

# Restraining Radicalisation

The Muslim Brotherhood as a Force of Moderation  
within the Islamist Student Movement in Egypt

Åsmund Gram Dokka

MA thesis, Middle East and North Africa Studies, 60 sp.  
Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages

University of Oslo

Spring, 2011



## Table of Contents

<b>Abstract</b>	5
<b>Foreword</b>	7
<b>Chapter I: Historical Background and Hypothesis</b>	9
Defining Islamism	9
A Short Overview of the History of Islamism in Egypt	10
The Revival of Islamism: Why?	11
Previous Research	13
Hypothesis	14
Additional Causes for the Division of JI	16
Methodology	18
<b>Chapter II: The Rise of JI and its Ideological Basis</b>	21
<i>Part 1</i>	21
Nasser's «Fall from Grace»	21
The Believing President and the Islamisation of Society	23
The Emergence of Religious Societies on Campus	24
The Islamist Students' Background	25
The Government and the Islamists	27
<i>Part 2</i>	29
Mawdudi and Jamaat-e islami	29
Qutb's Clout and the Interpretation of Ḥisba	31
Salafism and the Power of Symbols	35
The Brotherhood: Slowly Awakening	38
<i>Conclusion</i>	41
<b>Chapter III: The Road towards the Brotherhood</b>	43
<i>Part 1</i>	43
Happy Campers	44
The Art of Propaganda	45
Recruitment through Services	45
A Landslide of Victories	46
<i>Part 2</i>	48
The Brotherhood and Violence	48
Out of prison, Out of Members	51
Meeting the Younger Guard	53
Won over by the Moderates	55
<i>Conclusion</i>	56

<b>Chapter IV: The division of JI</b>	59
<i>Part 1</i>	59
The Face of the Moderate JI	60
Infitāḥ and Westernisation	62
Peace with Israel and the Revolution in Iran	65
<i>Part 2</i>	69
Outrage and Infighting	70
Clashing with the Copts	72
Upper Egypt: Violence and a Weak Brotherhood	73
Regime Repression	76
Graduation and Fragmentation	80
<i>Conclusion</i>	81
<b>Chapter V: Conclusion</b>	83
Idealist and Salafist	83
Moderation through Conversation	84
The Great Divide	85
Assassinations and Associations	86
Shaping Egypt's Future	86
<b>Bibliography</b>	89

## **Abstract**

The Islamist student movement, al-Jamā'a al-'Islāmiyya, emerged on the Egyptian universities in the 1970s, winning landslide victories in a number of student elections and also gaining increasing influence in society outside campus. The movement was a loose composition of students with different persuasions, from apolitical Salafists to violent Jihadists bent on toppling the regime. Shortly before the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981, al-Jamā'a al-'Islāmiyya disintegrated due to differences regarding violence as a political tool.

This thesis demonstrates the pivotal role played by the Muslim Brotherhood in regard to changing the minds of the majority of the Islamist students on the issue of violence. Brotherhood members approached central leaders of al-Jamā'a al-'Islāmiyya as early as 1975 and were able to persuade the students into adopting anti-violent position.

This thesis highlights the potential of change and moderation within Islamist movement inclined to violence.

Many of the moderate student leaders joined the Muslim Brotherhood and their generation has influenced Egyptian politics and public life for decades. Now they will play a part in shaping society in post-Mubarak Egypt.



## Foreword

This master thesis is a result of a year long study of the Islamist student movement in Egypt in the 1970s and its relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood.

Egypt and the region at large has changed tremendously since I started my work. Though my research may be void of any direct links to the demonstrations that eventually toppled the Mubarak regime on February 11<sup>th</sup> this year, the events still made the process of writing more exiting.

There are some that deserve special gratitude for helping me finishing the thesis. First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor, associate professor Bjørn Olav Utvik, for advice and guidance along the way, both during my stay in Cairo and in the hectic weeks before the thesis was finished. The Fault Lines of Islamism project also deserves thanks for granting me a scholarship in order to write this thesis. It has been most helpful.

I would also like to direct a special thanks to the proprietors of Maktaba `Ayman li-Turāth on the bookmarked in `Adhbbakiyya who gave me invaluable assistance in my search for Arabic literature. `Abd al-Mun`im `Abū al-Futūḥ, `Abū al-`Ilā Māḍī, `Usāma Ḥāfiẓ and `Iṣām al-`Aryān all deserves gratitude for letting me interview them.

Last but not least, I must thank my wife, Eva, for enduring support and patience.

Brussels, May 12<sup>th</sup>, 2011.

### *Note on Transcription, Names and Abbreviations*

As this thesis is based on Arabic sources to a great extent, I have chosen to transcribe most names. The exceptions are the names of people and places that are familiar in the West. Hence, I refer to Egypt's second President as Nasser, not Jamāl `Abd al-Nāṣir. The Mediterranean city is called Alexandria, while I have chosen to transcribe lesser known cities such as `Asyūt and al-Manṣūra.

Concepts which a Western audience will be accustomed to, such as the Sharia (Islamic Law) and Shia Muslims (Islam's second largest denomination), however, will not be transcribed. I have also chosen not to apply the system of so-called sun-letters as it would have served few purposes in the context of this thesis.

For translations of the titles of books and articles in Arabic and Norwegian, I refer to the bibliography.

Because I think too many abbreviations obstruct the language, I have chosen only to cut short al-Jamā`a al-`Islāmiyya (JI).





## Chapter I: Historical Background and Hypothesis

On January 25<sup>th</sup> this year a peaceful revolt began in Egypt with the demand that President Hosni Mubarak resigned. Over the next weeks the demonstrations grew in size until Mubarak finally stepped down on February 11<sup>th</sup> – ending his nearly 30 year long rule.

In the wake of the historic resignation, the Muslim Brotherhood took centre stage as the most organised political force by far in Egypt. The Islamists threw their weight behind the constitutional reforms which were approved by a popular referendum on March 19<sup>th</sup>. In April the movement formed the Freedom and Justice Party with the aim of contesting about 50 percent of the seats in the parliamentary elections coming up in September.

Many central figures in the Muslim Brotherhood started their political careers as activists in the Islamist student movement al-Jamā'a al-`Islāmiyya in the 1970s. With its numerous ideological inputs the movement soon spread to most universities in Egypt, winning sweeping victories in the student elections. However, towards the end of the decade the movement became increasingly divided over the question of violence as a means for political change – a discord that eventually led to the disintegration of al-Jamā'a al-`Islāmiyya in the early 1980s.

The purpose of this thesis is to show how the Muslim Brotherhood persuaded a majority of the student leaders to denounce the use of violence and join the `Ikhwān, and how this choice eventually led to al-Jamā'a al-`Islāmiyya's demise. The effort paid off for the Brotherhood, however. It was provided with a generation of highly capable members who made their mark in Egyptian society for decades and may very well be instrumental in the shaping of the country's future.

Before I present my hypothesis, I will define the concept of Islamism and then give the reader an overview of the history of Islamism in Egypt.

### *Defining Islamism*

Political Islam, Islamic fundamentalism, Islamicism, Islamism – the names depicting the phenomenon of politicised Islam are many. In my opinion, not all of them are very accurate, for example Islamic fundamentalism.<sup>1</sup> As the most common label today is Islamism, I will stick to that.

With regard to this thesis, I have chosen to base my interpretation of Islamism on the Norwegian scholar Bjørn Olav Utvik, who defines the Islamist movement as

---

<sup>1</sup> Fundamentalism was first used to describe Christian Protestant sects in the U.S. After the First World War. The difference between these sects and Islamism is substantial. Roger Owen, *State Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East* (London, Routledge, 2004), 156.

...an ideological direction which emphasises that the religion of Islam not only concerns the individual's relation to faith, but contains God-given guidelines which also should apply to societal, legal and political matters in Muslim societies. For most Islamists, this view implies the demand that Sharia, the Islamic law based on the Koran and the Prophet's Sunna, must be the basis of the law.<sup>2</sup>

First and foremost, the definition is broad and inclusive, which is an advantage as far as the thesis is concerned, because a number of movements and groups will be referred to. When sticking to this definition, they will all be considered Islamist, as they have a common goal; namely a society which is based on the Sharia.

Their visions of the nature of such a state may differ, but in regard to the mission of this thesis, the interesting point is which methods the different groups or individuals apply to pursue the goal of an Islamic state.

My choice of definition makes it easier to separate between the ones that advocate the use of violence as necessary for reaching that goal and the ones that do not deem it imperative. In this thesis the former category of Islamists will be referred to as *radicals* and the latter referred to as *moderates*. Hence, the possibility that Islamists classified as moderates can harbour views that many will consider to be extreme can occur. In this thesis however, they will still be referred to as *moderates*.

### *A Short Overview of the History of Islamism in Egypt*

The ideologisation of Islam can be traced back to the mid to late 19<sup>th</sup> century and has been an attribute of Muslim politics ever since.<sup>3</sup> The thinker Jamāl al-Dīn al-'Afhānī (1838-97) is together with Muḥammad 'Abduh (1849-1905) often credited as the origin of Islamism. The aim of these «Islamic modernists» – looking to counter the Western influence that was building in the Muslim world at the time – was to show that Islam and modernism were not opposites.<sup>4</sup> Islam, 'Abduh claimed, was a religion based on reason, as opposed to Christianity which was not. Their movement «sought to accommodate Islam with the ideas of modern secularism» and appeared in many ways as a progressive movement – containing the first feminist movements in Islam, for instance.<sup>5</sup>

These were merely seeds for coming generations to reap, though. The thoughts of al-

---

<sup>2</sup> Bjørn Olav Utvik, *Islamismen* (Oslo: Unipub, 2011), 24.

<sup>3</sup> Sami Zubaida, «Political Modernity», in *Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debates*, ed. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Armando Salvatore and Martin van Bruinessen (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 78.

<sup>4</sup> Muhammad Khalid Masud, «Islamic Modernism», in *Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debates*, 241-42.

<sup>5</sup> Cyril Glassé, *The Concise Encyclopædia of Islam, Revised Edition*. (London: Stacey International, 2002), 395-96.

ʿAfhānī and ʿAbduh did not penetrate the lower classes and accordingly they failed to gather a popular following.

The first broad, popular Islamist movement to appear was the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in the Egyptian town of ʿIsmāʿīliyya in 1928. The ʿIkhwān emerged independently of the traditional ʿulamāʿ, and concentrated on teaching Islamic morals and ethics, as well as working for the restoration of religious law and Islamic hegemony in public life.<sup>6</sup>

During its heydays in the 1930s and 40s, the Muslim Brotherhood gathered a large following, consisting of people with a traditional Muslim education; clerks, lower civil servants, students, shopkeepers and generally people aggrieved and deprived of their status by foreign domination and the increasing westernisation. Although the leader al-Bannā advocated a return to Islamic piety and a society based on the principles of the Koran, the ʿIkhwān were at the same time underlining the need to adapt these principles to a modern world. They did not seek to transform society into a blueprint of Arabia, in the seventh century, that is.

In the crisis-stained years after the Second World War, the tension increased between different power blocs in Egypt, leading to the assassination of both Prime Minister Maḥmūd Fahmī al-Nuqrāshī Bāshā in December 1948 and Ḥasan al-Bannā in February the following year. Although the Brotherhood was regarded as a serious contender for power at the time, it was the Free Officers (al-Ḍubāṭ al-ʿAhrār) that stroke first, staging a bloodless military coup on July 23<sup>rd</sup> 1952.

Even if the ties between the new military regime and the Brotherhood were initially good, they soon deteriorated, and after the attempt on President Nasser's life in 1954, the movement was driven underground.

As a consequence, Islamic activism was close to being non-existent in Egypt until the 1970s – the prison camps containing the brothers were the exception.<sup>7</sup> The aftermath of the Egyptian defeat in the Six Day War of 1967, however, and especially after the death of Nasser in 1970, saw a revival of Islamism.<sup>8</sup>

### *The revival of Islamism: Why?*

What did cause the Islamic resurgence? Most fingers point towards the failure of what Richards and Waterbury labels the «old order», i.e. Nasser's Arab Socialism.<sup>9</sup> One reason was the great promises of Nasserism, which, though fulfilled in the initial years, failed to materialise come the mid 1960s

<sup>6</sup> Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 521-522.

<sup>7</sup> Bjørn Olav Utvik, «Ḥizb al-Wasat and the Potential for Change in Egyptian Islamism», *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* vol. 14, no. 3 (Fall 2005), 296.

<sup>8</sup> Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, 529.

<sup>9</sup> Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 348.

when the economy stagnated and job-creation was brought to a halt. Frustration was also building with the authoritarianism of the Nasserist state, whose nationalistic and ideological slogans appeared hollow after the disastrous defeat in the 1967 war.<sup>10</sup>

Is it then possible to reduce the re-emergence of Islamism to economic hardship and social grievances? Probably not. «Blocked careers, unemployment, rampant corruption, unavailable housing all set the context for Islamism, but they are poor predictors of exactly who will participate» in Islamist movements, Richards and Waterbury points out.<sup>11</sup> Would there be no Islamists if all these «wrongs» were corrected, they ask, rather rhetorically.

There have also been attempts to explain the rise of Islamism by referring to their demographic roots. These studies highlighted the fact that members of Islamist groups were highly educated and tended to have recently migrated from the countryside to urban centres.<sup>12</sup> The social alienation these people suffered in the cities, uprooted from their families, made them receptive to the Islamic message of tradition, goes the arguing. This account also presents Islamisation of young people as a phenomenon that can be avoided, given that certain circumstances are altered.

However, disenchanted young people do not all become Islamists. As Richards and Waterbury emphasise, some may just as well fall into drugs and crime, hard work or simply indifference.<sup>13</sup> And, in Egypt, members of the last category may be just as numerous as the Islamists.

The above-mentioned explanations fail to take into account the appeal of Islam to the individual, and reduces the role of piety and faith in the Islamic identity. «People do not come to Islam as an alternative for their social misfortunes. People come to Islam in response to a call, a call which goes very far and deep in the human soul», said the Moroccan Islamic leader, ʿAbd al-Salām Yāsīn, as a response to the reduction of Islamism to socioeconomic circumstances.<sup>14</sup>

In other words, one must also appreciate the potential of mobilisation within Islam. This is especially true in countries where inhabitants daily are reminded of Islamic history and the appropriateness of some practices and the inappropriateness of others.<sup>15</sup>

Or, as Wickham puts it: «Islamist mobilizers in Egypt did not simply exploit the frustrations of unemployed and underemployed youth. Rather, they engaged in a massive ideological project to

---

<sup>10</sup> Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, 529.

<sup>11</sup> Richards and Waterbury, *Political Economy of the Middle East*, 348-49, 324.

<sup>12</sup> Mohammed M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, «Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement», in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 64-65.

<sup>13</sup> Richards and Waterbury, *Political Economy of the Middle East*, 348-49, 324.

<sup>14</sup> Richards and Waterbury, *Political Economy of the Middle East*, 324.

<sup>15</sup> Owen, *State Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*, 156.

capture the hearts and minds of possible recruits».<sup>16</sup> I would argue that this project was made easier by the government's control of Islamic institutions such as al-`Azhar, which started as early as the 1890s. It was Nasser, however, that first started to actively use al-`Azhar as a source of legitimacy for the regime. The government domination led to a loss of credibility for al-`Azhar in some parts of the population, according to Moustafa.<sup>17</sup> This in turn, fuelled radical Islamism, he argues.

### *Previous Research*

Thanks to the assassination of President Sadat in 1980, the killing of tourists visiting Luxor in 1997 and the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks – where the most infamous participant, Mohammed Atta, was Egyptian – much has been written about the Islamist movement in Egypt.

However, the research, or press reports for that matter, tends to focus solely on the group behind the Sadat assassination, Tanzīm al-Jihād, or another group responsible for attacks on tourists in Luxor in 1997, al-Jamā`a al-Islāmiyya.<sup>18</sup>

When concerned with years preceding the murder of Sadat, much emphasis is put on two other organisations: namely Munazzamat al-Taḥrīr al-`Islāmī (often just referred to as al-Fanniyya al-`Askariyya) and Jamā`at al-Muslimīn (better known as al-Takfīr wa al-Hijra). The former draws attention because of its failed coup in 1974, whereas the latter is often highlighted due to its obscurity and the members' kidnapping and killing of an Egyptian minister in 1977.

These groups clashed with the government, though none of them had a large following. Jamā`at al-Muslimīn for instance, may have had between 3.000 and 5.000 members.<sup>19</sup> Compared with the organisation that actually wielded some political power during the 1970s, al-Jamā`a al-`Islāmiyya (JI), the Islamist student movement, the above-mentioned groups are dwarfed. Firstly, JI is thought to have commanded around one-fifth to one-third of Egyptian students at the height of their power in the 1970s.<sup>20</sup> Secondly, the organisation triumphed in a number of student elections and with time outgrew the universities, arranging open air prayers for all to take part in. These prayers gathered tens of thousands of participants.

Despite JI being matched only by the Muslim Brotherhood as far as membership and political

---

<sup>16</sup> Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism and Political Change in Egypt* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 120.

<sup>17</sup> Tamir Moustafa, «Conflict and Cooperation between the State and Religious Institutions in Contemporary Egypt», *Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 32, no. 1 (February, 2000), 17.

<sup>18</sup> Al-Jamā`a al-`Islāmiyya referred to here, is the radical and violent organisation that developed from 1981 and onwards, not the student organisation subject to this study.

<sup>19</sup> Raymond A. Hinnebusch, *Egyptian Politics under Sadat* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 205.

<sup>20</sup> Hinnebusch, *Egyptian Politics under Sadat*, 205.

power are concerned, JI have rarely been put under scrutiny in the 30 years that have passed since its dissolution. Despite some shortcomings which I will return to, Gilles Kepel's *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh* towers as the most influential work, covering both JI and the other parts of the Islamist movement in 1970s Egypt. Apart from Kepel's book, JI is treated briefly in works about the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Alison Pargeter's *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition* where a couple of pages are dedicated to the relations between the *ʿIkhwān* and JI in the 1970s. A few pages in Ahmed Abdalla's *The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt 1923-1973* is committed to the rise of Islamist groups on campus, but his work does first and foremost concern itself with Egyptian students up until the emergence of JI.

Additionally, JI is mentioned shortly in books covering the Sadat era, like Raymond A. Hinnebusch's *Egyptian Politics under Sadat* and *Sadat and After: Struggles for Egypt's political Soul* by Raymond William Baker. Far from examining JI in depth, they also fail to make a firm distinction between *jamāʿa* and *jamāʿāt*. In other words, the Islamist student movement that took the name al-Jamāʿa al-ʿIslāmiyya in the early 1970s is not always clearly separated from other Islamist groups (*jamāʿāt*) operating at the time.

In the Arabic language few if any authoritative works have been published. ʿĀdil ʿAmīn al-Muḥāmī has produced two volumes on the student uprisings of 1972 and 1973, *Intifāḍa al-ṭalaba al-miṣriyyin*, but as Islamist student never played a prominent role in those demonstrations, they do not figure heavily in that work. Hāla Muṣṭafā's *Al-Niẓām al-siyāsī wa al-muʿāraḍa al-ʿislāmiyya fi Miṣr* is a detailed work which analyses the ties between the Sadat regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, but few pages touch upon JI.<sup>21</sup>

Thus, one is left with books about the Islamic movement in general. A couple of autobiographies have appeared in recent years, however, most notably *Shāhid ʿalā tārikh al-ḥaraka al-ʿislāmiyya fi Miṣr 1970-1984*, by ʿAbd al-Munʿim ʿAbū al-Futūḥ, one of the most influential JI leaders in the 1970s.<sup>22</sup>

Apart from Kepel's «Muslim Extremism in Egypt», the only other work I have found that concerns itself solely with JI, is the master thesis of the Norwegian researcher Truls Hallberg Tønnessen from 2005, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad: Framveksten av den islamske studentbevegelsen 1970-1981».<sup>23</sup> However, his main concern in the thesis is how JI rose to power at the universities in the 1970s and the general Islamisation of campus, not the organisation's

<sup>21</sup> The title of this book may appear to be *Al-Dawla wa al-harakāt al-ʿislāmiyya al-muʿāraḍa: Bayna al-muḥādana wa al-muwāḍaha*. However, the title I refer to is the one given by the publisher on page 3.

<sup>22</sup> This book was published in Egypt in October 2010, but an unedited manuscript have been available on ʿAbū al-Futūḥ's website for some years.

<sup>23</sup> The work is written in Norwegian. See bibliography for an adequate translation of the title.

split.

### *Hypothesis*

The topic of this master thesis is the reasons for the dissolution of JI, the Islamist student movement, in 1981. My hypothesis is as follows:

*The Muslim Brotherhood acted as a force of moderation within al-Jamā'a al-`Islāmiyya from the middle of the 1970s, which eventually led to the break-up of the organisation.*

Obviously, this hypothesis rests on a number of preconditions, which I will account for in the following pages.

Firstly, *the Muslim Brotherhood had to be a moderate organisation that rejected violence.* The `Ikhwān distanced itself from the use of violence and struck a moderate chord after the crackdown on Tanzīm 1965 in that very year. By the time JI was founded, the Brotherhood had quite good relation with the Sadat regime. And, although they were not formally a legal organisation, they opted to work within the domain of politics to pursue their goal of an Islamic state.

Secondly, *there had to be a radical current within JI at the organisation's outset.* Kepel claims that Sayyid Quṭb was a great source of inspiration for the members of JI.<sup>24</sup> And, while Kepel at times gives the impression that Quṭb was the *only* influence of JI, moderates like `Abū al-Futūḥ admit that Quṭb was widely read and that the use of violence was not rejected, but more a question of timing.<sup>25</sup> Another JI leader belonging to the moderate camp, `Abū al-`Ilā Māḍī, also points out that violent currents was not outright condemned in the initial years.<sup>26</sup>

Thirdly, *the Muslim Brotherhood had to make contact with parts of JI from the middle of the 1970s.* `Iṣām al-`Aryān, another JI leader, recalls meeting prominent members of the `Ikhwān before 1976.<sup>27</sup> According to `Abū al-Futūḥ, his first contact with the Brotherhood occurred in 1975.<sup>28</sup> At the time, this was a hot topic surrounded by secrecy in Islamist circles. Now, however, no

---

<sup>24</sup> Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 155.

<sup>25</sup> `Abd al-Mun`im `Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid `alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, ed. Ḥussām Tammām (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2010), 65.

<sup>26</sup> `Abū al-`Ilā Māḍī, *Jamā'āt al-`unf al-miṣriyya wa ta`wīlātha li-l-`islām: al-juḍūr - al-`asas al-fikriyya - al-murāja`āt* (Cairo: Maktbat al-Shurūq al-Duwaliyya, 2006), 17-18.

<sup>27</sup> «Al-`Aryān ytaḥaddathu `an nasha`a al-tayār al-`islāmī bi-l-jāma`āt al-miṣriyya», *Ikhwanonline*, accessed March 20th, 2011, <http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.asp?ArtID=7008&SecID=270>.

<sup>28</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid `alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 95.

one disputes that these meetings took place.

Fourthly, *the Brotherhood had to be able to win over a substantial number of JI members*. Most of the JI leaders in Cairo and Alexandria chose to affiliate with the `Ikhwān, according to `Abū al-Futūḥ.<sup>29</sup> That view is shared by Utvik, who notes that a large section of the JI rank-and-file members went on to join the Brotherhood.<sup>30</sup>

Fifthly, *factions within JI had to reject the influence of the Brotherhood, eventually causing a rift*. Māḍī recalls great fury among the radicals when the news about the moderates' affiliation with the `Ikhwān broke.<sup>31</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ says that their membership was kept secret because they anticipated strong opposition from the Salafī and Jihadi wings inside JI.<sup>32</sup>

#### *Additional causes for the Division of JI*

Having established the probability of my hypothesis, it is important to emphasise that the Brotherhood did not cause the dissolution of JI single-handedly by persuading leading figures to join them. Although I will argue that this was the main reason for the split, other circumstances contributed as well.

While I concentrate on inside factors when explaining the demise of JI, Kepel, and to a certain degree, Tønnessen, points to outside factors. In my eyes, Kepel's work is somewhat disorganised and clearly vague when it comes to the reasons for the collapse of JI. The ambiguity is first and foremost caused by his failure to make a distinction between the radical and moderate wings of JI, a flaw also underlined by Tønnessen.

Hence, the disagreements within JI regarding the use of violence are not highlighted, which in turn leads to Kepel portraying the organisation as double-tongued:

«While the Islamicists brandished sticks and clubs on the one hand, they also wrote articles seeking to protect their image as a peaceful force expressing the country's deepest sentiments and therefore unjustly persecuted by an iniquitous prince».<sup>33</sup>

This reveals Kepel's failure to spot the different currents inside JI. The ones that brandished sticks were clearly not the same as those working to secure the organisation's peaceful image, a point I will prove throughout this thesis.

<sup>29</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid 'alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 78.

<sup>30</sup> Utvik, *Islamist Economics in Egypt*, 297.

<sup>31</sup> Māḍī, *Jamā'at al-'unf al-miṣriyya wa ta'wīlātha li-l-'islām*, 20.

<sup>32</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid 'alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 95.

<sup>33</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 151.



In Kepel's account, JI is abruptly broken up after confrontations with the regime, ending with widespread arrests on September 3<sup>rd</sup> 1981.<sup>34</sup> The confrontation was «egged on» by the secret police, he claims, implying that the downfall of JI was due to the regime's loss of patience with the Islamists.<sup>35</sup>

Thus, the focus is solely fixed to the struggle between the government and JI, a fight the Sadat regime won. Kepel does not grasp JI's transformation from a broadly based student movement into two different groups, a dormant division that was there from the beginning, became wider in the middle of the 1970s and evident for everyone in 1980 – which I will show in this thesis.

