



Enough is too much

Norway, the United States and the Three Wise
Men

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MA Thesis in History

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To Eirik

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Introduction

[...] the Council will in particular undertake [to] exchange views on political matters of common interest within the scope of the Treaty [and] consider what further action should be taken under Article 2 of the Treaty [...]

-North Atlantic Council Resolution, 18 May 1950¹

[...]The Ministers discussed the problems of long-term planning within the Alliance in the non-military sphere [...] dealing with the future development and role of the Alliance in the political, economic, civil emergency planning and other fields [...]

-Final Communiqué, 8 May- 10 May 1961²

The subject of this thesis is the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation, informally known as the Three Wise Men. The Committee of Three was set up by the North Atlantic Council at its May 1956 Ministerial Meeting, and was tasked with advising the NAC “on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community”.³

As is evident from the above quoted resolution passed by the NAC in 1950, the interest in increasing non-military cooperation, particularly political consultations, was nothing new in 1956. Yet, as is evident from the final communiqué from 1961, only five years on the need for increasing non-military cooperation was a still an issue at Ministerial Meetings. The continued emphasis on the need for extending non-military cooperation in the Alliance would suggest that the Committee of Three was not very successful in its task. There is a distinct lack of literature on the work of the Three Wise Men and the results of their work, or lack thereof. It is usually only mentioned in juxtaposition with the Harmel Report of 1967, which is widely credited with mapping out NATO’s future as a political entity.⁴ Further, it is widely thought that the results of the report of the Committee of Three were negated by the Suez crisis. The Anglo-French invasion of Egypt and the resulting tension within the Alliance have

¹ NATO Archives, North Atlantic Council Resolution, 18 May 1950.

² NATO Archives, Final Communiqué, 8 May- 10 May 1961.

³ NATO Archives, North Atlantic Council, “Final Communiqué, 4 May- 6 May 1956”.

⁴ Lawrence S. Kaplan, “The 40th Anniversary of the Harmel Report”, *NATO Review Spring 2007*, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue1/english/history.html>, accessed on 17 March 2007.

been seen as a case in point of the lack of unity within NATO, at precisely the same time that the Three Wise Men were working to strengthen cooperation within the alliance.

i. Approach to the Problem

This thesis aims to investigate several questions concerning the work of the Committee of Three in particular and non-military cooperation in NATO in general. The chosen approach to the problem divides these questions into three separate areas. First, what was the background for the Committee of Three, what was their stated task and how was this task accomplished? What effect did the Suez Crisis have on their work? Second, what were the Norwegian and US positions on non-military cooperation, and how can these be immediately explained? In this there is also a comparative dimension. What were the differences and similarities in these positions? Finally, how can we understand the Committee of Three and the Norwegian and US positions on non-military cooperation in relation to the bigger picture of the transatlantic relationship and the history of NATO.

ii. Method

The thesis is based on archival material in Norway and the US, as well as in the NATO Archives, supplemented by relevant secondary literature. Before giving a detailed survey over the archival material and secondary literature, there are several methodological considerations that need to be explained, as well as certain methodological problems that need to be addressed.

A primary methodological consideration that was faced early on was the choice of archival material. Due to time constraints and the limited scope of the thesis, the task of investigating attitudes towards non-military cooperation in every member government was quite simply not possible. Therefore the selection was narrowed down to Norway and the US. However, this selection may be said to be adequate for two reasons. First, through the work of Halvard Lange on this Committee Norway was certainly a central actor. Lange was an ardent and vocal supporter of increased non-military cooperation and Atlantic unity throughout the 1950's. Secondly, Norway was in many ways a representative of a third tier of member nations in NATO in terms of size of population, GDP and military clout, along with nations such as Denmark and the Benelux countries. The Danish position in particular largely

coincided with the Norwegian one. The inclusion of the US on the other hand seems self-evident. The US was of course the central actor in any matter concerning NATO. In addition to this, there was a close bilateral relationship between Norway and the US. This relationship was so close, in fact, that it has been termed an “alliance within the alliance”.⁵

The selection of the US and the Norwegian positions as a basis for the thesis presents certain methodological problems. Again, even with this limitation the sheer volume of archival material, particularly in the US, represents a daunting task for the researcher. The amount of available material is so vast, and spread between different locations and files, that a complete investigation of all relevant material proved impossible within the scope of the thesis. The focus was thus placed on the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park. The situation in Norway is less problematic in terms of volume, yet more problematic in terms of accessibility and availability. In particular, problems were faced in investigating the views of Lange himself, as there are no collections of his papers to be found either at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Riksarkiv or the Labour Movement’s Archives.

The secondary literature also presents methodological problems. Writing Cold War history after the end of the Cold War obviously gives the historian a perspective on events that was not possible during the period itself. Simply the knowledge that the period has a definite end affords a different outlook. In addition, the time that has passed since the end of the Cold War enables the historian to study the period as a distinct era. Further, due to the necessarily different outlooks of historians writing during and after the Cold War, it is imperative that one maintains a critical attitude to the literature. For example, it is important to note the fact that of the literature written during the Cold War, almost all of it is written from a Western vantage point. Thus only one side of the conflict is represented. This problem has been mitigated greatly since the end of the Cold War, for example through new literature based on recently opened archives in the East.

iii. Secondary Literature

Norwegian foreign policy during the Cold War has been analysed extensively by Norwegian historians. In *Integration and Screening: the two faces of Norwegian alliance policy, 1945-1986*, written in 1986, Rolf Tamnes argues that there emerged a dialectic in Norwegian

⁵ Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Ø. Pharo, *Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie, bind 5: Kald krig og internasjonalisering, 1949-1965*, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 77.

alliance policy “after World War II between “the two faces of deterrence and reassurance in relation to the Soviet Union”, and “the two interrelated faces of integration and screening in relation to the West and in alliance policy”.⁶ Tamnes points to the duality of Norwegian foreign policy during the Cold War. On the one hand, Norway abandoned its traditions of neutrality and isolationism and joined “a far-reaching Atlantic Process of Integration” with the establishment of NATO. On the other hand, there was a second security dimension in Norwegian foreign policy, which entailed a policy of screening towards the NATO allies to “avoid the possibility of the Western powers using Norway for offensive operations against the Soviet Union”.⁷ A similar duality between nationalism and internationalism in Norwegian foreign policy has been pointed out by Geir Lundestad. Lundestad argues that despite the vocal support for international cooperation, there was a great deal of scepticism towards concrete suggestions for cooperation, usually leading to the conclusion that if Norway was to participate at all, it would need special arrangements.⁸

A more general analysis of Norwegian foreign policy is presented by Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Ø. Pharo in their volume of *Norsk utenrikspolitikk historie*, written in 1997. Eriksen and Pharo argue that Norwegian foreign policy can be seen as operating within four distinct *circles*: a global, an Atlantic, a European and a Nordic circle.⁹ Of these four circles, the Atlantic circle was viewed as the most important one by the foreign policy establishment.¹⁰ This is not to say that even this Atlantic circle was unproblematic. On the contrary, the Atlantic cooperation through NATO and the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) brought far more tension to the foreign policy establishment than any of the other circles. In particular, these tensions concerned questions of supranational structures and loss of sovereignty and freedom of action as a result of membership in international organizations such as NATO and OEEC, as well as the question of how to reconcile cooperation in these organizations with obligations to the UN.¹¹

⁶ Rolf Tamnes, “Integration and Screening: the two faces of Norwegian alliance policy, 1945-1986”, in *FHFS notat 5-1986*, (Oslo: Forsvarets høyskole, 1986), 3.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁸ Geir Lundestad, “Nasjonalisme og internasjonalisme i norsk utenrikspolitikk. Et faglig provoserende essay”, in *Norsk utenrikspolitikk: perspektiver og sammenhenger*, (Oslo: Norsk utenrikspolitisk institutt, 1985), 41.

⁹ Eriksen and Pharo, *Kald krig og internasjonalisering*, 15; see also Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Ø. Pharo, “De fire sirklene i norsk utenrikspolitikk, 1949-1961”, in *Danmark, Norden og NATO 1948-1962*, (Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forl., 1991), 193.

¹⁰ Eriksen and Pharo, *Kald krig og internasjonalisering*, 16.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

The existing body of literature concerning US foreign policy during the Cold War is comprehensive. Thus it has been necessary to focus on literature concerning the transatlantic relationship, and NATO in particular. Geir Lundestad has characterised the relationship between the US and Western Europe as an *empire by invitation*. Lundestad argues that the American role in the post-war world in many ways resembled that of an empire, albeit a somewhat unusual one compared to for example the British Empire of the 19th century. However, Lundestad does not use the term *empire* in the strict sense, which would signify formalised political control over another states' policies, but rather to connote "a hierarchical system of political relationships with one power clearly being much stronger than any other."¹² According to Lundestad, this role of empire in the relationship with Western Europe was in many ways a result of explicit European invitations, both in the economic and the military spheres. On the one hand, the European nations participating in the Marshall Plan all showed a great interest in involving the US as intimately as possible in their economic affairs.¹³ On the military side, the European countries put great pressure on the US to join in taking responsibility for the security of Western Europe. These efforts were successful through the establishment of NATO. However, it is important to note that the success of the European efforts would not have been possible if they had not been supported by important groups in the US foreign policy establishment. Nonetheless, the process on the American side was speeded up and facilitated by the European pressure. After the establishment of NATO, the European invitations continued through questions concerning the further organization of the alliance. The US was, as a result of pressure from practically all the member nations, represented on the Defence Committee, the Military Committee and the Standing Group, all of which were established at the first session of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). In addition, the US was represented in two of the Regional Planning Groups, and had a consultative role on the other three Regional Planning Groups. In addition to the Planning Groups, after the Korean War the Europeans worked to establish an integrated force in Europe, to be commanded by an American. This was accomplished with the appointment of General Eisenhower as SACEUR, along with the dispatching of four additional US divisions to Europe and an increase in military assistance to the European member nations.¹⁴ In summary, Lundestad presents the argument that in order to avoid an American withdrawal

¹² Geir Lundestad, *The American "Empire" and other studies of US foreign policy in a comparative perspective*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 37.

¹³ Geir Lundestad, "Nasjonalisme og internasjonale i norsk utenrikspolitikk. Et faglig provoserende essay", in *Internasjonal Politikk (Temahefte 1)*, (Oslo: Norsk utenrikspolitisk institutt, 1985), 269.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 270-272.

from European affairs, as had been the case after World War I, the Europeans extended invitations in three ‘rounds’. First, requests for economic assistance, then requests for political support and military guarantees, and finally requests for a strong American military presence in Europe.¹⁵

Lawrence S. Kaplan has written extensively on NATO and the transatlantic relationship. Kaplan concentrates on the differences within the Alliance, particularly between the US and the European members. In his account of NATO in the 1950’s, he points to the impact of the Korean War as the main unifying factor in the transatlantic relationship. At the same time he maintains that the US, in the process of transforming NATO to meet the Soviet military challenge, created new divisions between itself and its allies, particularly France and the UK.¹⁶ As examples he mentions the British frustrations over being denied the SACATLANT and an autonomous Mediterranean command, the French-American disputes over the EDC and Indochina, the resentment of the smaller nations towards “the NATO method” of decision making and the Icelandic-American conflict over the base agreement. Kaplan’s argument is that the limits and freedoms of all the allies were evident in these disagreements. Each European member had grievances with the US, and each made these grievances clear. However, no one contemplated disengagement because the Cold War “provided a check on transatlantic passions”.¹⁷ In other words, though Kaplan’s focus is on conflict within the transatlantic relationship, he nonetheless recognizes the limitations the Cold War placed on these internal conflicts.

According to Lundestad, on the other hand, the Atlantic Alliance should not be characterized as having been beset with conflict and disagreement. On the contrary, the striking feature of NATO in juxtaposition with other alliances throughout history is the closeness of cooperation. After all, NATO has lasted more than half a century, without defections, and throughout the period popular support in most member countries has been strong.¹⁸ Far from becoming obsolete, the Alliance has expanded several times. The 1950’s alone saw the accession of Germany, Turkey and Greece. This view is supported by John Lewis Gaddis, who points out

¹⁵ Geir Lundestad, Ed., *No end to alliance: the United States and Western Europe: past, present and future*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1998), 6.

¹⁶ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United. The Evolution of an Alliance*, (Westport, CT. : Praeger, 2004), 10-11.

¹⁷ Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United*, 27.

¹⁸ Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945*, (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003), 5-7.

that the history of NATO is one of compromise¹⁹. However, while Lundestad explains this by pointing to the common interests, ideology and culture that were shared on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as the continued European “invitations”, Gaddis sees the willingness of the US to compromise from a position of strength as a result of democratic tradition. In his opinion, democratic theory provides a “rationale for *diffusing* power to strengthen a shared purpose” (original emphasis).²⁰

There is no literature that relates the work of the Committee of Three. As mentioned above, the Committee is only mentioned in passing in relation to the Harmel Report or the Suez Crisis. Kaplan discusses the Committee briefly in an article concerning the Harmel Report, as well as in his book *NATO Divided, NATO United*. Kaplan characterizes the work on the Harmel Report as fundamentally different from the work of the Committee of Three due to the participation of both smaller and larger alliance members. The Committee of Three, on the other hand, was a “cri-de-cœur of smaller nations” that felt excluded from the decision making process, and was in any case “overshadowed” by the Suez Crisis.²¹

iv. Structure of the Thesis

Chapter One concerns non-military cooperation in NATO and the Committee of Three in particular. A brief survey of the history of non-military cooperation in NATO is provided, as well as the immediate background for the establishment of the Committee of Three. Further, the work and proceedings of the Committee are detailed, and its final report is summarized. Finally, the treatment of the report at the December 1956 Ministerial Meeting is briefly recounted.

Chapters two and three focus on the Norwegian and US positions on non-military cooperation respectively. The replies to the questionnaire circulated by the Committee are summarized, and the positions contained therein are explained by examining the immediate factors that lay behind them.

¹⁹ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War History*, (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1997), 202.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Lawrence S. Kaplan, “The 40th Anniversary of the Harmel Report”; Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United*, 25.

Chapter Four gives a comparative analysis of the Norwegian and US positions on non-military cooperation, and places these positions and the work of the Committee of Three in a larger context of Cold War history.

The concluding chapter provides a general conclusion before placing the Committee of Three in the bigger picture of Cold War history, the history of Norwegian foreign policy and the history of the transatlantic relationship.

Chapter One- The Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation

Although the Alliance was only seven years old in 1956, the idea of it becoming something more than simply a military alliance geared towards defending Western Europe from the spectre of Communism was not new. It seemed that the threat emanating from the Soviet Bloc was taking on a new form; since the death of Stalin in 1953, the new Soviet leadership had changed its tone. Whereas the message had previously been that the triumph of socialism was inevitable, the Soviets were now championing their new concept of “peaceful co-existence”.²² This shift in strategy encouraged the already familiar idea of using NATO as a vehicle for non-military cooperation in addition to the well-established military side.

That is not to say that one was meeting a new challenge with an old reply. The concept of an “Atlantic Community”, even an “Atlantic Union”, had been around for a few years already, and had many proponents on both sides of the Atlantic. But while some Atlantic enthusiasts envisioned a supranational entity to rival the Soviet Bloc, what the NATO members now had in mind was something far less enveloping, yet perhaps far more realistic. Relinquishing sovereignty, particularly in matters of foreign and security policy, was perhaps never a reasonable prospect in an alliance of 15 members that in no way constituted a homogenous group.

This chapter will give an account of the work of the Three Wise Men. However, before detailing the endeavours of the Committee, it is necessary to delineate the backdrop to the proceedings. The first section gives a brief history of the previous attempts at extending cooperation to non-military fields. The second section will deal with the May 1956 Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, and the setting up of the Committee. The third section recounts the work of the Committee, from the establishment in May until the submission of its report in December. The fourth section analyzes the final report of the Committee, and the discussions surrounding it at the December 1956 Ministerial Meeting of the NAC.

²²*Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS hereafter), 1955-57, vol. XXIV, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 64.

1.1 A brief history of non-military cooperation in NATO

The history of non-military cooperation stretches back to the very beginning of the Alliance. The North Atlantic Treaty contains articles that allow for the extension of cooperation from strictly military matters to fields of a non-military character. The signatories thus envisioned a closer-knit association than a mere multilateral agreement of mutual defence. However, the wording of the articles leaves ample room for interpretation. Through the seven years from the signing of the Treaty until the establishment of the Committee of Three, attempts were made at explicating the possibilities for an extension of cooperation afforded by the Treaty. The most substantial of these was the establishment of the Committee of Five on the North Atlantic Community in 1951, whose endeavours are briefly recounted below. Its report was adopted by the NAC in 1952. But only three years later the subject was again on the table at the Ministerial Meeting in December 1955.

1.1.1 Non-military cooperation in the North Atlantic Treaty

The North Atlantic Treaty consists of 14 articles, as well as a preamble. Of these, the preamble and Articles 2 and 4 relate to non-military cooperation. The Preamble of the Treaty states that the signatories “are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”²³ The mention of ‘common heritage’ and ‘civilization’ is revisited several times in the US answers to the questionnaire circulated by the Committee of Three.²⁴ Further, the Preamble states that the members “seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic Area”.²⁵

Thus, in addition to preserving the freedom of the member nations, the Alliance is tasked with protecting the shared legacy and traditions of the members. Such concepts can, of course, not be adequately defended from a foe using non-military tactics by agreeing to obligations of mutual defence. It is necessary to extend obligations into non-military fields. While it may seem that the Preamble is general in its wording, the mention of “civilisation” and “common heritage” can easily be interpreted as pointing the way towards cultural cooperation.

²³ *NATO Handbook 2001*, (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 527.

²⁴ National Archives (NA hereafter), Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, “US answers to the NATO questionnaire”. Dated 30 August, 1956.

²⁵ *NATO Handbook 2001*, 527.

Article 2 states that the signatories will “contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well being” and further to “seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and ... encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them”.²⁶ The second half of the article is clear in its objective: to strengthen economic cooperation between the members. It is evident that some form of economic cooperation was envisaged already at the founding of the Alliance, and indeed, the field of economic cooperation would be central in the work of the Committee of Three.

The first half of Article 2 also contains provisions that allow for non-military cooperation. The Committee of Three would, in addition to economic cooperation, also examine the possibilities of cooperation in the information field. This was understood not only in terms of propaganda, but also in terms of distributing factual information about NATO and its members, with a view to increase public understanding of the Alliance and its goals.

While the Preamble is rather vaguely worded, and Article 2 mainly concerns economic collaboration, Article 4 on the other hand concerns political consultation. It states that members will “consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”²⁷ Though it may seem that the wording of this Article is unequivocal, the wording was deemed by some to be too vague. In the words of Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak, Article 4 “c'est celui qui prévoit les consultations politiques mais dans les termes si généraux et si vagues qu'on peut à la fois être fidèles au Pacte en ne faisant rien du tout, et en faisant tout.” (“is one which provides for political consultation, but in terms so general and so vague that one can be faithful to the Pact both by doing nothing at all, and by doing everything.”) (**My translation**)²⁸ It was his opinion that it was necessary to “draw up a formula defining the method of application”.²⁹

²⁶ *NATO Handbook 2001*, 527.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ NATO Archives, North Atlantic Council, C-VR (56) 20, “Verbatim Record of Proceedings, 4 May, 1956, Morning”.

²⁹ NATO Archives, North Atlantic Council, C-R (56) 20, “Summary Record of Proceedings, 4 May, 1956, Morning”.

Thus, the Treaty lays down provisions for extending cooperation into the fields of political consultation, economic collaboration, cultural cooperation and cooperation in the field of information.

1.1.2 The Committee of the North Atlantic Community

The subject of non-military cooperation had, as already mentioned, previously been worked on by a Ministerial Committee in 1951. The Committee on the North Atlantic Community, informally known as the Pearson Group, was established at the Seventh Session of the NAC in Ottawa in September 1951. Its purpose was to “consider further strengthening of the NA Community and especially implementation of Art II” of the Treaty.³⁰ The Committee’s mandate was to “consider and make recommendations” on matters including “coordination and frequent consultation on foreign policy”; “close economic, financial and social cooperation”; and “collaboration in fields of culture and public information”.³¹ Not only were these tasks identical to those of the Committee of Three established five years later, but both Canadian Minister for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson and Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange worked on both Committees.

