

Performing Participation

Stakeholders, Translations & Power in
The World Bank Participation Sourcebook

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Abstract

This thesis is a discursive analysis of the performance of *stakeholder participation* in *the World Bank Participation Sourcebook* (1996). Stakeholder participation is defined as ‘a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them’ (ibid: 3). With empirical data taken primarily from three case studies presented in *the Sourcebook*, this thesis identifies the various ways in which stakeholder participation is managed when transformed into practice. An important premise of these case studies is the perceived *bipolarity* of government and direct beneficiaries as opposing stakeholders. Whereas the participation of government representatives is explained as a required necessity, Bank task managers utilize different ‘levelling techniques’ in order to increase the visibility and participation of weaker, marginalized groups. However, the technically orientated rational of the World Bank creates effects that arrange the content of participatory processes. I have also identified a number of *translations* that further demonstrate how participatory processes are constrained. I argue that how stakeholder participation is translated into practice in effect limits rather than emphasizes its primary definition.

I have also utilized Foucault’s notion of *governmentality* to explain the rationality of stakeholder participation as a form of government. By approaching stakeholder participation as an *organized practice*, I illuminate the World Bank’s field of vision and the technical aspects it depends on. I also discuss what kind of knowledge or rationality that informs stakeholder participation as a practice. I argue that how stakeholder participation is practiced is the result of tensions between two opposing ideas of how to approach development; stakeholders are in different ways included in participatory processes, but their participation is arranged in ways that produces results that benefit the operational demands of the World Bank. Accordingly, I view the examples of stakeholder participation as presented in *the Sourcebook* as *operational participation*, i.e. as participation to the extent that the operational rationality and knowledge of the World Bank allows.

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Introduction

The really helpful things will not be done from the centre; they cannot be done by big organizations, but they can be done by the people themselves... (2003: 34).

Schumacher's formulation comments on a new way of approaching development and aid, one in which material needs are to be addressed through localized and community-based production; it also emphasizes the importance of reforming traditional relations of power in development activities. *Human-centred development* is a perspective that took root in development discourse parallel to the rise of neoliberalism during the 1980s. The perspective is highly influenced by the article *The Meaning of Development* (1969) in which Seers argued that development should be defined through moral evaluations and that the realization of the human potential should happen through certain requirements of human needs and political dimensions (Thomas 2003: 33). Its biggest concern is the redistribution of power; power should be redistributed from traditional centralized instances of power to the direct beneficiaries, i.e. those who are to be 'developed'. Development in this sense not only addresses poverty, but also the strengthening of human capacity and freedom; a central component in the ideology of the human-centred perspective is the notion that local people should be responsible of and active participants in their own development. This notion is central to the idea of *participatory development*. The idea of participatory development is highly influenced by neoliberalism; first, advocates of the human-centred approach often express the need to minimize state influence within recipient countries and distribute resources directly to local people and groups. In addition, participatory development also has a capitalistic dimension as many participatory development projects seek to stimulate local commercial production (ibid 34).

The publication of *the World Bank Participation Sourcebook* (1996) indicated a shift in how the World Bank approach development activities; whereas the traditional approach to development used to be what is referred to as the *external expert stance*, the human-centred perspective of the 1980s would eventually direct the World Bank

towards more democratically and locally driven approaches to development. This study aims to analyze how participation is textually performed and embedded in World Bank discourse. In the article *Beyond the Formulaic* (2001), Hailey questions why development institutions and especially development ‘experts’ are so eager to support and advocate participatory approaches to development (ibid: 97). In the case of contemporary development in general, including the World Bank, development institutions and development experts seem more than willing to empower the poor, and to share power over decisions and resources. Hailey argues, ‘There has been surprisingly little research that offers a critical perspective on the motives, actions and agendas of those who promote these participative tools and techniques’ (ibid). He continues:

The early work of...Michel Foucault would suggest that unless we understand why the development community in general, and the development ‘experts’ in particular promote such participative approaches we will never gain a critical insight into their real role and influence (ibid).

This study aims to contribute to this lacking research. I wish to explore the role of stakeholder participation in World Bank discourse and to describe how stakeholder participation is understood and applied to development practice. I also aim to give possible explanations as to why the World Bank would promote participatory techniques, or in other words, to provide a critical perspective that can explain the motives of the World Bank for applying participatory strategies to development activities. Now, Hailey’s request implies a research that seeks to find the underlying motives and agendas of development institutions and experts that advocate participatory initiatives. However, the analysis of discourse can never get behind the discourse, to find out what people ‘really’ mean, or to find a genuine reality that lies behind discourse. The discourse itself is the object of analysis in this thesis. However, by focusing on oral or written statements, one can find patterns that describe the effects that discursive constructions of reality have on social processes (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 31).

The World Bank Participation Sourcebook (which I will refer to as just *the Sourcebook* from now on) offers its own understanding of the term participation as it divides between the notion of ‘popular participation’ and its own understanding of participation formulated as ‘stakeholder participation’. I would later discover that this division was only the first of many *translations* of participation expressed in *the Sourcebook*; the term would take on different meanings when confronted by different situations and different stakeholders. What the translations have in common is that they in different ways contribute to the simplification and management of complex realities. I argue that stakeholder participation as described in *the Sourcebook* manage the content of development activities and can be viewed as a *process of power*. I will support this argument by analyzing three different case studies presented in *the Sourcebook*. Moreover, I will approach the description and analysis of these case studies with the following questions in mind:

1. How is stakeholder participation understood and/or *translated* when introduced to World Bank development activities?
2. How and in what ways do the translations of participation affect the participatory processes of the three case studies as revealed in *the Sourcebook*?
3. With the prior questions in mind, what could explain stakeholder participation as an *exercise of power*?

Next, I will describe the different historical perspectives of development. I will also display how these perspectives interrelate with the creation and later activities of the World Bank.

Development as Concept and Practice, and the World Bank

Development as a concept has had different meanings and understandings throughout modern history. Some argue that development as a concept was shaped during the Enlightenment period with its emphasis on progress, but also by the idea of evolution during the 17th and 18th century (Baaz 2005: 37). The simplest definition of development as formulated by Chambers means just ‘good change’, which has a positive connotation virtually synonymous with ‘progress’ (Thomas 2000: 23). Some

claim that the term ‘underdevelopment’ was formulated in the inaugural address of American President Harry Truman on January 20, 1949. The greatest consequence of Truman’s development program was the new institutionalisation and practice of development, which ultimately led to what we now call the development industry or ‘the development machine’ (Baaz 2005: 37). However, development as an ‘intentional practice’ can be dated approximately a century earlier. As a response to the problems created by the ‘immanent development’ of industrial capitalism in the first half of the 19th century, ‘intentional development’ set out to solve the problem of the ‘surplus population’ not integrated in the production process of capitalism as wage-labourers, to limit the risk of revolution (Nustad 2004: 14). The notions of social progress, evolution and capitalistic development are all examples of immanent development, which describes a dynamic ‘that builds on itself and develops from within’ (Thomas 2000: 25). These forms of immanent development should be clearly differentiated from the intentional development characteristic of the deliberate policy and action of development agencies (ibid). Out of these different ways of understanding development, Thomas formulates three main senses in which the term is used (ibid: 29):

1. Development as vision, description or measure of the state of being of a desirable society (good change).
2. Development as a historical process of social change in which societies are transformed over long periods (immanent development).
3. Development as consisting of deliberate efforts aimed at improvement on the part of various agencies, including governments, all kinds of organizations and social movements (intentional development).

The idea of a new economic world order based on a Bank was first proposed by Harry D. White. Informed by the depression of the 1920s and 1930s and the importance of reforming international trade after the war, White was convinced that the US needed to aid the reconstruction of Europe and to stabilize the world market in ‘third world’ countries to secure outlets for American products (Nustad 2004: 15). The formation of a World Bank was seen as a necessary step in order to guarantee American investment (ibid). On the 27th of December 1945, President Truman signed the ‘Bretton Woods

Agreement Act' thus giving life to *the World Bank*, an institution set up to lend money to developing countries (ibid).

Besides the economic rationality of this new institutional creation, development as an intentional activity was also explicitly political during this period. Truman himself saw development as a strategic alternative to communism (ibid: 16). Others were even more explicit. Walt W. Rostow's *The Stages of Economic Growth: a Non-Communist Manifesto* (1961) had a significant influence on the development discourse of the time. In the first part of his book, Rostow delineates a universal model of economic growth that all societies must follow, whereas the second part of the book becomes more politically explicit. The book had two main objectives; to present a universal idea for development, whilst simultaneously maintain the continuous dominance of the Western world (Rostow in Nustad 2003: 47). At the heart of Rostow's model was the understanding that all societies must go through different stages of economic development (ibid). Rostow's work was a major influence on what later would be called *the modernization theory* that characterised the intentional development of the 1950s and 1960s. This perspective saw development as a natural immanent process, where societies could be placed on different stages of a timeline; however this immanent process could be expedited through intentional development by introducing poor countries to modern technology, production and expertise (ibid: 51).

This perspective was very much present in the initial development activities of the World Bank of this period, as the Bank began with a strict focus on funding infrastructure in the countries that were granted loans (Nustad 2004: 16). The remedy to the poverty of poor nations was the infusion of the 'bourgeois package', meaning elites, nation-states capital, technology, education and the rule of law. Providing 'third world' countries with these western ideals would enable them to catch up with western industrialised nations (ibid). In the mid-1960s, the Bank became faced with a problem; the stress on the creditworthiness of potential lenders eventually led to a situation in which the Bank ran out of countries to which they could lend money. As a response, the Bank changed its policy and went from funding huge infrastructural programmes towards a wider economic policy by directly seeking to influence the economic policy of their borrowers (ibid: 17).

The modernization theory was widely criticised during the 1970s by a perspective called structuralism or *the dependency theory*. This perspective argued that the capitalistic system had evolved from being a system of free competition into a monopolistic system and rejected the notion of temporal segregation central to the modernization theory. 'Temporal segregation' is the idea that poor nations exist in a sphere separate from and unaffected by the sphere of richer western nations; in other words, it is the idea that 'their' poverty has no connection with 'our' wealth (Nustad 2003: 46). Instead, dependency authors saw poverty and wealth as elements of the same process, a process that primarily was a political one (ibid: 80). Nustad refers to Frank who argued that what developed in the South as an immanent process was the process of underdevelopment as a direct consequence of the capitalist world system (2004: 18). Although this perspective challenged the capitalist orientation of development institutions, critics of the dependency theory states that the tradition did not challenge and transcend the dichotomy of 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' countries. What it did however was to replace expert knowledge of development with expert knowledge of underdevelopment, which illustrates the extent to which development has been established as a hegemonic idea (ibid: 19).

The World Bank was probably less occupied with the squabbles of development critics during the 1970s, and more focused on the fact that debtor countries had difficulties repaying their loans. Money was being spent on projects with no promise of future returns, or being stowed away in international banking accounts by 'development country elites' (ibid). In an attempt to prevent an international economic crisis by defaulting loans, World Bank policy embraced 'structural adjustment programs' during the 1980s and the 1990s, that sought to stabilize the situation by providing further loans to pay off interests on debt (ibid). The granting of these programs was conditional on a restructuring of economic policy in line with present neoliberal economic theory (ibid). Neoliberalism became a dominant perspective of development in 1980s. This perspective considers capitalistic development as the most important strategy towards modernization. Moreover, it argues that intentional development creates problems for a 'well functioning free market'. The reason why societies have developed in different directions is explained by three dimensions of obstacles in 'third

world' countries. The first obstacle is tradition, as traditional social relations and systems of retribution are seen as barriers for the commercialization of production. The second obstacle is monopoly, which creates problems for a self-regulating market. The third obstacle is state regulation, which according to the neoliberal view should be minimized. The role of the state should first and foremost be as a protector of capitalism and the free market by guaranteeing political order and the security of those that 'comes short' in the competitive capitalist market (Thomas 2003: 42-45). Neoliberalism is in this sense not only concerned with economy, but also with politics as embracing economic liberalism to promote economic development will also secure political liberty.

As mentioned earlier, human-centred development is a perspective formulated parallel to the rise of neoliberalism during the 1980s and the focus on human needs is clearly aligned with the neoliberal devaluation of state influence in economic processes. In participatory development there is an increased focus on 'bottom-up' development and making people central to development 'by encouraging beneficiary involvement in interventions that affect them and over which they previously had limited control or influence' (Cooke & Kothari 2001: 5). Recognizing and supporting greater involvement of local perspectives, knowledge and priorities, have been adopted rapidly and widely by development agencies (ibid), including the World Bank. *The Sourcebook* certainly embraces the idea of increased beneficiary involvement; however, it also expresses sensitivity towards other groups that can be affected by World Bank development initiatives. *The Sourcebook's* definition of participation thus focuses on the participation of the multitude of affected *stakeholders* in which direct beneficiaries is counted as but one, though important stakeholder.

Describing 'the Field'

The *Sourcebook* is the most important document to come out of what Francis refers to as a 'learning process' in which the vocabulary and practice of participatory development began to enter 'the mainstream of World Bank operations' (2001: 78). As *the Sourcebook* contrasts the participatory approach to the traditional and technologically orientated external expert stance, it seems unwilling to be too

deterministic about participation (1996: 4). However, the document still formulates its own take on participation, one that is based on the principles of 'joint learning experience, engendering inventiveness and commitment on all sides' (Francis 2001: 78).

By whom is the Sourcebook written? The Sourcebook was first published in 1996, which signified a shift in perspective and approach to development activities. Formulated by the 'Environment Department's Social Policy Division' (ENVSP), *the Sourcebook* consists of a collection of texts contributed by the efforts of approximately two hundred people, including Bank staff and external consultants. Arguably, the most important contributors to the Sourcebook are the *task managers*; these Bank representatives voice sixteen different case studies that describe the successes (and frustrations) of working with participatory approached development projects (1996: xi).