Tønnessen on the other hand, is aware of the differences that existed within JI, especially regarding the use of violence.<sup>36</sup> Moreover, he points out that the rift the Muslim Brotherhood may have caused with its recruitment of central JI figures. However, when it comes to the organisation's split, he still highlights the external pressure. The repression from the regime made it harder for the moderates of JI to contain the radical elements within the organisation, he argues, adding that the pressure also forced JI from the universities.<sup>37</sup>

I will not argue that the pressure put on JI by the regime did not contribute to its downfall. Tønnessen mentions that the repression may have hastened the divisions within JI, which may be true to some extent.<sup>38</sup> However, he also suggests that the fact that JI was forced off campus led to tighter connections with the Brotherhood.<sup>39</sup> The growing regime repression at the universities in 1979 increased the collaboration with the *Īkhwān*, he says, adding that the relationship became public the year after as JI was in need of new arenas of activity.

In this thesis I will argue that the connection with the Brotherhood was established at a much earlier point, and that central JI figures regarded the two organisations more or less as one after their graduation in 1976-77. The graduation of many of the leading members contributed in itself to the fragmentation of JI, although some tried to stay in touch with campus.

---

<sup>34</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 170.

<sup>35</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 237.

<sup>36</sup> It should be noted that the dissolution of JI was not Tønnessen's focus in his thesis. And although he recommends further studies into the reasons behind the break, his thesis is nevertheless one of the most extensive works on that topic.

<sup>37</sup> Truls Hallberg Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad: Framveksten av den islamske studentbevegelsen 1970-1981» (Master thesis, University of Oslo, 2005), 126.

<sup>38</sup> Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 119.

<sup>39</sup> Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 121.

## *Methodology*

In order to put my hypothesis to the test, a qualitative methodology was chosen for this thesis. As opposed to quantitative data – collective data that can be measured by numbers – qualitative data are presented either in writing or speech. In my case, that meant the use of a mixture of interviews, autobiographies and secondary literature.

I spent the time between October 12<sup>th</sup> and November 12<sup>th</sup> 2010 in Cairo doing research for the thesis. The time was divided between finding informants and conducting interviews and searching for relevant literature written in Arabic.

When contacting people in order to ask them for an interview, I had one great disadvantage, namely the parliamentary election in early December that year. At the time I arrived in Egypt, many of the old JI members were busy preparing for the Muslim Brotherhood's election campaign, and could therefore not find the time to meet me.

I nevertheless conducted four interviews with former figureheads of JI. Three of them, `Abū al-`Ilā Māḍī, `Iṣām al-`Aryān and `Abd al-Mun`im `Abū al-Futūḥ, belonged to the what I have defined as the moderate wing, while one, `Usāma Ḥāfīz, was considered a radical. All interviews were digitally recorded.

In two of the cases, I had read memoir-like books published by the interviewees beforehand, which gave me the possibility to pinpoint my questions according to what I had read. In turn, this enabled me to obtain comprehensive answers on key issues, such as the ties with the Muslim Brotherhood and the position on the use of violence. It was also an advantage that I knew the biography of the interviewees when meeting them, hence no time was lost establishing their position and history with the JI.

The interviews with the three men belonging to the moderate camp were conducted in more or less the same fashion, circling round early influences, the timing of the first contact with the Brotherhood, the developments regarding JI's stance on the use of violence, the relations with the radical wing and the repression by the regime.

The interview with Ḥāfīz followed more or less the same formula. However, even more emphasis was put on the issue of violence, since he belonged to the radical wing, and on the subject of differences between Upper Egypt on one hand and Cairo and the Delta on the other, since he was born in al-Minyā and went to university in `Asyūt.

It is important to underline that while the interviews followed a pattern, the sources were allowed to talk freely if they thought something particularly important.

While there is no denying the drawback of only having one interviewee from the radical side of JI, it is at the same time important to stress that the hypothesis concerns the influence of the

Muslim Brotherhood within JI. The influence was inevitably stronger among the moderates than the radicals and they should therefore be in a better position to talk about that subject.

A common problem when it comes to interviews of this character is the informants' bias. In this case the problem is possibly even more noteworthy because two of the interviewees, al-'Aryān and 'Abū al-Futūḥ are veterans of the Muslim Brotherhood, occupying central positions. On top of that, Mādī was a member of the 'Ikhwān until forming his own party, Ḥizb al-Waṣat al-Jadīd, in 1996. Although I never detected any obvious bias, the informants' answers and understanding of events will nevertheless be coloured by their present roles and their history with the movement. However, in regard to the Islamist movement in Egypt, and Egyptian politics in general, there are few unbiased figures. My experience is that most people belong to one camp or the other. And, since refraining from interviewing them is not an option – these people are sources of vast amounts of information – one must be careful to put their statements under close examination.

As to the literature, one of my goals from the offset was to use as many Arabic sources as possible. I command the language fairly well after three years of Arabic studies – one of them in Cairo. The main reason for the choice was the notion that Arab and first of all Egyptian scholars would have a closeness to the subject lacking in Western literature. While this is true when it comes to primary sources such as biographies and autobiographies, my impression is that there is a lack of authoritative research on JI conducted in Arabic. Just as in the West, there is a tendency to focus on the more violent 1980s and 90s or the assassination of President Sadat.

Moreover, obtaining the books that offer some examination and analysis of JI were not an easy task since such books were rare even in bookstores specialising in Arabic literature. An alternative way of getting my hands on relevant books was the 'Adhbakiyya book market on Maydān al-'Ataba in Cairo. Although chaotic at first sight, it turned out to be my greatest source of literature in Arabic.

And, in the end, I would argue that I managed to gather quite a wide range of works written in Arabic. The most noteworthy written primary sources have been 'Abū al-Futūḥ's *Shāhid 'alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984* and Mādī's *Jamā'āt al-'unf al-miṣriyya wa ta'wīlātha li-l-'islām*, which have provided unprecedented detail about JI's development in the 1970s.

As for other secondary sources, the most important have been Kepel's *Muslim Extremism in Egypt* and Tønnessen's thesis «Egyptske studenter mellom Marx and Muhammad». In analysing the relations between JI and the 'Ikhwān, Alison Pargeter's *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition*, was particularly helpful.



## **Chapter II The Rise of JI and its Ideological Basis**

In this chapter, I will give a short introduction to the historical circumstances in which JI emerged on the universities in Egypt, while also discuss the ideological basis of the movement.

The first part will consist of a short introduction to Egyptian politics in the late 1960s and early 1970s, before I deal with the formation of JI. The alleged role played by the Sadat regime in this process will be discussed in depth. That Sadat aspired to increase the regime's influence on campus, partially caused by the wish to strike down the leftists, is beyond doubt. Yet, when it comes to collaboration between JI and Sadat, the sources are more divided. I will argue that while Sadat encouraged JI and other Islamist organisations on campus, there is little to support allegations that the regime created or controlled JI.

The second part will be spent accounting for the ideological foundation of JI and examining their religious and political goals as they were expressed in the first part of the decade. Besides pointing out the diversity of influences, the important question is whether or not JI, due to the ideological input, was a radical and violence-embracing organisation from the offset. This is an important question when it comes to determining developments in JI's view upon violence as a means for change, which will be dealt with in later chapters.

### **Part 1**

After Nasser's ascend to power in 1954 and the subsequent attempt to assassinate him later that year – allegedly planned by the Muslim Brotherhood – there was no room for popular Islamist movements no more. Until the defeat in the Six Day War of June 1967, Nasserism, Pan-Arabism and Secularism were the dominant ideologies rather than Islamism.

As we shall see, the defeat gave Islamists a chance to get back at the stage, while Sadat's ascend to power three years later gave them a veritable boost. The new president was bent on distancing himself from his predecessor and in Islam he found the tool to help him embark on that process.

#### *Nasser's «Fall from Grace»*

The tremendous popularity Nasser enjoyed throughout the 1950s and until the Six Day War in June 1967 enabled the regime to subdue popular Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood. The

ʿIkhwān witnessed two crackdowns during the reign of Nasser, in 1954 and 1965, including arrests and executions.

The official institutions of Islam, like al-ʿAzhar University – the training ground of the *ʿulamāʿ* of Egypt and other Muslim countries – were effectively brought under government control. From 1961 and onwards, al-ʿAzhar was expanded with four new and non-religious faculties which reduced the power of the rector and put the government in charge of the curriculum.<sup>40</sup> The Sharia courts had been abolished already in 1955.

The defeat in the war in 1967, *al-Naksa*, and not at least its humiliating circumstances, was a devastating blow for Nasser and his regime. Although «persuaded» by popular support to continue as president after his initial resignation, the Six Day War severely weakened Nasser.

The economy that had started to lose steam in the mid 1960s was left in ruins.<sup>41</sup> In the fiscal year following the defeat, Egypt's economy experienced negative growth. And, with the Israeli army on the east bank of the Suez Canal, Egypt had to accept donations from the old enemies Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to make up for the loss of revenue due to the cutting off of transport through the canal.<sup>42</sup> Militarily, the defeat made Cairo more dependant on Moscow, with thousands of Soviet advisors flocking to Egypt.<sup>43</sup>

At the same time, students, workers and professionals began questioning the repressive nature of the regime and demanding liberalisation.<sup>44</sup> At the forefront of the criticism were the students, with thousands of them taking part in the demonstrations in February 1968.<sup>45</sup> The demonstrations were a reaction to the sentences in the trials against military figureheads in the aftermath of the Six Day War, which many considered far too soft.

On the ideological level, the 1967 defeat resulted in increasing religious activism.<sup>46</sup> The secular ideology that was the basis of the Nasserist regime was discredited. For people who sought to fill the vacuum caused by the disgrace of Nasserism, Islam figured as a safe and familiar haven.<sup>47</sup> At the same time, the defeat gave Islamists ammunition in their criticism of the regime. Some members of the Muslim Brotherhood allegedly celebrated the humiliation of Egypt in 1967 because it revealed the corruption of the Nasser regime.<sup>48</sup>

---

<sup>40</sup> William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004), 320-21.

<sup>41</sup> James Jankowski, *Egypt: A Short History* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2000), 146.

<sup>42</sup> Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 339.

<sup>43</sup> Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 342.

<sup>44</sup> Hamied Ansari, *Egypt: The stalled Society* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 141.

<sup>45</sup> Ahmed Abdalla, *The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt 1923-1973* (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2008), 149.

<sup>46</sup> Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*, 155-56.

<sup>47</sup> Hinnebusch, *Egyptian Politics under Sadat*, 199.

<sup>48</sup> Raymond William Baker, *Sadat and After: Struggles for Egypt's Political Soul* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 249.

The defeat could be explained by the Egyptians' turning their backs on Islam, Islamists claimed.<sup>49</sup> Islam had not been defeated, they argued, while imported western ideologies like Socialism and Secularism, had.

In the aftermath of the June 1967 a small number of Muslim Brotherhood members were released from jail, while on the universities the first religious societies, *jamā'āt dīniyya*, were starting to form.<sup>50</sup>

### *The Believing President and the Islamisation of Society*

It was the supposedly weak Anwar Sadat who was left with the task of filling the void after Nasser when the Arab hero died of a heart attack in September 1970. Despite having earned the nicknames of «Nasser's poodle» and «Bikbashi Sah-Sah» («Major yes-yes»), Sadat soon grabbed the reigns of power with both hands. In May 1971 he staged the so-called Corrective Revolution, cleansing the Arab Socialist Union of his Nasserist rivals.<sup>51</sup>

The following month, thousands of members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including a number of its leaders, were released from jail, with Sadat hoping that the Islamists would provide him with a new power base to counter his foes on the left.<sup>52</sup> In addition to the ones that were let out of Egyptian prisons, hundreds of Brotherhood members returned from exile in either Europe or other Arab countries.

The Brotherhood had, along with other Islamist movements, regained the support of a wide range of middle class Egyptians.<sup>53</sup> Meanwhile, Sadat was making an increasingly use of Islamic symbols in his official policy, styling himself as the *al-ra'īs al-mu'min* (the believing president) and making sure that he was photographed attending the Friday prayers. In the constitution that was passed in 1971, Islam was ascertained as the state religion, while the principles of the Islamic Sharia were made one of the sources of legislation.<sup>54</sup>

Although receptive to the constitutional amendments, the main bulk of the Islamists thought that Sadat did not go far enough. Hence, the struggle for an Islamic state continued throughout the decade. The Islamists gained further concessions from the regime when the Sharia was elevated to

---

<sup>49</sup> Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, «The Resurgence of Islamic Organisations in Egypt: An Interpretation», in *Islam and Power*, ed. by Alexander S. Cudsi and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 114.

<sup>50</sup> Walid M. Abdelnasser, *The Islamic Movement in Egypt: Perceptions of International Relations 1967-1981* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1994), 58-59.

<sup>51</sup> Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., *Modern Egypt: The formation of a Nation State* (Boulder, Westview Press, 2004), 158-59.

<sup>52</sup> Abdelnasser, *The Islamic Movement in Egypt: Perceptions of International Relations 1967-1981*, 58.

<sup>53</sup> Saad Eddin Ibrahim, *Egypt, Islam and Democracy* (Cairo: The American University of Cairo Press, 2004), 36.

<sup>54</sup> Hāla Muṣṭafā, *Al-Nizām al-siyāsī wa al-mu'āraḍa al-islāmiyya fī miṣr* (Cairo: Markaz al-Mahrūsa, 1996), 205-06.

the *main source* of legislation in May 1980.<sup>55</sup> Moreover, the Shaykh of al-`Azhar was promoted to the rank of prime minister as far as protocol and salary were concerned.

The general liberalisation of the religious and political field also resulted in the building of mosques, supported by the government, on a scale never seen before in Egypt.<sup>56</sup> The main bulk of these mosques were private (*`ahli*) and hence beyond government control. Throughout the 1970s, the number of private mosques doubled from about 20.000 to 40.000. Only 6.000 were controlled by the Ministry of Religious Endowments (*`Awqāf*), a number Sadat tried to increase by a futile attempt to nationalise the private mosques later in the decade.

### *The Emergence of Religious Societies on Campus*

Despite Sadat's Corrective Revolution, the spirit of his predecessor was very much alive at the Egyptian universities, where the left-wing students were the leading forces in the first part of the 1970s.<sup>57</sup>

Not surprisingly, religion did not play any significant role on the universities in Egypt at that time. For instance, one of the later leaders of JI, `Abd al-Mun`im `Abū al-Futūh, points out that when he entered the Faculty of Medicine in Qaṣr al-`Aynī at the University of Cairo in 1970, there was no Islamic activism worth mentioning and no faculty mosque.<sup>58</sup> The first religious groups seems to have been formed by students – «religious by instinct» – who sought someone to pray alongside and a place to conduct it.<sup>59</sup>

Gradually these groups gave themselves names such as the Religious Group (*al-jamā`a al-dīniyya*) at the Faculty of Medicine in Cairo, and then began social work and mission (*al-da`wa*) on campus.<sup>60</sup>

This happened in a number of universities in Egypt roughly at the same time. There are no indications however, that these developments were organised by a central leadership – the different groups cropped up independently of each other.<sup>61</sup> The circumstances appear to have been quite similar though, as Ṣalāh Hāshim, considered among the founders of JI at the University of `Asyūt, gives testimony to.<sup>62</sup> He recalls that when he entered university in 1972, there was a religious group

<sup>55</sup> Dessouki, «The Resurgence of Islamic Organisations in Egypt: An Interpretation», 109-10.

<sup>56</sup> John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Islam and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 174-76.

<sup>57</sup> Rif`at Sayyid `Aḥmad, *Limādhā qatalū al-Sādāt: Qiṣṣa tanzīm al-Jihād* (Cairo, al-Dār al-Sharqiyya, 1989), 106.

<sup>58</sup> `Abū al-Futūh, *Shāhid `alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 28.

<sup>59</sup> `Abū al-Futūh, *Shāhid `alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 33.

<sup>60</sup> Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 48.

<sup>61</sup> Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 49.

<sup>62</sup> Mamdūh al-Shaykh, *Al-Jamā`āt al-islāmiyya al-miṣriyya al-mutashaddida fī `Ātūn II sibtabir: Mufāriqāt al-nisha`a wa mujāzafāt al-taḥawwul* (Cairo: Maktaba Madbūlī, 2005), 45-46.



present on campus, but it was far from an organised force. The group's main function was the holding of a weekly seminar, where famous *shuyūkh* such as Muḥammad Mutawallī al-Sha'rāwī, Muḥammad al-Ghazālī and Sayyid Sābiq came to speak.

Despite the initial independence of each other, the different groups shared many features. They belonged to a generation which was one of the first to experience mass education due to the opening of the universities to students from the lower levels of society. Education for the lower classes was one of president Nasser's primary goals.<sup>63</sup> In 1962 Nasser offered people an incentive to embark on a university degree, promising every graduate a government job. As a result, the number of students nearly doubled during the 1960s.

The promise of a government job stood firm in the Sadat era, and the 1970s saw an explosive growth in student numbers, from just below two hundred thousand in 1970 to above five hundred thousand in 1977.<sup>64</sup>

The opening up of education was accompanied by the establishing of a number of new universities such as in Ṭanṭa and al-Manṣūra in 1972, al-Zaqāzīq in 1974 and Ḥilwān in 1975. The following year three universities, in al-Minyā, al-Minūfiyya and one serving the Suez Canal area, opened its doors. The new universities were not fit for the tidal wave of students and therefore badly equipped.<sup>65</sup> The short supply of books and laboratory equipment, not to mention teachers, led to increasing discontent at the universities in the late 1960s. The situation turned from bad to worse in the 1970s. Lecture halls cramped with students – male and female – hefty sums for private tutoring necessary for passing exams and overcrowded dormitories were commonplace all over Egypt.<sup>66</sup>

### *The Islamist Students' Background*

According to Ayubi, most of the members of the Islamist groups of the 1970s came from the lower middle classes and were between 20 and 30 years old.<sup>67</sup> And, although they tended to come from urban areas, they had either rural or small town backgrounds. Notwithstanding the fact that Ayubi is referring to other and more violent parts of the Islamist movement, many of the JI leaders share these features as far as background is concerned.

ʿAbū al-ʿIlā Māḍī, JI leader in the latter half of the 1970s, grew up in a modest part of al-Minyā in Upper Egypt.<sup>68</sup> His father being a manual labourer, Māḍī was the first in his family to

---

<sup>63</sup> Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 320.

<sup>64</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 135.

<sup>65</sup> Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 320.

<sup>66</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 135-36.

<sup>67</sup> Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (Routledge, London, 1991), 82.

<sup>68</sup> Geneive Abdo, *No God But God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 110.

graduate from university. One of the founders of JI in Cairo, `Iṣām al-`Aryān was born in Nāhiya, a village in al-Jīza governorate just outside the capital.

In his studies of various Islamist groups, Ibrahim has found that their members have come mainly from the middle and lower middle class in the cities.<sup>69</sup> The rural element is present here as well, however, as the members' families tended to come from the countryside, having recently moved to urban areas.

Furthermore, the Islamist students seem to have been inclined to profession studies such as medicine or engineering, which was – and still is – among the most attractive subjects among students in Egypt.<sup>70</sup> This could be due to higher education being made available for the masses, and a wish among students from the lower classes to climb the social ladder. Ibrahim's studies of the Jamā'at al-Muslimīn provide some support for this theory. The group's members tended to be better educated than their parents, who shared the social profile of the early `Ikhwān of the 1930s and 1940s.

The members of the Islamist movement were not entirely recruited from the mid and lower levels of society, though. Hinnebusch suggests that since its members managed to enter the attractive studies mentioned above, JI must also have appealed to the higher strata.<sup>71</sup> There may be some truth in that. Kepel, for instance, argues that apart from the young urban poor whose families were still influenced by their rural and traditional roots, one more social class appeared receptive to the Islamists' call.<sup>72</sup> This was the devout *bourgeoisie*, barred from political and economic power by the regimes in both the period of monarchy and military dictatorship. `Abū al-Futūḥ, for instance, describes his family as middle class, coming from al-Manyal in the Cairo district of Miṣr al-Qadīma.<sup>73</sup> Judging by his memoirs, however, it would be an exaggeration to brand his family background as *bourgeois*.

It is nevertheless proof of JI's quite broad appeal and shows that the movement was not only restricted to the countryside or the recently urbanised classes in the small towns or popular districts of the big cities. In that regard, JI are quite in line with the broader Islamic movement in many countries in the Muslim world in the 1970s. The movement's support was based in the lower and lower middle classes, Dekmejian points out, while ascertaining that Islamic lifestyle also penetrated the middle and upper middle echelons in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey.<sup>74</sup>

---

<sup>69</sup> Ibrahim, *Egypt, Islam and Democracy*, 25.

<sup>70</sup> Tønnessen, «Egytiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 125.

<sup>71</sup> Hinnebusch, *Egyptian Politics under Sadat*, 203.

<sup>72</sup> Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 67.

<sup>73</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid 'alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 21.

<sup>74</sup> R. Hrair Dekmejian, «The Anatomy of Islamic Revival: Legitimacy Crisis, Ethnic Conflict and the Search for Islamic Alternatives», *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 34, no. 1, (winter 1980), 2.

### *The Government and the Islamists*

As his predecessor, president Sadat also thought it important to control the students, fearing that his enemies would be able to turn them against the regime.<sup>75</sup> The government disliked the revival of political activism on campus, especially the students' role in the demonstrations of 1972, and sought to stem this development.<sup>76</sup> The regime's main target appears to have been the leftist, resulting in the formation of special squads that targeted left-leaning student leaders under the supervision of organisation secretary of the Arab Socialist Union, Muḥammad ʿUthmān ʿIsmāʿīl. ʿIsmāʿīl later went on to become governor of the province of ʿAsyūṭ between 1973 and 1982, where he, according to Kepel, gained a reputation for supporting the Islamists' struggle against Communists.<sup>77</sup>

When examining allegations of close cooperation, however, it is important to have in mind the sources' lack of impartiality, as Tønnessen emphasises.<sup>78</sup> The leftists have a habit of exaggerating the government's role, reducing the rise of Islamism to a phenomenon orchestrated by the regime, he points out. Some Islamists on the other hand, are keen to reject the role of the regime altogether.

According to Abdalla, the student group Shabāb al-ʿIslām – formed in 1972-73 as a counterweight to the leftist dominance on Cairo Polytechnical and with the aim of affirming the Islamic political presence on campus – was immediately contacted by regime officials with offers of money in return for instigating violence against the leftists.<sup>79</sup> The offer was nevertheless turned down, he underscores.

According to ʿAbū al-Futūḥ, however, Shabāb al-ʿIslām appeared quite spontaneously on campus.<sup>80</sup> He depicts them as more government-inclined than JI, and not as rigorous with regard to clothes, beards and other Islamic insignia. While ʿAbū al-Futūḥ implies that Muḥammad ʿUthmān ʿIsmāʿīl may have played a pivotal part in the founding of Shabāb al-ʿIslām, he does not attach much importance to the group, emphasising that it disappeared quite rapidly. This could of course be due to the fact that ʿAbū al-Futūḥ belonged to a «rival» Islamist group. Yet, in hindsight the role played by Shabāb al-ʿIslām on the political scene was nowhere near that of JI, and if this was the only group the regime managed to penetrate, their influence did not reach very far.

In regard to the formation of JI, there are few indications, if any, of the government having

---

<sup>75</sup> Abdalla, *The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt 1923-1973*, 213.

<sup>76</sup> Abdalla, *The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt 1923-1973*, 198.

<sup>77</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 134.

<sup>78</sup> Tønnessen, «Egytiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 53.

<sup>79</sup> Abdalla, *The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt 1923-1973*, 198.

<sup>80</sup> ʿAbū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid ʿalā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 34-35.

any say, apart from looking upon the movement with favourable eyes in the initial years. Hāshim mentions for instance that a religious group sponsored by the university administration existed when he started in 1972.<sup>81</sup>

There is nevertheless a wide belief that Sadat and his henchmen, like `Ismā`il, just about single-handedly gave birth to the Islamist current among the students. According to Ansari, both leftists and movements on the political right were convinced that the Islamists enjoyed official encouragement and privileges from the regime.<sup>82</sup>

While, in my opinion, this is a far too narrow explanation for what turned out to be such a powerful political force in the Egyptian society in the 1970s, one cannot totally deny the role played by the regime in encouraging Islamic activism on the universities. For example, both parties had common interest in reducing the influence of the leftists on campus and thus it may have appeared as if they were cooperating.

`Abū al-Futūḥ denies in very clear words that there ever was a deal with the Sadat regime, but concedes that a numbers of obstacles in the Islamist movement's way were removed by the government.<sup>83</sup> Those very same «obstacles» were also removed for other political forces, he claims. While `Abū al-Futūḥ's second statement is an exaggeration – there is no reason that Sadat should have taken great pains to purge the government of leftists and at the same time leave their comrades on the universities unheeded – there is a distinct difference between *create* and *support*. Sadat undoubtedly supported the Islamist student movement, although there is little evidence of him creating the likes of JI. And, although he wished to control Islamist groups on campus – for them to become the base of the regime inside the universities, as `Alī mentions – there is hardly anything that supports allegations that the regime was in command of JI.<sup>84</sup>

The fact that government representatives supported a number of JI's events and members of the Muslim Brotherhood were permitted to meet the students on campus, is neither evidence of creation nor control, only of support.<sup>85</sup>

Moreover, developments later in the decade, for instance the souring of the relations with the government over key issues, also suggests that JI was established and grew independently.

---

<sup>81</sup> al-Shaykh, *Al-Jamā`āt al-`islāmiyya al-miṣriyya al-mutashaddida fī `Ātūn II Sibtabir*, 45-46.

<sup>82</sup> Ansari, *Egypt: The Stalled Society*, 213.

<sup>83</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid `alā tārikh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 56.