The Committee on the North Atlantic Community was to submit its report to the Council at the following session, to be held in Rome in November 1951. At the session in Rome only an interim report was submitted, and the Committee was directed to continue its work. This was, however, seen only as a minor problem.³² The Committee’s final report was submitted at the next Council session in Lisbon in February 1952. The report contained recommendations on movement of labour, coordination and consultation on foreign policy, social and cultural cooperation and information activities.³³

The Final Communiqué released after the Lisbon session of the NAC states that since the matters dealt with by the Committee of Five was “of direct and common concern to each member of the Council”, it was decided that “future work in this sphere should be transferred to the Council”.³⁴ The responsibility for implementing its recommendations and for future study of the matter thus lay with the Permanent Council. The fact that non-military

³⁰ *FRUS, 1951*, vol. III, (Washington D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 688.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*, 753.

³³ *FRUS, 1952-1954*, vol. V, (Washington D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 180-190.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 179.

cooperation was still the subject of discussion in 1956 would suggest that the Council failed at this task, or that the situation had changed. Particularly in terms of the need for political consultation, which all parties seemed to agree on, at least in principle, development did not follow the course set out by the Committee of Five.³⁵

It would be a likely assumption that in spite of pledges of agreement in principle from all member nations, the will to discuss political questions in the Council was lacking. It is a commonly asserted belief that it is the smaller nations in an alliance that stand to profit from increased political consultation.³⁶ Allowing for more input from smaller nations regarding the policies of larger nations, if such input is taken into consideration in policy formation of course, would give the smaller nations a degree of influence that is disproportionate to their material contribution to the alliance. At the same time, the larger nations do not necessarily gain any amount of influence over the policies of the smaller nations. However, it can also be concluded that the lack of discussion evident here was due to the reluctance of smaller member nations to discuss political matters in the Council.³⁷ This phenomenon, known as *le refus d'opinion*, a term coined by Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak, implies a refusal by a member country to explain its position in the process of consultation.³⁸

The seeming lack of results from the work of the Committee of Five on the North Atlantic Community may also simply be a matter of unfortunate timing. At the Ninth Session of the NAC in Lisbon in 1952, the Council adopted the report of the Committee. In addition, however, the Lisbon meeting resulted in the appointment of a Secretary General and the setting up of a Permanent Council. Ambitious new force level goals were agreed upon, and the European Defence Community was discussed. Agreement was reached on further financing of the infrastructure programme.³⁹ Such extensive changes in the Organization stand out as a seminal event in its evolution, and it may be that the report of the Committee of Five simply drowned in the midst of this reorganization.

Whatever the reasons may be for the apparent failure of the Committee of Five on the North Atlantic Community, the international situation was changing, and in December 1955 the issue of implementing Article 2 was once again on the Agenda.

³⁵ NATO Archives, NHO/63/1, "Monograph on 'The evolution of NATO political consultation 1949-1962'".

³⁶ Ibid. See also Robert O. Keohane, "Lilleputian Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics", *International Organization*, vol. 23, no. 2 (1969).

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ *FRUS, 1952-1954*, vol. V, 177-79.

1.1.3 The December 1955 Ministerial Meeting

On departing for Paris on 13 December, Secretary Dulles stated that the meeting would deal “not only with the military problems which ... [NATO] always has to deal with but to exchange views about the significance of the Soviet Action during recent months.”⁴⁰ It is evident that the Geneva Summit in July 1955 had left an impression. Under the discussion of Agenda item II, *Review of the International Situation*, Dulles described the position of the Soviet Union as “ambiguous; smiling but hard beneath”.⁴¹ There was a definite impression that Soviet tactics had changed. The new Soviet threat was an “attempt to undermine Western World by economic and political means”, as it was expressed by Italian Foreign Minister Gaetano Martino, who would later work on the Committee of Three.⁴²

In the discussions under Agenda item IV, concerning implementation of Article 2, Martino proposed that the problem of implementation be studied at the Permanent Representative level, and be discussed at the next Ministerial Meeting. In the course of the discussion it became clear that there was a difference of opinion as to what constituted the best possible solution for meeting the new Soviet threat. Some members, such as Italy, Greece and Turkey focused primarily on economic matters such as coordination of policies and aid to underdeveloped areas, both outside and within the NATO area. Others, such as Canada, Denmark and Norway focused more on cultural questions and political consultation. In the end, a resolution was adopted supporting Martino’s suggestion.⁴³ This divergence in focus between economic, cultural and political questions would continue at the next Ministerial Meeting.

1.2 The May 1956 Ministerial Meeting

If the atmosphere at the previous Ministerial Meeting had been characterized by concern over Soviet intentions as a result of the Geneva Summit, the atmosphere at the May 1956 Ministerial Meeting was strongly influenced by the results of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. At this Congress the Soviet leadership turned away

⁴⁰ “Statement by Secretary Dulles”, *The Department of State Bulletin*, vol. XXXIII, no. 861, (October-December, 1955), 1048.

⁴¹ *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IV, (Washington D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 29.

⁴² *Ibid*, 31.

⁴³ *Ibid*, 42-44.

from the Stalinist emphasis on the inevitability of war with the West, and also voiced support for the peaceful transition to socialism using parliamentary mechanisms, rather than revolution.⁴⁴ At the same time that it emphasised that peaceful co-existence was the only alternative to nuclear war, the Congress called for the development of friendly relations “throughout the world”, with particular focus on underdeveloped countries.⁴⁵

It was in this atmosphere of concern that the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation would be established. Martino’s suggestion at the previous meeting had been acted upon, and the issue of implementation of Article 2 would see thorough discussion at the May 1956 Ministerial Meeting. As a basis for the discussions the International Staff had prepared a *Survey of Article 2 activities*. Also, the specific issue of political consultation would be discussed, as well as information policy.⁴⁶

1.2.1 Countering the new Soviet tactics

The concern over the international situation is evident from the Agenda. Item 2 concerned the “International Situation in light of Current Developments”, hereunder “Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy Including the Political and Economic Penetration of Underdeveloped Countries”; and “Political and Economic Questions Arising from Current Soviet Tactics.”⁴⁷

The discussion on item 2(a) of the agenda, concerning “Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy”, would revolve around the apparent changed nature of the Soviet challenge. The Turkish Foreign Minister Koprulu pointed out that the Soviets had also previously called for peaceful coexistence when they needed peaceful frontiers in order to cope with internal problems. The same was the case now, he maintained. The Soviet goal was still world domination.⁴⁸ Koprulu also commented that the Soviets, in the period following the summit at Geneva, had seemed to prefer bilateral contacts with NATO members. This made it necessary to “establish as close political coordination as possible”.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. XXIV, 60.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 64.

⁴⁶ *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IV, 54.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 53.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 58.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 59.

While some nations maintained that there were no changes to be found in Soviet motivations, others saw merit in East-West contacts. Lange stated the opinion that “Soviet leaders may be groping for way out of complete isolation” and that their seeming desire for lessened tensions might be sincere. Danish Foreign Minister Hans Christian Hansen did not go as far, but stated that as long as the West did not lose sight of the “real motives behind Soviet readiness to be on ‘speaking terms’”, East-West contacts could be continued and might in fact turn the scales in favour of the West. Italy on the other hand, was apprehensive about East-West contacts due to the presence of a strong Communist party in Italy. Although this was also the case in France, the Italian sentiment found no agreement with French Foreign Minister Pineau, who held the opposite view.⁵⁰ It is evident that although there was general agreement that the Soviet Union still posed a grave threat to the West, and that its tactics had changed, there was no clear agreement on Soviet motives or the desirability of East-West contacts.

Item 2(b) of the agenda concerned political and economic questions arising from the changed Soviet tactics. As with the previous agenda item, the discussion showed that while there was agreement on a general level that increased non-military cooperation might provide the best means of countering the new Soviet tactics, there was disagreement on exactly what forms of cooperation provided the best chances of success. Italy, for example, had already made it clear that its focus was on economic questions. As early as 12 April the Italian Delegation had circulated a memorandum titled “Future Action under Article 2”.⁵¹ This memorandum referred to the resolution, proposed by Italy and adopted at the previous Ministerial Meeting, which instructed the Permanent Council to examine and implement measures conducive to closer cooperation “as envisaged in Article 2”.⁵² The memorandum further states that “the consultations which have been taking place for some time among the NATO members can already be considered as a first satisfactory step”. Thus the focus is clearly placed on strengthening economic collaboration, particularly as a “consequence of the threat from the Soviet economic offensive”.⁵³ At the meeting Italy proceeded to propose a resolution which would have the NAC periodically examine “economic problems with political implications”,

⁵⁰ *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IV, 59.

⁵¹ NA, Department of State, Conference Files, Lot 62D181, CF 695, “C-M (56) 44: Future Action Under Article 2. Memorandum by the Italian Delegation”. Dated 12 April, 1956.

⁵² *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IV, 44.

⁵³ NATO Archives, C-M (56) 44, “Future Action Under Article 2. Memorandum by the Italian Delegation”.

as well as intensifying cooperation in other organizations “in pursuance of the aims of the Alliance”.⁵⁴

1.2.2 Establishing the Committee of Three

The suggestion to establish a ministerial committee to study the possibilities of extending non-military cooperation in NATO was put forward by Secretary Dulles in his remarks on Agenda Item III.⁵⁵ While pointing out that one of three tasks facing the Alliance at the time was to “create ... bonds of unity ... between members to avoid internal conflict” which could be exploited by the Soviets and the Chinese, Dulles suggested the formation of committee of two or three members to “undertake urgently to consult with each of the members ... with a view to reporting not later than next fall how ... the Atlantic Community can best further organize itself to deal with the problems that lie ahead”.⁵⁶ When the meeting resumed the following day, British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd seconded Dulles’ suggestion of a committee to deal with the matter of non-military cooperation, as it would be difficult to give adequate thought to the matter in a two day meeting. He also suggested the proposed committee consist of Pearson, Lange and Martino, a suggestion which was subsequently endorsed by Dulles.⁵⁷ The apparent harmony of the American and British action is not surprising, considering that Dulles and Lloyd had discussed the matter at length in bilateral talks on 4 May.⁵⁸

Lange’s reaction to the idea of establishing a committee was to urge that a precise definition of the goal of the committee be given immediately, while Pearson commented on the difficulties such a committee would face. Martino did not comment on the suggestion. Lange’s wish for a precise definition was not fulfilled, and at Secretary-General Ismay’s suggestion the NAC adopted a proposal giving interim approval to set up a “Committee of Three to undertake work, which would be defined later”.⁵⁹ This rather vague conclusion presented a problem in framing the terms of reference for the Committee. In particular, Lange “insisted that the directives to the Committee be precise” and wanted a special Council

⁵⁴ NA, Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62D181, CF 695, “POLTO 2015”. Telegram sent from the US Permanent Delegation to the Department of State, signed by Ambassador Perkins. Dated 4 May, 1956.

⁵⁵ NA, Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62D181, CF 695, “Remarks by Secretary John Foster Dulles in connection with Agenda Item III at the Afternoon Session of the North Atlantic Council on May 4”.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IV, 71-72.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 56.

⁵⁹ Ibid, 73.

meeting to be held in two months specifically to formulate the terms of reference, after the Permanent Representatives and member governments had had time to study the matter. However, in the end it was decided that the Committee should formulate its own terms of reference.⁶⁰

In formulating the Committee's terms of reference, the Committee members consulted on the matter with a few other member governments, but far from all. Pearson consulted with Dulles on 12 June 1956, stating that he thought the study "should be more than a list of recommendations". Dulles replied that the State Department had set up a Working Group to consider the problem, but that it had not yet concluded. However, this Working Group was "proceeding on the premise that the Ministerial Committee of Three had a broad mandate, embracing an examination of the possibilities of building closer Atlantic Unity through various media, including but not restricted to the North Atlantic Council."⁶¹

Lange was also made aware of Dulles' general thoughts on how the Committee should proceed. In an Aide Mémoire delivered to Lange on 14 May 1956, it was communicated that in Dulles' opinion, "it would ... appear appropriate that the three Foreign Ministers regard their role primarily as that of carrying forward the debate started at the recent Paris meeting".⁶² In addition, Lange discussed the matter with German Foreign Minister Von Brentano, who agreed with Lange that the job of the Committee was to "ascertain realistically how far the members of NATO, especially the great power members of NATO, were willing to go in this field".⁶³

In the end, as is stated in the Committee's final report, the terms of reference were interpreted as requiring the Committee "to examine and re-define the objectives and needs of the Alliance, especially in light of current international developments", and "to make recommendations for strengthening its internal solidarity, cohesion and unity".⁶⁴

⁶⁰ NA, Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62, D 181, CF 809, "B-3.51: The History of the Committee of Three". Undated background paper prepared for the December 1956 Ministerial Meeting.

⁶¹ NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, "CA-10252. Conversation with Foreign Minister Pearson on Developing Atlantic Unity." Dated 22 June, 1956. The conversation took place on 11 June, 1956.

⁶² NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, "Aide Mémoire, based on Deptel 1126". Dated 14 May, 1956. The telegram that is referred to, "Deptel 1126", instructs the Chiefs of Mission in Oslo, Rome and Ottawa to discuss with the respective Foreign Ministers the responsibilities of the Committee of Three, and to convey Dulles' own thoughts as to how they should proceed.

⁶³ NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, "Foreign Service Despatch 706. Norwegian Discussions with German Foreign Minister Von Brentano", Dated 1 June, 1956.

⁶⁴ NATO Archives, C-M (56) 127 (Revised), "Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO", 5. Circulated to the Permanent Delegations on 10 January, 1957.

1.3 The Work of the Committee

So it was that the Committee of Three, or the Three Wise Men as they would be known, was established at the suggestion of two of the Great Powers in the Alliance, and it was to consist of the Foreign Ministers of three of the smaller powers, at least in terms of military clout. They would gather in Paris twice, once in June and once in September. Their report would be submitted at the Ministerial Meeting in December 1956. But in the period between May and December, the Alliance would be put under great internal strain as France and the UK split with the United States over the Suez Crisis. And within the Committee two of its three members would at times express serious doubts as to the purpose of their work.

1.3.1 The First Session: June 1956

The Committee decided to hold its first round of meetings in Paris in June 1956. It was agreed upon that the preparatory work would be carried out by the Permanent Representatives from Italy, Canada and Norway, in collaboration with the Secretary General. Consultations with individual governments were planned, but it was felt that these should be deferred until Pearson had obtained the views of Washington and London, and the Committee had had time to meet. Behind this lay a wish to have some concrete proposals to discuss with the individual governments, and that these take into account the thoughts of Washington and London.⁶⁵ This is not to say that the subject was off limits in the meanwhile. Lange, for example, broached the subject in discussions with German Foreign Minister von Brentano on 29 May when he visited Oslo, and again when he consulted with Danish Foreign Minister Hansen in Copenhagen on 12 June.⁶⁶

At their meetings on 20-22 June 1956, the Committee compiled a questionnaire that was to be circulated to all the individual governments, to be turned in by 20 August. This questionnaire

⁶⁵ NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, "DEPT 1143", telegram sent from the U.S. Embassy in Oslo to the Department of State, as well as the embassies in Rome and Ottawa and the Permanent Delegation to NATO. Dated 25 May 1956.

⁶⁶ Riksarkivet, Utenriksdepartementets Arkiv 1950-1959 (UD hereafter), Dz 533, 11.8/14: *Tysklands utenriksminister von Brentanos besøk i Oslo 1956*, "Referat av konferanse mellom utenriksminister Lange og utenriksminister von Brentano i Oslo den 29. mai 1956"; UD, Dz 2002, 33.2/61: *Tremannskomiteén*, vol. I, Journal number 03546, "Notat: Møte mellom utenriksminister Lange og stats- og utenriksminister Hansen i København den 12.6.1956 vedrørende NATOs tremannskomiteé".

was closely based upon a draft paper proffered by the Italian representative.⁶⁷ It is interesting, however, to note the differences between the Italian draft and the final questionnaire. The Italian draft does not mention the cultural field at all. It has a clear focus on economic cooperation, and to a lesser degree political consultation and the possible necessity for organizational changes to allow for greater economic and political cooperation. This is not surprising. As is made clear in a memorandum circulated by the Italian Delegation as early as April 1956, the Italians were at least initially focused solely on economic cooperation.⁶⁸ It is clear from the sources that Lange was more interested in cultural cooperation than both his fellow Committee members, particularly Martino. The idea for establishing a common research institute for *Atlantic Community Studies* was developed by Lange and Danish Foreign Minister Hansen.⁶⁹ The question of recruitment and training of technicians was another issue Lange had a penchant for. At the same time, too much should not be made of this. The clear focus of the Committee of Three was political consultation and economic cooperation, as is evident from the questionnaire itself, around half of which concerned political and economic questions.

The results of the meetings on 20-22 June were substantial.⁷⁰ In addition to the questionnaire, agreement was reached on how to proceed. It was decided that a second session would be held in September, after the individual governments had responded to the questionnaire. It was also decided that in order to assist the Committee in preparing the report, experts would be approached to serve as consultants on certain questions. Further, a fair amount of groundwork was delegated to the International Staff, such as preparing background documents on previous achievements in the non-military fields. It was also decided that certain non-member countries should be approached, as well as the NATO Parliamentary Committee and the Atlantic Treaty Association.

⁶⁷ UD, Dz 2002, 33.2/61: *Tremannskomiteén*, vol. I, Journal number 03957, "Memorandum". Unsigned and undated, however the coversheet is dated 23 June 1956.

⁶⁸ NATO Archives, C-M (56) 44, "Future Action Under Article 2. Memorandum by the Italian Delegation".

⁶⁹ NATO Archives, CT-D/5, "Centre of Atlantic Community Studies. Memorandum by the Danish and Norwegian Governments". Circulated to the Permanent Delegations on 13 August, 1956.

⁷⁰ NATO Archives, North Atlantic Council, CT-R/1, "Committee of Three. Decisions reached during meetings held on 20th-22nd June, 1956, at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris". Circulated to the Permanent Delegations on 28 June, 1956.

1.3.2 The Second Session: September 1956

The second session of the Committee of Three was held on 10-22 September. The replies of the individual governments to the questionnaire were now in hand, and the Committee would now consult with each of the members, using their replies as a basis for discussion. The purpose of these consultations was to “clarify, where necessary, the positions taken by governments in their replies, and to obtain their views on a number of specific proposals selected from the different replies”.⁷¹ In addition to consulting with the individual governments, the Committee met with the Standing Committee of the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO Countries, the Atlantic Treaty Organization and a delegation representing the Signatories of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity.

The individual governments were for the most part represented by their Foreign Ministers. The exceptions were Iceland, who was represented by their Permanent Representative; the UK, who was represented by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Denmark, who was represented by the Deputy Foreign Minister; and the US, who was represented by Senator Walter George. There was initially some concern on the part of the Committee as to the perspicacity of consulting with the individual Foreign Ministers. Pearson in particular was apprehensive on this subject, since it was assumed from an early point that Secretary Dulles would be unable to travel to Paris in September. Pearson feared this would be misconstrued as a lack of interest on part of the US.⁷² However, in Washington it was felt that it was important for the Committee to consult the replies with representatives at a high level, even though Dulles would not attend.⁷³ The Italians were on the other hand content with the participation of Senator George.⁷⁴

While the individual consultations did not uncover any radical novelties in the stated views of the member governments, they provided a chance for the individual governments to place extra emphasis on the questions which they considered most important. In addition, the Committee was able to meet with the Parliamentary Conference to hear their views. The

⁷¹ NATO Archives, North Atlantic Council, CT-D/10, “Committee of Three. Draft Formal Record of Proceedings”. Dated 2 November, 1956.

⁷² NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, “Telegram ROME 362.” Sent from Department of State to Rome, Oslo, Ottawa and the Permanent Delegation to NATO on 27 July, 1956. Signed by Under Secretary of State Hoover.

⁷³ NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, “Telegram OTTAWA 41”. Sent from Department of State to Ottawa, Oslo, Rome and the Permanent Delegation to NATO on 27 July, 1956. Signed by Under Secretary of State Hoover.

