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
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“Sustainable Capacities”
Norwegian People’s Aid through 13 years of
Humanitarian Mine Action in Mozambique
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Globalisation, Innovation and Policy
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To preserve the personal security and good name of some of persons described it should remain unavailable to the general public, pending revision by the informants involved.

They will have until October 20th to inform the author of whether information contained must/should be removed. The author can be contacted at kjell@knudsen.org for any questions.

Abstract

Building local organisations for demining is about technology transfer between widely different environments. While Norwegian People's Aid's demining operations in Mozambique were intended to last only for a short period of time, they remained for 13 years. The case presents an organisational study of the organisation created in Mozambique and seeks answers to how it developed and why it is not likely that an organisational capacity remains. It also elaborates on how varying interests among the stakeholders led to changing, vague and unrealisable goals being defined.

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Abbreviations, acronyms and Mine Action expressions explained

Also see *Definitions and clarifications* in the introduction.

ADP	Accelerated Demining Programme (Also UNADP) The UNDP organised demining organisation, which operated mostly in the south of Mozambique until 2005. A new organisation with the same acronym was started by ex-employees but received no funding.
CND	Commissao nacional do desminagem – same as NMCC (English translation)
DANIDA	Danish International Development Assistance
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal The removal of the threat posed by explosive objects (UXOs) left behind after a conflict.
Expat, expatrite	Person living abroad, usually in mine action a westerner used as Technical Advisor or management positions.
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. Performs scientific studies and develops standards and guidelines. Several former NPA staff work here.
GoM	Government of Mozambique
GOP	General Operating Procedure Template for SOPs to use in the field, to be adapted to local conditions.
HALO Trust	British NGO that performed large scale demining in the four north eastern provinces of Mozambique from 1993-2007
HMA	Humanitarian Mine Action
HO	Head Office. This is used within NPA when the NPA office in Oslo is mentioned. I have chosen to use this the same way in this document.
IND	Instituto nacional do desminagem. National Demining Institute, taking over as CND is closed.
LTD	Long Term Development. The development component of the NPA Mozambique programme.
MA	Mine Action Originally denotes the five different approaches to reduce the landmine problem: demining, victim assistance, mine risk education, stockpile destruction and ban on landmine use.
MAP	Mine Action Programme
MAU	Mine Action Unit Refers to the NPA Oslo head office with regards to mine action
MDD	Mine Detection Dog
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Referring to the Royal Norwegian MFA in this document.
Mine Awareness	Former denomination of MRE

MRE	Mine Risk Education Educational efforts to sensitise populations living in or moving to areas with a mine problem.
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NMCC	National Mine Clearance Commission
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
Ops Off	Operations Officer Technically responsible for demining operations.
PARPA	Plan de Acção para Reducção de Pobreza Absoluta Mozambican national plan to reduce absolute poverty.
PM	Programme/Project Manager NPA top responsible for Mine Action in a country.
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
QA/QC	Quality Assurance/Control
Res. Rep. / RR	NPA Resident Representative In principle the highest ranking NPA person in the country, in principle responsible for both development and mine action.
RONCO	American commercial demining operator. Usually working on behalf of the US government.
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure Detailed instructions for how eg. manual demining shall be performed.
TA	Technical Advisor
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNOHAC	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance This is what later becomes UN OCHA
UNOMOZ aka	UN Operations in Mozambique
ONUMOZ	
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
UXO	UneXploded Ordnance Mines, cluster bombs, bombs, grenades etc. used during conflict that has not yet exploded.

Acknowledgements

I have had an interest in demining ever since I first started working for NPA with landmines in 1997 and later for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. More recently the interest was sparked after work with the NPA Mine Action Programme in Sudan and a visit to Mozambique during the summer of 2005. The study started after discussions with people working for NPA during late 2005 and early 2006. Participation at a meeting with key Norwegian Mine Action actors gave further inputs. At the very end of the study participation at the NPA programme managers meeting held in Oslo, gave a good overview of current NPA tendencies and visions for the future.

On handing in this thesis I would like to thank the following:

- NPA, for their generosity in letting me perform this study, giving full access to information and being inclusive. In particular Steinar Essén, who had faith in the project and spent time to discuss what angles would be interesting to NPA (I hope I have not completely failed), and Siri Kvenild for help with the NPA non-archives.
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That said, any errors, lacks, omissions, misinterpretations or spelling errors left are mine.

Kjell Knudsen

Oslo, 2 October 2006

1 Introduction

On an overall level the history told in this thesis is about the transfer of technology between and the difficulties involved. The creation by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) of an organisation for the purpose of demining in Mozambique was about taking a technology¹ from a highly advanced post-industrial society ("1st world") and introducing and developing this in a seriously underdeveloped, war-ridden and politically unstable country ("3rd world"). On the more specific level I will study a case about the creation of one organisation by another organisation. An organisation created in order to fulfil a very specific task and what affected the evolution of it. This thesis is an attempt to organise and analyse experiences of NPA with regards to the creation of capacities in the area of Mine Action.

1.1 AIM OF THE STUDY

Whether NPA intended to create and leave a self-sustaining organisation in Mozambique is debated. Some say this was never the intention and that the pull-out is just natural since the problem it was meant to help has been solved. However, it appears that along the way it has also been the intention by some to leave a behind capacities when NPA pulls out, and that some stakeholders still have an interest in a continued effort.

The thesis seeks to relate and analyse **how the organisation in Mozambique was created, what factors affected its development, and why it was difficult to create a sustainable capacity.**

1.2 BACKGROUND

Mozambique history in brief

Mozambique was a Portuguese colony from the 16th century until the Portuguese gave it up in 1974. During the last ten years of colonial rule, the FRELIMO liberation movement waged an unsuccessful liberation war supported by China and the Soviet Union. After independence a one-party communist state was organised, and the new regime supported liberation movements in neighbouring South Africa and Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia). The latter resulted in those states financing the RENAMO rebel movement which waged civil war lasting until 1992, when both

¹ The concrete demining knowledge but most importantly the surrounding organisational structures required for this.

parties had lost their external supporters. The country was devastated and ranked as one of the poorest countries in the world. During the almost 30 years of warfare, landmines were used extensively and indiscriminately by all parties. As peace was declared and stability reached, about 5.7 million Mozambican refugees and internally displaced persons returned to their homes over a period of about three years. One of the methods to prevent a humanitarian disaster was to start demining. (Eaton, Horwood, & Niland, 1997a, pp. 1-3; Millard & Harpviken, 2000, pp. 15-26; Wikipedia, 2006)

NPA Mine Action in Mozambique

Founded in 1939, Norwegian People’s Aid is the humanitarian organisation of the Norwegian labour movement. Its international engagement goes back to the highly political support to the rebels fighting Franco in Spain in the thirties.

Based on successful experiences in Cambodia, NPA started demining operations in Mozambique in March 1993, as part of the general United Nations peacekeeping operation. It was intended to become integrated in general UN long-term efforts, but this did not happen. As of 1995 NPA operated more or less independently. From a strong expatriate presence in the start it was headed by a local programme manager from 1997 to 2004, only a few international advisors remained after 1997. In 1999 a donor report estimated the problem to be solved by 2006-7 and recommended that NPA should start planning for a phase-out by then. A phase-out strategy was not adopted until 2003 and the build-down of the organisation started. From then the remaining efforts were geared towards surveying and identification of the remaining problem. Operations ended in September 2006, as no more funding was available and NPA plans to end all activities by October. At the time of writing it was still unsure if local staff would make a serious attempt to create a local NGO.

Definitions and clarifications

I use the following definitions in this thesis unless otherwise specified.²

(Humanitarian) Mine Action, in a wider sense the term is used to talk about the five activities to fight the landmine problem: Demining, victim assistance, mine risk education, stockpile destruction and ban on landmines. Mostly it is used to denote activities to prevent accidents by either removing the mines or educating people in affected areas through *mine risk education*. In this thesis it will be used about the removal of mines.

² The more generally accepted definitions are in the list of *Abbreviations, acronyms and Mine Action expressions explained* on page iv

(Humanitarian) *Demining*, this is the concrete activity of removing landmines from the ground. The term humanitarian is used to distinguish it from military demining, where minimal casualties and near 100% clearance rate is not demanded. I will use it alone and to denote the activities to remove landmines performed by NPA.

Nationalised, where used in this thesis I give it the meaning of something taken over by Mozambicans; regardless of whether this is connected to the government.

Independent, in this thesis, when not described otherwise, used to mean independent of NPA. Again, independence of the government is not intended unless specified.

Indigenous, something fully run and managed by Mozambicans.

Sustainable, something that it is meant to last in the particular environment. Some interviewees pointed out the clear contradiction in putting *sustainable* and *humanitarian demining* together. One should not intend to create sustainable *capacities* when the problem should rather be solved quickly and then there should be no more need for capacities.

1.3 METHODOLOGY

Historical case study

The case of NPA in Mozambique will contribute answers to some overriding questions regarding technology transfer and problems formulated by various actors with regards to mine action, development aid and the creation of *sustainable capacities*.

While all environments are different, the case can hopefully provide some transferable experiences to other mine action programmes. In particular the analysis should be of interest in these days, since the NPA Mine Action Unit is planning expansion to several new countries.

Data collection

General literature and debates on capacity building and sustainability in Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA), as well as specific reports written about HMA in Mozambique, have provided a background for the study. The actual research consists of an archive review at the NPA head office in addition to interviews with several current and former employees as well as some other actors.³

Most of the interviews, lasting about one hour each, were performed in person at the NPA head office. After consent that it would only be for me to hear and transcribe afterwards,

³ An attempt at accessing the archives of the MFA was done in order to if possible find documents with regards to former policy with regards to HMA in Mozambique. However it was made clear from the switchboard that access was very limited and no answer was given what so ever after requests to the archivist.

the interviews were recorded and the audio files stored. From an original plan of 6-8 interviews the scope increased to 19 interviews.⁴

I used a loose interview guide which would start with an open question about “why is there no organisation left when NPA leaves Mozambique”? Unfortunately, I often made the interviewees feel that I said that the NPA operation in Mozambique had been a failure. Most did not agree to this, the general view was that NPA solved a serious problem in Mozambique. And that the main reason for no organisation being left behind is that there is no use for it. At the end of the interview a presentation was done of the preliminary theories of why NPA had not succeeded in creating an independent entity in Mozambique, divided in the five organisational elements described in chapter 2. Feedback was sought on each point even if they had somewhat been mentioned by the informant in the first part of the interview.

The assessment of the two first years of the programme is based on evaluations and considerations presented in monthly reports to the NPA HO. These have not been referenced each and every one, unless direct quotes are used. Thereafter quarterly reports found have made the background together with interviews. All reports and other relevant NPA archive information providing the background for the history have been collected in two chronologically sorted folders together with the transcribed interviews.

An early version of the historical chapter was sent to the informants for feedback and review, the same was done with a draft of the full thesis. Comments were included as far as possible and content considered too sensitive by some, was removed or rewritten.

Factors affecting the study

There are limitations I see to this study:

With limited time and finances it is based on available personnel and material in Oslo.⁵ Preferably more local staff and other actors involved with NPA in Mozambique could have been consulted.⁶ Having only a vague understanding of culture in Mozambique I have not been able to see where Norwegians might have misunderstood local culture.

There was a noted reluctance by informants in mentioning “negative” histories, in particular related to personnel. This was discovered as I reviewed archive material, or talked to people remotely involved. The complete picture was established upon request in some cases. While I have chosen not to tell those stories in full detail and omit some completely, they do

⁴ See *Interviews* for a list of persons interviewed and consulted.

⁵ With the exceptions of the long time local Programme Manager and the current local deputy.

⁶ Such as the UN, government and one former NPA resident representative.

form part of the general picture of the organisation. I do suspect that other themes of relevance can have been left out, but do not believe it would have made the analysis very different.

The NPA Oslo archives are not complete. While much help was provided by their archivist in finding existing material, it is clear that archiving over the years has depended on the individual desk officer. Archive material from the first couple of years (after some compiling from different parts of the archive) provided a good background. It is feared that with the change from fax to e-mail that much less archiving was done.

My background in NPA should be noted as it has influenced the research in both positive and negative ways. The informants are mostly people that I have known for years and many whom I have a friendly relationship with. This can have led to me being more “friendly” in my questioning and reluctant to push for or relate difficult issues. On the other hand it also means I had their trust. They were probably more free in their communication and have volunteered more information than they would have done to an outsider. Several of the informants appeared not to have discussed their involvement with anyone in depth before. My interviews became a way to “confess”, which meant that I had to caution myself in what parts could go in as part of a public history and not.

Within the limitations of this thesis and my background, I have chosen not to enter into wider political discussions about geopolitical interests and neo-colonialism. While this might be seen to have an effect on the goals and power distribution which will be discussed later, it was considered to be beyond my scope.

1.4 DISPOSITION OF THE THESIS

The document is divided into three main parts: First a presentation of the framework which will be used for the analysis, *Elements of Organisations*. Second, chapter 3 gives a chronological review of the case and the findings. Third, chapter 4 contains the analysis of the empirical material, where I also present further comments on the case conveyed by the informants and go in depth on some incidents related in chapter 3. At the end there is a conclusion where I summarise the findings and suggest some further areas to study.

The empirical chapter is long and contains little explanation of the history related, but serves to draw conclusions in the analysis with regards to the development over time.

Appendix 1 was a document used by the author to keep track of various events and participants involved in the organisation. It has been partly anonymised and included to give the reader an idea of the changes of personnel. However, it is not intended to be exact nor is it fully correct.

2 A framework, Elements of Organisations

The study is about the technology transfer occurring in the case of NPA in Mozambique. To order the factors that influenced the process I will use the framework developed by Richard Scott in *Organisations, Rational, Natural and Open systems* (2003).⁷

The primary elements of organisations can be defined as:

- *Social Structure*, the rules or structures for interaction in an organisation.
Scott groups the social structure into three components:
 - a. *Normative structure*, being the values (criteria for selecting behaviour), norms (rules for e.g. how goals can be pursued) and role expectations (expectations or standards for behaviour of the participants).⁸
 - b. *Cultural-cognitive structure*, shared beliefs and understanding about the situation by a majority of the participants.
 - c. *Behavioural structure*, how the participants actually behave.
- *Participants*, the individuals that for one reason or another take part in the organisation.
- *Goals*, desired ends for the organisation.
- *Technology*, what the organisation knows and “sells” either in terms of physical gear, knowledge and skills; or with simple words: “what it does” and ultimately produces.
- *Environment*, the situation, in which the organisation operates, relates and must adapt to in order to succeed.

In the following figure (based on an original illustration made by Leavitt) Scott illustrates how all the different elements interrelate – and in particular all relate to the environment.

⁷ It should be noted that Scott only gives a presentation of theories discussed by others in the field of organisation theory, he does not as such present a clear theory of how to understand and tell why things go well or not. I have chosen to use parts of it, as I say, as a framework in order to systematize and attempt to understand the factors that have been at work in NPA in Mozambique. For a deeper understanding of the various factors a more profound study of the theories he present would be merited.

⁸ Norms are often thought of as unwritten rules, in this context normative structure includes written and formal rules.




Figure 2: Leavitt's Diamond: A Model of Organisation (as adapted by Scott)

2.1 WHAT COULD WE EXPECT TO FIND ACCORDING TO THEORY?

Organisation theory tries to give answers to what factors affect the evolution of organisations. In this thesis the framework provides a way to systematise and analyse the various factors that affected the establishment of the organisation. By this it serves as a method to explain why the organisation has not become a sustainable capacity.

Social structures

The establishment and imprinting of common values, norms and roles are important; and more so if the organisation is large. Divergences between this normative structure and the actual way people behave (the behavioural structure) is normal in most organisations. But too big divergences can be a problem. If the managers give one instruction but act in a different way, it will be hard to have the employees follow the said thing. It can also be a problem for an organisation if its members have too widely differing interpretation of themselves, the other members and the organisation itself. If the cultural background is very different among the participants, it can be hard to imprint a new structure.