<sup>84</sup> `Abd al-Raḥīm `Alī Muḥammad, *Al-Muqāmara al-kubrā: Mubādara waqf al-`unf bayna rihān al-ḥukūma wa al-Jamā`a al-`Islāmiyya* (Cairo: Markaz al-Maḥrūsa, 2002), 136-37.

<sup>85</sup> Tønnessen, «Egytiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 55.

## Part 2

While much has been written about what influenced the violent JI of the 1980s, not much research has been conducted into the ideological basis that inspired those who founded JI as a religious student movement.

Before pointing out the most important sources of inspiration and ideological fundament of JI, it is important to emphasise that this never was a streamlined organisation with clear influences and a coherent background.<sup>86</sup> As `Abū al-`Ilā Mādī – one of the leaders of JI in al-Minyā in the late 1970s – recalls, the movement had «no organisational ties, not even intellectual ties, because of the lack of a real organisation».<sup>87</sup>

As much of an exaggeration of the disunity of JI as this may be, it underlines the nature of an organisation that in its early years drew influences from a wide range of Islamic scholars and movements. It was ideologically immature and lacked both a clear policy and a defined project, apart from their quite ambiguous goal of Islamising campus.<sup>88</sup>

Although Sayyid Quṭb's affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood is far beyond doubt, I have chosen to deal with his influence on JI in a separate part of this chapter. This is due to Quṭb and his writings having more leverage and influence on groups and movements embracing violence compared with his standing in the Brotherhood in the years that have passed his execution in 1966. In short, I have chosen to deal with him as *jihādī* ideologue rather than a Muslim brother.

### *Mawdudi and Jamaat-e islami*

One of the sources of influence often mentioned by former members of JI, is the Pakistani *ʿālim*, journalist and politician Abu al-Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979).

Mawdudi was the first to develop the concept of *jāhiliyya* which he used to describe states, governments or societies who failed to exercise the divine law of Sharia.<sup>89</sup> *Jāhiliyya*, «the state of ignorance», was traditionally applied to the societies of pagan pre-Islamic times on the Arab Peninsula. However, Mawdudi saw the non-appliance of Islamic law in self-proclaimed Muslim countries as an equation of this paganism. Although the concept originates with Mawdudi, it was developed further and given a wider audience by Sayyid Quṭb, which I will return to later.

More important in relation to Mawdudi and JI, is the former's notion of *tawhīd* as a part of

<sup>86</sup> Ansari, *Egypt: The Stalled Society*, 213.

<sup>87</sup> Mādī, *Jamā'at al-'unf al-maṣriyya wa ta'wīlātuhā li-l-'islām*, 16-17.

<sup>88</sup> Roel Meijer, «Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong as a Principle of Social Action: The Case of the Egyptian al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya» in *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement*, ed. Roel Meijer (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 192-93.

<sup>89</sup> Abdennasser, *The Islamic Movement in Egypt*, 194-95.

his political agenda. Mawdudi saw Islam as more of an ideology than simply a religion and advocated for instance that the Islamic state was the sixth pillar of the religion.<sup>90</sup> Social ills, he believed, could be overcome by a literal reading of the Koran and a return to the practices of the early Medinan community.<sup>91</sup> Hence, the solution to the problems faced by the Muslims of India was to become better Muslims.<sup>92</sup> Western and secular influences should be refused.

In this respect, *tawhīd* became not only an expression of the unity and oneness of God – as is the original meaning of the word – but also a concept of Islam as a «system that was 'complete and total' that could not only interpret the larger world, but also transform it».<sup>93</sup> This concept became a rallying point to which it was easy to attract students with traditional backgrounds from the countryside who may have felt alienated moving to urban areas.<sup>94</sup> There is also reason to believe that it also appealed to students from the lower middle classes and as those originating in the popular (*sha'bi*) areas of the bigger cities – the other stratum that JI drew its recruits from.

For some, among them Mawdudi, the concept of *tawhīd* also leads to a belief in the exclusiveness of Islam compared with other religions.<sup>95</sup> Hence, by implication, other religions and philosophies – even Christianity and Judaism, although both commonly regarded as monotheistic religions – are not reliable as sources of guidance for humans' lives due to the belief in multiple divines.<sup>96</sup> This view appears to have struck a cord with the students that later made up the radical wing of JI, which viewed the Copts as their biggest enemies, a subject I will return to in chapter four.

Mawdudi's party, Jamaat-e islami, inspired the Islamist students to change their name from al-Jamā'a al-Dīniyya to al-Jamā'a al-'Islāmiyya, according to 'Abū al-Futūḥ, who allegedly was one of those deciding the name.<sup>97</sup> The decision was spontaneous, however, and there is a lack of consensus concerning why the name was chosen. A prominent member such as 'Iṣām al-'Aryān recalls that the name was chosen simply because it was the name that suited the group's activities best.<sup>98</sup> Salāḥ Hāshim on the other hand, one of the JI founders in 'Asyūt in Upper Egypt, also emphasises the importance of Mawdudi in deciding the name.<sup>99</sup>

Regardless of who is right, there is little doubt that Mawdudi's thoughts had an impact on the

---

<sup>90</sup> Glassé, *The Concise Encyclopædia of Islam*, 300.

<sup>91</sup> Beverley Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Fundamentalism Since 1945* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 26.

<sup>92</sup> Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*, 128.

<sup>93</sup> Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, 82.

<sup>94</sup> Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 84.

<sup>95</sup> Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Fundamentalism Since 1945*, 27.

<sup>96</sup> Albert J. Bergesen, ed., *The Sayyid Qutb Reader: Selected Writings on Politics, Religion, and Society* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 15.

<sup>97</sup> 'Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid 'alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-'islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 47.

<sup>98</sup> «Al-'Aryān ytaḥaddathu 'an nasha'a al-tayār al-'islāmī bi-l-jāma'āt al-miṣriyya», *Ikhwanonline*.

<sup>99</sup> Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 50.

young students in JI. His books for instance, were among the first printed when JI won the student elections to the Arts Committee at the Faculty of Medicine in Qaṣr al-ʿAynī in 1973 and subsequently gained control of publishing funds.<sup>100</sup>

### *Qutb's Clout and the Interpretation of Ḥisba*

One of the questions most heavily debated regarding JI, is the reach of the Egyptian ideologue Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), a member of the Muslim Brotherhood who was eventually executed by the Nasserist regime in 1966.

In his most renowned work, *Maʿālim fī al-Ṭarīq (Milestones)* Qutb championed reorganising the society in line with how the Prophet and his Companions lived.<sup>101</sup> This, in turn, demanded a merger of politics and religion.<sup>102</sup> The only source of guidance for this society is the Koran, Qutb advocates, referring to a *Ḥadīth* where the Prophet Muḥammad is displeased with ʿUmar when he brings along some pages from the Jewish Torah.<sup>103</sup> This emphasises that the first generation of Muslims were not inspired by any other cultures or other sources than that of the Koran.

Hence, Qutb's goal was a return to the society of the first generation of Muslims. The obstacle to the return, was the society of *jāhiliyya*, a concept first introduced in its modern form by Mawdudi and applied to states and societies not governed by the Sharia laws, above all self-proclaimed Muslim states.<sup>104</sup>

Qutb however, developed the concept of *jāhiliyya* further. In his view the state of *jāhiliyya* is «based on a rebellion against God's sovereignty on earth».<sup>105</sup> The rebellion consists of peoples' failure to accept the oneness of God and to submit only to His sovereignty. In today's society the rulers are making a mistake by demanding a loyalty which is only to be given to God alone.<sup>106</sup> In turn, the subjects are wrong to submit to the demands of the rulers – the submission is for God alone, «humans must take the rules and laws from no other than Allah».<sup>107</sup> Because Islam, says Qutb, «is not merely belief (...) Islam is the freedom of man from servitude to other men».<sup>108</sup>

According to Qutb, the *jāhiliyya* society is as deep-rooted today as at the time of Islam's

---

<sup>100</sup> ʿAbū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid ʿalā tārikh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 45.

<sup>101</sup> Also known under *Signposts, Milestones along the Road* and similar titles in English translation, first published in 1964.

<sup>102</sup> Bergesen, ed., *The Sayyid Qutb Reader*, 12.

<sup>103</sup> Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* (New Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 2008), 16-17.

<sup>104</sup> Abdelnasser, *The Islamic Movement in Egypt*, 195.

<sup>105</sup> Qutb, *Milestones*, 11.

<sup>106</sup> Bergesen, ed., *The Sayyid Qutb Reader*, 19.

<sup>107</sup> Bergesen, ed., *The Sayyid Qutb Reader*, 22.

<sup>108</sup> Qutb, *Milestones*, 61.

arrival, if not deeper.<sup>109</sup> Even Muslim societies of today were *jāhili*, «not because they believed in other deities besides God or because they worship any other than God, but because their life is not based on submission to God alone»<sup>110</sup>.

These lines underscores Qutb's belief that it is not simply enough to be a devout Muslim on a personal level as long as one lives and abides by the rules in a society that is not governed only by the laws of God – the Sharia. It is impossible for a true Muslim to submit to any other power than God's. Or, as Bergesen illustrates, obeying the law in a democracy for instance, is equivalent to denying God.<sup>111</sup>

The way to return to the ideal society is by way of *jihād*. Although Qutb refers to a Koranic verse (*sūra*) that says «There is no compulsion in religion» and also stressing that «The Islamic Jihad has no relationship to modern warfare, either in its causes or in the way in which it is conducted», there is little doubt Qutb saw a need for some kind of violent struggle to rid the world of the state of *jāhiliyya*.<sup>112</sup>

Notwithstanding the apparent clear-cut words, it should be noted that he himself was never explicit about whether his *jāhiliyya* should be interpreted as a «clean break» or merely as a «spiritual abstraction».<sup>113</sup>

As we in this chapter are mostly concerned with the influence in the initial period of JI – it is also worth taking a brief look at other parts of Qutb's literature. It is not given that only *Milestones* alone influenced JI; two of his works – *Hadhā al-Dīn* and *Al-Mustaqbal li-Hadhā al-Dīn* – were for example among the first published in the JI series «*Şawt al-ḥaqq*» in 1973 and not *Milestones*.<sup>114</sup>

In an university environment in the first half of the 1970s, dominated by westernised and secular leftists, it must have been a relief for a devout Muslim youth to read the words of Qutb, stressing that «we have not a single reason to make any separation between Islam and society (...) such reasons as there are attach only to European Christianity», and furthermore, «we have no good grounds for any hostility between the thought of social justice, such as the hostility that persists between Christianity and Communism».<sup>115</sup>

Social justice and a (certain) redistribution of wealth are already prescribed by Islam, Qutb claims. There is reason to believe that these opinions went down well with students fresh from the countryside and popular neighbourhoods in the cities who where brought up to believe in Islam as a

<sup>109</sup> Qutb, *Milestones*, 20.

<sup>110</sup> Qutb, *Milestones*, 82.

<sup>111</sup> Bergesen, ed., *The Sayyid Qutb Reader*, 19.

<sup>112</sup> Qutb, *Milestones*, 57.

<sup>113</sup> Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, 84.

<sup>114</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid 'alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 45.

<sup>115</sup> Sayyid Qutb, «Social Justice in Islam», trans. John B. Hardie, in *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives*, ed. John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 103-04.



complete system fit for all aspects of society and life. What is more, Quṭb's emphasis on Islam's superiority compared with both Western Christianity and Communism must have been well received by many on campus at a time when Nasserist socialism had proved to fail; Egypt had been routed by Israel in the Six Day War of 1967 and the Sadat regime were looking to revive itself in an ever more Islamic cloak.

Nevertheless, how much Quṭb influenced the young students of JI is a cause for some debate. *Milestones* had enormous impact on what was published by JI, according to Kepel, who claims that «Quṭb's name crops up repeatedly in the mimeographed leaflets and newsletters produced by the jama'at rank and file, and the young militants claimed allegiance to his memory». <sup>116</sup> In contrast, he says, the works of Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī – the former Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood – was «virtually ignored». <sup>117</sup>

Roel Meijer paints more or less the same picture in his review of the key influences of JI and points to the emerging importance of Quṭb: «...by the mid 1970s the Jama'at had adopted such potentially revolutionary concepts as *jāhiliyya* (period of ignorance) and *hakimiyya* (sovereignty of God as opposed to the sovereignty of man) from Sayyid Quṭb». <sup>118</sup> Hamied Ansari also describes his writings as an inspiration for the movement, especially the radical wings. <sup>119</sup>

There is no doubt that Quṭb was widely read among the members of JI – as mentioned above, his books was among the first printed by JI. Furthermore, his call for a society based purely on the Koran and the first generation of Muslims also appealed a great deal to the young Islamist students, who longed for what had been before the founding of the modern state: «From our point of view, setting up a state meant a return to the Islamic Caliphate (...) Our 'dream state' was a Sharia state based on *ḥudūd*», `Abu al-Futūḥ recalls. <sup>120</sup> Obstacles like disagreements regarding *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) was not considered. The organisations of the Egyptian state was looked upon as a department from the spirit of Islam and subsequently had to be abandoned for an Islamic substitute.

These thoughts are not far from the ideas of Quṭb. Moreover, in the first half of the 1970s, JI's view upon violence as a means for change was far more double-edged than it eventually became. Judging by the memoirs of `Abu al-Futūḥ, there was, even among those who considered themselves moderates, an acceptance of violence: «Not only did we believe in the authorization of the use of violence, in some cases (we saw it as) imperative for the sake of spreading our call and

---

<sup>116</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 155.

<sup>117</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 155.

<sup>118</sup> Meijer, «Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong as a Principle of Social Action», 194.

<sup>119</sup> Ansari, Egypt; *The Stalled Society*, 214.

<sup>120</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid 'alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 70. My translation.

the rise of our idea. To us, violence was not only legitimate, it was also justified».<sup>121</sup>

These views are to a great extent affected by the medieval *ʿālim* (Islamic scholar) *ʿIbn Taymiyya*, who, claims Meijer, was JI's primary source when it came to the organisation's view of the central principle of *ḥisba* (*al-ʿamr bi l-maʿrūf wa al-nahī ʿan al-munkar* – command that which is just and forbid that which is evil).<sup>122</sup>

*Ḥisba* is described as the «greatest pole of religion» by the important Islamic philosopher and theologian *ʿAbū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī* (1058-1111). It is the essence of all religion, he says, and its neglect will lead to the downfall of religion and in turn corruption and ignorance.<sup>123</sup> Despite its prominence, it is not treated as part of the *Sharia* in the sense that its neglect carries any legal sanctions, Kamali notes: «It is instead treated as a normative principle of Islam which provides moral argument and the foundation for the bulk of the detailed rules of the applied *Sharia* in its various branches».<sup>124</sup>

The duality of *Ḥisba*, as both a right and a duty, has been widely debated in Islam. For the concern of this thesis, however, it suffices to underline that this discussion also took place within JI. Meijer notes that certain elements of JI not only emphasised the duty part of *Ḥisba*, but also embraced *ʿIbn Taymiyya*'s argument that it is right in certain situations to use force to exercise it (i.e. forbid that which is evil) – without the state sanctioning it.<sup>125</sup> Meijer's view is to a certain extent backed by *Mādī*, who recalls that the violence-embracing wing of JI defended its actions with this interpretation of *Ḥisba*.<sup>126</sup>

Mawdudi also stressed that it is not enough to simply utter *al-shahāda*, one must also strive to enforce Islamic moral order in the society.<sup>127</sup> How this struggle was to be brought about was the concern for great debate within JI all along. However, in the early years the debate seems to have evolved around the timing of the use of violence rather than if violence in itself was acceptable. Although the violent trend was not clear, there was a feeling among some for the need of changing the *munkar* (evil) by power.<sup>128</sup> In the first period *munkar* was attributed more to social wrongs, for instance boys and girls walking together on the street, than it was to the regime. Nevertheless, with time, this changed and the same people also heralded the need for political change by force, says *Mādī*.

For the moderates of the organisation, the use of violence was limited to fistfights with

<sup>121</sup> *ʿAbū al-Futūḥ, Shāhid ʿalā tārikh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 69. My translation.

<sup>122</sup> Meijer, «Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong as a Principle of Social Action», 194.

<sup>123</sup> Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Freedom of Expression in Islam* (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1997), 28.

<sup>124</sup> Kamali, *Freedom of Expression in Islam*, 28-29.

<sup>125</sup> Meijer, «Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong as a Principle of Social Action», 194.

<sup>126</sup> *Mādī, Jamāʿat al-ʿunf al-maṣriyya wa taʿwīlātuhā li-l-islām*, 42-43.

<sup>127</sup> Ayubi, *Political Islam*, 129.

<sup>128</sup> Interview with *ʿAbū l-ʿIlā Mādī*, October 2010.

leftist students on campus. Some Islamists also tore down posters and broke up the meetings of their opponents.<sup>129</sup> More radical students on the other hand, went more than one step further; two JI members were given prison terms in the trial in the wake of the attack on the Technical Military Academy (al-Kulliyya al-Fanniyya al-ʿAskariyya) in April 1974.<sup>130</sup> Despite the fact that none of the two convicted held any central positions in JI, it is nevertheless proof of a violent current within the movement at the time, however minor it may have been.

And, despite refusing any contact with such organisations as al-Fanniyya al-ʿAskariyya (the name attributed to Munazzamat al-Taḥrīr al-ʿIslāmī that attempted a coup by attacking the Technical Military Academy) and Jamāʿat al-Muslimīn (known in the press at the time and afterwards as al-Takfīr wa al-Hijra), the idea of use of force revolved around timing rather than the use of force itself.<sup>131</sup> While some members demanded a violent change as quickly as possible – apparently a minority as JI did not take part in any serious violence until later – others did not see the time fit for a violent uprising. The thought of a violent take-over of power however, was not outright condemned.

### *Salafism and the Power of Symbols*

Apart from Meijer's remarks that «most (JI) members were simply pious and endeavoured to follow a 'traditional Salafism'» the Salafī influence on JI is rarely commented on by authorities on the field.<sup>132</sup> At least if one compares it with how many times the name of for instance Sayyid Quṭb is mentioned when it comes to sources of inspiration.

This may be due to Salafism being first and foremost an influence in JI's early years; come the late 1970s the movement had become more politicised and Salafism had lost its dominating role. Salafism was nevertheless an important source of inspiration for JI at the time the organisation was founded.<sup>133</sup>

Salafism is not an easily explained. First of all it should be noted that the Salafism that is referred to here, is not that which is commonly attributed to the reformers Jamāl al-Dīn al-ʿAfhānī and Muḥammad ʿAbduh and their followers, who in the in the second half of the 19th century called for a return to the basic principles of Islam as an answer to the hegemony of Western ideas. This movement was basically a progressive movement, as I accounted for in chapter one.

---

<sup>129</sup> Abdalla, *The student Movement and National Politics in Egypt 1923-1973*, 227.

<sup>130</sup> ʿAbū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid ʿalā tārikh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 65.

<sup>131</sup> ʿAbū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid ʿalā tārikh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 65.

<sup>132</sup> Meijer, «Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong as a Principle of Social Action», 193.

<sup>133</sup> Interview with ʿAbd al-Munʿim ʿAbū l-Futūḥ, October 2010.

The Salafism that inspired the students of JI is quite the converse of that preached by al-`Afghānī and `Abduh. This version of Salafism also points back to the *al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ* (the venerable forefathers), the first three generations of Muslims.<sup>134</sup> Yet, for these Salafists the point is to read the Koran and the Traditions (*Aḥādīth*) in their most literal, traditional sense. As implied above, `Ibn Taymiyya was a great source of influence in that respect. The real fundamentalists of Islam were the Salafists, Kepel says and points to their hostility to «any and all innovation, which they condemned as mere human interpretation».<sup>135</sup> Hence, most Salafists has distaste for man-made concepts and institutions such as government and politics.<sup>136</sup> Clothes, prayer and personal piety are on the other hand of the utmost importance.<sup>137</sup>

Some of the founding members of JI in Cairo attended the lectures of the shuyūkh of Jamā`at `Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya.<sup>138</sup> This was a group founded in 1926, and although most of its members were `ulamā` from al-`Azhar, it has been strongly linked to Salafism.<sup>139</sup> In their monthly magazine *al-Tawhīd* the group called for the implementation of the Sharia by the government. Apart from that demand `Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya held all other aspects of politics in disregard.

It is not difficult to spot how the influence of Salafism on JI played out in practice in the early years. First, it was compulsory for men to grow of a beard.<sup>140</sup> Second, wearing the white jallabiyya also became a common feature among male students.<sup>141</sup> Females on the other hand, had to wear Islamic garments – long robes, veil and gloves – if they wanted to use JIs bus service in Cairo, according to Kepel. Once the Islamist students had entered the student union, part of the union's budget was for instance used to buy *ḥijābs* that were distributed among female students.<sup>142</sup> At a later point, they were encouraging women to wear *niqābs* that did not show any skin at all.<sup>143</sup> These *niqābs* were soon spread among the female students too, and were referred to by president Sadat as «tents».

Additionally, the separation of the sexes was tremendously important. Kepel points to JIs successful campaign for the separation of women and men at university lectures.<sup>144</sup> Furthermore, it

<sup>134</sup> Glassé, *The Concise Encyclopædia of Islam*, 395.

<sup>135</sup> Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, 220.

<sup>136</sup> International Crisis Group, «Understanding Islamism», Cairo/Brussels: Middle East/North Africa Report N°37, March 2005, 7-8.

<sup>137</sup> Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 58.

<sup>138</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid `alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 65.

<sup>139</sup> `Abd al-Mun`im Munīb, *Daḥil al-ḥarakāt al-`islāmiyya al-maṣriyya* (Cairo: Maktaba Madbūli, 2010), 53-54.

<sup>140</sup> Interview with `Abū l-`Ilā Mādī, October 2010.

<sup>141</sup> Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, 82.

<sup>142</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid `alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 45.

<sup>143</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid `alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 71.

<sup>144</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 143.

was forbidden for a JI member to speak to a female student, even if the conversation was about Islam. This was one of the differences between JI and another Islamist organisation on campus, Jamā'at Shabāb al-`Islām, according to `Abū al-Futūh, who recalls that «because the spirit of conservative Salafism had got the better of us, we adopted a hard-line stance in everything that concerned women».<sup>145</sup> The JI members regarded the separation between male and female students as an achievement they were responsible for.

For those most heavily influenced by Salafism and Wahabbism, the fight for separation reached the point where they were calling for the separation of boys and girls in primary school in addition to men-only hospitals run by men and women-only hospitals run by women.<sup>146</sup>

Moreover, it appears to have been hostility towards art, theatre and music among JI members, not an uncommon feature among Salafists. The aforementioned election to the Arts Committee of the Medicine Faculty in Qaṣr al-`Aynī was entered with a view to stop the evil (*`iqāf al-munkar*) and not at all out of interest for art, which was considered the «work of Satan» (*`aml al-shayṭān*).<sup>147</sup>

Former leading members of JI also express that in the beginning the important thing was to see to that people lived their lives in accordance with the teachings of the Koran and the Traditions.<sup>148</sup> The students met each other through a need for a more religious life on campus and started preaching and missionary work (*al-da'wa*) among the other students. They were not joined by common political goals, but rather the concern for the individual's morals and beliefs. These attitudes are in line with Salafism where the focus on appearance and a pious life eclipses other matters and politics is not of great importance.

In addition to the students' want of a campus more in line with Islam's teachings (as they saw them), external factors also helped to blow the Salafi wind over campus in the early 1970s. That Salafism had a hold on the students in the first part of the decade is no coincidence if one looks at what happened in Egyptian politics at the time.

President Anwar Sadat's wish to rid Egypt of Nasser's heritage – Nasserism – led to a shift in the country's foreign policy. While Nasser had aligned himself more and more with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, Sadat sought to strengthen Egypt's ties with the West and the US instead. The program of «de-Nasserisation» led to a closer relationship with Saudi Arabia, which in the age of Nasser was considered an arch enemy. With Sadat's new orientation, a Cairo-Riyadh axis developed

---

<sup>145</sup> `Abū al-Futūh, *Shāhid 'alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 71. My translation.

<sup>146</sup> `Abū al-Futūh, *Shāhid 'alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 68.

<sup>147</sup> `Abū al-Futūh, *Shāhid 'alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 41-42.

<sup>148</sup> Interviews with `Abū l-`Ilā Mādī, `Abd al-Mun'im `Abū al-Futūh and Osāma Ḥafīz, October 2010.

which was to last until 1977.<sup>149</sup> As a result of the tightened relations, Egypt became more financially dependent on the oil kingdom and the Saudis also gained influence due to a more conservative elite being consolidated in Cairo.<sup>150</sup>

The oil embargo that Saudi Arabia initiated as a reaction to the October War between Egypt and Israel of 1973, pushed the Wahhabi kingdom's prestige in the region to new heights.<sup>151</sup> The war, also known as the «Ramadan War», was seen as an Islamic victory and strengthened the contact between the two countries even more. The closer ties with Saudi Arabia not only lead to numerous Egyptians crossing the Red Sea to work in the Saudi oil sector, it also resulted in funds being made available to religious groups in Egypt in order to stimulate a religious revival, along with a flow of Salafist books. As of the early 1970s, these free books arrived in Egypt by the thousands and heavily impressed and influenced the members of JI.<sup>152</sup>

The Egyptian oil workers also brought back with them a more strict and conservative version of Islam, which also contributed to the growing Islamisation of Egypt at the time, resulting for instance in more girls and women taking the veil.<sup>153</sup>

### *The Brotherhood: Slowly Awakening*

What separated the Brotherhood from the other sources of influence dealt with above, is of course that it is an organisation with a vast membership and not a thinker or an ideologue.<sup>154</sup> Therefore, it is important to define the Brotherhood which I will be referring to in the coming paragraphs.

