Turkish Political Parties and the European Union

How Turkish MPs Frame the Issue of Adapting to EU Conditionality

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Abstract

Turkey's relations with the European Union (EU) are at a critical juncture. As of 2002, the process of adapting Turkey's legal framework to the EU's political membership criteria began in earnest. The legislative amendments carried out in this respect amount to one of the largest, most wide-ranging reform processes Turkey has ever experienced. At the level of legislation, it involves updating Turkey's laws to ensure that the prerequisites of a stable, pluralist democracy are in place, and that human rights are respected. In order for these amendments to be passed, however, the reforms must also be continuously justified vis-à-vis key constituencies. In this respect, the reforms are not only interesting from the perspective of EU-Turkey relations. They come at a crucial time in Turkey's domestic politics, and pose a challenge to some of the most fundamental divisions in the country's political party system. For the secularist state elite, supporting the reforms entails loosening their grip on the state, and allowing the public expression of Muslim and Kurdish identities. For the Islamic party elites, it involves modifying their anti-Western rhetoric, and reconciling their interests with the universalist norms expressed in the EU's membership criteria. Thus, successfully following through with the legal prerequisites of EU membership requires not only legal engineering, but also a radical shift in Turkey's political culture.

Against this background, this thesis addresses the question of how representatives of Turkey's largest political parties have framed the reforms in public discourse. Specifically, using a qualitative and quantitative content analysis, it analyzes the debates in Turkey's Grand National Assembly regarding a selection of key adaptation packages, and measures to what extent Turkish MPs, when justifying or opposing the amendments, have distanced themselves from the antagonistic ideologies with which they have been associated in the past.

The analysis finds that they have. In general, all of the parties have moderated their antagonistic discourses, and have emphasized the inherent and universal validity of the norms underlying them. The only clear exception is the far-right Nationalist Action Party, whose MPs see the reforms as a threat to Turkey's unity. Interestingly, the analysis also finds that among the more moderate parties, those traditionally associated with the secular, Westernized state elite have had the most difficulties in adapting to the EU's criteria. The Islamic parties, including the Justice and Development Party currently in government, have consistently emphasized the need for strengthening civil society and guaranteeing the freedom of speech and conscience. Although this may to some extent be a matter of self-interest, there are also indications that this is not the case.

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If I have learned one thing from writing this thesis, it is that writing a good thesis is never done alone. Academic work is a social endeavor, and I have been lucky enough to benefit from an engaging and supportive community of scholars.

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Contents

Abbreviations

DLP	Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Partisi*)
DP	Democrat Party (*Demokrat Partisi*)
EU	European Union
FP	Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*)
JDP	Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*)
JP	Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*)
MLP	Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*)
MP	Member of Parliament
NAP	Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*)
NP	Noun Phrase
NPAA	National Program for the Adoption of the *Acquis* (*Avrupa Birliği Müktesebatının Üstlenilmesine İlişkin Türkiye Ulusal Programı*)
NTP	New Turkey Party (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi*)
PKK	Kurdish Worker's Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan*)
RPP	Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*)
TGNA	Turkish Grand National Assembly (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*)
TPP	True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*)
VP	Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*)
WP	Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*)

1. Introduction

This thesis addresses the appropriation of parts of the European Union's (EU) *acquis communautaire* in the context of Turkish elite political discourse. Specifically, by analyzing debates in Turkey's Grand National Assembly (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*, TGNA),[1] it seeks to answer the question of *how Turkish party representatives have framed the issue of adapting to the EU's political conditionality.*

Turkey became associated with the European Economic Community in 1963 and formally applied for EU membership in 1987, but it was not until the Helsinki Summit of 1999 that it was granted candidate status for EU membership. Having sufficiently harmonized its internal market and customs regime with that of the EU, Turkey was then considered ready to go on with the considerable political and legal reforms stipulated in the accession *acquis* in preparation for full membership. In December 2004, the European Council decided on conditions for the opening of membership negotiations, which commenced October 2005.

However, membership is not inevitable. The negotiation framework adopted in October 2005 stresses that the membership talks are "an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand" (Commission 2005: § 2). Moreover, Turkey's future road to membership seems littered with obstacles to an extent not encountered in negotiations with any other candidate country. As of this writing (November 2006), the latest Progress Report on Turkey expresses serious misgivings about the progress achieved in nearly all sections of the *acquis* (Commission 2006).

Ultimately, this unpredictability and lack of commitment can be ascribed to the fact that both sides of the equation, Turkey and the EU, contain domestic conflicts that are to a large degree mutually contingent. As Ugur (1999; 2003) has argued, the membership negotiations can be seen as a two-level game, where the conditions placed on policy formulation and implementation by the domestic political context are at least as important as the international level of the actual negotiations. While convergence at the international level requires that Turkey and the EU make credible commitments vis-à-vis each other, making and following

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[1] For the sake of readability, English abbreviations will here be used throughout when referring to Turkish institutions, laws, and parties.

through with these commitments require that legitimacy is maintained vis-à-vis constituencies and important pressure groups at the national level. Because the political cultures and historically dependent internal conflicts of Turkey and the EU member countries differ to a considerable degree, the ways in which the latter type of legitimacy can be achieved varies depending on the context.

This thesis focuses on the Turkish context. Since the Helsinki Summit, Turkey's process of adapting to EU conditionality has gained momentum through Turkey's National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (*Avrupa Birliği Müktesebatının Üstlenilmesine İlişkin Türkiye Ulusal Programı*, NPAA). The NPAA was initiated by the Turkish Government in March 2001, and has been revised once to adjust to an evolving *acquis*. As a whole, the NPAA is a very broad program, aimed at fulfilling institutional, financial, and political criteria. It outlines 89 new laws, and foresees amending 94 existing laws, to be enacted in a number of legislative "harmonization packages." This thesis limits itself to addressing the first to the sixth harmonization packages that have been enacted, leading up to the announcement by the EU Presidency during the Brussels European Council of 16-17 December 2004 that Turkey had sufficiently fulfilled the political criteria to enter into membership negotiations. The analysis thus covers some of the adaptations in which the specifically *political aspects of EU conditionality* were addressed. Furthermore, it focuses on how a specific group of Turkish society, namely, *the representatives of the seven largest political parties in Parliament during the two parliamentary terms in question*, has justified or objected to these adaptations in the context of parliamentary debates.

1.1 The Copenhagen Criteria and the NPAA

From the perspective of the EU, several factors contribute to explaining why Turkey's road to EU membership candidacy has been more difficult than that of any other candidate country. As long as the EU remained a primarily economic union, the question of Turkish membership was limited to Turkey's willingness to adjust its economic policies to that of the EU, and its ability to cope with competitive market forces (Rumford 2000). Since the beginning of its relations with Turkey, however, the EU has gone through an internal process of deepening, developing beyond the confines of economic cooperation to become a polity with "probably […] the most formalised and complex set of decision-making rules of any political system in the world" (Hix 2005: 3). This development, occurring in tandem with an

enlargement process that has expanded the number of member countries from six to twenty-five, has necessitated a formal redefinition of the EU's legal personality in terms that enable it to judge whether new a candidate country is similar enough to the EU in important respects to become a member. The Copenhagen Criteria, formulated during the European Council of June 1993, have become an important reference point in determining a country's eligibility for membership. The Copenhagen Criteria stipulate that, in addition to having a functioning market economy, a country that wishes to become a member of the EU must prove that it "has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities," and furthermore that it is able to adhere to these obligations (Council 1993: § 7). These criteria have since been incorporated, in a slightly adapted form, into article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. It has also been incorporated into the 90,000-page (and growing) accession *acquis*, where the criteria concerning democracy, legal order, and human rights constitute what are referred to as *political* criteria.

Given these criteria, it may seem quite obvious why Turkey has been seen as a special case. Turkish democracy, now in its sixth decade, has appeared to be caught in a cycle resembling the "modal pattern" (cf. Malloy 1977), oscillating between periods of dysfunctional electoral competition, military coups, and interim military rule. Widespread torture has been reported, both in the southeastern regions, where internal warfare against Kurdish insurgencies have displaced thousands, and among the police forces of larger cities (AI 2006; HRW 2005). The military, whose priorities and budget have long been exempt from public accountability, has had an inordinate amount of influence on all three branches of government, and has repeatedly used that influence to limit the freedom of speech and organization for ethnic and religious minorities, including repeatedly dissolving parties that it has deemed detrimental to the secular and unified nature of the state. In turn, both state institutions and political parties have been afflicted with rampant corruption. Thus, in effect, Turkey has been in violation of all of the central institutional and political tenets of the Copenhagen Criteria from the outset.

As has been argued before, however, these essentially moral obstacles do not sufficiently explain the EU's behavior toward Turkey. An identity-based sense of cultural and religious difference also seems to be salient, affecting the perception of Turkey's eligibility for membership (Öniş 1999; Sjursen 2002). Although there are arguably many reasons for Turkey's democratic deficiencies, including a stumbling economy and dramatic demographic developments, a widespread notion among Europeans associates these

problems with Turkey's perceived lack of cultural affinity with Europe's Christian and Enlightenment heritage. The notion that Islam is fundamentally incompatible with secular democracy has been fortified by post-9/11 developments around the world,[2] developments that, in turn, have been easy to exploit by right-wing populist politicians skeptical to EU elites and Muslims alike.[3] Moreover, this perception is not limited to political contestation on the level of European domestic politics. Compared to other recent candidate countries, the EU's pre-accession financial support for democratic reform in Turkey has been much smaller, suggesting that these concerns are in force also at EU elite level (Lundgren 1998; 2005; 2006). Thus, as Öniş (1999: 117) points out, "The arguments concerning economic backwardness and deficiency of democratic institutions have been used for helping the Eastern Europeans over a difficult period of adjustment, while similar deficiencies have been identified as a barrier for Turkey's admission to the EU as a full member."

While the political aspects of EU conditionality are framed in terms of universally acceptable norms, then, there is good reason to pay attention to their effect when embedded in domestic political contexts. The Copenhagen Criteria exhibit willingness on the part of the EU to judge Turkey's eligibility in fair and equal terms with other candidate countries, and to make accession dependent on criteria that are deemed legitimate by all parties, regardless of cultural characteristics. As Benhabib and Türküler (2006) argue, however, their universalistic character can also be seen as a way of avoiding formulations in terms of "thick" cultural criteria, while indirectly retaining the requirement that "thin" institutional changes are attended by deeper changes in actor perceptions and motivations. As such, they provide considerable room for interpretation and politicization by domestic political actors. In the EU, this has resulted in a mixture of liberal and communitarian, or, in more abstract

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[2] Among the events that received the most worldwide attention were the bombings in Madrid in March 2004, the actual and attempted bombings in London during July 2005, the riots among immigrant youth in France in October and November 2005, and the worldwide unrest provoked by the controversy over Danish and Norwegian cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in February 2006.

[3] Jörg Haider's *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* in Austria, *Front National* in France, and *Vlaams Belang* in Belgium are among the most prominent of these. As the referenda on the European Constitution in 2005 showed, however, perceptions of irreconcilable differences between Turks and other Europeans were not limited to these far-right parties, but were found on both sides of the political left-right divide. As has been suggested by Boomgaarden and Vreese (2005), the prospect of increased immigration by Turkey's predominantly Muslim population may even prove to be a decisive factor in determining further referenda on EU enlargement.

terms, universalist and particularist arguments concerning Turkish membership. In Turkey, the same dynamic can be observed in the problems faced by political parties in commending the reforms of the NPAA while remaining true to their ideological commitments. Consequently, to understand the Turkish reaction to EU conditionality, it is first necessary to understand what particular conditions the political culture of Turkey places on their reception.

As a whole, the NPAA is a remarkably broad program, comparable in significance to the two previous large-scale reform movements in Turkish history, the *Tanzimat* of the mid-nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, and the Kemalist reforms of the 1920s and 1930s (Barchard 2005). Like the previous reform movements, it involves making changes to fundamental characteristics of the country's political regime, and necessitates a concomitant shift in political culture that goes far beyond institutional engineering. As opposed to those previous reform movements, however, the NPAA has been drafted, enacted, and revised by democratically elected governments and parliaments, under the auspices of political actors whose stake in the reforms are to a considerable degree perceived to be in conflict. Thus, if the *acquis* can be thought of as the product of an uneasy mix of universalist norms and particularist interests in the EU, the NPAA must be thought of as Turkey's "translation," adapted so as to accommodate the conditions placed on justifying legislation at the level of Turkish domestic politics.

The tri-party coalition government that originally drafted the NPAA in 2001 was formed after elections characterized by the salience of Kurdish nationalism and political Islam. Two of the parties in the coalition, the Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti,* DLP) and the Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, NAP), were quite far apart on a conventional left-right scale, but had in common a state-centered view of national security, and a policy of zero tolerance on both ethnic separatism and the representation of religion in politics (Başkan 2005). This somewhat contradictory state of affairs made the debates on some of the political criteria addressed by the NPAA difficult. The NPAA itself testifies both to the resolution of the coalition partners to move on with the required reforms, and to their difficulties in doing so while maintaining credibility as representatives of distinct values and interests (Avcı 2006: 158). The first six harmonization packages, to which this thesis is limited, address some of the most acute legal obstacles to democratic accountability and the guarantee of basic rights and freedoms, but have also been criticized for being "watered-

down versions of what was really needed" (Ibid.). While space precludes listing all the amendments in detail, the most significant of them include:

- Amending parts of the criminal legislation that allowed sentencing of individuals perceived as having publicly "offended Turkishness," the Turkish nation or state, the TGNA, the Army, or any representative thereof, or as having used religious or racial divisions to disrupt the order of Turkish society;

- Abolishing the death penalty in peacetime;

- Allowing for retrials in cases where complaints are or have already been upheld in the European Court of Human Rights, including the cases of imprisoned deputies from Kurdish parties;

- Allowing for schooling and public broadcasting in languages other than Turkish (i.e., Kurdish);

- Easing restrictions on setting up clubs or associations, and allowing associations to open offices abroad and seek membership in international organizations;

- Introducing measures for the prevention of torture and unfair treatment by police and courts.

1.2 Why Study the Parliamentary Discourse of Turkish Political Parties?

In electoral democracies, political parties are the only legally recognized, organized contenders for legislative and governmental power. As such, they play a crucial role in obtaining legitimacy[4] for legislation. In democracies, the legitimacy of the actions of political parties in parliament or government stems from a combination of formal and informal characteristics, the former pertaining to procedural premises governing the decision-making process, the latter to the substance of the decisions themselves (Luhmann 1983: 31). Formally, parties function as *representatives* of interest groups insofar as party members are duly elected to seats in accordance with democratic election procedures. Once

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[4] Note that *legitimacy* is here understood in Weberian, positive terms, as acceptance of the criteria on which political decisions are made (Weber 1968: 24-5). No claims are made in this thesis as to the inherent validity of any such criteria.

elected, their representative function is realized through legislation in parliament, and, if possible, by forming a government. For the individual party, however, this formal legitimacy can only be realized if it is able to present itself, through discourse and action, as representing particular values or interests in more than a purely nominal sense. They must, in a sense, fulfill the expectation that they act "for" or "on behalf of" their voters (Pitkin 1967). While formal legitimacy refers to the overall function of parties in an electoral democracy, then, the continuously iterated self-presentation of parties legitimates the existence and holding of power by *specific* parties with *specific* agendas, as mediators between voters' preferences and public outcomes.

It has long been argued that in terms of ideological positioning, a single, encompassing center-periphery divide has tended to subsume almost all other persistent issues dividing Turkish society (Heper 1985; Mardin 1973; Özbdudun 1980; Sayarı 1978). The "center," represented by the nationalist, republican, centralist, statist tradition of Kemalism, has identified closely with the bureaucracy, state, and Armed Forces, and has been extremely suspicious towards what it sees as the centrifugal forces of the "periphery." The "periphery," in turn, refers to the ethnically and culturally heterogeneous masses, originally rural but increasingly urbanized, who have been defined by the "center" as backward-looking, traditionalist, and, if openly hostile, as reactionary (*irticai*). The result of this divide has been an unstable party system, characterized by high levels of conflict. The close identification of certain parties with the "center" has made the preservation of the secular and monocultural state their overriding principle of legitimacy, at the detriment of the procedural legitimacy associated with democracy. The "periphery," in turn, has at times reacted to the lack of venues for participation with violence, creating an atmosphere of "politics as war." Between the major parties, elections have often been viewed as zero-sum games over the control of the entire state apparatus, rather than just over governmental power. This has inevitably provoked the military into action, making it a central, if reluctant, political actor. Thus, until quite recently, it could be asserted that in Turkey, "the line separating opposition from treason is still rather thin compared to older and more stable democracies" (Özbudun 1995: 246).

Lately, however, several observers have argued that since the 1980 *coup d'état*, the center-periphery divide has been showing signs of erosion. Long-term globalization processes have contributed to strengthening the coherence and status of civil society, enabling actors that were previously excluded from the public sphere to participate in redefining the shape and

boundaries of the state (Keyman and Özbudun 2002; Toprak 1995). As against the traditional state elite, "counter-elites" have emerged as formidable contenders, building on significant economic and cultural bases (Göle 1997). As a consequence, claims to universalism that were previously monopolized by the state elite through its scientifically inspired brand of social engineering are being challenged by ethnic and religious minorities, feminists, and Islamists, whose claims to legitimate political representation combine particularistic interests with global discourses of universal rights (Gülalp 2001; Rumford 2000; 2002).

These changes undoubtedly have their roots in a combination of economic, cultural, and political opening towards the Western world. At the level of party competition, though, it has been argued that it is the prospect of EU membership, and in particular the process of adapting to the economic and political conditionality of the EU, that has been the decisive factor in reshaping Turkey's political culture (Duran 2006; Kubicek 2005; Müftüler-Baç 2000; Öniş 2003a; Senem and Keyman 2004; Tocci 2005; Wood and Quaisser 2004). The EU, it is argued, has provided the needed external impetus to initiate reforms; in addition, it has functioned as a political "anchor," allowing parties to lay their antagonisms aside to the extent needed for going through with many of the required democratization measures (Ugur 1999). The result has been a moderation across the spectrum of political parties, and a shift from conflicts associated with the center-periphery cleavage to more universalist themes.

In particular, considerable interest has lately been devoted to the party currently in government, the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, JDP). The JDP has roots in the Islamist National Outlook (*Milli Görüş*) movement, but has moderated the religious stance of its predecessor parties in favor of what has been called "enlightened self-interest" (Özel 2003: 174). In its public discourse, the JDP has articulated what it calls its ideology of "conservative democracy," a mix of liberal "third way" economic reforms and an appeal to the inherent value of democratization. According to some, its justification of the EU-related reforms have been in the nature of universally acceptable rights-based arguments, as against both the state-centered arguments of the "center" and the particularistic interests traditionally associated with the "periphery" (Avcı 2006). This shift in discourse, combined with the current government's success so far in negotiations with the EU, may signal a broader change to come in the tone of political competition.

However, this process has by no means been frictionless, and is not over yet. Despite overall support for EU membership in the population,[5] the largest political parties remain to a large degree bound by their traditional ideological commitments, and finding the right balance between accommodating change while remaining relevant contenders for government is proving difficult for many (Çarkoğlu 2003). Turkey's political parties bear the brunt of the ideological dilemmas posed by EU conditionality, and must find ways to redefine themselves in a new context. On the question of EU membership, the republican elite finds itself torn between "longing and resentment" (Keyder 2006: 75), the desire to continue the modernization and Westernization envisioned by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the 1920s, and the equally strong need for centralized control dictated by their discourse of national pride and sovereignty. Equally paradoxical is the position of Islamist elites, who must negotiate a position between the anti-Western sentiments of Islamic fundamentalists, and the promise of religious freedom implied by the Copenhagen Criteria (Dağı 2005).

Although there have been several studies of Turkey's changing party system, serious attempts at substantiating claims about political elites' mentality or frame of reference are rarely found. Among those who focus on party politics, most have been in the nature of impressionistic reports based on a wide variety of sources, including newspaper articles, television appearances, and party programs. In spite of the pivotal role of the TGNA in justifying and enacting legislation, few attempts have been made to study it directly. There are earlier surveys of the TGNA's social composition (cf. Tachau 1988) and *enquête*-based surveys of MPs' understanding of the EU (McLaren and Müftüler-Baç 2003), but the readily available minutes of debates in plenary sessions, where the actual debating takes place, have "hardly been exploited" (Dorronsoro and Massicard 2005: §8). This means that a voluminous and detailed source of real-life confrontations between elite representatives of Turkey's political divisions remains unexplored.