To what extent the social structure is formalised, affects the organisation. If the structure is only loosely defined, the exit or entry of participants will lead to their personality defining their positions in the organisation and possibly the structure itself (pp. 18-20).

Participants

Participants can be widely defined as all individuals that somehow contribute to the organisation, i.e. not just the employees. To use a terminology that is often used in development and Mine Action theory: all *stakeholders* to the organisation. As just mentioned under social structures, in a

more informal social structure the participants will influence more on the organisation. The characteristics of participants, their goals and their contributions to the organisation are important in forming the social structure, just as well as the social structure established affects the participants. Which way the influence is stronger has been debated. I will assume there is an influence both ways and that this has an effect on the organisation. (Scott, 2003, pp. 21-22)

The availability, inclusion and personal development of participants will be important for how an organisation is created and later evolves.

Goals

Goals, policies or strategies, and understanding how they are defined, are vital in the study of organisations. To systematise goals Scott defines five uses of goals in organisations:

- *Cognitive*
Goals provide criteria for the generation and selection of courses of action as well as give directions and constraints for decisions and actions.
- *Cathetic*
Providing motivation and identification for the members of the organisation.
- *Symbolic*
Goals to influence the environments of the organisation such as local communities, national governments and donors
- *Justificatory*
As a means to justify the behaviour of the organisation.
- *Evaluative*
As a means to evaluate whether the organisation is successful.

Quite often the goals will be different depending on what level of the organisation is approached. The employees on the ground will see quite different goals from the top level managers. There will also be a difference between the *intended*, *emergent* (what comes up anyway) and *realised* goals. And certainly the goals will change over time.

Who defines the goals to actually be followed in an organisation is an important question. And, to most scholars in the field, this has been seen as a continuous battle for *power* among the internal and external stakeholders. Scott proposes the theories by Cyert and March about *Dominant Coalitions* as a sensible approach to evaluating the powerplay. They say that organisations are composed of coalitions of stakeholders that pursue similar interests. One group or one individual seldom has full control. Everybody have to seek out other stakeholders, with coinciding interest, that have power and negotiate agreements over goals.

Asymmetry in power between the ones defining the goals can often lead to differentiated power structures. This will be relevant in a case where one stakeholder receives everything from others and is fully dependent on them.

The absence of clearly specified goals is often caused by an *unstable environment*. This will make it difficult to both design a structure and establish goals for the participants. In such cases a more temporary organisation setup might be preferable to a fixed, long-term one.

(pp. 22, 292-309)

A lot more theory about goals, power and control is certainly relevant for this case. I have only touched the surface of what is discussed by Scott and others.⁹ Since the intention of this study is a mere superficial presentation I will not go further here.

Technology

Technology focus in organisation theory is about looking at the organisation as a place where input is transformed into output. It is defining technology as not just about converting something physically (like removing mines from the ground and making it safe) but it could also be about contributing to someone’s education or making their life better. Technology is here interpreted as both the machines possessed, the knowledge, skills and methods as well as the required organisation of the participants in order to obtain the output.

Internal and external environments shape the technology in use and vice versa. While an organisation might attempt to buffer its core technology from too much uncertainty in the environment, it is also fully dependent on the environment for the continued development of its technology. Seldom will an organisation invent and develop its technology alone. Three dimensions can be used when we evaluate the technologies of an organisation and see how they affect the structure.

- *Complexity or diversity*. How many elements must be handled simultaneously?
The more complex technology the more complex the structure.
- *Uncertainty or unpredictability*. How well can the outputs be predicted?
With less certainty a less formal structure and decentralisation would be expected.
- *Interdependence*. To what extent will the technologies in use affect each other?
With more and interdependent technologies higher demands for coordination would be expected.

⁹ Some issues would be the relevance of culture; endorsed and authorized power; intended, emergent and realized strategies; and theories on how organisations lacking clear goals tend to act.

With an increase in all these three dimensions, we should see either a reduced need for (by lowering performance standards) or an increase in the capacity for information processing in the structure. (pp. 23, 230-261)

Environment

Environments on several levels are vital for the possibilities of an organisation to develop at all, *how* it develops and for its survival. As has been evident from the presentations above, the environment is important for all the other organisational elements.

- The *social structure* will often reflect or be borrowed from the environment, much of the order or disorder within an organisation will be reflecting the environment.
- The *participants* available to the organisation and their previous socialisation and training depend on the environment.
- With regards to the *goals* – Scott provides a reflection on this by Parsons from 1960 saying that “what is termed a goal [...] is, from the point of view of the larger society, its [the organisations] specialised function. An organisation may thus expect societal support for its activities to reflect the relative value society places on those functions” (p. 23)
- Which *Technologies* are viable to use and not will depend on the environment. If the environment around is weak, it might be hard for an organisation to support the use of a complex technology that requires certain structures in the society at large.

In an environment just emerging from decades of war, competition for available resources is expected and there will most likely be a high rate of corruption. The initial resources available will affect the structure of the organisation. As organisations often tend to be imprinted with their first structure, this will define the future of the organisation.

While organisations will be influenced by the environment, influence also goes the other way. Organisations can have an impact on their environments.

Summary and expectations for NPA Mozambique

None of the organisational elements can explain separately what an organisation is, how it is created and evolves. In order to understand the whole picture, factors within all these elements need to be reviewed to see how they affect each other and contribute to the organisational whole.

I will here list some assumptions with regards to a demining organisation in Mozambique and factors affecting the various organisational elements.¹⁰

Social structure

- Initial rigid social structure in order to handle difficult environment gets “imprinted” and influences the organisation later on.
- Social structure imposed by Norwegians which is not in the area. Need to do basic training to establish.
- Loosening of the original social structure when expatriates leave or diminish in numbers.

Participants

- Few educated or trained persons available locally.
- Other actors in the environment competing for qualified participants.
- Expatriates: Military trained, action oriented, lack of cultural sensitivity leading to problems.
- External: UN, Donors, Government, Other authorities, “Clients” having different motivations.

Goals

- Rapidly changing environment leads to problems in defining goals.
- Goals are established as “they go” on the ground without a clear overall policy.
- Changing actors, internal and external, leading to frequent redefinition of goals – changing dominant coalition.
- Local staff establishing and influencing goals in order to preserve employment.
- Expatriate staff having other goals than the local staff.

Technology

- Military technology leading to military structure and military goals.
- New technical field influencing the goals of the organisation and creating ambiguities.
- Desire to develop new technologies by internal and external actors leading to organisational complexity.
- Changing environment leading to changing and more complex technology.

Environment

- Rapidly changing environment as the country goes from war, to reconstruction and later to development.
- First phase with abundance of funds, followed by other phases where less funds are available and goals that “sell” have to be established.
- Environment not favourable for large organisations.
- Corruption.

¹⁰ Table 1: *Organisational elements and factors in the different phases* synthesises the actual findings in a similar way.

3 NPA Mine Action in Mozambique review

For the analysis of the case I will present a chronological review of the programme. The review focuses on the first years of establishment and nationalisation of the programme. From the last years of the operation I only present highlights of relevance to the analysis performed later on. This is *not an attempt at a full historical review*. It is intended to single out events and stories that are relevant to the destiny of the organisation and form a background for the analysis.

The overview has been divided into four main periods: *Emergency*, when NPA first arrives on the ground and works as part of the peacekeeping operations, on behalf of the United Nations; *Nationalising*, where all efforts are made to phase out expatriate staff and establish a nationalised management; *maturation*, where the nationalised NPA Mozambique works with minimal NPA supervision; *phasing out*, in this period it becomes clear that donors will no longer fund the operations, and a gradual downscaling occurs.

The illustration on the following page (adapted from an original created by the GICHD) illustrates the need for different kinds of demining approaches in the various phases occurring in Mozambique as a whole. It also gives a good presentation of some of the main events in the country that affected the development of the organisation.

Figure adapted from original by GICHD




Figure 3: The evolution of Mine Action in Mozambique

3.1 EMERGENCY PHASE – 1993-1995

Preparation, January – June 1993

The Mozambican peace accord was signed in October 1992 and the United Nations moved in with peacekeeping forces to oversee the peace accord and stabilise the country while it prepared for general elections in 1994. NPA, after success with their demining operations in Cambodia, sought new areas of operation and identified Mozambique as a potential. After discussions with the Norwegian embassy in Maputo, initial plans were made and the UN contacted. This resulted in a formal request already in January 1993 for NPA to start operations in Mozambique. (Interview 19; 23)¹¹

The UN Mine Action plans for Mozambique rephrased by NPA in 1993 were to establish:

- A demining school after the Cambodian model, a Mine Clearance Training Unit (MCTU)
- A UN structure for demining operations in Mozambique.
- A National Demining Structure/Mozambican Mine Agency Centre to carry on demining activities when the UN leaves.
- A Prioritized Mine Clearance Plan to ensure
 - clearance routes for food relief
 - routes to assembly and demobilization areas with admin support
 - routes for refugee return from abroad
 - clearance of villages, access roads and rural areas for resettlement

(Nikolaisen, Bjarkøy, & Hoksnes, 1993)

NPA had been on the ground in Mozambique since 1986 with a relief and development programme. The organisation was asked to take on the creation of Emergency Demining Units and as a secondary objective to contribute with instructors to the demining school. The purpose was to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe as the refugees started returning and it was suspected that parts of the return routes were mined. At the same time the capability of the UN to establish demining operations within an acceptable timeframe was doubted by the donors. Based on the

¹¹ The request came from UNOHAC (now UN OCHA), which was then in charge of the Mozambique UN peace keeping operation (UNOMOZ). Frequently history of NPA and Mine Action in Mozambique starts with NPA being requested to come, excluding the NPA initiative.

experience with NPA in Cambodia, it was assumed (even by the UN) that NPA would be a more capable organisation.¹²

An NPA fact-finding mission (consisting of one development expert, one HO representative and one technical person from the Cambodia demining programme) to assess the possibilities and requirements for an NPA operation, was performed in late January and early February 1993.

The NPA mine action operations were to go in as a part of the general UN effort. The funding applications sent to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated that “the project will be implemented in close cooperation with UNOHAC, UNOMOZ and forms part of the other UNDP/UNOPS projects”. (Hoksnes, 1993b, p. 1[my translation]) Financially the cost was to be split between the UN and the MFA. NPA obtained funding from the MFA, (while UN financing was still unsure) and estimated in the first application that the duration of the project would be until the end of 1994. Due to the uncertainty of UN financing, a second application was sent one month later, funds to be returned when or if the UN funding is received. The total budget for the project in 1993 was of NOK 12.823.800.

The plan in brief was to create a seven man force of Norwegian military personnel, building on the experienced staff from the NPA operations in Cambodia.¹³ These would go to Mozambique, train demobilised soldiers. Later they would be supervisors for these, and be joined by three additional Norwegians once operations started. Further plans are not mentioned in the first two applications.

NPA undertook a second fact-finding mission at the end of March. The objectives were to find counterparts in the country and work out agreements and objectives. All operations should be in cooperation and accordance with the UN structures, but there was reluctance to wait for the UN. It became clear that the original objective of using demobilised soldiers from both parties in the conflict would have to be postponed because RENAMO was delaying demobilisation. At this mission NPA was also requested by the UN to start a mine risk education (MRE) programme in neighbouring Malawi¹⁴ where the largest numbers of refugees were located. The aim of this was to prevent casualties when they started returning.

Tete, the capital of Tete province, was after some considerations chosen as the operational base for the demining; mainly because UNOHAC and UNHCR estimated that the

¹² The UN itself was quoted: “To put it with Mr. Patrick Blagden’s [chief coordinator for demining operations in UN, New York] words: ‘Don’t let us down. We (i.e. UN) relay [sic] on you’.” (Nikolaisen et al., 1993)

¹³ Later on personnel was also recruited from Sweden and Britain

¹⁴ Mine Awareness, or lately named Mine Risk Education, consists of activities to inform people of the dangers of mines in order to avoid accidents, often cited as the most cost effective element of Mine Action.

province would be an area of great influx of returning refugees. That the existing NPA office was also located there was more of a coincidence. (Interview 18)

NPA started preparing on the ground directly after the second fact-finding mission. The UN was supposed to provide NPA with most of the logistical items for the operation (such as visas and access of NPA staff to the country), which did not happen.¹⁵ Some of the delays were due to political issues of the peace process, but others appear to have been caused by mere tardiness in the UN system.

Operations start, July – October 1993

The international NPA team was gathered in early June and started preparing for operations which were continuously delayed by UNOHAC. At the end NPA disregarded UNOHAC instructions and reached agreements with FRELIMO and RENAMO. They also got approval from the MFA to start training deminers, even if RENAMO had not yet started demobilisation (which was the crucial point for the UN).

Training finished in mid August and demining started towards the end of the month after heavy pressure by NPA on the UN for a go. Neither RENAMO nor FRELIMO seemed too concerned, but agreed that demining should start. Mine risk education trainings started up in refugee camps in Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia and South Africa around the same time (Interview 18).

In the setup phase there was close cooperation between the existing NPA development programme. However, in some cases the demining team chose other ways to work locally. The cooperation seems to have been mostly on the top level and after a while the new operations set up separate offices due to space constraints. One early expatriate supervisor said in interviews that “I didn’t know there was another NPA in Tete until several months after I had arrived”. (Interview 21)

NPA worked hard to obtain maps of minefields from local military personnel and also performed reconnaissance of their own to define what areas to work in. In some areas they were able to collaborate with or employ former officers to use on reconnaissance missions.

In September and October the NPA demining operations received a lot of media attention which among others lead to a discussion of and change of demining priorities by the UN. This was a result of information given by NPA after reconnaissance work in the border areas found that not only mined roads are an issue but also mined fields. NPA started to plan for

¹⁵ The UN delayed to sign the agreement for several months, it was not signed until 14 June after repeated NPA requests and pressure from the Norwegian MFA. The agreement became crucial for the NPA team to be allowed entry in the country.

an expansion of the project in order to handle the large areas found to be mined. Mines were not laid densely, but over huge areas meant. A larger effort was therefore needed. The plans were to increase to some 300 deminers starting training by late 1993, in order to “cover the immediate need within a two-years period” (Bach, 1993, p. 2).

Some expatriate staff was changed early in the programme, apparently for personal reasons, while some of the local staff was fired or left of free will.

Planning for the future and expanding, November 1993 – January 1994

In November 1993 NPA sent a funding application to the MFA for the period 1994-1995 applying for NOK 31.216.000 and a considerable expansion of the programme. This was the first time (found in the archives) that NPA in writing put forward a longer timeframe for its demining project and formulated an NPA “concept” of demining:

[...] the *NPA concept of demining* is based on the need for immediate clearance of mined areas related to the repatriation and resettlement of refugees. However, countries like Cambodia and Mozambique will have to struggle with the mine problem for many years to come. Another principle objective in the NPA mine clearance concept is therefore the *transfer of expertise to local personnel and to establish a structure enabling them to cope with the mine problem in the long run*. In Mozambique the *first phase* of the project is the training of local deminers and the subsequent demining under expatriate supervision. The *second phase* of the project is the training of local supervisors and the demining under local supervision combined with expatriate monitoring of the demining activities in the field. The *third phase* of the project is the transfer of administrative functions to the local structure. The NPA mine clearance project therefore has the character of both responding to an emergency situation and dealing with the mine problem in the long run. To reach the objectives the *expatriate involvement of the mine clearance project needs a time frame of about 2-3 years*.

(Hoksnes & Hansen, 1993, p. 1[my emphasis])¹⁶

This formulation was repeated in what seems to be the first NPA policy paper on demining: “The Norwegian People’s Aid involvement in mine clearance” where the NPA also offers its assistance in demining services to “...any area of the world within our capacity” (Hoksnes, 1993a, p. 5). The approved expansion in Mozambique stipulated an increase to 21 expatriates and 270 local deminers. Also this time the UN was supposed to pay a share of the cost. But the support of the Norwegian MFA was still required in order to advance the necessary funds.