How is the text structured? The Sourcebook is a 250-page document consisting of four chapters, an introduction and two appendixes. The first chapter titled *Reflections: What is Participation?* explains the primary understanding of participation in World Bank development practice. The most interesting aspect of this chapter is the dissociation between the notion of 'popular participation' and 'stakeholder participation'. The second chapter titled *Sharing Experiences* presents sixteen different World Bank development projects in which participatory strategies have been applied. These projects have been designed and implemented in a wide variety of nations, mainly in the regions of northern and southern Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America, and within different economic and social sectors, both on micro and macro levels. The case studies also offer different strategies of participation used when dealing with different sets of stakeholders within different contexts of development activities. *The Sourcebook* comments on an important limitation regarding these case studies. They primarily describe participation that happens during the preparation and planning phases of projects and to a much lesser degree during implementation phases. *The Sourcebook* states that this 'planning bias' reflects the infancy of the Bank's institutional commitment to supporting participatory approaches (ibid: 10). The third chapter, *Practice Pointers in Participatory Planning and Decision-making*, draws on the field experiences of task managers and is meant to guide the reader through the

different steps of participatory planning and decision-making, whilst the fourth chapter, *Practice Pointers in Enabling the Poor to Participate*, focuses on ‘the poor’ as a stakeholder and common barriers to their participation.

Why was the Sourcebook written and towards what audience? Originally, the Sourcebook intended to focus on ‘popular participation’, defined as the ‘participation of the poor and others who are disadvantaged in terms of wealth, education, ethnicity and gender’ (ibid: 6). However, during the documentation of the case studies, they discovered the range of other stakeholders that existed in World Bank operations. The participation of these groups was also important, since bypassing them could lead to situations of opposition that could create problems for project implementation. Thus, the Sourcebook shifted its focus from ‘popular participation’ to ‘stakeholder participation’ (ibid). *The Sourcebook* follows the definition of participation adopted by the Bank’s ‘Learning Group on Participatory Development’ which states that ‘participation is a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them’ (ibid: xi). *The Sourcebook* was written to discover how the contents of this definition could be achieved, and it does so primarily by drawing on the experiences and situations of World Bank development projects that has been carried out in a participatory manner (ibid). *The Sourcebook* states that:

The Sourcebook is not a policy document on participation; nor is it to be read cover to cover. It also does not seek to persuade anyone (other than through example) to use participatory approaches. It is primarily intended for readers who have already decided to use participatory approaches in their professional work (ibid).

This statement signifies what Francis refers to as the learning period of participatory development in World Bank development practice. However, the text states that it still hopes to strengthen the way the readers think about participation and the way they incorporate these ideas into their work. *The Sourcebook* claims that its idea about participation is only one way of understanding the term, but still expresses confidence that the participatory approaches presented in the Sourcebook can ‘improve projects, contribute to the development process and help reach the poor’ (ibid)

Finding ‘Experiences’

When I first decided to write a thesis on development, participatory development seemed like an obvious and interesting direction to take. Participation has certainly rooted itself in contemporary development, and gradually gained a hegemonic position both as a term and as an activity in general development discourse. I was also aware of the more than adequate size of literature on participatory development, and thus confident that the theoretical aspect of the thesis would not pose any serious challenges in terms of accessibility. What I needed then was empirical data. I figured a good place to start my search would be to look at the larger international development institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. By typing ‘participation’ in the search engine of the official web page of the World Bank (worldbank.org), I soon came across the document that later would become the ‘field’ of this thesis, i.e. *the Sourcebook*. I had earlier envisioned that my empirical data would be collected from various documents from a different range of institutions and agencies, and examine participation in general development discourses. However, *the Sourcebook* offers an extensive description (approximately 250 pages) and understanding of participation by one of the largest and most influential development agencies in the world. Moreover, what the Sourcebook offers that really caught my attention, is the sixteen different field *experiences* described by Bank staff; *the Sourcebook* not only offers perspectives of how participation is understood as a term, but also descriptions of participation when introduced to actual development activities. These experiences are the greatest strength of the Sourcebook and the main reason to why I chose this specific document as a source of empirical data.

The second chapter of the Sourcebook presents sixteen different case studies in which World Bank task managers describe both the frustrations and rewards of designing and implementing participatory approached development projects. How I initially approached these case studies was simply by reading them in the alphabetical order they were presented. Whilst I read them, I would also take notes and formulate an overview describing the most important aspects of all the case studies. The reason for doing this was not only to order the material and to narrow it down; I initially intended

to use examples from all the case studies in *the Sourcebook*. However, when going over the case studies for the second time, I made a discovery that would fundamentally direct the writing of this thesis. The fifth case study titled *Colombia: Electricity Sector Reform* describes the successful achievements of a participatory approached development workshop initiated by the World Bank in collaboration with the Colombian government. Faced with possible bankruptcy in the electricity sector, the workshop had provided the Colombian participants with a forum that enabled them to interact as equals (independently of positions in government) and collaboratively and democratically find solutions to solve their own problems. In the latter part of the case study, the task manager listed the concrete recommendations that the Colombian participants had formulated collaboratively over a three-day period. However, upon reading these solutions, something seemed oddly familiar. I remembered reading that prior to the participatory approached workshop, the task manager had organized an assessment group consisting of fifteen Bank staff representatives ‘familiar with Colombia’ (1996: 39) to examine the severity of the Colombian energy crisis and to find out what measures could be taken to avoid further problems. I went back to the section in which this ‘expert workshop’ was described and discovered that the solutions they had proposed were close to identical to those formulated at the participatory approached workshop. These two separate events, one characterised by the activities of external experts and the other by the collaborative efforts of participants had produced the same solutions, different only in the slightest nuance of formulation. Were the similar solutions merely a coincidence or would a closer examination of the participatory process show instances of *control* that guided the Colombian participants in a specific direction? This question prompted me to investigate the relationship between participation and power, and take a stance that would fundamentally affect the methodological and theoretical foundation of this thesis.

The Colombia case differed quite drastically from the other case studies in terms of participants, which in this particular example were taken primarily from different governmental positions. Thus I wanted to find other case studies that described the participation of direct beneficiaries, i.e. the groups of people often labelled as ‘poor’ and ‘voiceless’. I wanted to find out whether *the Sourcebook* would offer other and

different descriptions of participation when confronted with the interaction of ‘less than powerful’ groups. I also wanted to find out if these examples would present similar instances of control as in the Colombia case. I was able to find two such examples that described the participation of direct beneficiaries, though in dramatically different versions. The *Nigeria: Women in Agriculture* example describes a project that sought to address the deficiencies of female inclusion in agricultural programs and does so, ironically, by *excluding* women farmers from the decision-making process. The third case study that I will analyze is called the *Egypt: Matruh Resource Management Project*. This case study offers an example of how the extensive mapping of a Bedouin community is utilized in the creation of ‘community groups’ organized through traditional Bedouin relations of power. In the process of selecting case studies, I actively read all the examples presented in *Sharing Experiences* with the intent of finding cases that described different understandings of participation. I argue that I have managed to do just that. The three case studies I have selected are different in terms of *space* (as in sectors and areas of decision-making) and *content* (as in different stakeholders). Although the case studies offer different versions of stakeholder participation, their common denominator is how the participatory content is *managed*.

A short comment should also be directed towards the different actors or *stakeholders* whose participation is described in *the Sourcebook*. Naturally, the World Bank is the most important actor, and I have approached the Bank just as that, as *one* actor. This view is certainly over-simplistic and blind towards the complex inner workings of a multilateral institution such as the World Bank. However, to approach the World Bank as one actor is justified because of the apparent consistency of *the Sourcebook* (both in terms of structure and content) and the fact that even though the document consist of several contributions from different individuals and groups, *the Sourcebook* as a whole speaks on behalf of the World Bank as an institution. So when I describe statements and actions of the World Bank, *the Sourcebook* and task managers (as representatives of the World Bank), I refer to them as the same actor. I thus view *the Sourcebook* as a voice of the World Bank.

Although *the Sourcebook* states that there are a multitude of stakeholders that can affect or be affected by World Bank development activities, primarily two groups of

stakeholders besides the World Bank, will be focused on; *the government* and *direct beneficiaries* (or the ‘the poor’). The dichotomy of these two groups is particularly evident and addressed in the Nigeria case and the Egypt case, cases that illustrates how the World Bank views and manages situations in which powerful stakeholders are meant to interact with and participate alongside the marginalized poor as stakeholders. This thesis is thus primarily concerned with three stakeholders: *the Bank*, *government* and *direct beneficiaries*.

Discursive Analysis as Theory and Methodology

This study is a textual discursive analysis of stakeholder participation as performed in *the Sourcebook*. *The Sourcebook* deals with cultural contexts, social situations and human pragmatism; in other words, the document presents an understanding of different social worlds of human interaction and of groups of people that are divided geographically, but unified by their involvement in World Bank development initiatives; more importantly, they are unified by participation. *The Sourcebook* however *is* not the social world; it is merely something that constitutes the social world. It is a written performance of space, of social relationships and of behaviour; even more importantly, it is a written performance of participation. Thus, I have approached *the Sourcebook* as a discursive expression of stakeholder participation. Jørgensen & Phillips defines the most fundamental understanding of discourse as:

...a certain way of speaking of and understanding the world – or a section of the world (2006: 9)

Although the term ‘discourse’ has been used differently and with various understandings in scientific literature and debates, it is usually understood through the idea that language is structured in a way that patterns our statements when interacting within different social domains (ibid). Even though there are many ways of approaching the analysis of discourse, most approaches follow the four premises of *social constructionism*. The premises of social constructionism are influenced by French post-structuralist theory that challenged the totalising and universal orientations of Marxism and psychoanalysis (ibid: 15). The first premise of the social-constructive foundation of

discourse is that our knowledge of the world cannot be interpreted as objective truths. The way we speak about the world, our identities and social relations do not present a neutral reflection of reality; in fact, discourses much rather creates and changes these perceptions of ourselves and our surroundings (ibid: 9). Reality is approached through our creation of categories, thus making our knowledge and worldviews products of these categorisations (ibid: 13). The second premise of social construction is its historical and cultural relativity; in other words, the way we represent the world is subjected to historical and cultural confinements that changes in time and space (ibid: 14). The third premise is the connection between knowledge and social processes as common truths and falsies are created and sustained by social interaction (ibid). Finally, there is a connection between knowledge and social action; in any given worldview, some actions are regarded as natural whilst others are regarded as unthinkable (ibid).

Discourse about 'discourse' in anthropology expanded in volume in the beginning of the 1970s. The term became relevant from two directions; it has become part of the language of both linguistic studies and cultural studies. Linguists focus on the structural elements of discursive flow, for example, how topics are introduced and controlled, interruption, and other devices that maintain discursive interaction. Anthropologists in general are more concerned with what these structures of discourse reveal about a 'culture' at large (Lindstrom 2003: 162). The second sort of discourse analysis more commonly applied to cultural studies, focuses more intently on discourse as a reference to particular areas of language use. This tradition of thinking incorporates three levels of meaning: 'discourse is the act of talking or writing itself; it is a body of knowledge content; and it is a set of conditions and procedures that regulate how people appropriately may communicate and use that knowledge' (ibid: 163). As opposed to the linguist focus on the elemental structures of conversational interaction, this 'cultural approach' focuses on the connections between the orders of communication, knowledge and power (ibid). Discursive analysis of this sort was largely pioneered by Michel Foucault who in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972) presented a programme that set out to describe discursive events in order to analyze how patterned discourse maintains particular ways of knowing and networks of power among those who have access to these particular ways of knowing (ibid). The latter form of discursive analysis is the one

I aim to utilize in this study. My approach to *the Sourcebook* has been to analyze the relationship between the textual constructions of meaning and interactional control; in other words, I have tried to explain instances of social control by looking at how participation is understood and translated when introduced to World Bank development practice.

As earlier mentioned, this study is empirically based on a written text, and the use of text as a source of data should be commented on. Jørgensen & Phillips refers to the Fairclough criticism towards what he sees as the ‘simplified and superficial’ linguistic understanding of the relationship between text and society (2006: 78). He argues that textual analysis alone is not sufficient since it does not explain the connections between texts and socio-cultural processes and structures. Discourse analysis should thus incorporate a perspective that combines textual analysis and social analysis (ibid). A similar comment is presented in *Exploring the Written* (1994). This book is composed of a collection of anthropological contributions that aims to discuss the various interconnections between written products and social processes. More specifically, they tend to the multiplicity of written texts and discuss the ways in which texts can function as alternative and complementary sources of knowledge, sources of knowledge that may enhance anthropological understandings of how different discourses are produced, distributed and consumed in the societies under study (Archetti 1994: 13). On the subject of ‘written identities’, Melhuus argues that texts (that usually are not the prerogative of anthropologists) only gains meaning in anthropological terms when it refers to a ‘lived experience’ beyond the text (ibid: 15). Both Fairclough and the anthropological perspectives on written texts, embrace textual analysis as a useful tool, but one that should not stand alone. Whereas Fairclough focuses his criticism towards linguistically orientated textual discourse analysis in general, and *Exploring the Written* focuses on the ‘complementary’ role of texts in anthropological analysis, Nustad focuses more specifically the inadequacies of development discourse analysis. He argues that much of the analysis directed towards development discourse tends to focus on the practitioners of development and thus neglect the reactions of the people that are to be developed (2004: 22). Nustad refers to Kiely’s argument that ‘post-development discourse tends to imply a passive Third World, simply having its strings pulled by an

all-powerful West' (ibid). Nustad thus argues for a more actor-orientated approach to development discourse analysis, by grounding it in 'the social reality from where the analysis began' (ibid).