By analyzing the discourse of the largest parties in the TGNA during legislative debates, then, this thesis seeks to ascertain how the NPAA has provided Turkish parties with an opportunity to redefine themselves, and to what extent they have seized that opportunity. The analysis thus contributes to several current debates. In addition to contributing to

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[5] Note, however, that support for membership seems to have diminished since the accession negotiations commenced. Between the Eurobarometer polls of October 2001 and May 2005, overall support for membership sank from 59% to 50%. See Eurobarometer (2001; 2005).

research on democratization in Turkey, it can be expected to shed some light on the future of EU-Turkish relations. More generally, the fact that the TGNA during the terms in question contained two parties originating from the same Islamist movement, one still professing Islamist leanings, the other claiming secularism among its key principles, makes the analysis relevant for theorizing the compatibility of Islam and democracy, a question that has been at the forefront of scholarly discussion in recent years.

1.3 The structure of the thesis

The central aim of this thesis is to investigate to what extent, and how, thematics and arguments associated with the center-periphery and universalist dimensions have been drawn on by the representatives of Turkish political parties in debating the amendments of the NPAA. In terms of research typologies, then, this study is perhaps best categorized as a theoretically guided, evaluative, descriptive, and exploratory case study (Yin 2003). Its *case* is the discursive treatment of parts of the NPAA by MPs in a parliamentary setting; thus, 'case' must here be taken in a nominalist sense, as a socially and institutionally constituted *process*, singled out for scientific purposes (cf. Blaikie 2001: 215-18; Ragin 1992). The evaluative and descriptive components consist of testing a political-historical *hypothesis* - that the universalist dimension is gaining ground in the Turkish party system, and therefore will be the most salient in the debates - directly against discursive material. Here, some amount of exploration is inevitable, as discourse very rarely allows for simple, clear-cut inferences. It is all the more important, therefore, that the entire process is theoretically guided by explicitly stated ontological and epistemological notions about the nature and function of political discourse, and the ways in which inferences can be made about it.

The analysis of spoken and written discourse is a wide and heterogeneous field, both in terms of basic theoretical assumptions and methodologies. In this study, I have chosen *issue framing* as the central organizing concept and analytical construct. **Chapter 2** is devoted to explaining what issue framing means, and to delineating and delimiting the scope of inferences it allows me to make from the analysis of parliamentary discourse.

The notion of issue framing essentially assumes that occurrences of culturally and ideologically salient themes and arguments will tend to be unevenly distributed among representatives of different political parties when they are engaged in discussing an issue.

Thus, there is both a quantitative and qualitative dimension to issue framing; both the quantitative distribution of themes and arguments and their ideological significance in the context of Turkish society must be measured. To this end, I here utilize a two-level content analysis, with both quantitative and qualitative components. ***Chapter 3*** discusses the strengths and weaknesses of this method, and explains each procedure in detail.

The content analysis used here involves operationalizing the universalist and center-periphery dimensions of Turkish party politics as nominal variables referred to as *coding dimensions*. To ensure that the measurement does not become biased, these coding dimensions have been devised prior to the coding of the texts, based on secondary literature on the Turkish party system. In order to contextualize these dimensions, in ***chapter 4,*** I discuss their ideological significance in the Turkish party system. I also explain how the parties that participated in the debates have historically positioned themselves in relation to these dimensions, and what themes they are associated with in the academic literature. This provides the study with a background against which the results of the content analysis can be compared.

Chapter 5 summarizes, analyzes, and interprets the findings of the content analysis for each party. The percentwise distribution of themes and arguments for each party here provides a basis for discussing the ways in which the parties have used them in order to justify or criticize the amendments, and to what extent this use contrasts with our expectations based on Chapter 4. Finally, ***chapter 6*** discusses what conclusions can be drawn from the analysis.

2. Issue framing

In political science, the identities, attitudes, and positions of political parties are often impressionistically inferred from a variety of sources. Some notion of "schemata," "mindset," "ideology," or "cognitive framework" is commonly presupposed to influence the perceptions and actions of political actors, but the precise way in which these can be mapped is often left to the imagination. This is sufficient for many purposes, but does not provide the theoretical framework needed for discourse analysis. In this thesis, the center-periphery and universalist dimensions of Turkish political discourse will be treated as nominal variables and applied to the selected parliamentary debates. The way in which these variables are operationalized relies on a number of assumptions about the role of language in representing the situational definitions and values of parties. Specifying these assumptions will both delimit the scope of inferences, and provide an analytical framework for interpreting the results. Therefore, before we move on to explaining the method used, some observations on the concept of issue framing are in order.

2.1 Frames and issue framing

For the purpose of this study, the center-periphery and universalist dimensions will be referred to as consisting of distinct *frames*. *Issue framing* will here be defined as *discourse in which political issues are discursively represented in terms of a subset of potentially relevant considerations*. This subset of considerations derives from, and recreates, *frames*.[6]

We may think of frames as cognitive or conceptual structures that enable us to recognize and communicate patterns in our environment. Such structures probably begin to be constructed in early childhood, and initially encompass physical qualia and basic human relations (Lakoff 1987; Sebeok and Danesi 2000). As an individual grows older and becomes socialized, a wider range of environmental factors interacts with the construction of frames. These include social relations on several scales, from one's family and closest circle of

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[6] This formulation is an adapted version of the definition offered by Druckman (2004). Note that although the term 'frame' is used in this thesis, the variety of terms in circulation make it necessary to occasionally refer to authors who, although referring to different terms, essentially discuss the same phenomenon.

friends, to characteristics of the larger social communities one belongs to, such as national cultures, class, and political orientations. As frames evolve in relation to these contexts and meta-contexts, they come to encompass expectations and values consonant with cultural, socio-economic and institutional characteristics (Lemke 1995). Thus, according to Chilton (2004: 51), frames are

> … structures related to the conceptualisation of situation types and their expression in language. Situations involve 'slots' for entities (animate and inanimate, abstract and concrete, human and non-human), times, places, with relationships to one another, and having properties. The properties include cultural knowledge about such things as status, value, [and] physical make-up. Certain properties specify prototypical roles in relation to other entities – for example, whether a participant entity is acting as an agent, on the receiving end of action, experiencing a sensation, and the like.

Because frames are cognitive constructs, they can only be shared, spread, and reproduced through externalized representations. *Framing* thus refers to the discursive representation of frames.

Framing is of particular importance for the analysis of political discourse. Institutional political discourse is normally understood to revolve around "issues," where specific problems, or real or perceived conflicts, are brought up and discussed in terms of their possible solutions. In our understanding, framing does not only involve suggesting solutions; it also contributes towards *defining* political issues. Thus, at the level of specific discourse situations, framing means "to *select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation*" (Entman 1993: 52, italics in original). By selecting some aspects of reality and leaving others out, an issue comes to be defined as worthy of attention *in some respect*. In political discourse, then, framing is a kind of "second-level agenda setting," where issues that have already been brought up are made to be discussed on certain premises (McCombs et al. 1997; cited in Scheufele 1999: 103). Those aspects that are made salient contribute toward construing an image of what agents are involved in the issue, what moral considerations it touches upon, and how one should go about collectively dealing with it.

In terms of discourse properties, framing manifests itself as *selection* and *salience* (Entman 1993: 52). Put simply, selection means that some aspects of reality are left out, other aspects mentioned. Salience implies that among those aspects that are mentioned, some are made

more noticeable, and brought to the forefront of attention. This subset of considerations manifests itself at the level of discourse as *patterned repetition* of themes that resonate with culturally or ideologically familiar concepts (Ibid.: 53; Lemke 1983: 164).

An important point worth noting is that issue framing does not carry any particular connotations as regards an argument's soundness or veracity. Frames need not be coherent in a logical sense, and the extent to which the way they represent an issue is true is of secondary importance when analyzing discourse.[7] Although scientific discourse is oriented toward truth-values, the scientific quest for truth must not be unduly projected on non-scientific discourse (Luhmann 1990). In most discourse situations, "truth is just a common foot soldier in a much larger semantic army, just one among many attributes of propositions deriving from the system of orientational and attitudinal stances our culture and language allows speakers to take toward the presentational content of their own discourse" (Lemke 1995: 44).

The same can be said of sincerity. Although frames, in order to be effective, must resonate with culturally salient patterns of value orientations, this does not preclude their conscious use by political elites. Frames can be consciously analyzed, manipulated, and used for strategic purposes by participants in a discourse situation. Just as we will be analyzing frames in this study, so MPs may analyze their country's current situation for clues about what themes will be most effective in justifying or opposing a proposal. While taking into account local contextual features of a given discourse situation can go some way toward disclosing such use, in the final analysis, the question of whether the framing of an issue is due to an MPs personal conviction or is an instance of strategic positioning cannot be determined.

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[7] This study thus ignores the distinction that is sometimes made between "equivalence framing" and "emphasis framing" (or "issue framing"). In studies by Druckman (2001; 2004) and Tversky and Kahneman (1981; 1987), for example, "equivalence framing" refers to situations where the "same information," or "logically equivalent" statements, are presented in different wordings, and thus cause the recipients to form different opinions. This distinction is made on the theoretical ground that "equivalency framing," unlike "emphasis framing," challenges the premise of preference invariance, and thus poses a challenge to rational choice theory. In my view, this distinction is problematic when applied to real-life political discourse, because it assumes the ability of the researcher to distinguish between true and false representations of highly complex political issues.

2.2 Issue framing in the TGNA

The definition of frames and framing has so far purposely been left simple and applicable to an almost unlimited number of political discourse situations. In analyzing parliamentary discourse, a number of additional assumptions are made that should be pointed out, both with regard to parliamentary contexts in general, and the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) in particular.

In common parlance, a parliamentary debate is "a formal gathering of a group of elected representatives, members of various political parties, engaging in a discussion about what collective action or policy to undertake concerning an issue of public concern" (van Dijk 2000a). Here, however, the assumption is made that parliamentary discourse also serves the function of allowing MPs to iterate and negotiate their parties' positions vis-à-vis each other in face-to-face confrontations. This function of parliamentary discourse has been described as a simultaneous "bonding and bounding" (Chilton 2004: 99-109). Party representatives "bond" by categorizing each other as belonging to the same parties in virtue of holding the same positions on issues, and at the same time "bound" by distancing themselves from each other, either directly or indirectly. Over time, framing over many individual discourse situations may lead to frames being permanently associated with certain parties. Thus, insofar as voters have access to parliamentary discourse, framing is a crucial component in allowing political parties to fulfill the function that Diamond and Gunther have called "issue structuring," the "structuring [of] choices and alternatives along different issue dimensions" (Diamond and Gunther 2001: 8).

It should also be noted that general sessions (*Genel Kurullar*) in the TGNA are public. Ostensibly, every word spoken during a general session is recorded by stenographers, and transcripts are made available on the Internet within a few days. The debates are broadcast live on television,[8] and newspapers regularly report on statements made during sessions. Most importantly, this public dimension seems to be highly salient in the minds of parliamentarians.[9] Many of the speeches made are only tangentially concerned with arguing

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[8] There has been live television broadcasting of the TGNA sessions since 10 December 1994, on the channel TRT 3.

[9] An event that occurred in the TGNA on 5 October 2005 is illustrative of the importance some representatives place on the public relations dimension of parliamentary discourse. During a speech by the RPP's Onur Öymen regarding the framework for EU membership negotiations, a member of

for or against a proposed amendment; some are primarily attacks on the behavior of other parties in the past, and yet others are simply ceremonial, self-congratulatory talks. Several of them are conducted after an amendment has been passed, and thus are not at all concerned with convincing other MPs in order to pass a proposal. At least for the TGNA, then, one may speak of both "discussion and showcase parliamentarianism" (Burkhardt 1995); the one does not exclude the other.

This image-building dimension of parliamentary discourse also rests on the assumption that MPs in the TGNA speak on behalf of their parties more than on behalf of anything else. It must be noted that parliamentarians in general are subject to several sets of role-orientations, some of which may be in conflict. "Politicians, MPs, ministers speak as unique persons and thus may embody many political roles at the same time, such as party members, representatives, or members of the opposition" (van Dijk 2000b: 24). The relative importance of these roles can be expected to vary from one national assembly to another. In the TGNA, in-depth studies have suggested that MPs, when speaking and voting, are bound by their party group orientation more than anything else (Massicard 2005). Parliamentarians are largely dependent on their superiors in the party for advancement; in addition, in many cases, speeches on behalf of party groups must be approved in advance by the group leadership. Thus, although MPs certainly inject a measure of their own style when expressing their opinions, they can be expected to represent the overall views and attitudes of their parties.

However, precisely because MPs are oriented toward their party affiliations, the position of their parties in relation to the government contributes toward determining the pragmatic orientation of each speech (Aslan-Akman 2005). Thus, for example, proposals tend to be presented by parties in government, and plenary questions regarding the proposals are presented by members of opposition parties (Massicard 2005: §48). As will become evident in chapter 5, the extent to which parties contrast themselves with other parties is also determined by such factors as the state of a coalition government, the time remaining before

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the RPP became aware that live broadcasting had stopped. Members of the RPP asked that the session be halted until broadcasting was resumed. When a break was not forthcoming, the leader of the RPP's party group angrily stated that a "hidden hand" had cut off the people's access to the RPP's speeches, and demanded that the missing segments be broadcast after the session was over ("Açıkça bir gizli el CHP'nin sesini kısmıştır"). (See *Cumhuriyet*, "Muhalefetin sesi 'teknik arızaya' takıldı!" 2005; TBMM 2005: 22-25).

the next election, and the like. Because such contextual conditions can be expected to affect the distribution of themes in parliamentary discourse, they must be taken into account when interpreting the results of the analysis.

3.   Methodological considerations

In this study, a version of *content analysis* has been used. Content analysis may be defined as "a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts […] to the contexts of their use" (Krippendorff 2004: 18). A stated goal of content analysis is thus to address two criteria that a scientific method is expected to ensure: reliability and validity.

Put simply, *reliability* concerns random error, or error produced as a result of randomness or inaccuracy in measuring procedures. A measurement method is unreliable if it leads to a high degree of variation among measurements. Lack of reliability is problematic because it violates the scientific tenets of replicability and intersubjectivity. Thus, problems of reliability may occur either between different researchers working on the same material, or between analyses conducted at different points in time. *Validity*, on the other hand, refers to nonrandom error, or error produced as a result of errors in the conceptual and logical structure underlying a research procedure. Validity thus concerns the connection between the conceptual apparatus used to interpret the data and justify the method of analysis, and that method itself. A measurement method may be highly reliable if it leads to the same result across several measurements, but may nevertheless be invalid if it measures the wrong phenomenon. Conversely, a method may measure theoretically relevant and valid phenomena, but may be of little scientific value if the results are not reproducible.

The proper way to ensure reliability and validity in text analysis is a matter of some dispute. According to Stone, "any systematic thematic text analysis risks alarming those who worry whether it can do justice to a text's meaning" (Stone 1997: 37). This is particularly true when an analysis requires quantification, as is the case in this study. Converting words into numbers involves stripping them of context. This is not unique to text analysis – quantitative research is always preceded by a process of abstraction wherein real-life phenomena are "disembodied" from their contexts and converted to uniform "cases" (or 'N's) (Ragin 1987). In some research, particularly that which stays true to a nomothetic-deductive framework, this is often an inevitable and accepted consequence, and the loss of contextual factors may be treated as a matter of controlling variables. In the analysis of meaning-bearing material, however, what is lost when units are taken out of their contexts may be precisely what the analysis is supposed to measure. Put simply, the *meaning* of a word, phrase, or sentence, may depend on factors *outside* it – the co-text (text-internal context), the concrete situation

in which it has been produced, or characteristics of its wider social context. If these characteristics are not taken into account during the conversion process, a quantitative analysis, though highly reliable, may ultimately measure the wrong phenomenon. Thus, "in the pursuit of high reliability, validity tends to get lost" (Krippendorff 2004: 213).

On the other hand, although qualitative, holistic reading methods may capture many aspects of a text's meaning, they are also prone to subjective interference. Precisely because texts are context-dependent, the meanings they produce may vary depending on aspects of the reader's background and predispositions. Thus, unless clear sampling and evaluation procedures are defined, serious bias may result. In testing a hypothesis, one may, in effect, find only what one is looking for. Thus, in the pursuit of validity, replicability and intersubjectivity can easily be lost.

An important aim in this study has been to ensure that both reliability and validity criteria are met by the analysis. To this end, a version of content analysis has been chosen that combines quantitative and qualitative procedures.

The most important procedure in this regard is the definition of *recording units.* A recording unit is any observable meaning-bearing unit that is "distinguished for separate description, transcription, recording, or coding" by the content analyst (Krippendorff 2004: 99). A recording unit may thus be any textual segment ranging in size from a single word to an entire text.

In general, smaller recording units can be expected to yield more reliable codings (Ibid.: 100). Words or phrases have a relatively narrow range of possible interpretations, and therefore stand a greater chance of being assigned the same value by different analysts. Larger recording units, on the other hand, tend to include more information, and therefore capture more dimensions of a discourse sample. This makes larger recording units more valid, but also more susceptible to subjective interference.

There is thus always a tradeoff between reliability and validity involved in delimiting the recording units of a content analysis. For that reason, we will here conduct the analysis on two levels, and record units of two different sizes. The rationale behind this is that a combination of procedures may ameliorate the weaknesses arising from the tradeoff between validity and reliability (Ibid.). By explicating each step of the analysis, performing multiple analyses of the same text, and comparing and interpreting the results against each other, the

weaknesses of each level of analysis can be countered by the strength of the other. We will refer to these two levels as *theme analysis* and *argument analysis.*

In addition defining two sets of recording units, each level of recording will be assigned its own level of *context units*. A context unit is a text-internal unit that delimits the scope of co-text used for determining the meaning of each recording unit. Defining a context unit can be an important factor in enhancing reliability if a recording unit, in order to be unequivocally assigned to one category in the coding scheme, must be related to other features of the text in which it appears. Thus, for example, if a word in a given language has more than one semantic value, the information required in order to determine the precise value of an occurrence of it may in some cases be found within the sentence in which it appears. Context units thus "set limits on the information to be considered in the description of recording units" (Krippendorff 2004: 101). In addition, context units may enhance the validity of the recording units, by making their interpretation dependent on wider aspects of the discourse in which they appears. Context units thus provide a controlled and relatively replicable way of approximating the richness of holistic reading.

3.1 Thematic analysis

The lowest level of recording units used here are *themes*. A theme is admittedly a rather vague notion, and difficult to operationalize. In order to ensure replicability, all of the themes recorded will be operationalized as an extensional "dictionary" consisting of a pre-defined selection of Turkish noun phrases (NPs). These are reproduced in chapter 5.1. Pre-defining all of the recorded NPs ensures a replicability of nearly one hundred percent. In addition, the ideological significance of these themes in the context of Turkish party politics will be ensured by culling them from a range of secondary literature on the parties represented in the TGNA during the debates. As noted, chapter 4 is devoted to contextualizing these themes, and explaining their relation to the Turkish party system.

In addition to ensuring reliability, using NPs as recording units has the advantage of allowing us to make finer distinctions between themes belonging to the same frame. Thus, instead of grouping all the themes predefined as belonging to the center-periphery frame on one variable, a distinction can be made between smaller groups of themes that can be expected to co-occur based on topical relevance. When analyzing the quantitative results,

this may provide clues as to what specific aspects of an issue a party has emphasized the most, and may also uncover emphases that cross the center-periphery/universalist divide. Thus, in devising the coding dictionary for the theme analysis, the center-periphery and universalist dimensions have each been divided into several clusters of themes that are recorded separately.

Because the NPs at this level are pre-defined, they can in most cases be recorded without recourse to context units. The only exception to this is where *ellipsis* occurs. Because an NP is a syntactically defined unit, it may consist of more than one word. In many cases, during a speech, an NP already mentioned will be referred back to, using only one of its constituent words. Thus, for example, the English NP *context units*, if mentioned once, can be referred to again as *these units*. When this occurs in parliamentary discourse, the missing noun can most often be recovered from within the limits of a single argument. An *argument* is here taken to refer to a speech by an MP, from the point at which he[10] is given permission to speak, until he is finished and leaves the podium for the next speaker. Thus, the context unit necessary for identifying the predefined themes in the text is here delimited to the *argument* in which it appears. This brings us to the second level of analysis, the argument analysis.

3.2 Argument analysis

As discussed earlier, issue framing refers to the salience of certain set of descriptive and evaluative considerations in discussing an issue. While using an extensional dictionary of NPs to guide the thematic coding procedure is a highly reliable measure of quantitative salience, some relevant information is lost in the process. For example, a high occurrence of an NP such as "secularism" (*laiklik*) does measure its thematic salience in quantitatively unequivocal terms, but indicates very little about the theme's role in the overall communicative situation. It does not, for example, reveal whether the representative is arguing against secularism or for it, quoting the speech of another representative, being sarcastic, or proffering a new interpretation of the concept. Thus, the thematic analysis would be relatively low in validity unless complemented by an analysis that takes into

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[10] All of the speakers in the selected material are male.

account the cohesive textual structures in which the themes are embedded – in short, arguments.