¹⁶ The true objectives here and what was written and what was meant within NPA greatly varies among the informants. Håvard Bach means that the intention was never to create a local organisation without NPA control. Halle Jørn Hansen says that creating local organisations was important. Eva Håland says that creating an organisation was against the principles of NPA and might have been thought about by the MA guys but never seriously considered by NPA as a whole. Håvard Hoksnes, who most likely wrote the document, does not feel that he took part in NPA discussions about building a local capacity (Interview 11; 12; 18; 19). See p. 50 and “Norwegian People’s Aid” for a discussion of the varying NPA goals.

As a result of the expansion plans, the team was reorganised and also started to use some of the local staff for more senior positions. NPA started recruiting and training the new deminers already in November. The addition of another batch of new recruits was reported to lead to “repeated changes of organisation and missions” (Bach, 1994, p. 1 [My translation]) but all the same demining proceeded well. Originally the UN was supposed to be training these new recruits but delays again occurred. In January, NPA started discussing with the UN how they could educate local supervisors, in order to reduce the amount of expatriates.

On the ground they spent a lot of time clearing areas that appeared to have been demined already, this led to NPA questioning the priorities set by UNHCR and they suggested some changes. Particularly since road clearance, which had top priority by UNHCR, had often been done on roads with few or no mines which caused lowered deminer morale. In this period the first serious mine accident occurred and one local deminer lost his life.

In Mozambique the two parties to the conflict finally approved *A mine clearance plan for Mozambique* which had been proposed earlier in the year by the UN. Among the needs identified was a survey to identify the extent of the problem. The survey was performed by HALO Trust at the beginning of 1994, but covered only parts of the country.

In December and January discussions started with regards to the possibility of an NPA expansion to Angola and also the employment of a demining expert at the NPA office in Oslo.

Consolidating the new force, February – March 1994

The training of new deminers continued all through February and March, finally bringing the force up to the planned six platoons or close to 300 (of which eight were women)¹⁷. In meetings with UNOHAC and UNHCR it was estimated that the NPA programme “would at least be implemented up till the end of 1995”. The UN had some concerns about the future of the personnel trained by NPA and desired that they should “be absorbed into local structures when such structures are in place”. They estimated that this would be in place from 1996. Whether NPA should be assisting in the creation and management of the operational part was for the first time discussed and NPA agreed to formulate a proposal. NPA also agreed to organise mobile demining units to be available in other areas than the Tete and Sofala provinces. (Nikolaisen, 1994a, p. 2)

In February a routine of monthly mine action coordination meetings was established, gathering the UN and other main actors such as NPA, HALO Trust and Ronco. Still NPA received tasks from the UNHCR to open up roads where they found few or no mines at all.

¹⁷ This might have been the first time in the world that female deminers were enrolled in UN operations.

Plans were made to ensure that all deminers at regular intervals cleared areas where they actually found mines or have refresher trainings in order to maintain good routines.

Work with the UN to establish training of supervisors was also undertaken. NPA was reluctant to speeding up the promotion of existing personnel to educate supervisors. They needed more experience to become supervisors and removing experienced, well qualified personnel was seen to weaken the existing structure. NPA hoped for additional trained personnel from the UN demining school. In the end the establishment of the UN Mine Clearance Training Center (MCTC) in Beira was delayed and supervisor training estimated to start in October/November, something NPA saw as too late. So, for the first time, NPA established local staff as supervisors in two of the demining groups. Another concern aired by NPA about the MCTC was that UNOHAC had no clear plans for employment of the deminers trained.¹⁸

From March the NPA programme started reporting to a new technical expert in Oslo.¹⁹ Some expatriates ended their contract and some moved over to the mine awareness programme. Funding for the NPA operations remained an issue; within the UN there were constant discussions over whether UNOHAC or UNHCR should be funding the “local component” of the programme.

Taking a lead role or not? April – July

In April NPA handed in its proposal to UNOHAC for a *Feasibility study on Mozambican take-over of demining operations after international NGOs and commercial companies have withdrawn*. The document estimated that the international presence “may withdraw within a year or two”; the importance of putting Mozambique in a position to take charge was seen as essential. The total time for Mozambique to solve its mine problem was calculated to 7-10 years; NPA was asked by the UN “to identify [...], or if necessary to establish [an autonomous] Mozambican entity that may take over the responsibility of demining operations [...] to be established by the end of 1994, and hopefully be operational locally at the end of 1995” (Nikolaisen, 1994c, p. 1). The focus in the Terms of Reference was on studying existing structures to see how the planned structure could fit in, both through identification of priorities and the needs on different government levels. It also referred to possible logistical conditions for such a structure, once the international presence had left and the current logistics would “fall apart” (p. 3). Local UN personnel, as well as donors in Mozambique, were positive to the idea. But in June it became clear that there was scepticism

¹⁸ The UN had a plan and funds to train some 1200 deminers but no funds or plans for how they would be employed afterwards. The training plan was later reduced to 450 deminers. (Interview 18)

¹⁹ A person originally intended for the programme in Angola was chosen for this position. (Interview 17)

to the idea at the UN headquarters in New York. In the end, the feasibility study was not performed due to lack of funding (Interview 18).

At the NPA Head Office there was debate over the division between the Operations Section and the rest of the organisation. The head of International Department considered that the Operations Section distanced itself too much, both physically and mentally, from the “mother organisation”. (Interview 19)

In the field, operations progressed well and transfer of leadership to local staff was prioritised. However, the old issue of clearing areas with few or no mines continued. Also, due to fewer inputs on demining priorities from the UN, NPA increased surveying and planned to define priorities on its own and report them to the UN. NPA convinced the UN to move its training centre from Beira to Tete, taking advantage of NPA’s already established training facilities. Albeit some delays this was completed in July.

3-4 of the expatriate staff ended contracts and were changed. Among the new arrivals was a new deputy programme manager as the former left for the new Angola demining programme in September, the programme manager was to follow in 1995.

Turned down by the UN, August – December

In August a UN representative arrived in Mozambique with the mandate to create a national Mine Action Center - MOZMAC. Neither UNOHAC in Maputo nor NPA appeared to have received information about this in advance. NPA still contributed serious resources to the planned MOZMAC and assisted the UN in several ways. However it was still uncertain what role NPA would have. In general NPA found it hard to plan and coordinate with the UN. Particularly as the plan finally proposed by the UN in September greatly differed from what had been discussed. The change also created strong reactions from the donors in the country. They actually refused to fund the UN initiative.

The UN operations started gradually to dissolve as the UNOHAC mandate was supposed to terminate at the end of the year. It was not yet clear if UNDP or another UN entity would take over responsibility for UN Mine Action in the country. This had consequences for NPA in terms of both logistics and uncertainty about future funding of the operations.

In October NPA HO received a formal request from the UN to submit a proposal *For the provision of Management Infrastructure for the Mozambique Demining Program*. Formally NPA declined to hand one in, due to a five day deadline from the day the request was received. In interviews NPA actors have indicated that this was also because the UN had changed the original terms too much. By November it was clear that the UN no longer intended to use NPA as the

implementing partner. They decided to take care of the creation of the national demining entity themselves (Nikolaisen, 1994b). A national demining commission was established, but did not become operational until much later and was then considered non-functional by most parties. UNDP, which was in charge of establishing the new entity, made plans to establish a new demining organisation called ADP (Accelerated Demining Programme) in the south of Mozambique. Due to donor discontent and distrust with the UN, the central organisation received a much weaker mandate than the corresponding structure in Cambodia. NPA considered whether its efforts should be continued as a standalone operation or be merged with the UN effort. Even if NPA saw it as beneficial to have a joint mine action effort, the national structure did not seem strong enough yet.

The perspective, with two alternatives in Mozambique, was formulated as part of a travel report by a NPA HO staff member in December:

- A. The NPA project will by the end of 1995 become integrated with the UN monitored unit whereas NPA will basically pull out.
- B. The NPA project will not become integrated under the same management whereas NPA will have to continue monitoring the project for a while with the perspective of establishing a separate Mozambiquan [sic] demining organisation in Northern Mozambique

(Smedsrud, 1994, p. 3)

Fortunately in this period the UN managed to get its training centre running, and from November NPA took part in the training of local supervisors. Participation ensured NPA quality control in the training but it also meant that NPA temporarily had to do without several expatriate staff in its own programme.

A policy document by NPA from November 1994 stated under NPA Mine Programme Concept: “**Competence Transfer:** ... The aim is to enable the cooperation partner to run its own programme, with the assistance of *at most one or two expatriate technical advisers after a period of two or three years* [my emphasis]”. In the same document it was also emphasised that “[NPA focuses on] assistance solidarity rather than charity” and that NPA envisioned participation in demining in several locations around the world (p. 2). However it was made clear that for NPA to manage this and “develop a comprehensive approach”, the Operations Section needed to be expanded and improved with regards to finances and human resources (p. 5). It was even hinted at NPA moving into Victim Assistance, stating that as part of a comprehensive approach “the introduction of the WHO community based rehabilitation of the handicapped will be a natural component” (p. 5). (Madsen, 1994)

NPA started its Mine Detection Dog (MDD) programme in Mozambique at the end of the year, but experienced great difficulties in identifying local personnel suitable for training as dog handlers. This was the first case of NPA using dogs in a Mine Action programme and was part of NPA's evaluation programme of new methods in demining, funded by the MFA. Later on dogs became one of the three main tools in NPA's Mine Action toolbox together with manual and mechanical demining.

During 1994 \$10.000 got lost from the NPA safe and at the beginning of 1995 one expatriate had to leave due to financial irregularities²⁰.

3.2 NATIONALISING – 1995-1999

1995

In the 1995 project document sent to the MFA, NPA put a clear focus on the establishment of an “indigenous demining capacity”, with “competence transfer on all levels” and saying that “NPA will employ Mozambicans in all HQ positions, deploy local supervisors in all platoons and train Mozambicans as paramedics” (Bach, 1995, p. 2). The project document estimated that by the end of 1995, the field operations should be able to function without any expatriates directly involved (seven were estimated necessary for various monitoring). The whole operation was built on the supposition that once a national mine clearance organisation was established, the NPA organisation would be included in this. It was discussed how NPA demining could best be linked with the government structure. But since there was not yet a clear entity to relate to, the plan was to work with provincial authorities and the UN to set priorities.

United Nations, a difficult stakeholder

In a progress report sent to the MFA the same day as the project document, NPA stated clearly that the continuity and communication in the UN demining organisation had not been optimal (Henriksen, 1995). Frequent staff changes and donor discontent made the UN a difficult organisation to make plans with. Uncertainty about the promised UN contribution to NPA operations, which lead to search for funds from other donors, formed part of the discontent.

Furthermore, in 1995 UNOHAC/UNOMOZ left the country, UNDP was not able to establish a new structure for a long while. This meant for example that NPA now had to build a new system for medical emergency evacuation and set its priorities for demining even more on their own. Albeit difficulties with the UN collaboration, NPA worked to keep up a good

²⁰ The two cases were not related.

relationship with the UNDP and provide advice on the future organisation of a MOZMAC or UNDP supported Mine Action organisation.

Identifying priority areas came up as a discussion again, as NPA kept clearing areas with few mines. In addition some resulted in not being used once demining had finished. NPA decided to clear areas around the Cahora Bassa dam which in many ways was a commercial project, but which gave the deminers valuable experience and training since it was a high density minefield.

NPA

On a general programme level the discussion started in March about the merger of the two NPA offices (development and mine action) in Tete, at the end of September this merger was completed. The idea was to reduce costs and be more coordinated between the demining and development programmes.²¹ However, that the resident representative left in April 1995 and a new one was not employed until much later (June 1996), caused much friction between the two programmes in the transition phase (Havik, 1995). Even external visitors noted the frustrations in the programme over to organisational problems (Broberg, 1995).

The deputy programme manager took over the monthly reporting, as the former programme manager left for Angola in March to help setup the programme there. A new programme manager was employed without the knowledge of and counter to discussions with the field staff with regards to qualifications. HO decisions overrode field preferences and the new programme manager stayed for a full year. (Interview 9; 14; 18)

In the field training of the new local supervisors and work to give them the confidence as true supervisors continued. For various disciplinary reasons several were fired. Troubles were noted with conveying “moral values” and “sense of duty” to the newly established leaders. The year also started with two demining accidents, included one death. Various other local staff also left or were fired from the programme making it necessary to recruit and train new personnel to maintain the force. The need to continuously re-educate and renew the staff was stated in the monthly reports.

Donors

Due to the need for long term planning and financing, NPA changed from being funded by the MFA humanitarian section and to the NORAD country programme for Mozambique. The commercial contractor RONCO pulled out of the country and after long negotiations

²¹ Whether the merger was solely an initiative of the staff in Mozambique, or an initiative from HO is disputed among the involved informants (Interview 10; 19).

(including USAID since they had originally funded RONCO) NPA took over the material, personnel and dogs left behind. Funding for this additional component was planned to come from USAID, NORAD and the Netherlands. Additional funding for NPA activity this year was received from AUSTCARE and the Swedish government.

In the funding proposal for the following two years, NPA laid out its plans to assist Mozambique in handling a problem that will last for “decades to come” (Holmegaard, 1995, p. 3). The objective became to “establish a national capacity to continue mine clearance for as long as the need exists in Mozambique”. To achieve this they aimed “to establish either a regionally-based or several provincially-based non-governmental entities” capable of handling the task.

Strategies

Internationally NPA stated in a position paper how “landmine clearance must be incorporated in the long-term plans for rehabilitation and development, and cannot be solved through immediate short-term assistance” – and that “we therefore emphasise the transfer of competence and contribute to establish national organisations and institutions which are suitable to manage and implement the landmine clearance on their own and as soon as the necessary competence and adequate resources are present” (Bjørsvik, 1995?, p. 6).

NPA put out a strategy of building competence for the countries to take responsibility for their own problem. Because they could not expect that the international society would continue to finance and run the demining activities. To facilitate this gradual training of its own staff, cooperation with and inclusion of local authorities at an early stage was seen as important. Integration of demining with development projects was also raised and put forward as an item for future demining projects. (Bjørsvik, 1995?, p. 6)

This year NPA also started considering mechanical mine-clearance as an option in its programmes. However, the position paper noted the danger of too much technology leading to further “dependency on international aid”. On a more theoretical level NPA stated that victim assistance also was important, indicating it could be an area to enter into and consider where NPA already operated. Finally, NPA also declared its new cooperation with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines.²² (Bjørsvik, 1995?)

1996

January 1996 started with the withdrawal of all expatriate staff from the field, leaving the responsibility to the Mozambican supervisors. The expatriate advisors were formed into two

²² ICBL is a global network launched in 1992 by NGOs working with landmine victims and demining to, among others; promote a global ban on landmines.

monitoring teams. They visited the field every second week with the purpose to “advise, carry out quality assurance and assist the Mozambicans in management issues” (Hansen & Øygaard, 1996, p. 3). Albeit extreme weather conditions and serious breakdowns of the material during the first three months, the system did not collapse. During the year the monitoring team was also partly nationalised. NPA cleared 25% more landmines than the previous year while no mine accidents occurred.

In January English replaced Norwegian as language for written communication between HO and the programme and some reports were also translated into Portuguese. The monthly reports on field operations were from now on only in Portuguese to facilitate their writing and reading by local staff.

A new component was added this year, the Survey Demolition and Reconnaissance (SDR) Teams. Delayed due to problems with Mozambican customs, these became operational in May. They mainly responded to requests from local communities to clear smaller areas. They also became a facilitating team to establish contact with Provincial and District authorities in advance of the regular demining teams.

NPA Mozambique sent some of its dog handlers with dogs to Angola and Bosnia e Herzegovina in order to help in the peace keeping operations there; other dogs with handlers were lent to the ADP demining operations in the south.

Strategies

In the new formal reporting format adopted when the new resident representative arrived, the synthesised project objectives were listed as follows:

1. Develop a human, organisational and operational capacity to sustain mine clearance during 1996 and 1997
2. Address humanitarian mine clearance needs.
3. Establish a close and efficient co-operation with Mozambican authorities on all levels in order to encourage local participation in fighting the landmine problem.

