of the term 'that' as understood by the paratactic theory. This will then be support for the paratactic theory as it makes it reasonable to take the term 'that' as primary as a demonstrative. However, this does not mean that the term 'that' must be a demonstrative. According to the paratactic theory the term 'that' do not refer to propositions it refers to the same-saying or the utterance that follows in the next sentence.

The paratactic theory differs from the standard theory in that it claims that indirect speech reports consist logically of two combined but still independent claims, and that these two sentences (or utterances) have separate claims. The paratactic theory claims that one has to se what is communicated as something combined out of two sentences and two claims and in this way can the problems of indirect speech reports and propositional attitude ascriptions be resolved. Davidson says: " Since an utterance of 'Galileo said that' and any utterance following it are semantically independent, there is no reason to predict, on grounds of form alone, any particular effect on the truth of the first from change in the second." (Davidson 107-108). The claim that someone said something and the claim of what one takes that person to have said at some time are in this sense independent. And so the problem of exchanging co-referring names in the second sentence is unproblematic – because either is what is uttered a same saying of what was ones uttered or it is not, and this can account for the implausible conclusion that we do not want to accept. There is not a special problem with these sentences as it was when what was claimed was taken as a single sentence. The truth of the first utterance or sentence depend on if the following utterance is a same-saying of what ones said, but the same-saying can supposedly say the same things in different ways without the whole thing collapsing. It is an important point that the same-saying is not the actual utterance that was uttered. Davidson says that he prefers the first sentence to be described as a performative because it serves the role of introducing the next utterance. He thinks that it is like saying 'This is a joke' where 'this' refers to the joke to come, analogous to 'that' referring to the utterance to come (Davidson 106-107). Actually he thinks one should take the two independent expressions in indirect speech reports not as sentences at all but as utterances; an utterance of a same-saying and a performative. This he holds because of his Tarskian truth theory. He says that he thinks that a theory of truth must apply to utterances as long as language contains demonstratives (Davidson 106). Perhaps demonstratives make it impossible to construct a truth theory of sentences as they can function well as a demonstrative in

utterances said in a context but without for filling the criteria for reference in sentences. I do not have a theoretical commitment to a truth theory like Davidson have and I have therefore mentioned both sentences and utterances.

I said that it was important to se that the utterance following the performative is not the same utterance that ones were uttered by the person in question. Why this is so is clearly seen in the example given in example (2). It is clear that 'The earth moves' cannot be the actual utterance once uttered by Galileo because he spoke another language than English.[29] But for the utterances of (2) to be true then the utterance 'The earth moves' it must be an utterance that is a same-saying of the utterance ones uttered by Galileo. The same-saying relation has proven to be difficult to explain, but according to Davidson if one can make radical interpretation a viable theory it will provide a concept of synonymy between utterances. This will then also be a possible explanation of some of the implausible entailments of Priors theory. Both Davidson and Prior are supporters of sententialism and a problem is that of unifying and explaining how one can express the same with two sentences in two different languages. This shows how integrated Davidson's claims are and what a complete language theory he presents. He has constructed a system that one can compare to a card house; just a few cards can be removed without taking it all down, and it all builds on each other. Following this analogy I would say that the paratactic theory is a card that can be removed without taking the card house down. But what it does is that it explains the Fregean puzzle, and I believe that is also the intention behind this alternative parsing. It makes the sententialism account seem more apt for explaining anomalies we don't appreciate. It is supposed to give another explanation of the Fregean puzzle than the standard syntactic analysis, because the standard syntactic analyses presuppose the existence of propositions.

The paratactic theory is a type of sententialism and sententialism is a theory that conflict with propositionalism, which is a part of the standard syntactic analysis. Sententialism claims that the object of thought is a type of linguistic entity. In Davidson's theory the linguistic entity is utterances. Davidson's main reason for presenting an alternative parsing of ISR is that he rejects the existence of propositions either as abstract, theoretical or ontological. He does not say that the predicate and 'that' form a semantic or syntactic unit or claim that 'that' not belonging in the subordinate place of propositional attitude ascriptions or indirect speech

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[29] And because utterances, are token objects defined form persons and time of utterance. It can be defined with different criteria, but these are common.