In what we will call the *argument analysis*, the units that function as context units for the theme analysis are treated as recording units in their own right. We thus end up with what Krippendorff (2004: 100) calls an "inclusion hierarchy," the higher level enclosing the lower. On the level of arguments, each speech made by an MP is assigned one value on a binary center-periphery/universalist variable. By recording both themes and the arguments they are embedded in, a quantitative measure can be produced that is both highly reliable and valid in a theoretical and context-sensitive way.

The argument analysis captures significantly more information than the thematic analysis. This can be expected to yield more valid results than the theme analysis. On the other hand, precisely because it involves taking account of more information, the argument analysis is also more susceptible to subjective interference. Like "theme," "argument" carries connotations that are not easily operationalized. Moreover, because parliamentary discourse, as discussed earlier, fulfills many functions, arguments are also liable to be interpreted in different ways. Some arguments may be quite long, and encompass many of the themes included in the thematic analysis, sometimes from both the center-periphery and universalist variables. Determining which of the two values an argument should be assigned to may therefore involve a certain amount of discretion.

However, some basic guidelines can be constructed. First, because we have defined frames as consisting of both descriptive and normative elements, when analyzing such arguments for frames, we are only interested in disclosing the *criteria* on which party representatives support or oppose legal amendments. Hence, a speech regarding a particular amendment may be recorded as "universalist" regardless of whether the representative opposes or supports it. The actual positions taken on the legal amendments are of secondary importance; what is of interest to us is *why* he opposes or supports it.

This is an important consideration. If we were to *a priori* define support for an amendment belonging to the NPAA as universalist, we would be implying that the amendment in itself is universalist, or that the only way to support it is by framing it in universalist terms. This would not only involve a great amount of normative assumptions, it would also require *a priori* differentiating between legislative proposals that fulfill universalist criteria and those that do not. The latter would be highly impractical and inevitably rather haphazard, as

legislative amendments often involve merely adding, removing, or changing one or two words.

Beyond this, some clues for interpreting the arguments can be inferred from the largely tacit compositional rules that govern the structure of discourse in the TGNA. These are not very different from those governing formal English discourse. Typically, an argument starts by the speaker introducing himself, and informing the audience why, and in whose name, he is going to speak. This is followed by a recollection and listing of a variety of considerations that the representative feels should be brought to bear on the issue. This is usually done by a combination of narration and appeal to legal or normative themes. The narrative component recalls past events, often intertwining legislative history with societal events and developments. Lastly, a peroration is usually signaled by a "therefore" or "in this light" (*dolayısıyla*, etc.), or a topical return to the amendment being debated. This last part is of particular importance for determining how to code an argument. In summing up the gist of an argument, an MP usually alludes to those themes that he finds most important for deciding on whether to support or oppose a proposal. These themes thus provide important clues for placing the argument on the center-periphery/universalist variable.

In cases where this structure is not upheld, the analysis must rely on less formalizable rules. In some cases, themes that are used in an argument may be indirectly referred to through oblique phrases such as "this danger," "these rights," and the like. Within the limits of a single argument, the precise theme referred to may therefore be unclear. However, due to the quasi-dialogical structure of parliamentary debates, these themes can almost always be recovered from some preceding argument. Thus, the position of an argument in the entire parliamentary session may be a crucial factor in determining what considerations an MP is mentioning. Therefore, in the argument analysis, we take the *parliamentary session* in which it appears as the context unit.

Finally, the results of the argument analysis must be compared to the results of the thematic analysis. Taken alone, the theme analysis and argument analysis would have serious flaws. Only by comparing and contrasting their results with each other, and interpreting them against the background of the entire parliamentary session, can a complete and reliable image of framing emerge.

3.3 Sampling

The texts that serve as the basis for the empirical analysis of this study have been selected because of their topicality. Within the universe of Turkish parliamentary debates, only those sessions during which the six first harmonization packages of the NPAA were explicitly discussed and voted over have been selected.[11] Here, "explicitly discussed" means that the packages, in whole or in part, appear on the officially announced list of issues to be discussed during the session. This list appears at he beginning of every transcript.[12] On the same criteria, a further reduction has been made within the sessions to only include those segments where speeches pertaining to the packages are addressed. Speeches and arguments on other topics made during the same sessions have been excluded. This has left us with a material of approximately 140,000 words.[13]

Further, it should be noted that no distinction has been made between passages where the speaker is announced to be speaking on behalf of a party group (*grup adına*), those where the speaker is announced to be speaking on his or her own behalf (*şahsi adına*), and those where neither option is announced.

All methods have their limitations, and this one is no exception. First, the fact that the content analysis used here is a quantitative comparison of party discourse implies that its validity is strengthened the larger the number of text samples it includes. In this case, the sample size is not large enough to ensure significance in a strict statistical sense. However, this is to some extent a limitation imposed by the nature of meaningful data itself. As the next chapter demonstrates, the center-periphery and universalist dimensions have been chosen precisely because they pertain to the fundamental issues that the NPAA implicates. If the analysis were to include a randomly sampled selection of parliamentary debates, it is likely that a majority of the themes broached would be of a much more technical character,

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[11] All of the transcripts have been retrieved from the TGNA's web site (http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/). These are listed under *References* at the end of this thesis.

[12] The head of transcripts of general sessions in the TGNA always include an agenda for the session. The legislative proposals that are covered in this study are listed under the header "*Kanun Tasarı ve Teklifleriyle Komisyonlardan Gelen Diğer İşler.*"

[13] The breakdown in terms of parties is as follows: JDP: 28,189; MLP: 8,786; DLP: 15,960; TPP: 16,490; NAP: 18,003; RPP: 19,578; FP: 33,083.

and would have little to do with issues such as those raised by the NPAA. Thus, to some extent, statistical validity must be sacrificed for theoretical validity.

4. Center-Periphery and Universalism: Themes in Turkish Party Politics

4.1 Center-periphery and universalism

The most well-known exponent of the center-periphery schema in social science is Edward Shils (1975). For Shils, "center" is a metaphor meant to capture the fact that the cultural and ideological value system of a society's state-building elite often becomes that society's dominant form of legitimating collectively binding decisions. Oppositional value systems thus become relegated to the "periphery." As modernization progresses, multiple confrontations between various peripheral forces and the center have in some cases, notably in Western Europe, led to a gradual incorporation of the periphery into the center, enabling the emergence of multidimensional politics (cf. Rokkan 1968). This process has also, to varying degrees, been attended by a rationalization and de-politicization of central state institutions, in particular the bureaucracy and Army (Weber 1978).

In Turkey, however, it has been argued that the centralist state tradition of the Ottoman Empire enabled the state-builders of the Republic of Turkey to perpetuate the center's hold over the periphery throughout the period in which the state was modernized (Heper 1985; Mardin 1973). Instead of becoming instruments for implementing political decisions, the bureaucracy and Army maintained a self-image as keepers of a moral order, defined by allegiance to Western, "scientific" principles. The flipside of this self-image is that it led to the suppression of political movements based on identities other than that of the urban, moderately Sunni Muslim, Turk. Alevis, Kurds, conservative Muslims, and a number of other identities thus became relegated to the "periphery" of Turkish politics.

During the transition to electoral democracy, the center-periphery division was reproduced in the party system (Karpat 1959). The result became what Heper has called a "moderately transcendental polity," in which the "locus of the state," formerly institutionalized in the bureaucracy and Army, in addition came to be represented by one political party among several others (Heper 1985: 9). Instead of solely representing the interests of specific groups, that party fashioned itself as the representative of the entire nation, defined as a moral community whose *telos* was the realization of Atatürk's principles. Party politics henceforth

came to revolve around the right to interpret and define the substance of politics itself. The center, aligned with the Army and bureaucracy, tended to emphasize a secularist, state-centered form of Kemalism, in which the public expression of religion and ethnic identity were considered detrimental to national unity. The periphery, in turn, represented a variety of particularist orientations, and consequently either rejected Kemalism completely, or attempted to interpret its basic tenets in a more liberal fashion. Although the introduction of competitive politics has gradually allowed other dimensions to emerge, notably the left-right cleavage familiar from European party politics, the prevalence of culturally and religiously based opposition to the basic features of the regime ideology has continued to be a significant factor in determining voting behavior and the tone of inter-party competition (Çarkoğlu 1998: 139-148; Ergüder and Hoffebert 1987; Özbudun 1980; Özcan 2000; Sayarı 1978). Thus, although it is possible, today, to map Turkish parties along a multidimensional left-right division (cf. Özbudun 2006; Türsan 2004: 100-2, 197-8), the center-periphery division has showed a remarkable ability to subsume under it new issues and themes.

In spite of this, two factors make the center-periphery division less useful in mapping *discursive* orientations on questions arising from the EU's accession *acquis*. One is a practical problem, arising from the nature of public political discourse in Turkey. As Avcı and Çarkoğlu note, while the center-periphery paradigm "clearly differentiates Turkish parties," the periphery is in fact a heterogeneous dimension, consisting of a multitude of socio-economic, ethnic, and religious groups (Avcı and Çarkoğlu 2002: 126). The dominant part in setting the agenda of political discourse has been the center parties, who, by consistently excluding openly peripheral elements, have made the discursive manifestation of the cleavage revolve around centrist concerns. In official discourse such as party manifestos and parliamentary debates, therefore, the center-periphery division tends to collapse into one group of themes, with parties differing mainly in their more or less explicit attempts at re-interpreting centrist thematics. Thus, for example, the parties associated with the National Outlook movement have been noted for developing two separate discourses, one "unofficial," emphasizing Islam, the other "official," often co-opting Kemalist thematics (White 2002; Yıldız 2003: 193-4). This may explain why, for all practical purposes, the periphery has been seen as "the complement of the centre" (Çarkoğlu 1998: 133).

This brings us to the other factor. Çarkoğlu (1998), relying on quantitative content analyses of Turkish party manifestos, finds that a third dimension, which he calls *universalist*, has emerged as a competitor to the center-periphery dichotomy. He thus empirically confirms

what has been claimed by several researchers (Gülalp 2001; Rumford 2000; 2002). Thematically, he finds this dimension to revolve around rights, democratization, and civil society. As against the center-periphery dimension, which emphasizes the conflictual dimensions of inter-party competition, the universalist dimension emphasizes "generalizable" principles one would expect to promote consensus. It is thus largely co-extensive with the thematics underlying the political criteria of the EU's accession *acquis*. Interestingly, he also finds that some of the parties most closely resembling a typical party of the periphery, such as the Islamist Welfare Party, have been those that have emphasized the universalist frame the most (Ibid.: 136).

An interesting question arising out of these observations, then, is to what extent the parties represented in the TGNA during the debates on the legal amendments of the NPAA have drawn on the universalist frame. On the one hand, because the amendments are essentially democratizing measures, one would expect an emphasis on universalist thematics and arguments. On the other hand, it is clear that the universalist dimension is not coextensive with a positive stance on the question of EU membership. Moreover, because parties in parliament have a need to differentiate themselves, one might also expect them to draw on themes associated with the more antagonistic center-periphery frame.

In order to investigate these questions, the center-periphery and universalist frames will be operationalized as two sets of themes and two argument values. These will then be applied to the discourse of the political parties represented in the TGNA during the debates on the NPAA. In order to contextualize these dimensions and the following analysis in terms of Turkish party politics, the remainder of this chapter addresses two questions:

1) *How have the seven political parties addressed in this thesis historically positioned themselves in the center-periphery cleavage, and to what extent have they adopted more universalist thematics?*

2) *What are the themes that have historically been associated with the center-periphery and universalist dimensions in the Turkish party system?*

4.1.1 The Republican People's Party

In the Turkish party system, the salience of the center-periphery division can be traced back to the fact that Turkey's oldest party, the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk*

Partisi, RPP), is popularly perceived to be a direct heir of the resistance movement, and later republican state cadre, centered on Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.[14] Although a nominally separate party was allowed to form in 1924, the RPP remained in government until 1950, in what was a *de facto* authoritarian one-party state. Therefore, during the RPP's first 26 years of existence, it was virtually synonymous with the state, and was in a position to formulate its ideology and the state ideology as one.

The RPP emblem's six arrows symbolize the six founding principles of the Turkish Republic, which were also included in the Turkish Constitution in 1937: republicanism, statism,[15] populism, nationalism, secularism, and reformism. Although none of these were ever given exact definitions, subsequent developments led them to be interpreted in an authoritarian and elitist fashion. In particular, "secularism" (*laiklik*)[16] was implemented through a series of aggressive reforms designed to disassociate Turkish society from its historical roots in the Islamic world. In addition to secularizing the legal system, religious orders (*tarikats*) were forbidden, "Western" dress codes were enforced, the Latin alphabet was adopted, and the vocabulary used in public discourse was drastically altered. These attacks on popular religion were probably enough to alienate large portions of the public from the RPP; however, for the party, its measures were justified by recourse to other principles. The notion of "populism" (*halkçılık*) held by the RPP was heavily indebted to Durkheim's organicist view of society, as well as ideas from Tarde, LeBon, and Tönnies (Spencer 1958). Combined with "statism" (*devletçilik*) and "reformism" (*inkilapçılık*), it emerged as a tendency to conceive of social change as state-led projects, "plans for change originating among a cohesive group of social 'engineers'" (Mardin 1997: 65), the ultimate aim of which were to bring Turkey up to date with Western standards of civilization.

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[14] The actual degree of continuity between the RPP and the "Society for the Defence of Rights" (*Mudafaa-I Hukuk Grubu*), a nationalist alliance founded in 1919 with the purpose of defending the unity of Turkish territories, is less clear. However, for a long time after the Republic was formed, Turkish historiography reflected the historical narrative of Atatürk's famous "Speech" from 1927 (*Nutuk*), in which he presented the RPP as a direct continuation of the Society (Karpat 1991: 45-51; Zürcher 1998: 182-3). This narrative is still upheld by the RPP (CHP 2006).

[15] "Statism" is sometimes referred to in the literature as "étatism."

[16] It has been argued that *laiklik* would be more accurately translated with the French word from which it was borrowed, *laicité*, reflecting the fact that the Kemalist policy towards Islam has been more in the nature of co-opting and controlling it than separating it from politics (Davison 2003). I nevertheless use "secularism" here for the sake of neatness.

Because the primary goal of these projects was to create a modern, unified nation, the RPP could claim to represent the *whole* of Turkey, regardless of class, ethnicity, or creed.

The latter claim became difficult to uphold when the RPP was ousted from government by the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Partisi*, DP) in the first free elections in 1950.[17] Although the program of the DP was initially very similar to that of the RPP, it soon came to differ on a number of matters, notably in its liberal interpretation of "secularism," and its rural, and more religiously conservative, constituency (Ahmad 1977: 13-15; Eroğul 1990). In addition, it differed from the RPP in its clientilistic politics, a strategy that effectively enabled it to build a following across several groupings in the heterogeneous periphery. The interaction between the RPP and the DP thus set the tone for a pattern of party competition, which, although complicated by various factors, was to continue for several decades.

The DP remained in power throughout the 1950s. After increasing its hold on Parliament in the 1954 elections, it started pursuing irresponsible economic policies, and began developing its hold on government into an authoritarian regime centered on the quasi-religious charisma of its leader (Sunar 1986). This led to the first military coup in 1960, which was backed by the RPP. Although the DP was closed after the coup, the center-periphery cleavage continued throughout the 60s and 70s, with the RPP as the main representative of the center, and the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*, JP) essentially continuing the tradition of the DP. During the seventies, several new parties emerged, some representing radical leftist and rightist tendencies, but the overall impact of the left-right divide was absorbed by the RPP and the JP, respectively (Tachau 1991: 99-100, 142; Türsan 2004: 106-114). Toward the end of the seventies, however, increasing political violence among the smaller fractions eventually became so problematic that the Army decided to intervene again.

The 1980 coup was an event that marked a decisive break in the RPP's tacit alliance with the Army. With the coup, the Army wanted to refashion the party system through legal engineering, and to a large extent it seems to have succeeded. All the existing political parties were dissolved, and their leaders were prohibited from participating in politics. In addition, to prevent fragmentation, a national 10% threshold was established. Since the RPP was allowed to re-open in 1993, it has struggled to regain its former place in the party

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[17] The first elections were held in 1946, but are widely held to have been manipulated, thus making 1950 the year of the first realistically free elections (Zürcher 1998: 222).

system. Due to its association with Atatürk, it is still perceived by many as being the most authoritative party representative of Kemalism. It has kept the six arrows in its party emblem, but has continued to adjust its interpretation of them to changing circumstances. The question facing it now is whether these adjustments will be adequate. The RPP was not represented in the TGNA after the 1999 elections, falling below the national threshold for the first time since the founding of the Republic. It was thus not represented when the first three harmonization packages of the NPAA were passed. However, following a severe economic crisis in 2001 and a corruption scandal that implicated members of it main rival on the center-left, the Democratic Left Party, it became the sole opposition party to the JDP in the 2002 elections, and participated in the debates on the fourth and fifth legislative packages with 152 MPs.[18]

4.1.2 The Democratic Left Party

The Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti*, DLP) was founded in 1985 as a competitor to the Social Democratic Party. Like the latter, the DLP was initially seen by many as a placeholder for the RPP while the latter was outlawed. During its early years of existence, it was controlled behind the scenes by Bülent Ecevit, the Secretary-General of the former RPP, with his wife, Rahşan Ecevit, functioning as the official leader. After the RPP was allowed to regroup in 1993, the DLP and the RPP have followed very similar policies, competition between the two parties upheld mainly as a result of the strong personalities of their respective leaders. On economic issues, the DLP has tried to fashion itself as a party to the left of the RPP, but on political issues pertaining to national sovereignty, it has usually been placed slightly to the right (Özbudun 2001: 258). In terms of center-periphery themes, therefore, the DLP and RPP are very similar. The DLP is also similar to the RPP of old in that it has an extremely centralized intra-party organization, and relies to a great extent on the opinions and behavior of its leader (Kınıklıoğlu 2002).

Like the RPP, then, the DLP has been a true "center" party, emphasizing many of the classic Kemalist issues: state-controlled economy, secularism, appeals to patriotism, and support for the military. In 1999, it entered government for the first time, in a coalition with the extreme-

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[18] The number of RPP MPs after the elections was originally 178, but declined to 152 between November 2002 and January 2003 due to resignations and transfers.

right Nationalist Action Party (NAP) and the Motherland Party (MLP). Like the NAP, it was elected on a nationalistic, state-centered platform, and promised to clamp down on the Kurdish militants that had been engaging the army in the Southeast. It fulfilled these expectations when Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was arrested during the DLP's tenure in government in 1999. While in Parliament, the DLP participated in debating and enacting the first to the third legislative package of the NPAA with 119 representatives.[19]

4.1.3 The Nationalist Action Party

The Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, NAP) was founded under the name Republican Peasants National Party in 1958. It was a marginal party until after the 1960 coup, when Alparslan Türkeş, one of the coup's main organizers, joined it, and changed its name to the Nationalist Action Party. While a member of the post-coup ruling council (the National Unity Council), Türkeş had been a part of the faction that favored changing the constitution to drastically lessen the influence of political parties. In the NAP, this authoritarian streak developed into what came to be known as "idealism" (*ülkücülük*), a notion that entailed subservience to the state above all. During the seventies, in particular, this manifested itself in the militant activities of the "idealist hearths" (*Ülkü Ocakları*), anti-communist youth organizations with militant offshoots.

While the NAP has its roots in the Army, traditionally the defender of the "center's" values, its willingness to embrace illegal activities has been one of the main factors serving to differentiate the NAP's brand of nationalism from that of the Kemalism of the RPP and DLP. It has, in a sense, fought for the state, in spite of the state. Like the RPP, the 1980 coup came as a shock to the NAP, which up until then had seen itself as serving the interests of the state against its enemies. To add to the confusion, after it was refounded in 1983, a religious dimension was added to its ethnic and racial mythology concerning Turkish nationhood, resulting in a concept called the "Islam-Turk synthesis" (*Türk-İslam Sentezi*). This implied a break with the secularist tradition of the officer corps in which Türkeş had his roots, and enabled the party to fathom a larger part of the right, in particular constituencies

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[19] Note, however, that a group of 58 representatives left the DLP on 21 July 2002, following a leadership crisis. These formed the New Turkey Party (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi*, YTP), and participated as such during the third debate. After the 2002 elections, the YTP merged with the RPP. In this thesis, YTP representatives have been treated as belonging to the DLP.

that had traditionally voted for the "peripheral" Justice Party and Motherland Party (Akgün 2002), and the Islamist Felicity Party (Yavuz 2002). During the nineties, however, its emphasis on support for the Army was again strengthened, when Kurdish terrorism once more became an issue. Although the NAP's interpretation on the racial belongingness of Kurds has varied throughout its history, during the 90s, in particular, it tended to define them in negative terms, as enemies of what became an increasingly securitized state ideal (Bora and Can 2004: 90-101). Consequently, much of its electoral discourse prior to the 1999 election was predicated on supporting the state and military in fighting Kurdish insurgents in the Southeast.