⁷⁴ NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, “Telegram DEPT 423”. Sent from the US Embassy in Rome to the Department of State, Ottawa, Oslo and the Permanent Delegation to NATO on 30 July, 1956.

central theme in the consultation with the Parliamentary Conference was the importance of public opinion and parliamentarians' attitudes to NATO. It was felt that public support was faltering in many countries, and that there was a general cooling of attitudes towards NATO on the part of parliamentarians. In the opinion of the Parliamentary Conference, this could be countered by evolving common foreign policies and keeping the public informed about the political issues that were discussed in the Council. Support and aid to underdeveloped NATO countries was another suggestion thought to buttress public opinion. Not surprisingly, the Parliamentary Conference also advocated more formal recognition of the Conference by NATO, including some modest financial support.⁷⁵

1.3.3 Sinking Spirits

In the course of the Committees work, its members at times questioned the possibilities of success. Martino and Lange in particular had doubts, as did many within the Foreign Ministries in Italy and Norway. In the case of Martino the doubts concerned the possibility of achieving any substantial results. Lange, on the other hand, expressed frustration at the lack of even rudimentary attempts at consultation during the Suez Crisis.

Within the Italian Foreign Ministry there were doubts about Martino's "personal faith" in the Committee of Three, and thus his ability to make an effective contribution to its work.⁷⁶ The opinion that the Committee would be unable to achieve any significant results was held by very senior staff in the Ministry, such as Secretary General Marquis Rossilonghi, who had formerly been the Italian Permanent Representative.⁷⁷ This attitude seems to have been present already at the Ministerial Meeting in May 1956. It seems, however, that this scepticism was prevalent only in the early stages of the Committee's work, and that there evolved a more positive attitude after the first session of the Committee, at least among Foreign Ministry officials.⁷⁸ The initial lack of confidence in the Italian Foreign Ministry may, at least in part, have been due to a feeling of frustration in course of their work on the

⁷⁵ NATO Archives, CT-R/2, "Summary Record: Committee of Three meeting with the Standing Committee of the Conference of Members of Parliament from the NATO Countries held on Wednesday, 12th September". Circulated to the Permanent Delegations on 27 September, 1956.

⁷⁶ NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, "Telegram DEPT 4103". Sent from the US Embassy in Rome to the Department of State, Ottawa, Oslo and the Permanent Delegation to NATO on 5 June, 1956.

⁷⁷ NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, "Telegram DEPT 3900". Sent from US Embassy in Rome to the Department of State, Ottawa, Oslo and the Permanent Delegation to NATO on 16 May, 1956.

⁷⁸ NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, "Telegram DEPT 5978". US Embassy in London to the Department of State, Ottawa, Oslo, Rome and the Permanent Delegation to NATO on 26 June, 1956.

Italian position.⁷⁹ A similar frustration was discernible also in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. The Political Section, which was tasked with developing a working paper detailing the Norwegian position, apparently found that almost every idea they came up with had previously been studied and abandoned.⁸⁰ It seems, however, that as the work of the Committee proceeded, the frustration waned.

Whereas the first session of the Committee proved to bulwark confidence among the participants, the second session left fewer grounds for optimism in some quarters. Particularly the US reply to the questionnaire indubitably left some people wondering. The US reply maintained that its position in the global strategic landscape placed limitations on its ability to consult in a manner satisfactory to the Committee. This led Secretary General Ismay to advise the Committee to “enquire whether the United States believes that the ... limitations can be sufficiently circumscribed to avoid crippling the effectiveness of NATO political consultation”.⁸¹ It seemed that the largest and most central member of the Alliance might prove unwilling to give a satisfactory commitment to consult on political questions in NATO. However, if the Committee was troubled at apparent lacking willingness to consult on the part of the US, it would be France and the United Kingdom that would raise the gravest doubts as to the possibility of achieving any results at all.

The Suez Crisis and the complete lack of willingness to even inform the Council on the part of France and the United Kingdom led to doubts as to the point of continuing the work of the Committee. The Norwegian Permanent Representative Jens Boyesen communicated to the US delegation that Lange was contemplating resigning from the Committee, as he felt that “recent events had made a mockery of their proposed report”.⁸² The US advised that the situation that had arisen made it ever more important to strengthen the unity of the Alliance. It was appreciated that the report would be in need of some revisions, but the US requested that the Committee continue its work as planned.⁸³ Boyesen himself also voiced frustration. While it was understood that due to time constraints advance consultation had not been feasible in this

⁷⁹ NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, “Telegram DEPT 4103”.

⁸⁰ NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, “Foreign Service Despatch no. 731. NATO Committee Activity”. Sent from the US Embassy in Oslo to the Department of State on 11 June, 1956.

⁸¹ UD, Dz 2003, 33.2/61: *Tremannskomiteén*, vol. IV, Journal number 05314, “Committee of Three. Brief for Consultation with the United States”. Undated, however the coversheet is dated 18 September 1956 and signed by Bureau Chief Georg Kristiansen in the 3rd Political Office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁸² NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, “Telegram POLTO 19”. Sent from the Permanent Delegation to NATO to the Department of State and Oslo on 3 November, 1956.

⁸³ UD, Dz 2003, 33.2/61: *Tremannskomiteén*, vol. V, Journal number 06255, “Notat. Rapporten fra ’de 3 vise”. Dated 7 November 1956, signed by Frithjof Jacobsen, Director General in the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

case, “several days after the fact, the British and French delegations still seemed uninstructed and unable to give the Council any information”.⁸⁴

In the end the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation decided to revise their report in the wake of the Suez Crisis, and the finished report was distributed to the member governments on 16 November 1956. It is important to note that while the report was subjected to revision after Suez, the conclusions of the Committee did not change. The report would then be discussed at the Ministerial Meeting in December 1956.

1.4 The Final Report and the December 1956 Ministerial Meeting

When the report of the Committee of Three was submitted in November, it was accompanied by a letter of transmittal which pointed to the fact that, at least in terms of cooperation within the Alliance, the situation had changed greatly.⁸⁵ The Suez Crisis was seen as an illustrative example of lacking willingness to use the consultative machinery of NATO. Indeed, the agenda of the December Ministerial Meeting shows that much of the focus of this meeting was on the international situation, particularly in the Middle East, in addition to the discussions surrounding the report of the Committee of Three. Considering the tensions within the Alliance so evident in the period leading up to the Ministerial Meeting, it might be expected that the discussions concerning the issue of political consultation would be characterized by antagonism and discord. This was, however, not the case.

1.4.1 The Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation

The final report of the Committee contained suggestions for extending cooperation in the four specific fields, and considerations in terms of any organizational or functional changes that would be necessary to achieve this. The issues of political consultation and economic cooperation received by far the most attention, while questions of cooperation in the cultural and information fields were afforded less. The tone of the report, perhaps particularly the introduction, was strongly influenced by the feeling that the Alliance was facing an internal crisis of disquieting proportions. Though the introduction was written before the Suez Crisis,

⁸⁴ NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, “WASHINGTON 543. Summary Discussion with Senior MFA Official re Wise men vs. Suez”. Sent from the US Embassy in Oslo to the Department of State, Ottawa, London, Rome and the Permanent Delegation to NATO on 7 November, 1956.

⁸⁵ NATO Archives, North Atlantic Council, C-M (56) 126, “Letter of Transmittal of the Report of the Committee of Three”. Circulated to the Permanent Delegations on 17 November, 1956.

it was revised in mid-November, and it contained a striking amount of references to the internal tension that was so strongly felt at the time. However, it is an important point that these references are prominent only in the introduction, as well as the letter of transmittal that accompanied the report.

The first section of the report, regarding political cooperation, began with some general remarks, which were basically a repetition of the conclusions of the Committee of Five: “...international cooperation... will depend largely on the extent to which member governments ... take into consideration the interests of the Alliance. This requires not only the acceptance of the obligation of consultation and co-operation whenever necessary, but also the development of practices by which the discharge of this obligation becomes a normal part of governmental activity.”⁸⁶ In other words, successful political cooperation was dependent on the willingness of the member governments to consult on political issues, and the development of a *habit of consultation*. The section dealt with three areas of political cooperation: political consultation; peaceful settlement of inter-member disputes; and cooperation with parliamentary associations in general, and the Parliamentary Conference in particular.

With regard to political consultation, the report discussed both the scope and character of consultations and the preparations needed to facilitate consultations. While pointing to the fact that a *habit of consultation* had failed to develop to a satisfactory degree, the Committee stated that there was a need for more than simply “broadening the scope and deepening the character” of consultation.⁸⁷ The goal should be to integrate the process of consultation into the normal formation of national policy, and to arrive, through collective discussion, at “timely agreement on common lines of policy and action”.⁸⁸

The report then went on to discuss some factors that limited political consultation. The first limitation mentioned was the time constraints faced in “a situation of extreme emergency... when action must be taken ... before consultation is possible”.⁸⁹ The second limitation that was discussed was the difficulty of specifying in advance what matters it would be necessary to discuss. The Committee quickly concluded that “experience is a better guide than

⁸⁶ NATO Archives, North Atlantic Council, C-M (56) 127 (Revised), “The Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO”, 11.

⁸⁷ Ibid, 12.

⁸⁸ Ibid, 12.

⁸⁹ Ibid, 12.

dogma”.⁹⁰ Instead of a rigid regimen of rules and guidelines, the Committee recommended certain principles and practices. According to these principles member governments should inform of any developments that significantly affect the Alliance; they should have the right to raise any subject of common interest for discussion in the Council; they should as far as possible consult before adopting firm policies or make major political pronouncements; they should take into consideration the interests and views of their fellow members in developing national policies, even when no consensus has been reached.⁹¹

To strengthen these proposed principles and practices, the Committee suggested that the Council in ministerial session discuss an annual political appraisal, based on an annual report to be prepared by the Secretary General. This report should give an analysis of major political problems, review the extent to which consultation has occurred and indicate future problems which may require consultation.⁹² The Committee went on to suggest that the Council create a Committee of Political Advisers to further facilitate preparation for consultation. This Committee would be constituted of members from each delegation, at times also aided by national experts. It was also suggested that current studies be included among its responsibilities, such as those on trends of Soviet policy.⁹³

In order to further promote the efficaciousness of political consultation, the Committee recommended that the Council adopt a resolution on peaceful settlement of inter-member disputes under article 1 of the Treaty, which stated that the signatories undertake to “settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means”.⁹⁴ With the proposed resolution, the members would reaffirm their obligation to settle disputes peacefully, agree to submit such disputes to good offices procedures within the Alliance framework, recognize the right of other members and the Secretary General to submit disputes to the Council, and to empower the Secretary General to offer his good offices at any time, and to nominate up to three Permanent Representatives to assist in enquiry and mediation.⁹⁵

The last part of the section concerning political cooperation contained recommendations on how NATO should cooperate with parliamentary associations. The Committee stated that

⁹⁰ NATO Archives, North Atlantic Council, C-M (56) 127 (Revised), “The Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO”, 13.

⁹¹ Ibid, 13.

⁹² Ibid, 14.

⁹³ Ibid, 14.

⁹⁴ *NATO Handbook 2001*, 527.

⁹⁵ NATO Archives, North Atlantic Council, C-M (56) 127 (Revised), “The Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO”, 14-15.

such associations were among NATO's most fervent supporters, and that the formation of such associations nationally and internationally had contributed greatly to developing public support for the Alliance. The Committee therefore recommended that the Secretary General continue to facilitate the work of the Parliamentary Conferences by placing the facilities of the NATO Headquarters at their disposal, and that the Secretary General and other senior NATO officials attend certain meetings in connection with these.⁹⁶

The second section of the report concerned economic cooperation. The point that willingness to discuss was paramount to effective cooperation was reiterated, and the common economic interests of the member governments were said to call for cooperative action, freedom in trade, payments, movement of manpower and movement of long-term capital, assistance to underdeveloped areas, and policies that underline "the superiority of free institutions".⁹⁷

While the previous section concerning political cooperation seemed to emphasize the need for harmonizing policies, this section focused on common interests between the members.

The Committee began by stating that while the principles of Article 2 were vitally important, it was not in the interest of NATO to duplicate the work done in other international organizations. In particular the report mentioned the OEEC, the GATT, the IMF, the IBRD, the IFC and various UN agencies, including the proposed SUNFED. While it was felt that "the common economic concerns ... will often best be fostered by continued and increased collaboration both bilaterally and through organizations other than NATO", the Committee recommended that such collaboration be strengthened by consultation on economic issues of special interest to the Alliance.⁹⁸ It was pointed out, however, that NATO members should not act as a bloc in other organizations, nor should NATO itself establish formal relations with any other organization.⁹⁹

In terms of resolving conflicting economic policies within the Alliance, the Committee suggested that, similar to political conflicts, the Secretary General and the individual members should be allowed to raise issues for discussion, with the only qualification being that the issue was not being handled effectively in another forum. The good offices procedure should

⁹⁶ NATO Archives, North Atlantic Council, C-M (56) 127 (Revised), "The Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO", 16.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 17.

⁹⁸ Ibid, 18.

⁹⁹ Ibid, 18.

be available in economic matters as in political matters.¹⁰⁰ To further facilitate consultation and resolution of disputes, the Committee advised the Council to establish a Committee of Economic Advisers, tasked with preliminary discussion of matters to be brought before the Council.¹⁰¹

The final recommendation in the section on economic cooperation regarded scientific and technical cooperation. It was noted that this is an area of particular importance to NATO, and indeed that progress in this field was “crucial to the future of the Atlantic Community”.¹⁰² The Committee therefore recommended that a conference be convened to foster cooperation in recruitment and training of scientists, engineers and technicians, interchange of experience between these between member countries, and to propose specific measures for future cooperation in this field.¹⁰³

After the two substantial sections on political and economic cooperation there followed two shorter sections on cooperation in the cultural and information fields. The Committee suggested certain general principles to further cultural cooperation, including support for private initiatives, giving priority to joint NATO projects that foster a sense of community and promoting transatlantic contacts. It was also pointed out that “there should be a realistic appreciation of the financial implications of cultural projects”.¹⁰⁴ The specific recommendations for projects to further cultural cooperation included arrangements for NATO courses and seminars for teachers, creating university chairs of Atlantic studies, government-sponsored programmes for the exchange of persons and establishing special NATO awards for students. It was also recommended that NATO cooperate more closely with youth organizations, and that travel restrictions be revised, with regards to both civilian and military personnel. With regards to financing, it was stated that projects that have a common benefit should be commonly financed.¹⁰⁵

The section on cooperation in the information field mainly focused on the importance of keeping the public in the individual member nations informed, both of NATO’s aspirations and of NATO’s achievements. However, it was pointed out that this was a task for the individual national information services, but it was recommended that NATO should assist

¹⁰⁰ NATO Archives, North Atlantic Council, C-M (56) 127 (Revised), “The Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO”, 18.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, 20.

¹⁰² Ibid, 19.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 21.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 21-22.

the individual governments in this work. The Committee specifically recommended the designation of an officer from each national information service to be responsible for dissemination of NATO information material, that governments should submit their information programmes to NATO review and discussion and that NATO should provide the national services with special studies on matters of common interest.¹⁰⁶

The final section of the report concerned the organization and functions of NATO. The Committee found that no structural changes were needed in the organization of NATO. The report states that the machinery was present; what was needed was the will to use it. However, certain improvements in terms of procedures and functioning were recommended. First, to allow for more discussion and consultation, more time should be allowed for Ministerial Meetings. It was also suggested that meetings of Foreign Ministers should be held whenever they were required, and occasionally at other locations than NATO Headquarters. In addition, ministers could more frequently attend regular Council meetings, and it was recommended that in order to strengthen links between the Council and the individual member governments, specially designated officers or the permanent heads of foreign ministries might also attend Council meetings. The Committee also made recommendations to strengthen and enhance the role of the Secretary General and the International staff. To enable this it was suggested, in addition to recommendations made in previous sections of the report, that the Secretary General chair the Ministerial Meetings of the Council.

1.4.2 The December Ministerial Meeting

It might have been expected that the discussion of the report at the December Ministerial Meeting would revolve mainly around the two most substantial sections of the report, namely political and economic cooperation. However, this would not be the case. The discussion of the report hardly touched upon economic cooperation at all. Much of the discussion revolved around the section on political cooperation, but there was little disagreement around the recommendations made in the report. Far from protesting that the Committee went too far in their recommendations, many of the Foreign Ministers stated that they felt the report did not go far enough.

¹⁰⁶ NATO Archives, North Atlantic Council, C-M (56) 127 (Revised), "The Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO", 23-24.

The discussion was opened by Martino, who was acting chairman of the meeting, and had functioned as Chairman of the Committee of Three. He referred initially to the altered international situation, saying that the Alliance was weakened by internal dispute, while at the same time events in Hungary had given cause to question the Soviet doctrine of peaceful coexistence. Lange continued the discussion, stating that, at the very least, the three major members should be able to coordinate their policies, in spite of differences “with regard to power and responsibilities”.¹⁰⁷ The initial comments from the Committee members were ended by Pearson, who reiterated Lange’s point concerning the three major members.

The discussion continued with numerous reaffirmations of the need for political consultation and cooperation, with few reservations, as long as approval of the report by the Council did not entail any other obligations for the member governments but to agree in principle. Secretary Dulles stated that the US supported extending political cooperation, but felt the need to note some reservations, mainly concerning language and the limitations placed on consultation by differing constitutional processes in policy formation.¹⁰⁸ The only objection of any consequence was voiced by the French Foreign Minister Pineau, who maintained that it should be the Council, not the Secretary General that should have the power to nominate Permanent Representatives in connection with good offices procedures. However, he did not insist that this point in the report needed to be changed.¹⁰⁹

The rest of the discussion surrounding the report of the Committee of Three revolved around whether or not the report should be published. Lange commented on this in his initial remarks on the report, stating that it was not the intention of the Committee to publish the letter of transmittal, which contained certain “internal considerations”, but that the report itself should be made public “if only because of wide spread publicity which has built up expectation and because of misunderstanding and misinterpretation which would ensue from non-publication”.¹¹⁰ Pearson also commented on this question, saying that he hoped the report could be published in order to give people a better understanding of NATO’s ideals and aims.¹¹¹ Of those opposing publication, France was most vehement. Pineau declared that if the report was to be publicized, the French would require certain amendments “in addition to

¹⁰⁷ *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IV, 139.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*, 141.

¹⁰⁹ UD, Dz 1919, 33.2/5²³: *Statsrådmøte, desember 1956*, Journal number 06933, ”Diskusjonen om ’de tre vises rapport’”.

¹¹⁰ *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IV, 138.

¹¹¹ *Ibid*, 139.

those required to permit their approval".¹¹² The French objections primarily concerned language that they felt implied criticism of French and British actions in the Middle East.¹¹³ It was decided to postpone further discussion until the next day. In the meantime the Committee would consult with Pineau on possible alterations which would address the French grievances. The next day, Martino presented proposals on changes that would allow for publication. It was suggested that the paragraph implying criticism of Franco-British action in the Middle East be changed, and that several paragraphs concerning the establishment of a Committee of Economic Advisers and cultural cooperation be transferred to a confidential covering letter. Also, the French had suggested omitting the whole section dealing with the organization and functioning of NATO. Except for a paragraph concerning security, the Committee proposed publishing this section. These suggestions were accepted by Pineau, though he still insisted that the report be published only if the resolution to be passed simply noted the report, approving only the conclusions. The report would be published as a report of the three ministers rather than of the Council.¹¹⁴

The Suez Crisis did indeed cast its shadow over the December ministerial session of the NAC, but in relation to the report of the Committee of Three and the discussions surrounding it, Suez did not have a negative impact. On the contrary, it must be said that the tense mood of the meeting and the focus that was placed on repairing the transatlantic relationship after Suez had a positive effect. In the wake of the Suez Crisis, it was impossible for the NATO members not to approve of the Committee's conclusions; such a refusal would have created a politically untenable situation that surely would have torn the Alliance apart. The French and British could complain about the language contained in the report and insisted on changes before publication, but not obstruct the acceptance by the NAC of the conclusions of the Committee.