For the purpose of this thesis, the most fruitful is to look at the ideas of the founder of the Brotherhood, Ḥasan al-Bannā which were carried on by his successors, Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī and ʿUmar al-Tilmisānī. After all, these ideas were crucial to what happened within JI from the middle of the 1970s onwards, as we shall see in the next chapter.

The aim of Ḥasan al-Bannā, was an Islamic state governed by Sharia, for, as he says: «We believe that Islam is a complete concept which regulates all aspects of life».<sup>155</sup> Al-Bannā advocated a gradual Islamisation of society through a bottom-up process beginning with the individual, then the family and consequently society.<sup>156</sup> The way to conduct this process was solely based on mission

<sup>149</sup> Dessouki, «The Resurgence of Islamic Organisations in Egypt: An Interpretation», 115.

<sup>150</sup> Hinnebusch, *Egyptian Politics Under Sadat*, 47.

<sup>151</sup> Hinnebusch, *Egyptian Politics Under Sadat*, 199.

<sup>152</sup> ʿAbū al-Futūh, *Shāhid ʿalā tārikh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 65.

<sup>153</sup> Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 59.

<sup>154</sup> See the introduction to part II of this chapter concerning the reason for dealing with Sayyid Quṭb separately from the Brotherhood.

<sup>155</sup> Ḥasan al-Bannā, *Majmūʿa rasāʾil al-ʾimām al-shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannā* (Cairo: Dār al-Shihāb), 16. My translation.

<sup>156</sup> Israel Elad Altman, «Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement 1928-2007», *Research Monographs on the Muslim World Series* No 2, Paper No 2 (January 2009), 9.

(*al-da'wa*) and education. Only after the society had embraced the Brotherhood's ideas would it be in a position to start implementing the Islamic state.

While underlining the importance of peaceful mission, al-Bannā at the same time glorified martyrdom and spoke of *jihād* as a duty compulsory for every Muslim.<sup>157</sup> His emphasis on *jihād* is however linked with Muslims being ruled by infidel foreigners rather than any notion of ridding the lands of Islam of *jāhiliyya*, like Quṭb advocated.<sup>158</sup> Apart from the killing of Prime Minister Nuqrāshī Bāshā in 1948, the violence conducted by the Muslim Brotherhood was mostly restricted to external enemies, such as the British in the Suez Canal zone or against the infant Israeli state in the war in the former Palestine Mandate in 1948-49. The assassination attempt on president Nasser in 1954 is often ascribed the Brotherhood, although it is unclear to what extent this was planned or given the green light by the organisation's leaders.

Since Brotherhood members were subjected to harsh repression and long terms in jail in the reign of Nasser, the organisation emerged from prisons and exiles «a seemingly broken, tamed, and aged remnant of the past».<sup>159</sup> Its members were cautious not to confront the Sadat regime that had released them from captivity and kept their heads low for the first part of the decade.

Therefore, opinions differ about how influential their role was in the initiation of JI.<sup>160</sup> Hisham Mubarak claims that the religious groups, *al-Jamā'āt al-Dīniyya*, came into being on the campuses without influence from the Brotherhood or more radical Islamist groups.<sup>161</sup> The young students lacked older role models, he says, because the Islamist movement in general was in a vacuum in the early 1970s.

Meijer supports his view, claiming that the different *jamā'āt* were established independently of each other – a view supported by most scholars and former members – and without any ties to the Brotherhood.<sup>162</sup>

Tønnessen on the other hand, underlines the Brotherhood's vital role as influence for the young students from the very beginning. Among others he refers to 'Iṣām al-'Aryān, one of the JI leaders based in Cairo, who underlines the history and writings of the Brotherhood as an early source of inspiration.<sup>163</sup> The Brotherhood was also essential in establishing JI in 'Asyūt in Upper Egypt, he argues.<sup>164</sup>

There is no doubt the students at the Cairo University's Medical Faculty in Qaṣr al-'Aynī got

---

<sup>157</sup> al-Bannā, *Majmū'a rasā'il al-imām al-shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannā*, 248.

<sup>158</sup> al-Bannā, *Majmū'a rasā'il al-imām al-shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannā*, 260.

<sup>159</sup> Esposito and Voll, *Islam and Democracy*, 174.

<sup>160</sup> Including the period up until 1973 when the organisation called itself *al-Jamā'a al-Dīniyya*.

<sup>161</sup> Tønnessen, «Egytiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 56.

<sup>162</sup> Meijer, «Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong as a Principle of Social Action», 191-92.

<sup>163</sup> Tønnessen, «Egytiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 56.

<sup>164</sup> Tønnessen, «Egytiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 50

in touch with religious doctors and members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1970s and that these meetings had an impact on the students. `Abū al-Futūḥ mentions both the Brotherhood-affiliated Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī – whom he describes as a moderate – as an Islamic author who were widely read, as well as attending lectures by the *shuyūkh* of al-Jama'iyya al-Shar'iyya.<sup>165</sup> This group can be traced back to the last decade of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and was initially apolitical.<sup>166</sup> Al-Jam'iyya al-Shar'iyya was also a source to the Salafist influence on JI, yet, at the time the pioneers of JI got in touch with it, some of the above-mentioned *shuyūkh* held views not far from the Muslim Brotherhood.<sup>167</sup> At the same time, al-Bannā's concept of Islamising the society from the bottom and up, was an approach many JI members made their own.

However, indications that the Muslim Brotherhood's impact was somewhat limited in the beginning compared with the later years, can not be overseen.

Firstly, there was an influx of Salafist literature from Saudi Arabia at the time – which I have accounted for – that swamped the universities. Brotherhood members may have been released from jail in the early 1970s, but their books were still banned and hard to come across.<sup>168</sup> Thus, Salafism's gain was in many ways the Brotherhood's loss.

Secondly, a certain scepticism existed among some JI members towards the Brotherhood, which in turn explains why many of those who joined the `Ikhwān chose to keep their membership secret for a long time.<sup>169</sup> The reason behind the scepticism – and in some cases hostility – was the notion that the Muslim Brotherhood was a weak organisation. This view was dominant among the radical factions of JI, as Ansari explains, and founded on the belief that the three decades long crackdown on the Brotherhood's leaders – a majority of them belonging to an older generation – had made them willing to «compromise true beliefs in order to win some favours from the political authority».<sup>170</sup>

Even among those who cannot be described as radicals, wariness existed towards the Brotherhood when its leadership emerged from prison in 1974. Apart from seeing themselves as the future leaders of the Islamist movement in Egypt whereas the older Brotherhood leaders belonged to history, the brothers' lack of Salafī sentiment – they did not grow long beards for example – caused caution among JI members.<sup>171</sup>

Besides, one must not forget the huge difference between the two organisations at the time.

---

<sup>165</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid 'alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 67.

<sup>166</sup> Munīb, *Daḥīl al-ḥarakāt al-islāmiyya al-miṣriyya*, 49-50.

<sup>167</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid 'alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 67.

<sup>168</sup> Interview with `Abd al-Mun'im `Abū l-Futūḥ, October 2010.

<sup>169</sup> Interview with `Abū l-'Ilā Mādī, October 2010.

<sup>170</sup> Ansari, *Egypt: The Stalled Society*, 214.

<sup>171</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid 'alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 79.



ʿAbū al-Futūḥ's story about the astonishment of the old Brotherhood member Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Muʿṭī al-Jazār when he sees an Islamist demonstration after being released from prison, illustrates this difference.<sup>172</sup> The level of Islamic activism was unbelievable for a man who was told in prison that there were no religious persons on the outside and no veiled women. Therefore, while the young leadership of JI was determined to fight (some of them with violent means) for the implementation of the Sharia and the founding of an Islamic state, the brothers who newly had regained their freedom had a quite different perspective.

For them, the immediate objective was to survive as an organisation. At the same time, the young members of JI were having fistfights with the Communist students on campus. This expression of *ḥass jihādī* (jihadist sentiment) may help to explain why Sayyid Quṭb allegedly was more popular among the JI students in the first part of the decade than the Brotherhood supreme guide Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī.<sup>173</sup>

## Conclusion

In this chapter I have showed that the defeat in the Six Day War in 1967 provided the Islamists with an opportunity to point out the flaws of the Nasserist system, and that there is good reason to believe that their call to return to Islam had some appeal among the Egyptian population.

I have also discussed the regime's role in the rise of the Islamist movement on campus in the early 1970s. That president Sadat contributed to an Islamisation of the society is beyond doubt. Although the sources on this matter vary in their credibility, little material supports theories of Sadat as the sole creator of movements such as JI. He saw them as pivotal in his struggle against leftist elements, but as later events proves, Sadat was never able to control them.

With regard to the different Islamic sources influencing JI at the time it emerged, what the preceding pages have done first and foremost, is to underline the diversity. There are nevertheless some common features, like the call for an Islamic state governed by the Sharia and Islam as a complete system for society – *tawḥīd*.

The Muslim Brotherhood as an Islamist organisation was undoubtedly important for the young students that founded JI. But, as I have shown, there was widespread scepticism towards the Brotherhood at the time, and I think it is right to say that JI was heavier influenced ideologically by Salafism in the early years. There are two reasons for this. First, you had the flow of Salafist

---

<sup>172</sup> ʿAbū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid ʿalā tāriḫ al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 74.

<sup>173</sup> ʿAbū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid ʿalā tāriḫ al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 53.

literature from Saudi Arabia at the time, and, second, the focus on appearance and religious rituals was easy to rally around. Kepel touches upon this when he claims that JI was more concerned with action slogans than the ideological basis of their faith.<sup>174</sup>

In spite of the exaggerated focus on Sayyid Quṭb by some scholars, there is no doubt that his books and fate as a *shāhid* (martyr) played an important role for the JI members – both to the ones who supported the use of violence and to the ones who appeared more hesitant on that field.

As I pointed out, even students that belonged firmly in the moderate camp spoke of their Jihadist spirit and did not outright condemn violence as a means for change. However, Quṭb's legacy turned out to be more of a source for division than unification within JI, as we shall see in the next chapters.

---

<sup>174</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 152.

### Chapter III: The Road towards the Brotherhood

This chapter will deal with how a number of the figureheads of JI came to be affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. However, before embarking on the affiliation process itself, I find it important to establish the nature of both JI and the Brotherhood in the mid 1970s.

Therefore, the first part of the chapter will be spent explaining how JI managed to Islamise campus and become the dominant force among Egyptian students in the 1970s. I will keep this part of the chapter fairly brief, as this is widely covered by Tønnessen in his thesis.

In the second part I will first discuss the Brotherhood's historical ambivalence towards the use of violence as a political tool. The reason for dealing with this question in depth, is because the view on violence was perhaps the main obstacle to JI joining the Brotherhood. Furthermore, it will highlight the internal divisions inside the Brotherhood when the contact with JI emerged. These factions, and their ideological connection with the likes of Sayyid Quṭb, actually played a crucial role in the process of winning over the majority of the JI leadership, as I will demonstrate.

Before I arrive at the actual affiliation process, I will address the Brotherhood's motives for inviting the students into the organisation. Here, the purpose is showing how the young generation of Islamists, when it joined, revitalised the `Ikhwān who was a movement with a broken back when its members were released from prison in the first years of the decade.

The last part will deal with how a number of leading figures of JI became members of the Brotherhood. Here, the aim is to demonstrate the developments inside JI in regard to violence.

#### Part 1

Students played a central part in the demonstrations in the aftermath of the defeat in the June War in 1967. The uprising persuaded President Nasser to grant students the right to form independent groups on the universities through decree 1533 of 1968. The decree established the General Union of Egyptian Students, a body which actually obtained a certain autonomy, contrary to earlier student organisations during Nasser's regime.<sup>175</sup> Moreover, the power of the University Guard, a sort of security force based on campus, was at the same time decreased.<sup>176</sup>

When the students engaged in new protests in November the same year, the regime tightened the rope and cut back on the students' new-won liberties. The backtracking encouraged the students

---

<sup>175</sup> Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 116.

<sup>176</sup> Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 39.

to detach themselves from the regime, and thus the foundation for a more independent student movement was laid.

Islamist students were far and few between on campus at this point, however. They were not in the forefront of neither the 1968 demonstrations nor the uprising in 1972. However, when demonstrations broke out again the next year, the presence of Islamists students were stronger.

In the five years that followed, JI succeeded in a number of student elections, finally gaining control over the General Union's national board by landslide victories in the academic year of 1978-79. On the following pages I will point to the various reasons behind JI's ascend to power.

### *Happy Campers*

The Islamic summer camps played a vital role in the schooling of young religious students. There had been religious summer camps during Nasser's reign as well, but they served the interests of the regime, implementing the regime's official views.<sup>177</sup> The camps that were organised by JI in the 1970s on the other hand, were modelled after the Brotherhood camps held in the 1950s.<sup>178</sup>

In the summer of 1973, Islamist students at the University of Cairo were able to organise their own camp independently of the regime. The camp was also open to students from the University of `Ayn Shams, situated in the north-eastern suburbs of Cairo. The next year, Egypt's biggest newspaper, al-`Ahām, reported from the final days of the camp where about five hundred students attended along with the first secretary of the Government party who praised the project.<sup>179</sup> The following year similar camps were organised in both the Delta city of al-Manṣūra and Banī Swayf in Upper Egypt.

Prominent *shuyūkh* and Islamist leaders were often invited to speak at these camps, thus providing the students with valuable schooling in Islamic issues.<sup>180</sup> The camps also gave the participants a taste of «Islamic utopia», Kepel remarks.<sup>181</sup> They functioned as a model for the society that the young students had in mind for the future.

The camps had yet another role, which proved valuable for the expansion of JI. According to `Abū al-Futūḥ, this was the place where a kind of organisational leadership formed.<sup>182</sup> In their heydays the camps drew thousands of participants and big names as Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī and Shaykh Yusūf al-Qaraḍāwī. `Abū al-Futūḥ also emphasises the tremendous importance of the

---

<sup>177</sup> Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 51.

<sup>178</sup> Abdo, *No God but God*, 125.

<sup>179</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 137-38.

<sup>180</sup> Tønnessen, «Studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 52.

<sup>181</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 139.

<sup>182</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid `alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 46-47.

camps as a place for *da'wa* (mission) and recruitment of new members .

### *The Art of Propaganda*

In chapter two I pointed out that JI was quick to publish Islamic literature when they gained control over the Arts Committee at the Faculty of Medicine in Qaşr al-'Aynī in 1973. On the whole, JI proved a modern force in their methods of communicating their message.

In 1975, JI also achieved control of the information and publishing committee at the Student Union's national level. JI soon initiated their collection of Islamic literature called Sawt al-Haqq, (Voice of the Truth) which was produced at low cost and distributed among the students.<sup>183</sup> In addition to renowned Islamic ideologues, like Quṭb and Mawdudi, JI also published their own statements containing either clarifications of their own ideology or opinions on current issues.<sup>184</sup>

In addition to that, JI also distributed cassettes where the lectures of prominent *shuyūkh* were recorded. These *shuyūkh* were also invited to hold lectures on campus. JI also organised special «weeks» attributed to certain issues related to Islam.

Tønnessen points out that these activities had to functions; first, they educated the young students and enabled them to perform *da'wa* (mission) themselves.<sup>185</sup> Second, these activities attracted new recruits. A quick look at some of JI's slogans at the time – «To God, Egypt!», «Together for the sake of Sharia!», «Together against apostasy and pornography» – reveals their inclusive and quite uncontroversial nature.<sup>186</sup> Thus, these slogans must have appealed to a wide range of students.

### *Recruitment through Services*

The third area where JI made an obvious difference for the students was on campus. Due to the explosive growth in the number of students from the 1960s and onwards, the universities were overcrowded and student services near non-existent: The lecture halls were overcrowded, the accommodation sparse and expensive private lessons imperative if one was to pass the exams.<sup>187</sup>

In principle, university studies was free of charge in Egypt – a system introduced by Nasser in order to make higher education possible for the lower classes. In reality however, background

---

<sup>183</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 141.

<sup>184</sup> Tønnessen, «Studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 66-67.

<sup>185</sup> Da'wa is a more complicated concept and mission does not cover the whole scope of it. However, in this context I think that mission is a sufficient translation.

<sup>186</sup> `Abū al-Futūh, *Shāhid 'alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 51.

<sup>187</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 135-37.

and economic sources still played a pivotal role. For instance, the jam-packed auditoriums made it extremely difficult for the students to comprehend the all details of the lectures. When exams consisted of parroting the lectures word for word, underpaid teachers saw an opportunity to earn an extra income through private lessons.

The malfunctions of the system contributed to the maintain a system where the ones with wealthy backgrounds and contacts succeeded, while the ones from poor or middle class families fell through – exactly what the Nasserist system meant to counter.

JI thrived on their ability to identify the students' everyday worries and annoyances. Once in power of the Student Union, JI started copying manuals sold by the teachers and distributing them among the students.<sup>188</sup> In regard to the overcrowding the students faced on their way to the university, JI solved the problem by providing their own bus service. JI also pushed for the building or expanding of mosques on campus. A fourth service they provided was cheap tours to Saudi Arabia which enabled cash-strapped students to conduct their pilgrimage.<sup>189</sup>

On top of that, JI began offering female students cheap Islamic clothes. The influx of women at the universities – between the ratio of female to male students went from 1:12 to 1:2 – allegedly increased the sexual tension on campus and conservative dress was a way to imply asexuality and unavailability.<sup>190</sup>

The majority of the students living in the university dormitories were poor or came from families far away. The standard of the dormitories however, was often very low, and two or three students had to share one room.<sup>191</sup>

JI responded to the material needs of the students, whereas the left wing students focused on issues of foreign politics such as the plight of the Palestinians or the growing unrest in Lebanon.<sup>192</sup> Thus, JI's activism can both be seen as an effort to create a more just society, in line with Islamic tradition, and an effective means to draw support on campus, as Tønnessen suggests. Their recruitment strategy must be considered a success, even non-religious students admitted going to their meetings, allegedly because the Islamists were the only ones «doing something».<sup>193</sup>

### *A Landslide of Victories*

In 1976 Sadat introduced what was supposed to be a multiparty system in Egypt. In practice it

---

<sup>188</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 144-45.

<sup>189</sup> Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 69.

<sup>190</sup> Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, 530.

<sup>191</sup> Abdo, *No God but God*, 123.

<sup>192</sup> Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 69-70, 65.

<sup>193</sup> Abdo, *No God but God*, 125.

meant creating three «platforms» (*manābir*) within the ruling The Arab Socialist Union, one to the left, one to the left and one in the centre of the political landscape.<sup>194</sup> Sadat placed himself among the centrists in the Egypt Party (Ḥizb Miṣr), which two years later was renamed The National Democratic Party (al-Ḥizb al-Waṭanī al-Dīmūqrāṭī).

The political liberalisation also benefited the students. Through decree 335/1976 the leadership of the National Student Union became independent and its twelve members were now to be elected by the students, not selected by the government.

Before the liberalisation, JI had managed to win elections to certain committees in some faculties. The student elections to the academic year of 1976-77 saw a change in fortunes for JI. `Abū al-Futūḥ was elected leader of the student union at the University of Cairo, Māḍī obtained the same position at the University of al-Minyā, while JI also won a number of other important positions. `Abū al-Futūḥ described the sweeping victories as the university «announcing its return to its origins».<sup>195</sup>

The subsequent year, Māḍī was elected vice president for the National Student Union. `Iṣām al-`Aryān won the leadership of the union at the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Cairo, whereas `Ibrāhīm al-Za`farānī obtained the same position at the University of Alexandria. On the whole, JI won a sweeping victory capturing a majority on eight out of twelve universities in Egypt. The JI domination continued until 1979 when the statutes of student elections were altered and student democracy circumscribed.

What is interesting is that JI did considerably better in the elections from the time they started opposing President Sadat, especially his peace initiative towards Israel, but also the effects of *Inḥitāḥ*, the economic open door policy. This may be explained by the fact that the peace initiative was equally unpopular among Islamist and leftist students. Moreover, as the public debt skyrocketed towards the end of the 1970s, the outlook for governments jobs, for many students the purpose of their education, became ever more gloomy.

It is also noteworthy that almost all the JI leaders that succeeded in the elections belonged to universities in either Cairo or Alexandria. The exception is Māḍī, who studied at the University of al-Minyā. Not surprisingly, all of the politically active students belonged to the moderate wing of JI.

---

<sup>194</sup> Goldschmidt, *Modern Egypt*, 175-76.

<sup>195</sup> Abdo, *No God but God*, 124.

## Part 2

This part will treat the Muslim Brotherhood, its history with the Sadat regime, violence, the advances towards JI leaders and the young students' eventual affiliation with the `Ikhwān.

The Brotherhood's view upon violence have been ambivalent up through the years and factions within the movement still looked at violence as a possible way to power, at least in theory, at the time the Brotherhood approached JI. This actually benefited the movement in their efforts to win over the students.

With regard to JI's initial affiliation with the Brotherhood, it is important to have in mind that we are only talking about in the excess of a dozen of JI leaders and prominent members, not the loosely organised Islamist student movement as a whole.

These figures were nonetheless the driving forces in the movement and did in turn influence the other students' attitude towards the Brotherhood in their respective universities.

### *The Brotherhood and Violence*

Traditionally, the The Muslim Brotherhood has been eager to emphasise its peaceful nature, stressing that their ultimate wish is to live under a rule which applies the Sharia correctly, rather than take power themselves.<sup>196</sup> The founder, Ḥasan al-Bannā, is himself widely portrayed as the traditional moderate face of the Brotherhood; the pious man non-violently pursuing the aim of an Islamist state.

The history of the Brotherhood's and violence is not so uncomplicated, though. I have in the preceding chapter pointed out the founder al-Bannā's emphasis on *jihād*, and according to Lia, the Brotherhood paid far greater attention to both the violent and the non-violent interpretation of it at the organisation's initiation than was normal at the time.<sup>197</sup> However, it is important to note that al-Bannā put far more emphasis on the struggle against what he perceived as the West's colonialism in the lands of Islam. In other words, al-Bannā did not call for *jihād* in order to overthrow the king or the Egyptian government.

However, al-Bannā himself never managed to – or was willing to – stamp out violent groups within the movement, such as *al-Niẓām al-Khāṣṣ (The Special System)*.<sup>198</sup> This group was responsible for attacks against British forces in the Suez Canal zone and from the 1940s and onwards, assassinations of Egyptian politicians, most notably the killing of Prime Minister Maḥmūd

---

<sup>196</sup> Alison Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition* (London: Saqi Books, 2010), 179-80.

<sup>197</sup> Brynjar Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2010), 83-84.

<sup>198</sup> Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition*, 29-30, 180.



Fahmī al-Nuqrāshī Bāshā in 1948. Al-Bannā distanced himself from the assassination and denounced perpetrators of violence as «neither Brothers» nor «Muslims», though it did not go down well with some of his followers.<sup>199</sup> The assassin himself – initially unwilling to speak to the police – was so disappointed with his leader that he started a chain of confessions that gave up his accomplices.<sup>200</sup>

This indicates that violence was far from alien to the Brotherhood under the leadership of al-Bannā. He was, as Pargeter puts it, «never able to reconcile his desire to adopt a cautious approach with his bid to be seen as defending Islam and capable of mounting a challenge to the established order».<sup>201</sup> And, although one must also take into account the turbulent and chaotic times in pre-revolutionary Egypt where the Ikhwān were far from the only ones resorting to violence, it is evidence of a mindset that survived into the 1970s, as we shall see later on.

The man that succeeded al-Bannā as the Brotherhood's General Guide (*al-murshid al-'ām*), Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī, took over the reins at a difficult time. The assassination of al-Bannā in 1949 was followed by infighting and disagreements over which direction the Brotherhood should take.

Al-Huḍaybī experienced the same difficult balancing act as his predecessor regarding al-Nizām al-Khāṣṣ and the Brotherhood's stance on the use of violence. On the one hand he spoke out against violent actions, but on the other failed to control the forces within *al-Nizām al-Khāṣṣ* who wanted to take on the regime.<sup>202</sup> The assassination attempt on Nasser in October 1954 resulted in a crackdown on the Brotherhood which saw thousands of members arrested and six of them hanged.

Rather than mute the militant elements of the Brotherhood, the experience of jail and torture only made them more bent on fighting the regime. The one that emerged as the ideological leader of this faction was Sayyid Quṭb whose ideas represented an important break with the tradition of al-Bannā.<sup>203</sup> While al-Bannā had supported attacks against British forces, he was far less supportive when it came to attacks on Egyptians. Quṭb's view, on the other hand, was an uncompromising one, detached from the overall pragmatism of al-Bannā.<sup>204</sup> Moreover, al-Bannā's vision was that an Islamic state would more or less follow as a natural consequence of the Islamisation of the people, whereas Quṭb saw the need for *jihād* to overcome the *jāhiliyya* rulers of today and implement Sharia. Therefore Quṭb's approach was that of a change from the top and downwards, whilst al-Bannā's focus was on a transformation of society from below.

When Sayyid Quṭb was hanged by the regime in 1966 and became a *shahīd* (martyr), his

---

<sup>199</sup> Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 68-69.

<sup>200</sup> Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers*, 72-73.

<sup>201</sup> Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition*, 30.

<sup>202</sup> Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition*, 32.

<sup>203</sup> His ideas have been discussed in Chapter II.