In terms of the center-periphery cleavage, then, the NAP has a mixed history. It has consistently branded itself as a party of the center, supporting the state and Army above all; at the same time, it has succeeded in alienating much of the traditional center elite through its extremism and occasional flirting with Islam (Öniş 2003b). After Devlet Bahçeli became Secretary-General, it has softened its image, in particular downplaying the role of "cultural" nationalism in favor of a "civic" nationalism, where devotion to Turkey as a community takes precedence (Çınar and Arıkan 2002: 36). It succeeded in this to such an extent that it was able to enter government coalition with the DLP and TPP in 1999, participating as a government party in the debates on the first to the third harmonization packages of the NPAA with 126 MPs in parliament. It remains to be seen to what extent its recent moderation affected its discourse on the democratization measures of the NPAA.

4.1.4 The Motherland Party

Among the "periphery" parties, two parties continued the tradition of the DP and JP in the 1980s and 90s, the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*, MLP) and the True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*, TPP). The Motherland Party was one of three parties that were allowed to participate in the 1983 elections. It was the only one that was not associated with the military junta, and it was also the most successful of the three. Like the JP, and the DP before it, the MLP was able to forge a broad coalition of segments belonging to various "peripheries." Its leader, Turgut Özal, was formerly a member of the JP, and had later been a member of Necmettin Erbakan's pro-Islamist National Salvation Party. In addition, he had experience from the financial sector, having worked for the World Bank and the Sabancı Corporation. This combination gave him credibility both with the economically liberal middle class and with the religious-conservative segments. Although the MLP's support

base came primarily from that of the old JP, it also drew members and voters from the former NAP and RPP through its insistence on representing "four inclinations" at once: liberalism, religious conservatism, nationalism, and social democracy (Ergüder 1991: 155-160).

In terms of the center-periphery cleavage, then, the MLP essentially continued the peripheral DP and JP's tradition. To a greater extent than the former parties, however, it downplayed the role of religion in its public discourse. By relying on the popular image of its leader as a pious Muslim to convey its essentially value-conservative attitude, it was able to justify its economic liberalization measures with an appeal to "universal" norms such as free enterprise and international cooperation (Çarkoğlu 1998: 144-46). Economically, it upheld the anti-statist stance of the former large parties of the periphery, the DP and the JP, with their support for free market capitalism. After the 1999 elections, it was able to participate in government in coalition with the NAP and DLP, with 73 MPs in Parliament.

4.1.5 The True Path Party

The True Path Party was founded in 1983. Unlike the MLP, the TPP openly claimed to be the heir of the JP (Acar 1991: 188). Although its leader, Süleyman Demirel, did not have the economic credibility of Özal, the main themes of the TPP's rhetoric were largely the same as that of the MLP: patriotism, value conservatism, and market capitalism. In addition, it espoused a simplified, "direct" democratic ideology, similar to that of the MLP, but with a stronger populist emphasis on the "national will" (*milli irade*), reminiscent of the DP and JP (Sakallıoğlu 1998: 149).

Due to its similarity with the MLP, the TPP and the MLP have been called "feuding twins" (Çandar 1999). Much like the RPP and DLP, they are perceived as virtually indistinguishable, and as competitors rather than opponents, fighting to occupy the same place in the party system (Kalaycıoğlu 2002: 53). Their disagreements have consequently been determined by strategic positioning more than ideological differences. For example, while it was the main opposition party in Parliament in 1994-1995, the TPP opposed the Customs Union, in spite of its overall support for economic liberalization (Öniş 2003a: 18). During the 1995 election campaigns, its stance shifted completely, making membership in the Customs Union one of the principal themes of its election platform (Sakallıoğlu 2002: 92-3).

The TPP was one of the largest parties during the 1999-2002 parliamentary term, when the first three harmonization packages were debated. In spite of having 83 representatives in parliament over the Motherland Party's 73, however, the DLP and NAP preferred to form a coalition government with the latter. Once again, then, the TPP was in opposition, and was faced with the dilemma of upholding a liberal, pro-EU ideology while differentiating itself from the MLP.

4.1.6 The Felicity Party

Among the five largest parties in Parliament during the 1999-2002 term, the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*, FP) comes closest to representing a typical party of the "periphery." It was founded in 2001 by the "traditionalist" (*gelenekçi*) wing of the dissolved Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*, VP), itself a continuation of the Islamist Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, WP) that was shut down by court order in 1998. After the 1980 coup, the Welfare Party became the Islamist-nationalist *National Outlook* movement's political party. Led by Necmettin Erbakan, it became partner in a coalition government with the True Path Party in 1995, marking the culmination of the rise of Turkish Islamism. This led to a great amount of uncertainty regarding the future of Turkey's relations with the EU. While the TPP was pro-EU, it was widely known that Erbakan saw the EU as a Western imperialist ploy, and preferred strengthening the country's ties with the Muslim world.[20] Although the WP subdued its Islamist rhetoric while in government, in 1997, the Army saw fit to pressure it to such an extent that the coalition government was dissolved, in what quickly became known as the world's first "postmodern coup" (Çandar 1997).

Unlike the liberal wing of the VP, which we will return to shortly, the conservative wing that founded the FP has continued to espouse values associated with the National Outlook movement, including a skeptical attitude to Westernization. Like the WP, the FP's official stance on EU membership is that while Turkey may benefit from democratic reform, it has no need to become a member of what the FP sees as a Western, essentially Christian club.[21]

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[20] In a book written in 1975, Erbakan claims that the Common Market is "a Zionist ploy" ("Ortak Pazar bir siyonist oyundur") designed to continue the economic colonization of Turkey begun by Western powers during the last century of the Ottoman Empire (Erbakan 1975: 248).

[21] See the Felicity Party's party program (SP 2001: § V.4.2). Note that the statement "As the Felicity Party, we are against Turkish EU membership" ("*Saadet Partisi olarak Türkiye'nin AB'ye üye*

It primary constituency comes from conservative Muslims across socio-economic divides, although the upwardly mobile Muslim middle class has recently drifted toward the Justice and Development Party (Yeşilada 2002). Following the shutdown of the VP, many of its former members stayed in parliament and simply transferred to the FP. During the debates on the three first harmonization packages, it was represented by 47 MPs in opposition.

4.1.7 Justice and Development Party

The Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi*, JDP) was founded in 2001 with several prominent members of the "progressive" (*yenilikçi*) wing of the former VP among its leadership. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, formerly mayor of Istanbul for the WP, became the leader of the new party, with Abdullah Gül, who had served as secretary general of the WP, as deputy leader (Atacan 2005; Yeşilada 2002).[22] The JDP also attracted members of Kurdish parties no longer in existence. In the 2002 general elections, helped by a 10% entry threshold, the JDP won a landslide victory over all other parties, and gained 363 of 550 seats. This enabled it to form a one-party government, which, in terms of parliamentary representation, is the most powerful government since the ten-year era of the populist Democrat Party in the 1950s.

The JDP has attracted the attention of researchers due to what many see as a fundamental paradox in its party ideology. Due to the fact that many of its most prominent members started their political careers in the National Outlook movement, it is routinely referred to in both media and academic literature as "pro-Islamist," yet its party program, official publications, and emblems are devoid of references to Islam. The fact that the current JDP government has succeeded in speeding up the reforms required by EU conditionality and negotiated the commencement of membership talks, further cements the impression that the JDP leadership has either undergone a complete personal transformation, or is involved in dissimulation (*takiyye*). The question of whether or not Erdoğan's personal transformation

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olmasına karşıyız") is not found in the English translation available at the party's website, only in the Turkish.

[22] Other prominent members of the VP that joined the JDP were Bülent Arınç, Cemil Çiçek, Abdulkadir Aksu, and Ali Coşkun.

from a pro-*sharia* fundamentalist to a conservative democrat is sincere has been the subject of several studies (Çakır and Çalmuk 2001; Heper and Toktaş 2003).

Whatever the reasons behind the founding of the JDP, the image it tries to project today lies closer to the Christian democratic parties of Western Europe than to its Islamist predecessors (Hale 2006). Its constituency has been shown to resemble to that of the MLP and TPP, with an emphasis on middle class business interests, and an implied rather than explicit conservative Muslim lifestyle (Çarkoğlu 2006; Coşar and Özman 2004). This has led some to conclude that it lies closer to the tradition of the Justice Party, Motherland Party, and True Path Party than to the Islamic Felicity Party (Özbudun 2006). Moreover, like the MLP, it has been quite open about the need to further define its identity, even going so far as to organize an international conference on the subject (cf. AKP 2004). The working title of its ideology, "conservative democracy," has so far emphasized classic liberal themes in both economic and normative terms. Thus, in spite of its Islamist roots, the JDP might be the party that has succeeded most in superceding the center-periphery divide, and approximating the third, "universalist" dimension.

4.2 Conclusion

In conclusion, although the center-periphery dimension seems to have declined in importance, several of its themes have persisted until quite recently. The center, represented by the RPP, DLP, and NAP, has continued to emphasize the classic Kemalist themes of secularism, state unity, state initiative, and national independence. In addition, it has increasingly turned its attention towards Kurdish separatist activities. The presently largest parties associated with the periphery, the TPP, MLP, and JDP, have continued to emphasize traditional values, respect for religion, and the importance of local initiative and will. The periphery, like the center, has become more fractionalized since the 1970s, several of its themes becoming embodied in separate parties. This has to some extent complicated the scheme, creating crosscutting cleavages where, for instance, the Islamist FP has in common with the state-loyal NAP an anti-Western rhetoric. Nevertheless, as before, the periphery continues to be defined as such by the center, which still brandishes its resolve to keep parties that openly represent political Islam and ethnic minorities from gaining influence.

The universalist dimension observed by Çarkoğlu (1998) seems to result from the fact that several parties have adopted accommodational attitudes on a series of key issues. A tendency can be observed across the center-periphery spectrum to adopt a conciliatory tone, and emphasize principled arguments for decentralization, strengthening civil society, and aligning the legal framework of politics with the norms expressed in international human rights agreements. These norms include freedom of speech and conscience, social and legal equality, and the creation of a more democratic and pluralist polity. This has increasingly turned attention away from themes associated with the center-periphery dimension.

Taking these observations as a basis, I now turn to operationalizing the two dimensions, and apply them to the six parliamentary debates.

5. Analysis

5.1 Coding dimensions

As noted in chapter 3, in order to be replicable, the quantitative *theme analysis* relies to a great extent on the researcher's ability to explicate every step of the analysis. Replicability will here be ensured by operationalizing the coding dimensions applied in the theme analysis as an extensional list of noun phrases. The *argument analysis*, as also discussed in chapter 3, is only operationalized as a binary center-periphery/universalist variable, and is therefore not reproduced here.

In order to ensure validity, care has been taken to define each NP in a way that captures as much of their normative connotations as possible. This should also, as a consequence, lead to an approximate correlation between the two levels of analysis. Hence, the NPs listed are all identifiable as value-laden and contentious in the context of Turkish party politics. They are for the most part abstract concepts or legal entities with a highly symbolic character, which makes them natural points of reference in arguing a point. Thus, for example, "state" is only included if it occurs as part of one of the NP combinations listed: "unitary state," "secular state," "the state's wholeness," and the like. While this does not ensure a one hundred percent fit between the two levels of analysis, when combined, the theme and argument analyses should result in an adequate measurement of the existence of a frame.

In addition, it should be noted that the list of Turkish NPs has been constructed so as to capture the widest possible range of phrases that express the same concept. Lexicogrammar frequently provides a wide variety of noun phrase combinations that express more or less the same concept. To capture as many occurrences of a concept as possible, in devising the coding scheme, each theme cluster has been operationalized as a set of NPs. In order to ensure replicability, although the list of NPs could be virtually endless, no further NPs than those listed have been coded.

However, as discussed in chapter 3.1, the theme analysis does include NPs where one of the elements listed in the coding scheme can be unequivocally recovered from within its context unit. As noted, the context unit for the theme analysis is limited to the argument in which it occurs. Thus, for example, if the phrase "these rights" (*bu haklar*) occurs, it is only recorded

if it can be established without reasonable doubt that "these" functions as an endophoric reference to, for instance, the noun "human" (*insan*), occurring somewhere within the same argument. If such a noun cannot be recovered from the argument, the phrase is not recorded.

One additional rule should be noted. In some cases, several recordable NPs occur within a larger NP. This occurs, for instance, where a combination of NPs is so common that is can be regarded has having achieved the status of a fixed expression. It also occurs in certain proper names, such as laws, treaties, or courts. In these cases, the NPs are only counted as belonging to the larger NP, and only if the larger unit is included in the coding scheme. Thus, for example, "basic rights and freedoms" (*temel hak ve hürriyetler/ temel hak ve özgürlükler*) is only recorded as one unit, despite the fact that it syntactically consists of two NPs that have been included as separate entries in the coding scheme. Similarly, "unitary state" is commonly expressed with the somewhat complicated expression "the undivisible unity of the state" (*devletin bölünmez bütünlüğü*) or the even more complicated "the undivisible wholeness of the state and its nation and community" (*devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmez bütünlüğü*), both of which stem from the 1961 Constitution. Here, too, each expression has only been recorded once. In the proper name "Law on Fighting Terror" (*Terörle Mücadele Yasası*), however, "terror" has *not* been recorded, because it belongs to a proper name that is not listed in the coding scheme.

CENTER-PERIPHERY

Theme cluster	Noun phrases[23]	English cognates
Secularism	laiklik, laik devlet/ cumhuriyet, irtica	secularism, the secular state/ republic, (religious) rectionarism
Statism/ centralism	üniter devlet, bölünmez devlet, devletin/ ülkenin/ milletin (bölünmez/ ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmez) bütünlüğu/ birliği/ üniter yapısı, millî/ ulusal birlik, bölücülük, bölücü	the unitary state, the state/ nation's wholeness/ oneness/ unitary structure, national unity
Kurdish separatism	PKK, KADEK, Abdullah Öcalan, Öcalan, "Apo"	PKK (The Kurdistan Worker's Party), KADEK (Kurdistan Democracy and Freedom Congress), Abdullah Öcalan (former leader of the PKK), "Apo" (popular nickname for Öcalan)
Nationalism/ Anti-internationalism	Cumhuriyetin/ Türkiye'nin bağımsızlığı/ egemenliği, emperiyalism, sömürgecilik	The Republic's/ Turkey's independence/ sovereignty, imperialism, colonialism
Kemalism	Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Atatürk	(Mustafa Kemal) Atatürk
Security	ulusal/ milli/ kamu güvenlik/-ği, terör, terörist, terörizm, şehit, gazi	national security, terror/terrorism, terrorist, (military) victims, (military) heroes

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[23] Legend for the Turkish NPs: NPs are separated by commas. A slash denotes a facultative element where one or more of the elements must be present for the NP to be recorded. An element inside brackets is entirely facultative. Except for possessive and genitive endings, suffixes are not included in the list.

UNIVERSALIST

Theme cluster	Noun phrases	English cognates
International legal authorities, treaties, agreements, and norms	uluslararası hukuk/ sözleşmeleri/ anlaşmaları/ taahhütler/ normlar, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi, İnsan Hakları (Evrensel) Beyannamesi/ Bildirgesi, Kopenhag Kriterleri	International law/ treaties/ agreements/ contracts/ norms, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The European Convention on Human Rights, The European Court of Human Rights, the Copenhagen Criteria
Civil society	sivil toplum, sivil örgütler, sivil toplum örgütleri, örgütlenme özgürlüğü/ hürriyeti	civil society, civic organizations, freedom to organize
Legality	hukuk/-ğun üstünlüğü/ egemenliği, hukuk devleti	sovereignty of law, constitutional state (*Rechtstaat*)
Rights	insan hakları, bireyin/bireysel haklar, temel/ evrensel haklar/ özgürlükler/ hürriyetler, ifade/ söz/ düşünce/ kanaat/ vicdan/ fikir özgürlüğü/ hürriyeti, ifade etme hakkı, düşünceyi açıklama özgürlüğü	human rights, freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of conscience/ opinion, individual rights, basic/ universal rights
Democracy	demokrasi, demokratikleşme	democracy, democratization
Social equality	eşitlik, eşitlsizik, eşit haklar	equality, inequality, equal rights
Pluralism	dinî/ dinsel/ etnik çoğulculuk	religious/ ethnic pluralism

5.2 Quantitative results

The results of the *thematic analysis* are here summarized for each party.

Center-periphery

	RPP	DLP[24]	NAP	TPP	MLP	FP	JDP	Totals
Secularism	5	3	4	2	0	1	2	*17*
Statism/ centralism	10	29	12	15	2	13	21	*102*
Kurdish separatism	0	1	32	9	0	3	4	*49*
Anti-internationalism	14	6	6	1	0	2	1	*30*
Kemalism	7	5	12	1	5	3	1	*34*
Security	7	30	50	10	4	7	13	*121*
Total Center-periphery	43	74	116	38	11	29	42	*353*

Universalism

	RPP	DLP	NAP	TPP	MLP	FP	JDP	Totals
International treaties/agreements	67	29	38	29	92	44	102	*401*
Civil Society	3	5	0	5	11	28	12	*64*
Legality	22	13	1	2	1	27	12	*78*
Rights	45	32	20	53	48	56	53	*307*
Democracy	14	20	10	77	10	81	59	*271*
Social equality	2	2	0	0	0	0	11	*15*
Pluralism	6	2	0	1	0	0	3	*12*
Total Universalism	159	103	69	167	162	236	252	*1148*

Percentages

	RPP	DLP	NAP	TPP	MLP	FP	JDP	Totals
Total	*202*	*177*	*185*	*205*	*173*	*265*	*294*	*1501*
Center/periphery %	**21.29**	**41.81**	**62.70**	**18.54**	**6.36**	**10.94**	**14.29**	**23.52**
Universalism %	**78.71**	**58.19**	**37.30**	**81.46**	**93.64**	**89.06**	**85.71**	**76.48**

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[24] As noted in chapter 4, the column for the Democratic Left Party (DLP) also includes the New Turkey Party (NTP).

As the percentages show, the dominant dimension in terms of theme salience is the *universalist*, with 1148 units, or 76.48 percent, out of a total of 1501 recorded units. At the most general level, then, the expectation that the legal amendments would be framed in terms of universalist themes has been confirmed. In particular, it seems, the theme cluster 'International treaties/ agreements,' encompassing both the agreements themselves, the legal norms perceived to underlie them, and the authorities that implement them, has been a topic of discussion, with the majority of units within the universalist dimension. The international context of the amendments, and their legal genealogy in terms of international agreements, thus seem to have been highly salient. This cluster is followed by themes pertaining to basic positive and negative rights, and by the cluster 'Democracy,' suggesting that democracy and rights are more closely associated with the international context than with typically domestic concerns such as "secularism" and security. Note that all the parties have this correlation in common, including the Nationalist Action Party (NAP), whose overall score on the universalist dimension is quite low. The extent to which these universalist themes were brought up in favor of the amendments thus needs to be further investigated at the argument level.

Within the *center-periphery* dimension, the focus seems to have been overwhelmingly centered on issues associated with security and ethnic separatism. The only party with a higher percentage of NPs in this dimension than in the universalist dimension is the NAP, followed at a distance by the Democratic Left Party (DLP). This is also in keeping with our expectations. Although the NAP and DLP are usually placed quite far apart on a conventional left-right scale, they are both considered loyal to the 'center' in terms of typically Kemalist concerns such as state unity and security. As mentioned earlier, both parties entered the 1999 elections promising to clamp down on the Kurdish insurgencies that took many lives during the nineties, a typical center-periphery concern. The theme analysis leaves no doubt that this concern has continued to play a role in their understanding of the three harmonization packages that they participated in debating.

Although the DLP and NAP share an emphasis on center-periphery concerns, their emphases within this dimension differ somewhat. The NAP scores highest on security issues such as terrorism, followed by Kurdish separatism. The DLP's emphasis, on the other hand, is more centered on the symbolic dimension of state unity, though less so than the RPP. Although it is perhaps not surprising that 'Terrorism' should correlate with 'Security,' the discrepancy in

emphases between the DLP and NAP suggests that the parties have had different agendas in bringing up centrist themes.

In addition, it is somewhat surprising that the theme cluster 'Secularism' scores very low across the board. The rise of political Islam was a highly salient theme in both public and academic discourse between 1995 and 1999, and received particular attention from the secular-leftist media. Given the additional fact that the Islamist Welfare Party, which was shut down through an indirect military intervention in 1997, is represented by two successor parties in the parliament during the sessions in question, this merits investigation. It is likely that the typically Kemalist concern of preserving the secular nature of the state against "reactionary" forces associated with Islamic fundamentalism has been overshadowed by the political reaction against separatist violence, but additional clues might be found in the discourse of their counterparts, the Felicity Party and Justice and Development Party.

Moving up a level, the *argument analysis* includes a wider range of contextual information, and treats the themes as subordinated to, and embedded in, arguments. As is readily apparent, there is a significant difference between the number of arguments recorded for each party, ranging from the Felicity Party's 56 to the Motherland Party's 11. In addition, the number of total units falls from 1501 in the theme analysis to only 219 in the argument analysis. As this makes the statistical significance of percentages less informative, the results have been left as they are.