In the light of these criticisms, how then can I justify my own thesis, a study based solely on textual data? Moreover, to what extent can I counter Nustad's criticism towards the general focus on practitioners in post-development analysis? Largely I cannot; because of the limitations of working primarily with a text, I cannot account for the reactions of the beneficiaries of development and their experiences of participating in a World Bank development initiative (other than the few participant statements at times presented in *the Sourcebook*). *The Sourcebook* does however, present an actor-orientated perspective that I can incorporate into my analysis, through the case studies presented in *Sharing Experiences*. This study is not only concerned with 'isolated discourse', that is, as text, as language, as meaning; this study is also concerned with how discourse is *materialized* (meaning what texts, objects and people do) by looking at how the construction of meaning through written action influence social processes. The three case studies that I have focused on offer descriptions of how participation is practiced in World Bank development projects. In this thesis, I will study these descriptions in an effort to show how the knowledge about or meaning of stakeholder participation is produced or *performed* (Asdal: 27).

My position in this thesis is not as an observer of the field (the field meaning the social process of participatory development), but as an observer of the discursive construction of the field. Moreover, I am an observer of *the Sourcebook* as a *communicative event* (2006: 80) that reflects action in terms of written text, but also how discourse is enabled textually. What the case studies offer in terms of an actor perspective is how the World Bank describes social processes of stakeholder interaction and participation as a strategic tool. By focusing on the textual description of the case studies, I am been able to analyze the discursive construction of participation and social processes, and the wider discursive practice within these constructions operate.

Approaching Power

In *Globalizing Development in Tanzania* (2003), Green explores the standardization of development practice through the social processes of participation. She argues that this standardization is a consequence of the practices applied when development agencies transforms policy visions into *manageable realities* through projects subject to techniques involving organization and control (ibid: 102). Green writes that ‘workshopping’ in Tanzanian development culture primarily functions as a social process with an emphasis on ‘professionalism’. Donor agencies expect from their participants to conform to the framework of these workshops, which functions as packages of input and output, and not to interfere with the ‘clear schedules and aim’ (ibid: 110). In this thesis, I will build on Green’s notion of ‘manageable realities’, and more specifically, on how discourses affect development activities as social processes. Especially two authors have influenced this endeavour, both theoretically and methodologically; two authors that both address the relationship between the construction of knowledge and practices: Bruno Latour and Michel Foucault.

In *Science in Action* (2003), Latour describes the strategies used to solve what he calls the ‘quandary of the fact-builder’. Whenever a scientist or an engineer, wishes to prove the infallibility of a statement or an object, they are dependant on the behaviour of others. Their objective is to transform their claim into a ‘black box’. A black box is not merely a well-established fact or an unproblematic object; it is when a certain object or statement becomes an ‘automaton’, when all the elements within it begin to act as one, that a black box is born (ibid: 131). The movement of a statement or an artefact from claim to black box, will depend to some extent on the fact-builders own actions, yet to a much greater extent on the actions of others whom the fact-builder have little control over. The construction of facts is thus a collective process; without the agreement of others, a statement is merely a claim, not a fact (ibid: 104). The solution sited above seems at first to be a contradiction; the enrolment of others endangers the statement or the object, as they are likely to transform its content beyond recognition. The very notion of involving others, limits the fact-builder’s degree of control. The solution to this contradiction is what Latour calls the central notion of *translation* (ibid: 108). I am not too concerned with Latour’s model in terms of

‘claims’, ‘facts’ and ‘black boxes’. I rather wish to utilize Latour’s model of translation to illustrate how and why the World Bank is able to manage the contents of the social systems they claim to place themselves within. I argue that Latour’s model allows a more explicit analysis of how participants are enrolled into collective processes and then controlled to achieve specific purposes and ends. According to Latour, this can be done by a series of *strategic translations*. Latour and the model of translation are never explicitly discursive; in fact, Latour expressed great scepticism towards the discursive deconstruction of meaning, arguing that discourses cannot be analyzed in isolation; discourses aren’t a world in themselves, but rather a part of the world (Asdal 2003: 27). However, by applying the model of translation to the participatory processes described in *the Sourcebook*, I have been able to identify the relationship between ‘ways of knowing’ and the effects that these ‘ways of knowing’ create. Latour’s model of translation thus offers a specific methodology in analyzing the ways knowledge is produced.

Another important influence has been the works of Michel Foucault, and more specifically his notion of *governmentality*. Foucault is argued by many as one of the ‘Fathers’ of discourse analysis and is frequently commented on, modified, criticised and referred to in most works of discourse analysis (Jørgensen & Phillips 2006: 21). Traditionally, Foucault’s work has been divided into an early ‘archaeological’ phase and a later ‘genealogical’ phase; however, these phases overlap each other. Foucault’s discursive theory is placed primarily within his ‘archaeological work’; what he was interested in is to identify ‘archeologically’, is the rules of which statements that are counted meaningful and true within a specific historic era (ibid). In Foucault’s later and more ‘genealogically’ approached work, he focused more specifically on the relations between *power* and *knowledge*. Instead of approaching agents and structures as primary categories, he focuses more specifically, on how power through discourse is spread across social practices (ibid).

The term ‘governmentality’ was first formulated by Foucault at a lecture delivered at the Collège de France in February 1978, in part as a response to the ascendancy of economic neoliberalism in Western European politics. In this lecture, Foucault shifts his focus from the specialised practices and knowledge of the individual

person, to the exercise of political sovereignty over an entire population. More specifically, he addresses government as a *practice* enabled by a specific *rationality*, or by a succession of different rationalities (1994: xxiii). This rationality of government, or governmentality, marks the emergence of a new way of thinking about and exercising power in certain societies; governmentality address a form of power that is ‘bound up with the discovery of a new reality, the economy, and concerned with a new subject, the population’ (Dean 1999: 19). One of the most interesting elements on the rationality of government is Foucault’s recognition of liberalism as an innovation in the history of governmental rationality (1994: xxvii). Gordon writes:

Liberalism advocates an ‘economic government’ – a government, in other words that, economizes on the use of resources and effort to achieve its ends, and more particularly, accepts that to govern well is to govern less (ibid: xxviii).

In other words, liberalism offers a new way of looking at political knowledge, a way that redefines the role of the state. Here political knowledge is rather concerned with a new objective, social and economic reality that is distinct from and independent of the state (ibid).

Foucault argues that the essential issue in the establishment of ‘the art of government’ is the introduction of economy into political practice; more specifically, Foucault writes that ‘the art of government’ is concerned with how to introduce economy, i.e. the correct way of managing individuals, goods and wealth within the family, to the management of the state (ibid: 207). ‘The art of government’ takes the shape of a ‘good father’; its role is to arrange things in such a way that it leads to a ‘convenient’ end for the family, or the ‘population’ as a whole (ibid: 211). Examples of such convenient ends is the production of wealth and making sure that the population is provided with sufficient means of subsistence, which in turn enables them to multiply, and so on (ibid). To achieve these finalities, government must *dispose things*. Foucault places a special emphasis on the term ‘dispose’. Whereas sovereignty rests on the obedience of laws and thus the instrument of laws itself to achieve its aims, government is not a question of imposing law on men. ‘The art of government’ is about ‘disposing thing’, employing tactics rather than laws (in which laws themselves can be used as

tactics) to ‘arrange things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such-and-such ends may be achieved’ (ibid). Foucault continues this thought by stating that the finality of government ‘resides in the things it manages’ and ‘in the processes it directs’ (ibid). In other words, Foucault is concerned with how power works ‘through’ people, rather than the idea that power is imposed upon people. Thus, ‘governmentality’ addresses the ‘conduct of conduct’, in terms of both how we think about governing, but also how we govern ourselves.

In *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society* (1999), Dean identifies a more general meaning associated with the term ‘governmentality’, one that deals with how we think about governing and with the different mentalities of government. Dean writes that the mentalities of government ‘emphasizes the way in which the thought involved in practices of government is collective and relatively taken for granted, i.e. not usually open to questioning by its practitioners’ (ibid: 16). Governmentality thus suggests a specific rationality (or rationalities) of government. Dean also formulates a way of analyzing government in this sense, by looking at the ‘organized practices’ through which we are governed and in which we govern ourselves; these practices are what Dean calls *regimes of practices*:

These regimes...involve practices for the production of truth and knowledge [and] comprise multiple forms of practical, technical and calculative rationality (ibid: 18).

In this study, I aim to apply Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’ to stakeholder participation as an organized practice. Whereas Latour’s model of translation offers a way of analyzing the rationalities of the World Bank by looking at the ways in which participation is translated, Foucault offers a perspective that can explain the powerful effects on social processes that these rationalities consequently create. In this sense, I will try to describe the linkage between the social production of participation and the production of knowledge that happens within the written experiences of *the Sourcebook*.

The theoretical perspective of governmentality as offered by Foucault, also offers a methodological approach that seeks to uncover such instances of power. The analysis

of government is concerned with how rationalities and thoughts are embedded within programmes for the direction and reform of conduct; in other words, the analysis of government is not concerned with thought in terms of theoretical and abstract dimensions, but rather with ‘thought made practical and technical’ (Dean 1999: 18). I aim to illustrate the ways in which participation is rationalized and translated when introduced to a practical and technically orientated development reality. Moreover, I aim to discuss the interrelation between these translations and the effects that these translations have on the social processes described in *the Sourcebook*.

Anthropology of Development and ‘the Radical View’

In the late 1980s, a group of authors writing from a poststructuralist perspective, began to approach development as a powerful discourse that helps shape the reality that development institutions claim to address, and discard alternative conceptions of the problem (Nustad 2004: 13). As opposed to the human-centred development perspective that seeks to redefine development, many poststructuralist authors reject the idea of development entirely. While some describes development as ‘the colonization of the mind’, others go even further and describes development activities as rape ‘either by force or by seduction’ (Baaz 2005: 149). Post-development discourse (of which I am familiar with and as Foucault would have argued that, I am largely ‘bound by’) offers various degrees of criticism towards development. A common stance of post-development authors seems to be as ‘defenders of local people’ and many claims to speak on the behalf of citizens in development countries or at least those subjected to development policies and practices (Grillo 1997: 4). Ferguson’s *The Anti-Politics Machine* (2003) describes a project in which a decentralized and depoliticized development project eventually leads to the expansion and strengthening of state power in a formerly remote mountain area in Lesotho. Inasmuch, Ferguson is concerned with how a development initiative both intentionally and unintentionally affects social and economic change in a contemporary context. In *Whose Development* (2002), Crewe and Harrison comments on the ways in which indigenous or local knowledge is marginalized in development contexts; a marginalization related to the operational importance of ‘experts’ and ‘expert knowledge’ in development initiatives. Escobar

(1991), comments on the problematic relationship between development and anthropology, and especially towards anthropologists working within the development context, not as scientists, but as policy-makers and consultants. He sees development as a historically specific (and peculiar) experience, which must be defamiliarized so that its naturalness and hegemonic position can be suspended in the eyes of theorists and practitioners. (ibid: 676). Instead of contributing to development, Escobar argues that anthropology should contribute to the re-envisioning of ways of organizing societies and economies, and in the process ‘discover other ways of caring and of healing the ravages brought about by development in the Third World’ (ibid: 678).

In *The Paternalism of Partnership* (2005), Baaz argues that there are problematic aspects of the post-development tradition; even though post-development and the activities they comment on are fundamental opposites, they still share one discursive strategy, i.e. the constructions of difference (ibid: 160). A common theme that operates within a lot of post-development literature is the binary opposition between the spiritual, grounded and altruistic ‘other’ and the West often characterized as non-spiritual, individualistic and materialistic. The ‘third world’ is construed as an opposite of the West; the idealization of the idea that the West ‘works’ and the South ‘lives’, continues the idea of an active West and a passive South (ibid). A problematic consequence of this is that it implies a rhetoric that explains poverty as an internal problem, localized in the culture and mentality of ‘others’ (ibid). Such rhetoric was coincidentally also the fundamental premise of the modernization theory. Baaz is also critical towards the apparent de-legitimization of development that many post-development authors express. The negative view of development as a ‘pathetic’ and potentially dangerous westernization of the ‘third world’ is according to Fagan in itself Eurocentric:

Adopting the privilege of anti-development is not...politically or morally viable when sitting in an ‘overdeveloped’ social and individual location (ibid: 163).

Most post-development contributions are arguably politically motivated, although in various degrees of radicalism. Such a political stance is natural surely, considering the

political potency of development as a social phenomenon. A problematic consequence of the more radical approaches to development can however, blur or dismiss the existence of alternative analytical approaches that challenge the usual conception of development as ‘domination’. Considering the apparent legitimacy of radical criticism within the post-development tradition, and the accessibility of such literature (some of which have been referred to in this thesis), I could have easily written a more radical criticism of World Bank development activities. However, this thesis differs thematically from the post-development contributions mentioned above; the limitations of my material do not allow me ‘to speak on behalf of local people’. This thesis is concerned with how government works through the practices of an international institution that deals with development. More importantly, how government works does not only reflect the relationship between ‘the powerful institution’ and ‘the powerless poor’; it reflects how power discourse operates through everyone within the context of stakeholder participation, including those that govern.

Outline of the Thesis

In this introduction, I have described the theme of this thesis and the problems I aim to discuss. I have also discussed the various historical perceptions of development and placed these parallel to the activities of the World Bank. I have also introduced the theoretical and methodological foundation that my thesis rests on.

In chapter one, I will describe the aspects that *the Sourcebook* argues should be in place in order for participation to be initiated and practiced in development projects, and how these participatory concerns influence the succession of a World Bank sponsored project. The *Nigeria: Women in Agriculture* case illustrate how the World Bank views and manages two primary groups of stakeholders: *the government* and *direct beneficiaries*. The most interesting aspect of this case is the implied view of government and beneficiaries as *bipolar groups*, a view that has fundamental effects on the project as a space of knowledge and decision-making.

In chapter two, I will focus on the *Egypt: Matruh Resource Management* case that illustrates how a complex and disorderly Bedouin community stakeholder (as perceived and described in *the Sourcebook*) is transformed into an administratively and

organizationally adept participant. I will relate this transformation to *the Sourcebook's* expressed emphasis on 'building community capacity' when dealing with beneficiary groups. In this chapter, I will also introduce the first part of Latour's model of translation. With examples from both the Nigeria case and the Egypt case, I will identify the ways in which stakeholder participation is translated in order to enrol others by catering to their interests.