Despite several attempts at studying ways of implementing Article 2 and extending cooperation in NATO to non-military fields, the perceived new face of the Soviet threat that was evident to the NATO governments in 1956 occasioned another try. The impression that the military threat from the Soviet Bloc was lessened, only to be replaced by threats of economic penetration of the underdeveloped world and political penetration of the West set the tone for the endeavours of the Three Wise Men. In this changed international climate,

¹¹² *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IV, 143.

¹¹³ *Ibid*, 143.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, 147-148.

events in the Middle East would make the Committee's work harder yet. At times the Committee members would even contemplate abandoning their task. The end result was a report whose conclusions were accepted only with the reservation that they be regarded as guiding principles rather than a strict framework.

Norway was, through the participation of Foreign Minister Lange, a central actor in the work of the Committee of Three. As a small state in an Alliance with a superpower, Norway might be seen to have had an interest in extending cooperation as much as possible, as it would stand to gain a disproportionate amount of influence. On the other hand, there was always the danger that Norway would see itself involved in issues in which it had little interest, and nothing to gain. Some issues might even have negative repercussions, particularly on public opinion. The next chapter focuses on the Norwegian position on non-military cooperation in NATO and what considerations lay behind it.

Chapter Two- The Norwegian Position on Non-Military Cooperation

The Norwegian position on non-military cooperation was developed through a cooperative effort. The reply to the NATO questionnaire was fashioned by the Foreign Ministry with input from several other Ministries, and the matter was discussed in depth at Cabinet level at several Cabinet meetings as well as in the Security Policy Commission. In addition, the work of the Committee of Three was discussed with the parliamentary opposition in the Storting's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs.

In developing the Norwegian position the Norwegian Government faced many dilemmas. As a small state in an alliance with one of the world's two superpowers, an extension of political consultation in NATO carried with it the prospect of an increase in the influence Norway could bring to bear on the international situation. At the same time, however, there existed the possibility that Norway would be forced to share responsibility for decisions that could adversely affect public opinion. Economic cooperation could offer opportunities for coordination of policy and resolving inter-member disputes in economic matters. But it could also demand extending financial aid to countries and regions both inside and outside the NATO area. Cultural cooperation had the potential of strengthening the unity of the Alliance, but joint action in this field also had financial implications. And extending cooperation in the field of information could result in the NATO Information Service being transformed into a propaganda institution, which might not sit well with the Norwegian public.

The general impetus behind the Norwegian wish to extend non-military cooperation was partly, as it was in many NATO capitals, the perception of a change in Soviet tactics. This was, as previously mentioned, one of the main reasons behind the establishment of the Committee of Three at the May 1956 Ministerial Meeting of the NAC. It was felt in the Foreign Ministry that it was important to remain united in meeting Soviet advances in the political and economic fields. Norway saw these advances as aiming at creating division among the Western allies, and discrediting them in the eyes of the world.¹¹⁵ This view of the aims of Soviet policy formed the background for the development of the Norwegian position,

¹¹⁵ UD, Dz 2003, 33.2/61- *Tremannskomiteén. Bind V*, "Notat". This is an unnamed memorandum signed by Bureau Chief Georg Kristiansen of the Foreign Ministry's 3rd Political Office. The memorandum contains a summary of the work of the Committee of Three. While it is undated, it was most likely written in November or December 1956.

but the reasoning behind the specific answers to the NATO questionnaire was more complex and varied.

This chapter will detail and analyse the Norwegian position on non-military cooperation, using the Norwegian reply to the Committee's questionnaire as a point of departure. The reply is divided into sections on political, economic, cultural, informational and organizational questions. This chapter will therefore be divided into corresponding sections containing a summary and an analysis of the Norwegian position.

2.1 Political Cooperation

The main focus of the Norwegian position on non-military cooperation in NATO was on political consultation. The Norwegian reply was based on the view that an extension of political consultation was necessary in order to prevent conditions detrimental to the unity and strength of the Alliance through unilateral and uncoordinated action. In addition to adversely affecting the unity of the Alliance, the Norwegian Government felt that such action also exposed NATO to Soviet propaganda, both at home and internationally.¹¹⁶

In order to avoid situations that would weaken the unity and strength of the Alliance, Norway encouraged informal exchanges of information, and espoused efforts to arrive at "common appreciations ... with regard to matters of common concern" in a wide range of matters.¹¹⁷ The Norwegian view of the appropriate scope of consultation reflected the view that the commitments of NATO were limited to a definite geographical area, and that it was not desirable to extend these commitments beyond this area. The Norwegian reply stated that the general aims set out in the Treaty gave a very wide scope of consultation. However, it was thought that particular focus should be placed on matters that related to the external threat to the NATO area, such as Soviet policy in general, the German question and disarmament. These matters were to be made the subject of regular studies and discussions aiming at a high degree of coordination of policies.¹¹⁸

While the Norwegian reply recognised that a wide scope of consultation was possible, the Norwegian Government admitted that there were certain limitations. First of all, it was

¹¹⁶ UD, Dz 2002, 33.2/61-Tremannskomiteén, Bind III, "Norway's Reply to the Committee of Three-Questionnaire".

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

pointed out that any general consensus reached through discussions in the Council should not be binding, due to the necessity in many member countries of parliamentary sanction before agreement could be reached. A second limiting factor was that certain members were recognised as having “specific responsibilities and possibilities of action not shared by other members”.¹¹⁹ In addition to these limitations, Norway pointed to the need to avoid duplicating the work being satisfactorily done in other organizations.¹²⁰ As for developing regulations for determining what categories of questions should be the subject of consultation, the Norwegian position was that devising rigid rules was not desirable, as it might reduce the interest of members to use NATO as a forum for consultation at all, and could lead to “unfortunate and useless discussions of procedural questions”.¹²¹

The second area of focus of the Norwegian reply to the political section of the questionnaire was inter-member disputes. The negative view towards rigid and definite procedures carried over to the issue of conciliation in inter-member disputes. With regard to situations of disputes between members it was the Norwegian view that it was of great importance to handle such disputes within the Alliance. It was felt that public opinion expected action in such instances, and that bringing up inter-member disputes in other organizations could be harmful to the unity of NATO. In the Norwegian view the two most evident questions of importance to NATO in this regard were Cyprus and Iceland. While discouraging the idea of definite procedures for handling inter-member disputes, the Norwegian position was that the Council should have the right to investigate “any inter-member dispute in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute is likely to endanger the security or weaken the unity of the Alliance”, and that the Secretary General or any Member Government should have the right to bring any dispute to the Council.¹²²

The final area of focus in the political section of the Norwegian reply concerned parliamentary associations. It was the Norwegian view that it was important to create interest and understanding of NATO in the members’ parliamentary bodies in order to obtain a high degree of parliamentary backing. In this regard it was felt that visits of parliamentary committees to NATO headquarters and to other member countries was a useful tool. In particular, establishing closer contact between parliamentarians on the two sides of the

¹¹⁹ UD, Dz 2002, 33.2/61-Tremannskomiteén, Bind III, “Norway’s Reply to the Committee of Three-Questionnaire”.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

Atlantic was seen as important. In this field it was the Norwegian view that the NATO parliamentary conferences played a significant role, and that these should be made a regular part of NATO activity. Giving the parliamentary conferences a consultative status, however, was not desirable. It was thought that this could have negative effects on political consultation.

Political consultation was the central theme of the Norwegian position on extending political cooperation in NATO. This had its background in the French decision to transfer two divisions of its troops that were earmarked for use by NATO to Algeria. The Norwegian Government resented the lack of consultation on the matter, and that the Council was presented with what it saw as a French *fait accompli*.¹²³ However, while resentment towards French unilateralism was an immediate and specific factor in the Norwegian wishes for more political consultation, there was also a more general feeling that developing the non-military aspect of NATO was essential to the continued existence of NATO. Bureau Chief Georg Kristiansen in the Foreign Ministry's 3rd Political Office presented the view that while the basic function of NATO was collective defence, this function could not be fulfilled without a sense of community that could not be created by military cooperation alone. Rather, genuine political and economic cooperation was necessary in order to eliminate the possibility of internal conflict.¹²⁴ Similar sentiments could be found throughout the upper echelons of the Norwegian Foreign Service. In the Foreign Ministry, Director General of the Political Department in the Foreign Ministry Frithjof Jacobsen stated that the future of NATO depended on the creation of genuinely effective political consultation machinery in NATO.¹²⁵ Another official that espoused the same view was Hans Engen, the Norwegian Permanent Representative to the UN. In his view, since the NATO member countries did not constitute a homogenous political group, extending cooperation outside military matters could result in the Alliance being torn apart by "centrifugal forces". However, Engen thought it likely that

¹²³ Riksarkivet, Statsministerens kontor, RA/S-1005 (SMK hereafter), *Referat fra regjeringskonferanser*, "29. Regjeringskonferanse torsdag 22. mars 1956".

¹²⁴ UD, Dz 2003, 33.2/61- *Tremannskomiteén. Bind V*, "Notat". This is an unnamed memorandum signed by Bureau Chief Georg Kristiansen of the Foreign Ministry's 3rd Political Office. The memorandum contains a summary of the work of the Committee of Three. While it is undated, it was most likely written in November or December 1956.

¹²⁵ UD, Dz 2002, 33.2/61- *Tremannskomiteén. Bind I*, Journal number 03428, "Notat: 3-mannsutvalget. Diskusjonsgrunnlag for møtet 13. juni 1956".

these forces would arise in any event, and that extending political cooperation might represent the best means of dealing with them.¹²⁶

The idea that NATO did not constitute a homogenous political group was present in Oslo as well. According to Bureau Chief Kristiansen, the reason behind much of the perceived malaise was that there was no real basis for common policies among the NATO members. In fact, Kristiansen doubted whether there was any common interest to speak of outside common defence. In his opinion, the long term goal of the Alliance had to be to provide a better foundation for common policies, through more sharing of information between members and closer economic and cultural cooperation.¹²⁷

Thus the Norwegian position on non-military cooperation was in many ways positive. However, there were definite limits to how far the Norwegian Government was willing to go, and at all levels there was apprehension as to what an extension of political cooperation could entail. First of all, Norway was unwilling to take any steps that would require relinquishing sovereignty. It was clearly stated that Norway had, as did the larger powers in the Alliance, objections to any such developments.¹²⁸ Any movement towards a supranational approach was unacceptable, as was also pointed out with regard to the role of national parliaments. Parliamentary cooperation such as that which took place through the Council of Europe was not seen as a profitable way forward.¹²⁹ The question of sovereignty did not only relate to developing common policies through political consultation and parliamentary cooperation, but also to solving inter-member disputes. However, here the position was the opposite. If conciliation in inter-member disputes was to be possible at all, member countries could not be allowed to refuse to let disputes be discussed in NATO. In this regard, however, it was seen as

¹²⁶ UD, Dz 2002, 33.2/61- *Tremannskomiteén. Bind I*, Journal number 3013, "Problemer i forbindelse med politiske konsultasjoner i internasjonale organisasjoner".

¹²⁷ UD, Dz 2004, 33.2/61a- *Tremannskomiteén. Internt norsk arbeid. Bind I*, "Momenter ved utarbeidelse av utkast til spørreskjema om utvidelse av NATO-samarbeidet på det ikke-militære felt", dated 15 May 1956.

¹²⁸ UD, Dz 2003, 33.2/61- *Tremannskomiteén. Bind V*, "Notat". This is an unnamed memorandum signed by Bureau Chief Georg Kristiansen of the Foreign Ministry's 3rd Political Office. The memorandum contains a summary of the work of the Committee of Three. While it is undated, it was most likely written in November or December 1956.

¹²⁹ UD, Dz 2004, 33.2/61a- *Tremannskomiteén. Internt norsk arbeid. Bind I*, "En del synspunkter når det gjelder tiltak for å styrke samholdet innen NATO, aktivisering og utviding av NATO's virksomhet på de ikke-militære områder- Tremannskomiteén". This is a memorandum by Sivert Nielsen, State Secretary in the Ministry of Defense, dated 8 August 1956.

necessary and acceptable, and it was thought that most of the NATO members would agree to this.¹³⁰

Beyond the problems extended political cooperation presented with regard to sovereignty, there was also widespread apprehension as to what such an extension would mean. The Norwegian Permanent Representative to NATO Jens Boyesen was quite clear in a letter to Lange in early April about the risks involved in extending political cooperation. In Boyesen's opinion, it was just as important to decide what matters it was not desirable to discuss as it was to decide what matters were suitable for consultation. With regard to issues that related directly to NATO, such as Germany and Soviet policy, Boyesen thought that the degree of consultation already present was satisfactory. In extending consultation to matters that, although important to security, lay outside of the Treaty area Boyesen strongly advised caution. Referring specifically to North Africa and the Middle East, Boyesen points out that if a matter has been the subject of proper consultation based on a sufficient amount of factual information, it would be difficult to reject attempts at developing a common policy. The end result of such discussions, he maintained, would always tend to be closer to the original intent of whichever member had the immediate responsibility and was best informed of the situation. Further, he stated that in a situation in which Norway could no longer complain about the treatment of an issue, and in which all the NATO members attempted to arrive at a common policy, one could not expect that any deviating views held by one or a few members would have an impact on the rest. Boyesen therefore advised that the aim of consultation should be to attain the fullest possible information on an issue, to be afforded the opportunity to question and comment, but not to develop common policies on matters for which Norway did not have any responsibility, nor had the ability to take responsibility for.¹³¹

The apparent negativity that underlies the Norwegian position on political cooperation stands in harsh contrast to the positive attitude that was conveyed in public. The Norwegian Government spoke warmly of the need for increased political cooperation and closer consultation within the Alliance, while at the same time clearly recognizing that the importance of maintaining sovereignty trumped the possible advantages of closer cooperation within the Alliance. In addition to this, the realization of what extensive consultation in the

¹³⁰ UD, Dz 2004, 33.2/61a- *Tremannskomiteén. Internt norsk arbeid. Bind I, Journal number 03349*, "Notat. Tvister mellom medlemsstatene i NATO". Dated 1 June 1956, signed by Einar Løchen.

¹³¹ UD, Dz 1918, 33.2/5²¹- *Statsrådsmøtet, mai 1956*, "Letter from Jens Boyesen to Halvard Lange", dated 9 April 1956.

NAC might entail politically in terms of shared responsibility for the policies of its allies further tempered the attitude towards political cooperation in the Norwegian Government.

2.2 Economic Cooperation

The Norwegian reply to the section of the NATO questionnaire regarding economic questions had three main areas of focus. The first area was the desirability of utilising already existing organizations such as the OEEC, IMF and GATT. The Norwegian reply stated that it was necessary to take full advantage of the opportunities for cooperation that these organizations already presented. The OEEC in particular is seen as an important economic body, despite the fact that the US and Canada only participated as *associated members*. In fact, it was the Norwegian view that this arrangement was adequate, and that no change in the relationship of the US and Canada vis-à-vis the OEEC was necessary.

While Norway was clear in its view on the necessity of utilising existing organizations, the possibility of using the consultative machinery of the NAC to discuss matters that mainly concerned other international bodies was also recognized as offering benefits. This pertained particularly to matters that had not received satisfactory attention or solution elsewhere, where it was seen as desirable to avoid conflicting views and with regard to economic questions with wider political and strategic implications. In cases involving such matters the Norwegian position was that it was important to use NATO's consultative machinery, not necessarily to develop common policies, but at least to reach agreement on principles.

Thus the basic assumption was that economic questions were best left to existing organizations, unless specific circumstances justified using the consultative machinery in NATO. This also applied to resolving conflicts between the economic policies of NATO members. While it was thought that inter-member disputes in political questions were best handled within NATO, rather than at the UN, in economic disputes it was thought that conflict resolution was best handled by the OEEC.¹³²

The second area of focus in the Norwegian reply was the question of utilising NATO to extend financial aid to areas both inside and outside of the Treaty area. Regarding the possibility of extending aid to underdeveloped areas within NATO, the Norwegian attitude

¹³² UD, Dz 2002, 33.2/61-Tremannskomiteén, Bind III, "Norway's Reply to the Committee of Three-Questionnaire".

was negative. It was felt that it would be more practical to handle such tasks by other organizations more specialized in the field. However, in answer to the question of developing public works for civilian use within NATO through common efforts, the attitude was more positive. It was thought that such works might be beneficial to military and civil emergency planning, and that it would be a natural field for NATO to engage in. In fact, NATO might have “particular qualifications” due to experience drawn from the military infrastructure programme.¹³³ In addition, efforts in this field were thought to have an appeal to public opinion. However, while Norway was clearly positive to efforts in this field, it was also stated that it would be necessary to thoroughly explore possible financial or organizational problems that might arise.¹³⁴

The negative view regarding aid to underdeveloped areas within the Alliance was based on the reasoning that in any kind of aid programme to underdeveloped areas within the NATO area, due to lower living standards in large parts of Southern Europe Norway would be a net contributor rather than a net receiver.¹³⁵ In any case, the Foreign Ministry was of the opinion that any initiative in this area would have to come from the US if it was to have any merit.¹³⁶ However, although Norway was sceptical to a NATO financed internal aid programme, there was a positive attitude towards a commonly financed programme for developing public works for civilian use. The stated reason for supporting such a programme referred to the positive effect this would have on public opinion. On the other hand the Norwegian reply also mentions the experience drawn from the military infrastructure programme. With the great benefits Norway had reaped through the military infrastructure programme, it is perhaps not surprising that the prospect of a similar programme in public works was welcomed.

Concerning whether to extend aid through NATO to underdeveloped areas outside of the Treaty area, this was seen as impractical and difficult due to political considerations, and it was felt that the existing agencies operating in this field were satisfactorily organized. Instead, it was thought that it would be more appropriate to stimulate UN activities in this field, for example by strengthening the economic basis of specialized UN agencies such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In particular, the Norwegian

¹³³ UD, Dz 2002, 33.2/61-Tremannskomiteén, *Bind III*, ”Norway’s Reply to the Committee of Three-Questionnaire”.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ UD, Dz 2004, 33.2/61a- Tremannskomiteén. *Internt norsk arbeid. Bind I*, ”En del synspunkter når det gjelder tiltak for å styrke samholdet innen NATO, aktivisering og utviding av NATO’s virksomhet på de ikke-militære områder- Tremannskomiteén”.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

Government suggested that the NATO members individually support the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). It was pointed out that this UN project was considered by a number of politically important underdeveloped countries to be of great importance.

While it was the Norwegian position that NATO was not a suitable organization for channelling aid, it was nevertheless felt that it would be useful if NATO members consulted within NATO on the basic policies to be followed in this field. In addition, it was the Norwegian attitude that coordinating individual policies regarding steps taken individually within normal trade relations with underdeveloped countries was essential, as such individual actions could contribute to creating a favourable political climate for Western countries in general. Aid given through the UN would not have the same “PR-value”.¹³⁷ It was recognized that multilateral efforts at extending aid would have a greater political effect than bilateral efforts, but at the same time it was realized that many countries would be apprehensive about aid coming from an organization which counted as its members several colonial powers.¹³⁸ The question of which method of extending aid would bring the greatest political benefits was clearly an important one. In the Norwegian view the best means of reaping maximum political advantage was through the UN, particularly the proposed SUNFED.¹³⁹

In relation to the question of aid to underdeveloped areas, the Norwegian Government based its view on the assumption that the changed international situation warranted an effort in this field. It was agreed that one should raise the issue in the NAC as to whether NATO members could to a certain degree decrease defence spending on the background of lessened international tension, and make the funds saved available to underdeveloped countries through the UN.¹⁴⁰ This was, however, not an uncontroversial idea. Boyesen advised against it, stating that as Norway already had a smaller defence burden than many of its allies, such a

¹³⁷ UD, Dz 2004, 33.2/61a- *Tremannskomiteén. Internt norsk arbeid. Bind I*, ”En del synspunkter når det gjelder tiltak for å styrke samholdet innen NATO, aktivisering og utviding av NATO’s virksomhet på de ikke-militære områder- Tremannskomiteén”.

¹³⁸ UD, Dz 2004, 33.2/61a- *Tremannskomiteén. Internt norsk arbeid. Bind I*, ”Notat: NATO’s ministerielle tremannskomiteé. Oppgaver på det økonomiske felt”. Dated 14 May, signed by S. Chr. Sommerfelt, in the Trade Policy Section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; UD, Dz 2003, 33.2/61- *Tremannskomiteén. Bind V*, ”Notat”. Unnamed memorandum signed by Bureau Chief Georg Kristiansen of the Foreign Ministry’s 3rd Political Office.