	RPP	DLP	NAP	TPP	MLP	FP	JDP
Center-periphery	3	4	24	5	0	1	1
Universalist	20	29	2	20	11	55	44

The argument analysis largely coincides with the results of the theme analysis. Again, the majority of units fall within the universalist dimension, with only the NAP scoring a higher number within the center-periphery dimension. The number of arguments that could be interpreted as resting on center-periphery themes is diminutive among three of the parties traditionally associated with the periphery, the MLP, FP, and JDP. However, the True Path Party (TPP), interestingly, scores higher than its "twin," the MLP.

Although the argument analysis is quite unambiguous in quantitative terms, it raises also interesting questions that merit further investigation. Firstly, the distance between the NAP and DLP in the argument analysis differs somewhat from that of the theme analysis, again indicating that although both parties seem to have emphasized centrist concerns, these concerns have played a different role in the parties' arguments. Furthermore, the MLP, whose percentwise loading for the center-periphery dimension in the theme analysis was 6.36, here drops to zero. In other words, the MLP has not paid heed to any centrist concerns whatsoever in arguing for or against the amendments, and has hardly mentioned them during their speeches. Considering the fact that the MLP, NAP, and DLP were coalition partners during the debates, this asymmetry needs to be investigated.

Furthermore, the existence of center-periphery outliers among the arguments of the other parties raises the question of why and how they have argued in terms of center-periphery criteria at all. A plausible explanation for why they have done so could be that they have felt the need to accommodate the nationalist concerns of the NAP by arguing that the amendments will not endanger the unitary and sovereign nature of the state. Because these questions can only be answered by a qualitative, interpretive reading of each party's positioning, using these empirical results as a basis, I now move on to a deeper analysis, taking into account a wider range of contextual factors.

5.3 Interpreting the results

5.3.1 The Republican People's Party[25]

As the prototypical centrist party, the Republican People's Party (RPP) seems to have gone quite far in adopting universalist frames, scoring higher on the universalist dimension in the theme analysis than the DLP, its post-1980 offshoot. This impression is somewhat tampered

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[25] All translations from the transcripts of parliamentary sessions are my own. For the sake of readability, I have only included Turkish words or phrases in square brackets in the main document where the Turkish conveys associations not adequately represented by an English word. The original Turkish quotations are reproduced in footnotes. Page references are to page divisions in the transcripts that have been retrieved from the TGNA's website. Note that these are *not* necessarily identical to page divisions in the printed editions of the transcripts (the *Türkiye Büyük Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*).

by the argument analysis, where the RPP's universalist score is just slightly below that of the DLP, but still quite high.

A closer look at the universalist dimension of the theme analysis reveals that a majority of NPs recorded for the RPP fall under 'International treaties/agreements' and 'Rights,' with 'Legality' and 'Democracy' below. As will become apparent further down, although the RPP is the only party to place more emphasis on legality than on democracy, their concern with legality is shared by several other parties. Two factors probably contributed to this. First, one of the amendment packages not covered by the analysis took place on 3 October 2001, and amended 34 paragraphs of the 1982 Constitution in preparation for the harmonization packages to come. Because these amendments were quite dramatic and relatively recent at the time of the debates, the extent to which the proposals belonging to the NPAA were in accordance with the Constitution can be considered a conveniently available theme, allowing parties in opposition to register discontent with the conduct of parties in government, while still supporting the spirit of the amendments. In many cases, therefore, the emphasis on legality does not necessarily reflect deep-seated ideological concerns, but may be ascribed to the need for parties to signal distance to each other. Secondly, many of the proposals drafted within the framework of the NPAA, both by the three-party coalition government and by the subsequent JDP government, were in fact written quite hastily, and, in the words of Avcı, amounted to "watered down versions of what was really needed" (Avcı 2006: 158). As we will see, several parties reacted to the wording of some of the proposals, arguing that they were not sufficiently precise. In general, however, these hesitations are set aside for the sake of passing necessary laws.

A more interesting aspect of the RPP's emphasis on the legal authority pertains to the relationship between the ostensibly universal status of the norms underlying the reforms and the imperative of national sovereignty intrinsic to the party's ideological *raison d'etre*. Kemalism here proves to be a flexible ideology, capable of both supporting and opposing proposals. One the one hand, several narratives are constructed where EU membership, and the amendments made to accommodate it, are seen as natural outcomes of the modernization projects of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (cf. TBMM 2003b: 17). Indeed, as will become apparent in discussing the discourse of the DLP, the Kemalist thematic of bringing Turkey in line with the civilizational standards of Western modernity (*çağdaşlık*) provides a useful source of justification. Rather than constituting a concession to foreign powers, the normative principles underlying the reforms are commended for being in the spirit of Atatürk, and thus

an inevitable outcome of a process begun at the founding of the Republic. As an extension of this argument, one RPP speaker presents the handing over of legal sovereignty to the European Court of Human Rights positively, as a question of remaining sovereign by the Assembly's doing so of its own will (TBMM 2003a: 42).

On the other hand, this selective use of Kemalist thematics is not without its difficulties. When the topic of recognizing universal rights comes in the shape of demands from foreign powers such as the EU, reconciling it with popular and national sovereignty presents a formidable dilemma. Occasionally, the resulting conceptual difficulties provoke tortured attempts at tackling the paradox head-on:

> Esteemed friends, during this process we are faced with the following dilemma: The effect that the concepts "universality of law" and "national sovereignty" have on each other, and the need to evaluate the results of this, has emerged. From time to time, in some parts of society, the idea is expressed that the universal norms that come with this process do damage to sovereignty. Let us immediately state that in our day, now, protecting the existence of mechanisms that are to secure the right to fair trial, and the implementation of this right, have all become an indispensable right [*sic*.]. Certainly, under any circumstances, the defense of the unitary structure is also a compelling responsibility. It has been equipped with rights and freedoms within this conception and approach. However, taking the individual who is aware of its responsibilities as the foundation, there is a need for democracy for the sake of the individual's freedom, laws for the sake of binding freedom to security, and finally, constitutional amendments that protect basic rights and freedoms vis-à-vis the authority of the public. [26]

This balancing act occasionally tips over into explicit skepticism regarding the entire process. On one occasion, the adaptation process is described as catering to the EU's fickle will, aptly illustrating exasperation with what has been called the "moving target" problem of EU conditionality (Grabbe 2002):

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[26] "Bu süreçte karşımıza şöyle bir ikilem çıkmakta değerli arkadaşlarım: Hukukun evrenselliği ile ulusal egemenlik kavramlarının birbirlerine olan etki ve sonuçlarını değerlendirmek gereği doğmaktadır; çünkü, bu yolla gelen evrensel normların egemenliği zedelediği düşüncesi, toplumun bazı kesimlerinde, zaman zaman ifade edilmektedir. Hemen belirtelim ki, günümüzde, artık, adil yargılanma hakkı ve bu hakkın uygulamaya geçirilmesini sağlayacak mekanizmaların varlığı ve korunması vazgeçilmez bir hak halini almıştır. Elbette, üniter yapının her halükârda korunması da vazgeçilmez bir sorumluluktur. Bu anlayış ve yaklaşım içerisinde, hak ve özgürlüklerle donatılmış; ancak, sorumluluklarının da bilincinde olan bireyi esas alarak, bireyin özgürlüğü için demokrasiye, özgürlüklerin güvenceye bağlanması için hukuka ve en nihayet, kamu otoritesi karşısında temel hak ve özgürlükleri koruyacak çağdaş anayasal düzenlemelere ihtiyaç vardır" (TBMM 2003b: 38).

> Esteemed friends, when is the exalted Assembly going to see the end of this process? When are European Union authorities going to reach the point where they say to us, "we are satisfied, this is what we wanted"? [...] They will probably say, in the manner often seen in the press – just think about the past, remember – "Turkey has taken a very positive step, and we welcome and appreciate this; however, Turkey still has shortcomings; it still has a long way to go; it has to remove these shortcomings. These are important adaptations for us; let's just see them first; we cannot make a decision without having seen them." Thus, once this package has been passed, a typical European Union reply will appear.[27]

There are also interesting combinations of anti-internationalist arguments clad in universalist terms. Here, the validity of universalist arguments is not questioned, but put to use against the Western world's normative criticism of Turkey. For example, one amendment pertaining to the guarantee of basic human rights is discussed in terms of the United States' *lack* of respect for those same rights in its activities in Iraq (TBMM 2003a: 39-40). Another speaker, recalling the domestic debates on the question of allowing US troops to use Turkish airbases during the early phases of their offensive in Iraq, states:

> When speaking of sovereignty and independence, should we not have thought about this sovereignty while the United States of America, whose image is that of an imperialist country, is allowed to have military bases within the borders of the Turkish Republic that we founded in the spirit of 1919!? [28,29]

In the same spirit, the EU's demand for amendments that secure freedom of worship and religious organization are criticized as hypocritical. The EU, it is argued, has not shown the kind of tolerance towards its own Muslim citizens of Turkish descent that it now demands that Turkey shows towards its Christian and Jewish minorities (TBMM 2003b: 19, 27-28). In

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[27] "Yüce Meclis, yolun sonunu ne zaman görecek değerli arkadaşlarım? Avrupa Birliği yetkilileri, bize, ne zaman, işte şimdi tatmin olduk, istediğimiz buydu deme noktasına gelecekler? ... Yani, diyeceklerdir ki, klasik, basında yer alan şekliyle -geçmiş dönemleri bir düşünün, bir hatırlayın- Türkiye çok olumlu bir adım atmıştır, bunu takdirle karşılıyoruz; ama, Türkiye'nin hâlâ eksikleri vardır, katetmesi gereken yol vardır, bunu gidermesi lazımdır; ayrıca, bizim için önemli olan da uygulamalardır, hele bir uygulamaları görelim, bunları görmeden karar veremeyiz. Klasik bir Avrupa Birliği yanıtı, bu paketin onayından sonra da, bu şekilde tecelli edecektir" (TBMM 2003b: 18).

[28] "Egemenlik, bağımsızlık derken, 1919'ların ruhuyla kurduğumuz Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin sınırlarında, emperyalist ülke görüntüsünde olan Amerika Birleşik Devletlerine verilen üslere izin verilirken, bu egemenlik hakkının düşünülmesi gerekmez miydi sevgili kardeşlerim?!" (TBMM 2003a: 42).

[29] The "spirit of 1919" refers to date (19 May 1919) on which general Mustafa Kemal, later Atatürk, landed in Samsun and started his efforts to unite the nationalist independence movement against Greek, British, and Russian forces.

a sense, then, the RPP's Kemalist legacy provides it with the opportunity to fashion itself as more in tune with Western values than the West itself.

The RPP scores higher on the theme cluster 'Secularism' than any of the other parties. One possible explanation for this is the unease likely felt by RPP representatives in accepting and passing laws that were drafted by the JDP. Thus, while discussing a proposal meant to secure the right of religious communities to own real estate, one RPP speaker explicitly directs his criticism of the proposal at the JDP government:

> There is absolutely no obstacle to freedom of religion in Turkey. Give up on denouncing Turkey to Europe. There is exploitation of religion, but absolutely no obstacle to religious freedom in Turkey. Who has ever been prevented from worshiping?[30]

> In Turkey, the founders of the Turkish Republic never oppressed Muslims. They founded a regime entirely based on freedom of religion and conscience, and eighty years later, we are the ones upholding it. Let's be honest![31]

It is, if course, difficult to gauge the extent to which these arguments reflect deep-seated convictions, or if they are made simply in order to maintain "face" in the presence of the JDP. Given the fact that the RPP cooperates in passing all of the amendments, the latter would seem a plausible explanation. However, it may also be the case that the RPP sees EU membership as more important than inhibiting the progress and public image of the JDP.

In sum, the Republican People Party's stance in the debates appears mixed. The analysis leaves little doubt that it has undergone a change. From being the archetypical state elite party, inventor and defender of Kemalist state principles, the RPP representatives' discourse on the NPAA amendments for the most part draws on universalist themes. At the same time, several of their arguments are framed in center-periphery terms, expressing both support for the liberalization measures and distaste for the acquiescent manner in which they are being accepted. Illustrating the mixture of "longing and resentment" mentioned by Keyder (2006: 75), one representative sums up the RPP's attitude to the NPAA like this:

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[30] "Türkiye'de din özgürlüklerinin önünde hiçbir engel yoktur. Türkiye'yi Avrupa'ya jurnallemekten vazgeçin. Türkiye'de din istismarı vardır, din özgürlüklerinin önünde hiçbir engel yoktur. Kim ibadet ederken engellenmiş?!" (TBMM 2003b: 28).

[31] "Türkiye'de, Türkiye Cumhuriyetini kuranlar, Müslümanlara hiçbir zaman baskı yapmamışlardır, Türkiye'de tam bir din ve vicdan hürriyetine dayalı bir rejim kurmuşlardır ve seksen seneden beri, biz, bu rejimi sürdürüyoruz, insaflı olalım!" (TBMM 2003b: 30).

We want to enter the European Union more than anyone else. But not by bending our necks, not by lowering our heads to everything they say.[32]

5.3.2 The Democratic Left Party

While the RPP's dilemma seems to have been of a primarily symbolic character, in the discourse of the DLP, the same challenge takes the more concrete form. As the theme analysis shows, within the center-periphery dimension, the DLP's emphasis is on 'Statism/centralism' and 'Security.' Their central concern thus seems to have been guaranteeing basic rights while preserving security and combating political violence. The argument analysis further fortifies this impression. Although most of the DLP's arguments have been recorded as universalist, a comparatively larger portion of their speaking time has been spent arguing in terms of concerns associated with the center-periphery dimension than that of the RPP.

This must be interpreted against the backdrop of the composition of the TGNA during the parliamentary period in question. As mentioned before, Kurdish separatism was at the top of the agenda during the 1999 elections, and as will soon become apparent, the NAP in particular chose to dwell on these issues during the debates on the first three harmonization packages. This probably encouraged a similar response from the DLP. Thus, from the outset, the DLP asserts that universalist norms, while commendable in themselves, must be balanced against the harsh realities of a politically and culturally divided country:

> Basic rights and freedoms should appear in the laws in the widest form; in particular, limitations on freedom of thought and expression should be removed. However, as stated in paragraph 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights, basic rights and freedoms do not include the freedom to destroy these freedoms. While legislating, every country takes into consideration its own sensitivities and particular conditions. We too, cannot overlook conditions particular to our country.[33]

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[32] "Avrupa Birliğine girmeyi, biz, herkesten çok istiyoruz; ama, boynumuzu bükerek değil; her dediklerine baş eğerek değil" (TBMM 2003b: 29).

[33] "Yasalarda, temel hak ve özgürlükler en geniş biçimiyle yer almalı, özellikle, düşünce ve anlatım özgürlüğü üzerindeki sınırlamalar kaldırılmalıdır. Ancak, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesinin 17 nci maddesinde belirtildiği gibi, temel hak ve özgürlükler, özgürlükleri yok etme özgürlüğünü de içermemektedir. Her ülke, yasa yaparken, kendi duyarlılıklarını ve özel koşullarını dikkate alır. Bizler de, ülkemizin duyarlılıklarını gözardı edemeyiz" (TBMM 2002a: 22).

In general, however, the DLP seems to have managed to distance itself from the nationalistic rhetoric of its coalition partner. Like the RPP, the DLP representatives seem devoted to EU membership, and also appear to have realized the importance of embracing the reforms for their own sake if they are to appear credible in the eyes of Europeans. Thus, one the one hand, the fact that the amendments are made in the context of Turkey's EU candidacy is mentioned several times. For example, towards the end of the 17-hour marathon session in which the third harmonization package was debated and passed, one DLP member likens the parliamentarians to "truck drivers who have set out on the road towards the European Union," and have "just had a roadside soup break."[34] On the other hand, the point is underlined several times that the amendments are made not only in order to gain membership in the European Union, but for the sake of Turkey and its development.

> As I have made clear before, while the replacements made to some of the paragraphs within some of these laws may seem to be carried out in order for us to enter Europe, in essence what we are doing is to bringing our laws up to date with changing global conditions, as well as with the founding principles of our Republic. This is something we should be aware of.[35]

> We are not removing the death penalty in order to enter the European Union, but in order to become a civilized nation. We are doing it for ourselves. [...] Esteemed friends, the Turkish Nation is neither a fool nor an imbecile. The Turkish Nation is civilized, hard-working, and powerful. As the DLP, we support the European Union project and the modernization project.[36]

As is apparent from these quotes, the DLP also shares with the RPP its use of Kemalist themes in justifying the amendments. The twin concepts of "modernity" and "civilization" are drawn upon to justify widening freedom of speech, organizational rights, and removing

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[34] "Bu saatten sonra, Avrupa Birliğine doğru yola çıkmış TIR şoförleri gibiyiz. Biraz evvel çorba molasını da aldık" (TBMM 2002d: 109).

[35] "Bu bazı yasalardaki bazı maddelerin yenilenmesi, daha önce de belirttiğim gibi, Avrupa'ya girmek adına yapılıyor görünse de, özünde yaptığımız, yasalarımızı, değişen dünya koşullarına ve cumhuriyetimizin kuruluş ilkelerine uygun hale getirmektir. Bunu bilmeliyiz ve görmeliyiz" (TBMM 2002d: 70).

[36] "Biz, idamı, Avrupa Birliğine girelim diye kaldırmıyoruz; medenî bir millet olduğumuz için kaldırıyoruz, kendimiz için kaldırıyoruz. [...] Değerli arkadaşlarım, Türk Milleti ne aptaldır, ne enayidir; Türk Ulusu medenîdir, çalışkandır ve güçlüdür. DSP olarak, Avrupa Birliği projesini, çağdaşlık projesini destekliyoruz" (TBMM 2002d: 10).

the death penalty. The latter is presented as an archaic concept, a "primitive system of punishment" that most "civilized countries have foregone during the 21st century."[37]

> Capital punishment has existed throughout history, but as mankind's reason developed, so the process of removing it began. There can be no talk of violating Turkey's rights of sovereignty, and removing capital punishment can not be characterized as a concession.[38]

> The work we are doing [in removing the death penalty] constitutes an important step in the Republican revolution outlined by Mustafa Kemal, and on the road toward EU membership.[39]

There are also interesting examples of what must be read as purposeful re-interpretations of concepts associated with the center-periphery conflict. Like the RPP, the DLP draws on highly symbolical historical themes with strong resonance within a Kemalist national narrative. On the question of allowing religious communities to own property, for example, one amendment is justified with reference to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. In Turkish historiography, the Lausanne Treaty is considered one of great victories of the nationalist independence movement's struggle against foreign colonialist powers, nullifying the humiliating conditions of the Sevres Treaty of 1920. One would therefore expect it to be referred to in the context of arguing against the amendment. In this quote, however, a DLP representative uses it in support of easing restrictions on minority foundations:

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[37] "İdam ilkel bir ceza sistemidir arkadaşlar. 21 inci Yüzyılda medenî uluslar bu sistemden vazgeçiyorlar, hatta büyük bir kesimi de vazgeçti" (TBMM 2002d: 10).

[38] "İdam cezası tarih boyunca var olmuştur; ama, insan aklı geliştikçe, bu ceza ortadan kaldırılmaya başlanmıştır [...] Türkiye'nin egemenlik haklarına aykırılıktan bahsedilemez ve idam cezasının kaldırılması, bir taviz olarak nitelendirilemez" (TBMM 2002d: 10).

[39] "Bu yaptığımız iş, Mustafa Kemal çizgisinin, cumhuriyet ihtilalinin yeni bir aşamasına, AB üyeliğine giden yolda önemli bir adım teşkil ediyor." (TBMM 2002d: 143)

> I am going to clarify the thoughts of my group on the fourth paragraph, regarding the acquirement of real estate by [religious] communities. The phrase "religious communities" [*cemaat*] is a provocative one; unfortunately, because it is capable of conveying the notion of minority, and because it is related to religious beliefs, it is vulnerable to all sorts of suspicion and exploitation. What we need to understand about the phrase "religious community" in the paragraph in question is that it refers to communities as they are defined in the Lausanne Treaty, which can be regarded as our Republic's title deed [*tapu*]. Here, the communities in question are Turkish compatriots. They consist of Greeks, Armenians, and Jews, and are guaranteed security by the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey.[40]

Similar universalist uses of center-periphery thematics are found in discussions on allowing broadcasting in minority languages. As mentioned earlier, the atmosphere of the debates in which the NAP representatives were present were characterized by a high level of sensitivity toward themes associated with Kurdish minorities. One would expect the DLP to address this concern, in particular considering the fact that its government was responsible for bringing Abdullah Öcalan into Turkish custody. However, instead of arguing against the amendments, the DLP generally translates the concern for preserving national unity and security into support for liberalization. For example, one representative argues that easing restrictions will cause separatism to diminish, not flare up:

> I have said this here once before, speaking on the topic of [music] cassettes: my native language is Kurdish; I also love Kurdish music, and listen to it. While it was outlawed, because it was nowhere to be found, I would implore and ask to be allowed to buy it whenever I came across it. But when it became legalized, and [cassettes] were given official seals of approval [*bandrol*], that ardor and enthusiasm, that searching, disappeared from me and from everyone else.[41]

Although this does amount to a justification within the center-periphery frame, it is worth noting that a statement openly displaying a representative's identification as a Kurd would

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[40] "Cemaatlerin taşınmaz mal edinmeleriyle ilgili 4 üncü madde üzerinde, Grubumun düşüncelerini açıklayacağım. "Cemaat" sözcüğü, iştah kabartıcı bir sözcük; azınlık ifade edebildiği için, dinsel inançlarla ilintili olduğu için, maalesef, her türlü kuşkuya, istismara açık. Önümüzdeki yasa maddesindeki "cemaat" sözcüğünden anlamamız gereken, cumhuriyetimizin tapusu niteliğindeki Lozan Antlaşmasında geçen cemaatlerdir. Burada, söz konusu olan cemaatler, Türk yurttaşlarıdır; Rumlar, Ermeniler ve Musevilerden oluşan ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasının güvencesi altında olan Türk yurttaşlarıdır" (TBMM 2002d: 58).