reports. This is the type of argumentation that has been focused on in this paper. My attempt is to see if there are problems with the entailments of the parsing and related claims that would go against the standard way to parse PAAs and ISR. Davidson believes that his paratactic theory present the correct logical structure of indirect speech reports, but he present it as an alternative and competing account. His reasons not to accept the standard analysis is supported by more fundamental and wide-ranging disagreements. He does not accept the existence of propositions and thereby he does not accept the parsing that entails propositions. I believe that his reason for presenting another parsing is to weaken the arguments supporting structured-propositionalism and any theories claiming the existence of propositions. The problems in attitude contexts have been taken to support this existence and this is way he has presented another way to accommodate these problems. The differences between standard syntactic analysis and the paratactic account steams form the fact that propositionalism taken as a commitment to claiming that propositions exist and Davidson's own truth theory are competing theories. The claim on parsing is simply a consequence of this. Davidson's truth theory is supposed to explain the same things as a concept of propositions explain and this is not primarily to explain the problems revolving the substitution principle in attitude contexts but the explanation and justifying of aspects revolving the application and use of the concept 'truth'. Having the concept of proposition is useful, it refers to something that is mind and language independent, and which serves as something fundamental and universal; this will then be used when one want to explain that there is something in the world that justifies the criteria of truth.

Propositionalism makes the concept of truth metaphysical while Davidson makes the concept of truth fundamental. I want to avoid these types of discussions. But propositionalism claims that propositions are true and this is what makes sentences that express propositions true. Davidson gives a competing account of how to explain truth. This is a theory in which truth and meaning is integrated, and an explanation using the concept of proposition is redundant. This is not the level of argumentation I have chosen for this paper, and so it is enough to mention these reasons. I will not explain them any further. I concentrate on the implications of his theory's parsing and what it contributes to the subject.

He mentions that his theory claims that the term 'that' is functioning as a demonstrative in ISR, and that this is supported by the fact that 'that' originally was meant as a term that pointed to the following clause. This is a kind of reasoning that I would be interested in. He appeals to the common semantic of the word to speak for the fact that his theory is right. But as I mentioned, this fact is support for his views and it is not conclusive. However I do find his parsing of indirect speech reports both workable and plausible. There has been some critic of this theory on logical form. It has been mentioned that this analysis is too dependent on language specific conditions. It is not all languages that have the term 'that' in these types of sentences. Another critic is an effect of taking 'that' as referring to different non- repeatable utterances (same-sayings) makes 'that' in these utterances: 'John said that. The earth is round.' and 'John said that. The earth is round.' refers to two different utterances. And the theory offers no internal claims that will justify us identifying 'the earth is round' with 'the earth is round'. Of course 'the earth is round' is a same-saying of 'the earth is round' but there is nothing identifying these as more alike than other same-saying of 'the earth is round'. This suggests that the paratactic proposal says and explains too little and we could perhaps hope for a theory that explains more precisely elements in indirect speech reports.

3.3 Rumfitt's Paratactic Theory

Ian Rumfitt develops another version of the paratactic theory in which the reference of 'that' is a proposition and the same-saying is a token of a propositional act type. He thinks that Davidson's claim that the term 'that' refers to an unrepeated individual utterance is problematic and should be revised (446). He suggests that an abstract entity a type is needed in the paratactic account to avoid some problematic entailments. I said that he thinks that the reference of 'that' is a propositions, he actually says: "…we *may*, I think, construe the "that" as denoting *the proposition associated with the propositional act* bound by *u'*: for short, *the proposition bound by u'*." (449). It seems he is unsure on this point, or perhaps he dislikes having to state this because he thinks it is too crude. He revises the paratactic theory so that 'that' no longer refers to a same-saying or a string-of-words utterance made by the speaker.