¹³⁹ NA, Department of State, Central Files, 711.56321, “Foreign Service Despatch no. 679: Norway and the Three Wise Men’s Committee: apparent contradictory policy statements by US officials on dispensing capital aid to underdeveloped countries”, dated 23 May 1956, relating a conversation with Bureau Chief Per Vennemoe at the Foreign Ministry’s 1st Political Office.

¹⁴⁰ SMK, *Referat fra regjeringskonferanser*, ”29. Regjeringskonferanse torsdag 28. juni 1956”.

suggestion might seem as “window dressing” for a lack of willingness to contribute to the common defence effort.¹⁴¹

The final area of focus in the Norwegian reply concerned economic policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Bloc. It was the Norwegian view that some issues of this kind were of great importance, and that close cooperation within NATO on these matters would be prudent. Such cooperation should not be limited to countering or neutralising Soviet commercial practices. Rather, it was important to discuss the basic economic policies to be followed in a broad sense. In spite of this clear view of the necessity of close coordination of policy, the Norwegian Government recognized certain pitfalls in this field. It was stated that any recourse to practices that were out of line with generally recognized commercial rules would not be beneficial. Also, it was realized that the Communist economic system made it comparatively easy for the Soviet Bloc to respond effectively to such competition.

The Norwegian position on economic cooperation in NATO was closely linked to the position on political cooperation. Much of the same reasoning that lay behind the conclusion that extending political consultation was necessary in order to create a better foundation for common policy, also applied to economic cooperation. Strengthening the unity of the Alliance by limiting the possibilities of conflict in economic matters was seen as necessary to strengthen the basis for collective defence.¹⁴²

However, the Norwegian reply clearly stated that such cooperation should only take place in NATO if warranted by special circumstances. There were several reasons behind this reluctance to make use of the consultative machinery of the NAC in economic matters. First, there was the realization that the NATO members did not comprise a homogenous group in terms of economic policies.¹⁴³ Second, there were fears that extending economic cooperation in NATO would be an obstacle in the ongoing work towards the development of a Nordic common market, as it might serve to alienate Sweden.¹⁴⁴ Finally, there was the basic feeling that the organizations that already existed on the economic side functioned satisfactorily. While political issues had to be handled within the Alliance, particularly inter-member

¹⁴¹ UD, Dz 1918, 33.2/5²¹ - *Statsrådsmøtet, mai 1956*, ”Letter from Jens Boyesen to Halvard Lange”, dated 9 April 1956.

¹⁴² UD, Dz 2003, 33.2/61 - *Tremannskomiteén. Bind V*, ”Notat”. Unnamed memorandum signed by Bureau Chief Georg Kristiansen of the Foreign Ministry’s 3rd Political Office. Undated, but filed in the 1 November- 31 December file.

¹⁴³ UD, Dz 2004, 33.2/61a - *Tremannskomiteén. Internt norsk arbeid. Bind I*, ”Notat: NATO’s ministerielle tremannskomiteé. Oppgaver på det økonomiske felt”.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

disputes, economic issues could safely be handled in the OEEC because of its limited membership. Unlike at the UN, NATO members were not directly exposed to criticism from the Soviet Bloc.

2.3 Cultural and Informational Cooperation

The Norwegian position on cultural cooperation was mainly focused on fostering closer ties between the member countries and on educational activities. In terms of education the position was divided between general activities and the more specific question of cooperation in training scientists and technicians. Regarding measures to engender closer ties between members, the focus was on exchanges of both civilian and military personnel, as well as coordinating the work of youth organizations.

In general the Norwegian position on cultural cooperation had a clear focus on the necessity of coordinating efforts in the field with other organizations where the NATO members were represented. In particular, Norway desired a more active approach by the NATO members to participation in the activities of UNESCO. Furthermore, Norway saw a need for improving coordination and cooperation between the foreign services of the members and youth organizations. The Communist youth organizations in Eastern Europe, it was stated in the Norwegian reply, were organized to work in close cooperation with each other and the foreign services of their respective countries. In the West, however, there were several organizations working in what was considered an uncoordinated fashion. While not suggesting that NATO itself should coordinate the work done by these organizations, the Norwegian reply suggested that NATO address this situation and consider what steps, if any, should be taken to encourage closer cooperation between the various organizations. To aid in this it was also suggested to strengthen the NATO Secretariat by creating a post for an official to study and report on this problem, as well as serve as a liaison between NATO and the youth organizations. In addition, it was considered that the NATO Youth Conference that had been arranged in July 1956 had been successful and should be repeated.¹⁴⁵

Concerning educational activities it was felt that a rise in the general level of education in the NATO countries was desirable. At the same time, however, it was felt that NATO was not a suitable organization for undertaking educational activities “in the proper sense of the

¹⁴⁵ UD, Dz 2002, 33.2/61-Tremannskomiteén, Bind III, “Norway’s Reply to the Committee of Three-Questionnaire”.

word”.¹⁴⁶ Rather, it was stated that NATO’s role should be to initiate, encourage and support activities in this field, while the responsibility for action should rest with the individual governments.¹⁴⁷

Regarding training of scientists and technicians, on the other hand, the Norwegian position was clear. This field was considered to be of the greatest importance and one in which NATO could play an important role. In fact, the Norwegian reply goes so far as to suggest that certain projects in this field might be considered as important as commonly financed projects in the military field, and particular focus was placed on the possibility of joint financing of projects in this field. There was also a feeling of urgency in the Norwegian reply, suggesting that “specially (sic) urgent tasks” be attempted.¹⁴⁸ It was also suggested that it might be useful to initiate a long-term programme in this field.¹⁴⁹

The Norwegian reply presented exchanges of personnel as a profitable means of fostering closer ties between the member countries. The arrangement of summer schools for students already taking place on a bilateral basis was considered successful, and it was suggested that similar exchanges be considered for other groups. Similarly, a planned project for visiting professorships at institutions in the NATO countries was considered to be of interest in this field. In addition, the Norwegian reply considered that exchanges of service personnel on leave might be beneficial in creating stronger ties between the member countries by creating mutual interest and understanding amongst the younger generation. However, it was felt that arranging exchanges of personnel on a multilateral basis would possibly raise considerable administrative and financial problems, and that members therefore should be encouraged to arrange such exchanges on a bilateral basis.¹⁵⁰

The idea of strengthening unity through increased understanding was also a factor in the Norwegian position on cooperation in the information field. However, the Norwegian reply expressed several reservations in terms of the scope of cooperation. It was stated that the NATO Information Service (NIS) should primarily focus on purely factual information. Further, it was the Norwegian opinion that this information should be of a *positive* character, in that it should explain what NATO was *for*, rather than what NATO was *against*. Nor did

¹⁴⁶ UD, Dz 2002, 33.2/61-Tremannskomiteén, Bind III, ”Norway’s Reply to the Committee of Three-Questionnaire”.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

the Norwegian reply show any enthusiasm for giving the NIS any responsibility for coordinating a centralized propaganda aimed at the Soviet Bloc, or that it should act as a counterpropaganda institution. However, Norway was not adverse to an arrangement where the NIS could act as a *clearing-house* for ideas and material. In relation to this, Norway also advocated establishing close ties between the NIS and the national information services. To this end it was suggested that national information officers could participate more frequently on the Information Committee, and that it might be necessary to strengthen both the national services as well as the NIS.¹⁵¹

Another means of fostering understanding that the Norwegian reply suggested was to continue and extend the practice of arranging tours of NATO countries for journalists, lecturers and teachers. It was considered of great importance to keep the public sympathetic to and informed of the activities of the Alliance, and as with exchanges of civilian and military personnel, such tours were considered to be a fruitful means of achieving this. On the other hand, it was recognized that while it was desirable to keep the public informed, the necessity for confidentiality, particularly in regard to political consultation, presented a dilemma. It was, however, not considered advisable to adopt a general policy in this question. Rather, such cases would have to be considered on a case by case basis.

The background for the Norwegian position on cultural and informational cooperation was that such cooperation was a means of strengthening the foundation for cooperation in the military and political fields. An important aspect in this regard was the need to bolster public support. The Foreign Ministry was of the opinion that among the different fields of non-military cooperation, the cultural field was the field which the public considered to be most *civilian*, and by engaging in this area NATO would be assured stronger support in public opinion.¹⁵² Educational activities could also be justified on these grounds. A cooperative effort in training scientists and technicians was considered to demonstrate NATO's competence and capacity in the non-military field, which would also be beneficial in strengthening public support¹⁵³ In the informational field, as well, there was a clear focus on ensuring that the Alliance had public support.

¹⁵¹ UD, Dz 2002, 33.2/61-Tremannskomiteén, Bind III, "Norway's Reply to the Committee of Three-Questionnaire".

¹⁵² UD, Dz 2004, 33.2/61a-Tremannskomiteén. *Internt norsk arbeid*, "Arbeidsnotat. Det kulturelle arbeid innenfor NATO", dated 4 June 1956 and signed by 1st Secretary Tim Greve in Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

¹⁵³ UD, Dz 2002, 33.2/61-Tremannskomiteén, Bind III, "Norway's Reply to the Committee of Three-Questionnaire".

This possibility for demonstrating NATO's capacity was not the only reason for suggesting common efforts in training scientists and technicians, nor was it the main reason. There was a feeling in the Foreign Ministry that the West was lagging behind in this field compared to the Soviet Bloc, and that there was a *technician gap* between East and West.¹⁵⁴ The fear that the West was falling behind in an important field was shared by the Ministry of Defence.¹⁵⁵

As in the other fields of non-military cooperation, the Norwegian Government recognized that there were obstacles and pitfalls. In terms of what could be achieved in the cultural field, Lange was of the opinion that it was paramount that proponents of cooperation in this field avoid alarming the US, particularly with regard to suggesting joint financing of projects.¹⁵⁶ Another tendency that is apparent throughout the Norwegian reply is the desire to avoid duplicating the work of other organizations. In relation to cultural cooperation, it was felt that it would be beneficial if all the NATO members would support the work of UNESCO. At the same time, Lange warned against encroaching on UNESCO's field of purpose.¹⁵⁷

2.4 Organizational Changes

To the extent that the Norwegian Government advocated any organizational changes, it was strictly to facilitate political consultation. In the Norwegian view, extending cooperation in non-military fields did not create the need for changes to the structure of the organization. There was also the question of whether to establish the position of NATO as a regional organization in the terms of Chapter 8 of the UN Charter. The Norwegian Government clearly stated that this was not considered either necessary or desirable.

To further facilitate political consultation, and thus consultation on certain economic matters, the Norwegian reply contained some suggestions to this end. First of all, the Norwegian reply stressed that the member Governments should recognize fully that the NAC in permanent session had the same authority as the NAC in ministerial session. In relation to this, it was also pointed out that it was viewed as essential that the members give a high priority to their representation on the NAC, and that an effort be made to ensure the closest possible link

¹⁵⁴ UD, Dz 2003, 33.2/61- *Tremannskomiteén. Bind V*, "Notat". Unnamed memorandum signed by Bureau Chief Georg Kristiansen of the Foreign Ministry's 3rd Political Office.

¹⁵⁵ UD, Dz 2004, 33.2/61a- *Tremannskomiteén. Internt norsk arbeid. Bind I*, "En del synspunkter når det gjelder tiltak for å styrke samholdet innen NATO, aktivisering og utviding av NATO's virksomhet på de ikke-militære områder- Tremannskomiteén".

¹⁵⁶ UD, Dz 2002, 33.2/6- *Tremannskomiteén. Bind I*, "Langes samtaler med Lord Ismay 16.5.56 om 3.mannkomitéens arbeid".

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

between Governments and their representatives. Second, the Norwegian reply suggested that the NAC should consider the possibilities of delegating its powers of decision in certain fields to the respective committees, leaving more time for discussions of political problems. In addition, it was stressed that more attention needed to be given to preparation of matters placed on the agenda of the Council. In relation to preparation of matters for discussion, the Norwegian reply suggested that consideration be given to whether the Working Group on Trends and Implications of Soviet Foreign Policy should be made a permanent institution, and the scope of its work extended to cover all aspects of Soviet policies.¹⁵⁸

In relation to strengthening the Council in permanent session, it was also considered whether it was necessary to strengthen the role of the Secretary General. In the Norwegian view this was not deemed necessary, as it was considered that the Secretary General already had sufficient powers to fulfil his role with regard to political consultation. However, it was suggested that the Council reaffirm the authority given to the Secretary General at the Lisbon ministerial session of the NAC, in particular his right to initiate matters for Council action.

The Norwegian view on the need for organizational changes was of course based on the Norwegian position on extending cooperation in the different non-military fields.

Strengthening the NAC in permanent session as well as the machinery for political consultation was in line with the clear Norwegian focus on political cooperation. Similarly, reaffirming the role of the Secretary General was considered necessary to ensure a wide scope of political consultation. In addition, by underlining the right of the Secretary General to initiate matters for Council action, members would not be able to keep inter-member disputes off the agenda in the NAC.

The clearly negative view on establishing NATO as a regional organization under the UN had to do with the fact that Chapter 8 of the UN Charter states that regional organizations created under Article 53 of the Charter were placed under the authority of the Security Council, a prospect that was unacceptable to the Norwegian Government, despite their continuously strong support for the UN.

¹⁵⁸ UD, Dz 2002, 33.2/61-Tremannskomiteén, Bind III, "Norway's Reply to the Committee of Three-Questionnaire".

2.5 Conclusions

The Norwegian position on non-military cooperation had a clear and distinct focus on political consultation. Economic cooperation was only seen as desirable in terms of consultation, and even then only under certain conditions, such as if the matter was not being handled in a satisfactory manner elsewhere, or it was of importance to avoid conflicting views in other forums. Questions of strategic importance were also considered as suitable for discussion in the NAC, as was the matter of Soviet economic policy. In the cultural and informational fields NATO was afforded a limited role, with focus on national responsibilities with regards to information and propaganda/counterpropaganda, and focus on support for external initiatives.

Another recurring trend in the Norwegian reply was the importance of avoiding duplicating the work of other organizations. In the economic field the OEEC was considered as the most effective means of cooperation, in part due to its limited membership. In the cultural field primary support would be given to the work of UNESCO. In the political field, however, there was a recognized need for discussing political questions within the organization before they were handled elsewhere. Still, it was maintained that the NATO members should not give the appearance of acting as a Bloc in the UN.

Thus the Norwegian position on non-military cooperation was developed balancing the desire for closer cooperation with the possible negative effects such cooperation could have for Norwegian sovereignty, freedom of action and public opinion. The US on the other hand, performed a balancing act of its own in developing its position on non-military cooperation. The next chapter will detail this US position and the considerations that lay behind it.

Chapter Three- The US Position on Non-Military Cooperation

Where the Norwegian position was developed through close cooperation between the Foreign and Defence Ministries, as well as with the political opposition, the development of the US position was largely handled by the State Department. While there did exist some cooperation with Congress, mainly through the integral participation of Senator George, the US position was developed more independently than was the case in Norway. This is not to say, however, that Congress was put on the sideline.

The Norwegian position on non-military cooperation was worked out taking into account the conflicting realities of being a small state in an alliance with a superpower. While, as we have seen, increased non-military cooperation might afford Norway an amount of influence out of proportion to its size, there was also an inherent danger of having to share responsibility for decisions that were controversial to the public, and which the Norwegian government did not necessarily have the resources to examine fully. The US position, on the other hand, was a balancing act which had to take into account other factors.

This chapter will detail and analyse the US position on non-military cooperation, using the US reply to the Committee's questionnaire as a point of departure. The US reply is divided into sections on political, economic, cultural, informational and organizational questions. This chapter will therefore be divided into corresponding sections containing a summary of the US position and an analysis.

3.1 Political Cooperation

In addressing the political questions in the questionnaire, the US reply focused on continuing to build on the existing working relationship in the NAC, rather than on creating new organizations or institutions. This view of the sufficiency of the current mechanisms was a recurring theme in the US position, and also applied to the question of the adequacy of the Treaty itself. There was, according to the US position, no need for a new Treaty or any amendments to the original Treaty.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁹ NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, "CA-1940: US Answers to Questionnaire". Circulated from the Department of State to the Embassies in the NATO countries on 30 August, 1956.

In particular, the US reply was sceptical of the necessity or practicality of taking a supranational approach in developing the Alliance. The US unwillingness to relinquish sovereignty to any kind of supranational cooperative entity was admitted in discussions surrounding the US attitude towards European integration as early as 1952.¹⁶⁰ However, it should be noted that while the U.S. in 1952 urged European states to relinquish sovereignty with regards to integration, this was in a purely European dimension. After the December 1956 NAC Ministerial Meeting, President Eisenhower asserted that US policy, like the policies of any other member government, could not be made in the NAC, due the obvious constitutional difficulties that would arise.¹⁶¹ Thus the US clearly did not intend to relinquish any sovereignty, and it did not expect the other member governments to do so either, within the NATO framework.

Regarding political consultation in the NAC, the US position was mainly positive. It was stated that the US was willing to participate in any of the forms of consultations mentioned in the questionnaire, although it was also asserted that devising rigid rules concerning consultations was not advisable.¹⁶² The most important need, in the US view, was to improve existing arrangements for consultations, in part by supplementing these existing arrangements by providing for a new type of periodic consultations to be conducted by high ranking officials.¹⁶³ This new form of consultation is discussed further in the section dealing with organizational questions.

In the opinion of the US, it was not advisable to attempt to develop “hard and fast” procedures, but at the same time, all the member governments should have the opportunity to inform of and explain their policies, and to request such information from their allies. It was recognized that US actions anywhere in the world could be said to have an effect on all the NATO members. Therefore, even subjects remote from the direct interest of NATO countries should not necessarily be excluded. However, it was Dulles’ view that the most important

¹⁶⁰ *FRUS*, 1952-1954, vol. VI, (Washington D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 655.

¹⁶¹ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, vol. IV, 164.

¹⁶² The questionnaire mentions informal exchanges of information; preparation of common appreciations in the light of current developments; consultations with the aim of arriving at a general consensus as a basis for determination or guidance of individual government policies; and consultation with the aim of arriving at agreement on specific policies or courses of action. See NATO Archives, CT-D/1, “Committee of Three Questionnaire”.

¹⁶³ NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, “CA-1940: US Answers to Questionnaire”.

issues on which common policies could be developed through political consultation were those which had direct consequences for the Alliance, such as Germany and North Africa.¹⁶⁴

While the general attitude towards improving and extending the consultation mechanism was positive, the US had reservations regarding certain factors. The first reservation was that while the US agreed in principle that NATO governments should make every effort to keep the Council fully and promptly informed, the US could not in practice assure the Council advance information except in rare instances, due to the nature of the US political system. It was noted that, in the US, Congress and the public become aware of political developments almost as they happen, thus making any advance information difficult at best.¹⁶⁵ A second reservation was that, while the US could agree to the principle that the Council should not be requested to adopt resolutions without being afforded the opportunity to consider the matter in light of all available information, the US could not agree to refrain from making political declarations without adequate prior consultation in the Council, even on issues significantly affecting the Alliance. It was pointed out that in the US, as in all the member countries, the government is in the end obligated to its own people and parliament. In addition, prior consultation could in some cases be precluded by time restraints. However, it was stated that the development of a habit of close consultation would, at least in part, alleviate this problem. A third reservation made with regards to political consultation was the assertion that the US had vital interests in other areas than Western Europe, including other Treaty obligations. It was therefore maintained that the main focus of political consultation in NATO should be with regard to NATO-area questions. It was at times felt that the Europeans held the view that NATO should always be first priority. Dulles stated clearly that the US could not subordinate its other Treaty obligations to NATO.¹⁶⁶

The US also agreed to the need for additional procedures for dealing with inter-member disputes. As with political consultation, it was felt that it was advisable to avoid elaborate and formal mechanisms in this field. The primary example of inter-member disputes at the time the Committee was preparing its report was the conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. In the course of the autumn of 1956, the Suez Crisis would of course also become a source of inter-member tension, if not direct conflict. The US had certain reservations on this

¹⁶⁴ NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, "CA-10252: Conversation with Foreign Minister Pearson on Developing Atlantic Unity". The conversation took place on 11 June, 1956.