[41] "Ben, bir kez daha bu kürsüden kaset konusunu söylemiştim: Benim anadilim Kürtçedir; müziği de severim, dinlerim de. Yasak olduğu zaman, kimde bulsam, yalvararak alıyordum, rica ediyordum; çünkü yoktu. Ne zamanki serbest oldu, bandrole bağlandı, hakikaten, o şevk, o heyecan, o arayış kalmadı kimsede; ne bende ne de bir başkasında" (TBMM 2002d: 103).

have been all but unthinkable a few years earlier. In a sense, it is an example of how far it is possible to go in embracing cultural and ethnic pluralism without entirely leaving a state-centered frame.

In sum, the DLP appears to have sought a middle ground between center-periphery and universalist justification. Like the RPP, it goes a long way towards adopting a universalist frame in discussing the amendments. It has an overall slightly higher emphasis on universalist than on center-periphery thematics, but tends to draw on center-periphery thematics in the context of supporting liberalization measures. At the same time, a closer reading has shown that the theme analysis does reflect a certain amount of misgivings with regard to security issues.

5.3.3 The Nationalist Action Party

The NAP has a high score on all theme clusters in the center-periphery dimension, but 'Kurdish separatism' and 'security' are particularly high. Their equally high score on this dimension in the argument analysis suggests that NAP representatives have been disproportionately concerned with the consequences that the amendments will have on the behavior of Kurdish minorities, and on the latitude afforded to the state in controlling them. A closer reading of the transcripts confirms this impression: unlike nearly all other parties, the NAP *opposed* many of the proposals, despite the fact that they were drafted by fellow government parties.

This may be partly explained by the state of the coalition government during the sessions. While the two first adaptation packages receive grudging support from the NAP, the third and longest debate sees much of the NAP's harshest criticism and all-out rejections. By the time of the third debate, the coalition partners had openly acknowledged their difficulties in cooperating, and had proposed early elections to be held in November 2002. Thus, in all likelihood, the NAP representatives felt free to speak their minds independently of the DLP and MLP.

Another aspect of the NAP's discourse not captured by the theme and argument analyses is the overall tone of their speeches. The speeches made by NAP representatives grow increasingly confrontational toward the end of the third debate, explicitly addressing the

present members of other parties in an emotionally laden language. When representatives of other parties speak, NAP members continuously disrupt their speeches.[42] Several of the NAP's arguments have not been recorded in the argument analysis at all, due to the fact that they do not address any legislative proposal whatsoever. Instead, much of their argumentation consists of defensive posturing, arguing about who proposed what first, and accusing other parties of selling out to the West and of unjustly attributing the NAP with various views:

> I would like to address the members of the TPP, who say they are nationalists: Is unconditional surrender to the Europeans your idea of nationalism?! [...] You members of the Felicity Party: since when did you become defenders of the Western clubs? Do you suffer pangs of conscience over the sale of your native land?![43]

This behavior is quite unique to the NAP in the material analyzed, and may seem irrational. The TGNA bylaws provide representatives with regularized opportunities to address personal affronts and perceived injustices towards themselves or their parties; thus, spending so much of the time allotted to discussing the amendments on bickering would qualify as counter-productive. When seen in connection with the substance of their arguments, however, it can at least partially be explained by the NAP's conception of what is at stake in passing the amendments. A look at the universalist dimension of the thematic analysis reveals an emphasis on 'International treaties/ agreements,' followed by 'Rights' and 'Democracy.' This suggests, first of all, that the democratic and rights-based normative dimension of the amendments is treated as subordinated to the external dimension. Like the RPP, then, there is a significant tendency to frame the amendments as impositions from external forces. Unlike the RPP, however, the NAP sees these impositions as part of a highly concrete plan, "a project […] to invent minorities whose ultimate aim is to divide and tear

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[42] A member of the New Turkey Party, commenting on the NAP's unorderly conduct, expressed his frustration like this: "Esteemed friends, having witnessed the scene we have experienced the last couple days, one does not feel like one is in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, nor in any grand national assembly whatsoever, but in the corner of a coffeehouse." ("Değerli arkadaşlarım, özellikle iki gündür yaşadığımız tabloyu görünce, insan kendisini, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinde değil de, bu büyük milletin Meclisinde değil de, bir kahvehane köşesindeymiş gibi hissediyor") (TBMM 2002d: 59).

[43] "Milliyetçi olduklarını ifade eden DYP'lilere seslenmek istiyorum: Sizin milliyetçilik anlayışınız, kayıtsız şartsız Avrupalılara teslim olmak mıdır?! […] Siz Saadet Partililer, ne zamandan beri Batı kulüplerinin savunucusu oldunuz; vatan toprağının satılması vicdanlarınızı sızlatmıyor mu?!" (TBMM 2002d: 59).

asunder Turkey."[44] Thus, if the other parties do not share this view, they are in effect cooperating with the enemy:

> The respected secretary-general of one of our parties that, having stood united for years, is now separating into two, gave a statement yesterday about the early elections that will be held on the third of November, where he emphasized that the elections will stand between the Nationalist Forces and the collaborators.[45] Who said this? – The secretary general of a party that today is fervently supporting the European Union and the Copenhagen Criteria.[46]

Secondly, a closer reading of the transcripts reveal that even in the domestic context, the NAP's conception of democracy and rights amounts to respecting the will of a "people" weary of separatist terror. Their confrontational passages abound with phrases invoking the authority of the Turkish people, such as "the people have learned from their mistakes, and are listening to you" and "you should know that the Turkish people will never forgive you for this."[47] Combined with their antagonistic conception of the EU, a picture is painted of a Turkey under siege from both internal and external enemies, suppressing the will of the people in the name of rights and democracy. The PKK is described as an organization that has "fought to split and tear asunder the Republic of Turkey with the help of foreign powers."[48] The process of adapting to EU conditionality, in turn, is said to "leave the door

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[44] "... bugün ülkemizde, nihaî amacı Türkiye'yi bölüp parçalamak olan yapay azınlıklar üretme projesi uygulanmaktadır" (TBMM 2002d: 119).

[45] The "Nationalist Forces" (*Kuvayi Milliyeciler*) refers to Atatürk's army that fought the War of Independence against Greek, Russian, and British occupiers. "Collaborators" (*mandacılar*) refers to Turks who collaborated with and supported the British occupiers during the War of Independence.

[46] "Yıllarca beraberken, ikiye ayrılan siyasî partilerimizden birinin sayın genel sekreteri 3 Kasımda yapılacak erken seçimler sebebiyle dün verdiği demeçte, bu seçimlerin Kuvayi Milliyeciler ile mandacılar arasında geçeceğini vurguluyor. Bunları kim söylemiş; Avrupa Birliği ve Kopenhag kriterleri diyen ve bugün bu yasa teklifini hararetle destekleyen bir partinin genel sekreteri" (TBMM 2002d: 111).

47 "Halk sizi ibretle dinliyor" (TBMM 2002d: 57). "Biliniz ki, bu davranışınızı tarih ve Türk Milleti asla affetmeyecektir" (Ibid.:59).

[48] "1984'ten 2000 yılına kadar 36 000 vatan evladının ölümüne sebep olan ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devletini bölmeye ve parçalamaya yönelik dış güçlerle birlikte hareket ederek mücadele eden bölücü PKK örgütünün yaptıklarına 'Türkiye'de demokrasi yoktur; dolayısıyla da, sesini duyurabilmek için böyle bir yolu denemek zorunda kalmıştır' demek, masum bir davranış mıdır?" (TBMM 2002a: 35).

open" for "the PKK's politicization program."[49] Consequently, "[a]t this moment, in front of you, all the families of the victims, all the military heroes are watching us and the decision we are about to make."[50]

This highly antagonistic take on Kemalist nationalism receives its fullest expression in the NAP's use of historical narrative in framing the proposals. While the DLP draws on the historical examples of the Sevres and Lausanne treaties to justify easing restrictions of minority rights, the NAP's use of historical narratives fits squarely within a militant centrist understanding of the situation, complete with far-ranging conspiracy theories. Ultimately, it seems, complying with the EU's wishes entails selling the Fatherland "to Armenians, Greeks, and Jews," an act that "will never be forgiven by history or by the Turkish nation."[51]

> [Y]esterday, empires were the biggest obstacle to international capital. Then, the empires collapsed, and nation states were founded. Today, the biggest obstacles to international capital, which has ascended to the highest footing in both qualitative and quantitative terms, is the nation state. As the examples of Yugoslavia and Slovakia show, right now, the process of eliminating the nation state has begun. Turkey is among the closest objectives of this project, the final aim of which is to found a global state consisting of small city-states. The historical hidden plan of this project consists in the age-old Eastern policy of throwing us Turks out of Europe, then out of Anatolia, and finally driving us into exile in the Eastern Caucasus. We cannot explain or understand the separatist terror that has cost the lives of thousands of our people, nor fully see the political separatist tendencies behind the Copenhagen Criteria, without taking this into account. […] We, as the Nationalist Action Party, consider the proposal to allow the broadcasting and teaching of mother tongues to be a forerunner for such a separatist project. An attempt is being made to create false minorities in our country, even false nations. The second stage of these tendencies will be federation, and finally, the realization of Sevres.[52]

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[49] "Değerli milletvekilleri, kafamızı kuma sokmanın anlamı yok. Avrupa Birliğine girme süreciyle, bu noktadaki kararlılığımızla, bu noktadaki uzlaşmamızla PKK'nın siyasallaşma programının birbiriyle örtüşmesine çanak tutamayız, müsaade edemeyiz. [...] Buna kapı aralayamayız" (TBMM 2002a: 25).

[50] "Şu anda, karşınızda, bütün şehit aileleri, bütün gaziler burayı gözetliyor, bizim alacağımız kararı gözetliyor" (TBMM 2002d: 7).

[51] "Vatan toprağını, Ermenilere, Rumlara ve Yahudilere satmak isteyenleri tarih ve Türk Milleti affetmeyecektir" (TBMM 2002d: 57).

[52] "[D]ün, uluslararası sermayenin önündeki en büyük engel imparatorluklardı; imparatorluklar yıkıldı, ulus devletler kuruldu. Bugün ise, niteliği ve niceliği en üst seviyeye çıkmış olan uluslararası sermayenin önündeki en büyük engel, ulus devletlerdir. Yugoslavya ve Slovakya örneğinde olduğu

That this situational definition is meant quite literally is apparent from other passages, too. Speaking of the Greek Orthodox patriarchate in the neighborhood of Fener in Istanbul, one MP states that "[w]e are worried that a new Fener State will be invented in Istanbul; this is what our concern stems from."[53]

Another selective use of Kemalist thematics is found in the NAP's emphasis on national sovereignty and pride. Unlike the RPP and the DLP two former parties, the NAP shows no signs of compromising sovereignty in order to strengthen minority rights. To the extent that minorities are discussed, this occurs only in the context of asserting the sovereignty of the Turkish state vis-à-vis other countries. Thus, European countries are criticized for not fulfilling the criteria that they are imposing on Turkey. In discussing an amendment that would allow minority foundations to obtain real estate in Turkey, one representative states: "If the principle of reciprocity were respected, would the remains of tens of thousands of our foundations in the Balkans have been destroyed? Would those who are unable to tolerate even Turkish gravestones have been respectful of our mosques, religious schools, fountains and caravanserais?"[54] Similarly, easing restrictions on the use of minority languages amounts to treachery against the memory of Atatürk. Here, the RPP and DLP's attempts at re-interpreting Kemalism to allow for a greater amount of cultural pluralism in the public sphere are explicitly contested.

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gibi, şimdi, ulus devletlerin tasfiye süreci başlatılmıştır. Nihaî amacı kent devletçiklerinden oluşan küresel devleti kurmak olan bu projenin yakın hedefleri arasında Türkiye de vardır. Temel amacı, biz Türkleri önce Avrupa'dan, sonra da Anadolu'dan atarak Kafkasların doğusuna sürmek olan kadim Şark politikası da, bu projenin tarihî arka planını oluşturmaktadır. Bu temel gerçekleri görmeden, ne binlerce insanımızın canına mal olan bölücü terörü gerektiği gibi anlatabiliriz, anlayabiliriz ne de Kopenhag Kriterlerinin arasına sıkıştırılmış olan siyasal bölücü dayatmaları net olarak görebiliriz. […] Biz, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi olarak, anadilde yayın ve öğrenimi öngören kanun teklifini, böyle bir bölücü projenin öncü adımı olarak değerlendiriyoruz. Bu yolla, ülkemizde yapay azınlıklar, hatta yapay milletler oluşturulmak istenmektedir. Bu dayatmaların ikinci aşaması, federasyon olacaktır; son aşaması ise, Sevr'in gerçekleştirilmesidir" (TBMM 2002d: 119-20).

[53] "İstanbul'da yeni Fener Devleti icat edilmesin diye endişe ediyoruz; endişemiz bundan kaynaklanıyor" (TBMM 2002d: 65).

[54] "Eğer, karşılıklılık ilkesi tanınsaydı, Balkanlar'daki onbinlerce vakıf eserimiz yerle bir edilebilir miydi?! Türklerin mezar taşlarına bile tahammül edemeyenler, camilerimize, medreselerimize, çeşme ve kervansaraylarımıza saygılı oldular mı?!" (TBMM 2002d: 57).

> The exalted Atatürk did not instate the Law on the Unification of Education and carry out the language reform in order for you to change the language of instruction here in the exalted Assembly that He founded. This is not what he carried out the language reform for. […] Some people, by stating in the name of Kemalism and the Republic that they are going to carry Turkey into the future, are unfortunately going to create serious troubles in Turkey. They are in fact leading [Turkey] into an outcome that may once again pit brother against brother as enemies.[55]

In sum, the NAP shows no signs of yielding its centrist position to allow for universalist considerations. Both the theme analysis and argument analysis show an overall emphasis on center-periphery concerns, and as the examples above show, the rhetorical context in which they occur is unyieldingly aligned with a centrist-nationalist position. All attempts at re-interpreting the center-periphery dichotomy in a less antagonistic fashion are interpreted by the NAP as hidden attempts at undermining the sovereignty of the Turkish state. Thus, representatives of other parties frequently find themselves in a position where they have to defend their positions in terms of centrist concerns. As we have seen, this is to some extent true of the DLP, and as the next chapter will show, the True Path Party may also have been affected.

5.3.4 The True Path Party

As the theme analysis shows, like the FP and JDP, a good portion of the noun phrases recorded for the TPP in the universalist dimension comes under the theme clusters 'Democracy' and 'Rights.' A closer reading of the transcripts furthermore reveals that the TPP has gone beyond appeals to empty phrases, and has been very concerned with discussing the meaning and substance of these terms. Particular attention is given to the need for strengthening organizational rights in order to bring about a sound democracy. In this, most of the amendments are commended for breaking with the "mechanical and legalistic" approach of the past.[56]

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[55] "Yüce Atatürk, Tevhidi Tedrisat Kanununu ve harf inkılabını, siz, O'nun kurduğu Yüce Mecliste eğitim dilini değiştiresiniz diye çıkarmadı; harf inkılabını bunun için yapmadı. […] Birileri, Atatürkçülük adı altında, cumhuriyet adı altında, Türkiye'yi yarınlara taşıyacağını söyleyerek, maalesef, Türkiye'nin içinde ciddî anlamda sıkıntılar yaratacak, kardeşi kardeşe yeniden düşman edebilecek neticeye doğru götürüyor" (TBMM 2002d: 95).

[56] "Bakınız, devletimiz, sistemimiz bu sorunu, henüz, sosyolojik akılla okuyabilmiş değildir, mekanik bir yasakçı gözle okuyor" (TBMM 2002b: 37).

One possibly self-interested rationale for this concern is hinted at in pages where the TPP's lineage is mentioned. In the context of discussing an amendment to the Law on Political Parties, the Democrat Party (DP) of the 1950s is mentioned as having, for the first time, "changed governance with the help of the will of the nation."[57] Along with the Justice Party (JP) of the 1960s and 70s, it is said to be "in the roots of the True Path Party."[58] As is well known, the DP ended tragically with the coup in 1960, when their leader and Prime Minister, Menderes, and two of the DP government's ministers, were executed. The JP, the most powerful party of the twenty years it was in existence, performed a constant balancing act to remain in favor with the Army until its demise, along with all other parties, in the 1980 coup (cf. Çizre 1993). It is therefore not surprising that one TPP representative describes political parties as "a bridge between the nation and state, and a very important element in maintaining peaceful relations between [them],"[59] which therefore "must be protected."[60] In one passage, this lineage is also linked directly to the effort to join the EU:

> The European Union has been a fifty-year long struggle. When Celal Bayar and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu,[61] who had been put on death row on Yassıada, saw their dear friends placed in a boat, their hands tied behind their backs, to be sent to İmralı Island for the execution of their sentences, Celal Bayar turned to Mr. Zorlu and asked: "Mr. Zorlu, if the European Union accepts Turkey, what effect will this have on our social and economic life?"[62]

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[57] "Siyasî partilere biz çok önem vermekteyiz. 1946 ile başlayan siyasî hareket, 1950'nin 14 Mayısıyla, Demokrat Parti iktidarıyla, ilk defa, millet iradesiyle idareyi değiştirmiştir" (TBMM 2002c: 43).

[58] "Doğru Yol Partisi, köklerinden olan Demokrat Partisini, öz kökü olan Adalet Partisini, sistemin bu yanlış yorumuyla kaybetmesi tecrübesini de gözeterek [...]" (TBMM 2002b: 37).

[59] "[S]iyasî partilerin, milletle devlet arasında bir köprü olduğunu, hizmetlerde, devletle milletin barışık olmasında çok önemli bir unsur olduğunu ifade etmiştim." (TBMM 2002c: 53).

[60] "Siyasî partilerin çok önemli olduğunu, milletle devleti kucaklaştıran bir unsur olduğunu ve siyasî partilerin çok önemli bir şekilde korunması lazım geldiğini düşünüyorum" (TBMM 2002c: 43).

[61] Celal Bayar was the one of the founders of the Democrat Party, and president of the Republic 1950-1960. Rüştü Zorlu was foreign minister of the Democrat Party government. Both were sentenced to death by the military tribunal after the coup of 1960, but Bayar's sentence was commuted due to his age.

[62] "Avrupa Birliği, elli yıldan beri devam eden bir mücadele. Yassıada'da idama mahkûm edilen Celal Bayar ve Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, diğer kıymetli arkadaşları, elleri arkadan bağlı, motora bindirilir ve İmralı Adasına infaz için sevk edilirler. Celal Bayar, Fatin Bey'e döner "Fatin Bey, Türkiye Avrupa Birliğine kabul edilirse, bunun sosyal ve ekonomik hayatımıza tesirleri ne olur" diye sorar" (TBMM 2002d: 27).

Thus, it is more than likely that the TPP, identifying with the victims of political oppression, welcome the EU-related amendments as strengthening their own position. For the most part, however, the TPP representatives go far in underlining the inherent necessity of the reforms. "The goal of entering the European Union," it is stated, "is first and foremost a project to get the state, the people, the nation, and the Turkish human being on its feet."[63]

Only when it comes to the debates on the third package do the TPP representatives show strains. As can be seen from the argument analysis, a larger portion of the TPP's arguments rely on themes associated with the center-periphery dimension than their "twin," the Motherland Party. All of these occur during the third debate. There is still an emphasis on rights, but the need for liberalizing reforms is more often presented in terms of national interests. As criticism starts to be directed at the behavior of the NAP, the latter's centrist line of argumentation comes to be adopted by the TPP, and put to use in supporting the amendments. Much like the DLP, then, it is argued that the EU does not pose a threat to national unity, but that the amendments may in fact strengthen the nation: "There is not one country that, upon entering the European Union, has been split into pieces, not one country whose borders have changed, or whose culture has been lost."[64] That these arguments are directed at the NAP is clear when seen in context.