In chapter three, I will focus on a case called *Colombia: Electricity Sector Reform Program*. The Colombia case offers an example of how representatives from different positions in government are brought together to attend a workshop in which decisions are to be generated collaboratively. However, by utilizing the second part of Latour's model of translation, I will identify the ways stakeholder participation is translated to control those enrolled. Such instances of control, is primarily identifiable on two accounts. The first is by looking at how conflicts are solved. The second and more important account of control is identifiable by looking at the role of the 'facilitator'.

In the fourth chapter, I will discuss the relationship between stakeholder participation and perspectives of power. In the effort to identify Foucault's notion of governmentality in the three examples of World Bank participatory efforts, I will conduct a closer examination of stakeholder participation as 'organized practices'. By focusing on dimensions of visibility, technical aspects and rationality, I will discuss what kinds of knowledge that arise from and inform stakeholder participation as organized practices. Moreover, I will discuss the effects of these dimensions of rationality in the attempt to explain, not only *how* participatory processes are arranged in certain ways, but also *why*.

1 Managing Space

Participation is a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives, and the decisions and resources that affects them (1996: xi).

In the participatory efforts of World Bank sponsored projects, ‘representation’ becomes especially interesting because of the inclusion of several interest groups, a central notion in the idea of stakeholder participation as defined above. In this chapter, I will focus on a case study that describes the participatory efforts of a World Bank task manager. The *Nigeria: Women in Agriculture* case, describes a project that sought to address the lacking inclusion of women farmers in agricultural extension programs funded by the Nigerian government. What this case study offers, is an example of how different stakeholders are understood and managed within the context of stakeholder participation. In this chapter, I will also identify three general concerns about participation expressed in *the Sourcebook*. These ‘participatory concerns’ are related to the proper management of stakeholders in participatory processes.

The first concern is *getting government support* (ibid: 121). *The Sourcebook* states that governments’ stand on stakeholder participation is ‘critical’ and that the first important step in starting a participatory approached project is to get the support of the government (ibid). The second concern is called *levelling techniques* (ibid: 133). This concern comments on the difficulties of including direct beneficiaries (i.e. ‘the poor’) in participatory processes, and the measures that can be taken in order to make sure that such marginalized groups are heard (ibid). The third dimension is a continuation of the second dimension. *Building community capacity* constitutes a levelling technique on its own and one that is a clear indication of how beneficiary groups are perceived as participants in World Bank development projects (ibid: 133).

These three participatory concerns are arguably interrelated; furthermore, they fundamentally direct stakeholder participation as social processes. I will describe these

in greater lengths later in this chapter, but before that, I will focus on the first case study of this thesis as described in *the Sourcebook*; the *Nigeria: Women in Agriculture* case.

Nigeria: Women in Agriculture

A study financed by the United Nations Development Program revealed that women make up 60-80 percent of the agricultural labour force in Nigeria. However, agricultural extension services in Nigeria had traditionally focused on men and their farm production, thus excluding a large portion of the production force; as a consequence, women were receiving minimal assistance and information from extension agents. As task manager for the *Women in Agriculture Program*, Katrine Saito worked with Bank staff in developing program guidelines that assist ‘women farmers’ in Nigeria (ibid: 90). In an attempt to counter this issue, the Nigerian government in cooperation with the World Bank, created Women in Agriculture (WIA) programs within the already existing agricultural development programs (ADPs). These programs sought to address ‘the gender-related deficiencies within the existing extension program’ (ibid: 89). A pilot focusing especially on women’s activities was initiated to supplement the ongoing sector, as well as to gain insights in how to improve extension services for Nigerian women farmers.

The task manager’s first major task was to bring all the relevant stakeholders together. The planning of a ‘National Planning Workshop’ would bring representatives from different WIA initiatives together, and allow them to share experiences and to come up with a three-year action plan for each state. The director of Nigeria’s Federal Agriculture Coordinating Unit (FACU) was supportive of the idea that local level stakeholders would participate in the workshop alongside national and state agriculture officials and Bank staff. The director felt that a better understanding of women’s constraints at the local level would best be achieved by ‘broadening the policy dialogue and bringing a range of different stakeholders into the learning and decision-making process’ (ibid: 90).

However, in the workshop planning process, a sense of uncertainty arose in relation to the direct inclusion of women farmers. The task manager admittedly stated that women farmers were voiceless, especially in relation to agricultural projects and

policies, but for them to participate directly could be problematic. One reason given was the volatile political situation in the country at the time, as strikes and riots made in-country travel difficult. Another reason was the limited access to rural areas, as public transportation was unreliable. According to the task manager, getting permission from their husbands and travelling with children would also constitute obstacles. In addition to these political, social and infrastructural barriers, the task manager and their Nigerian counterparts expressed concerns about the ‘effectiveness’ of women farmers as participants in the workshop, here described as a ‘high-level forum’:

This would be an entirely new and potentially overwhelming situation for them in which they would have to interact with powerful stakeholders such as ministers and senior government officials. We were also uncertain of their ability to articulate their problems and needs effectively in this sort of context (ibid: 90).

The solution to this concern would be the inclusion of ‘female extension agents’ whom interacted with women farmers on a regular basis. According to the task manager, these women were ‘accustomed to working with male bureaucrats, travelling alone, and were better able to articulate constraints faced by women farmers and propose solutions on their behalf’ (ibid). Whether these women were representative of women farmers, the task manager commented that:

...although it should never be assumed that certain groups will accurately represent the interests of others, in this case, we had every reason to believe that female extension agents would serve as reliable proxies (ibid).

The workshop was to be held in July 1989, but due to demonstrations against the Nigerian government and an attempted coup in Lagos, the Bank staff was uncertain about the attendance of the workshop. However, some sixty-four participants, mostly women, from all over Nigeria made their way to the workshop. The delegates were primarily the female heads of WIA units, chief extension officers and ADP (Agricultural Development Projects) managers, whom were mostly male. In addition, senior ministers and officials from the sponsoring government departments were also

present, and of course, the Bank, represented by project division and resident mission staff (ibid: 91). After the opening remarks by key officials attending the workshop, the first day was devoted to defining the problems, whereas each WIA representative were given time to present and identify problems that were encountered by women in their ADPs respectively. The task manager was clearly impressed by the results:

Believe me when I tell you that these women were impressive! They were well informed, dedicated, dynamic and articulate. They all came with prepared presentations and they blew us away...The excitement and energy in the room was almost tangible (ibid).

The problems and constraints expressed in these presentations were then discussed in plenary. On the second day of the workshop, the attendants were divided into smaller groups, to undertake strategic and tactical planning. They were asked to come up with three-year action plans for integrating women farmers into the core of ADP activities. Each team was made up of three to four state ADPs, and each state ADP was represented by at least one WIA person and one senior ADP manager. The task manager stated that they ‘felt it was critical to have ADP managers involved to build ownership of the plans by management’ (ibid).

The technical specialists, that is, the Bank staff, government officials and resident staff served as resource people, going from group to group while listening and giving advice. The task manager described the proceedings as following:

The whole process was informal. We all huddled around tables and worked out the three-year plans with little more than pencils and paper (ibid).

The task manager argued that the workshop certainly could be described as collaborative decision-making as ‘participants were actively brainstorming, discussing and exchanging all sorts of ideas’ (ibid). Experiences were shared between the participants, and appropriate technology and innovations were exchanged among the female extension agents:

It was obvious that a lot of knowledge was floating around at this workshop – it was just a matter of pulling it together. We found that combining this local knowledge and creativity with the technical expertise of the government and Bank worked extremely well in producing plans that were locally tailored, financially viable, and technically sound (ibid).

The task manager also described the group dynamics at the workshop. What she found interesting about working in small groups was that it broke the formal office hierarchy that existed between the female extension agents and their ADP managers, who were male. This she related to the pressure the participants were faced with; each team was to prepare presentations that would be performed in front of everyone and that they obviously wanted to make a good impression. According to the task manager, the forced cooperation and direct interaction between the female agents and male managers, broadened the participants' view of each other, and helped them realize that they relied on each other 'to get the job done':

Although the women could put forth their perspectives based on first-hand experiences in the field, managers could put a budgetary perspective on solutions being proposed, while gaining an understanding of the impact their decisions would have on women farmers (ibid).

On the last day of the workshop, each ADP presented their action plans; this time however, presentations were made by the program managers. Again, the task manager emphasized the need for management ownership of the plan. Without their personal involvement and commitment, the likelihood of changes being implemented was minimal:

Bringing about change in favour of women farmers required ownership by *both men and women* at all levels. We knew from past experience that sensitizing or empowering one set of stakeholders to take action while leaving other key players out of the process could lead to problems down the road, or worse, no action at all (ibid: 92).

On reflection, the task manager stated that the momentum created by the workshop was difficult to stop and that the program had benefited both the agricultural sector and the activities of rural women (ibid: 94). It had created a greater awareness of the needs of

these women among policy makers, provided them with new technologies and increased the percentage of women reached by the extension system. The task manager comments:

It is also heartening to see that women farmers now regularly visit the ADP headquarters to express their grievances and dissatisfaction about such things as the method of fertilizer distribution, for example. Until recently, women were rarely heard – only seen – and in this sense the WIA program has dramatically increased their voice and participation (ibid).

The Nigeria case offers an example that illustrates the tensions between government participation and beneficiary participation in a World Bank development projects, and how the inclusion of one stakeholder group consequently resulted in the exclusion of another. How the task manager rationalized the exclusion of the direct beneficiaries can be further understood by looking closer at what I called ‘participatory concerns’ in the introduction of this chapter. The first concern is *getting government support*.

Getting Government Support

According to *the Sourcebook*, the first important step when initiating participatory approaches to development is ‘getting government support’ (ibid: 121). To gain government support, task managers use different types of persuasion, including initiating pilot and field visits to sustain dialogues, orientation workshops and building alliances with central government officials that support a participatory approach. How governments stand in relation to stakeholder participation is characterized as ‘critical’:

Without government support, the Bank can do little to initiate, broaden and sustain participation...Bank task managers must obtain government support to work in a participatory manner (ibid: 122).

The Sourcebook states that this does not mean that the Bank should be passive, but rather that government consent is a required necessity. In most cases, getting government support is not a problem. In some cases, governments call for participatory approaches (ibid). As we saw in the Nigeria case, the government became aware of the

study revealing that women farmers was being excluded from agricultural extension services; their response was to create the 'Women in Agriculture' program in collaboration with the World Bank. In this case, government was positive towards participating with female delegates and jointly designed the participatory efforts from the beginning.

The Sourcebook regards governments as a 'primary group' (ibid: 125). As a primary group, the government is always regarded as a key stakeholder, and is always the first and obvious stakeholder that task managers work with. *The Sourcebook* explains this by stating 'the government is a Bank shareholder, the primary decision-maker and implementer of policies and projects, and the one who repays the Bank loan or credit (ibid). Therefore, a core ministry is always involved, such as finance, planning, and the central bank or similar ministries; often other officials from core and line ministries, in addition to officials from provincial or local authorities have a stake in certain activities (ibid). As described in the Nigeria case, the government was represented by senior ministers and officials from the Agricultural Department during the participatory process, as well as state employed extension agents.

Governments are also viewed as important in terms of identifying other stakeholders. The process of identifying relevant stakeholders is usually done by Bank staff in collaboration with governments by asking questions and seeking answers from both in country and Bank sources (ibid). In the Nigeria case, the task manager and the Bank staff initiated a pilot program where they tested out a number of different approaches on representatives from ADPs. Through this pilot, they learned that the different WIA initiatives had achieved highly different results. The Bank approached the head of FACU with the idea of bringing a number of representatives from the different WIAs together under the assumption that a workshop could enable them to share experiences and thus bring a higher degree of efficiency back to their respective programs.

The first and necessary step in achieving and initiating participation is therefore to secure government approval of working in a participatory manner and their involvement as participants; in addition, the inclusion of government is also important

in terms of identifying other stakeholders. The second participatory concern is directly connected to the first and is called *levelling techniques*.

Levelling Techniques

The Sourcebook states that ‘those directly affected by a proposed intervention are clearly among the key stakeholders. They are the ones who stand to benefit or lose from Bank-supported operations or who warrant redress from any negative effects of such operation’ (ibid: 126). The poor and marginalized are often part of this group. *The Sourcebook* states that ‘voiceless’ groups, such as the women farmers in the Nigeria case, often are the stakeholders whose interests are critical to the success and sustainability of Bank-supported programs. However, it is often these groups of stakeholders that task managers find most difficult to identify and involve in participatory processes (ibid). This is attributed to the fact that when stakeholders such as government officials are included in participatory processes, the differences in power between stakeholders, makes interaction between groups difficult (ibid: 132). Kothari argues this attribution rests on a common assumption in participatory methodology; those who wield power are usually those located at the institutional centre, whilst those who are subjected to power are those located at the local level (2001: 140).

When stronger and more established stakeholders are engaged in participatory processes with weaker, less organized groups, Bank task managers have made use of different techniques in order to ‘level’ these differences (1996: 132). One way of levelling differences is by ‘mandating representation’; i.e. the Bank and sponsors ensure that certain groups participate as ‘a rule of the game’. In such cases, the participation of voiceless groups is incorporated into the design of the project. In the *Benin Health* example, the possibility of women being left out was foreseen by the project managers, and the formation of a village health committee consisting of at least one mother from each of the respective villages in the area, was planned in the design phase (ibid: 133). In the *Chad Education* example however, the issue of participation by women was not addressed, resulting in that no women showed up at the national participatory planning workshop (ibid).