(Hansen et al., 1996)

This was similar to the objectives stated in the Plan of Operation 1997 and the annual report issued in December. There the focus on training of Mozambican staff and in particular management positions was clear; as well as that NPA would work within the central provinces of the country (this is added to item one above).

UN

Finally there was also a formal agreement between NPA and the National Mine Clearance Commission (CND/NMCC). With some expectations from NPA that this entity might now start working and fill in the vacuum after UNOMOZ left in February 1995. Still, the *deployment plan* was based on discussions with provincial rather than national authorities. In one of the three provinces where NPA worked, the province authorities appointed a demining responsible who met regularly with NPA, in another the governor declared mines not a problem and lets NPA define its own priorities. (Suhrke et al., 1997, p. 81)

Donors

From August the Danish development agency, DANIDA came in as a donor to cover shortfalls in the 1996 budget. In the project document it was stated that an aim for the project was “building up a national institutional and manpower capacity to continue operations [in the central provinces] once the NPA project ends” and NPA was to work towards this by decreasing the number of expatriate staff “from the original 25 to expected 5 in 1998”. “It is foreseen that NPA support on a limited scale will be needed for a consolidation period for a few more years” after 1997 (DANIDA, 1996, pp. 1-2).

The document also stated what had become an established truth and formalised in agreements with the IND, that since the attempts at establishing national capacities were not yet successful, the country was for now divided in three with regards to demining, HALO Trust in the north, NPA the centre and UNs ADP the south.²³

1997

The programme objectives from 1996 remained, while caution was taken to prevent problems as in 1996 with regards to heavy rain. Several seminars and planning sessions were held to develop a long term country strategy for the period 1998-2002. Among the suggestions was a phase-out of the demining programme by the end of that period. Before that the demining part was to be more integrated with the rest of the programme, in what was denominated *A new human demining approach*. (Dupont & Ahmed, 1997)

This year focus was also put on measurement of social impact on the communities NPA worked in. One way was through courses for local supervisors to identify the local needs. And they established routines to involve Traditional Chiefs in ceremonies before demining was started. Involving the locals in this way “contributed a lot to good co-operation regarding

²³ It should be noted that this was one of the few contracts written by NPA donors found in the archives that clearly stated the objectives and not just referred to submitted documents by NPA.

information about minefields” (Muzima, 1997). One of the former SDR teams was reorganised to become a *mobile demining unit* in order to easily respond to incoming demining requests and perform surveys. In the *Integrated Demining Programme Mozambique, 1998-1997* the plans were stated and the key targets for NPA demining would be “the most vulnerable groups”. The Objectives were reformulated:

Long Term Development Objective:

Sustainable improvement of the socio-economic, political/democratic living conditions and reduced human suffering from land mine accidents of the targeted population in Manica, Sofala and Tete provinces [the central provinces].

Immediate Objective

- Maintain a human, organisational capacity, at the present operational level of approximately 560 persons, to sustain humanitarian mine clearance needs in Manica, Sofala and Tete Provinces.
- Further develop and maintain close co-operation with Mozambican authorities at all levels to encourage maximum local participation in fighting the existing landmine problem, in an environmental conscious manner.

(Øygaard & Muzima, 1997)

The Integrated Demining Programme was to be evaluated in 1999. It was discussed whether to establish smaller decentralised units, in order to operate “directly under and according to” the provincial authorities. The splitting up of the demining platoons had already started and no new deminers were recruited. However problems were encountered and the need for “strong leaders with good managerial skills” was highlighted.

Work with the Provincial Co-ordinators for mine action was done to define priorities and define deployment plans. Mostly NPA found its own priorities and then discussed these with the various parties and made an issue out of receiving approval from the provincial authorities before starting operations.

Capacity building

The NPA programme in general emphasised capacity building in 1997, establishing training schemes on various levels of management. Among those were courses for some of the superior management to become trainers themselves. It was noted that the remoteness of Tete, meant that few training options were available. More remote options for education and study visits were implemented. The most remote was an exchange visit to the Mine Dog Centre in Afghanistan.

The work to establish the programme with a national management by the end of the year proceeded rapidly. Inclusion of local staff in international strategy meetings was also made a

point of, seeing that “the process of being exposed to the International arena, donor representatives and reporters is considered important training aspects”(Muzima, 1997, p. 4). The programme was however not without expatriates in this period. The expatriate coordinator for the dog programme was acting deputy programme manager for the duration that the local deputy programme manager served as Acting programme manager.

In December the national programme manager assumed the position after an official ceremony and the Mozambique demining programme became the first Nationalized NPA programme. The resident representative (RR) remained an expatriate together with three expatriate advisors. Also, as mentioned by the RR when discussing the job description for the programme manager: “direct administration and safekeeping of remaining expatriates personnel files will be handled by myself in the future” (Hansen, 1997a).

Unfortunately one local supervisor died in a mine accident in May, 18 months after the last accident. Of other concerns the resident representative on October 22 complained about the lack of “attention and support from HQ”. Several issues were raised for the Mine Strategy Meeting which was held at the end of that month. (Hansen, 1997b)

UN

In 1997 the UN Department of Humanitarian affairs publishes its much cited report on *The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities*, where Mozambique was one of the case studies. The report listed the politicisation of the process, the persistent desire of the UN for a Cambodian style solution albeit donor opposition and the lack of government ownership, as key reasons for the failure to develop indigenous capacities. In the study report a key finding was the need to redefine the priorities as “activities were not always focused on helping those who were most in need”. (Eaton et al., 1997a; Eaton, Horwood, & Niland, 1997b)

Integrated Demining Programme – 1998-1999

1998 meant the launch of the NPA Integrated Demining Programme which had a timeframe until end 1999. The concept included small scale development activities to be performed together with demining to make the side effects of having a large demining team present more positive. Activities could be community education, rehabilitation of infrastructure, construction of improved traditional latrines and drilling of wells. Much focus was put on the engagement of the local communities in both the demining and the development activities. Handover ceremonies were conducted where local administrators signed on to the job having been done once a task was completed.

All positions were nationalised within the demining programme itself; however the following expatriate staffs remained in 1999: Resident representative, administrative coordinator, logistic coordinator, chief technical advisor (CTA), medical advisor (remained only parts of the year) and MDD instructor.

Re-structuring

Re-training and new training of supervisors was performed, and new medical personnel is recruited and educated, however no new deminers were recruited. The kennel master was trained to become a para-vet, decreasing the dependence on an external veterinarian. Computer trainings were given to some of the field staff to increase their general competence. National management on all levels participated in trainings and seminars both in- and outside the country.

Work to reduce the size of the demining units was continued in order to make them more flexible, this was also a recommendation made in the donor report from March 1999 (Thue, Jarnehed, Andersen, & Hauglin, 1999). One of the fixed demining groups was reduced in size and converted into a mobile team. However, the previously noted concerns about the demand for stronger leadership to be able to operate with several smaller units, lead to the transition going slowly. In October 1998 discussions came up about the establishment of a mechanical demining component within the programme. This was strongly advised against by the HO, but brought up again in the donor report from 1999 (Interview 14).

Some Mine Detection Dogs were retired, reducing the overall capacity of the programme. At the beginning of 1999 only 13 of an original 33 MDD remained. Towards the end of the year it became evident that the programme was also heavily lacking human competence in this area, and it was decided to increase the expatriate presence to have three dog instructors. Discussions were also held with regards to how to supplement the programme with new dogs. The global market at this time was swamped for suitable dogs.

Internal disagreement

A serious difference in opinions occurred between the head office and the resident representative. He did not feel that the adequate follow up was given and that he was overrun. There were also discussions over the reporting chain and power distribution between the RR and the HO. Resulting in that the RR did not want the programme manager to communicate directly with the Mine Action desk in Oslo. It also became an issue when the need for renewed expatriate presence with the MDD component was seen at the end of 1999. Whether this should be purely technical expertise or if a more management trained advisor should be employed. The HO stated intention of contributing to competence transfer, was felt as overriding by the RR. Differences

were evident over whether to acquire *raw* dogs and train them in the country, or to wait for fully trained dogs.²⁴ Internationally NPA was trying to reach the same MDD standards in all programmes and as such the Mozambican decision to train their own dogs was not appreciated.

Donors

In the first quarter of 1999 a review of the programme, required by the donors (now being Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Norway), was performed by Agenda Utredning. In the Terms of Reference the objective for the study was listed as “to analyse the results achieved of the demining undertaken ... to provide basis for a decision regarding continuation, change or termination of the programme”. It would, among others, consider results with regards to

... the capacity building and its sustainability, including whether the administrative routines of the programme have been developed in such a way that a later transfer of the programme to a local entity would be possible [and also] assess the administrative set-up of the programme with special reference to Mozambican administrative rules and regulations.

(MFA, 1998)

The report concluded that the NPA operations should continue, with some modifications to the “organisation and structure”, for “four to six years within the present NPA framework, and then be phased out”. It also made it clear that creation of an independent entity was “considered to be neither a correct nor a realistic option”. Notes were made about the lack of support from NPA HO, NPA’s vulnerability with regards to loss of skilled labour, the need to downsize the structure to fit the tasks, the need to reconsider the community services component and the need for more “sophisticated criteria for priority setting”. (Thue et al., 1999, pp. 7-10)

The donors agreed to most conclusions and e.g. the development or community services component was no longer to be funded by Norway (Munkeby, 1999). NPA agreed to and followed up on many of the recommendations, however did not fully agree about removing the community services component which was seen as a way to establish closer ties to the communities where operations took place (Essén, 1999).

Probably as a result of the report findings, the donors at the end of the year jointly stated a concern over the 2000-2001 proposal having a too high Project Related Follow Up component. The PRFU was intended to make all NPA project proposals include funding to finance support positions at the HO. NPA HO and the Mozambique programme differed in

²⁴ *Raw* in this sense meaning a dog seen as suited for demining and trained in basic obedience but having no training in detecting mines or other explosives.

opinion as to how relevant this was, or maybe rather if the money received for this had been put to use.

Local authorities

In 1999 several important events happened on the national level: For one, the government replaced the CND (National demining commission) with the IND (National demining institute) subordinating the demining issue to only one (the MFA) instead of seven ministries. Second, the Canadian International Development Agency commissioned a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) to assess the situation throughout the country.²⁵

3.3 MATURATION OF THE NATIONALISED NPA – 2000-2003

2000-2001

In the plans for 2000 – 2001 continuation of existing efforts was planned. The name of the programme was changed from *Integrated Demining* to *Mine Action* Programme and focus was put on the already started re-structuring into smaller flexible demining units. The plan also had a more detailed listing of gender and ecological approaches to include in the programme. In the field the result was an overstretched monitoring team that suddenly had to cover 9 field units in three provinces which lead to less frequent follow-up. (Muzima & Hansen, 1999) In an attempt to counter this, a second monitoring team was established in 2000. From now the “integrated demining” part became the Community Services Unit. The priorities for demining were still set on a provincial level, and hopes that the IND would become a central entity to define priorities were not met.

Reporting on 1999 it was stated that: “Norwegian People’s Aid has developed the routines in such a way that transfer of programme to local authorities is possible in close future”. And that: “Local authorities are actively involved in the programme” through assessment, implementation and post demining activities. It was also noted that the population in the areas where NPA worked more and more saw their own role in the demining. No longer (as they could frequently be previously) expecting rewards for providing information on mined areas. (Muzima & Tomren, 2000, pp. 1-3,5)

Furthermore, with regards to community involvement and impact assessment, a study was performed by the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) on the *socio-economic impact of Mine Action*. (Millard et al., 2000) Among others the researcher spent time together with the NPA

²⁵ This work was finalized in 2001 and in the end disapproved by most actors.

Mine Action Programme. When reporting on the country in general the report stated that “The lack of coordination between HMA and other reconstruction agencies is, for the most part, paralleled with very little coordination between different components of HMA”. It also emphasized the fact that the particularities of the problem in Mozambique required a “variegated response” with “small-scale, flexible units that can take on random mine occurrences”. While the need had been there from the beginning, the report said, few efforts had been made to create such capacities. (Millard et al., 2000, p. xiii) As a result of the report, plans were made for PRIO to provide training on socio-economic impact assessment and to incorporate this as a general feature of the NPA Mozambique programme.

The MDD programme continued to suffer throughout 2000; hoping for improvements in 2001. In particular it was hoped that collaboration with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining would improve conditions, as GICHD set up a MDD testing and training site together with NPA.²⁶ MDD were seen as a crucial component in the NPA *toolbox*, the manual demining was seen to be much more effective when strengthened by a MDD component. Reasons for the problems were quoted as “the dog trainers have limited experience in training mine detection dogs within the region” and that the field was new. At the end of 2000 the programme stated to have “created perhaps the best training and testing grounds in the world” (Muzima & Labra, 2001a, p. 5). Unfortunately the right dogs to train were not available; the expectations to have 30 operational dogs at the end of 2001 were reduced to 15 in the plan for 2002.

Evaluations for setting up a sup-office in Chimoio in the Manica province were done in 2000 and the office established in 2001. One of the aims was to improve co-operation with the IND and also to have an office closer to many of the field operations. 72 new deminers were recruited and trained to replace lost personnel in 2000.

In April 2000 NPA’s Danish resident representative passed away in a traffic accident in Zimbabwe. He was replaced by a new female RR from Latin America. Two demining accidents occurred in 2001, resulting in one dead and eight injured local staff as well as four dead MDD. In November the deputy programme manager drowned in the Zambezi River.

In August 2001 the Mozambique Landmine Impact Survey was completed. Although strongly criticized for its lack of quality (as many areas were declared “mined” that were not and vice-versa) the general idea of the survey was agreed upon: The landmine problem in Mozambique should be manageable by 2006. No need was seen for the large-scale operations of NPA, HALO Trust and ADP after that.

²⁶ It bears to mention that the GICHD representative is identical to the first Programme Manager.

2002

The original plan for 2002-2004 aimed to sustain the efforts. This was changed after the Mozambique Landmine Impact Survey finished. Two donor reports, for DANIDA in 2002 and NORAD in 2003 (mentioned later) concluded that since the problem was not as big any longer, operations should close down by 2006.

An important feature for the year was the introduction of a “socio-economic impact assessment concept into the ongoing operations” (Muzima & Labra, 2001b, p. 8) – “NPA Mozambique will not undertake any mine clearance in a given area/road without first assessing the social and economic impact aspects” (p. 13). NPA also laid out a plan to re-visit all areas already cleared by NPA to do technical, social and economic data collection. The Socio-Economic Impact Assessment later on changed into the general NPA Task Impact Assessment (TIA) approach which was developed simultaneously in the Angola programme and adopted by NPA in Oslo as a goal for all the programmes.

Competence building was still an issue, literacy and other primary courses were introduced for field staff; successful students were brought on to the next level. Through cooperation with education authorities some of the capable NPA field staff also performed literacy training in the areas where NPA operated. (Muzima, 2003b)

The last fixed technical expatriate positions that had been kept were planned phased out by the end of 2002. It remained an option to get this expertise in through consultancies as needed (which became necessary for the dog programme). The positions of resident representative, Administrative Manager and Logistic Coordinator remained as expatriate positions.

Donors

In February 2002 a review mission on behalf of DANIDA was performed; as part of this an assessment of a suggested new mechanical component in the programme was done. This related to the acquisition of Casspir mine safe vehicles following a proposal submitted by NPA.