> Now, one wing of the coalition has criticized the European Union's criteria. Very well, fine, what is your solution? Let's solve it; let's make heroic speeches, let's save our party, but at what price? At the price of blocking Turkey's progress. And the name of this is nationalism, love of one's fatherland, is that so?![65]

Just as the NAP criticizes the TPP's conception of national interests, then, so the TPP argues that the NAP's position does more harm than good to the Turkish nation. Thus, although the

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[63] "Sosyolojik gözle değerlendirebilirsiniz, jeostratejik bir zaruret olarak da görebilirsiniz; ama, bir hususa dikkatlerinizi çekmek istiyorum: Avrupa Birliği veya Batılılaşma hedefi, en başta, devletin, halkı, milleti, Türk insanını yola getirmesi projesiydi" (TBMM 2002b: 36).

[64] "İkincisi, Avrupa Birliğine [...] girip de parçalanan bir tek ülke yok, Avrupa Birliğine girip de sınırları değişen bir tek ülke yok, Avrupa Birliğine girip de kültürünü kaybetmiş bir ülke yok, sınırlarından taş zorlanmış ülke yok" (TBMM 2002d: 121).

[65] "Şimdi, koalisyonun bir kanadında, Avrupa Birliği kriterlerine itiraz var; çok güzel, tamam; çözüm yolunuz nedir; reddedelim, hamasi nutuklar atalım, partimizi kurtaralım; ne pahasına; Türkiye'nin önünü tıkama pahasına. Bunun adı da milliyetçilik, vatanseverlik; öyle mi?!" (TBMM 2002d: 9).

TPP occasionally reverts to nationalist argumentation, it is clear that their aim in doing so is to bring the understanding of national interests into harmony with the EU-related reforms.

5.3.5 The Motherland Party

In quantitative terms, the Motherland Party's contribution to the debates is very limited, with a total of 11 speeches. This quantitative paucity is to some extent compensated for by the quality of the individual argument. As one of the coalition partners in the 1999-2002 government, the MLP participated in drafting the proposal texts of the first and second packages, and presented the third package alone when the coalition was falling apart. One would therefore expect MLP representatives to not only support the packages, but to have a strong line of argumentation to do so with. As both the theme and argument analyses show, their framing has been done in terms of the universalist dimension more than that of any of the other parties, with 93 percent of their themes, and 100 percent of their arguments, recorded as universalist. Moreover, in relation to the number of arguments, the number of themes recorded is quite high, suggesting an efficient use of time, with a high frequency of references to value-laden themes.

Within the theme analysis, a majority of themes fall under the cluster 'International treaties/ agreements.' A contextual reading shows that many of these occur in the context of explaining the proposals' legal genealogy in terms of the history of the international treaties and declarations that they derive their principles from. These treaties and declarations are, in turn, always presented in terms of their *inherent* legitimacy, never as impositions from outside, nor as strategically valuable from the viewpoint of national interests. Furthermore, the MLP seems to perceive no discrepancy between the founding principles of the Republic and the process it has now entered. The NPAA is described as "an opportunity to rectify the mistakes we have made during our two hundred year long Westernization process and forty year long European Union process."[66] These mistakes, furthermore, have already been identified and described by the founding father of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk:

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[66] "İkiyüz yıllık Batılılaşma ve kırk yıllık Avrupa Birliği sürecinde yaptığımız hataları ve kaybettiğimiz zamanları telafi etme fırsatıyla karşı karşıyayız" (TBMM 2002b: 34).

Esteemed friends, we should know that resisting the flow of change and history is a wasted effort. These efforts are anyhow not in the interest of our nation. We should all take the great Atatürk as an example in this. The great Atatürk, who waged war against the West, immediately after the war stated that our nation's goal is to become one with the West. On his historical speech on the 29th of October 1923 he said, "We want to modernize our nation. All our efforts are aimed at bringing into being a modern, and therefore Western, government in Turkey." Again, explaining where the Ottomans went wrong, the great Atatürk said: "The fall of the Ottoman state started the day it, haughty from the victories over the West, cut the ties that bound it to the European people."[67]

Although this may seem a universalist use of centrist arguments, in the context in which it occurs, it is clear that the target of the argument is the state-centered appeals of the NAP. For the MLP, following the example of Atatürk means devolving the state's dominance and providing civil society and private enterprise with more elbowroom. Countries with developed and strong civil societies, it is argued, are frequently also the richest countries, because "a liberal economy and free market works better in countries where free thought and democratic criteria are more developed."[68] To achieve this, however, the state must yield some of its transcendence, and allow for two-way influence between state and society.

Look, our basic problem is this: in our country, in our eyes, the state is our father... We have no objection to the state being a father; however, our father is a little harsh, a little authoritarian. What we want, what we desire, is that our father becomes a little more compassionate and tolerant towards his children.[69]

[67] "Değişme ve tarihin akışına direnmenin boşuna bir gayret olduğunu bilmeliyiz değerli arkadaşlar. Ayrıca, bu direnişler milletimizin menfaatına da değildir. Bu konuda, hepimiz Büyük Atatürk'ü örnek almalıyız. Batı'ya karşı savaşan Büyük Atatürk, savaştan hemen sonra ülkemizin hedefini Batı'yla bütünleşmek olarak ortaya koymuştur. 29 Ekim 1923'te yaptığı tarihî konuşmada "milletimizi asrîleştirmek istiyoruz. Bütün çalışmamız Türkiye'de asrî, binaenaleyh, Batılı bir hükümet vücuda getirmek içindir" demiştir. Yine, Büyük Atatürk, Osmanlının nerede hata yaptığını anlatırken şöyle demiştir: 'Osmanlı Devletinin sukutu, garba karşı elde ettiğimiz muzafferiyetlerden mağrur olarak kendisini Avrupa milletine bağlayan rabıtalarını kestiği gün başlamıştır'" (TBMM 2002b: 34).

[68] "Demokrasileri oturmuş, siyasî çarkları daha iyi dönen, daha iyi işleyen, sivil toplumu gelişmiş ülkelerin aynı zamanda zengin ülkeler olması tamamen tesadüf mü? Bu durum, liberal ekonominin ve serbest pazarın, hür düşünce ve demokratik kriterlerin daha çok geliştiği ülkelerde daha iyi çalıştığını göstermiyor mu" (TBMM 2002b: 34).

[69] "Bizde, işte, temel mesele bu. Bizim ülkemizde, bizim gözümüzde devlet, baba... Devletin babalığına bir itirazımız yok; ancak, bizim baba biraz sert, biraz da otoriter. Bizim istediğimiz, arzuladığımız, bizim babamızın, evlatlarına biraz daha şefkatli olması, evlatlarına karşı biraz daha hoşgörülü olması" (TBMM 2002b: 35).

This line of argument is also extended to permit minorities an equal range of freedoms to that of Turkish Muslims. There are a few passages that recall the DLP's argument that minorities should be allowed broadcasting in the mother tongues, because this will have the effect of ameliorating social unrest. Thus, for example, "the bases of separatist movements have always consisted of cultures that were considered to be nothing, and purposely overlooked."[70] On the whole, however, their arguments are of a principled nature:

> [T]he foundations of democracy are rights and freedoms. Every human being is born with certain rights, and those rights cannot in any way be circumscribed or limited. Communication is one of these rights. It is a well-known fact that a segment of our citizens, for reasons of tradition and of other social factors, use their mother tongues. […] It is up to us to make amendments according to the requirements of the age and of becoming a democratic state. […] This is a guarantee that our unity and wholeness will be protected and that a synergy will be created out of differences.[71]

In this, the MLP is closely aligned with the TPP of the first two debates. This impression is fortified by the fact that the MLP also expresses its identification with the two large populist parties of the past, the Democrat Party and the Justice Party. Like the TPP, this identification is asserted in the context of narrating the history of Turkey's relations with the EU.

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[70] "Yok sayılan, görmezden gelinen kültürler, ayrılıkçı hareketlerin hep temelini oluşturmuşlardır" (TBMM 2002d: 97).

[71] "Sayın milletvekilleri, demokrasinin temeli, biraz önce de vurguladığım gibi, hak ve özgürlüklerdir. Her insan belli haklarla doğar ve bu haklar hiçbir şekilde engellenemez ve sınırlanamaz. İletişim de bu haklardan biridir. Geleneksel ve toplumsal nedenlerle vatandaşlarımızın bir kısmının anadillerini kullandıkları bilinen bir gerçektir [...] Bize düşen, demokratik devlet olmanın ve çağın gereklerine ve toplumun ihtiyaçlarına göre bir düzenleme yapma zorunluluğudur. […] Bu, birlik ve bütünlüğümüzü korumanın ve farklılıklardan sinerji yaratmanın teminatıdır" (TBMM 2002d: 97).

> Thanks to the outstanding efforts of the late Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, after Greece had started talks with the Common Market on the 1st of March 1960, on the 21st of April, a decision was made to continue the talks with both our countries together. Unfortunately, my dear friends, this process was cut short by the 1960 *coup d'etat*. Later, 1980 became another fateful year on our road to Europe. In that year, the Foreign Minister of the Demirel Government, Hayrettin Erkmen, announced that he would apply for full membership in order to avoid the probable veto by Greece, which was to become a member of the Community one year later. However, Erkmen's political life did not last long enough; he lost his position after a question-answer session in Parliament, and thus the project was sabotaged. The *coup d'etat* on the 12th of September caused a standstill in our relations with Europe until 1986, and as all of you know, this adventure started up again on April 14th 1987, when the Motherland Party Government applied for full membership.[72]

Thus, in practical terms, the differences between the TPP and MLP seem miniscule. Where the TPP, in opposition, occasionally draws on centralist argumentation, the MLP holds on to its universalist frame of reference throughout the debates, and is able to do so due to its position as a government party. In terms of their overall positions, however, both parties argue for less state involvement in social life, and see the process of adapting to EU conditionality as a necessary step in the right direction. Their positions are thus largely in accordance with what we would expect based on their previous histories.

5.3.6 The Felicity Party

Like the MLP, the FP has a very high score on the universalist dimension of both the theme and argument analyses. Given the official anti-EU stance of the party, this is quite surprising. It is also somewhat unexpected in light of the fact that the FP, during the parliamentary period in question, was in opposition to the government coalition that drafted the bills. One would expect, first of all, criticism of the proposals, and secondly, that such criticism was

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[72] "Dışişleri Bakanı rahmetli Fatin Rüştü Zorlu'nun üstün çabalarıyla, büyük gayretleriyle, Yunanistan'ın, 1 Mart 1960'ta ortaklık görüşmelerine başlamasının ardından, 21 Nisanda, her iki ülkenin birlikte bu görüşmeleri sürdürmesi kararı verilmiştir. Ne yazık ki, bu süreç, 1960 darbesiyle kesilmiştir değerli arkadaşlar. Daha sonra, 1980 yılı, Avrupa yolundaki kader yıllarımızdan biridir. O yıl, Demirel Hükümetinin Dışişleri Bakanı Hayrettin Erkmen, bir yıl sonra Topluluğa üye olacak Yunanistan'ın muhtemel vetosundan kurtulmak için üyelik başvurusu yapacağını açıklamıştır; ancak, Erkmen'in siyasî ömrü buna yetmemiş, bir gensoruyla düşürülmüş ve bu proje sabote edilmiştir. Arkasından gelen 12 Eylül darbesi, Avrupa'yla ilişkilerimizin 1986 yılına kadar kesilmesine sebep olmuştur ve hepinizin bildiği gibi, bu macera, 14 Nisan 1987'de, Anavatan Partisi Hükümetinin tam üyelik başvurusuyla yeniden başlamıştır" (TBMM 2002b: 33-34).

presented in centrist-nationalist terms, emphasizing the fact that the NPAA transfers sovereignty to a supra-national set of institutions.

A closer reading reveals that much of the FP's discourse does consist of criticism of the proposals. However, instead of objecting to the normative principles underlying them, their harshest criticism is directed at the half-hearted nature of many of the proposals. The FP places itself completely within a universalist frame of justification, and demands more liberalization, not less. Thus, the coalition government is told that "you have no intention of fulfilling the requirements of democracy. You still have no interest in our people's rights and freedoms; what is more, you are afraid of rights and freedoms. In other words, you are afraid of the people and the nation."[73]

One possible explanation for this can be found in the FP's thematic distribution within the universalist dimension. A notable feature of the FP representatives' universalist discourse is their emphasis on rights. In the thematic analysis, themes relating to this cluster appear more often, in absolute terms, than in the discourse of any other parties. Moreover, within this cluster, their emphasis is primarily on rights pertaining to freedom of speech, thought, opinion, and conscience, with less emphasis placed on the wider terms 'human rights' and 'basic rights.' Although the variable 'Rights' used in the theme analysis does not capture the distinction between these two concepts, a secondary theme analysis reveals that a majority of the units loaded on this variable for the Felicity Party belong to the latter category (see Table 1).

Table 1

	RPP	**DLP**	**NAP**	**TPP**	**MLP**	**FP**	**JDP**
Basic human rights	33	13	13	43	37	12	34
Freedom of speech, conscience	12	19	7	10	11	44	19

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[73] "Demokrasinin gereğini yapmak diye bir niyetiniz yok. İnsanımızın hak ve özgürlükleri, sizi, hâlâ ilgilendirmiyor; hatta, siz, hak ve özgürlüklerden, yani, halktan, milletten korkuyorsunuz" (TBMM 2002c: 61).

A plausible explanation would thus be that the FP, as a party representing an Islamist identity movement, supports widening the scope of freedom of speech out of self-interest. There are several examples of passages that would support such a conclusion. For example, during a question session regarding changes to the Criminal Code that were meant to strengthen freedom of speech, one FP representative asks the Minister of Justice, Hikmet Sami Türk (DLP), whether the amendment implies that a number of imprisoned journalists from the daily newspapers New Asia (*Yeni Asya*) and the National Newspaper (*Millî Gazete*) may be acquitted and freed.[74] These newspapers have well-known connections to the Islamist *Nurcu* and National Outlook movements, respectively, and at the time of the debate, New Asia had recently been sentenced to close down for one month.[75]

Similarly, when discussing measures to strengthen civil society, examples are taken primarily from Islamic associations. At one point, an FP speaker begins his argument by referring to the importance of religious associations. Upon being asked to specify what kinds of religious associations he is referring to, he answers that he means religious communities in general. However, when giving examples of the activities of these associations, all of the examples are Islamic associations (TBMM 2002d: 53-4).

Moreover, the arguments where the Law on Political Parties is discussed leave no doubt that the FP's stance, like that of the TPP, is informed by the experiences of its predecessor parties. However, while the TPP draws on parallels to historically remote parties, the FP's predecessor parties have had recent brushes with the centrist elite. One FP representative, criticizing what he perceives to be vague formulations in one of the proposals, states that in the past, "tens of parties were closed, supposedly by court orders, but everybody knows that they were closed by politics, by the requirements of economic conditions, or arbitrarily. […] In one respect, to close a party is to deal a heavy blow to democracy's right of life."[76] Later,

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[74] "Yine, bu değişiklikle, şu anda hapishanede bulunan Yeni Asya Gazetesi sahibi Sayın Mehmet Kutlular, Fikret Başkaya ve benzeri düşünür ve yazarlar, beraat ve tahliye imkânına kavuşabilecekler mi? Yine, 312'den mahkûm olan birçok yazar, Yeni Asya Gazetesi yazarları, Millî Gazete yazarları ve daha birçok gazetenin yazarları bundan istifade edebilecek mi, bunlar hakkında beraat kararı verilebilecek mi?" (TBMM 2002a: 33).

[75] This occurred on 24 January 2001. On the history of *Yeni Asya*, see Yavuz (2003: 173). *Millî Gazete* has been a self-declared supporter of Erbakan's parties since the National Order Party.

[76] "Onlarca parti kapatıldı, sözde, mahkeme kararıyla kapatıldı; ama, herkes biliyor ki, siyaseten kapatıldı, konjonktürün gereği olarak kapatıldı, keyfî olarak kapatıldı. […]. Siyasî partiyi kapatmak

presenting the FP's own proposal meant to make the criteria for closing a party less equivocal, one MP says: "Look, last year, after the party that we were members of was closed, we founded a new party. You didn't experience it, so you don't know…"[77]

However, the FP's universalist discourse cannot be completely reduced to a matter of self-interest. On the one hand, passages are found where self-interest is obviously a contributing force, but on the other hand, universalist arguments are set forth that have no obvious connection to the interests of an Islamic movement. Like the TPP and MLP, the primary target of the FP representatives' criticism seems to be what they perceive as an outdated, reified notion of state and society. As opposed to the two former parties, however, the FP in particular targets the notion that pluralist politics is as a dirty, subversive activity that must be held in check. "[T]here is an idea that wherever politics or politicians enter, it is like a microbe enters, as if anarchy or terror is about to enter." [78] This notion is described as misguided both from a normative point of view and from the perspective of national interests. Furthermore, they extend this argument to cover several political factions, including ethnic minorities. Thus, broadcasting in minority languages such as Kurdish, "the language of millions of Kurds who feel more Turkish than the Turk,"[79] is supported by reference to democratic principles.

demek, bir bakıma, demokrasinin yaşam hakkına önemli bir darbe vurmak demektir" (TBMM 2002c: 46).

[77] "Bakınız, geçen sene bizim mensup olduğumuz parti kapatıldıktan sonra yeni bir parti kurduk. Sizin başınıza gelmedi, onun için bilmezsiniz..." (TBMM 2002c: 56-57).

[78] "Konferans deyin, bir yetkilinin, bir siyasî parti yetkilisinin konuşması deyin, kesinlikle halk eğitim salonuna girilmez; çünkü, siyasetin, siyasetçinin girdiği yere, sanki, mikrop girecekmiş, sanki, anarşi, sanki, terör girecekmiş gibi bir anlayış var" (TBMM 2002c: 58).

[79] "Merhum Türkeş'in ifade ettiği gibi, kendisini Türkten daha Türk hisseden milyonlarca Kürt'ün de lisanıdır Kürtçe" (TBMM 2002d: 118).

People will speak their minds. There is no valid objection to letting people speak their minds. You sometimes hear: "There are dangers to this country, we have special conditions." This is true, every country has its dangers, and we also have dangers particular to us. There may be division, there may be threats to the basic principles of the Republic, and no one denies this. However, my friends, it is possible to preserve democracy using democracy's own methods. Some people speak of militant democracy. No, democracy cannot be preserved by the methods of any totalitarian system. Consequently, we cannot preserve democracy with prohibitions and pressure, my friends. If it were thus, democratic systems would not widen the scope of freedoms, but narrow them.[80]

Arguments such as these are difficult to reduce to a matter of self-interest. At best, they may be described as the outcome of an "enlightened self-interest," as has previously been argued about the Justice and Development Party (Özel 2003: 175). Rather than push their agenda by conventional means, the FP seems to have realized the importance of wholeheartedly embracing "generalizable" principles as a means to achieving the particularist goals they have traditionally been associated with, even if this means supporting other ethnic and religious minorities with which they have little in common.

In sum, the Felicity Party seems to stand completely behind liberalizing measures, and to do so, at least in terms of discourse, on the basis of universalist argumentation. In fact, they appear to have adopted universalist principles to such an extent that the question of democratization is severed from the question of EU membership, a notion that seems alien to most other parties. The FP's official standpoint remains opposed to EU membership, a stance they justify with reference to cultural differences. Furthermore, in the eyes of the FP, modern, pluralist democracy is not an invention of the West, but is a notion that the Prophet Muhammad arrived at approximately 1400 years ago.[81] There is therefore no reason to

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[80] "Sonra, insanlar fikrini söyleyecek. İnsanların fikirlerini söylemesinde hiçbir sakınca olamaz. Deniliyor ki: "Bu ülke için tehlikeler var, bizim özel şartlarımız var." Doğrudur, her ülke için tehlikeler var, bizim için de özel tehlikeler var. Bölünme olabilir, cumhuriyetin temel ilkeleriyle ilgili tehlikeler olabilir; bunları kimse yadsımıyor; ama, demokrasiyi korumak, demokrasinin kendi yöntemleriyle mümkündür değerli arkadaşlarım. Birileri çıktı, militan demokrasiden bahsediyor. Hayır, hiçbir totaliter sistemin yöntemiyle demokrasi korunamaz; dolayısıyla, yasaklarla, baskılarla demokrasiyi koruyamayız değerli arkadaşlarım. Eğer böyle olsaydı, gerçekten, demokratik sistemler özgürlüklerin alanını açmazlardı, tıkarlardı" (TBMM 2002a: 29).