Another levelling technique is to ‘organize separate events’ (ibid); the problems that may arise when marginalized groups are expected to participate and interact with powerful government officials may be solved by arranging separate and less intimidating participatory events for the ‘voiceless’. In the *Philippines Integrated Protected Areas* example, it was discovered that workshops were being dominated by local authorities and NGOs at the expense of indigenous communities. In this case it was decided that tribal groups should have separate workshops; other parties would be present, but as ‘observers only’ (ibid). Power differences can also be levelled by the use of ‘participatory techniques’. One such technique is called ‘level interactions’. Level interactions constitute the division of participants into small groups where participants are expected to comply with certain ‘behavioural rules’:

‘Levelling’ is facilitated when people listen to or observe quietly what others say without criticism or opposition. In the Egypt Resource Management example, outsiders watched respectfully as the Bedouins drew maps on the ground. Quiet observation encouraged the ‘voiceless’ to express themselves through non-verbal representations (ibid: 133).

As seen in the Nigeria case, the use of surrogates was the technique applied to level power in the context of participatory decision-making. *The Sourcebook* defines surrogates as ‘any group or individual who has close links to the affected population and is capable of representing their views and interests during participatory planning’ (ibid: 131). In the Nigeria case, the task manager and the Nigerian government felt that the inclusion of women farmers could be problematic, since ‘women farmers might feel intimidated and overwhelmed and might not be able to articulate their needs effectively’ (ibid: 134). Instead, female extension agents were brought in as ‘reasonable substitutes’ under the assumption that they had the necessary experience of working with male bureaucrats and local government officials, thus making it ‘easier for them to speak to more powerful stakeholders and participate more equally...on behalf of farmwomen’ (ibid).

The third concern is merely a continuation of the second concern, as it constitutes a separate technique that can be utilized when trying to ‘level power’ in participatory processes. However, I feel that this specific participatory technique is essential in

understanding how beneficiary groups are viewed by the World Bank and should thus be commented on separately.

Building Community Capacity

As expressed earlier, Bank representatives express difficulty in involving the marginalized poor because of the many barriers that prevent them from having any real stake in development activities. The first and foremost barrier is the involvement of powerful government officials as their inclusion is viewed as an absolute necessity in World Bank development projects. In the Nigeria case, women farmers were excluded under the assumption that the participation of powerful officials could be experienced as ‘intimidating’ and ‘overwhelming’ and that they would not be able to express their needs efficiently. Power differences are one aspect that limits the poor opportunities in participatory processes. Another barrier that complicates the participation of the poor in World Bank projects is the ‘weak’ structures commonly applied to poor communities:

Some groups – especially the very poor, women, indigenous people or others who may not be fully mobilized – may not have the organizational or financial wherewithal to participate effectively (ibid: 132).

When designing ‘poverty-focused initiatives’ task managers have found it necessary get an overview of the organizational characteristics of poor communities, i.e. the organizational structure in which community decisions are made (ibid: 152). Many informal organizations with different functions operate within such communities. *The Sourcebook* states that it is important to identify such ‘invisible groups’:

Some of the most active community organizations are informal. They are not listed in any documents, and they may be unknown even to people who are familiar with the communities (ibid)

The identification of existing organizations in these communities is explained as important when trying to build community capacity, as it is often through such organizations that demands are expressed, participatory processes organized and

development services are delivered. In fact, many projects work through existing community organizations and are built on the already established, collaborative experience of these groups (ibid). The World Bank must therefore identify these ‘invisible’ and non-documented institutions within the communities by formalizing them (ibid). By increasing their capacity to interact efficiently within the participatory process, they increase their visibility and thus their ability to participate directly in development projects.

The Sourcebook states that when working with local groups project designers might face potential pitfalls when creating the institutional structure ‘without paying adequate attention to the capability, knowledge and technical skills the group will require’ (ibid: 154). Often, newly established groups have failed because too much was expected from them too soon; also, attempts to modify the form or function of existing groups to serve project needs, does not always work:

Community groups, in addition to lacking sufficient funds to begin their own development efforts, frequently lack adequate organizational, administrative, and technical skills to design and implement such activities (ibid).

‘Building community capacity’ is not explicitly relevant to the participatory process described in the Nigeria case, but will be more extensively applied to a different case study presented in the next chapter of this thesis. However, the operational insistence on building community capacity illustrates an important implication, as it indicates a view of beneficiary groups as *collective entities*. This collectivization of direct beneficiaries is also evident in the Nigeria case; the task manager questioned the inclusion of the women farmers, referring to their inadequacies in terms of ‘efficient articulation’ and the fact that interacting with government officials could be an ‘intimidating’ and ‘overwhelming’ experience. The task manager showed no consideration towards the variety of individual personalities existing within the beneficiary group. Arguably, a closer inspection of women farmers as a group (or of *any* group of people for that matter) would reveal simply that some people are more articulate than others, and that some people are harder to ‘intimidate’ and ‘overwhelm’ than others. However, the task

manager applied these perceived characteristics to the women farmers as a collective entity, which consequently resulted in their exclusion as a collective entity.

Efficient Participation

In this chapter, I have described a participatory process in which stakeholder groups are either included or excluded as participants in a World Bank development project. The three participatory concerns (and especially the first two), has had important effects on the participatory process described in the Nigeria case. First, Bank sponsored projects always include governments in participatory processes. As described in the concern of 'getting government support', government inclusion is rationalized in terms of 'project sustainability'. Accordingly, Bank-sponsored development projects does not resemble so-called 'grass-root projects' proven popular especially in certain NGO activities. Such projects emphasize the direct participation between beneficiaries and the NGO outside of government influence or involvement; these projects are what *the Sourcebook* defines as 'popular participation' (ibid: 6). In World Bank development processes of stakeholder participation, governments are *always* included and perceived as an absolute necessity. The most important effect of government inclusion is the fundamental premise it lays for the continuing events of a participatory approached development projects. The first concern, i.e. 'getting government support' is thus intrinsically linked to the second concern of 'levelling techniques'. Since government is included from the beginning, project managers must apply different levelling techniques to ensure that other, less powerful stakeholders can be heard as participants in decision-making processes. In the Nigeria case, we saw how women farmers were replaced by female external agents to 'level' the interaction between participants in the National Planning Workshop.

To 'level' interaction is also viewed as important in order to increase project efficiency and to achieve 'good results'. In the Nigeria case, women farmers were excluded on the grounds of logistical infeasibility, but more importantly, because of a lacking ability to articulate their needs 'efficiently' in a forum consisting of government staff and officials. In this specific case, the inclusion of government created a premise that effectively excluded the women farmers. It was not that the beneficiaries lacked

knowledge, but that they lacked the ability to articulate this knowledge efficiently when interacting directly with government participants. Thus, female external agents were brought in to replace them and to speak on their behalf. Although the involvement of direct beneficiaries in development projects are always wanted to secure sustainability, *the Sourcebook* admits that, the inclusion of these groups often is difficult and sometimes ‘inappropriate’. One of the most important reasons explaining this limitation is precisely the ever-presence of government officials and staff as participants; the direct interaction between powerful stakeholders and ‘weaker and less organized groups’ (1996: 132) is thus viewed as a threat to the overall efficiency of the participatory approach. In the Nigeria case, the workshop was described as a ‘high-level forum’, referring to the government officials that would participate. Because of this, the task manager felt uncertain about the degree in which women farmers were able to ‘articulate their problems and needs effectively in this sort of context’ (ibid: 90). Consequently, the task manager decided instead to involve women farmers indirectly by including female extension agents, under the assumption that they were ‘better able to articulate constraints faced by women farmers and propose solutions on their behalf’ (ibid). In the Nigeria case, stakeholders were included and excluded based on a preferred capability of ‘articulation’, an expression that implies a notion of ‘participatory efficiency’ as an essential part in achieving ‘good results’. I argue that the different degrees to which stakeholders are included in the decision-making process are related to their *relevance*. In the Nigeria case, being a stakeholder is not necessarily the same as being a relevant stakeholder, at least not in terms of direct participation. *The Sourcebook* states that:

Once a participatory stance is taken, getting the right stakeholders becomes essential to producing good results. Not all parties...can automatically be assumed relevant (ibid: 125).

This statement has a couple of implications. First, it divides between the right and relevant stakeholders, and less relevant stakeholders. Second, this division is done as a means to achieve ‘good results’. I argue that the inclusion and exclusion of participants in the Nigeria case are done according to predetermined ideas of what results a

development project should produce. What exactly does ‘good results’ mean in this specific case? This is not specifically defined in the Nigeria case, but one way of interpreting ‘good results’ is by applying the notion of *dual logic* to the participatory efforts (Mosse 2001: 25). Mosse argues that there is a characteristic ‘dual logic’ of participation, which is explained as a product of the tensions between established demands and donor demands for participation. The first logic is the emphasis on ‘local-level integrated planning and local capacity building’, whilst the second logic is concerned with the importance of ‘operational delivery’ (ibid: 25). The first logic juxtaposes project success with the demand that programme activities should be seen and understood as participatory. This logic is certainly evident in the Nigeria case as it offers several statements that describe the program as a thoroughly participatory project. First, the project manager defended the decision of excluding women farmers from the decision-making process, arguing that the participatory efforts had not been significantly weakened by the inclusion of surrogates:

We felt confident that these women extension agents were well qualified to represent the interests of women farmers because they were from the same areas and often were farmers themselves (1996: 90).

The task manager’s description of the National Planning Workshop also emphasized the participatory nature of the project, stating that ‘participants were actively brainstorming, discussing and exchanging all sorts of ideas’ (ibid: 91). On reflection, the task manager also stated that ‘until recently, women were rarely heard – only seen – and in this sense the WIA program has dramatically increased their voice and participation’ (ibid: 94). These statements describe the proceedings of the project as fully and successfully participatory.

The second logic emphasizes ‘upward accountability, proper use of funds, and the planning and delivery of quality programmes’ (2001: 25). In other words, the second logic is concerned with the institutional and organizational demands of *operational delivery*. Mosse argues that there is an element of conflict between these two logics, stating that the ideals of participation are contradicting the World Bank’s basic operating procedures (ibid: 27). This conflict between participation and operating

procedures is especially apparent in a statement offered by the task manager of the *Lao: Health System Reform* example; in this case, the task manager encountered difficulties when trying to formulate organizational reports that justifiably expressed ‘the spirit of the participation mode and conveyed the essence of the participatory process used’ (1996: 65). He continues:

I kept falling back into old habits and had to struggle to bridge the gap between participatory language – with less precision and more flexibility – and Bank standards, which demanded a higher degree of certainty and precise, hard numbers (ibid: 65).

In the Nigeria case, the operational demands of delivery are present in the explanation for and consequently inclusion of surrogates. The female extension agents were brought into the participatory process, replacing the direct beneficiaries that were seen as lacking the ability to express their needs efficiently. To possess an ‘efficient language’ is thus considered a quality that strengthens the ‘delivery’ aspect of World Bank initiated projects. In addition, the inclusion of surrogates is directly related to the participation of government officials. Thus, the emphasis on operational delivery also explains the importance of government involvement in participatory processes, especially in terms of the knowledge they bring with them as participants. In *Reflections: What is Participation?* the following is stated:

The stakeholders contribute their experience and expertise – for instance, the experience of what it is to be poor or female or the expertise to develop specifications for a new road or educational program (ibid: 5)

This statement indicates a division in what sort of knowledge different stakeholders bring into a participatory process. First, it implies that direct beneficiaries contribute ‘experiences’ and thus provide other stakeholders with an increased understanding of their situation. Another form of knowledge is ‘expertise’, i.e. the technical knowledge that can help improve the situation of direct beneficiaries. This division of knowledge is also explicitly identifiable in the Nigeria case. When the task manager commented on the workshop as a ‘space of knowledge’, he stated the following:

Combining this local knowledge and creativity [of the female external agents] with the technical expertise of the government and Bank worked extremely well in producing plans that were locally tailored, financially viable, and technically sound (ibid: 91).

This statement has two important implications. First, it comments on the fact that ‘the technical expertise’ of government and Bank staff produced ‘financially viable and technically sound’ plans. The emphasis on the financial importance of government inclusion is further supported when the task manager stated that ‘managers could put a budgetary perspective on solutions being proposed’ (ibid). Second, it comments on role of surrogates as representatives of ‘local knowledge and creativity’. An interesting aspect of the use of surrogates is that it apparently bridges the gap between the perception of ‘soft’ and flexible participation and the ‘hard’ technical and administrative orientation of the Bank’s standards of operational delivery. In the view of the World Bank, the use of female extension agents simultaneously meets the requirements of participation (as extension agents are seen as viable representatives of direct beneficiaries) *and* the organizational demands for delivery (as they possess qualities that enable them to participate efficiently). The workshop as a space in which decisions are made collaboratively is in itself viewed as participatory, but the content of this space is equally important as it combines ‘local knowledge’ with the financial and technical orientated knowledge of government representatives and Bank staff. The surrogates in the Nigeria case thus functions as a sort of *missing link* that ‘smoothens’ out the contradictions of the dual logic, and secures a ‘good result’ by making sure that *both* participation *and* delivery have been achieved.

Efficient Participation as a ‘Purification of Space’

The most eminent feature of the Nigeria case is the decision in which the direct beneficiaries, i.e. the women farmers were excluded as direct participants. *The Sourcebook* seems to express a view of government and direct beneficiaries as *bipolar groups*, as stakeholders who mutually exclude each other from the possibility of cooperation and participation. The main explanation given for this bipolar view of

government and direct beneficiaries seems to lie with the notion that the two groups inhabit different capabilities in terms of ‘efficient participation’. First, there is an emphasis on the personal involvement of government employed program managers. Without their commitment, the task manager felt that implementation would face difficulties. Their involvement was also important in bringing a budgetary perspective on the solutions that were proposed (ibid: 91). Secondly, as a direct consequence of government participation, the task manager felt uncertain about directly involving beneficiary groups, as women farmers were seen as unable ‘to articulate their problems and needs effectively’ in what was described as a ‘high-level forum’ (ibid: 90). Thus, female external agents were brought in as ‘surrogates’. In *Participation: the New Tyranny* (2001), Kothari argues that ‘there is a purification of space by the exclusion or rejection of certain people and certain forms of knowledge’ (ibid: 147). Kothari continues:

The methodological tools and techniques of participatory development [such as the workshop as a decision-making process]...require a purification or cleaning up of knowledge and experience: a tidying up...through the exclusion of anything that is messy or does not fit...structured representations (ibid).