<sup>204</sup> Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition*, 183.

ideas gained even more weight. Within The Muslim Brotherhood, a group which came to be known as *Tanzīm 1965* (Organisation 1965) and whose inspiration was drawn from Qutb, had formed. The group supported tougher measures against the regime, and there were even discussion about assassinating president Nasser.<sup>205</sup> In turn, this led to a crackdown on the *Tanzīm* in 1965 (thereby the group's name), and the Brotherhood found itself in the middle of another major crisis.<sup>206</sup>

Once again the Brotherhood found itself divided over which approach the movement should take towards the state. And although al-Huḍaybī had initially been receptive to *Milestones*, announcing Qutb as «the future of the Muslim da'wa», the older guard within the Brotherhood, al-Huḍaybī included, came to see him as a threat to the philosophy of the Brotherhood.<sup>207</sup> Hence, with the followers of Qutb – *al-Qutbiyyin* (the Qutbists) – gaining strength within the Brotherhood, al-Huḍaybī saw the need to distance himself from the martyr. In 1969 he published his renowned book *Du'ā lā Quḍā* (*Preachers not Judges*) where he rejects the idea of Egypt being a country in the state of *jāhiliyya*. According to al-Huḍaybī, it was in the state of *juhl* (sic) and was merely in the need of a correction in the direction of the teachings of the Brotherhood.<sup>208</sup>

Despite *Du'ā lā quḍā* being an influential work – also on the generations that were to come – al-Huḍaybī failed to unite the movement around a moderate and non-violent approach. On the contrary, in Qutb's ideas radical elements both inside and outside the Brotherhood had a «theoretical tool that provided them with an analysis of the state they were combating and charted the road to its destruction and its replacement by a Muslim state», Kepel points out<sup>209</sup>.

That Qutb became the ideological figurehead for generation after generation of young Islamists bent on establishing an Islamic state by force, is undeniable. Pargeter claims however, that Qutb radicalised the Brotherhood as such.<sup>210</sup>

I find this view poorly documented and the arguing confusing, as the radicalism in question increased in the 1970s, according to Pargeter. This was a period when a number of brothers had just been released from prison and were cautious in its relations with the regime, as I will argue in the next part of the chapter. Furthermore, Pargeter presents both *Ji* and *al-Takfīr wa al-Hijra* (*Jamā'a al-Muslimīn*) as evidence of the Brotherhood's alleged radicalisation, which I find strange.

Even if *Ji* did not denounce violence outright in its initial years, the members were not entirely Qutbists – the sources of influence were many, as I highlighted in the preceding chapter.

---

<sup>205</sup> `Aḥmad `Abd al-Majīd, *Al-`Ikhwān wa `Abd al-Nāṣir: al-qīṣṣa al-kāmila li-Tanzīm 1965* (Cairo: Al-Zahrā' li-l-`I`lām al-`Arabī, 1991), 49-50.

<sup>206</sup> Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition*, 183-84.

<sup>207</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 30.

<sup>208</sup> Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition*, 184.

<sup>209</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 35.

<sup>210</sup> Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition*, 185-86.

Moreover, the radical elements rejected the `Ikhwān, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter. Hence, neither they nor their more moderate comrades can be put forward as proof of radicalisation within the Brotherhood.

The same goes for Shukrī Muṣṭafā and al-Takfīr wa al-Hijra. Even though Muṣṭafā allegedly started out as a Muslim brother, his actions many years after his departure from the `Ikhwān is poor proof of the Brotherhood's radicalisation.<sup>211</sup> Muṣṭafā never rejoined the movement after being released from prison in 1971 and his teachings were quite the opposite of those of the Brotherhood.

212

I therefore think it is more correct to say that Quṭb was a clear inspiration for the increasing number of radical groups that emerged in the 1970s, but that this radicalism failed to influence the official line of the Brotherhood.

### *Out of prison, Out of Members*

It is said that the first thing the future Brotherhood General Guide `Umar al-Tilmisānī did when he was let out of prison by the Sadat regime in 1971 was to visit the president in the `Abdīn Palace in Cairo and thank him personally.<sup>213</sup>

The attitude illustrates the changes that had taken place both within the regime and the Brotherhood in the period after Sadat assumed the presidency in October 1970. After winning an internal fight for power against people still loyal to Nasser's ideas – the so-called Corrective Revolution in May 1971 – Sadat set about making his own mark on the Egyptian society, among other things easing the heavy surveillance and repression of dissident forces.<sup>214</sup>

The Muslim Brotherhood was the main benefactor of Sadat's conciliatory attitude towards the political opposition who had been severely repressed during the reign of his predecessor. Numerous members were released from prison in the early 1970s as part of Sadat's wish to reconcile with the Islamist movement.<sup>215</sup> In 1972 `Umar al-Tilmisānī succeeded Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī as General Guide after the latter's death. Although many from the al-Nizām al-Khāṣṣ – among them people such as future al-murshid al-`ām Muṣṭafā Mashhūr, `Aḥmad Ḥasanayn and Kamāl al-

---

<sup>211</sup> Kepel claims he was arrested while distributed Brotherhood leaflets on campus in `Asyūt, while Kamāl Habīb, a long time member of II's radical wing, denies any links between Muṣṭafā and the `Ikhwān, Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 74. Kamāl Habīb, *Taḥawwulāt al-Ḥaraka al-Islāmiyya wa al-Istrāfijiyā al-Amrīkiyya* (Cairo: Dār Miṣr al-Maḥrūsa, 2006), 55.

<sup>212</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 75-77

<sup>213</sup> Raymond William Baker, *Sadat and After: Struggles for Egypt's Political Soul* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 245.

<sup>214</sup> Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., *Modern Egypt: The Formation of a Nation State* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004), 158.

<sup>215</sup> Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition*, 36.

Sanānīrī – initially viewed al-Tilmisānī as figurehead from behind whose back they could operate freely, the new leader proved himself an influential figure.<sup>216</sup>

Al-Tilmisānī's first years in power saw little, if any, opposition to the regime on the part of the Brotherhood, according to Muṣṭafā.<sup>217</sup> The Brotherhood's initial reaction to two of Sadat's major policy changes after the October War – an opening up of the economy (*Infiṭāḥ*) and a general orientation to the West – demonstrates this.

The Western turn in the foreign policy was far from rejected by the Brotherhood, and al-Tilmisānī advocated that Egypt «had to stretch out» to countries in the West «in a way they like».<sup>218</sup>

Furthermore, despite *Infiṭāḥ* ultimately leading to a growing social gap, the al-Tilmisānī saw no need to oppose it.<sup>219</sup> He saw nothing wrong in wealth itself and was obviously not in favour of any compulsory redistribution of it: «We do not call for the rich to give up their wealth, the contrary is true».<sup>220</sup>

The Brotherhood had their reasons for supporting Sadat's policy shift. As far as the foreign policy is concerned, Sadat had already indicated his reluctance towards the Soviets when he threw out nearly 20.000 Soviet technicians from Egypt in the summer of 1972.<sup>221</sup> Besides being a godless Communist state, the soviet Union was also associated with Nasser who was largely a hated figure among the `Ikhwān.<sup>222</sup> Thus, the West may have been regarded a lesser «evil».

The new «open door»-policy in the economic field also marked a departure from the politics of Nasser, whose Socialism preferred tight governmental control of the economy. However, The Brotherhood had additional reasons for embracing the *Infiṭāḥ*. It gave the movement opportunities that were out of reach under Nasser. The Brotherhood contributed widely to the new economic activity, setting up multiple institutions dealing with Islamic investment and banking.<sup>223</sup> «You will find Muslim Brothers behind a lot banks today», al-Tilmisānī admitted.<sup>199</sup> According to Muṣṭafā, the Brotherhood's return to the economic sphere, may have helped the return to Egypt of many of those who emigrated to the Gulf in the 1960s and made huge fortunes there.

For Sadat, the Brotherhood played a crucial role in the first years of his reign when he searched for new and different sources of legitimacy compared to the ones that his predecessor had leaned against. Religion was crucial to this strategy, as Sadat styled himself al-ra`īs al-mu`min (the

---

<sup>216</sup> Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition*, 44.

<sup>217</sup> Hāla Muṣṭafā, *Al-Niẓām al-siyāsī wa al-mu`āraḍa al-`islāmiyya fi miṣr* (Cairo: Markaz al-Maḥrūsa, 1996), 205..

<sup>218</sup> Muṣṭafā, *Al-Niẓām al-siyāsī wa al-mu`āraḍa al-`islāmiyya fi miṣr*, 205.

<sup>219</sup> Amira El-Azhary Sonbol, *The New Mamluks: Egyptian Society and Modern Feudalism* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 160.

<sup>220</sup> Muṣṭafā, *Al-Niẓām al-siyāsī wa al-mu`āraḍa al-`islāmiyya fi miṣr*, 205.

<sup>221</sup> Goldschmidt Jr., *Modern Egypt: The Formation of a Nation State*, 161.

<sup>222</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 120.

<sup>223</sup> Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East* (London: Routledge, 2004), 165.

believing president), was careful that photographs of him attending Friday prayers made the press, changed Egypt's slogan to *al-'ilm wa al-'imān* (knowledge and faith) and in 1971 made the Sharia the main source of legislation in the new constitution.<sup>224</sup>

In spite of the initial peace between the Brotherhood and Sadat, the relationship did not lead to any official legal recognition of the movement, neither as a political party or religious organisation. On the other hand, the Brotherhood's support was not unconditional and was mostly provided when it served their own interests and left their ideology unexposed to any threat.<sup>225</sup> Thus, when the obligations of the «truce» with Sadat clashed with their own goals, the 'Ikhwān chose to oppose the President. This became more evident in the latter half of the 1970s, when Sadat's political line clashed with that of the Islamist movement on numerous occasions, as we shall see in the next chapter.

### *Meeting the Younger Guard*

As mentioned in the last chapter, many of the JI founders came in contact with members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the first year in university as medical students at the Qaṣr al-'Aynī hospital in Cairo. Though it was not until a few years later that JI leaders were approached by members of the Brotherhood in order to persuade them to join the ranks of the 'Ikhwān.

In Muṣṭafā's view, the Brotherhood's contact with the young students was based on a need for additional weight in their struggle for more concessions from the government; the Brotherhood had to make the public more sympathetic to the movement's thoughts and in doing so the attention was drawn to the *jamā'āt*.<sup>226</sup>

Moreover, this strategy would also give the Brotherhood a chance to rebuild itself. There was a desperate need for renewal within the 'Ikhwān in the early 1970s, according to Pargeter, who describes the movement before meeting JI as primarily a «leadership with no one to lead».<sup>227</sup> 'Abū al-Futūḥ recalls that when they entered the Brotherhood, they «pledged allegiance to an idea, a project, a history... Because there was no Brotherhood organisation in the sense of the word 'organisation'. It was a group of individuals or historical leaders that from us received the leadership of an organisation that existed in reality».<sup>228</sup>

This view is supported by the fact that the Brotherhood leaders insisted that the JI's eventual affiliation with the 'Ikhwān should be kept secret. The reason, says 'Abū al-Futūḥ – one of the

<sup>224</sup> Muṣṭafā, *Al-Niẓām al-siyāsī wa al-mu'āraḍa al-'islāmiyya fi miṣr*, 209.

<sup>225</sup> Muṣṭafā, *Al-Niẓām al-siyāsī wa al-mu'āraḍa al-'islāmiyya fi miṣr*, 205.

<sup>226</sup> Muṣṭafā, *Al-Niẓām al-siyāsī wa al-mu'āraḍa al-'islāmiyya fi miṣr*, 204.

<sup>227</sup> Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition*, 42.

<sup>228</sup> 'Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid 'alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-'islāmiyya fi miṣr 1970-1984*, 91.

leaders who negotiated the association on behalf of parts of JI – was that president Sadat had allowed JI to organise and work freely both inside and outside the universities.<sup>229</sup> The Brotherhood, and especially the General Guide ʿUmar al-Tilmisānī, feared that this situation could change if the regime learned that large parts of the Islamist youth suddenly were under the leadership of the ʿIkhwān. In other words, he saw in the young religious students a popular base for the Brotherhood and a great resource.<sup>230</sup> Moreover, these youths could still operate without the obstacles the old guard faced, as the Muslim Brotherhood was still banned by law, despite the regime easing the pressure on the movement.

The initial attitude of the JI leaders towards the Brotherhood was hesitant, however. As I indicated in the previous chapter, at the time of the first conversations with the leadership of the ʿIkhwān, the JI front men saw themselves as the ones who were actually leading the «Islamic work», whereas the Brotherhood was merely a thing of the past.<sup>231</sup> Numerous options were discussed amongst the JI leadership, even inviting the Muslim brothers to join them.

Besides, the ʿIkhwān were not as strict as JI wished in regard to the latter's Salafist-inspired demands of «Islamic appearance» – they did not sport long beards and even had pictures on the walls of their homes.<sup>232</sup> Some Brotherhood members allegedly chose to comfort the young guard by growing beards, while others – among them ʿUmar al-Tilmisānī – refused and tried to convince the students that growing a beard was not a duty.<sup>233</sup>

An important factor in this process, that seems to have contributed deeply to many JI members eventually joining the Brotherhood, was the fact that the students first met with the remnants of al-Nizām al-khāṣṣ and Tanẓīm 1965: «I was drawn towards an undertaking that evoked the spirit of *jihād* and secret work», ʿAbū al-Futūḥ recalls.<sup>234</sup> Before he and other JI leaders joined the Brotherhood, their methods and way of thinking were closer to that of Tanẓīm 1965.<sup>235</sup> What appealed to the young JI leaders was the group's methodology of coup and revolution (*manhajīyya al-inqilāb wa al-thawra*) and their earlier desire to bring down president Nasser as revenge for what he had done to the country.

It is also beyond doubt that the young men looked up to the older Islamists who had spent dozens of years behind bars because of their beliefs: «The spiritual powers some of their members had shown during twenty years in prison drew us towards the Brotherhood», al-ʿAryān recalls<sup>236</sup>.

<sup>229</sup> ʿAbū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid ʿalā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 89.

<sup>230</sup> Baker, *Sadat and After*, 249-250.

<sup>231</sup> ʿAbū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid ʿalā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 73.

<sup>232</sup> «Al-ʿAryān ytaḥaddathu ʿan nashaʿa al-tayār al-islāmī bi-l-jāmaʿāt al-miṣriyya», Ikhwanonline.

<sup>233</sup> ʿAbū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid ʿalā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 79.

<sup>234</sup> ʿAbū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid ʿalā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 78. My translation.

<sup>235</sup> ʿAbū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid ʿalā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 95.

<sup>236</sup> «Al-ʿAryān ytaḥaddathu ʿan nashaʿa al-tayār al-islāmī bi-l-jāmaʿāt al-miṣriyya», Ikhwanonline.

The mediating role of the more rigid figures from the two above-mentioned factions should not be underestimated. When the students complained about the leniency of the older guard in religious matters, the men from al-Nizām al-khāṣṣ and Tanzīm 1965 supposedly softened the atmosphere. The initial differences between the old and young were real enough, though, as `Abū al-Futūḥ illustrates: «Had we met with the old, moderate brothers first, for example `Umar al-Tilmisānī and those close to him, we would have decided not join the group».<sup>237</sup>

With leading JI members aboard, the Brotherhood had managed to undertake the renewal it desperately needed. In `Abū al-Futūḥ's words, the «`Ikhwān was an empty house that was filled with the youth of al-Jamā'a al-`Islāmiyya who pumped blood into it».<sup>238</sup> Nevertheless, the movement now had the allegiance of some of the most active and capable student politicians in the country, among them al-`Aryān and `Abū al-Futūḥ, who were later to become both prominent leaders of Egyptian trade unions and occupy high positions inside the Brotherhood itself.

#### *Won over by the Moderates*

The process of deciding to join the Brotherhood took the leaders of JI approximately a year.<sup>239</sup> When they eventually agreed to join, they found themselves in a movement divided between a moderate old guard led by al-Tilmisānī and more hard-line elements rooted in the slightly younger al-Nizām al-Khāṣṣ and Tanzīm 1965.

In the beginning, it was the latter group that appealed the most to the students that was about to enter the Brotherhood.<sup>240</sup> The JI members that affiliated with the Brotherhood had yet to distance themselves entirely from the use of violence, a question they debated heavily with the General Guide `Umar al-Tilmisānī.<sup>241</sup> He appears to have been crucial to the transformation, as it was during these conversations the students became gradually more opposed to the use of violence until they dismissed the idea altogether later in the decade.<sup>242</sup>

In the process of changing the students' minds it was critical to increase their tolerance towards those with different beliefs. At the time they entered the Brotherhood, the young Islamists «suffered from anger with those who opposed us, and maybe also anger with the concept of disagreement in itself and especially if the disagreement concerned religion (...) This narrow-mindedness and dismissal of difference and tolerance of adversaries made us practice intellectual

<sup>237</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid 'alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 95. My translation.

<sup>238</sup> Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid 'alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 91. My translation.

<sup>239</sup> «Al-`Aryān ytaḥaddath 'an nasha'a al-tayār al-`islāmī bi-l-jāma'āt al-miṣriyya», Ikhwanonline.

<sup>240</sup> Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition*, 41.

<sup>241</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid 'alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 69.

<sup>242</sup> Interview with `Abd al-Mun'im `Abū al-Futūḥ, October 2010.

terrorism», `Abū al-Futūḥ explains.<sup>243</sup>

Up until then they had dreamed about «establishing a new state in a land like Egypt, one of the oldest nations in the world», and did not see this as naive.<sup>244</sup> As well as softening the students' approach to difference of opinion, al-Tilmisānī appears to have made them realise the naivety of their ideas and that violence would not bring the results they wanted: «We were young», says Mādī, who affiliated with the Brotherhood in 1979, «though with time we became more moderate. Joining the Brotherhood was a kind of underscoring on our part of our change of minds on the use of violence.»<sup>245</sup>

Al-Tilmisānī himself describes how the Minister of the Interior at the time, Muḥammad al-Nabawī `Ismā'īl, would call him in order to get advice on how to deal with the Islamist student organisation.<sup>246</sup> According to al-Tilmisānī, the Minister would even ask him to go to some university faculties to talk to the students. The General Guide says that the student responded to him and accepted his arguments against the use of violence and participating in demonstrations, strikes and sabotage.

In addition to being convinced of the futility of using violence, another factor contributed to pushing the students towards supporting peaceful means of change. While many of the students were engaged in dialogue with al-Tilmisānī, they were at the same time gaining influence in student politics, as I showed in the first part of this chapter.

The experience of student politics made it clear to the JI leaders that there existed an alternative to the *jihādī* way preached by some units of JI, and, moreover, that they could be successful. Despite the fact that the political experience appears to have preceded the eventual denial of violence on part of some of the JI members, it was nevertheless a confirmation of the non-violent path they were to follow in the coming years.

## Conclusion

This chapter have demonstrated how JI grew stronger and in the end won the student elections at eight of twelve universities in Egypt. Pivotal to their domination was their welfare programs and their determination to educate their followers in the Islamic faith.

In the second part of this chapter I have demonstrated how the Muslim Brotherhood adopted

---

<sup>243</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid 'alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 69-70. My translation.

<sup>244</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid 'alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 70. My translation.

<sup>245</sup> Interview with `Abū l-'Ilā Mādī, October 2010.

<sup>246</sup> Baker, *Sadat and After*, 249.



a cooperative attitude towards the government under the new regime of president Sadat. Notwithstanding the fact that the `Ikhwān only cooperated as long as they benefited from it, the new stance towards the regime is nevertheless a proof of the changing political climate in Egypt in the 1970s towards openness and wider liberties in regard to political organisation.

In this new reality, the Brotherhood saw a need for renewal and additional means to put more pressure on the regime. The solution was to attract the leaders of the Islamic student movement, as this would both extend the powerbase and see to a renewal of the Brotherhood. The move was a success for the Brotherhood as the new members were far more politicised than earlier `Ikhwān generations, which in turn gave the movement a sense of urgency.<sup>247</sup> Moreover, some of these young men proved to be highly capable and came to dominate the Islamist movement for the next decades.

In regard to the process of winning over the JI leaders, I have shown how the «veterans» from al-Niẓām al-Khāṣṣ and Tanẓīm 1965 played a pivotal role. The beliefs of the young Islamists were at the time heavily influenced by the heritage of the likes of Qutb, if not in its most radical form. There is reason to believe that without those two hard-line factions providing a sort of «soft landing» for the students in the initial interaction with the Brotherhood, JI may never have joined in such numbers as they eventually did.

However, the students did not settle for a position on the dark fringes of the Brotherhood, unwilling to change their positions on the need for violence and revolt. In the period that followed, they were greatly influenced by the moderate line of General Guide `Umar al-Tilmisānī and before long they set about convincing their JI colleagues of the need for restraint in relation to violence.<sup>248</sup>

However, it is important to emphasise that far from the whole of JI agreed to enter the Brotherhood. The «negotiations» between the `Ikhwān and the leaders and important members of JI took place in secrecy not only because of al-Tilmisānī's fear of losing campus as a place of Islamic activism.

There were also many elements within JI who looked upon the Brotherhood as a weak organisation and refused any contact with it whatsoever. The JI leaders were perfectly aware that their affiliation with the Brotherhood would meet with staunch opposition from some of the other leaders and a possible split inside the Islamist student movement.<sup>249</sup> Hence, they had their own reason for keeping the talks secret.

Indeed, when the news finally broke in late 1979, it led to an outcry and a subsequent division of JI. That process will be discussed in the next chapter.

---

<sup>247</sup> Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition*, 42.

<sup>248</sup> «Al-`Aryān ytaḥaddath `an nasha`a al-tayār al-`islāmī bi-l-jāma`āt al-miṣriyya», Ikhwanonline.

<sup>249</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid `alā tārikh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 79.



## Chapter IV: The Division of JI

This chapter will deal with the decline of JI at the universities in the late 1970s and in the end the organisation's split in 1981. The reasons for these developments will be presented in two separate parts.

The first will show JI's relations to the society, politics and the Sadat regime, i.e. deal with external reasons for the division of the Islamist student movement.

The second part will concern itself with the developments and internal divisions of JI in the latter half of the decade. The last part of the chapter will be devoted to the role of the regime in JI's downfall, before I end the chapter with a discussion of external versus internal reasons for the split.

### Part 1

1977 is regarded as a watershed in the relationship between the Sadat regime and the Islamist movement in Egypt. The main reason is Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem and the peace treaty that followed two years later.

The peace with Israel enraged the Islamists, who answered with fierce attacks in their periodicals and mass demonstrations staged by JI. 1977 also saw the «Bread Riots» in January. Until the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution which forced president Hosni Mubarak from power this year, these two days of protests were widely regarded as the largest expression of anti-government sentiment after World War II. The Islamists were not the driving force in these events however, although they sympathised with the people's demands. Both JI and the `Ikhwān used the occasion to criticise the *Infitāḥ* – the project of liberalising the economy – which the Sadat regime had embarked upon after the October War in 1973. Later, the president's support for the Shah of Iran became another rallying point where the Islamists firmly demonstrated that they now belonged to the opposition.

Albeit Sadat appeared to be committed to the Islamisation of Egypt, he took few, if any, concrete steps to put his promised policy into practice. On the contrary, in the closing years of the 1970s the «Believing President» often chose to go his own ways, avoiding the calls from the Islamist camp.<sup>250</sup>

Hence, the latter part of the decade saw Sadat clash politically with the Islamist movement on a number of occasions, with 1977 being the starting point. However, while JI did not hesitate

---

<sup>250</sup> Hinnebusch, *Egyptian Politics Under Sadat*, 200.

organising demonstrations against the regime, some of whom developed into violent clashes with the security forces, the `Ikhwān took pains not to engage in an open conflict with Sadat.<sup>251</sup>

The first part will also illuminate the importance of the re-emergence of the al-Da'wa magazine in 1976 and the role it played in the growing Islamist opposition to the regime at a time when the movement was growing bolder, fuelled by JI's sweeping victories in the student elections of the academic year 1977-78.

It also important to have in mind that at this point most of the JI leaders in Cairo and the Delta had affiliated with the Brotherhood, although not yet made their membership public. The affiliation included adopting a more moderate line regarding the use of violence, a process which was accounted for in the previous chapter. The first part of this chapter will demonstrate how JI placed themselves on the non-violent side when forced to take sides in the Jamā'a al-Muslimīn case that broke in the summer of 1977.

### *The Face of the Moderate JI*

When the case of Shukrī Muṣṭafā's Jamā'a al-Muslimīn (better known as al-Takfir wa al-Hijra, the name given to the group by the press at the time), filled the newspapers in the summer of 1977, the JI was fast to condemn it.

On the July 3<sup>rd</sup> Jamā'a al-Muslimīn kidnapped and later killed the Minister of `Awqāf, Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Dhahabī. JI quickly distanced itself from the group, claiming that they had «fought the group from the very beginning» and that Jamā'a al-Muslimīn «is destroying Islam». <sup>252</sup> Furthermore, Jamā'a al-Muslimīn was labelled an extremist group without any real support inside the university. Four days later, JI in Alexandria saw the need to send out a statement where Jamā'a al-Muslimīn was once again condemned. <sup>253</sup>

Even so, JI still felt the need to warn against the abuse of Muslim men and women who appreciate the «traditions of the Umma». The warning suggests that JI feared being likened to Shukrī Muṣṭafā's group.

However, if one goes as far as Kepel, claiming that JI «gave the regime what it wanted» by publicly denouncing Jamā'a al-Muslimīn – which implicates that JI to a certain degree approved or sympathised with the group – one is turning a blind eye to the evident differences between the two groups. <sup>254</sup>

---

<sup>251</sup> Baker, *Sadat and After*, 246.

<sup>252</sup> `Amīma Ḥātīm, «Shabāb al-jamā'āt al-Islāmiyya yakshif `asālib Jamā'at al-Takfir», *al-Ahrām*, July 12<sup>th</sup>, 1977.

<sup>253</sup> «Al-Jamā'āt al-dīniyya wa al-ṭulābiyya tudīn al-`irhāb bi-ism al-dīn», *al-Ahrām*, July 16<sup>th</sup>, 1977.

<sup>254</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 148.