¹⁶⁵ NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, "CA-1940: US Answers to Questionnaire".

¹⁶⁶ NA, Department of State, Conference Files, Lot 62D181, CF 815, "Telephone call from Secretary Dulles to Mr. MacArthur". Dated 26 November 1956.

issue as well. It was asserted that an important distinction needed to be made: whatever procedures were agreed upon would not establish any notion of NATO *jurisdiction* in inter-member disputes.¹⁶⁷

The final political question that was addressed was the nature of NATO's relationship with parliamentary associations, and the Parliamentary Conference in particular. While looking favourably on the formation of parliamentary associations and the work done by the Parliamentary Conference, the US did not feel that it was necessary or desirable to afford these groups more formal recognition. In Dulles' opinion, the idea of a closer relationship between parliamentarians and the work of NATO presented "interesting and hopeful, but somewhat delusive, possibilities".¹⁶⁸

As we have seen, the US was in general quite positive to extending political cooperation in NATO. At the same time, the US had important reservations on virtually every point. There are several factors that explain the positive US attitude. Firstly, the US believed that the very survival of the Alliance depended on the ability of the member governments to develop common policies on several of the central issues facing NATO, such as Germany and North Africa. Dulles clearly stated to Pearson that if the NATO governments were unsuccessful in developing a common policy on Germany, and in convincing the Germans as to the effectiveness of such a policy, Germany could be lost to the Alliance.¹⁶⁹ Another issue that the US thought it crucial to address was the lack of coordination of responses to Soviet initiatives towards NATO countries, specifically problems arising from Soviet and Chinese efforts to make deals with individual NATO countries to the embarrassment of others.¹⁷⁰ There was also a general worry concerning a perceived new Soviet focus on Scandinavia, Greece and Turkey on NATO's flanks.¹⁷¹ Also with regard to the Scandinavian NATO members, an extension of non-military cooperation in general was seen as a move that would strengthen popular support for NATO in these countries, and counteract "strong neutralist currents" in these countries.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁷ NA, Department of State, Conference Files, Lot62D181, CF 807, "Comments on the Committee of Three Report on Non-Military Cooperation". Undated, compiled for the December 1956 Ministerial Meeting.

¹⁶⁸ NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, "CA-10252: Conversation with Foreign Minister Pearson on Developing Atlantic Unity".

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. XXIV, 95.

¹⁷² *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. XXVII, (Washington D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 12.

Another factor in the US support for extending political cooperation, and political consultation in particular, was the wish for more opportunities to exchange views on contemplated actions of the other member governments. It was Dulles' view that the US was often placed in the position of having to "underwrite the consequences" of actions that other NATO governments had taken without prior consultation. The US wanted an opportunity to express its views on actions that would create responsibilities for the US.¹⁷³ Almost prophetically, Dulles spoke on this subject in a conversation with Pearson as early as June 1956, months before the Suez debacle, which although not the first example of this, was certainly the most serious.

The US support for establishing new procedures for dealing with inter-member disputes may be explained also by the wish to keep internal disputes out of the UN. By allowing disputes to reach the UN, NATO would become susceptible to propaganda from the Soviet Bloc. The solution, according to Dulles, was not just to discuss matters in the NAC before discussing them at the UN, but discussing them before they reached the UN at all.¹⁷⁴

The US reservations had their background in a few central political realities. First, the US could not assure that advance information could be given, nor could the US refrain from making political declarations without adequate prior consultation. This was due to the nature of the US political system, where both Congress and the press are kept thoroughly briefed on most political matters. Even if there had been a will to change this system, which there was not, it is doubtful whether this would have been at all possible. Second, while NATO held the key to many important goals in US foreign policy in Europe, such as German unity and countering the Communist threat, Europe was not the only area in which the US had vital interests and Treaty obligations. On the contrary, the US had interests and obligations in every region of the world, and could not afford to give the impression that NATO was more important than other Treaty organizations such as ANZUS and SEATO. Third, the US could not agree to establish any procedures for resolving inter-member disputes that involved giving NATO any form of jurisdiction. Giving NATO jurisdiction in inter-member disputes would entail relinquishing sovereignty, and this is something that the US would not do. It is doubtful whether it would have been possible to give NATO jurisdiction in any event at all, as it would

¹⁷³ NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, "CA-10252: Conversation with Foreign Minister Pearson on Developing Atlantic Unity".

¹⁷⁴ NA, Department of State, Conference Files, Lot62D181, CF 825, "MEMCON Dulles-Pearson 11.12.1956". Memorandum of a conversation between Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister Pearson in Paris on 11 December, 1956.

have meant amending or altering the North Atlantic Treaty, which would have to be sent to Congress for approval, which would be difficult to obtain. Senator George had advised against this.¹⁷⁵ Finally, the opposition to giving more formal recognition to parliamentary associations had two reasons. First, there was the unavoidable fact that in an association of parliamentarians from the NATO countries, there would be representatives from the Communist Parties from several countries, such as France and Italy. This was clearly not desirable. Secondly, more formal recognition and closer relationships would bring up the question of financing. In the US opinion, such associations should be based on private financing. This primacy of private initiative is a recurring theme in the US position on non-military cooperation.

Thus it is evident that, as was the case with the Norwegian attitude towards political cooperation, the US attitude was similarly tempered by the realization of what closer cooperation would entail. Further, it was important for the US to at least give the impression that there was balance in its relationship with the various regional arrangements with which it was associated. In addition, the prospect of relinquishing sovereignty was as impossible for the US as it was for Norway. On the face of it the public US attitude towards closer political cooperation was positive, despite the underlying scepticism. This was, as previously mentioned, also the case in Norway.

3.2 Economic Cooperation

The second section of the US reply to the Committee's questionnaire concerned economic questions. It was pointed out at the outset that continued close cooperation in this field was of prime importance in countering the new Soviet economic tactics. The economic questions were divided into three general areas: economic cooperation, aid to underdeveloped areas and economic policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Bloc. In terms of economic cooperation, the US position was that consultation on economic issues should aim at developing common views on economic policy, while taking into account the political implications of economic decisions. A point was made in this regard that the focus should be on issues rather than specific concerns primarily related to national interests.

¹⁷⁵ NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, "CA-10252: Conversation with Foreign Minister Pearson on Developing Atlantic Unity".

Another facet of economic cooperation that was addressed was conflicts in international economic policies. It was stated that attention should be given particularly to economic issues that had a bearing on the unity of the Alliance. As with the subject of inter-member disputes, it was felt that conflicts in international economic policies between members should be handled in NATO. However, here the distinction was made that this was only the case if the conflict had an impact on the internal strength of the Alliance, or if progress in resolving the conflict made in another organization was too slow. A special point was made here that it was important to distinguish between conflicts that arose as a result of the element of competition that is inherent in the Western capitalist system and conflicts that arose as a result of protectionist policies.

A recurring theme in the US position that was evident in this section was the adequacy of the existing institutions. As was previously stated in the section concerning political questions, the US saw no need for new mechanisms, whether in terms of new agencies or organizations, closer relations between NATO and existing organizations, or a change in the US status in the OEEC. However, while it was felt that any new mechanisms would impair rather than improve cooperation, it was asserted that it was desirable to improve informal working relationships.

The second area of focus in the economic section was aid to underdeveloped areas, both within and outside of the NATO. With regard to underdeveloped areas within the NATO, the US position was that this was better done through other channels than NATO. Similarly, it was not felt that it would be useful to give attention to the construction of public works for civilian use in a NATO framework. Outside of the NATO area it was stated that NATO had an important interest in economic development, and that an exchange of views and information with regards to this would be useful. However, it was not felt that NATO was an appropriate agency to undertake action in this field.

The final area of focus was economic policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Bloc. Cooperation between NATO members was emphasized in this area. The US saw the need for an exchange of information with regard to Soviet commercial practices and their purposes, and it was asserted that it was highly important to ensure adequate consultation on questions likely to arise in international economic bodies in which the Soviet Bloc was represented. Every effort should be made to develop coordinated policies in such cases. Also, NATO should give attention to concerting economic strategy, particularly strategic trade controls. In spite of this focus on

countering the new Soviet tactics, the US also advised caution in taking special action to meet the Soviet competition, such as attempting to meet politically motivated Soviet offers in the field of contracts for public works, even in politically sensitive areas.

The US attitude towards economic cooperation bears witness to a divergence in perception between Europe and the US. Whereas several of the European NATO countries had quite far reaching ideas of extending economic cooperation, such as the full membership of the US in the OEEC, NATO financing of civil infrastructure programmes and aid to underdeveloped areas within the NATO territory, the US saw economic cooperation more in terms of consultation on economic matters and coordination of economic policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Bloc. The US tended to underestimate the amount of interest in extending economic cooperation that was present in the European governments, at least before May 1956.¹⁷⁶ After the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC in May 1956, Dulles was frustrated by what he saw as the willingness of the NATO countries to “follow the Italian lead and have NATO turned into an economic organization which can probably extract a little more money out of the United States”.¹⁷⁷ Thus while the US was very positive towards certain aspects of economic cooperation, such as consultation and coordination of policies, there was a more negative attitude towards some of the areas on which particularly Italy and France focused on. In addition to the frustration mentioned above, there was another reason for the US scepticism: both Dulles and Pearson agreed that the US and Canada should do more to encourage European economic integration.¹⁷⁸ Similarly, Eisenhower was of the opinion that nothing should be done that would hinder further European integration, a view Dulles made clear in his remarks at the NAC Ministerial Meeting in December 1956.¹⁷⁹ Thus it seems that the US saw the different means of extending economic cooperation as a choice between building Europe and helping Europe build itself.

The US focus on coordination of policy is perhaps easier to explain. The US viewed the new Soviet focus on *peaceful coexistence* as a ploy, a *divide and conquer* tactic aimed at weakening the unity of the Alliance.¹⁸⁰ This tactic could best be countered by extending cooperation in general, to cement the unity within, and by coordinating policies towards the

¹⁷⁶ *FRUS, 1952-1954*, vol. VI, 51.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 75.

¹⁷⁸ NA, Department of State, 711.56321, "CA-10252: Conversation with Foreign Minister Pearson on Developing Atlantic Unity".

¹⁷⁹ *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IV, 142. For an analysis of the US position towards European integration see Geir Lundestad, *"Empire" by Integration. The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997* (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1998), 148.

¹⁸⁰ *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. XIX, (Washington D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 29.

Soviet Bloc in particular, to avoid the appearance that NATO didn't speak with one voice. With regard to economic matters, the US position was clear in advising that NATO act as a bloc in organizations where the Soviet Bloc was represented, as opposed to in political matters, where the US was wary of NATO appearing to take positions as a bloc.¹⁸¹

The question of aid to underdeveloped areas was one fraught with difficulties. Again there was a difference in perception on the two sides of the Atlantic. Certain of the European members, Italy in particular, were positive to the idea of developing areas within the NATO area, such as Southern Italy. The US did not agree that this was a suitable area of focus for NATO. Aid to underdeveloped areas outside of NATO, however, was seen as an important issue. Discussions in the NSC show that the Eisenhower administration was worried about what the CIA called "a pattern of coordinated long-term and high-level operations designed to advance Communist influence" in underdeveloped areas.¹⁸² Indeed, Vice President Richard Nixon expressed doubt as to whether the US "held adequate cards to play against the Soviet Bloc" in this regard.¹⁸³ However, it was at the same time recognized that NATO was not an appropriate vessel for aid to the underdeveloped world, for several reasons. NATO was regarded primarily as a military organization, and counted among its members all the major Western colonial powers. It was therefore doubtful if NATO could appear as an acceptable agency for giving aid.¹⁸⁴ There was also the question of whether it was at all possible for the US to channel aid through NATO. Senator George advised that Congress was reluctant to funnel aid through the UN, and would probably be as reluctant to funnelling aid through NATO.¹⁸⁵ The US emphasis on taking advantage of existing agencies again demonstrates the US view of the adequacy of existing institutions. It is important also to note that although the US was enthusiastic about using economic cooperation within NATO to counter the new Soviet tactics, taking special action to meet Soviet competition in the underdeveloped world, such as in the field of contracts for public works, was not seen as advisable. The US did not want to become enmeshed in a bidding war with the Soviet Union.¹⁸⁶

An interesting point is that in the US view economic cooperation was ideologically limited. Cooperation was necessary when it came to coordinating policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Bloc,

¹⁸¹ *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IV, 164.

¹⁸² *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. X, (Washington D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 28.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 29.

¹⁸⁴ NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, "CA-10252: Conversation with Foreign Minister Pearson on Developing Atlantic Unity".

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. X, 35.

and when the situation called for it to resolve internal conflicts. But a limiting factor for the US was the distinction between “the conflicts of commercial interests as a result of competitive market forces and those which spring from actions of governments which impede such forces to the detriment of the interests of other members of the Alliance”.¹⁸⁷ In other words, the US asserted that a clear distinction needed to be made between conflicts resulting from the competitive factor inherent in the Western capitalist system and those resulting from attempts at protectionism and obstruction of free trade.

There was also an element of ideology in the attitude towards economic aid to underdeveloped areas. In a discussion concerning economic assistance to underdeveloped areas in the NSC in late 1955, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson commented that aid programs that involved building or financing industrial installations in underdeveloped countries were problematic because if “the ultimate owner was the state, we would be helping these countries to proceed down the road which led to state socialism or to Communism”, a view that had some support in the NSC.¹⁸⁸ President Eisenhower, however, did not see this as a point of crucial importance, pointing to the fact that several US allies, such as Norway and Denmark, were “far more socialized than the US”.¹⁸⁹

3.3 Cultural Cooperation

While the US position was relatively positive with regard to economic cooperation, there was a cooler attitude towards cultural cooperation through NATO. While it was pointed out that there were distinct advantages in cooperative or joint action in this field, it was also asserted that cultural cooperation was not an end in itself. Priority should be given to projects that benefited from joint action, and special emphasis should be put on projects that had a catalytic effect in terms of fostering unity. The main emphasis in the US position on cultural cooperation was that governments should mainly support and supplement private initiative. In addition, it was felt that NATO should not directly support influential NGOs, or large scale youth gatherings, although it was stated that close and frequent contact between such organizations was highly desirable.

¹⁸⁷ NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, “CA-1940: US Answers to Questionnaire”.

¹⁸⁸ *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. X, 29.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid*, 36.

A field of cultural cooperation on which the US attitude was far more positive was that of cooperation in science and technology, where it was stated that this should be one of the most important and urgent objectives of the Alliance. This should not be limited to the manpower aspect, such as recruitment and training of scientists and technicians, but encompass the entire field of science and technology. The joint Norwegian-Danish proposal for a common research institute was said to have some merit, although further study would be needed for the US to support this fully. In addition, consideration should be given to establishing 'Atlantic Chairs', visiting professorships, Atlantic seminars and Atlantic Community prizes at universities. Finally, it was considered that exchanges of personnel were valuable, and that consideration should also be given to limited exchanges with ANZUS, SEATO and Baghdad Pact members.

An important issue in terms of cultural cooperation in the US view was the question of financing. It was suggested that certain joint educational activities and a common research institute could be commonly financed, and it was recognized that a satisfactory increase in scientific cooperation would necessitate large government subsidies. Cooperation between private groups, however, should be financed by the groups involved. It was also pointed out that the financial implications of joint action would have to be dealt with realistically.

The US position on cultural cooperation was markedly dualistic in its approach. While it was emphasized that closer cultural ties and cooperation were vital in cultivating a sense of community and strengthening relations between members, the US was not prepared to commit to any specific NATO cultural programme, at least not until such a program was more clearly defined. This duality stemmed from two factors.

First, the US focused on encouraging private initiative in order to foster closer cultural ties between NATO members, as opposed to direct government intervention. This reflected the belief in the primacy of private initiative which is inherent in American society, where individualism and success through private initiative are considered integral to the American dream. Closer cultural ties and cooperation between NATO members was seen as desirable, but it was believed that the role of government should be to support and facilitate such private cooperation.

The second factor was the question of the financial implications of a NATO cultural programme. The US already felt that Europe was unwilling to contribute enough financially to other aspects of the Alliance, and in some quarters there was fear that the new focus on

non-military cooperation represented another attempt at extracting further financial support from the US.¹⁹⁰ This is also evident in the US reply to the NATO questionnaire, where it is specified that “member governments must be prepared to deal realistically with the financial implications of proposed cultural projects to be undertaken within a NATO framework” (emphasis mine).¹⁹¹

While the US was apprehensive in with regard to certain aspects of cultural cooperation, the position on cooperation in the field of science and technology was another matter completely. This positive attitude can be explained by the fact that there was a general feeling that the West would not be able to maintain its technological superiority versus the Soviet Bloc without a concerted effort to, among other things, develop “an adequate number of highly qualified scientists and engineers” and to maintain “an expanding system of technological institutions and facilities”.¹⁹² It was believed that the US was approaching a decisive period in which it was vital that the US continue to maintain “short-run technological superiority”.¹⁹³

3.4 Cooperation in the Information field

In general, the US position on cooperation in the information field was based on a stated awareness that wide popular support was “the indispensable basis for the strength and cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance”.¹⁹⁴ In the US view, this support depended mainly on keeping the public informed of the accomplishments and goals of NATO. However, it was believed that expanding cooperation in this field would be difficult, due to a lack of agreement on the objectives and purposes of NATO activities in this area. US suggestions for such objectives and purposes included disseminating information about the Atlantic Community both within and outside the NATO area, countering Communist propaganda in the NATO area, and developing a more effective information programme directed at the Communist Bloc. However, it was also stated that an agreement on objectives and purposes should also emphasize that the individual governments should retain the primary

¹⁹⁰ *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IV, 75.

¹⁹¹ NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, “CA-1940: US answers to the NATO questionnaire”.

¹⁹² *FRUS, 1955-1956*, vol. XIX, 176.

¹⁹³ *Ibid*, 174.

¹⁹⁴ NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, “CA-1940: US answers to the NATO questionnaire”.

responsibility for informational activities, while using NATO to harmonize national policies and information programmes.¹⁹⁵

The US position on cooperation in the information field can be described as having two dual objectives. On the one hand, there was a defensive aspect. First, a NATO information programme would be aimed inward, through dissemination of comprehensive information compiled by the NATO Information Service, to the peoples of the NATO area by the individual governments, in order to bolster public support of the Alliance. Second, an information programme would also be aimed outward, informing people outside the NATO area in order to remove misconceptions and create a favourable view of the Alliance. However, it was maintained that if such information was to be directly released by NATO, the materials should not be susceptible to characterization as propaganda. No such limitation would be necessary for materials provided for the individual national services.¹⁹⁶

On the other hand, there was an offensive aspect to the US position on cooperation in the information field. First, NATO members should cooperate in countering Communist propaganda in the NATO area. It was acknowledged that the different situations that existed between the NATO members made close coordination in this field impractical, but it was felt that basic approaches should at least be coordinated, and members should share information on Communist propaganda activities. Second, NATO should aid the individual member governments in sharing propaganda materials aimed at the Communist Bloc.¹⁹⁷

As was the case with the US position on economic cooperation, the position on cooperation in the information field also stemmed at least partially from a perception of changes in Soviet tactics. As the Soviet Union would attempt to create division and disunity in the Alliance through renewed propaganda initiatives, it was important to coordinate the individual responses to these initiatives. Soviet policy towards non-NATO areas and the way in which the Soviet Union was perceived by underdeveloped countries also had a bearing on the US position. The extrovert defensive aspect of the US position was aimed at creating a favourable view of NATO in non-NATO areas mainly to counter any positive views of the Communist Bloc. In this regard there was concern at the highest levels in the US administration that underdeveloped regions might look to the Soviet economic system rather than the Western capitalist system, due to the extremely rapid industrialization that the Soviet Union had

¹⁹⁵ NA, Department of State, Central File, 711.56321, "CA-1940: US answers to the NATO questionnaire".

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

successfully undergone under the Communist regime.¹⁹⁸ Therefore, the accomplishments and goals of NATO needed to be emphasised by disseminating information about the Alliance in non-NATO areas.