He says that what people utter is an utterance that must be interpreted as a LF-structure, which includes the grammatical structure of utterances, this opposed to an utterance as a string of words, and that these are token types of a *propositional act* that he stipulates as: "…the conditions for an utterance *u* to be a token of the propositional act bound by *u'* is that *u'* report *u*, i.e. *u'Ru*." (440). His technical notion *propositional act* functions as link between utterances and propositions, as he cannot say that the reference of an speech episode is ipso facto a reference to a universal proposition. This is a too far step. But then again he is not content with claiming that the reference of 'that' is the propositional act bound by *u'*. He says that: "The denotation of the demonstrative ought, *ex officio*, to be the thing said…", and that the thing said is not identical with the act done by saying (440). He would be more content if propositions were deemed as what was *said*, and he concludes that one can associate, or perhaps even identify, distinct propositions with distinct propositional acts. But does he then mean propositional acts as tokens are to be identified with propositions or does he mean propositional acts as types have a proposition which can be identified or at least associated with it? I also have trouble finding out what is implies by "bound by". He says: "…only one proposition is bound by any given utterance." and this relation is different form "expressing" (Rumfitt 450). He says there is a one-to-one correspondence between propositions and propositional acts. But he does not seem content with a strong identity claim, and I wonder whether his theory propositional acts can be seen as being constitutive for the notion of propositions, as Schiffer would claim that the use of proposition constitutes it as a notion.

He mentions that Davidson's version has some problematic aspects; among other things that it is implausible that every instance of 'that' e.g. the complementizer is an instance of an equiform demonstrative pronoun (Rumfitt 433). He says: "…there is next to nothing in common *grammatically* between (on the one hand) a pronoun that combines with a common noun to form a noun-phrase which can then stand in various sentential positions, and (on the other hand) and a particle that takes a finite clause to produce an object for a verb like "say" or "believe" (433). He seem to think it is impossible to originate with a neutral view on what type of term 'that' is in indirect speech reports as he seems to assume that 'that' *is* a complementizer that needs to be transformed to a demonstrative pronoun for Davidson's claims to be plausible. As Davidson claimed that in indirect speech reports the term 'that' is a demonstrative pronoun. In the beginning of the article Rumfitt says that he will take that-clauses to be noun phrases and this would explain why he thinks it is natural to see 'that'

fundamentally as a complementizer in these sentences. I agree with his saying that it is implausible that a complementizer is a demonstrative. However, I do not think that Davidson need to show how the complementizer 'that' can be transformed to or in some way double function as a demonstrative pronoun. It has been shown in this paper that that-clauses are not likely viewed as noun phrases. And therefore an account stating that 'that' is a complementizer is not a neutral ground for this debate. The view of 'that' as a complementizer is not a background claim for Davidson, even if it is a background claim for Rumfitt. Rumfitt thinks that one can convert the structure of indirect speech reports where 'that' is a complementizer to a structure (LF-structure) where: "…the complementizing "that" *gives way to* a demonstrative pronoun which just *happens*, in English, to be equiform with it." (Rumfitt 435). This LF-structure is also to play a prominent role in Rumfitts version of the paratactic theory. He says that the LF level is a description level of utterances where structural ambiguities are resolved, and therefore if 'that' is taken as referring to an LF –structure as apposed to common utterances, then indirect speech reports where there are ambiguities as to what was once originally said, can be explained. To give an example; in 'John said that someone heard the shooting of the hunters' is it claimed that the hunters were shoot or that there shooting on animals was heard? Rumfitt thinks that one can keep the reference of 'that' to an utterance but that this utterance is an utterance of a LF-tree structure (Rumfitt 437). This resolves the problems with determining what was originally said, because it accounts for a determinate original saying and that the same-saying in these cases must be same-saying of this original saying (tree structure) if it is to be true. Rumfitt says:

> …The paratactic proposal is no longer being defended as a thesis about that string [the string of (English) words that the reporter utters]; rather, it is being defended only as a conjecture about a structural description (more or less remote from surface form), under which the utterance receives its interpretation.
> (Rumfitt 439)

The arguments supporting the transformation from 'that' as a complementizer to 'that' as a demonstrative pronoun is not explicated in the article by Rumfitt. But his figures show that he sees the that-clauses as a NP (noun phrase) where 'that' is a demonstrative pronoun referring to a unit that I suppose must be the same-saying which in Rumfitts terminology R-relates to a propositional act which in turn is connected to a proposition. I cannot see how a demonstrative pronoun referring to an utterance with an LF-structure, which in turn functions

with "deferred ostension" and is a token of a propositional type which is associated with a proposition, can be taken to be a noun phrase. It becomes meaningless labeling this as a noun phrase.[30]

Matthew McGrath says something interesting about Rumfitts theory. He says:

> Standardly, defenders of the Relational Analysis take *that*-clauses to be syntactic units and take the attitude verbs to designate two place relations. However, strictly speaking, the analysis leaves open the possibility that *that*-clauses designate propositions by virtue of the combined workings of the complementizer 'that' and the sentence immediately following it. A case in point is the propositionalist version of Donald Davidson's)(1968) paratactic theory of indirect speech reports. On Davidson's theory, 'Galileo said that the earth moves' amounts to 'Galileo said that. The earth moves'. Here 'the earth moves' functions as a separate displayed and nonassertoric utterance, and so does not combine with 'that' to form a syntactic unit. On the propositionalist version of this theory, 'that' refers not to the displayed utterance, but to the proposition designated by that utterance (Rumfitt (1993, p. 449). On such a view, through the combined workings of the 'that' and 'the earth moves', a proposition is designated.

(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/notes.html)

McGrath says that the that-clause designate with the complementizer and the sentence that follows it. This is apparently wrong for 'that' is either a complementizer e.g. a conjunction or a demonstrative pronoun. Rumfitts converts the complementizer to a demonstrative pronoun before making his claims, as he needs 'that' to be a demonstrative pronoun not a complementizer. Another question is if it is true that 'that' refers to a proposition in Rumfitts theory? Perhaps this will lead to problems when dealing with attitude ascriptions without the term 'that'. In the original version of the paratactic theory the term 'that' simply denoted the utterance or string of-words following, one can say that 'John believes that snow is white' is the same as 'John believes; snow is white'. If the term 'that' in Rumfitt's theory denote a proposition then attitude examples without 'that' will be harder to explain. I am unsure what to conclude 'that' refers to in Rumfitt's theory. Is it a proposition or an utterance type or a LF-

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[30] For example: "that. The water is cold".

tree? Is it perhaps all of them? I would also be more content if Rumfitt had explicated his transformation of 'that' as a complementizer to 'that' as a demonstrative pronoun.

4.1 Conclusion

What motivated me to choose an investigation of the term 'that' in that-clauses was the discrepancy between the statement of Abrahamsen and Bechtel and Williamson and Stanley. This made me question the need for the term 'that' in the subordinate clause in propositional attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports. It also made me wondering what support there was for treating the that-clause as a singular term. Williamson and Stanley relied on the standard syntactic when they argued for their views, and because of this it became important for me to investigate the claims of the standard syntactic analysis. Stephen Schiffer an advocate of the that-clause maintained that there where two important reasons to accept the that-clause as the last subordinate clause and as a singular term. The that-clause can function as a logical unit in logical arguments and this support it as having the property of being a singular term. The that-clause as singular term that refers to propositions is something that explains some problematic puzzles in philosophy of language, and one can say that without the possibility of treating the that-clause as a singular unit referring to something distinct the fregean puzzle would again be pressing. We saw that according to Quine this puzzle is not supposed to be resolved with theoretical assumptions and arguments.

I thought that the account of the that-clause would be more plausible if what made up the that-clause was established as a singular term before the introduction of the that-clause as referring to something as a unit. I would also prefer the account if one could show that that-clauses were a natural singular expression in natural language. I investigated to se if the that-clause was a singular term as a proper name or a complex noun phrase. I found that it was not plausible to se the that-clause as a noun phrase. It is also clamed that 'that' in that-clauses are complementizers and this was shown to be implausible, because either this would suggest that 'that' is a independent syntactic unit or that 'that' is a marker for a clause and this account

would not support only stipulate that including 'that' in the last syntactic part is simply to separate it form sentences. Then there is the possibility of stating that the that-clause is a singular term because it functions as a singular term, and this is possible, but it makes the that-clauses property of being a singular term justifiable from the two main arguments and it in my opinion weakens the *account* of it as a singular term and as a part of natural language.

The advocates and the opponents of the that-clause have substantial reasons in support of their account. Opponents like Donald Davidson want to avoid an account that need to stipulate something mind and language independent entity with the property of being true. The answer to where to parse 'that' in attitude ascriptions and indirect speech reports rest fundamentally on the ontological views that support what expressions are to function as singular terms and what they refer too. Disagreements in this philosophical area lead to disagreement revolving the units in sentences. Then one should probably see the whole packaged when deciding upon which view to support.

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