[81] "Hepimizin bildiği gibi, çağdaş demokrasiler temel hak ve hürriyetleri hedef alan bir sistemdir, çoğulcu, katılımcı, düşünceye dayanan bir sistemdir, hoşgörü ortamında gelişen bir sistemdir. Çağımızda insan hakları ve temel hürriyetler; eğitim özgürlüğü, din ve vicdan özgürlüğü, düşünce özgürlüğü, ifade özgürlüğü evrensel boyutlar kazanmış ve uluslararası kurum ve kuruluşlar da bu konularla ilgili oluşturulmuştur. Aslında, Avrupa'nın, Amerika Kıtasının, Afrika'nın 20 nci Asırda

equate democratization with EU membership. Thus, commenting that many more packages will need to be passed for the sake of democracy, one representative adds that "[w]hen we make all these efforts [to come], hopefully, they will not accept us into the European Union, because we will already have arrived at our goal."[82]

5.3.7 The Justice and Development Party

The JDP participated in Parliament during two parliamentary periods, first as a minor opposition party, then as the ruling government party. In absolute terms, the number of units recorded in the theme analysis is therefore higher than those of any of the other parties. Within the theme analysis, the JDP scores highly on the theme clusters 'International treaties/ agreements,' followed by 'Democracy' and 'Rights.' The only cluster in which their score on the center-periphery dimension is surprisingly high, is 'Statism/ centralism.' Among the other traditionally "peripheral" parties, only the TPP comes close to this score, and as the argument analysis showed, this is explained by the fact that the TPP occasionally reverts to a centralist, nationalist frame during the third debate. For the JDP, however, the argument analysis displays an overall emphasis on universalist arguments, suggesting that the comparatively higher score on the 'Statism/ centralism' cluster must stem from a *problematization* of statist arguments.

At closer inspection, is appears that the JDP's discourse largely follows the division between the two parliamentary periods. Like the FP, the JDP representatives' contributions to the first three debates are mainly in the shape of criticism of what they see as insufficiently clear formulations in the amendments. In particular, amendments that were meant to widen the scope of freedom of speech are criticized for leaving too much room for interpretation, and thus politicization, of the courts. According to the JDP and several other parties, many of the

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gelmiş olduğu bu noktaya Hz Peygamber bundan yaklaşık 1400 sene önce daha anlamlı ve daha geniş boyutuyla gelmiş ve değinmişti" (TBMM 2002a: 47).

[82] "Bütün bu çalışmaları yaptığımızda, inşallah, bizi Avrupa Birliğine de almazlar; çünkü, istenilen amaca ulaşmış oluruz" (TBMM 2002d: 133).

three-party coalition's proposals do not ameliorate the situation at all, but pave the way "for more misuse, and more interpretation."[83]

The high score on the theme cluster 'International treaties/ agreements' stems primarily from the fourth, fifth, and sixth debates, in which the JDP, having taken hold of the reins of government, sped up the reform process. The JDP's discourse here focuses on explaining how the proposals relate to the political criteria of the accession *acquis*, and how these, in turn, relate to treaties such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. There is no mention of external impositions like those found in the discourse of the RPP. Where the amendments receive more extensive justification, the JDP representatives take care to present them as developmental measures, with the EU membership as a secondary goal. Thus, "our goal is not something like entering the European Union. Our goal is to create a more democratic, more free, more peaceful country for the people."[84]

This notion of development constitutes the core of the JDP's discourse, and enables it to establish a close link between the Kemalist theme of modernization and universalist themes like democracy, rights, pluralism and civil society. The JDP thus goes some way towards accommodating the queries of the RPP. On the whole, however, nearly every one of its arguments frames development in terms of democracy and rights. The latter terms, in turn, are closely associated with organizational freedom and civil society. "If people live with fear, and if a few people cannot come together and easily organize for a common and legitimate aim, then that country cannot be called developed."[85] Thus, one of Kemalism's core ideas is put to use against the notion that only Kemalists know what is best for the country.

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[83] "Getirilen şekil, 312 nci maddedeki tanımları muğlak ve müphem olmaktan kurtarmıyor, bilakis, daha suiistimale, daha yoruma açık hale getiriyor" (TBMM 2002a: 44).

[84] **"**Bizim hedefimiz Avrupa Birliğine girmek gibi bir şey değil; bizim hedefimiz, insanlar için, insanımız için daha demokrat, daha özgür, daha barışçı bir ülke yaratmaktır" (TBMM 2002a: 26).

[85] "Eğer, insanlar korkularla yaşıyorlarsa, birkaç insan bir araya gelip müşterek ve meşru bir hedef için rahatça örgütlenemiyorlarsa, o ülkede gelişmişlikten söz edilemez; olsa olsa baskıcı bir idareden söz edilebilir" (TBMM 2002d: 43).

Friends, today, the clearest measure of modernity, democracy, participation, and development, is the number, activity, and strength of a country's civil society organizations. Your country is developed if the field of its civil society organizations is wide, and if the freest and most outspoken representatives of the people's demands are able to raise their voices. Otherwise, you are a third, or even a fourth world country.[86]

A detailed reading also confirms that where statist considerations are brought up, this occurs in the context of arguments which, much like those of the FP and MLP, attempt to problematize the assumptions that tend to turn the situational definitions of the "center," perhaps best illustrated by the discourse of the NAP, into zero-sum games. In particular, the classical Kemalist notion of a unitary and transcendent "Father State" is criticized for being hopelessly out of date. The state, it is argued, should not be thought of as an entity that exists in spite of pluralist society, keeping the seams together, but as a set of institutions that work *for* the people, enabling harmonious coexistence and growth. Easing restrictions of civil society and freedom of speech should therefore not be thought of as patricide, but as means to create a happier family.

For years, we were stubbornly determined to exalt our people by exalting the state. However, by exalting the state we belittled our people, and trampled human value and honor in the name of making the state permanent.[87]

Esteemed friends, look: We are not faced with the choice of *either* democratizing Turkey *or* conserving its unitary structure. As long as both Turkey's unitary structure and its democratization exists, why do we choose 'either/or'? We keep saying 'black or white, right or wrong.' It is not like that; we absolutely cannot get anywhere without seeing the grey tones between them. We cannot lock ourselves into these two options.[88]

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[86] "Değerli arkadaşlar, bugün, çağdaşlığın, demokratlığın, katılımcılığın, gelişmişliğin en belirgin ölçüsü, bir ülkedeki sivil toplum örgütlerinin çokluğu, etkinliği ve güçlülüğüyle doğrudan orantılıdır. Eğer, ülkenizde sivil toplum örgütlerinin sahası geniş tutulmuşsa ve bunlar, halkın taleplerini özgürce ve en yüksek sesle yönetenlere haykırabiliyorlarsa, o zaman, gelişmiş bir toplumsunuzdur. Aksi takdirde, üçüncü, hatta dördüncü dünya ülkesi konumundasınızdır" (TBMM 2002b: 40).

[87] "Biz, yıllarca, devleti yüceltelim ki, insanımız da yücelsin azim ve gayreti içerisinde olduk; ancak, devleti yüceltirken, insanımızı küçümsedik ve devleti payidar kılmanın yolunu, insan haysiyet ve onurunun çiğnenmesinde bulduk" (TBMM 2003b: 26).

[88] "Değerli arkadaşlarım, bakınız, 'Türkiye'nin demokratikleşmesi ya da Türkiye'nin üniter yapısı' gibi bir tercihle karşı karşıya değiliz. Hem Türkiye'nin üniter yapısı hem Türkiye'nin demokratikleşmesi varken, niçin 'ya...ya da' tercihini seçiyoruz 'veya' tercihini seçiyoruz? Biz, diyoruz ki: 'Ak veya kara, doğru veya yanlış.' Böyle değildir, aradaki gri tonları kesinlikle görmezlikten gelemeyiz, kendimizi bu şekilde bunlara kilitleyemeyiz" (TBMM 2002a: 72).

This basic argument is applied to nearly all aspects of the amendments. For instance, the idea that ethnic and linguistic pluralism are threats to the state's unity is repeatedly denied. Perhaps reflecting the fact that some of the JDP's members come from former Kurdish parties, the JDP representatives here show themselves to be more in touch with the realities of millions of Turkish citizens who, increasingly at ease with cultural pluralism and connected to the world through global media, are nonplussed by the Kemalist elites' restrictive attitude.

> Esteemed friends, it is our common duty to preserve and protect the indivisible unity of the State of the Republic of Turkey, in every law and in every institution. However, it is not enough to produce new laws in the State. You may broadcast in Kurdish and Persian; in fact, whether you like it or not, people *are* doing it, they are setting up satellite dishes and listening to broadcasts in English, or Arabic, it makes no difference at all. You must privatize their minds, and they will develop in a healthy manner; these minds will protect the unity of the country, they will show how it can be developed. […] All of the people of this country are working for its unity and togetherness, Kurds, Persians, Laz, Circassians, Alevis, Sunnis, Armenians, and Jews. The unity and togetherness of this country, its salvation, depends on our grasping the age.[89]

Interestingly, the above quote also illustrates one of the most important points at which the JDP's discourse differs from that of the FP. While the FP's arguments for religious diversity and freedom of conscience have distinct undertones of self-interest, no such connotations emerge from the arguments of the JDP. The JDP representatives take care to speak of minorities in general, also when mentioning religious minorities. In addition, instead of claiming Islam as the defining value system of the Turkish people, the JDP develops a notion of "privatization," where questions pertaining to religious and ethnic identities are removed from the domain of the unified state, and allowed to compete on equal terms with other political interests. In terms of basic regimes features, then, the term "minorities" should ultimately be removed, and relegated to the private sphere:

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[89] "Değerli arkadaşlar, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devletinin bölünmez bütünlüğünü, her kanunda, her kurulda saklamak, onu korumak hepimizin görevidir. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devletinde kanunları çıkarmak yetmiyor -siz, radyo ve televizyonlarda Kürtçe yayın, Farsça yayın yapabilirsiniz, zaten yapılıyor, istemeseniz de yapılıyor; çanak anteni koyuyor, dinliyor adam, İngilizce, Arapça hiç fark etmiyor- kafaları özelleştireceksiniz, beyinler sağlıklı gelişecek; beyinler, bu ülkenin bütünlüğünü koruyacak, nasıl gelişebileceğini gösterecek [...] Bu ülkenin bütün insanları, Kürdüyle, Acemiyle, Farsıyla, Lazıyla, Çerkeziyle, Alevîsiyle, Sünnîsiyle, Ermenisiyle, Yahudisiyle bu ülkenin birliği ve beraberliği için çalışmaktadır. Bu ülkenin birliği ve beraberliği, bu ülkenin kurtuluşu, çağı yakalamasına bağlıdır" (TBMM 2003b: 44).

> This is what we should be saying: There are no minorities in Turkey, there are citizens of the Republic of Turkey. These citizens are able to worship and believe as they wish. They should be able to build mosques, synagogues, and churches as they want […] Dear friends, this needs to be accepted, and just as it must gain wider acceptance, it needs to be completely widened, and the question of minorities completely removed. This is one of Turkey's basic problems.[90]

Another point at which the JDP differs from the FP lies in its use of historical narrative. Much like the FP, the JDP seems to see no paradox in maintaining pride for the nation's history and achievements, and at the same time developing the democratic values associated with the West. However, while the FP argues that what are usually thought of as "Western" values are in fact intrinsic to the Islamic world, the JDP sees them as distinctly Western, and precisely for that reason worthy of imitation. There is no element of the "international competition in cultural and religious terms"[91] spoken of by the FP. Instead, adopting the best elements of other cultures is presented as a distinctly Turkish quality.

> Esteemed friends, the adventure we Turks have been experiencing for the last 2000 years has always gone from the East to the West. The armored cavalrymen on horseback on the steppes of Central Asia, our forefathers who came to Anatolia as a migrant group, were never forced to assimilate or appropriate the values of the cultures and civilizations they encountered. They mobilized their own peculiarities, their own opportunities and abilities in order to establish, develop, and spread the values of the new civilization. Thus, during the last thousand years they bequeathed two large empires and states to the world's political history. However, we, who have played such an active role for nine hundred years, have unfortunately during the last one hundred years lost become inactive.[92]

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[90] "Bizim şunu söylememiz lazım: Türkiye'de azınlık yoktur, Türkiye'de Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşları vardır. Bunlar ibadetlerini, inançlarını istedikleri gibi yaşayabilirler. Cami nasıl yapılıyorsa, havrasını da, kilisesini de öyle yapabilmelidir [...] Değerli arkadaşlar, bunun kabul edilmesi, hatta daha da geniş kabul edilmesi gerektiği gibi, aslında bunun tamamen genişletilmesi ve azınlık meselesinin ortadan kaldırılması gerekiyor. Bu, Türkiye'nin temel sorunlarından birisidir" (TBMM 2002d: 56).

[91] One FP representative argues that "We need to strengthen civil society in a way that will allow it to strengthen us and our own cultural and spiritual values and beliefs on the level international competition. Today, competition is not only about trade, but also about cultures, civilizations, conceptions and beliefs." ("Bizim, kendi değerlerimizin, inançlarımızın, kültürel değerlerimizin, manevî değerlerimizin, uluslararası platformda, rekabet sahasında -ki, bugün, rekabet, sadece ticarî emtiada değil; kültürler, medeniyetler, anlayışlar, inançlar rekabet ediyor- bizi güçlü kılacak şekilde sivil toplumun güçlendirilmesine ihtiyacımız var") (TBMM 2002d: 55).

[92] "Değerli arkadaşlar, biz Türklerin 2 000 yıllık tarih içindeki serüveni, sürekli olarak doğudan batı istikametine olmuştur. Ortaasya steplerinde at sırtında zırhlı süvariler, göçebe bir topluluk olarak

Note that this narrative also differs from that of the RPP and DLP in significant respects. While the RPP and DLP see Westernization as one of the hallmarks of Kemalism, the JDP presents it as having been stifled by precisely the same people who claimed to be its champions. Instead of contributing to the Westernization project of Atatürk, eighty years of Kemalist dominance has maintained only the authoritarian aspects of his legacy, thereby closing the country off to the positive effects of diversity and globalization. As a counterexample, "the tolerance of the Ottomans"[93] is presented as the key to finding the right balance between a unified state and a pluralist society. "Look, how did the Ottomans solve this? The Ottomans said 'oneness in multiplicity,' that is, 'unity within plurality, within pluralism.'"[94]

In sum, in terms of both thematic salience, type of arguments, and overall characteristics, the JDP's discourse lies somewhere between that of the FP and MLP. The few differences that can be discerned are largely attributable to the party's position at the time of the debates. Like the MLP, the JDP sticks to a descriptive, explanatory discourse when presenting proposals that they have written themselves. Like the FP, it criticizes proposals in legalistic terms when it is in opposition. Throughout the debates, however, it draws on distinctly universalist frames.

Anadolu topraklarına gelen atalarımız karşılaştıkları yeni kültür ve medeniyet değerlerini özümsemekte ve benimsemekte hiç zorlanmamışlardır. Kendi özelliklerini, imkân ve kabiliyetlerini ise, yeni medeniyet değerlerinin yerleşmesi, gelişmesi ve yaygınlaşması için seferber etmişlerdir. Böylece, son bin yılda iki büyük imparatorluğu dünya siyasî tarihine, devletler tarihine hediye etmişler; ancak, bunun dokuzyüz yılında etkin rol oynayan bizler, ne yazık ki, bin yılın son yüzyılında birçok etkinliğimizi kaybetmiş bulunuyoruz" (TBMM 2003b: 35-36).

[93] "Osmanlının toleransından, hoşgörüsünden …" (TBMM 2002d: 72).

[94] "Bakınız, Osmanlı bunu nasıl halletmiş; Osmanlı buna 'kesnet [sic.] içinde vahdet' diyor; yani 'çokluk içinde, çoğulculuk içerisinde birlik'diyor" (TBMM 2002a: 72).

6. Conclusion

This thesis started from the hypothesis, suggested by several researchers, that the center-periphery cleavage in the Turkish party system is giving way to a more complex system of party positions, where a third, universalist dimension is becoming increasingly dominant. Based on this assumption, we hypothesized that the parliamentary debates on the first six harmonization packages of the NPAA would be framed in universalist terms. To analyze the debates, we used a two-level content analysis. The *theme analysis* measured the quantitative salience of themes associated with the two dimensions on the level of noun phrases. The *argument analysis* measured the number of arguments that drew on each of the two dimensions. Finally, both levels of the analysis were compared and interpreted.

The analysis has largely confirmed the hypothesis. It has shown that in quantitative terms, the universalist dimension has been dominant in framing the NPAA amendments. This has been the case both on the level of thematics and on the level of argumentation, with only one party, the NAP, emphasizing the opposite frame.

However, a comparison of the theme analysis and argument analysis also uncovered slight discrepancies between the salience of universalist themes and the arguments in which they appear. As discussed in chapter 3, this is only to be expected. Text analyses that include more contextual information result in more ambiguous interpretations. Therefore, the further up on the inclusion hierarchy the analysis moves, the more equivocal the results become. In the final analysis, reading and interpreting the results in a qualitative manner must be expected to result in less clear-cut conclusions. In this case, interpreting the results demonstrated that there are no absolute divisions between the parties. A certain measure of universalism and particularism is present among all parties, but receives qualitatively different treatments.

What *has* been uncovered in quite unequivocal terms is the fact that whatever the salience of the center-periphery frame, a universalist dimension has been *added* to the party system, and has become a frame of reference that cannot be ignored by any parties. It has been invoked at the thematic level by all parties in one way or the other. What differs among them is the relative priority given to the universalist frame in relation to the center-periphery frame. The discrepancy between the theme and argument analyses has thus been demonstrated to consist in different *uses* of thematics belonging to one or the other frame. While the overall tendency

has been to draw on universalist thematics in universalist arguments, there have also been examples of universalist thematics embedded within center-periphery arguments. Thus, for example, the RPP, DLP, and NAP all invoke minority rights in the context of arguing *against* such rights being imposed on Turkey. Conversely, from the opposite side of the spectrum, the MLP, FP, and JDP invoke the Kemalist thematics of progress, development, and modernity in the context of arguing for organizational rights and free speech.

Kemalism thus proves to be an ideology so loosely defined that, as Heper argued more than twenty years ago, "even [Atatürk's] opponents could pose as genuine 'Atatürkists,' because, when necessary, they could find a quotation from Atatürk, which apparently supported their point of view" (Heper 1985: 11). Interestingly, the peripheral parties seem to have realized this potential more than the center parties. Whether or not this is related to the "enlightened self-interest" mentioned by Özel (2003) is a matter that can ultimately only be resolved by future developments. At least at the level of discourse, the MLP, TPP, JDP, and FP seem to have had very few difficulties in accommodating the universalist norms underlying the amendments, while the parties associated with the center, the RPP, DLP, and NAP, have found it more difficult to adjust their ideological foundations. As a whole, they appear more ambiguous, and less willing to cede the ideological characteristics that have defined their parties for several decades.

Nevertheless, the largest center parties have largely succeeded in selectively interpreting Kemalism in a way that differs dramatically from the militant nationalist emphasis of the NAP. In particular, the RPP has chosen to emphasize a largely symbolic dimension of Kemalist nationalism, drawing on themes of national pride and modernization in a way that seems to lend itself easily to accommodating the required reforms. In this context, it is worth remembering that "reformism" (*inkılapçılık*) was, and still is, one of the RPP's official founding principles. It is therefore not surprising that the reform process accelerated after the elections of November 2002. While an uneasy blend of security issues and nationalist symbolism created difficulties for the tri-party coalition government that drafted the NPAA, the RPP seems to have kept to its promise to cooperate with the JDP in passing the required amendments, and has pragmatically adjusted its oppositional discourse to allow it to do so with its head raised.

The results raise several questions that would be interesting to investigate further at another occasion. First, although the quantitative results do demonstrate a clear preference for the

universalist dimension, it would be desirable to widen the data base of future analyses to include larger amounts of text. Since the six debates covered here were conducted, three more harmonization packages have been passed, and more are on the way. Including them would not only strengthen the statistical significance of the results, but would also widen the number and types of issues debated, allowing for wider generalizations. For purposes of validation, it would also be desirable to compare the results with discourse contexts other than the TGNA, such as press conferences, party conferences, and other media appearances. This would provide greater control with contextual variables such as the composition of the Parliament, the degree of publicity, and the extent to which parliamentary rules of conduct inhibit the number of themes available for framing.

Secondly, although the future of Turkey's relations with the EU is intrinsically bound up with its democracy, ultimately, the question of EU membership will also depend on how political parties present the EU to the public. This study has focused on those issues that have historically been the most significant in determining inter-party competition, and has only secondarily touched on the more complicated issues arising from parties' attitudes to the question of EU membership. However, the few quotes taken from the transcripts indicate that the prospect of EU membership has been a highly salient dimension of the parties' understanding of the NPAA. They also indicate that, although the NPAA and the EU are interdependent issues, positions on one question do not correlate completely with positions on the other. Thus, it would be interesting to add the question of EU membership as a variable in future studies, and investigate how it interacts with the center-periphery and universalist dimensions.

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