I argue that this sense of purifying space is evident in the Nigeria case. ‘Purification’ was achieved by excluding ‘inefficient’ women farmers from the workshop as a ‘space of knowledge’. By replacing women farmers with female extension workers, the task manager felt that the dynamic interaction between participants would be more ‘levelled’ and enable a more efficient participatory process. I argue that the workshop as an arena of participation and knowledge is ‘purified’ through the selection process of stakeholders; this purification excludes or includes stakeholders based on their capability of ‘efficiently articulating knowledge’ in the form of ideas, experiences and solutions. The women farmers in the Nigeria case were seen unfit as direct participants and was thus excluded from the workshop as a space of knowledge and decision-making, because of the operational demands of the World Bank.

In this chapter, I have explained how the management of space was done through the exclusion of a beneficiary group. In the next chapter, I will try to illustrate how the

inclusion of a beneficiary group is managed by the World Bank to achieve a similar sense of order and efficiency.

2 Managing the Social

A city map that aspired to represent every traffic light, every pothole, every building, and every bush and tree in every park would threaten to become as complex as the city that it depicted. And it would certainly defeat the purpose of mapping, which is to abstract and summarize. A map is an instrument designed for a purpose. We may judge that purpose noble or morally offensive, but the map itself either serves or fails to serve its intended use (Scott 1998: 87).

Scott writes that the function of the map is to simplify the immense three-dimensional complexity of the city; the map abstracts and summarizes the complexity of reality, thus making these realities more manageable (1998: 97). I argue that the selection process of stakeholders as described in the Nigeria case follows a similar logic. I view the process of inclusion and exclusion as a form of ‘mapping’ that narrows the field of actors, thus making the process of participation more manageable. By removing the ‘odd man out’, the women farmers, and replacing them with surrogates, the female extension agents, the World Bank managed both participatory space and content in order to achieve specific ends. In this chapter, I aim to continue the argument that participation is understood in ways that in effect simplifies and manages the complex reality of development as a social process. Whereas the Nigeria case illustrated how the exclusion of direct beneficiaries resulted in a more manageable and homogenized workshop, the Egypt case offers an example of how a beneficiary community participates directly in a World Bank development project. The task manager of the *Egypt: Matruh Resource Management Project* set out to empower a Bedouin community through the extensive community mapping known as ‘Participatory Rural Appraisal’ (PRA). The Egypt case describes a project in which there is a high degree of interaction between beneficiaries and other stakeholders. I argue that this example presents a case in which purification and management is not achieved through the exclusion of beneficiary stakeholders, but rather through the *management of beneficiary stakeholders as participants*.

Egypt: Matruh Resource Management

In late 1990, the World Bank was approached by the Egyptian government to help identify ways to improve agriculture in the Matruh Governorate, especially in relation to poor and remote farmers in the area. The area was inhabited by 250 000 people, 85 % of whom were Bedouins, who according to *the Sourcebook* were ‘among the poorest and most vulnerable of Egyptians’ (1996: 47). In October 1990 whilst conducting an identification mission in the Governorate, the task manager Bachir Souhlal noted that Bedouins no longer were nomadic, as they had accepted a government program to settle into a more sedentary lifestyle. One of the identified problems was overgrazing, and in general, ‘environmental degradation and poor management practices’ was evident everywhere (ibid: 48). The task manager realized ‘by intuition’ that a traditional livestock project would not suffice and that all stakeholders had to make an effort towards a more efficient use of resource management. The problems of the Matruh region could not be solved by technical solutions, but rather through a change in ‘behaviour’:

Local people would have to change the way they behaved, individually and collectively.

Government would have to learn how to work with the local people and develop their trust and confidence. Finally, the Bank would have to learn how to contribute its knowledge and resources to fit what the local people were capable of and willing to do (ibid).

The best way to address these ‘behavioural problems’ would be to let the local people do the ‘actual work of identification and preparation, instead of a team of external agents’ (ibid). The project started with the formation of a local task force, which consisted of ten people from central government, twenty from local government and ten from the Bedouin community. The latter group was chosen by the local authorities based on the individuals’ positions in their respective communities. A British consulting firm was hired to assist the task force with their work. The task force was divided into seven groups, which set out to learn ‘everything about the governorate and its people’ (ibid). One aspect of this learning was the government’s construction of a library, collecting texts covering geography, topography, economies, history and culture. However, the task manager felt that this alone was not sufficient; the task force

would also make use of a technique called 'PRA'. Francis writes that a key characteristic of the World Bank methodological approaches to participation is that they are 'justified in terms of the short-comings of conventional development planning methods, which are seen as lacking in a 'human' or 'social' dimension' (2001: 72). In an effort to increase the human and social aspects of participatory efforts there is therefore an expressed emphasis on incorporating the 'emic' view in participatory efforts (ibid: 72). Accordingly, the seven groups comprising task force would thus utilize different participatory techniques in order to map the different perceptions, values and priorities of the local population, over a period of three months.

One way of collecting data was through 'semi-structured interviewing'. A sub-team of the task force conducted guided interviews, usually a group of households together. Only some topics were predetermined, leaving room for local people to talk about their specific interests. These interviews provided data about the households; how many people the households consisted of, assets they owned, activities they engaged in etc. This kind of data collection also contributed to 'a feeling for and understanding of the other, thereby generating vital insights' (1996: 49). Another way of collecting data was through 'participatory mapping'; creating maps collaboratively with local people allowed project designers to recognize spatial relationships, differences in farming practices and pinpoint constraints (ibid). 'Transect walks' was a device that ensured an exploration and understanding of the spatial differences of the area being studied. The group walked to the periphery of the settlement, along with selected locals, observing differences in land use, vegetation, livestock and so forth. The task manager stated that 'the local people did the observing while the team recorded the observations because local people always see things outsiders are likely to miss' (ibid). These observations were then used in the construction of a transect diagram, a stylized representation of the area. Different 'seasonal calendars' were also formulated, which focused on local livelihood systems. These calendars were created in meetings composed of several households, on the spot and in front of the groups, so that data checking occurred immediately. The task force also used a technique called 'matrix ranking'; this technique enabled the team to learn what the Bedouins thought about particular matters in both absolute and relative terms. The task force formulated a list of measures in

which the locals would judge, for example possible project activities. This exercise was done a number of times with groups representing different tribes, areas and wealth, which helped the task force to better focus on the poorer areas. The task manager stated that ‘these exercises often turned into brain-storming sessions; team-members became active participants, offering at times concepts and suggestions that were new to the Bedouins’ (ibid).

The task manager stated that it took about one year to prepare a project based on the data they had collected through the PRA method. The project would eventually focus on natural resource management to preserve water, land and vegetation, adaptive research on dry land farming and livestock production systems, and rural finance (ibid). The task manager also stated that once the plan was approved, the Bedouins themselves would implement the plan and monitor the results:

‘Community groups’ which build on traditional Bedouin lineage structures – the bayt – will prepare community action plans to tailor the objectives of the project to local circumstances and capabilities (ibid).

According to the task manager, the most important point about this project was its thoroughly participatory and empowering community-based implementation arrangements (ibid). In addition to community empowerment and action, the task manager stated that mutual respect and trust had been established between the Bedouin community and the Egyptian government (ibid: 51). On reflection, he stated that:

Through participation, we lost ‘control’ of the project and in so doing gained ownership and sustainability, precious things in our business. We also gained more influence with the local people, and they were more open to listening to our suggestions and to the experiences of other people in the world that we could provide (ibid).

The Scientific Forestry Model

In the early modern European state, its forests were primarily viewed through the fiscal lens of revenue needs; from ‘the crown’s’ point of view, interest lied in the annual revenue yield of timber extracted from the forests. In this ‘fiscal forest’ the actual trees

with all its vast number of possible uses, were replaced by an abstract tree representing a volume of lumber or firewood. The state's narrow frame of interest excluded the vast majority of flora and most species of fauna, in addition to nearly everything touching on human interaction with the forest. Hunting and gathering, fishing, pasturage and so on, as well as the social significance of the forest as a place of worship and refuge among other things, was not present in the state's 'tunnel vision' (Scott 1998: 13). The forest as a habitat for plants, animals, insects and humans, was replaced by the forest as 'a manageable economic resource'. The management of such an abstracted 'fiscal forest' is referred to as 'scientific forestry', which was developed largely in Prussia and Saxony from about 1765 to 1800. Its emergence cannot be understood outside the centralized state-making initiatives of the period (ibid: 14). Mathematical principles, sample plots, size categories and colour coding would later contribute to and intensify the narrow vision of the forest primarily as commercial wood; the essential component of a logic that imposed neatly arranged constructs of science on a disorderly nature (ibid: 15). Another aspect of the fiscal forest was the convenience of *uniformity*; a uniform forest was a more manageable forest, a view that prompted centralized powers to turn to monocropping in order to increase revenue yields. In practice, the logic of scientific forestry would have disastrous effects as both natural and human factors intervened; monocropped forests deprived peasants of grazing, food, raw materials and medicines that earlier forest ecology had provided them. The uniform forest would also introduce a new term to the German vocabulary: 'Waldsterben', or 'forest death'. The disruption of the highly complex process of soil building, nutrient uptake, and symbiotic relation between fungi, insects, mammals and flora, left uniform forests more vulnerable to natural injuries and stress such as storms, disease, drought, fragile soil, or severe cold (ibid: 20-21). Scott writes:

...the simplified forest is a more vulnerable system, especially over the long haul, as its effects on soil, water and 'pest' populations become manifest... Given the fragility of the simplified production forest, the massive outside intervention that was required to establish it – we might call it the administrators' forest – is increasingly necessary in order to sustain it as well (ibid: 22).

Scott uses the scientific forestry model as a metaphor to illustrate how powerful institutions like state bureaucracies and large commercial firms, are able through knowledge and manipulation to create manageable realities out of complex natural and social realities. Moreover, it illustrates clearly a common dimension of state-driven social engineering; *the administrative ordering of nature and society* (ibid: 4). I argue that the Egypt case illustrates a similar process. I will continue this argument in the following sections of this chapter.

Participatory Rural Appraisal

In *Participation: the New Tyranny* (2001), Francis discusses the participatory efforts of the World Bank, with a special emphasis on ‘Participatory Rural Appraisal’, the same methodological approach that was utilized in the Egypt case. Associated with one of the most influential writers on participatory methods, Robert Chambers, the PRA method has begun to feature commonly in World Bank projects. Moreover, it is seen as a means of ‘validating local knowledge and empowering local populations’ (ibid: 76). Chambers defines PRA as ‘a family of approaches and methods [that] enable people to share, enhance and analyze their knowledge of life and conditions, to plan and to act’ (ibid).

The methodology of PRA consists of a wide number of research tools and methods, many of them that have been identified in the Egypt case. By using tools and methods such as semi-structured interviews, participatory, mapping, transect walks, seasonal calendars, social and historical profiling and matrix ranking, project designers hoped to formulate an extensive social overview that would generate vital insight into and understanding of Bedouin life and needs. However, the defining character of PRA, Francis writes, is primarily found in the ‘attitudes’ brought to the task. Core values of PRA methods are a heightened sense of self-critical awareness and personal responsibility, to rely on ones judgement before rules and manuals (ibid: 76). In the Egypt case, it was ‘intuition’ that told the task manager that a regular life-stock project would prove insufficient, which in turn directed him towards a participatory approached resource management project (1996: 48). As part of this heightened sense of awareness and responsibility is the acquisition of interpersonal and communicative skills.

Participatory research practitioners are trained in learning before lecturing, but also to

be 'respectful' towards local skills and knowledge (2001: 76). This respectful approach towards local knowledge and practice is also evident in the interactions between Bedouins and government officials as described in the Egypt case. One example is the situation described as 'silent observation' in which non-Bedouin participants 'watched respectfully as the Bedouins drew maps on the ground' (1996: 133).

Francis argues that PRA does not have a formal theory of knowledge, but that it nevertheless has a distinctive attitude towards local knowledge. First, PRA focuses on the emic (actor's) view, before the etic (observer's) view, as local knowledge and constructs are valued over scientific taxonomies. Second, there is an emphasis on achieving credible information through local knowledge, by building trust and rapport with informants (2001: 77). Issues of 'trust' and 'mutual understanding' are mentioned on occasions in the Egypt case. On the matter of using semi-structured interviews, the task manager stated that it generated 'a feeling for and understanding of the other' (1996: 49). On reflection, the task manager also stated that participatory efforts had established 'trust and respect...between the Bedouins and the government' (ibid: 51). Third, there is an emphasis on differences rather than absolute measures, as 'comparison' is higher valued than 'measurement'. Researchers are expected to learn from exceptions rather than averages (ibid: 77). A fourth attitude towards local knowledge in PRA methods is a preference of visual over verbal data. An emphasis on visual data enables the participants to be independent of alphabetical literacy; visual data is therefore preferred by the argument that the 'visual language' of knowledge is a more universal one, and thus further empowers beneficiary groups and secures a levelled participation (ibid). This emphasis can be identified in the earlier mentioned situation when Bedouin participants drew maps on the ground. The importance of visual data is also present elsewhere in this case. For example, the spatial examination of transect walks consisted of walking along the periphery of the settlement whilst local people observed differences in land use, vegetation, cultural practices, etc. These observations were then recorded and later used in the production of transect diagrams (1996: 49).