Despite all its ambiguity and simplicity, Jamā'at al-Muslimīn was ideologically and strategically more streamlined than JI. The group centred round the strategy of withdrawal in a period of weakness, inspired by Prophet Muḥammad's *hijra* to Medina in 622. What caused the weakness, was the *kāfir* (infidel) nature of society. It was a duty for all Muslims, Jamā'at al-Muslimīn argued, to withdraw from such societies – i.e. all societies not governed by the Sharia.<sup>255</sup> Until the group felt forced to act violently, their strategy was to build counter-societies in which the members lived in accordance with their interpretation of Islam. As the trial after the murder of al-Dhahabī revealed, this was an extremely literal reading of the Koran and the *āḥādīth* that reached the extent of backing illiteracy since the Prophet had not opened schools in order to teach people to read and write.<sup>256</sup>

The majority of JI, on the other hand, had quite the opposite approach. First of all, they still regarded Egypt as a Muslim country.<sup>257</sup> Secondly, they also disapproved of branding fellow Muslims as *kuffār*, an attitude shared with the Muslim Brotherhood's founder, ḤasanḤasan al-Bannā. Thirdly, their ideological basis consisted of numerous directions, as I pointed out in the first chapter.

In short, JI was an organisation of inclusiveness, whereas Jamā'at al-Muslimīn cherished the exclusiveness of their little group.

Their different ideological fundamentals also influenced their strategies. While Jamā'at al-Muslimīn withdrew and refused to have anything to do with the *jāhiliyya* society, JI worked more or less within the borders of society, and, notably, in an outward fashion. Their moderate elements relied upon *da'wa* to change society, arranging summer camps, writing pamphlets and taking part in student politics.

Although Jamā'at al-Muslimīn is too extraordinary a group to be put in the same category as *jihādī* groups such as al-Jihād and al-Fanniyya al-'Askariyya, they still share a concept of changing society from the top. The fact that they threatened to kill the hostage al-Dhahabī if their demands were not met, reveals this attitude. They were willing to realise their goals by coercion, if necessary.

JI had quite the contrary approach. Although calling for the implementation of the Sharia and the setting up of an Islamic state, their actions was more in line with the aim of al-Tilmisānī; creating of an Islamic society rather than an Islamic state.<sup>258</sup> The state would follow as a natural consequence of the piety of a majority of Muslims. Their tactics were therefore an Islamising of society from bottom and upwards, as al-'Aryān points out, rather than the Jamā'at al-Muslimīn and

---

<sup>255</sup> Munīb, *Daḥl al-harakāt al-islāmiyya al-miṣriyya*, 118-19.

<sup>256</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 84.

<sup>257</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 147.

<sup>258</sup> Meijer, «Towards a Political Islam», 14-15.

similar groups' top-down approach.<sup>259</sup>

Therefore, there is absolutely reason to believe that a majority of JI genuinely disagreed with Shukrī Muṣṭafā's group, rather than paying lip service to Sadat. There may however, have been elements within JI that started to feel disillusioned in the last years of the decade, as Sadat's Islamic commitment never seemed to be fully implemented into his politics, as Hinnebusch suggests.<sup>260</sup> A similar development had taken place in the late 1930s, when a group within the Brotherhood grew disillusioned with Ḥasan al-Bannā's leadership, due to what was regarded as his gradual and passive approach.<sup>261</sup> The alleged leader of the group, `Aḥmad Rif`at, accused the leadership of busying themselves with the government rather than challenge it for not implementing the Sharia.

More or less the same accusations were made against those from JI who joined the Brotherhood some forty years later. According to `Abū al-Futūḥ, the radical wing in Upper Egypt complained that the moderates were «weak truce mongers»: «In their eyes we preferred well-being over fighting the system».<sup>262</sup>

Hence, Kepel's notion that «Shukri's radicalism and the daring with which he defied the state and expressed his ideas produced more than a few admirers among the rank-and-file Islamicist student militants», at least has a historic parallel and may hold some truth.<sup>263</sup>

Part two of this chapter will deal with JI's internal struggle and how the movement eventually split.

### *Infitāḥ and Westernisation*

On the field of domestic politics, the *Infitāḥ* – the economic «open-door policy» – was increasingly becoming a source for opposition in the latter half of the 1970s. However supportive of the reform in its initial years, the Islamist camp began to see *Infitāḥ* as a tool for Western penetration of the country; not only had Egypt become economically dependent on the West, but in the wake of the new policy followed the influx of Western culture.<sup>264</sup>

Furthermore, the growing gap between the rich and the poor blamed on *Infitāḥ* ran contrary to many Muslims' notion of Islamic justice. Following the so-called «Bread Riots» in January 1977, the Islamic camp decried the inefficiency, corruption and not at least injustice that the liberalised

---

<sup>259</sup> Interview with `Iṣām al-`Aryān, October 2010.

<sup>260</sup> Hinnebusch, *Egyptian Politics under Sadat*, 200.

<sup>261</sup> Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition*, 25.

<sup>262</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid `alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 90.

<sup>263</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 148.

<sup>264</sup> Esposito and Voll, *Islam and Democracy*, 175.

economy brought with it.<sup>265</sup>

The *Infitāḥ* can be viewed as yet another of Sadat's efforts to rid Egypt of Nasserism.<sup>266</sup> And, as Sadat sought loans from The International Monetary Fund (IMF), he had to reform the economy along more capitalist lines. This including opening up the Egyptian economy to more imports and exports, and also brought along with it cuts in public spending.

The demonstrations in January 1977 saw thousands – coming from all parts of the political scale, including Islamists – take to the streets to protest the rise in food prices. However, the uprising must be seen in a wider context than just the price of food. Many of the protesters were just as much opposing the results of the government's course; the austerity and cuts in consumption for the poor, while the rich were growing considerably richer.<sup>267</sup>

It is also worth noting that parts of the protest were directed at the casinos and nightclubs.<sup>268</sup> The destruction of some of these establishments had a double symbolism to them; for Islamists, they had long been the symbols of the moral corruption westernisation brought with it, while many poor people were angered by the Egyptian *nouveau riche* who frequented these places along with Western tourists. On the whole, a belief began to dominate among Egyptians that the increasing corruption and collapsing moral – both personal and business life – was caused by foreigners, be they Arab or Western.<sup>269</sup>

Barely a month later, 'Abd al-Mun'im 'Abū al-Futūḥ caught the president off guard in a discussion which was broadcasted on live television. Among a number of complaints, 'Abū al-Futūḥ, at the time president of the student union at the University of Cairo and secretary of national student union's media committee, attacked the president for the harsh treatment peaceful demonstrators were given by the security forces.<sup>270</sup>

Although the first cracks in the «truce» between the regime and the 'Ikhwān became apparent in 1976 – due to the latter's persistence in its struggle to gain legitimacy as either a political party or religious organisation – it was not until the riots of January 1977 that the Brotherhood openly sided with the opposition.<sup>271</sup>

Instrumental in this transformation was the magazine *al-Da'wa* (*The Call*) which was allowed to publish again from 1976 after a 22 year ban. The magazine condemned the mounting prices which caused the «Bread Riots», but also went further to criticise the lack of political

---

<sup>265</sup> Baker, *Sadat and After*, 258.

<sup>266</sup> Ansari, *Egypt: The Stalled Society*, 235-36.

<sup>267</sup> Hinnebusch, *Egyptian Politics Under Sadat*, 71.

<sup>268</sup> Hinnebusch, *Egyptian Politics Under Sadat*, 206.

<sup>269</sup> Leila Ahmed, *Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 218-19.

<sup>270</sup> 'Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid 'alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 61.

<sup>271</sup> Muṣṭafā, *Al-Nizām al-siyāsī wa al-mu'āraḍa al-islāmiyya fī miṣr*, 210, 207.

freedom in Egypt, as well as the freedom of expression and to organise.<sup>272</sup> *Al-Da'wa* called for a system of *shūrā* (council) as they thought that was the political system that complied best with Islamic teachings. Naturally, there were also regular calls for the implementation of the Sharia.

The JI leaders' affiliation with the Brotherhood coincided more or less with the re-emergence of *al-Da'wa*. The combination contributed to push the Brotherhood in a more political direction. As I have pointed out earlier, the new generation was not one used to work in secrecy and hiding, rather it was accustomed to voicing their opinion quite openly. As they became more and more a household part of the Brotherhood in the latter years of the 1970s and early 1980s, they aspired to push the movement in a direction where it engaged itself more in «socio-economic challenges such as poverty and corruption».<sup>273</sup> The group was more politically aware, and for them, that stage proved just as important as the religious and ideological debate.

Sadat also made himself unpopular in the Islamist camp by pushing for a new law on personal status. For years, many proposals to a new law had been debated, though without any consensus being reached. This prompted Sadat to take the matters into his own hands. In 1979 he passed a controversial proposal into law through an emergency decree.<sup>274</sup>

Men were now obliged to inform their first wife through a court order if they wanted to remarry, whereas before they could have four wives all oblivious of one another.<sup>275</sup> Moreover, the first wife obtained the right to an immediate divorce and the right to live in her husband's home until their children reached the age of majority.

The new law had been a victory for Egyptian feminists who had fought for a reform for decades, and their victory was accompanied by a more visible struggle against taboo issues, among them contraception and clitoridectomy.<sup>276</sup>

From the Islamists' point of view, the law went contrary to what is prescribed in Islam, namely that a man is allowed to have four wives. It was labelled «Jihan's laws» after Sadat's wife, Jihan.<sup>277</sup> She had a British mother, was regarded as a westernised woman and allegedly her support for the law reform strongly influenced the president's decision.<sup>278</sup> Sadat himself warned against «the misuse of religion as a mask behind which man hides his vindictive desire to maintain absolute supremacy over women». For the Islamist however, it seemed like Sadat was backtracking and once more choosing the Western alternative over the Islamic one when presented with a choice.

---

<sup>272</sup> Muṣṭafā, *Al-Niẓām al-siyāsī wa al-mu'āraḍa al-islāmiyya fī miṣr*, 207-08.

<sup>273</sup> Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition*, 43.

<sup>274</sup> Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, ed., *Islamic Family Law in a Changing world: A Global Resource Book* (London, Zed Books, 2002), 169-70.

<sup>275</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 184.

<sup>276</sup> Ahmed, *Women and Gender in Islam*, 214.

<sup>277</sup> Esposito and Voll, *Islam and Democracy*, 175.

<sup>278</sup> Hinnebusch, *Egyptian Politics under Sadat*, 154.



### *Peace with Israel and the Revolution in Iran*

What probably caused the most anger – in all political camps, Islamist as well as leftist – during Sadat's presidency, was his strive for a peace agreement with Israel. The process was part of Sadat's reorientation to the West where the ultimate goal apparently was to boost the deteriorating Egyptian economy.<sup>279</sup> In this process, a peace with Israel would be helpful in drawing more Western investments.

His journey to Israel in November 1977 to get the Israelis' attention sparked heavy criticism at home. In this case, however, it is worth noting that the Brotherhood's official reaction was much more cautious than JI's.

The Brotherhood declared that Sadat's trip to Jerusalem was disapproved of by Islam, but apart from that saved its harshest criticism for Israel.<sup>280</sup> A peace with Israel would not bring prosperity, they argued, but rather give the Zionists a chance to penetrate Egyptians' minds and change their mentality.

But the *Ikhwān* appears to have been careful not to go too far in their criticism of the peace negotiations. Al-Tilmisānī was keen to point out that the Brotherhood's aim was not to oppose the government, but to appeal for an end to the occupation of Palestinian lands. Moreover, *al-Da'wa* asked other Muslim countries not to judge Sadat's Jerusalem before the outcome of it was clear.

In their reaction to the Camp David Accord in 1978, the *Ikhwān* also focused more on the content of the accord – arguing that it was vague on the question of borders and decrying the absence of any references to Jerusalem – rather than going all out against the president himself.<sup>281</sup> When the peace treaty was completed and signed in Washington in 1979, however, the Brotherhood placed itself firmly among the critics. General Guide al-Tilmisānī declared that the deal should be fought to the end by all Muslims.<sup>282</sup> It was impossible for a Muslim to accept an occupation of his land, al-Tilmisānī said, adding that the *Ikhwān*'s opposition to the peace agreement was religiously motivated. Al-Tilmisānī still refused to engage in a full-scale attack on Sadat, and he rejected the Arab boycott of Egypt after the signing of the treaty, demanding from those countries to come up with an alternative.<sup>283</sup>

Sadat had released the brothers early in the 1970s on the condition that they did not involve

---

<sup>279</sup> Ansari, *Egypt: The Stalled Society*, 187.

<sup>280</sup> Abdelnasser, *The Islamic Movement in Egypt*, 128-29.

<sup>281</sup> Abdelnasser, *The Islamic Movement in Egypt*, 130.

<sup>282</sup> Baker, *Sadat and After*, 255.

<sup>283</sup> Abdelnasser, *The Islamic Movement in Egypt*, 131.

themselves in politics.<sup>284</sup> Yet, when the implications of Sadat's redirected foreign policy became clear, it became increasingly difficult for the Brotherhood to keep their end of the «bargain». From an Islamic point of view, al-Tilmisānī saw the American support for Israel as dangerous, while the widespread Westernisation was corrupting the youth of Egypt and undermining her culture and Islamic heritage.<sup>285</sup> Nevertheless, the Brotherhood's response to Sadat's peace initiative was far more tempered compared to other Islamist movements in Egypt, among them JI.

Ji's rejection of the peace and normalisation of the ties with Israel was total, and the organisation made their views public already from November 1977, printing leaflets, organising conferences both on campus and in mosques, as well as taking to the streets in protest marches that at times ended in violence.<sup>286</sup> Ji also warned against perceiving the conflict as Israeli-Arab. Using a more religious vocabulary than the `Ikhwān, Ji argued that this was a clash between Judaism and Islam and that the only solution to the conflict was *jihād*. To wage *jihād*, Ji argued, an Islamic state had to be established, hence postponing the immediate call to take up arms against Israel.

A similar mode of reaction can be observed in regard to the Iranian Revolution. The revolution was a populist burst where millions took to the streets in the final months of 1978 and which led to the overthrow of Muhammed Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, a couple of months later.<sup>287</sup> The protesters in the streets of Tehran and elsewhere in the country condemned the secular and authoritarian Pahlavi regime with its strong ties to the US, and called for the establishment of an Islamic state.

Sadat – at the time heavily engaged in the final negotiations with Israel over the peace treaty which was signed on March 26<sup>th</sup> 1979 – condemned the demonstrations and sided firmly with the Shah. When he eventually was forced to step down on February 11<sup>th</sup> the same year, the Shah found his exile in Egypt. However, the backing of the Shah against what turned out to be an Islamic Revolution did not go down well with neither Ji nor the Muslim Brotherhood.

Although the Iranian demonstrators were Shiites, many of their demands corresponded with those of the Islamic movement in Egypt. They were both opposed to Western influence and the secular nature of their regimes. After Egypt's peace with Israel, both countries also recognised the Jewish state – to the resentment of not only Islamists, but large parts of the populations.

Compared to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the revolution in Iran did not have the same unifying effect on the Islamist movement in Egypt. One reason was the traditional divide and suspicion between the Sunni and Shia directions of Islam, carefully observed by the likes of Saudi

---

<sup>284</sup> Meijer, «Towards a Political Islam», 13.

<sup>285</sup> Baker, *Sadat and After*, 257.

<sup>286</sup> Abdelnasser, *The Islamic Movement in Egypt*, 134.

<sup>287</sup> William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004), 448.

Arabia which explains the Salafi rejection of the revolution.<sup>288</sup> Despite the fact that this view also influenced the Brotherhood and JI to some extent, they both supported the revolution.

Notwithstanding the Brotherhood's explicit support of the revolution, the organisation was careful to underline that it was not calling for revolution itself.<sup>289</sup> Instead the `Ikhwān emphasised the need for both ruled and rulers to unite under the banner of Islam. They were also sceptical to the new Iranian regime's appeal to other Islamic movements to wage *jihād* against their governments. And, although al-Tilmisānī visited Tehran on numerous occasions, the relations between the new Islamic republic and the Brotherhood soured rather quickly.<sup>290</sup> This was due to the accusations against al-Tilmisānī coming from Tehran claiming that he was an American agent. The background was the General Guide's efforts to mediate during the American hostage crisis. Additionally, after the war between Iran and Iraq broke out in 1980, Saudi hostility towards Tehran grew. This also affected the Brotherhood's position because of its connections with Saudi Arabia.

Despite the somewhat reserved response to the Iranian revolution, it nevertheless had a huge influence on the Brotherhood, giving them, as Abdelnasser remarks, a great deal of confidence.<sup>291</sup> Their reservations at the time must be seen in the light of their struggle to become a legally recognised political force in Egypt. Important to that struggle was the need for the `Ikhwān to present itself as a moderate force in a period when theirs and the regime's ways parted on an increasing number of occasions.

Furthermore, the Brotherhood did not phrase their outspoken views on events in Iran at all times. In the universities and mosques, JI expressed both their support for the revolution and their disgust for Sadat housing the Shah. As was the case in the opposition to the peace with Israel, JI once again organised demonstrations on a large scale, circulated leaflets praising the «movement of the masses» while denouncing «dependence on the United States».<sup>292</sup> The Islamist students arranged sit-ins and street protests which emulated those in Iran. Some of the demonstrations staged in `Asyūt and Alexandria in March and April 1980 developed into violent clashes.

The JI's support for the Islamic revolutionaries in Iran had limits, however. The events in Iran was not more important than similar developments elsewhere, according to JI who pointed to Afghanistan, Eritrea, Chad and the Philippines.<sup>293</sup> This view is not only evidence of JI's emphasis on Islam as a religion for all inhabitants on earth, but also a reluctance to fully recognise Khomeini. Although the national student union declared their support of Khomeini on a conference in al-

---

<sup>288</sup> Abdelnasser, *The Islamic Movement in Egypt*, 74.

<sup>289</sup> Abdelnasser, *The Islamic Movement in Egypt*, 68.

<sup>290</sup> Abdelnasser, *The Islamic Movement in Egypt*, 69-70.

<sup>291</sup> Abdelnasser, *The Islamic Movement in Egypt*, 68-69.

<sup>292</sup> Abdelnasser, *The Islamic Movement in Egypt*, 71.

<sup>293</sup> Tønnesen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 96-97.

Minyā on February 6<sup>th</sup> 1979, it is worth mentioning JI's national leadership never explicitly backed the Iranian Revolution.

Moreover, certain elements within JI distanced themselves from the Shia revolution and made it clear that they would refuse any support from Iran. Expressions such as these show that the Salafists, traditionally hostile to Shiism, still held sway over parts of JI in the closing years of the 1970s. Even so, the revolution had an immense impact on the Islamist students, giving them a solid belief in their cause and claiming that the developments in Iran was proof of the victory that awaits those who follows in the path of God.<sup>294</sup>

As pointed out above, there were unmistakable similarities between Sadat and the Shah. Therefore, when JI condemned the secular leanings of the Shah, it was at the same time an attack on the Egyptian president who in the late 1970s seemed to play down the Islamic symbols that dominated his politics earlier in the decade. Furthermore, when the US influence on the Shah was criticised, the Islamists knew very well that their own leader looked to be following in his footsteps.

The revolution in Iran worked as a moral and psychological boost for JI and should not be underestimated, argues Sonbol, referring to Iran's push to export the revolution to other countries in the region.<sup>295</sup>

A number of demonstrations that started out as anti-Shah gatherings, developed into protests against Sadat. More than 500 students participated in the demonstrations organised by JI In `Asyut on April 3rd 1980, chanting the slogan «The blood of Moslem youth will not be an offering for Sadat and the Shah».<sup>296</sup> When the protesters reached the city centre, they were met by riot police who subsequently opened fire which killed one person and injured six seriously.<sup>297</sup> Around sixty participants were arrested.

In their communiqués in 1980, JI became ever more explicit in their attacks on Sadat, criticising the burden placed on the Egyptian people by the boycott in the wake of the peace treaty with Israel that left Egypt isolated in the Arab world.

In the end it appears to have been the criticism of his foreign policy that made Sadat decide that enough was enough. In 1979 in `Ismā`īliyya he met with various leaders of the country's Islamic organisations, among them the General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, `Umar al-Tilmisānī. The last months had seen harsh attacks against the `Ikhwān in the government-controlled press, blaming them for conspiring against the regime.<sup>298</sup> Sadat continued in the same track, making no effort to disguise his displeasure with the Brotherhood, pointing out that he would not tolerate

---

<sup>294</sup> Abdelnasser, *The Islamic Movement in Egypt*, 68.

<sup>295</sup> Sonbol, *The New Mamluks*, 171.

<sup>296</sup> Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 98.

<sup>297</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 159.

<sup>298</sup> Baker, *Sadat and After*, 244.

«those who try to tamper with the high interests of the state under the guise of religion», before he made it clear that religion «must not be mingled with politics».<sup>299</sup> Furthermore he also accused the `Ikhwān of inciting both people and students against the government and aiming at stirring up a sectarian strife.<sup>300</sup>

Al-Tilmisānī's responded with calling for Sadat to implement the Sharia, only then would the masses support him, he said. According to the Brotherhood leader, he was invited to another meeting with Sadat a short while after their encounter in `Ismā'īliyya. This time Sadat struck a different chord, offering to broaden his «truce» with the `Ikhwān.<sup>301</sup> He also offered to get the movement registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs along with a position for al-Tilmisānī as the Brotherhood's representative to the Shūrā Council. The General Guide rejected both offers, preferring to keep both himself and the organisation independent of the government.

It may very well have been the last offer the Islamist movement received from the president. The following years up until the assassination of Sadat on October 6<sup>th</sup> 1981, saw a decline in the relationship between the «Believing President» and the Islamists.

## Part 2

This part of the chapter will be dedicated to the various internal reasons for the eventual breaking up of JI. Earlier analysis, like the one conducted by Kepel for instance, has tended to focus on external forces; namely the rising pressure and subsequent crackdown on JI undertaken by the Sadat regime. For instance, Kepel identifies the widespread arrests on September 3<sup>rd</sup> 1981 as the reason for JI's ultimate collapse.<sup>302</sup>

When the authorities cracked down on JI, no part of the mainstream Egyptian society came to its rescue, Kepel remarks, and underscores the failure of JI to «persuade the Egyptian Muslim masses to fight alongside them for the victory of the *umma*».<sup>303</sup>

Tønnessen also underlines the increasing resistance from the regime on campus as probably the most important reason for JI's split. He concentrates mostly on the restrictions put on JI's political activity in the universities from the academic year 1977-78 and onwards and refers to how their candidates were erased from the election lists at the universities of Cairo and Alexandria as

---

<sup>299</sup> Baker, *Sadat and After*, 244.

<sup>300</sup> Muṣṭafā al-'Adawī, *Umar al-Tilmisānī: Bayna ḥamās al-shabāb wa ḥukma al-Shuyūkh* (Cairo: Dār al-'Aqṣā li-l-kitāb bi-kardāsa, 1986), 20.

<sup>301</sup> Baker, *Sadat and After*, 244.

<sup>302</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 170.

<sup>303</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 165.

well as in the al-`Azhar university.<sup>304</sup> In addition, the popular Islamic summer camps arranged by JI were in 1978 forced out of campus by Sadat's security forces.<sup>305</sup>

Tønnessen is also aware that internal divisions contributed to the downfall of JI, such as the majority of the leadership's affiliation with the Brotherhood. In doing this, he is also differentiating between moderate and radical parts of JI – a contrast Kepel rarely makes. However, it was the pressure from the regime, Tønnessen claims, that forced the dormant split within the student movement; the radical elements advocating a violent answer to the repression from 1979 onwards, whereas the Brotherhood-associated fraction appealed to the JI-members to stick to a non-violent approach.<sup>306</sup>

I will explore the differences between the Upper Egypt camp of JI and the organisation in Cairo and the Delta, and explore which role these regional divisions played in the fragmentation of the Islamist student movement.

In my opinion, neither of them is downright wrong in their analysis. However, as I will argue when I identify the reasons for JI's split in the following sections of this chapter, they both put too much weight on the clashes with the regime. The strained relations with the Sadat were more of a «last nail in the coffin» than an original reason for the split within JI.

### *Outrage and Infighting*

As showed in the previous chapter, the Muslim Brotherhood was not held in high esteem among the ranks of JI in the early 1970s. Upon agreeing to join the `Ikhwān in the middle of the decade, the JI leadership in Cairo and the Delta were still not entirely convinced about the non-violent line adhered to by the General Guide `Umar al-Tilmisānī. However, after long discussions with al-Tilmisānī, the majority of them were won over to the moderate camp.

This process lasted from approximately 1974-75, when the first contact was made. It is hard to establish precisely when the different figureheads affiliated, but `Abd al-Mun`im `Abū al-Futūḥ and `Iṣām al-Aryān – both from Cairo – decided to join sometime during 1975-76. There is reason to believe that Muḥammad `Abd al-Laṭīf, Sanā` `Abū al-Zayd followed them shortly afterwards.<sup>307</sup> `Ibrāhīm al-Za`farānī, maybe the most prominent JI leader in Alexandria, also appears to have joined the `Ikhwān at this time. The second round of affiliations began in the spring and summer of 1979, when JI moderates in al-Mīnyā were approached. As a result, Muḥy al-Dīn `Īsā, `Abū al-`Ilā

<sup>304</sup> Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 108.

<sup>305</sup> Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 109-10.

<sup>306</sup> Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 119.

<sup>307</sup> Mādī refers to him as Thanā` `Abū al-Zayd. `Abū al-Futūḥ names him Sanā`. Mādī, *Jamā`āt al-`unf al-miṣriyya wa ta`wīlātha li-l-`islām*, 18-19.

Māḍī and Hashamat Khalīfa joined the Brotherhood.