The same report discussed the difficulties faced by NPA due to the spread of HIV/AIDS. A sizable percentage of the staff and work capacity is lost due to this, either because of chronic illness or death. In addition established funds for staff illness treatment and funerals are being depleted. (DEMEX, 2002)

Finally, under recommendations for continued support by DANIDA, the report stated that NPA should develop an exit strategy “with the aim to hand over HMA capacity to national

responsibility and operators”. And that they effectuate their intended reorganisation “into smaller and more flexible operating teams”. (pp. 33-34)

Local authorities

The IND branch office in Beira started operating and again expectations to a central coordination of demining priorities rose (Muzima et al., 2001b). The IND also published the first National Mine Action Plan 2002 – 2006 (NMAP), with a “development oriented approach that seeks to maximise the socio-economic impact and benefit of HMA” (Scanteam, 2003, p. 7). Supposedly through this plan the IND should have been giving priorities and providing for more effective targeting of Mine Action. In the NMAP it was estimated that the suspected mine areas identified in the Landmine Impact Survey could be reduced significantly. (ibid)

2003

In February 2003 a NORAD review performed by Scanteam, similarly emphasised that phase-out was natural by 2006. Before that the performance of and tools for good surveys would be crucial. This would enable the cancellation of areas that did not actually contain mines and clearance of the ones with the highest impact. The report estimated a reduction of manpower by 100 men per year and did not discuss any transfer of assets to a local entity or organisation as an end of the phase-out. It was a concern in the report that clearance of mines should happen where it had the greatest socio-economic impact. Pointing out that “only NPA is currently carrying out work to develop methods to include socio-economic impacts in the prioritisation” (Scanteam, 2003, p. 8). This should be coordinated with the IND to avoid duplication of efforts. As part of the recommendations the report encouraged the donors to monitor the priority setting process more closely and states that “the review team believes that lack of clear priorities have had a negative impact on the results of NPA over the last nine years” (Scanteam, 2003, p. 22)

As a result of the Scanteam report NPA started discussing how to perform a phase-out of the programme and whether to leave something behind. One of the alternatives discussed was a small ‘fire brigade’-like organisation, either with a small capacity of some 50 manual deminers or a larger capacity including mine detection dogs. An Exit Strategy 2003-2007 was formulated in late 2003, planning for the termination of operations by late 2006. The listed reasons for pulling out or having reached the *end status* were:

- a. the scope of the problem had been significantly reduced;
- b. demining was no longer a national priority, and;
- c. NPA’s attention was required elsewhere

Under “identificaiton of possible further training areas and jobs...” some intentions for a future organisation were stated: “The possibility of starting the [sic] Community based Demining, and using some of the leaders as trainers, is currently being considered and will be tested out as part of a pilot study” (NPA, 2003a, p. 7). The task of phasing-out was given to the programme manager. However, at the end it was considered whether international staff should be employed to monitor the implementation of the exit plan. This in order to relieve already highly taxed senior management in the programme.²⁷ (NPA, 2003a)

As a result of decreased funding the community services project (what was previously making the programme *integrated demining*) was closed down in July 2003. A proposal for a new project was requested by UNDP, a *community based demining project*. NPA planned to run a pilot for this in February 2004, but did not obtain funding in the end.

Structural problems?

From July to October 2003 a British Technical Advisor was with the programme, to do an evaluation of the mechanical demining component. In a confidential memo to the HO he reported the whole programme to have serious lacks in security, efficiency, administration, training, planning, equipment and most importantly chain of command. The final recommendation was that management of both the operations and the phase-out should be handled by an expatriate staff member with a clear mandate from Oslo. (Williams, 2003)

A mission performed shortly after by key NPA Oslo MAU staff drew similar (though not so negative) conclusions. In particular it identified problems with logistics and follow up of the field operations by senior management and advisors. The report from the mission stated that “the ‘exit phase’ requires different skills than establishing and consolidating a programme”. Especially with regards to the expected pressure from employees and others an international programme manager was seen as important. (Bjørsvik, Haug, & Steen-Nilsen, 2003, p. 8)

Struggles in the programme

At the start of 2003 the programme experienced delays in operations due to issues with the customs. Required equipment could not be brought in under the tax-free conditions promised by the government. Eventually the delay in bringing them in caused additional costs of about \$30,000. The machines brought in also meant new trainings were performed and a new part of the organisation created. Unfortunately one of the machines came out of use after

²⁷ The local Programme Manager had already in 2002 voiced desires to leave the programme (Interview 15).

damage from an anti-tank mine detonation. Slow repairs and delayed acquisition of new parts meant that the new resource was out of use for a long time.²⁸ In addition the repairs caused large non-budgeted expenses. (Muzima, 2003a)

The dog section continued to suffer and had only 7 operational dogs. NPA Mozambique worked hard to obtain and train new dogs. During the visit from the NPA HO mission in November it was noted that the dogs observed in the field were not working in the prescribed NPA manner. Efforts to bring the dog section up to a relevant standard also caused over-expenditures. Because expatriate personnel had to be brought in and new physical facilities constructed.

On overall, NPA suffered from a large number of staff being on long-term sick leave or struggling to do their job. In addition, during 2003 20 NPA employees died. While it was not confirmed for all the cases, it was assumed that a large share of the illness and death was due to HIV/AIDS. (Nielsen & Jarnehed, 2004)

3.4 PHASING OUT – 2004-2006

2004

From 2004 a new resident representative was in place together with an expatriate Operations Officer (in the summer an expatriate programme manager arrived too) to oversee the phase-out and improve the field operations for the remaining time.²⁹ A key task for the Operations Officer was to improve the delegation of authority and responsibility. He stayed for the year when the position was left vacant as part of the general programme phase out (Interview 14).

As part of the downscaling and following up on the recommendations given by donors, the organisation went from its 15 demining teams in 2003 to only six at the beginning of this year. This was reduced further to only three teams at the end of the year. While the manual capacity was downscaling the MDD part was planned to expand or consolidate. It was getting more dogs and improving quality in order to facilitate surveys. During 2004 the MDD section was retrained and restructured to conform to the international NPA MDD standard.

The IND had stated as a priority from 2003 to get a better picture of the mine problem in the country. By this acknowledging that the survey from 2001 did not give a true picture. NPA

²⁸ The Casspir *mine-safe* vehicles, when fitted with steel wheels, are constructed to withstand anti-personnel mine detonations without interruption of work. Detonations from anti-tank/vehicle mines will cause serious material damage and require repairs. This means previous survey and assessment of the area of operation is required to as far as possible avoid use in areas with such mines. Because only one set of steel wheels had been bought, the destruction of two of the available steel wheels meant that both the Casspirs were taken out of operation.

²⁹ The new resident representative was in fact the same person that led the team producing the NORAD report from the previous year.

and other demining organisations were therefore primarily given survey tasks as opposed to demining tasks; this continued in the period 2004-2006.

In January 2004, the expatriate Operations Officer reported serious omissions in the recording of the surveys already performed by NPA, seeing a danger of having to re-survey areas in a short while. The same report also debated how logistics were breaking down and causing unnecessary delays and down-time in all parts of the programme. (Kampenhøy, 2004)

Another TA visit to the programme from June to August 2004 reported that several problems pointed out by previous assessment missions and reports had still not been corrected. It reported it being a “fractured programme” and that there was a lack of discipline. It was suggested that these issues be addressed as part of the re-structuring to occur with the office move. (Porter, 2004)

Donors

A general review of Danish government support to mine action in Mozambique written by COWI gave recommendations to continue support until early 2005³⁰. Denmark had been one of the donors to the NPA programme in general, and the sole donor for the mechanical demining component. The report recommended that a detailed plan should be made to see “how the NPA HMA capacity in form of vehicles, equipment and machines, as well as human resources will be handed over [to ADP]”. (Nielsen et al., 2004, p. 25) Apart from focus on how to best phase-out operations it also said that “The operational organisation of NPA mine action was not sufficient in 2003 to manage and coordinate the operations of all deployed capabilities in an efficient manner” (Nielsen et al., 2004, p. 19).

Re-structuring

In the Annual Report for 2004 it was explained how most problems earlier observed had finally been addressed, and that through capacity building of the remaining staff and improvement of routines the situation was under control. The new Regional Representative analysed that it had been a tough year, but that the situation had “improved significantly”.³¹ (Sekkenes & Gopani, 2004)

In 2004 the operational headquarters was moved from Tete to Gondola in the Manica province. A MDD testing site was maintained close to Tete and another close to Gondola. In

³⁰ Note that this is a significantly shorter period than what the Norwegian report stated – and means an end to funding before the NPA exit plan which estimated work until end 2006.

³¹ After general NPA re-organisations the Mozambique resident representative became regional representative for Southern Africa and responsible also for the programmes in South Africa and Zimbabwe.

addition there was a sub-office in Chimoio city and a management office in Maputo. (Gopani, 2004)

As a part of the downscaling NPA *released* all national staff from their positions and paid out compensation packages in 2004. Key staff for the rest of the phase-out process was re-hired on short-term contracts. Throughout the year NPA kept losing and having long term sick-leaves in significant numbers among national staff due to HIV/AIDS. (Sekkenes et al., 2004)

Already in 2002 the national programme manager had voiced his desire to end the work with NPA, in February 2004 he applied in writing. Two months later he had to leave NPA after some irregularities were discovered.

2005

The NPA 2005 work plan took into consideration serious reductions in funding; only the Netherlands MFA and NORAD chose to continue funding the programme until the end of the phase-out plan. As such the work plan had four objectives:

1. Mine clearance of identified high and medium impact areas,
2. Technical survey of identified suspected mined areas
3. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) on request and,
4. Task Impact Assessment of mine affected communities in the three central provinces where NPA had been operating.

Priorities were to be defined in cooperation with the IND regional office and the provincial governments. New this year was the clearly formulated plan to support the national poverty reduction plan - PARPA³². The main objectives formulated were still the same as before; improving the socioeconomic living conditions for target groups.

By the end of August 2005, all remaining manual deminers were dismissed as part of the phase-out. In October the same happened with the staff of the mechanical demining component. Only survey capacities remained and efforts concentrated on documenting the work that had been done by NPA since 1993. Discussions internally and with donors took place over what could possibly be left of the NPA efforts. From the international staff and HO it was clear that the initiative to establish a local NGO would have to come from local staff. No such initiative came up.

³² Plan to reduce absolute poverty, which unfortunately included no plans or priorities for demining until its final second edition in late 2005.

Future possibilities in the environment?

In summer 2005 UNDP ceased its Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP). This had been imagined as the only large actor to remain when the international NGOs left Mozambique. The ADP staff made an attempt to create a new organisation, but did not obtain funding.

Discussions were also held with regards to transferring the NPA MDD capacity to the IND for them to use in QA/QC. (Combs, 2005) The last was strongly advised against after a visit from the head of the NPA global training centre (GTC) for MDDs to the current IND facilities. Instead the dogs were transferred to the newly started NPA programme in Ethiopia. In the report from the GTC it was also noted that the NPA MDD programme in Mozambique had “taken a quantum leap” and that “won [sic] may wonder how the MDD history and legacy would have looked like if this kind of follow up had happened on an earlier stage”. (Berntsen, 2005, p. 3) It was made clear that close follow up from the GTC would be required for the dogs to be useful in Ethiopia.

At the end of 2005 the Mozambican TIA personnel was considered an asset to NPA internationally. The national TIA responsible in Mozambique was used in other NPA programmes to build TIA competence throughout 2006.

2006

2006 started with yet another national management member resigning, the then deputy programme manager and highest ranking national employee.

Further discussions occurred between the NPA and the MFA as to possible continuation of the organisation. But again it stranded with the local staff and national authorities desiring continued NPA presence. The local staff “would prefer to work under the NPA umbrella as it will provide easier access to funds and quality assurance”. (Essén, 2006, p. 6)

As NPA finished the work to survey and document their work in the central provinces at the end of April, it was decided to perform surveys of areas previously cleared by ADP in the south. This was done in order to provide as good a picture as possible of the situation for the IND since the ADP had ceased operations.

Two visits by HO staff noted problems with how the NPA surveys were performed, and deficiencies and difficulties in the planning. Some of the problems were caused by the survey teams no longer being manned with staff that had competence in all clearance methods. To solve this they suggested close follow up through visits from NPA’s international TIA expert, the international technical consultant for digital issues and possibly using personnel with experience from other NPA programmes. (Essén & Steen-Nilsen, 2006; Steen-Nilsen, 2006)

Some concerns were also noted with regards to confusion around the position of the acting deputy programme manager. By this time both the international programme manager and the former national deputy programme manager had left. Not having a new job description had:

. . . made it difficult for him in some cases to know clearly what his role is and what under [sic] his responsibility. This has also been made more difficult by several international experts coming and going with not always well presented ToRs for the DPM, [sic] It has also not been done a proper job in clarification of the reporting lines which can be a bit difficult with reporting lines to both the Regional Representative and the MAU in Oslo.

(Steen-Nilsen, 2006, p. 2)

The last report also made it clear that no real options for halting the phase-out plan existed. IND had no true plans and lacked a management that dared make decisions as with regards to a national take-over of the efforts, UNDP was overworked and last: NPA itself was on a general level moving efforts out of Mozambique and over to South Africa. However it is stated at the end of the report that “there is clearly still a need for a MA clearance operator in Mozambique and NPA has unique knowledge and experience to operate in the country and could therefore still do a very good job if so desired” (Steen-Nilsen, 2006, p. 5).

One of the very last events to occur with regards to what will happen with the NPA programme in Mozambique, was that the deputy programme manager at a meeting in Oslo in August 2006 came forward with ideas for an independent NGO when NPA is to leave the country finally in October/November. However he made it clear that for it to work, a close relationship with NPA Oslo would have to be kept.

3.5 HISTORY SUMMARY: TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND SUSTAINABLE CAPACITIES

The history of NPA in Mozambique is a history of technological transfer from a highly advanced environment to a pre-industrial society where national authorities had collapsed. It tells about obstacles encountered and how the decisions made to solve them led to later consequences. It also tells about how on the way the desire for a more permanent transfer of capacities evolved, out of a powerplay between the various stakeholders. The power of the different internal and external actors changed over time and contributed to the changing goals.

As stated, it is not possible to say that one factor was the reason, but several interrelated factors contributed. I use the following table to describe the organisation in the various phases of mine action in Mozambique.

	Emergency 1993-1995	Nationalising and consolidating 1995-2000	Maturation and phase out by NPA 2000-2006	Development 2006- (An imagined organisation)
Social structure	Strong formal military structure. Establishment of desired behavioural structure demanding much attention from expatriates	Formal structure loosening but maintained. Expatriates leave formal command but maintain in practice. Structure complicated by introduction of MDD	Further loosened structure and complexity as TIA and mechanical demining is introduced. Expatriates retake more control towards the end.	Small local structure receiving advice and being monitored by NPA
Participants	EOD trained expats. Demobilised soldiers with little or no education.	Fewer and more broadly educated expats. Large scale capacity building of local staff.	Expats present for short term engagements. Several key local staff lost. Expats come in towards end to take more control.	Locals in all roles – expats coming in for consultancies when requested.
Goals	Demining for stabilisation. 2-3 years of expat presence. Handover/integrate with UN.	Demining for reconstruction. NPA presence to build local organisation.	Demining for reconstruction and development. Downscale – handover to authorities?	Small scale demining where most needed in accordance with PARPA II and NPA surveys.
Tech.	Manual demining	Manual demining. MDDs	Manual demining. MDDs. Mechanical. Task Impact Assessment	Manual demining. TIA speciality?
Environment	UN DPKO. Non existent government. Weak district authorities. MFA as donor. HALO Trust	UN DHA and UNDP. CND. Several new donors. Established routines with provincial authorities. ADP, HALO Trust.	IND with UNDP support. Fewer donors towards the end. ADP, HALO Trust	Government/IND as donor and tasking authority? Handicap International. Military demining?

Table 1: Organisational elements and factors in the different phases

While not being perfect and having many defects, the organisation created was arguably one of the best “in the class” in a brand new field. As the goals changed and the technology changed the organisation eventually faced an environment where it possibly no longer has a place. The following chapters will seek to identify and analyze the factors involved using the organisation theories explained in chapter 2 and attempt to provide an answer to why it is

difficult to see an organisation independent of NPA being left behind and why the organisation created at times struggled.

4 Analysing the case

The following analysis uses the theories presented in chapter 2 to organise and analyse the findings of chapter 3. This will suggest answers to what prevented the creation of sustainable capacities and identify the factors involved.

4.1 SOCIAL STRUCTURE

In order to solve the task given, emergency demining, a group of Norwegian military engineers set up an organisation with a structure based on Scandinavian military structures. Through a strong expatriate presence this was up and running within an impressively short time³³. It was possibly the best solution at the time and was not intended by its main creator to become an independent indigenous organisation (Interview 18). However, the social structure chosen gives explanations to why it was difficult to turn the organisation into a *national sustainable organisation*, or an *organisation nationalised as far as possible*.³⁴

An unfamiliar structure

The social structures established in Mozambique were similar to those found in Western military organisations and bore little resemblance to non-military social structures found locally at the time.³⁵ It was a large military organisation fit for large-scale demining operations, action oriented and with clear command structures.