Beneficiaries as ‘One Voice’

In cases where the World Bank includes beneficiary groups in participatory processes, participatory rural assessment is viewed as a methodology that ensures an extensive examination of local beneficiaries and local knowledge through the use of several participatory techniques. However, Francis argues that one of the most important limitations of most PRA efforts is their tendency to view communities primarily as *collective entities*:

In Participatory Rural Appraisal, the ‘social’ is manifested in a heightened sense of ‘community’, a level privileged both methodologically and morally. Most PRA exercises are collective (2001: 78).

Francis continues that the emphasis on the ‘collective community’ has a few problematic consequences. First, insufficient attention is often paid towards levels of social differentiation within communities. Although techniques such as wealth ranking do try to identify differentiation and inequalities within the community, these efforts often fall short in practice as PRA efforts primarily seek to explain and identify ‘community priorities’ and ‘community plans’ (ibid: 79). Although there is much emphasis on levelling differences between investigators (project designers, Bank staff, etc.) and communities, much less emphasis is directed towards differences within communities. Francis argues that such an emphasis may be equally critical, as ‘transcending historically and culturally rooted differences and conflicts between genders, factions, castes and occupational groups’ are not easily done over short periods of time (2001: 79). A second consequence is the rather simplistic view of communities as singular agents, capable of planning and implementing collective initiatives. Francis argues that experience often does not corroborate this view, as collectivities above and below the community level often function as critical units for decision-making and action (ibid). Although such groups are not necessarily bluntly ignored or dismissed by PRA practitioners, there is still a frequent emphasis on the notional community, often at the expense of other social groups and institutions (ibid). As described in the Egypt case, the task force consisting of Bedouin, government and World Bank representatives,

set out to capture the diversity of the Bedouin community. However, the homogenous view of beneficiary groups is still evident when the task manager described the earlier mentioned ‘thoroughly participatory and empowering implementation arrangement’ that was to follow the research phase of the project:

‘Community groups’ which build on traditional Bedouin lineage structures – the *bayt* – will prepare community action plans to tailor the objectives of the project to local circumstances and capabilities...Once the plan is prepared and approved, the community will be involved in implementing it and monitoring results (ibid: 50).

The Sourcebook does not go into any detail concerning the organization of community groups built on the traditional lineage structure of the *bayt*. It does not even explain to the reader what a ‘bayt’ is. The ‘bayt’ in Bedouin community is the social entity that most closely resembles the notion of ‘domestic group’ or ‘domestic unit’ and translates as ‘tent’; in anthropological literature, the term is generally used to indicate an ‘extended family’ consisting of several ‘conjugal families of male individuals of more than one generation united by descent’ (Fabiatti 1990: 240-241). Now, what exactly *the Sourcebook* refers to when it says that the community groups builds on these *bayts* is uncertain. One possible interpretation is that a community group is organized as one bayt, with one male leader that makes all the decisions. This however, would surely go against the democratically characteristic of participatory initiatives. A more likely interpretation would be that the community groups comprise a number of household heads as equals in the decision-making process. Either way, what is most important about the building of community capacity in the Egypt case, is that it follows the traditional power structure of the Bedouin society. In the book *Power: a Radical View* (2005), Lukes refers to the words of E. E. Schattschneider:

All forms of political organization have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of other because organization is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out (ibid: 6).

Accordingly, I suggest that the efforts towards collecting diverse views and experiences in the research phase fall short when moving from the data-collecting phase to the action plan and implementation phase. If community action plans and their following implementation is formulated and organized through already existing power structures within the Bedouin community, the question is, to what degree are the diverse opinions and interests of the community included? The PRA method seemingly takes on the task of capturing diversity within communities. However, empowerment is not primarily attempted through the inclusion of different views and ideas within the community, but rather through the inclusion of those with power within the community. Hailey comments on the inadequacies of PRA method:

...these processes are not as inclusive as might be expected, and they commonly rely on a small sample of self-selecting participants. The nature of group dynamics also suggests that power often lies in the hands of the most articulate or politically adept (2001: 94).

He continues this argument by stating that such dynamics often serve to reinforce the status and power of existing individuals and groups within the community (ibid). In the Egypt case, I suggest that the World Bank views empowerment as a *trickle-down effect*; by empowering its leaders, the community as a whole is empowered. The community empowerment described in the Egypt case illustrates the World Bank's view of beneficiary groups as collective entities. As described in the first chapter of this thesis, the third participatory concern states that beneficiary groups have to 'build community capacity', i.e. to strengthen their organizational and administrative capabilities in order to interact efficiently as one participant, or as one voice. *The Sourcebook* states that it is often through the organized beneficiary groups 'that demand is expressed, participatory processes organized, and development services delivered' (1996: 152). As earlier mentioned, Francis argues that 'the notional community' is frequently emphasized in World Bank participatory efforts, thus neglecting other social groups and institutions (2001: 79). The PRA method described in the Egypt case gives the impression of capturing the diversity of the Bedouin community, in an effort to empower the community as a whole. However, when organizing the community through already

existing power structures, one might question whether the diverse interests of the community are taken into account in later stages of the project.

The PRA method as described in the Egypt case shares many of the features of the scientific forestry model presented at the beginning of this chapter. Whereas the European forest was seen as a manageable economic resource, the Bedouin community in the Matruh Resource Management Project is converted into *a manageable social structure* through the extensive mapping of the PRA method. Furthermore, the PRA method with its different participatory approaches is similar to that of the logistical representation of the forest; making the forest more manageable is achieved through various techniques such as mathematical calculations, sample plots, size categories and so on. The participatory techniques of the PRA method produces collective beneficiary renderings on different themes which then are interpreted and inserted into tables, calendars, etc. As the scientific forestry model imposed 'neatly arranged constructs of science on a disorderly nature' (1998: 15), the PRA method similarly imposes neatly arranged constructs of participatory techniques on the disorderly and complex social nature of the Bedouin community. The most important aspect of the narrowing vision of the scientific forest is what Scott calls 'the convenience of uniformity' (ibid: 20); a more uniform forest is a more manageable forest. I argue that the same logic may explain the World Bank's emphasis on building community capacity when working directly with beneficiary groups. A uniform beneficiary group, removed from the complex social reality of individual interests within the community, is a more manageable beneficiary group. Accordingly, I view the process of 'building community capacity' as a process that 'purifies' the social reality of development activity. Instead of having to deal with a complex reality composed of individual thoughts and experiences, the World Bank narrows this reality through the capacity building of beneficiary communities. Beneficiary participation is possible when they act as one, organized and unified group. Only when equipped with the administrative, organizational and technical tools that enable an 'efficient participation' are beneficiaries 'brought into vision' in World Bank activities.

Thus far, I have argued that the Nigeria case and the Egypt case exemplifies participatory processes that produce less than participatory results; in other words, the

management of content (whether it be spatial or social content) of development processes produces effects of control that constrains the definition of stakeholder participation. In *the Sourcebook*, by the words of the task managers, both of these case studies are portrayed as participatory and furthermore, as ‘successful’ participatory processes. Why is this? Furthermore, why even promote and utilize participatory approached development when participation is to a high degree limited by the operational logic of the World Bank? Why include other stakeholders, with other interests, understandings and needs, when the World Bank is so immersed in a certain way of thinking about and practicing development that effectively limit the participation of other stakeholders? I argue that the answers to these questions can be found by focusing on how participation is perceived in *the Sourcebook*, or in other words, how participation is *translated* into practice when introduced as development activities. The translation of participation will be discussed in the following section of this chapter.

Translating Participation

Before I start discussing translations specifically, I think it is important to understand the relationship, or more importantly, the *conflict*, between two opposing stances in World Bank development activities: the traditional ‘external expert stance’ and the ‘collaborative stance’. The ‘external expert stance’ is described in *the Sourcebook* as the traditional approach to Bank-sponsored projects, which served as a precursor to the participatory stance that are more commonly applied today, not to all, but in many of the projects that the Bank is involved with. According to *the Sourcebook* however, the introduction of participatory approaches to World Bank practice has seemingly not significantly diminished the role of the ‘expert’:

The external expert stance is not a World Bank innovation, but an inherent and deeply embedded part of our understanding of how to produce results and the role one plays in producing them (1996: 4).

The main difference between the traditional external expert stance and participatory approaches, is that in the external expert stance, project sponsors and designers places

themselves ‘outside’ the system they are investigating, mainly viewing other stakeholders as sources for information. Subsequently, these ‘experts’ determine what a specific project would look like (ibid). With the introduction of the participatory stance, *the Sourcebook* reveals that this is now changing, and that efforts towards *consultation and listening* is being introduced to the role of the expert. A key characteristic of the participatory approach is that ‘the sponsors and designers take a stance that places them inside the social system being addressed’ (ibid: 3). *The Sourcebook* states that the external expert stance has previously often failed and that ‘development experience has shown us that when external experts *alone* acquire, analyze, and process information and then present this information in reports, social change usually does not take place’ (1996: 5). The emphasis on the word ‘alone’ in this quote supports the implication that the introduction of participation in World Bank activities does not necessarily imply a clean break with the traditional ‘external expert stance’. Simultaneously, *the Sourcebook* states that when analysis, objectives, strategies and project tactics are formulated collaboratively, programs are more likely to sustain over time, after their implementations. Accordingly, collaboratively approached development programs are also more likely to achieve real ‘social change’ (ibid: 3). If the introduction of participation in World Bank practice implies a sharing of influence and control, it would also imply a *loss* of influence and control, especially for the ‘expert’, and the knowledge that the ‘expert’ brings into development practice. How then are participation and the external expert stance, allowed to co-exist within World Bank development activities? If the collaborative stance were the antithesis of the external expert stance, would it not mutually exclude the other? When a ‘fact’ faces controversy in the shape of a new ‘claim’, Latour describes the meeting as a ‘two-faced Janus’:

They are as different as the two sides, one lively, the other severe, of a two-faced Janus. ‘Science in the making’ on the right side; ‘all made science’ or ‘ready made science’ on the other (2003: 4).

I suggest that the traditional or ‘ready made policy’ of approaching development in World Bank activities was the ‘external expert stance’. It gave the World Bank absolute control in terms project design and implementation, a control that ensured the

operational demands for efficiency and delivery. However, projects conducted by external experts often failed after implementation. ‘Participation’ as ‘policy in the making’ is viewed as countering this problem; *the Sourcebook* states that by allowing other stakeholders to ‘generate’ and ‘internalize’ social change, projects have a better chance of sustaining after implementation (1996: 5). On the other hand, the ‘soft’ and ‘unpredictable’ characteristics of participation, threatens the operational demands for delivery. Both ‘stances’ offers positive aspects in terms of ‘efficiency’; the former in terms of project sustainability and the latter in terms of result-orientated delivery. I argue that ‘stakeholder participation’ as a practice enables the World Bank ‘to have the cake and eat it too’ by doing two things. As stakeholder participation is a collective process, the World Bank is dependant on the ‘enrolment of others’. However, once people have been enrolled, the World Bank must ‘control their behaviour’. To achieve this, stakeholder participation is subjected to a series of *strategic translations*.

The Model of Translation: Enrolling others

Whereas popular participation primarily is concerned with the participation of the ‘poor and disadvantaged’, *the Sourcebook* explains that other stakeholders affected by World Bank development initiatives deserve equal attention. Because of this, *the Sourcebook* shifted its attention from ‘popular participation’ to ‘stakeholder participation’. As mentioned earlier, *the Sourcebook* defines stakeholder participation as:

Participation is a process, through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affects them (1996: 3).

By using examples from the Nigeria case and the Egypt case, I aim to illustrate how this primary understanding of stakeholder participation is translated in different ways when transformed into development practice. In this chapter, I will use the Latour’s model of translation to illustrate the strategies of interpretations applied when trying to enrol others; how to control those enrolled, will be addressed in the next chapter.

Latour’s model consists of two main parts, whereas PART A describes the strategies of *translating interests*. The first translation Latour offers is (1) ‘I want what

you want' (2003: 108). The first and easiest way to enrol others is to cater to their 'explicit interests' (ibid). In the Nigeria case, one might say that stakeholder participation is presented as a methodological approach that caters to all the different interests simultaneously. First, it caters to the agricultural interests of the Nigerian government. As women farmers constitute 60-80 percent of the agricultural labour force, turning attention towards their needs specifically, would definitely benefit the national farm production in the country. Second, it caters to the interest of the women farmers themselves; as their voices and needs are heard, their working situation, and consequently their life situation, might improve. Third, it also benefits the World Bank as participatory approaches to development projects are seen as more sustainable. Hence, the changes that they help formulate and implement stand greater chance of sustaining over a longer period. As described in the Nigeria case, *the Sourcebook* views stakeholder participation as a sustainable approach to development that caters to the interests of relevant groups and benefits all those enrolled.

The second strategy of translation is what Latour formulates as 'if you just make a short detour...' (ibid: 111). This strategy does not try to shift those enrolled away from their goals; it rather offers them to guide them through a 'detour' that allows them to reach these goals. This strategy is appealing to those enrolled if three conditions are fulfilled. First, the main road must be unavailable. Second, the detour must be well signposted, that is, it must be clear to those enrolled what the detour actually entitles. Third, the detour must appear short (ibid: 111-112). In the Nigeria case, the task manager and government officials emphasized the inclusion of all relevant stakeholders, and then especially local women farmers. The director of FACU stated that in order to better understand the constraints of these women at the local level, they had to broaden policy dialogue and bring a range of different stakeholders into the decision-making process (1996: 90). However, as an uncertainty about the women farmer's ability to participate efficiently arose, the project management decided to bring in female extension agents to speak on behalf of women farmers during the decision-making proceedings. The task manager did not see the exclusion of direct beneficiaries as a decision that made the project less participatory. The decision to exclude women farmers and include female external agents was primarily seen as a strategy of 'levelling

power' within the decision process, which in turn would benefit all stakeholders, including the direct beneficiaries. However, the decision to remove these beneficiaries can also be interpreted as a detour; the main road, i.e. the inclusion of women farmers was closed because of the political and social constrictions that would have made it difficult for them to attend the workshop. Another, more important aspect that blocked the main road was the women farmers' inability to 'articulate their needs efficiently'. In the Nigeria case, the exclusion and inclusion of stakeholders as direct participants was done based on perceptions that measured their ability to participate efficiently in order to secure 'good results'. I suggest that the exclusion of women farmers (who certainly were considered 'relevant') can be viewed as a detour that secured an overall project efficiency that would benefit everyone, including the excluded women farmers.