In all, between twelve and fifteen JI leaders joined the Brotherhood, which in turn spurred on a great number of other members to join the ranks of the `Ikhwān.<sup>308</sup>

The secrecy surrounding not only the first group's affiliation with the Brotherhood, but also the second group, including `Abū al-`Ilā Māḍī and Muhy al-Dīn `Īsā, is proof of the `Ikhwān's controversial role inside JI. In the previous chapter I have referred to al-Tilmisānī's reason for not making the new members public as he wished their work on campus to go on uninterrupted by the authorities. For the students, it was just as important to avoid the strong opposition from other blocs inside JI, most notably the Jihadists and the Salafists.<sup>309</sup> When the news finally broke in 1979, it was those two factions who most eagerly denounced the decision to join the Brotherhood.

`Iṣām al-`Aryān describes how the move was received with shock and astonishment.<sup>310</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ also recalls great anger: «The *jihādī* wing said to us at that time 'You are afraid, you are `Ikhwān, you are cowards, we refuse you!'.<sup>311</sup>

The radicals' wing was upset by the moderates' «betrayal». When joining the Brotherhood, they had affiliated with a peaceful organisation, long considered a collaborator with the authorities by many JI members. This kind of criticism have sustained up until this day, the violent groups denouncing the Brotherhood as a «domesticated opposition movement destined to remain weak so long as it participates in politics». <sup>312</sup>

When the second round of affiliations – involving students from the universities in Upper Egypt – became public in 1980, the leader of radical wing, Karam Zuhdī was furious, according to Māḍī.<sup>313</sup> The disagreements in some governorates in Upper Egypt reached the point where mosques were divided, especially in al-Mīnyā and `Asyūt, and the different parties would engage in bloody fights with chains and knives over who were to lead the `Īd prayer.<sup>314</sup> It should also be pointed out that the relations between the different factions remained peaceful on other occasions.<sup>315</sup>

Despite hostility and abuse, the moderates of JI and Brotherhood leaders allegedly put down considerable work to try and win over radicals to their side or at least make them refrain from using violence: «The Brotherhood was not able to change the radicals' minds, nor were we. Karam Zuhdī, Nājīḥ `Ibrāhīm and `Usāma Ḥāfīz spoke many times with prominent Brotherhood leaders like al-

<sup>308</sup> `Abd al-Rahīm `Alī Muḥammad, *Al-Muqāmara al-kubrā: Mubādara waqf al-`unf bayna rihān al-ḥukūma wa al-Jamā'a al-Islāmiyya* (Cairo: Markaz al-Mahrūsa, 2002), 141.

<sup>309</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid `alā tarīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 89.

<sup>310</sup> Interview with `Iṣām al-`Aryān, November 2010.

<sup>311</sup> Interview with `Abd al-Mun'im `Abū al-Futūḥ, October 2010.

<sup>312</sup> Amr Hamzawy and Sarah Grebowsky, «From Violence to Moderation: Al-Jama'a al-Islamiya and al-Jihad» in *Carnegie Papers* No. 20, (April, 2010), 2.

<sup>313</sup> Māḍī, *Jamā'āt al-`unf al-miṣriyya wa ta`wīlātha li-l-`islām*, 19.

<sup>314</sup> `Alī Muḥammad, *Al-Muqāmara al-kubrā*, 141.

<sup>315</sup> Interview with `Usāma Ḥāfīz, October 2010.

Tilmisani and Mashhūr, but they would not change their minds», `Abū al-Futūḥ recalls.<sup>316</sup>

This effort seems to have continued until early 1981, when the group led by Mādī invited all parts of JI, including the clique around Karam Zuhdī, to a meeting in al-Minyā. The backdrop for the meeting was information about training with weapons allegedly practiced by Zuhdī and his comrades in various apartments in al-Minyā at the time.<sup>317</sup> Yet, the meeting came to nothing, as Zuhdī reportedly denied the information while angrily accusing the organisers of the meeting of drawing the suspicion of the Egyptian security forces.

Thus, the attempts to get the violent wing of JI to show restraint proved futile. And, as indicated above, at the time Zuhdī and his circle had already taken their first few steps on the path of violence. Their first victims were Copts, as will be the concern of the next part of this chapter.

### *Clashing with the Copts*

The 1970s saw the nascent tension between Copts and Muslims, after decades of all but peaceful coexistence. One of the reasons for the sudden tension, Ansari notes, was president Sadat's increasing utilisation of Islamic symbols, which he initially used to combat the leftists in domestic politics.<sup>318</sup> Coptic leaders were obviously displeased with these developments and what they saw as official tolerance of harassment of Copts by Islamists.<sup>319</sup> Pope Shenūda III took on the regime in 1978 when he cancelled the celebrations of Easter in protest against the treatment of Copts.

The response from Sadat was devastating. Not only did he declare that Egypt was an Islamic state, he also accused the Coptic leaders of trying to create «a state within the state». The edgy relationship between Muslims and Copts somehow culminated in the clashes in the Cairo district of al-Zāwiyya al-Ḥamra in June 1981 where dozens were killed. In the aftermath of the al-Zāwiyya al-Ḥamra incident Sadat refused to recognise Shenūda as Pope.

In this highly-strung atmosphere, how to treat the Copts naturally generated great debate within JI. Until the assassination of Sadat, it was also one of the few occasions where one part of JI used violence whereas the other denounced or abstained from it.

Those belonging to the radical, violence-embracing faction in Upper Egypt, led by Karam Zuhdī, were very much in favour of attacking the Copts. They also did, starting in the early 1980s, arguing that the Copts should be the first victims of *jihād*.<sup>320</sup> That robbing (and killing) Coptic goldsmiths also provided the group with money which gave them the opportunity to buy arms,

<sup>316</sup> Interview with `Abd al-Mun`im `Abū al-Futūḥ, October 2010.

<sup>317</sup> Mādī, *Jamā`at al-`unf al-miṣriyya wa ta`wīlātha li-l-`islām*, 21.

<sup>318</sup> Ansari, *Egypt: The Stalled Society*, 175-76.

<sup>319</sup> Hinnebusch, *Egyptian Politics Under Sadat*, 154.

<sup>320</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 207, 209.



appears to have been a useful side effect.

Zuhdī's affiliates in Cairo and the Delta saw things differently, however. There, the radicals were reluctant to identify the Copts as the primary target and more concentrated on waging *jihād* against the state.

There was also hostility towards the Copts within the moderate camp, although not going as far as to take up arms against them. Mādī recalls, for instance, that most Islamic groups at the time, the Muslim Brotherhood included, looked upon the Copts as *ahl al-dhimma* (non-Muslims who in return for special taxation should enjoy safety and protection), in his words a kind of second class citizens.<sup>321</sup> This view resembles that of the Brotherhood's founder, Ḥasan al-Bannā, who preferred a treaty with non-Muslims where they would pay the *jizya*, the tax explained above.<sup>322</sup>

ʿAbū al-Futūḥ on the other hand, says the influence from the Brotherhood brought with it respect for the Copts.<sup>323</sup> It was the radical wing of JI, he claims, that classified the Copts as *dhimma*. This was allegedly debated within JI and disagreed upon.

There may even have been disagreements inside the moderate base on this question. Though, judging by what was communicated through the Brotherhood-controlled monthly al-Daʿwa, the reigning notion was that of the «ungrateful Copts»; in the view of both the Muslim Brotherhood and JI, no minority in the world enjoyed as much freedom as the Christians of Egypt.<sup>324</sup> The Copts exploited the hospitality though, aiming to control the country and its economy. Al-ʿAryān even claimed that the Copts were reviving their old ambition of setting up a state in upper Egypt with ʿAsyūṭ as its capital.<sup>325</sup> JI also claimed that Christians and Jews were conspiring to discredit Islam on an international level and that the Copts of Egypt were the spearhead in this process.

Though, despite the moderates' conspiracy theories and general suspicion, the Coptic question became yet another issue where the radicals preached the need for violence, while the moderates took a stand against the use of force; Karam Zuhdī spurred his followers on to smash liquor stores owned by Copts and attack Coptic students on campus, whereas JI leader Ḥilmī al-Jazzār urged Muslims to boycott Coptic businesses in order to prevent the Copts from buying weapons.<sup>326</sup>

Al-ʿAryān, though suspicious of the Copts, at any rate denounced those behind the destruction. In his view the violence underlined the weaknesses of the Islamic movement.

---

<sup>321</sup> Interview with ʿAbū l-ʿIlā Mādī, October 2010.

<sup>322</sup> Abdelnasser, *The Islamic Movement in Egypt*, 212.

<sup>323</sup> Interview with ʿAbd al-Munʿim ʿAbū al-Futūḥ, October 2010.

<sup>324</sup> Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 113-14.

<sup>325</sup> Ansari, *Egypt: The Stalled Society*, 228.

<sup>326</sup> Ansari, *Egypt: The Stalled Society*, 228.

The lack of support for the attacks among the moderates is depicting of how wide the gap between the violent and the non-violent camps had become.

### *Upper Egypt: Violence and a Weak Brotherhood*

As I pointed out in the preceding part, the attacks on Coptic goldsmiths had a regional dimension to them. The Copts were the preferred targets for the Upper Egyptian radicals, whereas the radicals in the north favoured attacking the state in the fight for the implementation of the Islamic state. This different priorities reflects a historical division; while the Muslim Brotherhood, for instance – founded in `Ismā`īliyya north-east of Cairo – historically has had an international outlook, in Upper Egypt the focus has been on poverty and injustice in the south.<sup>327</sup>

This mentality can explain why the Brotherhood never had a large following in Upper Egypt, as two important issues during the `Ikhwān's first two decades were the struggle against the British and the Palestinian cause. For the *Ṣa`āyida* the campaign against Zionism must have appeared somewhat alien at a time where the majority of the population of the south were struggling to make ends meet under the authority of local landlords. Whereas for the British, they hardly had any military presence in Upper Egypt.<sup>328</sup>

On top of that, the leadership of the Brotherhood had traditionally been rooted in the urban areas. Despite the fact that the movement also had a large following in rural regions, the decision-making was done in Cairo and the Delta cities.<sup>329</sup>

The repression during the Nasser era further weakened the `Ikhwān in the south.<sup>330</sup> Moreover, the Brotherhood did not increase their popularity when they supported the landowners against small farmers in a land reform during the first part of the 1970s.<sup>331</sup> At that time, the movement's presence in Upper Egypt was more or less wiped out.<sup>332</sup>

Hence it is not surprising that a majority of the JI leaders in al-Mīnyā and `Asyūṭ chose not to join the `Ikhwān when most of their northern colleagues affiliated.<sup>333</sup> The recruitment activity on behalf of the `Ikhwān also met with staunch opposition in Upper Egypt, al-`Aryān underlines:

It was only in al-Mīnyā and `Asyūṭ that a majority refused to join. One of the reasons was psychological. Some of the students in Upper Egypt were affected by elders who

<sup>327</sup> Mamoun Fandy, «Egypt's Islamic Group: Regional Revenge?», *The Middle East Journal* Vol. 48, No. 4, Autumn 1994, 610.

<sup>328</sup> Fandy, «Egypt's Islamic Group: Regional Revenge?», 611.

<sup>329</sup> Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 329.

<sup>330</sup> al-Shaykh, *Al-Jamā`āt al-`islāmiyya al-miṣriyya al-mutashaddida fī `Ātūn II sibtimbr*, 49.

<sup>331</sup> Fandy, «Egypt's Islamic Group: Regional Revenge?», 611.

<sup>332</sup> Pargeter, *The muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition*, 41.

<sup>333</sup> al-Shaykh, *Al-Jamā`āt al-`islāmiyya al-miṣriyya al-mutashaddida fī `Ātūn II sibtimbr*, 50.

were against the Muslim Brotherhood. And of course it played a role that the Brotherhood was not as strong in Upper Egypt as they were in the Delta and Cairo.<sup>334</sup>

ʿAbū al-Futūḥ paints the same picture, stating that most JI members in the universities of Egypt had become affiliated with the Brotherhood by late 1979, except for JI in the universities of al-Minyā and ʿAsyūṭ.<sup>335</sup>

In refusing the Brotherhood, the JI in Upper Egypt fended off the ʿIkhwān's message of non-violence and moderation. ʿAsyūṭ seems to have been particularly receptive to the *jihādī* current. The Brotherhood were especially weak in ʿAsyūṭ, according to ʿAbū al-Futūḥ, and in 1979 the Jihadists camp managed to wrestle power from the local JI *ʿamīr* (leader), ʿUsāma Sayyid ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd.<sup>336</sup> He was known to have relations to the Brotherhood, his father being an old member of Tanẓīm 1965.<sup>337</sup> Nājiḥ ʿIbrāhīm became new *ʿamīr* with the support of Karam Zuhdī, and consequently, ʿAsyūṭ became a stronghold for the radical wing of JI.

The leader of this wing that emerged at this time was the aforementioned Karam Zuhdī. Given the Brotherhood's weak role in Upper Egypt, there is good reason to believe al-Shaykh when he claims that Zuhdī did not have many difficulties establishing a JI wing independent of ʿIkhwān domination.<sup>338</sup> With the new leadership came a flow of impassioned speeches thrown by Zuhdī in the mosques and on the campus in ʿAsyūṭ, in which he stirred the excitement of the students and rallied part of the local leadership around him, according to Muḥammad al-Muntaṣir ʿAbd al-Mun ʿim ʿAlī – better known as Muntaṣir al-Zayāt – a former JI member from ʿAswān.<sup>339</sup>

In these speeches, Zuhdī insulted senior officials and attacked symbols of the regime.<sup>340</sup> He also publicly denounced the Muslim Brotherhood and its followers among the students in what developed into a battle for the control of the mosques between the two factions of JI.<sup>341</sup> At times, these struggles became violent and bloody, as mentioned above. According to Mādī, the moderate wing was able to adjust the balance in their favour, though ʿAsyūṭ remained under the control of the Zuhdī camp.

It is also important to add that Zuhdī's violent conviction probably was more in line with the local customs. Many sources points to the tradition of blood feuds in Upper Egypt, and the

<sup>334</sup> Interview with ʿIṣām al-ʿAryān, November 2010.

<sup>335</sup> Interview with ʿAbd al-Mun ʿim ʿAbū al-Futūḥ, October 2010.

<sup>336</sup> ʿAbū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid ʿalā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 92.

<sup>337</sup> In ʿAbū al-Futūḥ's memoirs, he is named as ʿUsāma Sayyid ʿAḥmad. However, Mādī refers to him as ʿUsāma Sayyid ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd. Mādī, *Jamāʿāt al-ʿunf al-miṣriyya wa taʿwīlātha li-l-islām*, 19-20.

<sup>338</sup> al-Shaykh, *Al-Jamāʿāt al-islāmiyya al-miṣriyya al-mutashaddida fī ʿĀtūn 11 sibtimbr*, 49.

<sup>339</sup> al-Shaykh, *Al-Jamāʿāt al-islāmiyya al-miṣriyya al-mutashaddida fī ʿĀtūn 11 sibtimbr*, 47.

<sup>340</sup> ʿAlī Muḥammad, *Al-Muqāmara al-kubrā*, 142.

<sup>341</sup> Mādī, *Jamāʿāt al-ʿunf al-miṣriyya wa taʿwīlātha li-l-islām*, 20.

acceptance of violence as a means to settle conflicts.<sup>342</sup> Or, in the words of `Usāma Ḥāfīz, at the time a member of the Zuhdī clique: «In the *Ṣa`īd* people are used to change things by hand, (*bi-l-yadd*, i.e. by power). We broke up a lot of parties by force. These things happened in Cairo as well, but not as often as here».<sup>343</sup> In addition to breaking up parties, the violent party would also smash liquor stores belonging to Copts and intimidate both students and regular citizens whose behaviour were deemed un-Islamic.<sup>344</sup>

The falling out with the Zuhdī group eventually lead the moderates to change the badge and slogan of their faction of JI to the one used by the Muslim Brotherhood. After the reports of the radicals' violent behaviour emerged, the moderates chose to abandon the name JI altogether in favour of The Muslim Brotherhood's.

### *Regime Repression*

The Sadat regime's shift towards attempting to contain the Islamist current on the campuses of Egypt, resulted in the curbing of JI's dominance of student politics. The academic year of 1977-78 saw JI sweep the student elections, winning a majority on eight out of twelve universities in Egypt. As we have seen however, this was also the time when JI developed into arguably the most powerful opposition force in the country.

Undoubtedly the Sadat regime also began to see JI more as a threat than a source for support. As I have mentioned, the Minister of the Interior even asked `Umar al-Tilmisānī, the General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, to talk to the students in order to get them to abstain from violence. The regime went further however, and also banned students wearing traditional clothes – distinctive of the Islamists – on campus, in addition to expelling others from university.<sup>345</sup> Teachers and Islamic scholars were also urged to contribute to the halting of the Islamist tide. Early in 1978 *al-Da'wa* reported struggles between JI and «puppets» backed by the regime.<sup>346</sup> The following months stories of persecution of JI members and attempts of stripping the organisation of its victory in the student elections appeared in the Islamist monthly.

Later that year it became evident that the regime's target was a curtailing of JI's power on campus. Student elections were allegedly rigged and payments that were due various activities in the name of JI were cancelled. Furthermore, the popular summer camps in Cairo, Alexandria and *Zāqāzīq* organised by JI were disrupted by the government's security forces in the summer of 1978.

<sup>342</sup> Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 125.

<sup>343</sup> Interview with `Uāma Ḥāfīz, October 2010.

<sup>344</sup> Roel Meijer, «Towards a Political Islam», *Clingendael Diplomacy Papers* No. 22, July 2009, 15.

<sup>345</sup> Abdalla, *The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt 1923-1973*, 227.

<sup>346</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 148-49.

A number of JI candidates had been omitted from the election lists already at the student polls for the academic year of 1977-78.<sup>347</sup> Still, the Islamists did incredibly well at the elections, which in turn forced the deans at some faculties to cancel the results and choose the leaders of the faculty unions themselves. A new party was also established on campus, *Ḥizb Miṣr* (The Egypt Party), with the sole mission of circumscribing the power of JI on campus, according to the Islamists.

In April 1979, fresh from the signing of the peace treaty with Israel in Washington and bolstered as the «peace president», Sadat delivered a speech in `Asyūṭ in which he launched an unprecedented attack on his critics. Those who walked around wearing the white *jallabiyya* and sported long beards were in fact communists and religion just a tool to disguise their political aims, Sadat claimed, with no attempt to conceal the addressees of his attack.<sup>348</sup> In the same speech he denounced JI by name and depicted the Brotherhood leader `Umar al-Tilmisānī a liar.

The president had then set the stage for what was to come two months later. In June the General Union of Egyptian Student was banned and its assets frozen by decree 265. From here on, student unions were only allowed at faculty level where they were put under the control of the joint committee of teachers, students and administrators.<sup>349</sup> On top of that, the University Guard, a security force, was reintroduced eight years after it was pulled out of campus.

The new law made it almost impossible for JI to keep their welfare program going, and many of their services were reversed by the new decree. With the welfare services gone, JI lost some of its appeal on campus, although they were able to keep some their activities going thanks to students' voluntary contributions.<sup>350</sup>

The organisational repression at the universities ran parallel to JI's demonstrations being quelled by riot police, often ending in violent clashes, as I pointed out earlier in the chapter. However, the new role as the «suffering leaders of the opposition» to the regime was not one immediately rejected by JI leaders. Moreover, in many ways it resembled the self-image of the Muslim Brotherhood who had been met with persecution as leaders of national resistance and fighters for social reform.<sup>351</sup>

The clamp-down on their student activity forced JI out of campus, but the crackdown did not have the effect the regime had planned. On the contrary, JI expanded on to the streets, penetrating the popular neighbourhoods of the big cities and finding new recruits there.<sup>352</sup> They also continued

---

<sup>347</sup> Abdo, *No God but God*, 128.

<sup>348</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 149-50.

<sup>349</sup> Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 117.

<sup>350</sup> Tønnessen, «Egytiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 111.

<sup>351</sup> Baker, *Sadat and After*, 250.

<sup>352</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 149.

their work through arranging conferences and publicising communiqués.<sup>353</sup>

According to Kepel, JI was radicalised on their way out of the universities and into the streets, claiming that the moderate wing connected to al-Tilmisānī lost influence in favour of militant elements.<sup>354</sup> Kepel points to articles in al-Da'wa warning students against «emotional actions» and appealing to moderation, and argues that these calls went unheeded.

In my opinion, this is not quite the right interpretation of the events. As an example of the radicals' increasing influence, Kepel holds out the incident at the University of Alexandria on March 24<sup>th</sup> 1980, where hundreds of JI members presented the dean of the Faculty of Science with an ultimatum. The ultimatum consisted of four demands; an end to interrogations of JI members, that «Islamic meetings» be organised at the faculty, that there would be no obstacles to Islamist candidates in the upcoming elections to the faculty student union and lastly, and end to festivals and screening of films.

When one examines these claims, what is striking is not their radical or *jihādī* essence, but rather their quite peaceful nature. One of the demands concerns the right to participate unhindered in elections, another calls for interrogations of certain students to stop, while the third regard the desire to see the «Islamic meetings» reappear on campus. Only the demand to stop festivals and films has a degree of authoritarianism to it. It appears heavily influenced by Salafism, which is not surprising, given that the University of Alexandria had a substantial Salafist following earlier in the 1970s.<sup>355</sup>

If the demands of the Alexandria students express anything, it must be frustration with measures the considered repressive, not radicalism and militancy.

The events that followed in `Asyūṭ and al-Minyā, were, as I have showed in earlier parts of this chapter, mainly driven by the *jihādī* faction centred around Karam Zuhdī and his followers. This group was always hostile to the `Ikhwān. Therefore, since the Brotherhood's following in Upper Egypt never was extensive in the first case – also demonstrated earlier in the chapter – they can hardly be said to have lost their leverage, as Kepel claims.

On the contrary, the late 1970s saw a great number of Islamist students join the `Ikhwān, even in the Ṣa'īd, where the leading figures i al-Minyā, Muḥyī al-Dīn 'Aīsā and `Abū al-'Ilā Maḍī, decided to affiliate with the Brotherhood while in jail in 1979.<sup>356</sup>

On the whole, the moderate forces of JI seem to put less emphasis on the regime pressure when asked to explain the break up. The hostility from the government came late in JI's time span,

---

<sup>353</sup> Tønnessen, «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad», 113.

<sup>354</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 156.

<sup>355</sup> Māḍī, *Jamā'at al-'unf al-miṣriyya wa ta`wīlātha li-l-'islām*, 17.

<sup>356</sup> Māḍī, *Jamā'at al-'unf al-miṣriyya wa ta`wīlātha li-l-'islām*, 19.

ʿAbū al-Futūḥ says, pointing out that the mass arrest did not take place until late 1981.<sup>357</sup> He claims it did not play any role at all in the breaking up of the organisation and that at any rate, the repression under Sadat was not great.

Māḍī, a couple of years younger than ʿAbū al-Futūḥ, more or less shares this opinion. First, what pressure may have been, was not very strong, he says, even brushing aside the fact that he was thrown in jail for a period of two to three months.<sup>358</sup> When confronted with the regime taking control over student politics, Māḍī says that this was not enough to break up the group. On the contrary, he points out, the pressure helped JI in a way: It heightened the tension inside the universities and made JI take the step from a student movement to a grassroots movement (*ḥaraka shaʿbiyya*).<sup>359</sup>

These moderates of JI are not alone in their view of the Sadat era as a relatively relaxed period. Shukrī Muṣṭafā, the leader of the Jamāʿat al-Muslimīn, labelled the Egyptian state as *jāhiliyya*, but nonetheless declared that «there is no doubt that the Sadat regime is a thousand times better than Nasser's. Nasser would never have allowed us to act as we re now acting, nor to carry out our propaganda openly».<sup>360</sup>

There is not consensus however, when it comes to how big a part government pressure had in breaking up JI. According to Ḥāfīz, the membership in the armed groups that had started to form in Upper Egypt in the end of 1979 and the beginning of 1980, was quite limited until Sadat declared his *qarārāt al-taḥaffuz* (mass arrests) in September 1981.<sup>361</sup> Then their numbers increased, he claims.

In these years the tension was increased by numerous house searches conducted by the authorities in order to confiscate hidden weapons in al-Mīnyā and ʿAsyūt.<sup>362</sup> The radicals would also clash with the security forces, such as in November 1980, when the lectures at the University of ʿAsyūt were interrupted by violence.

There is no doubt that the pressure from above made life harder for JI as a student organisation. JI's loss of power on campus due to the regime's change of the laws regulating student elections is proof of that. However, whether the loss of power among at the universities and the subsequent clashes with the regime was the decisive blow to JI as an organisation with a broad appeal on campus, is rather doubtful in my opinion.

---

<sup>357</sup> Interview with ʿAbd al-Munʿim ʿAbū al-Futūḥ, October 2010.

<sup>358</sup> Interview with ʿAbū l-ʿIlā Māḍī, October 2010.

<sup>359</sup> With regards to the interviewees' consideration of the level of repression in the Sadat era, it should be noted that many of them thought that the circumstances was worse under Hosni Mubarak.

<sup>360</sup> Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 95.

<sup>361</sup> Interview with ʿUsāma Ḥāfīz, October 2010.

<sup>362</sup> Ansari, *Egypt: The Stalled Society*, 221.

These questions will be dealt with in depth in the conclusion of the chapter. Before I reach that point, however, I will put forward one more factor that contributed to the downfall of JI in the late 1970s and early 1980s, namely the age of the founding generation of JI.

### *Graduation and Fragmentation*

Already in 1976 `Abū al-Futūh's class graduated and as a consequence many of the movement's figureheads were no longer to be found on campus.<sup>363</sup>

In itself this was not enough to break the organisation, as JI still had capable and charismatic leaders in its ranks – people like `Abū al-'Ilā Māḍī, Ḥilmī Jazzār and Muḥī al-Dīn 'Aīsā on the moderate side and Karam Zuhdī and Nājiḥ 'Ibrāhīm among the more radical-minded.