It is claimed that suitable local organisation structures were sought for, but not seen as suitable (see *The possibilities in the local environment*, p. 60). As a result, NPA had to work hard to imprint the normative structure required to get the organisation to work; first in the training of the deminers, later in the process of training supervisors and senior management staff. On the way several local staff were found unsuitable and fired for not conforming to the desired social structure.

The military structure can have been a reason for the difficulties in reforming the organisation into a more flexible entity with several small units. By some informants it is

³³ Informants hold that the percentage of expatriate staff was much less than other comparable operations at the time, such as the UN.

³⁴ Håvard Bach upholds the importance of distinguishing these two. I'll leave the discussion over what the goals were to NPA and its donors and merely note that whichever was the goal, from the material reviewed and people interviewed it seems like the organisation created, albeit helping significantly in solving the landmine problem in Mozambique, did struggle at times.

³⁵ One informant inquired that in general the organisations created by NPA are not really well made military organisations. Arguing that few of the organisers had a high military rank and were not trained in building military organisations. (Interview 13)

suggested that the military structure should have allowed for exactly this division of the forces. This need was identified early by NPA and later on in donor reviews. Still, it took years to accomplish, possibly the lack of suitable local personnel made it difficult. In the end, my knowledge of military structures and what actually happened is too vague to be able to say something definitive about this.

From interviews and documents reviewed, it appears that the social structure established tended to become relaxed and inefficient with time. Possibly it was adapting to more local social structures under local leadership. Towards the end of the programme, several concerns were noted that related to the established social structure collapsing (Berntsen, 2005; Essén et al., 2006; Kampenhøy, 2004; Porter, 2004; Steen-Nilsen, 2006; Williams, 2003). This could also be a result of the structure having been weakened as key national staff had left the programme (a danger noted already in the 1999 donor report). If important parts of the structure were not formalised, but rather imprinted in and dependent on participants, this would be to expect.

It has been suggested that an approach where local social structures are studied in advance, and combined with the desired levels of security and standards, would provide a stronger and longer term structure. While deeper analysis of the local culture and identification of suitable local social structures might be difficult in an emergency context, it would certainly pay off in a development and capacity building perspective.

Expatriate dependence and moving from manager to advisor

In the beginning, with around 30 international staff members the programme was largely dependent on the expatriate staff. The nationalisation aimed to establish the local leaders and managers as legitimate. However, local managers were always controlled or monitored by expatriate staff in some way. Even if local managers had the responsibility, they had to take advice from expatriate staff. As one informant said; “they [expats] came in and held the steering wheel themselves whilst telling the locals to drive” (Interview 17). Hence whether they were ever truly in charge is in question. It is difficult to conclude that full control should have been handed over, considering problems discussed above regarding availability and training of local staff. Several informants pointed out the possibility that the wheel was actually handed over too quickly, with the wrong or too little follow-up (Interview 9). There are problems related to this that also relate to the goal setting and power structures, as well as corruption, which will be discussed later.

Several informants have cited the problem for expatriate staff to move from a manager role to advisor. While many of the expatriates might have been excellent managers and

technically skilled, good in a supervisor role, they might have failed in becoming good advisors and teachers of more advanced matters (Interview 8; 9; 13; 17). Equally, the time available was never enough for the local leaders and managers to build the necessary self-confidence to fully take-over the organisation. When key persons trained disappeared the organisation struggled due to its informal structure and lack of head office support. New strong management had not been recruited, nor could be recruited from the local community.

The long-time local programme manager has pointed out as a considerable source of frustration the frequent changes of technical advisors and other expatriate staff (such as resident representative and Administrative Manager), with different cultural backgrounds and opinions on how to solve matters. Initiatives by technical advisors, who were on the ground for a short while and possibly had no interest in the long term goals of the programme, became his responsibility and he was blamed when they were not successful. (Interview 15)

Towards the end, it was realised that the programme was struggling without expatriate management. Especially as a tough change process was to be implemented. Key positions were again, possibly a bit too late according to the former local programme manager, staffed by Norwegians. While this was needed to improve the situation of the programme, it was also done as a clear step to facilitate the phase-out. Not in an effort to lay the ground for a sustainable organisational structure. Actually it was a reversion of the formal structure established to promote local management of the organisation.

Summarizing the social structure

The social structures created were not known in the local society and depended much on the expatriate presence and individuals. Within the short timeframe of the demining programme, it was not possible to convey and imprint the imported structure required for the organisation to function independently.

4.2 PARTICIPANTS

Informants have stated that NPA had “luck” with some of the local and international staff recruited (Interview 6; 19). In a difficult environment, with a loose and weak structure of NPA mine action internationally, little support from the Head Office in Oslo and the fact that the social structure created was informal and unknown in the local environment, the dependency on individual capacities has been strong.³⁶

³⁶ One former desk officer holds that he intentionally employed strong leaders (whom he knew personally) and gave much room for them to decide in the field. (Interview 17)

Availability and selection

Local staff

As a result of UN requirements, NPA had to start out with primarily demobilised soldiers as a basis for its demining teams. It was considered a good idea by the UN, donors and NPA alike at the time to keep the soldiers “off the street”. Today many informants see this as a reason for later problems. In an environment where the educational level was generally low, these were the least educated persons (Interview 6; 18).³⁷ While many of the ex-soldiers worked well as deminers, problems occurred later when the recruitment of supervisors was based on deminers. It was easier to recruit administration employees, but also had to be recruited in an environment where few educated people were available. That NPA had located its operation in Tete decreased the numbers further because of its remoteness. At the time of start-up several other organisations were establishing themselves in the area and there was a big demand for educated labour.³⁸

Particularly the Mine Detection Dog programme NPA suffered. The keeping of dogs as domestic animals, even less to train them, was unknown to most Mozambicans. Hence to obtain qualified personnel with the personal affection required was not easy. It is clear from documents and interviews that a fully independent MDD capacity in Mozambique would have been extremely difficult to establish.

A former expatriate programme manager in Mozambique expressed great difference in the quality of local managers and commanders recruited when he managed the programme in Angola. He then knew Portuguese and recruitment was done on the “open market”. Knowing the language meant that he himself could assess the quality of the personnel and whether they possessed the required leadership qualities or not. (Interview 9; 18)

Loosing the good ones

There was a continued loss of educated staff throughout the history of the organisation. Due to the harsh conditions in Mozambique with issues such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, traffic accidents, climate as well as the frequent loss of staff that broke the rules and norms established in the organisation.³⁹ Staff also left for other jobs (Interview 12; 14).

In the last years, the more important national management persons left for various reasons. It appears that the behavioural structure of the organisation became weaker. Some

³⁷ In the later rounds of recruitment NPA asked for a larger selection of demobilized soldiers to recruit from, something that improved the quality. (Interview 18)

³⁸ Many of the informants have expressed that it would not have been right if NPA had absorbed all of these, since it might have hampered other development in the area.

³⁹ In the early monthly reports there are several incidents of local staff being fired for disciplinary reasons.

informants have suggested that the recruitment and training of senior management slowed down or halted under national management.⁴⁰ It is anyway a stated concern by former and current staff (both local and international) that NPA had no clear policy for further advancement of local staff after they had reached top management positions. As they all knew by 2000 that a phase out was imminent, they had less incitement to stay.

NPA identified the possibility for a lapse in morale and the need for a good human resources policy early on. But it appears that no actions were taken early to counter this and ensure key national staff had motivation to stay and do a good job for the organisation.⁴¹

International staff

In the beginning, NPA had no technical expertise and little staff in Oslo to handle the rapid needs for new staff. Recruitment policies and routines were non-existent or very weak and so clearly some of the staff recruited, should not have been employed (Interview 9; 14; 17; 18). The focus was on technical expertise with regards to explosives and demining rather than competence in organisation development and building of strong management. Few or none had knowledge of Portuguese, and could therefore not communicate directly with the local staff they were to work with and educate. The general profile of the “recruits” was: male around 30, often with little experience abroad, low military rank and trained to lead small units at home. Suddenly these came in charge of up to hundreds of men from a completely different culture (Interview 9). While efforts were made by NPA field management to educate expatriate staff members with undesired attitudes and behaviour, it seems clear that the local population and staff were at times appalled by the demining staff (Interview 10; 11).

Many of the informants question what the alternatives should have been. Their opinion is that in what they were set to do, the ex-military staff “did the job” in a very hard environment. And few others achieved similar results with regards to time spent and areas cleared. This study has been too superficial and my experience in the field is far too light to say how it could have been done better. With what was known at the time and the lack of standards, what was done by the staff in Mozambique seems to have been among the best solutions in the world for. However, it also seems clear that several lessons were learned that should not have to be repeated.

There were also cases where the bad recruitment policies and internal politics of NPA led to employment of unsuitable expatriate managers (Interview 14; 18). Fortunately for NPA they

⁴⁰ They are not blaming the local management for this, but seeing it as a lack of follow-up from the head office.

⁴¹ Policies for the expatriate staff might not have been better, but NPA has had a spirit and attitude which has attracted and kept a considerable force of highly qualified personnel. Management in Oslo today sees a need for better follow-up of both international and national staff, but due to lack of resources it is still struggling to implement its intentions.

had also recruited some expatriate staff that had wider competencies and worked to counter the lacks of others. Questioning of the NPA recruitment policies came back in various interviews; it has improved lately but still needs improvement.

A last problem is that once it was realised that participants were not suitable for the organisation, they were hard to get rid of. Both with regards to local and international staff. The NPA background in the Norwegian labour movement meant that concerns for employees at times led to decisions that were not for the best of the development of a strong organisation.

Why were the participants so important?

While some remarkable persons were employed, the organisation suffered from scarce availability of qualified personnel, the later difficulties in managing these, the frequent loss of trained personnel as well as frequent changes of expatriate staff. With an informal structure, where much was imprinted in individuals, it was hard to build a strong organisation.

The fact that it remained as long as it did, must be credited to a few capable local and international staff members on the ground.

4.3 GOALS AND POWER

“The problem for mine action is that, over much of a programme’s life cycle, the attention is not on development but on other related yet different, goals. These goals include humanitarian assistance, peace-building or reconstruction of essential infrastructure. As a result, the mine action programme may not be linked early and strongly with developmental actors, particularly within the national government, who eventually will assume control of the country’s development agenda. If this happens, the profile of the mine action programme will almost certainly suffer, along with its funding.” (Paterson & Filippino, 2006)

NPA Mine Action in Mozambique had frequently changing and vague goals, varying over time and space depending on when and who you ask. While this to some extent is normal, it is problematic if an organisation is to be established and develop an identity.

I will now review the goals of the various actors, external and internal, and how they have affected the goals NPA in Mozambique.

Norwegian People’s Aid

To illustrate and explain the ambiguity in how NPA relates to the landmine issue a quick return to history before the Mozambique case and how NPA became a mine action operator will be clarifying.

NPA in the 80s and early 90s was an organisation generally refraining from relief aid and humanitarian emergencies, concentrating on long term development aid and work with partner organisations.⁴² In 1992 Jan Egeland, then State Secretary in the Norwegian MFA, visited Cambodia and saw the horrors of landmines. Not particularly content with the UN and having little faith in its capacity to build an operative demining capacity, he had the idea to create a Norwegian demining organisation.⁴³ Funded by the MFA and with staff mainly recruited from the Norwegian army the organisational anchorage would be with one of the “big five” Norwegian NGOs.⁴⁴ All five got “the offer” but only the then head of NPA’s international department saw an opportunity in the field. Albeit serious possibilities for the whole project to have gone seriously in Cambodia from the start (again due to variable recruitment and follow up from NPA), it became a success (Interview 14; 19).⁴⁵ From there the move to Mozambique was natural, NPA saw a new field where it received much positive attention and actually made some profit. (Interview 17; 19; Filippino, Wheatley, Paterson, & Lambert-Madore, 2004, p. 66; King et al., 2005, p. 293)

The move into demining happened quickly and without much discussion in the organisation as a whole. In just a few years NPA had a portfolio of large operational demining programmes in several post-conflict countries. In Mozambique NPA employed and was responsible for several hundred individuals, expatriates as well as nationals. The mother organisation was only sparingly expanded to cater for the expansion, both in terms of resources and ideology. A conflict occurred over the build-up of a professionalised operative section to handle the new demands of the demining programmes; a strife which has not been solved and with regular intervals returns. The Mine Action weight on “getting the job done” and the development approach of “getting the job done *the right way*” have always collided, in addition the professionalisation meant a distancing from the membership base of the organisation (Tranvik, 2007 forth.). In many regards the new activities went contrary to the NPA philosophy, with focus on solidarity (working together and both parties growing) as something different from charity (pacifying with giver in control).⁴⁶ The imbalance in the relationship, the fact that the local

⁴² However at the same time the history of NPA as the Norwegian labour movement’s aid organisation shows several occasions of grass root enthusiasm and individual initiative sprouting projects where the NPA HO policy would not have allowed action. The desire to help when help was needed and one could provide has often caused internal divergence and conflict.

⁴³ Quite an interesting stand considering his current position as head of UN OCHA.

⁴⁴ Norwegian Red Cross, Save the Children, Norwegian Church Aid, Norwegian Refugee Council and Norwegian People’s Aid.

⁴⁵ Resulting among others in a call from the UN Mine Action responsible Paddy Blagden to the head of NPA international department stating that NPA was the only organisation doing something good in Cambodia: “you clear mines, the others kill people” (Interview 19).

⁴⁶ “Solidarity means supporting groups so that they themselves may have the opportunity to protect and promote their own interests. Solidarity is the opposite of charity. Whilst charity implies that the giver has control over the recipient, solidarity means showing respect for the partners’ integrity and their right to set their own conditions.”(NPA, 2003b)

counterparts are fully dependent on NPA as benefactor, is seen as a dilemma by several of the informants.

The Mozambique programme is an illustrative example of this. In a way the original idea of NPA building up an operational organisation to be handed over, then later only to provide technical input (as had been done in Cambodia) became confused by development ideas and desires to “build something” (Interview 1). The 2003 Scanteam report stated: “NPA’s goals are too fuzzy and non-committal, which makes it difficult to evaluate and assess its effectiveness, efficiency and actual achievements” (p. 22).

Donors

I have also mentioned that donors, in particular the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, affect the goals of NPA demining and vice versa. NPA could not define its goals in Mozambique without consent from its main donor, nor could the MFA define its policies without inputs from the technical expertise of NPA (Interview 5)

While other donors were added to the NPA Mozambique programme, the MFA remained the most concerned and committed donor. However, the MFA person responsible for the programme in Mozambique changed frequently, and the possibility for good follow-up can be questioned. Most MFA staff work on a rotation, 2-3 years is considered long time. Discussions during the establishment and the first years were frequent. Later, when the MFA got involved with regards to the goals, it was mostly through proxies. Research teams were engaged to do an evaluation over a couple of weeks. Reports were produced and often resulted in new MFA policies and requirements for change. Several informants and sources listed it a key concern that the donors did and do not engage profoundly in the goals and objectives for the Mine Action activities that they fund. (King et al., 2005, p. 297)

For the MFA and other government donors there is also often an agenda of “political demining”. The fact that in a post-crisis situation it must be shown that things happen on the ground, that the suffering is being alleviated and that there is a point in maintaining the peace. That it happens fast is then more important than whether everything is happening in the best way and if it is suited to become a sustainable activity. This was a goal which NPA fulfilled in Mozambique and it seems to have been repeated with the Norwegian efforts in Sudan.⁴⁷ (Interview 5; 9) NPA’s demining capacities can be said to form part of the Norwegian government’s “peace package” in international politics. It is not unlikely that Norway and other

⁴⁷ Norway played an active part in the peace process between the Sudanese government and the SPLA/SPLM in the south. The startup of demining quickly after peace agreements was one of the Norwegian “contributions”.

donors had further underlying political goals; of for example influence in Mozambique and the region, as reasons for supporting mine action.