3.5 Organizational and Functional Changes

The general US approach as to whether extending non-military cooperation would necessitate any organizational changes was that while certain changes would be necessary, it was not necessary to alter or amend the Treaty in order to achieve results. The changes proposed included the creation of a new consultative mechanism to supplement the existing arrangements, improving the International Staff and creating additional ad hoc Council Committees in connection with the enlarged scope of consultation. The new consultative mechanism would be created through the designation by each member government of a so-called *Ministerial Delegate*, “an outstanding person of sub-cabinet or equivalent rank to meet periodically with similarly-designated officials”.¹⁹⁹ These delegates would meet several times annually at regular intervals, and on special occasions when necessary.

The US also believed that the role of the Secretary General needed to be enhanced. It was suggested that the Secretary General should preside at all Council meetings, propose agenda items, serve as chairman of special Council Committees and represent NATO in international conferences of interest to NATO. In addition, the US proposed that the Secretary General should annually submit a *State of the Alliance* message, similar to the customary Presidential State of the Union address in the US.

Throughout the US reply to the NATO questionnaire it was held that an extension of non-military cooperation was possible without any far-reaching organizational changes. Similarly, it was continuously maintained that the Treaty was adequate as it was. It is not surprising that the US did not wish to alter or amend the North Atlantic Treaty. As previously discussed with regard to the question of jurisdiction in inter-member disputes, the fact that altering the Treaty entailed resubmitting it to Congress for approval precluded any changes to the Treaty.

The designation of *Ministerial Delegates* can be explained by the reluctance of the US to accommodate the wishes of some of the NATO members for more frequent Council meetings

¹⁹⁸ *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. X, 29.

¹⁹⁹ NA, Department of State, Central Files, 711.56321, “CA-1940: US answers to the NATO questionnaire”.

at ministerial level. Dulles clearly stated in a conversation with Pearson that no US Secretary of State would be able to dedicate more time and energy to NATO matters than he himself had done.²⁰⁰ This problem might be alleviated to some degree by the proposed new mechanism.

3.6 Conclusions

The US position on non-military cooperation reflected a tendency of general support moderated by political realities. The US supported, in theory, extension of cooperation in every field. In practice, however, the US had reservations in every proposed field of cooperation. While supporting consultation on a wide range of political questions, the US had responsibilities in other regions and to other organizations that would at times hamper consultation in NATO. In addition, there were constitutional and systemic limitations to how far the US could go. The US supported economic cooperation in most fields, but was careful to avoid anything that would hamper European integration. While supporting the idea of extending aid to underdeveloped areas, the US recognised that NATO was not a suitable vehicle for such aid. The US was not averse to resolving inter-member disputes in economic matters, as long as the disputes were not caused by healthy competition inherent in the capitalist system. Cultural cooperation was supported in principle, as long as the primacy of private initiative was maintained. Dissemination of propaganda was supported, but it was emphasised that it was important that the material disseminated did not appear to be NATO propaganda.

In the two previous chapters we have seen the Norwegian and US positions on non-military cooperation outlined and analysed. These positions were the result of many factors, both internal and external. In the next chapter the respective positions and the factors they were based on will be compared, and any similarities or differences will be analysed. It is also necessary to place these positions and their background into a bigger picture.

²⁰⁰ NA, Department of State, Central Files, 711.56321, “CA-10252: Conversation with Foreign Minister Pearson on Developing Atlantic Unity”.

Chapter Four- Comparative and Synthesis

Having analyzed the Norwegian and the US positions on non-military cooperation in NATO and their immediate explanations, it would be interesting to provide a comparison. Given the disparity in stature between these two NATO members one might expect that the differences in position outweighed the similarities. This was not the case. The Norwegian and the US positions were remarkably similar, and some of the differences that existed were contrary to expectations.

In addition to comparing the Norwegian and US positions on non-military cooperation, this chapter also analyzes the impact of the Suez Crisis on both the Norwegian and the US positions as well as on the work of the Committee of Three. The Suez Crisis has been seen as an illustration of the lack of consultation in NATO, and has been considered to have negated any potential results that might have been achieved by the Committee of Three.

The final part of this chapter attempts to place the Committee of Three into a bigger picture. The Norwegian position on non-military cooperation must be understood relative to the more general history of Norwegian foreign policy during the Cold War. The US position on non-military cooperation, on the other hand, can perhaps more easily be understood relative to the history of the transatlantic relationship during the Cold War.

4.1 Similarities and differences in the Norwegian and the US positions

The Norwegian and the US positions on non-military cooperation coincided on several issues. In terms of the main focus of the positions, the desirable scope of cooperation, the importance of cooperation to the Alliance, the position of the West relative to the Soviet Bloc, what limitations should be placed on cooperation and the possibility of extending aid through NATO, the Norwegian and US positions were mostly in line.

First of all, the general focus of both Governments was very similar. It was clear that the main objective regarding extending non-military cooperation was to strengthen the habit of consultation in the NAC. In addition, both Norway and the US emphasised the importance of not duplicating the work being done in other international bodies in which the NATO members were represented. This was based on the view that the existing cooperative bodies

were adequate. Neither Government saw a need for establishing new institutions, nor was there any desire to add new organizational structures to NATO.

Second, concerning what the scope of cooperation should be the Norwegian and the US positions also coincided, particularly with regards to political consultation and economic cooperation. Both Norway and the US were in favour of consultations on a wide range of subjects. On the one hand, there was practically no limit to the types of questions the US considered to be suitable. Norway, on the other hand, were also in favour of a wide scope of consultation, but shied away from so-called out-of-area issues. In addition to favouring a wide scope, there was a shared negativity to establishing rigid rules for determining what matters were appropriate for consultation, as well as what the procedure should be in inter-member disputes. Regarding inter-member disputes there was agreement, however, that it was important that no member should be able to keep disputes out of the NAC. In economic matters, both Governments agreed that the scope of issues suitable for consultation should be narrow. Only in cases where an issue had not received satisfactory attention elsewhere, or where it was important to avoid conflicting views, should the NAC be used to consult on economic matters. In addition, both Norway and the US were in favour of consultation in the NAC on economic issues with wider strategic implications.

Third, Norway and the US were mostly in agreement on questions concerning foreign aid. Both Governments were negative to extending aid through NATO to underdeveloped areas within or outside the NATO area, although they both agreed that furthering development of such areas was an important task. However, both Norway and the US also agreed that it would be useful to consult on basic policies in this field, and on strategic issues that might arise in relation to development. The attitude that aid to the underdeveloped countries was important was also based on the same view that underdeveloped countries were more susceptible to Soviet advances, as well as the danger that those countries would look to the Soviet economic model as a more rapid means of industrialization.

Indeed, both Norway and the US were aware that the new Soviet tactics presented new challenges, and this influenced to a great extent their attitude towards non-military cooperation in NATO. The sentiment that NATO should have a greater role in meeting the non-military aspects of Western relations with the Soviet Bloc had widespread support both in Washington and Oslo. To maintain unity it was imperative that NATO meet the Soviet threat in the political and economic fields as well as militarily. In the economic field both Norway

and the US agreed that it was important that the NATO members consult on economic policies towards the Soviet Bloc, as well as ways of countering and neutralising Soviet commercial practices. Further, both Norway and the US perceived what can be termed a *technician gap*, similar to the *bomber gap* and the later *missile gap*. Similar to the perception throughout the 1950's that the Soviet Union was gaining an advantage in strategic bombers, there was wide-spread fear that the West was also falling behind in training scientists and technicians. It was thought to be of the utmost importance to close this gap, through a concerted effort through NATO.

In a more general sense, the Norwegian views on the importance of cooperation in NATO, as well as on the importance of placing limitations on such cooperation, largely coincided with those of the US. Both countries recognized the impossibility of adding functions to NATO that would in any way limit national sovereignty. Both Governments pointed out that they were responsible to their respective parliamentary bodies and electorates, and could not subjugate the process of policy formation to the NAC. Similarly, there was a deep-seated scepticism in general of anything remotely smacking of supranationality in international institutions in both capitals. In a narrower sense, it was agreed that certain forms of cooperation should not be the direct responsibility of NATO. Different forms of cultural cooperation in particular were thought to lie within the realm of private initiative, and it was felt that NATO's role should be to encourage and support rather than to initiate. In the Norwegian position this particularly applied to educational activities.

The differences between the Norwegian and the US positions were far fewer. The tendency seemed to be that there was general agreement modified by slight divergences in some cases. In terms of the focus there was a slight predilection towards the UN on the part of the Norwegian Government. This was particularly a factor in the attitude towards cultural cooperation in general, and to the question of extending aid to underdeveloped areas. At the same time, it is important to remember that the main focus of the Norwegian position was on political cooperation, and in relation to this the focus was placed squarely on NATO.

Concerning the scope of political cooperation there was also disparity. Though both Governments favoured a wide scope, the US did not want to exclude out-of-area issues from consultation in the NAC. This was contrary to the Norwegian focus on the territorial limitations set out in the Treaty. Norway, on the other hand, favoured an increase in

parliamentary cooperation in NATO. This attitude did, however, stop well short of extending consultative status to the parliamentary conferences.

With regards to the limits of cooperation there were also slight dissimilarities. There was a tendency on the part of the US to go further in terms of how much cooperation was desirable. This did not only concern the scope of suitable subjects for consultation. However, it must be remembered that the actual US attitude and the public position it took on non-military cooperation were not the same. As pointed out earlier, the US spoke warmly of cooperation while at the same time recognizing that the limitations placed on cooperation by inherent factors in its political system, as well as by obligations to other regional arrangements, precluded such a measure of cooperation as the US position professed to support. A similar divergence between public position and internal attitude was present in the Norwegian Government, as previously discussed. In terms of meeting the Soviet threat the US was more positive to implementing more direct measures than was the case with the Norwegian Government. Likewise, in the field of information the US wanted the NIS to facilitate a propaganda effort by producing suitable material. It was pointed out that materials that were to be directly released by NATO should not be of a nature that could be characterized as propaganda, but that such a limitation did not apply to the national services. Norway, on the other hand, maintained that the NIS should focus on purely factual information aimed at enhancing public support in the member countries. As such it should mainly describe the goals and activities of NATO, a limitation the US did not see as necessary.

Finally, in terms of organizational changes there was a slight difference of opinion. While neither Government saw the need for any concrete changes, the US suggested creating so-called Ministerial Delegates. In addition, the US was in favour of enhancing the role of the Secretary General, while Norway was of the opinion that his role was sufficiently provided for in the Lisbon Decisions, and that all that was needed in this regard was a reaffirmation of his role.

4.2 The positions of the other NATO members

Although a thorough review of the positions of every member of the Alliance is well outside the scope of this thesis, a short summary is in order, based on the Committee's reports on the

consultations held with each member contained in the records of the Committee.²⁰¹ The Canadian and Italian positions are thus excluded. France and the UK, who must be considered the two other Great Powers in the Alliance, held rather similar views. The French were in general agreement with the proposals of the Committee in most areas. They expressed support for political consultation in the NAC, with a wide scope allowing for discussion of out-of-area issues. There was also support for using NATO in settling inter-member disputes. The French were in favour of closer economic cooperation through consultation on economic questions in the NAC, including questions of foreign aid. However, France did not envision NATO having a direct role in extending aid. In terms of countering Soviet economic initiatives, the French view was that it was not enough merely to counter these initiatives. Rather, NATO should endeavour to take the initiative itself. Interestingly, according to France the most interesting field in its eyes was the organization of functions. The British position was in many ways in line with the French. The British also supported making use of the NAC for political consultation. Although the UK also suggested a wide scope of possible questions for discussion, the British view was that questions outside of the geographical area of NATO were not considered suitable. Another clear difference from the French position was that the UK did not see any benefits of using NATO to settle inter-member disputes.

If one then considers the rest of the NATO members to be smaller states, at least relative to the US, France and the UK, it is nonetheless problematic to lump them together. Even the Benelux countries, although a homogenous group, differed in their opinions. Though Belgium and the Netherlands both supported extending political cooperation with a wide scope of possible issues for discussion, they disagreed on the desirability of using NATO to settle inter-member disputes. In addition, while Belgium favoured increased economic cooperation, and were very positive to cooperation in general, the Dutch were sceptical to economic cooperation. Greece and Turkey, making up NATO's southern flank, were both positive to political cooperation, although they were sceptical to using the NAC for settling inter-member disputes. Turkey had a clear focus on economic cooperation, and both these countries supported using NATO to extend aid to underdeveloped areas within NATO. Portugal and Germany, however dissimilar, held similar views on political cooperation, including support for a wide scope in political cooperation and for using the NAC for settlement of inter-member disputes. On economic cooperation, on the other hand, Germany was positive while Portugal was generally negative.

²⁰¹ NATO Archives, CT-R/1 through CT-R/14.

The views of Denmark and Iceland were largely similar to those of Norway. Denmark was positive to political cooperation, though not necessarily to settling inter-member disputes in the NAC. However, in terms of inter-member disputes, Denmark would rather handle them within NATO than in the UN, an opinion shared by the Norwegian Government. The Danish view on economic cooperation was also in line with the Norwegian position; the Icelandic position, however, was not. Though Iceland supported the Committee's work in general, their focus was on economic cooperation. Citing the Icelandic fishery dispute as an example of economic conflict that would have benefitted from discussion in the NAC rather than the OEEC, Iceland also stressed cooperation in the economic field, commenting that the Soviet Union had in fact become the largest export market for Icelandic goods.

The general impression after reviewing the positions of the other NATO members is that there was general agreement on the desirability of extending political cooperation, although this agreement did not extend to the issue of inter-member disputes. Concerning economic cooperation, however, there were differing views.

4.3 The impact of the Suez Crisis

As has been previously mentioned, the Suez Crisis was seen as a case in point of the lack of consultation, and is still considered to be the primary reason for a perceived lack of results of the work of the Committee of Three. The French-British aggression in the Middle East came without advance consultation with the NATO allies, indeed without even advance information. In fact, it would take several days before the French and British Permanent Representatives informed the allies on the matter. Boyesen stated that he had the impression that the Representatives "seemed uninstructed and unable to give the Council any information".²⁰² Thus the conclusion that the Suez Crisis represented a clear lack of consultation on a matter of interest to all of the NATO allies is unproblematic. The fact that Egypt lay outside the area stipulated by the Treaty was beside the point, as the conflict had implications both in terms of trade and the fact that central NATO members, and thus the Alliance itself, became susceptible to criticism from the Soviet Bloc. This susceptibility to Soviet criticism also limited the ability of the NATO countries to criticize Soviet actions in

²⁰² NA, Department of State, Central Files, 711.56321, "WASHINGTON 543: Summary discussion with senior MFA official re Wise Men vs. Suez". Telegram sent from the US Embassy in Oslo to the State Department summarizing a conversation between Ambassador Strong and Boyesen. Dated 7 November 1956.

Hungary. This was an integral part of the background for the chastising of France and the UK in the NAC.

The Norwegian and US reactions to the events of the Crisis itself are not the subject here. But the effect the Suez Crisis had on Lange personally should be noted. As previously mentioned, Lange seriously considered resigning from the Committee and abandoning non-military cooperation, at least for the time being. A point concerning the reaction of Lange to the Suez Crisis in relation to non-military cooperation can be found also in the Algerian situation. The resentment at being presented with a *fait accompli* in the Algerian situation was a major factor in the Norwegian desire for increased political cooperation. That the French again undertook controversial actions in the Mediterranean without consultation in NATO even after pledging support for the Committee of Three was certainly part of the reason for Lange contemplating resignation. Dulles, on the other hand, came to the opposite conclusion. In addressing the news that Lange was considering resigning from the Committee, Dulles maintained that the Suez Crisis in fact reinforced the need for the Committee of Three, and that it was more important than ever that they finish their work and submit their report to the NAC.

With all the focus on the Suez Crisis in the precise period that the Committee of Three were finishing their report on non-military cooperation in NATO, one might expect that both the Report itself and its treatment at the NAC Ministerial Meeting in December 1956 would be heavily preoccupied with the Crisis and the issues it raised. Interestingly, this was not the case. The Suez Crisis was indeed a hot topic at the December Ministerial Meeting, but not so much in relation to the Committee of Three. The clear focus in terms of the Suez Crisis was not so much on what went wrong, i.e. lack of consultation, as on the necessity of repairing relations within the Alliance and how to accomplish this. One way of repairing relations would of course be to stand together in approving the Committee's conclusions on the need for more consultation.

The main issue in the discussion surrounding the Report of the Committee of Three was not relative to the Suez Crisis, but on whether or not it should be published, and if so, whether it should be published as a report of the Council or as a report of the Committee of Three. On the one hand, these discussions were not independent of the Suez debacle. France in particular was wary of the possibility that the wording of the Report would be construed as criticism of

French-British actions.²⁰³ Similarly, the question of whether it would be published as a report of the Council or of the Committee played in. There would be a significant difference in the gravity of the criticism if it was published as a report of the Council. In the end it was agreed to publish the Report as a report of the Committee, while the Council approved a resolution supporting the Committee's conclusions.

While the discussions revolved around language and how it should be published, it could also be expected that the Committee itself and the report would be significantly influenced by the Suez Crisis. Interestingly, the report itself did not receive any significant revisions in terms of the recommendations that were made. The Formal Record of Proceedings states that the Committee met on 14 November to re-examine the report in light of the Suez Crisis. No significant revisions are mentioned, and in the final Report the Suez Crisis is mentioned clearly only in the letter of transmittal, and in vaguer terms in the introductory chapter.

As to whether the Suez Crisis cancelled any potential effects of the implementation of the Committee of Three's recommendations, the opposite can just as easily be maintained. The focus at the May 1956 Ministerial Meeting had been on the need to strengthen unity in order to more effectively meet the perceived new Soviet tactics. In this regard, the fact that the Suez Crisis was understood to reinforce the need for an effort to strengthen unity within NATO, particularly in the opinion of the US, would just as easily tend to reinforce the potential effects of such an implementation. Thus the reason for the limited results of the continued efforts to increase cooperation in NATO was more a result of the individual member countries' reluctance to relinquish sovereignty and to, in their own view, subjugate their national interests to that of the Alliance.

4.4 Non-military cooperation in Norwegian foreign policy

Cooperation in an Atlantic framework was a central part of Norwegian foreign policy as early as during the Second World War. Foreign Minister Trygve Lie, later to become the first Secretary General of the UN, was a vocal Atlanticist during his time as Foreign Minister during the war. In a break with his predecessor Halvdan Koht's line, Lie introduced a firmly

²⁰³ NA, Department of State, Conference Files, Lot 62D181, CF 818, "POLTO 1408". Telegram from the USRO to the State Department summarizing the restricted NAC morning session on 13 December 1956.

Atlantic dimension into Norwegian foreign policy.²⁰⁴ Lie's policy stated that in the future Norway would look to cooperate with the US, and to a lesser degree the UK, in foreign policy. However, it should be made clear that non-military cooperation within an Atlantic framework was not what Lie had in mind. Lie's Atlantic policy was geared strictly toward security and defence. Economic, social and cultural cooperation was also considered important to the maintenance of world peace, but could more appropriately be handled within a global rather than regional framework. In any case, after the end of the war Lie rejected the notion of a regional arrangement, even if Article 52 of the UN Charter allowed for regional security arrangements. In Lie's opinion, international cooperation and peace would now be adequately safeguarded through the UN.²⁰⁵

Lie's thoughts on an Atlantic policy were conditioned by the public mood at the end of the war, leading to his rejection of regional security arrangements. The political climate in Norway was not receptive to the idea of an Atlantic security arrangement. This mood was evident not only in public opinion, but also among most politicians, particularly those who had not been part of the Government in exile in London. Many central figures in the new Government had had a very different experience during the war, which in many ways conditioned their outlook. Lange and Gerhardsen, for example, had both spent most of the war in German concentration camps.