Although JI did not collapse after the graduation of its first generation, Māḍī, who belonged to what can be described as the second generation, says that it became harder to keep the organisation together after graduation: «We tried to keep the Islamic activities going in the universities with meetings for the graduates (*liqā'āt al-kharrījīyin*). In the beginning it was monthly meetings, then the intervals became longer and in the end we lost it».<sup>364</sup>

This activity seems to have been just as much an effort to strengthen the Brotherhood's hold on JI as an attempt to keep JI together. According to `Abū al-Futūh, the *graduates* was instructed to go home to their provinces and contact the JI leaders there.<sup>365</sup> The aim appears to have been to bolster the ties between the local `Ikhwān leadership and the new generation of members, rather than consolidate JI's position in the provinces.

Many of those figureheads mentioned considered their options when their time as students was drawing to a close, searching for a role outside the realm of the universities after graduation.<sup>366</sup> I have more than once emphasised the political mindset of what is described above as the first generation of JI. There is reason to believe that many of the politically ambitious young men already affiliated with the Brotherhood saw further ahead than just JI. 'Iṣām al-'Aryān, for instance, says that they faced two alternatives; Either they could set up their own organisation outside the universities, or they could join the Brotherhood.<sup>367</sup> When they decided to join the Brotherhood, they did so wholeheartedly, as the developments in the ensuing decades is proof of.

Although belonging to what I have described as the «second generation» of JI leaders, the words of `Abū l-'Ilā Māḍī is quite telling in this respect: «When we decided to become a serious

<sup>363</sup> `Abū al-Futūh, *Shāhid 'alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 91.

<sup>364</sup> Interview with `Abū l-'Ilā Māḍī, October 2010.

<sup>365</sup> `Abū al-Futūh, *Shāhid 'alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 91.

<sup>366</sup> 'Alī Muḥammad, *Al-Muqāmara al-kubrā*, 141.

<sup>367</sup> Interview with 'Iṣām al-'Aryān, November 2010.



organisation, we joined the Muslim Brotherhood and JI separated».<sup>368</sup>

And, as I have demonstrated earlier in the chapter, the affiliation with the Brotherhood was not taken lightly by the radical wing of JI and therefore contributed to factionalism and in the end the full split of the movement.

## Conclusion

This chapter have dealt with the deteriorating relationship between JI and the regime, starting briefly before 1977 and ending with the disintegration of JI and the assassination of president Sadat, both in 1981.

The decline in the relationship between the Islamist movement and the regime was however not unique at the time. The criticism that followed the introduction of the multiparty system in 1976, forced Sadat to reconsider this strategy, as Ibrahim underscores.<sup>369</sup> JI was but one of the victims of the subsequent constriction of the political leeway. Yet, it was a far more potent movement from the mid 1970s than the severely weakened left which in turn made JI harder to repress.

As this was a period when Sadat had raised the stakes of his policy, hoping to show the western world that Egypt could both adapt to a more market-friendly economic system and securing a peace agreement with the arch enemy Israel, it is not difficult to imagine that the regime was eager to demonstrate that it could keep its house in order. Hence it was less receptive to criticism than earlier in the decade.

As I implied earlier in this chapter, however, the repressive measures from the government did not come until 1978-79. At that point, a majority of the founding generation of JI had already been members of the Muslim Brotherhood for a couple of years and were in the process of becoming convinced by al-Tilmisānī's non-violent line. The staunch opposition to Shukrī Muṣṭafā's Jamā'at al-Muslimīn is an example of this shift. The moderates' and the radicals' also differed on the view of the Coptic minority, even if the former's conception of the Copts' role in the future Islamic state was somewhat ambiguous.

The non-violent line became the dominant one in Cairo and the Delta, only in Upper Egypt did it not fully penetrate the local JI. I believe there is sufficient grounds to suggest that the Upper Egyptian wing of JI was more radical than the ones in Cairo and the Delta. I have pointed out the

---

<sup>368</sup> Interview with `Abū l-'Ilā Mādī, October 2010.

<sup>369</sup> Saad Eddin Ibrahim, *Yāda al-i'tibār li-l-ra'īs al-Sādāt* (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1992), 149-50.

Brotherhood's failure to gain substantial support, and also highlighted the traditions of violence in the region. Another reason may be the rapid urbanisation that cities like `Asyūṭ and al-Minyā underwent. Growing populations led to social instabilities increasing the risk of violence.<sup>370</sup>

Moreover, leading figures were in the process of leaving university and had to decide where to spend their forces. The solution was a tighter association with the Muslim Brotherhood, and although they did stay on as members of JI, it seems as if they more and more looked upon the two movements as one: «(...) the moment we, as officials of JI at the university, decided to affiliate with the Muslim Brotherhood (...) we became one organisation», as `Abū al-Futūḥ explains.<sup>371</sup>

Thus, when the regime began its crackdown, JI was already in the process of splitting – although not openly. The violence-embracing wing, especially in `Asyūṭ, refused to follow the line of al-Tilmisānī, despite numerous attempts of persuasion. Among the moderates in the north on the other hand, the General Guide's non-violence policy was held in increasingly high esteem.

Therefore, it was internal factors that ignited the process of splitting JI, and not the pressure from the regime, as put forward by Kepel. His focus on the external reasons for JI's division may be connected to his conception of JI as a more unified and radicalised organisation than I believe it was. Such an organisation would have been more likely to be broken up from the outside than the inside. However, as I have demonstrated more than once, the different members' views varied on several key issues. JI was therefore more likely to cause its own dissolution at some point, rather than be pressured into pieces. That said, the regime repression may have accelerated the slumbering divisions within the movement.

---

<sup>370</sup> Ansari, «The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics», *Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 16, no. 1 (March, 1984), 130-31.

<sup>371</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ, *Shāhid 'alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984*, 91.

## Chapter V: Conclusion

I started my work on this thesis based on the following hypothesis: «The Muslim Brotherhood acted as a force of moderation within al-Jamā'a al-Islāmiyya from the middle of the 1970s, which eventually led to the break-up of the organisation».

The conclusion will be presented in three parts. The first part will deal with the ideology of JI at the movement's initiation. Secondly, I will explain the process of affiliation with the Brotherhood, before I deal with the split within JI.

In the last part of the chapter I attempt to place the lessons of this thesis in the context of the situation in present day Egypt.

### *Idealist and Salafist*

In the presentation of my hypothesis, I put emphasis on the need to define JI's ideological starting point. This was done to enable me to point out a moderate development within the organisation at a later stage in the thesis.

What defines JI at the offset is however the plurality of influences. The young students read the works of Mawdudi alongside al-Bannā and Quṭb, while also drawing influence from newly released Brotherhood members. At the same time, I have demonstrated a clear admiration for Quṭb and the «revolutionary spirit» that featured heavy in his works – even the moderate JI leaders were unwilling to denounce the principle of violence as a means for change up until the mid 1970s.

Kepel's claim that JI was a radical organisation from its creation, is nonetheless a step too far in my opinion.

If there was a dominant current, I would say it was Salafist. The clout of Salafism was expressed in the struggle for the separation of men and women in the lecture halls, and the promotion of Islamic dress and appearance. Moreover, the early years saw few demands with relation to politics as became more common later in the decade. The slogans focused on Salafi-inspired symbolism and the implementation of the Sharia, while the JI members longed for a return to the Caliphate.

The «basic» and Salafi-inspired slogans undoubtedly functioned as rather uncontroversial rallying points which appealed to a broad segment of students. This is probably what caused Kepel to claim that JI shunned theoretical reflection in fear of a potential split, which I regard as an exaggeration.

Therefore, I would describe JI as a predominantly Salafist movement with radical tendencies when its leaders were approached by the Brotherhood in 1974.

### *Moderation through Conversation*

The subsequent process of affiliation with the `Ikhwān went about in three stages:

\* The first period, lasting approximately one and a half to two years, consisted of meetings between senior Brotherhood members and leading figures in JI, described in chapter three. Pivotal in these conversations – kept secret from the JI leadership in Upper Egypt as well as the rank-and-file members – were the remnants of al-Nizām al-Khāṣṣ and Tanzīm 1965. Both their history as «hard-liners» and their ordeals during long years in prison made an impression on the Islamist student leaders. This faction of the Brotherhood seems to have appealed more to the JI leaders in the beginning than the moderate line of the General Guide `Umar al-Tilmisānī.

\* The second period consisted of long conversations with the likes of al-Tilmisānī. The role of violence in the struggle for an Islamic state was central in these discussions and al-Tilmisānī's conviction of the need to refrain from violence had a profound impact on the young JI leaders. They were eventually persuaded to adopt a non-violent stance, although they still harboured a certain scepticism towards the lack of Islamic symbols among the elders of the Brotherhood.

\* Regardless of certain disagreements that still existed, the JI leaders of Cairo and the Delta decided to join the Muslim Brotherhood. This took place in secrecy around 1976-77. From that point on, the northern leadership of JI was convinced Muslim brothers and the third stage therefore consisted of efforts to persuade other parts of JI to join. This struggle was particularly directed towards the students in Upper Egypt, where the Brotherhood's position historically have been weaker than in the north, as I pointed out in the fourth chapter.

It is also important to stress that the Brotherhood also benefited highly from the affiliation of the JI figureheads, in whose wake followed the rank-and-file members. The General Guide al-Tilmisānī himself stressed the `Ikhwān's need for a student following at a time when the member base was substantially reduced due to nearly two decades of government repression. This move from al-Tilmisānī cannot be described as anything other than a success as the JI leaders, also known as the 70s generation, *jīl al-sab`īnāt*, provided the Brotherhood with fresh blood. The young and

politically aware students also came to influence the `Ikhwān for decades to come.

### *The Great Divide*

The affiliation with the `Ikhwān symbolised two important changes of direction that contributed to the division of JI.

First, the northern JI leaders no longer saw violence as a question of timing, as had been the case before their discussions with al-Tilmisāni. From the late 1970s they promoted a non-violent line that was unacceptable to the radicals in Upper Egypt.

Second, independently of the denouncing of violence, the mere affiliation with the Brotherhood was a source of controversy, as the secrecy is proof of. For many JI members, be they Jihadists or Salafists, the Brotherhood in and of itself represented weakness, collaboration with the regime and a departure from the ideal of a true Islamic state.

The internal divisions surfaced in 1979, when the affiliations with the Brotherhood became public. In the middle of 1980, two separate organisations formed: One that approved of, and in many cases encouraged, the use of violence in the struggle for an Islamic state, and another that renounced violence as a political tool. I have not found any connections between this dispute and the Sadat regime, and I therefore regard it as an internal struggle brought about by different views on violence.

Hence, JI was deep in the process of dissolution when the Sadat regime decided to circumscribe the power JI had amassed on the universities. JI was weakened as a *student* movement due to the new laws governing student elections introduced in 1979. At the same time, it enabled JI to develop into something more than merely a university movement, staging open air prayers in Cairo and Alexandria that drew tens of thousands of participants.

On its way out of the universities Kepel claims that JI was radicalised. I have found no grounds for this claim. The violent-radical axis had already been established at the time. The moderate wing did not become more radical as a result of the new university laws, and the enemy of the radicals had always been the regime.

Hence, I do not support the view that JI was broken by the regime repression, although it may have accelerated the process to a certain degree. The wheels were already set in spin by the Muslim Brotherhood, as I have demonstrated in this thesis.

### *Assassinations and Associations*

After the split, the moderate wing gave up the name of JI and started referring to themselves as members of the Muslim Brotherhood rather than JI. The radical faction kept the name and some of its members merged with *Tanzīm al-Jihād* and participated in the futile insurrection in `Asyūṭ in the aftermath of the assassination of President Sadat on October 6<sup>th</sup> 1981. A number of JI members were handed long prison sentences in the trials that followed, among them Karam Zuhdī.

During the 1980s and 1990s JI became infamous due to a series of attacks on tourists, Copts, policemen and politicians. However, after a massive crackdown on JI in the middle of the 1990s, JI agreed to a ceasefire with the government in 1997. Six years later, the organisation's leaders renounced violence and over the subsequent years thousands of its members were released.

The moderates who joined the Muslim Brotherhood followed a quite different path. Leading members such as `Abū al-Futūḥ, al-`Aryān and Māḍī played crucial roles in the Islamists' take-over of the professional syndicates (*al-niqābāt al-mihaniyya*) in Egypt in the 1980s and 1990s.

While Māḍī left the Brotherhood to form al-Ḥizb al-Waṣaṭ al-Jadīd in 1996, both `Abū al-Futūḥ and al-`Aryān rose to become members of the Brotherhood's governing body, Maktab al-`Irshād (the Guidance Bureau).<sup>372</sup>

### *Shaping Egypt's Future*

I opened this thesis with a reference to the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution and the sweeping changes Egypt has undergone the last months. The overthrow of President Mubarak has led to a growing focus on the Muslim Brotherhood as the biggest and best organised opposition force in Egypt. The increased political freedom after the regime's fall enabled the `Ikhwān to set up their own party, al-Hurriyya wa al-`Adāla (the Freedom and Justice Party), on April 30<sup>th</sup> this year.

Although the `Ikhwān have participated in elections earlier, either on the lists of other parties or as independent candidates, the forming of a party is in many ways the end of a long journey that started with Ḥasan al-Bannā's attempt at standing for the parliamentary elections in 1942, continued through the Brotherhood's push for legal recognition during the reign of Sadat and the increasing activism in the subsequent decades and ending with final forming of a party.

And despite the fact that the majority of the *jīl al-sab`īnāt* now are in their late 50s and early 60s, I have few doubts that they will play important roles in the shaping of a new political environment in an Egypt that hopefully will have a taste of democracy after over half a century's

---

<sup>372</sup> `Abū al-Futūḥ was a member of the bureau between 1987 and 2009, while al-`Aryān is a current member, holding the position of the Brotherhood's official spokesman.

oppressive dictatorship.

In that context, doubts about the Brotherhood's democratic credentials have been expressed time and again in Western media. The `Ikhwān have been portrayed as a movement that «despise and fear popular power and democratic institutions».<sup>373</sup> Some politicians have been more bluntly, for instance Siv Jensen, the leader of the Fremskrittspartiet, a Norwegian right-wing populist party: «The Muslim Brotherhood is the source of all terror (...) If they gain power, the Middle East will be turned into a minefield».<sup>374</sup>

These are naturally ill-founded expressions of hostility and outright condemnation. And while a certain amount of caution is necessary in times of upheaval, I find it more fruitful to focus on the democratic experience many Brotherhood figureheads gained as student leaders in the 1970s. This work enabled them, says Utvik, to «break the confines of the Islamist movement and gain a broader outlook on society and politics».<sup>375</sup>

One can hope that it will benefit Egypt in the time to come.

---

<sup>373</sup> Kenan Malik, «The Muslim Brotherhood may gain power in Egypt by default», *The Guardian*, accessed May 3rd, 2011. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2011/jan/31/egypt-secular-protests>

<sup>374</sup> Lars Løkkebø, «Siv Jensen frykter Det muslimske brorskap», *Telemarksavisa*, accessed May 4<sup>th</sup>, 2011. <http://www.ta.no/nyheter/grenland/article5480448.ece>

<sup>375</sup> Utvik, «*Hizb al-Wasat* and the Potential for Change in Egyptian Islamism», 299.





## Bibliography:

### *Sources in English:*

- Abdalla, Ahmed. *The student Movement and National Politics in Egypt 1923-1973*. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2008.
- Abdelnasser, Walid M. *The Islamic Movement in Egypt: Perceptions of International Relations 1967-1981*. London: Kegan Paul International, 1994.
- Abdo, Geneive. *No God But God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Ahmed, Leila. *Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.
- Altman, Israel Elad. «Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement 1928-2007», *Research Monographs on the Muslim World Series*, No 2, Paper No 2, January 2009.
- An-Na'im, Abdullahi A., ed. *Islamic Family Law in a Changing world: A Global Resource Book*. London, Zed Books, 2002.
- Ansari, Hamied. *Egypt; The Stalled Society*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986.
- Ansari, Hamied. «The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics». *Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 16, no. 1 (March, 1984), 123-144.
- Ayubi, Nazih. *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*. London: Routledge, 1991.
- Baker, Raymond William. *Sadat and After: Struggles for Egypt's Political Soul*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990.
- Bergesen, Albert J. ed. *The Sayyid Qutb Reader: Selected Writings on Politics, Religion, and Society*. New York: Routledge, 2008.
- Cleveland, William L. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. Boulder: Westview Press, 2004.
- Dekmejian, R. Hrair. «The Anatomy of Islamic Revival: Legitimacy Crisis, Ethnic Conflict and the Search for Islamic Alternatives». *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 34, no. 1 (1980, Winter), 1-12.
- Dessouki, Ali E. Hillal. «The Resurgence of Islamic Organisations in Egypt: An Interpretation». In *Islam and Power*. Edited by Alexander S. Cudsi and Ali E. Hillal

- Dessouki. London: Croom Helm, 1981.
- Esposito, John L. and John O. Voll. *Islam and Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
  - Fandy, Mamoun. «Egypt's Islamic Group: Regional Revenge?». *The Middle East Journal* Vol. 48, No. 4, Autumn 1994, 607-625.
  - Glassé, Cyril. *The Concise Encyclopædia of Islam, Revised Edition*. London: Stacey International, 2002.
  - Goldschmidt Jr., Arthur. *Modern Egypt: The Formation of a Nation State*. Boulder: Westview Press, 2004.
  - Hafez Mohammed M., and Quintan Wiktorowicz. «Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement». In *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, edited by Quintan Wiktorowicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.
  - Hamzawy, Amr, and Sarah Grebowsky. «From Violence to Moderation: Al-Jama‘a al-Islamiya and al-Jihad». *Carnegie Papers* No. 20, (April, 2010).
  - Hinnebusch, Raymond A. *Egyptian Politics Under Sadat*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
  - Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. *Egypt, Islam and Democracy*. Cairo: The American University of Cairo Press, 2004.
  - Jankowski, James. *Egypt: A Short History*. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2000.
  - Kamali, Mohammad Hashim. *Freedom of Expression in Islam*. Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1997.
  - Kepel, Gilles. *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003.
  - Kepel, Gilles. *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2006.
  - Lapidus, Ira M., *A History of Islamic Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
  - Lia, Brynjar. *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942*. Reading: Ithaca Press, 2010.
  - Malik, Kenan. «The Muslim Brotherhood may gain power in Egypt by default». *The Guardian*. Accessed May 3rd, 2011.  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2011/jan/31/egypt-secular-protests>
  - Masud, Muhammad Khalid. «Islamic Modernism». In *Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debates*, edited by Muhammad Khalid Masud, Armando Salvatore and Martin van

- Bruinessen, 237-60. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2009.
- Meijer, Roel. «Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong as a Principle of Social Action: The Case of the Egyptian al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya» in *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement*, edited by Roel Meijer, 189-220. New York: New York Columbia University Press, 2009.
  - Meijer, Roel. «Towards a Political Islam». *Clingendael Diplomacy Papers* No. 22, July 2009.
  - Milton-Edwards, Beverley. *Islamic Fundamentalism Since 1945*. New York: Routledge, 2005.
  - Mitchell, Richard P. *The Society of Muslim Brothers*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
  - Moustafa, Tamir. «Conflict and Cooperation between the State and Religious Institutions in Contemporary Egypt». *Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 32, no. 1 (February, 2000), 17.
  - Owen, Roger. *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*. London: Routledge, 2004.
  - Pargeter, Alison. *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition*. London: Saqi Books, 2010.
  - Qutb, Sayyid. *Milestones*. New Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 2008.
  - Qutb, Sayyid. «Social Justice in Islam», translated by John B. Hardie. In *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives*, edited by John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
  - Richards, Alan and John Waterbury. *A Political Economy of the Middle East*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1998.
  - Sonbol, Amira El-Azhary. *The New Mamluks: Egyptian Society and Modern Feudalism*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000.
  - Utvik, Bjørn Olav. «Hizb al-Wasat and the Potential for Change in Egyptian Islamism». *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* vol. 14, no. 3 (Fall, 2005), 293–306.
  - Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky. *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism and Political Change in Egypt*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.
  - Zubaida Sami. «Political Modernity». In *Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debates*, edited by Muhammad Khalid Masud, Armando Salvatore and Martin van Bruinessen, 57-90. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2009.

*Sources in Arabic:*

- `Abd al-Majīd, `Aḥmad. *Al-`Ikhwān wa `Abd al-Nāṣir: al-qīṣṣa al-kāmila li-Tanzīm 1965* (The Brotherhood and Nasser: The Complete Story about Organisation 1965). Cairo: Al-Zahrā` li-l-`Iḷām al-`Arabī, 1991.
- `Abū al-Futūḥ, `Abd al-Mun`im. *Shāhid `alā tārīkh al-ḥaraka al-islāmiyya fī miṣr 1970-1984* (Witness to the History of the Islamist Movement in Egypt 1970-1984), edited by Ḥussām Tammām. Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2010.
- al-`Adawī, Muṣṭafā. *`Umar al-Tilmisānī: Bayna ḥamās al-shabāb wa ḥikma al-Shuyūkh* (`Umar al-Tilmisānī: Between the Enthusiasm of the Youth and the Wisdom of the Shaykhs). Cairo: Dār al-`Aqṣā li-l-kitāb bi-kardāsa, 1986.
- Aḥmad, Rif`at Sayyid. *Limādhā qatalū al-Sādāt: Qīṣṣa tanzīm al-Jihād* (Why They killed Sadat: The Story of the Jihad Organisation). Cairo, al-Dār al-Sharqiyya, 1989.
- al-Bannā, Ḥasan. *Majmū`a rasā`il al-`imām al-shahīd Hasan al-Bannā* (A Collection of Messages from the Martyr Imam Ḥasan al-Bannā). Cairo, Dār al-Shihāb, undated.
- Habīb, Kamāl. *Taḥawwulāt al-Ḥaraka al-Islāmiyya wa al-Istrāṭijyya al-`Amrīkiyya* (Developments of the Islamist Movement and the American Strategy). Cairo: Dār Miṣr al-Maḥrūsa, 2006, 55.
- Ḥātīm, `Amīma. «Shabāb al-Jamā`āt al-Islāmiyya yakshif `asālib Jamā`a al-Takfīr» (The Youth of al-Jamā`āt al-Islāmiyya uncover the Methods of the Takfir Group). *Al-Ahrām*, July 12th, 1977.
- Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. *Y`ada al-i`tibār li-l-ra`īs al-Sādāt* (Reconsidering President Sadat). Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1992.
- Ikhwanonline. «Al-`Aryān ytaḥaddathu `an nasha`a al-tayār al-`islāmī bi-l-jāma`āt al-miṣriyya» (Al-`Aryān talks about the Establishing of the Islamic Movement on the Egyptian Universities). Accessed March 20th, 2011. <http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.asp?ArtID=7008&SecID=270>.
- Mādī, `Abū al-`Ilā. *Jamā`āt al-`unf al-miṣriyya wa ta`wīlātha li-l-`islām: al-juḍūr – al-`asas al-fikriyya – al-murāja`āt*. (The Violent Egyptian Groups and Their Interpretations of Islam: The roots – The Ideological Basis – Studies) Cairo: Maktbat al-Shurūq al-Duwaliyya, 2006.
- Muḥammad, `Abd al-Raḥīm `Alī. *Al-Muqāmara al-kubrā: Mubādara waqf al-`unf bayna rihān al-ḥukūma wa al-Jamā`a al-Islāmiyya* (The Biggest Gamble: The Sudden Hault in Violence between the Government and al-Jamā`a al-Islāmiyya). Cairo: Markaz al-Maḥrūsa,

2002.

- Munīb, 'Abd al-Mun'im. *Daḥīl al-ḥarakāt al-`islāmiyya al-maṣriyya* (Guide to the Egyptian Islamic Movements). Cairo: Maktaba Madbūlī, 2010.
- Muṣṭafa, Hāla. *Al-Nizām al-siyāsī wa al-mu'āraḍa al-`islāmiyya fī miṣr* (The Political system and the Islamist Opposition in Egypt) Cairo: Markaz al-Maḥrūsa, 1996.
- «Al-Jamā'āt al-dīniyya wa al-ṭulābiyya tudīn al-`irhāb bi-ism al-dīn» (Religious Student Groups denounce Terrorism in the Name of Religion), *al-Ahrām*, July 16th, 1977.
- al-Shaykh, Mamdūh. *Al-Jamā'āt al-`islāmiyya al-miṣriyya al-mutashaddida fī `Ātūn 11 sibtabir: Mufāraqāt al-nisha` wa mujāzafāt al-taḥawwul* (Egyptian Islamic-Extremist Groups in the Furnace of September 11<sup>th</sup>: The Distinctions of Origin and the Risks of Transformation) Cairo: Maktaba Madbūlī, 2005.

#### *Sources in Norwegian:*

- Løkkebø, Lars. «Siv Jensen frykter Det muslimske brorskap» (Siv Jensen fears the Muslim Brotherhood). *Telemarksavisa*. Accessed May 4th, 2011.  
<http://www.ta.no/nyheter/grenland/article5480448.ece>
- Tønnessen, Truls Hallberg. «Egyptiske studenter mellom Marx og Muhammad: Framveksten av den islamske studentbevegelsen 1970-1981» (Egyptian Students between Marx and Muhammad: The Emergence of the Islamist Student Movement 1970-1981). Master thesis, University of Oslo, 2005.
- Utvik, Bjørn Olav. *Islamismen* (The Islamism). Oslo: Unipub, 2011.

#### *Reports:*

- International Crisis Group. «Understanding Islamism». Cairo/Brussels: Middle East/North Africa Report N°37, March 2005.

#### *Interviews:*

- `Abū al-`Ilā Mādī. Cairo, October, 2010.
- `Adb al-Mun'im `Abū al-Futūh. Cairo, October, 2010.
- `Iṣām al-`Aryān. Cairo, November, 2010.

- `Usāma Ḥāfiẓ. Al-Minyā, October, 2010.