At times it also appears that donor goals, possibly out of lack of knowledge, lead to the implementation of activities that the NPA HO did not see as viable for the Mozambique programme. In particular this relates to the start-up of Mechanical Demining. The HO had expressed clear concerns that this would be too difficult with the existing organisation and conditions. However, DANIDA had received recommendations that Mechanical Demining would be good and thus funded this effort in the end. Later reports indicate that this complex technology was too much of a strain for the organisation, and required a huge effort from the HO in order to work at all.

United Nations

NPA started the organisation as a part of the UN peacekeeping operation. NPA Mine Action staff had UN ID cards, the cars used UN license plates and UN logos for the first two years. The aim was clear in the beginning (at least for the field staff): NPA was only helping the UN for a short while and would then pull out. As such the UN goals what had most significant influence in the first years. It is clear that the UN was a rather schizophrenic “beast”, several entities and personalities fought to define the goals. In the end UN desires to control and run the whole country as one (with regards to demining) was turned down by the donors, leaving the UN in a somewhat defied state. From the interviews it appears that the UN representatives at several stages were told by donors that their work was much less worth than what NPA was doing. While it on the ground and in one part of the UN was clear that they needed all the support they could get from NPA, the ones higher up in the system could not see the dependence nor accept a too strong NGO. Seen by NPA there was a fear within the UN in New York that an NGO might take the coordinating role and the UN loose fame, which might have led to the decision *not* to use NPA as implementing partner to establish the national coordination (Interview 10; 18).⁴⁸

At the same time, once there was an option for NPA to join the UN effort it was also clear that NPA did not see the plans as interesting, due to lack of competence and UN disinterest with the NGOs. But possibly this was also because NPA had a desire to build its own organisation (Interview 17; 18).

⁴⁸ The lack of UN sources for this analysis should be noted.

The later ambiguity of the UN effort and the lack of success in establishing a capable national coordination led to further frustrations for NPA and needs to reassess efforts and to create a more independent organisation. (see “1996” p. 25).

Government of Mozambique and other authorities

What has maybe become clearer over the last years to all actors in mine action is the fact that the principal output of demining (safe land) should not be the “end in itself”, rather it is a means to an end, to “support the most strategically important efforts under way in the country” (Paterson et al., 2006). Hence the focus on *recipient government ownership* has become important (Paterson, Lardner, Rebelo, & Tibana, 2005, p. ix). While definition of priorities and clearance goals in the emergency phase could and possibly should be done by outsiders, it should be done by a national authority on behalf of the government in the later stages. This will be fundamental to ensure that demining serves the general development goals of the country.

Unfortunately the government of Mozambique (through its CND and later IND) never reached the level where they were able to define goals for the mine actors. What goals NPA received were disregarded as they did and still do not correspond with the realities (ICBL, 2006; Interview 22). The lack of clearly and realistically defined goals by the GoM is one of the key reasons for why donors refuse to fund any more demining in Mozambique. It was only after much pressure from donors, Mine Action operators and the IND itself that demining was included in the government’s key document for future planning (PARPA II). (ICBL, 2006)

I will discuss the weakness of the GoM in Mine Action further in chapter 4.5.

Individual and organisational goals

While there are certainly other stakeholders to the NPA operation in Mozambique influencing the organisations goals (maybe unfortunately some that influenced in the least degree were the ones most in need of the organisations help) I will mention one last group of stakeholders before I sum up. Each and every individual in an organisation has their own goals, which the wide array of understanding of the goals in Mozambique among the informants shows. Individual goals, or *motives* as some choose to say, decide why the different participants choose to join an organisation. It would be highly naïve to believe that the local staff that joined the organisation because they were interested in ridding the world of landmines. They did so because it was the alternative which at the time corresponded the most with their own goals of personal security and a steady income. Similarly only few on the technical experts employed by NPA are concerned about the deeper humanitarian goals of NPA as an organisation, they take an

interesting job with a fair pay. Once the goals of the organisation no longer coincide with the personal motives they will leave the organisation as many have done.

Before donors choose to fund an independent effort based on the organisation NPA created in Mozambique they will seriously consider whether this is based more on the motive of continued employment of the staff and the desire for continued international funding by the government. If they feel that these outplay the goals that they would like to see, of truly solving the remaining problem, they will not continue funding.

Cathetic goals

My review of NPA in Mozambique has listed a host of participants with a multitude of goals that have varied over time. The following table identifies assumed and generalised (all the stakeholders could be further divided) motivational goals of the most important stakeholders; these are their reasons to contribute to the organisation. Whoever had the most power at any time, alone or in a *dominant coalition*, decided what common goals were to be prioritised and acted upon. Some stakeholders have had a vetoing power and as such defined NPA's room to maneuver.

This table is speculative in the way that I am trying to guess true goals, based on discussions with informants and archive information.

	Emergency 1993-1995	Nationalising 1995-2000	Maturation 2000-2006	Post NPA	Power
NPA Members	“solidarity across borders”, sprout similar organisations around the world				medium low little direct influence
NPA HO MAU ⁴⁹	Enter new field, gain international and national credit, positive financial outcome	Develop international capacity, explore new methods	Maintain well running capacity	Ensure good reputation after exit.	medium high Implementation, defines strategies and selects staff. Provides tech. advice to donors.

⁴⁹ NB! A clearly defined and internally accepted MAU did not exist until 2001. Before this mine action staff belonged to the various country desks.

NPA HO LTD	Help in crisis – work with locals as much as possible	Work to develop local organisation? Long term capacities to contribute to development			Medium Often RR has development background or wider views and is more steered by dev. section.
NPA expats	New job, exciting experience, master something large, personal development	Short term experience, try new things	Gather experiences, maybe help some.		High – medium Implement the projects on the ground take daily decisions. In early days with weak MAU had defined policies.
NPA local staff	Employment, personal development.		Run an organisation that is seen as credible by donors in order to receive funding.		Low – receive employment and give some skills back.
Donors/ MFA	Stabilise country. Create Norwegian capacity. Show public in home country that government is helping	Development in country. Ensure efficient use of funds		Funds given only if well used.	Vetoing - High Holds the funds, no funds means no activity.
UN (could be divided into 4-5 entities)	Stabilise country, clear mines as fast as possible, keep control and do “by the book”	Create national capacity, keep UN control/coordination	Try to develop national coordination .	Move to other arenas internationally.	Vetoing->low Held funds, initially controlled the country. Lost donor faith and control in the country.
Moz government	no goals	Employment through UN funds.	Activity. Get funds of customs scheme.	Equipment for personal use? Keep funds coming.	Medium high Can deny access to areas or the country.
Mine affected societies	Avoid accidents. Get money for information	Avoid accidents; get access to mined areas; general development.			No power

Table 2: Stakeholder goals and power over time

How did goals and power influence?

In a rapidly changing environment, with an informal structure and missing or ambiguous overall policies defined by the head office, the decisions on goals for NPA in Mozambique have depended on individuals. With mine action not fitting in with the overall strategy of the mother organisation, the organisation created has also been influenced. Policies have been “squeezed” between development and mine action, and were never well defined or viable for concrete action. This resulted in unfeasible long-term goals and the mid-term goals being vague.

The remaining local staff, who will now have to set the goals for a future organisation, never took true part in the definition of goals and the plays for power among the stakeholders earlier. Hence for them to write a credible strategy for the new organisation, to be accepted by the other stakeholders, will be a challenging task.

4.4 TECHNOLOGY

The technology of humanitarian demining is very much affecting the other aspects of the organisation. What personnel was recruited (both local and international), the structure chosen as well as the goals made depend on the technology in use. The technology itself was “brand new” in 1993; military demining had been happening around the world since mines were invented but the humanitarian demining approach was something new (Interview 6). If we exclude the actual picking of the ground, the technology involved has evolved incredibly over the past fifteen years. There was no ready made technology that NPA brought to Mozambique and trained the locals in. It was a case of two-sided learning where the expatriate staff learned and found solutions that were simultaneously conveyed to their local counterparts. Early focus on demining being something new, technical and short term meant that earlier learning and mistakes from development aid were overlooked in the first years. Later on the perspectives have been changed and the realisation that for many countries it is a more long-term problem, has meant that the part of the “technology” that regards impact assessments and making sure that the “right job is being done” rather than the “job being done right” has received much more focus. (King et al., 2005, pp. 305-334)

Manual Demining

The actual technology used in the field when demining is not a hard technology to learn and master. Most demining programmes start with a two-three weeks course for local recruits with no background. What demands attention are the stringent rules and operating procedures to ensure safety and quality of the work performed. Logistics to ensure the smooth operation and

deployment of several hundred deminers is the next concern; this as well as tracking of what they do and ensuring that they do clear mines where demining is most needed appears to be where the difficulties enter.

The organisational structure required to manage this first simple technology is what NPA spent the first couple of years to construct (seems to have been rather successful at as proven by several reviews); we could say that this is the core technology of NPA. However, it appears from reports that when there was less expatriate presence the adherence to the normative structure also relaxed.

Mine Detection Dogs

The introduction of MDDs to Mozambique was something completely new to NPA at the time, Mozambique became a laboratory and a starting point for many of the later NPA MDD programmes. It was a technology in development and being self-critical NPA staff state that they are seriously concerned about the quality of their first five years of dog use, in all their programmes (Interview 6). With both the technology being new and undeveloped, as well as the use of dogs as domestic animals being something unusual in Africa, it appears logical that NPA struggled with this technology in Mozambique. While the dogs were seen as critical to the quality and speed of the demining programme it appears never to have been running smoothly even with expatriate presence (Interview 22).

Mechanical Demining

Mechanical demining of various kinds is used by NPA around the world as a supplement to manual demining and MDDs in the NPA “toolbox”. In Mozambique the NPA Head Office made it clear that the complexity made it uninteresting, however the programme still acquired machines that remained a headache until they were sold in 2005. Being self-critical HO staff admits that possibly early close follow up from the HO could have improved performance (Interview 14). That still makes it clear that the complexity was too much for the local organisation to handle without expatriate support.

Task Impact Assessment

The introduction of TIA (see page 32 about TIA and socio-economic impact) meant another level of technology was added to the NPA operations. While certainly considerations were made earlier as to prioritising what land to clear, the TIA meant something different. A whole new set of criteria for assessment of the situation in the mined communities before, during and after demining were applied and supposed to be followed up on. While clearly a useful tool the

approaches, an actual move over to sociology, meant a completely new “technology” for the young organisation to learn and incorporate. In later reports several important features of TIA (like proper recording of information) unsurprisingly appear to have been overlooked without expatriate presence.

On a positive note: the local TIA responsible in Mozambique is often referred to as one of the world’s top TIA experts. Possibly indicating that in this field NPA managed to transfer capacities or develop them in union with the local staff. However, it would remain a question whether this is still tied to one person and that the loss of this person would mean the loss of the capacity.

How has technology affected the organisation?

The technology chosen in Mozambique was intended to handle a large scale problem in a quick manner with a large influx of funds. It was not adapted to a small scale approach with less expatriate presence, and huge demands on individual capacities in the local participants. This and the introduction of new, complex and interdependent, but widely different technologies increased uncertainty and put a large demand on the organisation. At the same time the necessary increase in capacity for information processing was not done (ref. p. 10). As a result the performance and quality was lowered.

In the end it appears that, albeit the intentions were good, the standards and technologies adhered to are made in a Western mindset and that they (as the head of the NPA MAU writes and was discussed at the NPA MA programme manager meeting) maybe become “externally managed, too-complex and thus pacifying mechanisms for mine action rather than assisting in the creation of nationally adaptable, appropriate and sustainable measures to solve the problem” (Nergaard, 2006).

4.5 ENVIRONMENTS

NPA entered Mozambique under challenging conditions in 1993 and quickly created something functional where others, in particular the United Nations, failed in many ways. Although attempts were made to engage seriously with both authorities and a somewhat malfunctioning UN operation, a setup was chosen or rather evolved in the end, based on the desire for cost-efficiency and productivity that made a somewhat independent organisation which worked well under expatriate leadership. As repeated by its main “creator” the organisation was never intended to become a local, independent entity; it was created to solve a short-term problem – which most agree it has done – and then disappear. He argues that while it lasted a bit longer

than planned it now retreats because the problem has been solved. (Interview 18) Regardless of this later managers and donors have inserted words like “sustainable capacity”, “indigenous organisation”, “transfer of programme to local authorities” etc. in the plans for the organisation and have had a desire to “leave something behind” and make a sustainable, positive impression for the local environment in other ways than just the removal of mines.

Let us analyse why the environment at various stages did not provide a good situation for this – the creation of a local organisation. I will also introduce some of what informants have said could possibly have been done differently on the way to facilitate this.

The possibilities in the local environment

The capacity of a population to develop and support special-purpose organisations is determined by such general factors as widespread literacy and specialized advanced schooling, urbanization, a money economy, and political revolution. Stinchcombe in (Scott, 2003, p. 153)

Clearly few or none of the factors listed above were to be found where NPA established its operations in 1993. In accordance with general NPA policies the demining teams should have found local counterparts in the country to train and thus enable them to perform the necessary job themselves. Some evaluations of this were done, of for example educating the military to train a demining capacity. But apart from fears of corruption the fact that the country did not have a formal military but rather two opposing forces that might go to war again made it not an option.

Society at large at the time had little to offer in terms of an educated work force, organisational freedom had been declared in the country only few years before and the concept of organisations was not known; at least not in the main areas of operation where NPA had to establish its operations⁵⁰. If again some capable persons were to be found many of the informants have declared it possibly unethical for NPA to absorb these for demining when other parts of society might have benefited from them. Still, in a way this was the case with NPA’s national programme manager who was one of few in the area with a higher education; he went from the ministry of health (where he was working to establish the local health structure) to NPA hoping to get better conditions (Interview 15).

Corruption

The fear of corruption has been an everlasting concern in the NPA programme. With a government in the country that is clearly corrupted, it is hard to see NPA handing over anything

⁵⁰ One informant suggested that locating the operations closer to the capital could have made the task easier.

to the government with an easy mind. For NPA employees it has seemed that the concern of the individuals representing the government is more about “when do we get the keys to the cars” than the desired “how we will be running the organisation once you leave”. (Interview 3; 18; 22) While NPA worked hard to imprint a normative structure in its own organisation to counter these problems it was hard to make this work in a highly corrupted society once the close monitoring by someone removed from the local society disappeared; “the international connection is a way to shelter against the temptations and the pressure from family, friends and other locals” (Interview 19).

Many new NPA projects are based on cooperation with governments⁵¹, for the Mozambique case, as it looks today it is doubted whether this is feasible. Donors also see this and the fear for corruption is one of the key reasons why they will not continue funding mine action in Mozambique.

Engaging the environment

Local communities

Several actors have claimed that the early NPA Mine Action programme in Mozambique interacted badly with or overrun the local communities where they performed demining, particularly in the first years (Interview 10; 11; 22). The participants that were on the ground strongly contest this and insist that serious efforts were made in advance of all operations to survey the areas and enter into a dialogue with the local authorities and communities⁵². While this was certainly improved on and more organised later on they feel that the intention strongly was there (Interview 14; 15; 18). This study has not been profound enough nor intended to make a clear opinion about the question; however the difference of views is noted and the importance of relating to the local environment clear if a sustainable impact is sought.

Once the UN inputs on tasks and priorities disappeared and no national authority was yet established, NPA went into dialogue with the provincial and district authorities as well as military authorities. While it was not seen as important for good input on priority setting, it was regardless important to establish a good relationship.

Later in the programme a point was made of involving the local communities with their traditional rituals and structures in the demining process. Getting such formal approval in advance and recognition once the work was finished is noted frequently in written reports.

⁵¹ For example Jordan, Ethiopia and Thailand.