Lange had been critical of Lie's Atlantic policy all along.²⁰⁶ When Lange took up the post of Foreign Minister after the war, Norway would continue to emphasise international cooperation through the UN, a policy which has received the misnomer *bridge-building*, implying an active policy aimed at reconciling the two emerging blocs after the war. This was not the case.²⁰⁷ Even after the 2nd General Assembly of the UN, at which it was clear that the cooperative spirit that the Norwegian policy presupposed was rapidly disappearing, Norway clung to the notion of an adequate security arrangement through the UN, despite crass criticisms from the US and the UK.²⁰⁸ Not until the international situation had changed to such a degree as to make an independent security policy impossible did Lange embrace a

²⁰⁴ On Lie's "Atlantic policy" see: Jakob Sverdrup, *Norsk utenrikspolitikkens historie, bind 4: Inn i storpolitikken, 1940-1949*, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1996), 89-98.

²⁰⁵ Sverdrup, *Inn i storpolitikken*, 197.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid*, 205.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid*, 201.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid*, 214.

westward orientation.²⁰⁹ The Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet overtures towards Finland greatly influenced the Governments view of Soviet intentions in 1948.

When Norway did become part of a regional security arrangement in NATO in 1949, Lange would become a vocal supporter of a wider framework for Atlantic cooperation. As early as May 1950, Lange stated that it was desirable to study extending non-military cooperation.²¹⁰ Thus over a period of just four years Lange had gone from being critical of Atlantic cooperation at all to being in favour of an extension of such cooperation. Indeed, Lange was part of the Pearson Group that studied the possibilities of such an extension. However, the pendulum would seem to have swung the other way by 1956, by which time there is evident apprehensions particularly towards political cooperation.

The formation of Norwegian foreign policy has been based on the axiom that as a small state Norway was best served with a binding international order of law.²¹¹ This would suggest that it was in the interest of Norway to develop as close a degree of cooperation as possible within NATO. However, the realization that close political cooperation and a greater amount of consultation in the NAC would entail sharing responsibilities for decisions over which Norway had little control led to a more reserved position on political cooperation than was in line with such an axiom. The Norwegian duality on this issue, both in terms of wanting and not wanting political cooperation, as well as in terms of the stated axiom, is characteristic of Norwegian foreign policy, particularly in relation to NATO. As Lundestad has argued, Norway tended towards scepticism towards concrete suggestions of cooperation, usually leading to a conclusion that if Norway was to participate, it would need special arrangements.²¹²

Another factor in Norwegian foreign policy that must be seen in relation to the Committee of Three is the primacy of the Atlantic circle. Eriksen and Pharo state that Norwegian foreign policy was conducted within four circles: a global, an Atlantic, a Western European and a Nordic. Of these, the Atlantic circle was the primary.²¹³ However, the official line of the Norwegian Government was not always clear with regards to the relationship between these

²⁰⁹ Sverdrup, *Inn i storpolitikken*, 298.

²¹⁰ *FRUS, 1950*, vol. III, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 115.

²¹¹ Eriksen and Pharo, *Kald krig og internasjonalisering*, 17.

²¹² Lundestad, "Nasjonalisme og internasjonalisme i norsk utenrikspolitikk", 41.

²¹³ Eriksen and Pharo, *Kald krig og internasjonalisering*, 15.

circles. For example, Lange stated in December 1956 that “in conflicts of NATO-UN interests, the UN’s is overriding”.²¹⁴ More directly related to non-military cooperation, in terms of cultural cooperation the Norwegian emphasis was on UNESCO. Similarly, in relation to foreign aid Norway emphasized the desirability of all the NATO allies supporting the proposed SUNFED. On the other hand, regarding political conflicts between members Norway agreed with the US that it was best to keep such conflicts out of the UN. None of this is to say that the Atlantic circle was not the primary focus of Norwegian foreign policy. Lange could well merely be paying lip service to NATO skeptics at home, of which there were quite a few, particularly in certain parts of the Labour Party, but also within the Government itself. The point is merely to illustrate that in cases where it was seen as appropriate, the stated Norwegian focus would be on the UN, not NATO. However, one did not necessarily exclude the other. In any case, the security dimension of the membership in NATO meant that as long as membership in the UN did not provide a security guarantee, Norway would afford NATO primacy in its foreign policy.

4.5 Non-military cooperation and the transatlantic relationship

A useful first step in examining the impact of non-military cooperation on the transatlantic relationship is to look at US policy regarding non-military cooperation in the period. In September 1951, at the same time the Pearson Group was established to study the possibilities of non-military cooperation, Dulles states that it was a major US objective at the Council Session in Ottawa to reassure the NATO allies that the US saw the Alliance as having more than a military function without regard for “economic and social realities or cultural matters”.²¹⁵ Thus it would seem that the immediate reasoning behind the US support for the establishment of the Pearson Group was a desire to reassure her allies rather than a wish to extend non-military cooperation.²¹⁶ By the time of the May 1956 Ministerial Meeting, however, the US view was that non-military cooperation had become an important aspect of meeting the new Soviet tactics. Of course, this reorientation could well have had more to do with the Soviet change of tactics than a genuine wish for further transatlantic integration.

²¹⁴ NA, Department of State, Central Files, 711.56321, “Summary and analysis of Lange’s speech in Copenhagen on December 8, 1956”.

²¹⁵ *FRUS, 1951*, vol. III, 678.

²¹⁶ Poul Villaume, *Allieret med forbehold: Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949-1961*, (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995), 750.

The transatlantic relationship, through and beyond the Cold War, has often been characterized as one beset with internal conflict. This characterization is of course very relevant to the issue of extending non-military cooperation in NATO. The focus of non-military cooperation was after all to strengthen unity within the Atlantic Alliance. Lawrence Kaplan maintains that the military and political reinforcements the Alliance underwent in the wake of the Korean War in order to enable NATO to meet a Soviet military challenge created new divisions between the US and her allies.²¹⁷ In relation to the Committee of Three it should be pointed out that the search for a means of extending non-military cooperation was in part an answer to one such disagreement. The establishment of the Committee of Three was justified by referring to the need for strengthening unity. However, it must also be pointed out that the desire for strengthening unity was not based on a perceived need to resolve internal tensions, but rather on the perception of a new Soviet threat that could not be met by military cooperation alone.

If one sees the history of NATO as being one of close cooperation, the Committee of Three should be seen primarily as an effort to strengthen unity. In measuring the results of the Committee, if one accepts that the goal in establishing the Committee was to face an external threat rather than internal divisions, then whether the goal was met or not is not the only point. Rather, the fact that the attempt was made at all speaks to the desires among the allies to cooperate more closely.

In short, regarding the relationship between non-military cooperation and the transatlantic relationship, it depends on the angle of view. The incessant calls for strengthening unity can be seen as proof that closeness of cooperation was lacking. On the other hand, the continuous focus on the need for maintaining as close a relationship as possible could just as well be a result of the member countries merely realizing that more cooperation was beneficial, rather than that cooperation was nonexistent.

4.6 Conclusions

In comparison, the degree of similarity in the Norwegian and the US positions on non-military cooperation was striking. One might expect that the disparity in stature of these two countries would have imparted fundamental differences in policy, and that these differences would have led to greatly differing outlooks on the possible benefits of non-military cooperation. As we

²¹⁷ For Kaplan's view of the impact of the Korean War on NATO, see Kaplan, *NATO United, NATO Divided*, 9-27.

have seen, this was not the case. However, it is interesting to note that these positions were arrived at through fundamentally different reasoning.

Norwegian foreign policy was based on the axiom that small states benefit from a binding international order of law. It was only the inability of the UN to provide an adequate security arrangement that made it necessary to join a regional security arrangement, in which the US would inevitably be the dominant partner. With such an imbalance of power within the Alliance it would be in the interest of Norway to extend non-military cooperation, particularly in the political field. However, in a typical example of the duality of Norwegian foreign policy, Norway was actually quite apprehensive regarding closer political cooperation.

The US, on the other hand, as the dominant partner in the Alliance, could not be expected to support establishing habits of consultation that would give the smaller states in NATO a louder voice. However, as we have seen, the US was willing to submit almost any category of question for consultation in the NAC, albeit with certain reservations. But these reservations were not so much a result of a genuine reluctance to afford Western Europe primacy in US foreign policy, as a wish to avoid giving the impression to the other regional arrangements of which the US was a participant that this was indeed the case.

The Suez Crisis has been seen to have had a great impact on the work of the Committee of Three and their conclusions. This assumption needs to be reconsidered. While it is unquestionable that the Suez Crisis had an impact on the Committee of Three, in particular Lange, it did not change their conclusions. On the contrary, the conclusions of the Report were not really altered when the Committee re-examined the Report in the wake of Suez. The discussions surrounding the Report were influenced by the impact of the Suez Crisis, but hardly in a manner that would indicate that there was a lack of acceptance of the Committee's conclusions. In retrospect it could easily be maintained that the Suez Crisis had the effect of reinforcing the conclusions of the Committee, and that the apparent lack of results of implementing the Committee's suggestions was as much due to unwillingness on the part of the NATO members to relinquish sovereignty.

In the concluding chapter of this thesis the Committee of Three will be placed in a historical context in terms of its importance in the evolution of NATO as a political entity, its effect on the situation NATO faced in relation to the détente of the 1960's and -70's, and the relation of non-military cooperation to European integration. Finally, the thesis is placed in relation to

existing research, in terms of the history of Norwegian foreign policy, the history of the transatlantic relationship and NATO.

Chapter Five- Conclusions

The goal of this concluding chapter is threefold. In addition to presenting a more general conclusion this chapter will also place the issue of non-military cooperation in NATO in a historical perspective by looking at the relationship between the Committee of Three and the evolution of NATO as a political entity, the role of NATO in the détente of the 1960's and -70's and the process of European integration. Finally, it is necessary to place these findings in relation to the existing research in the field.

5.1 General Conclusions

The Committee of Three was established in part to address a perceived need for strengthening the unity of the Alliance. This need had its background in what was seen as a change in Soviet tactics following the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at which the Soviet leadership distanced itself from the Stalinist ideology of inevitable war, emphasising instead the possibility of *peaceful coexistence*. There was a clear difference between the rationale behind the US suggestion to establish the Committee of Three and its attitude toward the previous effort to extend non-military cooperation in 1951. Whereas the US saw the Pearson Group as a method of reassuring allies who were increasingly uneasy about the one-sidedness of the Alliance, the US suggestion to establish the Committee of Three was based on a genuine wish to find new ways of meeting the changing Soviet threat. Whereas the establishment of the Committee of Three has previously been seen mainly as a call for changing the "NATO method" of decision making emanating from the smaller nations in the Alliance, this thesis shows that this was not the case. Not only was the Committee established at the suggestion of the largest member of the Alliance, but there was widespread agreement among the members on the need to extend non-military cooperation, not to change the decision making process but to counter the new Soviet threat.

In spite of Lange's wish for a clear definition of purpose to be stated by the NAC in ministerial session, the Committee in the end had to define its own terms of reference. These terms of reference were formulated after consulting with other members, including the US. This shows again that the Committee of Three was not a *cri-de-cœur* from the smaller nations,

as Kaplan has stated.²¹⁸ After the Committee had thus defined its mandate, it proceeded to consult thoroughly with the other members of the Alliance through the questionnaire and the following consultations. The process of compiling the Committee's report was completed before the schism between the US and the UK and France fully developed over the Suez Crisis, and though the report was revised in the aftermath of Suez, the conclusions of the report were unchanged. The impact of Suez on the work of the Committee mainly manifested itself in Lange's contemplated resignation, and in terms of the report of the Committee mainly in the letter of transmittal rather than the report itself. Thus it is evident that the Suez Crisis did not change the conclusions of the Committee, rather it had the effect of emphasising the need for extending non-military cooperation.

While it is unnecessary to repeat the respective positions on non-military cooperation here, some general observations are in order. The Norwegian and the US positions on non-military cooperation both emphasised political consultation on a wide range of questions. In general, both Norway and the US were positive to extending political cooperation, including providing mechanisms for dealing with inter-member disputes. Similarly, both were clearly negative to most forms of economic cooperation in NATO, based largely on the perceived adequacy of existing organizations in the field. Cultural and informational cooperation were afforded less emphasis, with the exception of the possibility of a cooperative effort in training technicians and scientists.

The striking thing when seeing these positions in comparison is the large degree of similarity. Based on the differences between these two states in terms of size and power, it could be expected that their conclusions as to the desirability of extending cooperation would be different. However, this thesis shows that the US and the Norwegian official positions were mostly in agreement. More important, on the other hand, is the similarity between the actual attitudes in Washington and Oslo. Both Governments were quite vocal in their support for the Committee's project, while at the same time they realized that the amount of cooperation that was being discussed went too far for either Government to accept. In the case of both Norway and the US the desire for increased cooperation met with the unassailable obstacle of maintaining national sovereignty.

²¹⁸ Kaplan, "The 40th Anniversary of the Harmel Report".

5.2 D tente and the Evolution of NATO as a Political Entity

“The Future Tasks of the Alliance”, better known as the Harmel Report, approved in December 1967, is credited with having “blunted centrifugal pressures that might have led to the Alliance’s dissolution”, as well as having “set NATO on a course that ultimately led to the end of the Cold War”.²¹⁹ The survival of the Alliance after the disappearance of its *raison d’être* with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 can be credited to its ability to function as a political entity, rather than solely as an organization with the single goal of mutual defence. Thus the Harmel Report stands out as a milestone in the history of NATO. Kaplan maintains that “the participants in the Harmel exercise were repeating the appeal of the Wise Men of 1956 ...who tried in vain to tell the larger powers that their voices should be heard”.²²⁰ Though Kaplan’s conclusion that the Committee of Three was a call from the smaller powers is wrong, he is right in stating that the Harmel exercise to a large degree reiterated the conclusions of the Committee of Three. Thus it is evident that the Harmel initiative owed a debt to the Committee of Three and that the Harmel exercise in fact can be seen as a consequence of the efforts to extend non-military cooperation in the 1950’s. The point is not that the Harmel Report built on the conclusions of the Committee of Three, but rather that if the Harmel Report represented the frustrated voices of the smaller nations of the Alliance, these frustrations were amplified by the fact that the conclusions of the Harmel Report was at least in part a repetition of the conclusions of the Committee of Three. In other words, the Harmel Report established NATO as a political entity, and the origins of the Harmel initiative can be found at least in part in the work of the Committee of Three in 1956. Thus the work of the Committee of Three, far from being negated by the Suez Crisis, constituted an integral part of the road to giving NATO a political role.

In addition to the aforementioned influence on the evolution of NATO as a political entity, and in the same vein, the Committee of Three must be said to have influenced the way NATO responded to the international climate of the 1960’s and -70’s. In a period characterized by rapprochement between East and West, the lessons learned in the 1950’s were a factor in how the Alliance reacted. As noted above, the Harmel Report established NATO as a political entity, and was in part a reaction to the international situation. It represented an effort to work towards a stable settlement in Europe through a policy of *d tente*. The idea of meeting a

²¹⁹ Kaplan, “The 40th Anniversary of the Harmel Report”.

²²⁰ Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United*, 43.

perceived lessened military threat from the Soviet Bloc by emphasizing the political aspect of the Alliance was also part of the background of the Committee of Three.

5.3 Non-Military Cooperation and European Integration

When placing the Committee of Three into a historical perspective the question arises as to whether the work towards extending non-military cooperation was conducive or hindering to European integration. As mentioned in Chapter Three, both Dulles and Eisenhower agreed that the US should do more to encourage European integration, and that nothing should be done in terms of extending economic cooperation that might hinder such integration.

A central factor in the transatlantic relationship has been the relationship between US policy and European integration. Furthering European integration was a clearly stated objective in US foreign policy during this period. To briefly recap some of Lundestad's arguments of relevance here, the striking thing about the US position on European integration in relation to an Atlantic framework is not the implicit emphasis on such a framework, but rather the direct support given to European integration. Throughout the 50's the US opposed every British push for unambiguous Atlantic solutions, for example rearmament of Germany in NATO, an OEEC approach to cooperation in atomic energy or an Atlantic free-trade area. However, despite this opposition, the US administration continued to take the wider Atlantic framework for European integration for granted.

The point of relevance to this thesis is that the US strongly supported European integration, taking it for granted that such integration would take place within an Atlantic framework. Thus strengthening the Atlantic framework in general would be conducive to European integration. Extending non-military cooperation would tend to cement the framework, and as long as one was careful not to cooperate in a manner that would hinder European integration, all was well. Thus the US could safely support extending non-military cooperation as it would be helpful in achieving an important objective. Still, there were obvious limits on what the US could participate in.

5.4 The History of Norwegian Foreign Policy

This thesis can be seen in relation to three interpretations of Norwegian foreign policy in the Cold War. While it seems evident in the Norwegian position that the Norwegian Government

desired a greater degree of consultations and information, we have seen that there existed serious doubts as to what this would entail in terms of increased responsibility, and in fact whether this was at all desirable. This is in line with Tamnes' theory of *integration and screening*. Norway desired integration in relation to the West, while at the same time it was seen as necessary to follow a policy of screening towards the NATO allies. However, the point was not to avoid conflict with the Soviet Union, but to avoid being involved in conflicts and matters over which Norway had no control or possibility of assuming responsibility. This also corresponds with Lundestad's argument that Norway tended towards skepticism concerning concrete suggestions of integration, usually leading to demands for special arrangements. In the case of non-military cooperation, the core of the Norwegian attitude was that it was desirable that the consultative machinery in NATO be strengthened and extended, while at the same time Norway did not actually want to consult on issues over which it could not exercise control itself. While not going so far as to making concrete demands for special arrangements, this is nonetheless an example of the dualism present in Norwegian foreign policy.

In terms of Eriksen and Pharo's view that the North Atlantic circle in foreign policy was accepted by the Government, as well as most leading politicians, as the most important, the findings concerning the Norwegian position on non-military cooperation correspond with this. Still, it must be pointed out that while the focus of Norwegian foreign policy was on NATO, there is an interesting duality evident both in the position on non-military cooperation and in the stated policy of Lange in terms of the relationship between NATO and the UN. While it is undeniable that with regards to the security dimension of Norwegian foreign policy NATO had absolute primacy, in relation to economic and cultural cooperation focus was at times placed more on the UN.

5.5 The History of the Transatlantic Relationship

Kaplan has stated that the Committee of Three was an effort to remedy a situation where the smaller states in NATO felt that they were on the sidelines in the decision-making process. While it may well be that the smaller states in NATO felt sidelined, it must be kept in mind that the Committee of Three was actually established at the suggestion of the US supported by the UK. This could of course simply have been based on the same attitude that the US had had towards the Pearson Group, i.e. that it was necessary to reassure the smaller states that the US

saw the Alliance as more than a military organization. However, this thesis maintains that the reasons behind the US suggestion to study means of extending non-military cooperation were not based on a wish to reassure the smaller states, but to strengthen the unity of the Alliance in the face of peaceful coexistence. The fact is that the NATO allies all perceived a change in the nature of the Soviet threat, and that the larger powers recognized the need to strengthen the Alliance politically to meet this threat.

Kaplan also maintains that the conclusions of the Committee of Three were not taken seriously, and that the Suez Crisis drowned out the voices of the Wise Men at the time. While it may well be said that the conclusions of the Committee were not acted upon, this was not because of the Suez Crisis. On the contrary, the Suez Crisis underlined these conclusions and reinforced the importance of the Committee's Report. The reasons for the lack of concrete results must lie elsewhere. This thesis has shown that the Norwegian and US attitude to non-military cooperation, particularly political consultations, while seemingly positive on the surface, was actually quite negative. This was due to a basic unwillingness to undertake any cooperative measures that would mean relinquishing sovereignty or subjugating national interest to the interests of the Alliance and its membership.

Regarding the view that the history of the transatlantic relationship is one characterized by conflict, the conclusions of this thesis agree with Lundestad's argument that the focus should rather be on the amount of cooperation, as well as on the fact that the Alliance has survived every conflict, and can be said to have emerged stronger every time. Similarly, Kaplan states that the striking aspect of NATO through the Cold War has been the silence over Article 13, which states that members can freely leave the Alliance after it has been in force for twenty years, despite the conflicts and disagreements. The work of the Committee of Three and the point that the Committee's report underlined the need for cooperation after the Suez Crisis can be seen as beneficial to cooperation, instead of the Suez Crisis being a demonstration of lacking willingness to consult. The focus should not be on Suez negating any results of the Committee, but on the possibility that the Committee was a factor in continued cooperation after Suez.

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