⁵² They confessed a feeling that others envied them because they had succeeded where the others had not, as being the reason for the claims (Interview 14; 18)

Government of Mozambique

The government of Mozambique never really got involved with the landmine issue. And as many informants have said – why should they? The government has had several critical issues at hand of which landmines was only one; one which they saw to a great extent being solved by international actors. There was never a need to take responsibility for the landmines too.⁵³

This is where current trends in mine action say that a new policy is required. Yes it is a good idea that one should help a weak government that has enough other issues to handle, but the government “ownership” of the problem needs to be clear. Only in this way can it be assured that the demining efforts are put to use where the country needs them the most, in order to ensure development and poverty reduction. And only in this way can the problem be solved fully since international donors are seldom interested in funding all the way until the last mine is lifted.

In practice the GoM has caused more problems than it has solved, e.g. the cases of customs retaining vital equipment for long periods and costing lots of money should clearly not have happened had the government been truly concerned.

Prioritising where demining is required, with a good understanding of the problem should have been the GoM’s task by now. However this never happened and as such there is also little room for an independent national operator to operate and define its own priorities. Little less chances are there of the government financing demining by an NPA offspring through its regular budgets.

While agreed that the mine problem is not close to as severe as before, donors and NGOs alike agree that there is more than a “residual” problem left in the country and that a capacity is needed to handle this. When they are no longer willing to stay to finish, or fund the reasons are most often due to the lack of concern shown by the GoM.

United Nations

NPA has a philosophy of collaborating with the UN. As it states in its 2004 portfolio: “NPA coordinates its activities with those of the UN where they are present, through assisting the organisation and coordinating mine action related activities in the field” (NPA, 2004) This desire for coordination notes a difference between NPA and several other large international Mine Action NGO’s who consider UN coordination a negative influence.

⁵³ A question raised which I have not entered into is whether the internal politics and tribal structure of Mozambique play a role. It has been indicated that the areas around the capital and other areas were rapidly cleared. This could relate to tribal patterns often seen in Africa where the ruling tribe will tend to care for its own, and leave the rest of the country to cater for itself.

The first couple of years in Mozambique the UN was a main part of NPA's environment – NPA Mine Action in Mozambique was part of the UN and conceived as such in the local environment. The UN defined the areas to clear and the desired capacity of the NPA forces.

On the ground and in operations NPA seldom had problems and cooperated closely with the UN during the peace-keeping operations and the later established training centre, providing key advice and inputs as well as material facilities when possible. However it seems clear from the history that the consistence and clarity of the UN leadership was dubious leading to slow action on behalf of the UN (Eaton et al., 1997b; Interview 14; 18). At several stages NPA, with the support of its main donor the MFA, went contrary to the UN when they felt the need for it. This could have been the cause for some later problems, having caused, as one informant indicates, hostility towards NPA among key UN staff (Interview 10).

The discussions about NPA possibly taking on a coordinating role for all operative mine action in Mozambique appear to have been serious and well considered by NPA, donors and the UN representatives in the country. However, international UN politics meant that decisions were made that NPA could do nothing about. As demining in Mozambique was moved from the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) to DHA a wholly new attitude was shown, by people who did not have knowledge of the actual situation in the field.

Had NPA been in an overall co-ordinating role it would have had better chances at influencing the environment and would have been part of the more clear effort to create future indigenous capacities. Whether they would have succeeded any better is a different matter, but it bears to consider the fact that donor support (a key environmental factor) for the NPA plan was much stronger than it was for the final UN plan for a Mine Action Center (which was not approved).

Donors

The main reason for NPA to pull out of Mozambique is because there is no more funding for its project and this is also the main reason for why the intentions of the local staff to create an organisation (with strong NPA follow-up) probably will fail. The donors frequently state the need for “indigenous” organisations and initiatives. But when it comes to the point, the fear of corruption if no international organisation is involved appears to prevent funding. While it might have been a better long term solution to attempt “education” of the government, for it to take responsibility for the problem this is much harder to find funding for (Interview 5).

Many of the “twists and turns” of the NPA programme in Mozambique can be accredited to the various donor reviews and assessments. While this is natural, the actual involvement of the donors in the goal setting and visions for the organisation can be questioned.

Short reviews without continuous follow up from donor representatives might not be all that helpful and rather damaging in definition of goals.

NPA – an ambivalent organisation

After I have followed the organisation NPA over more than ten years the clear ambiguity and wide array of interests, goals and visions are impressive. Under the slogan “Solidarity in Action” the organisation includes all from first-aid in Norway, immigrant social events, anti-racism advocacy and international development work to mine action; distinguishing itself from other similar organisations by taking a political point of view. Clearly the organisation struggles to keep it all unified under one roof.

As discussed under goals, the changing courses and varying views, in short: the development of NPA in Mozambique must also be said to relate to the varying inputs from its mother organisation. Starting out as an initiative by ex-military personnel with little or no relationship to NPA and little understanding of its principles and development objectives the organisation later had to adapt to some of the NPA philosophy (Interview 1; 18).

However, the clouding with development and the political approach – the continued forcing of the demining people to relate to development and vice-versa – might be what contributes to NPA’s strength and the donor confidence in NPA work internationally (Interview 5).

Last, the fact that NPA has a rather weak hold on its programmes means that a lot depends on local initiative of the managers in place (Interview 9). In a development programme where partners are the most important this might work, but in the demining work with large operational organisations in greatly varying environments it seems evident that a clear sense of direction from the home organisation is vital. This is something that NPA has started to address the last years, in an environment where the Mine Action Unit, to the dismay of other parts of the organisation and the former secretary general and head of international department, has grown and tried to establish the strong central organisation they feel required for their activities (Interview 19).

The “business” environment

Over the past years the “business” of humanitarian mine action has expanded significantly. A wide array of experts, institutes and organisations opine about the best ways to perform demining.⁵⁴ While much is certainly good and diversifying it can be of serious challenge

⁵⁴ As does this thesis...

if a weak local organisation is to critically choose and assess the best inputs. For NPA as an organisation a key feature has been to pick-up the best and most vital input from the international environment (and to some extent coordinate the international business); then integrate best practices into their country programmes and design the overall goals (even if they have struggled somewhat). This strength can clearly not be expected of a local demining organisation.

Why is the environment so critical?

A difficult environment in the start-up phase, led NPA to make certain necessary choices for the creation of the local organisation. The choices made had consequences for how well the organisation created was able to function independently later on. With the current high rate of corruption, it is hard to see how a successful hand-over to local authorities (the goal in early strategies) can be accomplished.

Several stakeholders in an asymmetrical power structure, and the choices made with regards to how NPA and other international actors engaged local stakeholders, led to differentiated power structures and can to some extent explain the passivity of the local environment today.

5 Final summary

I have told the history of NPA in Mozambique and analysed it using organisation theory. Through this I sought reasons for why the organisation created by NPA in Mozambique did not become a “sustainable capacity” and why it had some struggles on the way. While certainly individual capacities have been transferred and the problem to a large extent has been solved, the larger whole of the organisation and the technological advance it constituted, most likely disappears as NPA leaves the country.

If we look at the social structure there are some key factors that affected the outcome. The structure created in the start-up phase revolved around the importance of and dependence on the expatriate staff. This never changed, the local Programme Manager employed from 1998 was responsible, but had to take advice and directions from local expatriate administration and Technical Advisors. In addition the informal structure (if we look away from the actual technology surrounding demining) depended on strong individuals, when these left the organisation suffered.

Establishing the structures needed for an organization of the dimensions we talk about here takes time. NPA did credible attempts at imprinting the necessary values, norms and role expectations and creating a common way of thinking and behaving; but this was not feasible within the timeframes given by the donors.

While some remarkable persons were employed, the organisation suffered from scarce availability of qualified personnel, the frequent loss of trained personnel as well as frequent changes of expatriate staff. With an informal structure, where much was imprinted in individuals, a weak human resources policy from the head office caused problems.

The goals of NPA Mozambique and NPA in Mozambique have changed frequently and been influenced by many along the way. From desiring to only build an emergency capacity to be taken over by the UN within two years, to building a long term demining capacity to aid general development. However logical and understandable this is, it has been hard for a fresh organisation manned with a newly trained staff to cope with.

In a rapidly changing environment, with an informal structure and missing or ambiguous overall policies defined by the head office, the decisions on goals for NPA in Mozambique have

depended on individuals. With mine action not fitting in with the overall strategy of the mother organisation, the organisation created has also been influenced. Policies have been “squeezed” between development and mine action, and were never well defined or viable for concrete action. This resulted in unfeasible long-term goals and the mid-term goals being vague.

The remaining local staff, who will now have to set the goals for a future organisation, never took true part in the definition of goals and the struggles for influence among the stakeholders. Hence for them to define a credible strategy for the new organisation, to be accepted by the other stakeholders, will be a challenging task.

The government, who should be acting on behalf of the affected population, never took a responsible role in goal setting.

The technology first chosen in Mozambique was intended to handle a large scale problem in a quick manner with a large influx of funds. It was not intended for a small scale approach with less expatriate presence and huge demands on individual capacities in the local participants. This and the introduction of new, complex and interdependent but widely different technologies, increased uncertainty and put a large demand on the organisation. At the same time a necessary increase in capacity for information processing was not done and as a result the performance was lowered.

The high standards set for the technology, much as required by western security norms, that the local environment is not able to support. This means that they make the organisation dependent on external support.

Due to a difficult environment NPA had to make certain necessary choices for the organisation they created to function. The choices made had consequences for how well the organisation created was able to function independently later on.

The most important reasons for the NPA operation in Mozambique being discontinued and having had problems along the way is that the government did not take ownership and is very corrupt. The ability of expatriate staff to withstand pressure for corruption will be higher than someone living in and depending on the local environment.

All in all the factors of social structure, participants, goals, technology and environment together explain why it was hard to create an independent organization in Mozambique based the first organization NPA created as an emergency response.

Taking this into consideration NPA has suggested a three pronged approach for future mine action programmes. Three separate paths (and by that organizations sought created) are to be followed: One emergency response, one approach to work with the government to establish permanent structures owned by the government and one to work with local communities to help them reduce the suspected areas in a safe manner and by that “own” the problem themselves (and be independent of corrupt governments).

The case studied in this thesis is the story of a fairly efficient organisation created to help a country recover from a crisis and succeeding in this. On the other hand it provides perspectives on how the transfer of technology between different environments can be difficult.

Building of mine action capacities is part of general recovery and technological development of the developing countries in question. While the main goal is demining, it would be bad if none of the capacity to manage large organisations remain and contribute to general development.

5.1 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES

While performing this study there were various foci of study that were considered and imagined as I progressed, but not found to fit in or be feasible to include within the time frame.

- A further study of how the goals in NPA evolve and how the power structures and the play of the *dominant stakeholder coalitions* influence, involving use of postmodernist theories of social situations. This would also help in analysing the apathy seen by recipients of development aid and assess how the level of empowering of the recipients of mine action would be crucial for local ownership of the problem. How can the ones in need of mine action be empowered to make sure that they get the help they need?
- With the help of organisation theory an analysis of *NPA as a whole*, encompassing all its various activities in Norway and abroad, should be useful to NPA but also provide insights into the development of organisations in general.
- A study of the organisational learning capacities of the local organisations created by NPA.
- Drawing further the connections with literature on *technology transfer* in business and development/capacity building theory while keeping an eye on the differences involved in the asymmetrical power situation at the basis of development aid.

- Studies of the *development of the various technologies for demining* – how did the technology become as it did and what drives the development?
- On a more *ethical* level: to what extent can the millions spent on research and development in new methods for demining be justified? What are the important developments in demining research and development and how adaptable are they to the field?
- With regards to *innovation*: how has Mine Action contributed to and played a role for development in the countries where it has been implemented? Has the effect been positive or negative?

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Appendices

APPENDIX 2 INTERVIEWS

The interviews were performed in Norwegian (apart from those marked with *) and recorded, then transcribed directly to English. Audio files have been saved for all except no 15.

+ Denotes interviews where additional information has been added later.

No	Name	Date	Years involved and Position(s) held	Interview details	Pgs
1	Atle Karlsen	25 July 2006	Management consultant NPA. Wrote report for NORAD in 2003. RR 2004-2006.	Interviewed at NPA HO. Very loose interview guide.	5+
2	Henrik Forsberg Mathiesen	26 July 2006	Desk officer MA Middle East	Interviewed at NPA HO. Very loose interview guide.	6
3	Aksel Steen-Nilsen	27 July 2006	NPA Angola. Consultant to NPA Mozambique and responsible from HO for phase-out in 2006.	Interviewed through Skype. Recording failed/is bad. Rather loose interview guide.	5+
4	Adam Combs	8 August 2006	Current deskofficer for Angola and Ethiopia. Deskofficer NPA Moz. for some months in 2005	Interviewed in person at NPA HO. More clear interview guide from this point..	5
5	Steffen Kongstad	9 August 2006	Department of UN, Peace and Humanitarian Affairs. MFA. Involved with mines from 1995.	Interviewed in person at his office. Tailored interview guide for MFA	6
6	Steinar Essén	14 August 2006	Current deputy head NPA MAU. Supervisor in Mozambique in 1994. Desk officer NPA HO at various stages.	Interviewed at NPA HO. Two audio files.	8
7	Harald Smedsrud	17 August 2006	Current desk officer Cambodia, Laos. Desk officer MA 1995->	Interviewed at NPA HO	6
8	Åge Skagestad	18 August 2006	Resident rep and development programme responsible NPA Tete 1990-1995. Cambodia 2000-2002. Currently controller at NPA HO	Interviewed at NPA HO	5
9	Arne Øygard	19 August 2006	PM Mozambique 1995-1997. Consultant to Angola programme and other NPA programmes in Africa	Interviewed at home in Sandefjord	6+
10	Laila Nikolaisen	21 August 2006	RR Maputo 1993-1995. Various other management positions in NPA, development educated.	Interviewed at NPA HO	8
11	Eva Haaland	25 August 2006	Desk officer Mozambique/Angola from 1995 to present. Development responsible.	Interviewed at NPA HO	6
12	Håvard Hoksnes	29 August 2006	Desk officer NPA operative department 1992-1994. RR Angola, currently at Norw. embassy Angola	Interviewed at NPA HO	7

13*	Luke Atkinson	31 August 2006	HMA from 1994. Started in HALO Trust and has worked with NPA, Danish Church Aid and has worked in Angola, Kosovo, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Jordan. Setup NPA programmes in Sri Lanka, Sudan and Jordan	Interviewed at NPA HO	5
14	Geir Bjørsvik	31 August 2006	Currently in charge of NPA international monitoring concept. Deputy PM Mozambique 1995.	Interviewed at NPA HO	8+
15*	Filipe Muzima	1 and 6 September 2006	National PM Mozambique 1998-2004. With NPA Mozambique from 1993	Interviewed by Phone. No recording due to technical issues. Several later discussions.	7+
16*	Felix Andre	1 September 2006	Deputy PM Mozambique Jan 2006 to present. Joined NPA Mozambique in 1995.	Interviewed at NPA HO	4
17	Svein Henriksen	4 September 2006	Desk officer MAU 1994-1998. The first technical expert at NPA HO	Interviewed at NPA HO	9+
18	Håvard Bach	5 September 2006	1992-1993 Cambodia 1993-1995 PM Mozambique 1995-99 Angola Later GICHD	Skype interview recorded in three files.	17+
19	Halle Jørn Hansen	5 September 2006	Head of NPA international department 1992-1995. Secretary General 1995-2001	Interviewed at NPA HO	6
Informal interviews, talks and e-mails providing important input and being used as references. No recording.					
20	Kristian Berg Harpviken	14 February 2006	PRIO	Talks at his office in Oslo	
21	Steinar Essén	February 2006	NPA MAU	Talks at NPA HO	
22	Sara Sekkenes	July 2005 and 24 February 2006	Current UNDP, former NPA MAU. TIA “inventor”, NPA Angola and PM NPA Mozambique 2004-2006	Conversations in Mozambique and phone call.	
23	Björg Leite	19 September 2006	Royal Norwegian Embassy in Maputo 1991-1995. Currently ambassador to Uganda.	E-mail correspondence	
24*	Ted Paterson		Head, Evaluation Unit GICHD	Various e-mail correspondence.	