A third strategy in enrolling others is the 'reshuffling of interests and goals'. Latour argues that when trying to enrol others, their explicit interests present the biggest obstacle. In order to increase ones margin for manoeuvre, you may be dependant on doing away with these explicit interests (ibid: 114). One tactic in achieving this is to 'invent new goals'. In the Egypt case, the government had approached the World Bank and requested the formulation and implementation of a livestock project in the Matruh governate. However, during the identification mission, the task manager argued that a traditional livestock project would not be the appropriate solution to the rapid environmental degradation and poor resource management in the region (1996: 48). Whereas a traditional livestock project would introduce technical solutions and support services, in relation to animal health, the management of grazing land and water resources, the task manager was more interested in solving the underlying issues to the problems. According to the task manager, the problem was not primarily a technical one, but rather a 'behavioural' one:

Local people would have to change the way they behaved, individually and collectively.

Government would have to learn how to work with the local people and develop their trust and confidence. Finally, the Bank would have to learn how to contribute its knowledge and resources to fit what the local people were capable of and willing to do' (ibid: 48).

The task manager thus invented a new goal. The problem that was to be solved was not the technical problems of the Matruh governate, but rather the attitudes and behaviour that caused the technical problems in the first place. Whereas a traditional livestock project could be formulated and implemented within the confines of the external expert stance, this new behavioural goal would be more adequately addressed by the ‘social learning’ generated and internalized by local people when using participatory approaches to development (ibid: 5).

A second tactic in doing away with specific interests is to ‘invent new groups’. Latour writes that this can be difficult as ‘interests are the consequence of whatever groups have been previously engaged to do’ (2003: 115). In other words, the ability to invent goals is made difficult by the existence of already defined groups:

It would be much better to define new groups that could be endowed with new goals, goals which could, in turn, be reached only by helping the contenders to build their facts (ibid).

As earlier argued, the Egypt case offers an example of how the social content of a Bedouin community was managed and made less complex. Whereas the utilization of the PRA method was described as a way of collecting diverse perceptions and needs within the community, the notion of ‘building community capacity’ had a fundamental ascendancy on how this information was used. The data collected from different groups and individuals within the Bedouin community, was used as input when creating a new operational structure organized through already existing relations of power; ‘community groups’ fashioned after *bayts* would formulate plans and monitor implementation. This example of community capacity building is related to the expressed difficulty of including beneficiaries in participatory approached development projects, as they often are not ‘fully mobilized’ and lack ‘the organizational...wherewithal to participate efficiently’ (1996: 132). Accordingly, the participation of direct beneficiaries in World Bank development initiatives is possible when they as *one* stakeholder, or *one* interest group, possess the institutional and organizational ability to participate efficiently. Instead of being a tool that collects ‘diversity’, the PRA method can be viewed as a technique that ‘manages’ the diverse and complex interests within a community. Once

the complexity of the Bedouin community was simplified through the PRA method, the collected data was used in the invention of a new group, i.e. the unified beneficiary group, sharing *one* voice as *one* participant.

PART A of the model of translation illustrates the various strategies used when trying to enrol others; however, by applying Latour's model to the development activities described in the Nigeria case and the Egypt case, I have also illustrated how translating participation in effect manages the content of participatory processes, both in terms of space and the social. In the next chapter, I will present a different case that illustrates a different way of managing participation. The *Colombia: Electricity Sector Reform Project* describes a participatory approached workshop, in which representatives from the Colombian government were brought together to define solutions to the problems of the electricity sector. Here, I will describe the ways in which behaviour and interaction between participants is limited as an effect of how the World Bank understands participation and the spaces within participation operates.

3 Managing Behaviour

The desire to maintain monopolies over areas of knowledge encourages ritual practices designed to protect the sacred status of established approaches to understanding (Kothari 2001: 146)

In the last two chapters, I have described how different participatory techniques combined with the operational rationality of the World Bank in effect manage, simplify and order development practices as social processes. I have also applied Latour's model of translation to these processes as a way of explaining how the World Bank is able to manage contents through the many translations of participation.

In this chapter, I will take a closer look at the participatory efforts of a World Bank initiated workshop. The *Colombia: Electricity Sector Reform Project* sought to solve the problems of a near bankrupt electricity sector of Colombia. The problems would be addressed by arranging a workshop in which participants from different positions in government could interact and define solutions collaborately. The Colombia case thus differs somewhat from the two prior case studies. Whereas the Nigeria case and the Egypt case (though in different ways) described the difficulties and means of including direct beneficiaries in participatory processes, the Colombia case offers an example in which direct beneficiaries are only briefly mentioned, and removed as direct participants from the very beginning. It is similar to the Nigeria case in terms of decision-making, which in both cases takes place in a workshop. However, in the Nigeria case I described the workshop as a space of relevant and efficient knowledge and focused explicitly on explaining why one set of stakeholders was excluded and others were included from this space. I will also approach the Colombia workshop as a space of knowledge, but with an approach that challenge the World Bank's view of the workshop as a space in which participants exchange knowledge and generate solutions through equal interaction. Instead, I argue that the Colombia case offers an example of how the translations of participation enable a *management of behaviour and interaction*.

Colombia: Electricity Sector Reform Project

Turid Sato, the task manager for the *Colombia: Electricity Sector Reform Project* was given this specific assignment in 1984. The Colombian finance minister had declared the electricity sector bankrupt. As a response, the task manager organized a workshop consisting of fifteen Bank staff, familiar with Colombia, including the relevant division chiefs. This group eventually concluded that what Colombia needed was an institutional mechanism that could monitor the energy sector as a whole, and proposed the formation of a nationwide energy board. In addition, the Bank staff concluded that the electricity sector should stop new construction, including a \$3 billion hydroelectric project called URRA, make better use of installed capacity, and finally, to increase tariffs (1996: 39). The solutions formulated seemed appropriate, but the manager issued one major concern:

The trouble was: we weren't the Colombians. The Civil service is competent and doesn't welcome outside directives (ibid).

At this stage, the preparatory work had been done in the traditional expert stance, by a group of external experts, with experience and knowledge about Colombia and the specific sector that had encountered a problem. However, although the solutions proposed seemed appropriate, the Task Manager was convinced that the solution had to come from 'the Colombians' themselves, and the main reason for this is stated above; according to the manager, the Colombian civil service was resistive towards outside directives. This concern can certainly be related to earlier mentions of the relationship between participation and sustainability; as solutions formulated and implemented primarily by external agents often fail, beneficiaries should be included in the decision-making process to secure project sustainability.

The manager then proceeded to convince the Colombian government to work collaborately with the Bank in finding a solution together, and proposed a participatory approach called Appreciation-Influence-Control (AIC). According to the manager, this proposition went over well, stating that 'the Colombians, including the minister of mines and energy...were delighted with my proposal of this approach' (ibid: 40). At

this stage, the collaborative process had been initiated, with the inclusion of central government officials. This stage also introduced a ‘technology’ to the participatory approach, i.e. the AIC method.

The two parties agreed to schedule a three-day conference, but ‘the Colombians’ (as they are constantly referred to in the text) did not want the Bank as a participant, thinking that they were ‘seeking the chance to put a new loan in place’ (ibid). After some negotiating, they changed their mind, and allowed the presence of Bank representatives at the conference. Exactly what ‘some negotiating’ means is not specified in the text. Note that the reason given for the Bank’s seclusion was a resistance towards the possibility of additional loans. Until this point, resistance towards the Bank had presented itself twice. The Bank resident representative then proceeded to organize the conference in collaboration with Colombian representatives. One major assignment was the identification of ‘key stakeholders’, who the task manager described as following:

...people with the power, influence and knowledge to change the electricity sector (ibid).

These stakeholders would include the ministers, permanent secretaries, and other government officials, such as mayors and representatives of Congress. In addition came several expert consultants, members of the opposition party, six Bank representatives from project departments and two conference facilitators.

To summarize, up until this point, the manager had in collaboration with other Bank employees, discussed the problem and found a solution, but was concerned that the solution had been worked out through the external expert stance. A solution had to be formulated by the Bank in collaboration with the beneficiaries to secure project sustainability. The manager then approached the relevant ministers of the Colombian government and suggested that the problems of the electricity sector should be solved in a participatory manner. The manager also suggested a specific participatory approach, the AIC method. The Bank’s resident representative was involved with the identification of relevant stakeholders. Bank expertise had therefore been applied to several stages in the process thus far; it had been applied in finding a solution, in

arguing for a participatory approach (by organizing a conference) and a specific participatory tool (the AIC method), and in identifying the relevant people that would attend the conference.

Stakeholder Participation in Action

The task manager had now managed to convince his Colombian counterparts that a participatory approach to decision-making would be the ideal way of solving Colombia's electricity sector problems. They had arranged a conference that were to be held at the small northern town of Santa Marta; however, the manager soon encountered a major problem when one of the more influential representatives, chosen by the minister of planning, vetoed the participatory approach, arguing that 'ministers want to make speeches, not participate in games' (ibid). The argument went on for hours, and eventually, the AIC consultant and the other facilitator pulled out of the conference. The task manager had run out of options and announced that:

If you insist on a traditional conference, I'll announce tomorrow at the opening that we cannot guarantee any results with a traditional format, and therefore we will have to leave the management of the conference to you (ibid).

With this 'take it or leave it' statement, their opposing counterpart changed her mind, but still insisted that 'the ministers would never go along with the idea of working actively and equally with others in search for solutions' (ibid).

Day one of the conference started with introductory remarks from four of the ministers present. Afterwards, the AIC consultant took the floor and introduced the method of approach that the representatives were about to participate in. The method would help the participants to understand and manage three levels of 'environment' that formed the fundamentals (Appreciation Influence Control) of the AIC method:

- The internal or *controlled* environment (of the organization that have the power and responsibility to carry out projects in the electricity sector).

- The relationship with others outside the electricity sector who *influence* or are influenced by the achievement of the sectors purpose (beneficiaries, contractors, credit companies, advisers, and so on).
- The relevant context that needs to be *appreciated* to understand the impact of economic, political, and cultural factors on the achievement of the electricity sector's purpose.

At this stage, the technology of participation was introduced to the representatives. By 'technology of participation', I mean the technical aspect of the AIC method which is concerned with the fabrication of temporary subjectivities and/or identities of the participants. In other words, the technology was meant to provide participants with the tools to transform their positions and to put aside their everyday role as government representatives or ministers, i.e. their role as people with power, and embrace the role as ordinary citizens. After this introduction, the facilitator turned their attention towards what he called the 'appreciative phase'; the participants were presented with the following hypothetical situation:

Imagine that you are ordinary Colombian citizens. We have just received news that the power plants in the country had been blown up. You are all out of jobs. Over the next twenty-four hours, you will act as ordinary citizens and devise a new electricity sector, an ideal one that serves the interests of all Colombian people (ibid: 41).

This approach was meant to stimulate as many ideas as possible, with an increased understanding of the economic, political and cultural context of the Colombian electricity sector. In addition, role-playing was also explained as a way of 'levelling power' in this specific context. By putting themselves into the mindset of 'ordinary citizens', and temporarily suspending their roles as powerful government officials, direct beneficiaries were seen as indirectly participating in this workshop. The participants were then divided into groups of ten, structured to balance the difference in power and experience between them. Furthermore, they were instructed to behave in a manner of 'equality':

They were told to come up with ideas and listen to each other without comment or judgement. Questions would be allowed, but only to clarify, not to criticize (ibid).

These guidelines would, according to the facilitator, ensure the participants to free themselves of the present dilemma, and to maximize their 'creative energies', whilst role-playing as ordinary citizens would reduce the power differences among the group (ibid). The facilitator would also go between the different groups, to make sure that these 'behavioural rules' were upheld:

The facilitator would go around ensuring that everyone was heard and that they listened uncritically (ibid).

The manager viewed this approach as successful and stated that the participants enjoyed the new way of working together. The task manager also emphasized the creative and playful dynamic of the approach through statements like 'the small groups were buzzing with ideas' and 'They really had fun' (ibid). The most important benefit from this particular approach, according to the manager, was the levelling of power and position between the participants:

The process enabled all the stakeholders, despite their relative power positions, to share information never previously brought together, to learn from each other and to build a common appreciation of the entire electricity sector and its relation to the broader energy sector and the national economy (ibid).

The appreciative phase continued on day two of the conference. Using the same process as the day before, the same groups was asked to examine the present realities that the electricity sector was faced with, both positive and negative, which then was reported back to the other groups:

With the help of the AIC consultant, the plenary was able to reduce all of the thinking into one overarching vision: a functioning system that provided electricity as a basic right of every Colombian citizen (ibid).

However, an interesting situation occurred during the proceedings of the appreciate phase. One of the participants, the manager of CORELCA, a corporation heavily involved in the earlier mentioned URRA project, expressed anger towards the insufficient attention directed towards the URRA project in the workshop. The task manager described the situation as following:

He [the manager] stood up and said that he wanted to discuss URRA – *now*. He ignored the facilitators' attempts to calm him, so the minister of mines and energy stepped in, saying "We will get to this issue in proper order. I ask you to wait." The CORELCA official wouldn't take his seat. Finally, the minister took him aside and told him that, if he was not willing to participate in the process, he should leave. So the man did leave (ibid).

The task manager stated that the remaining participants agreed with the minister, and that removing the manager was the right thing to do (ibid). After having dealt with this major disagreement during the appreciative phase, the facilitator moved on to the 'influence phase'; at this stage, the participants were provided with the tools to understand other external interest. Once again, the participants formed groups of ten with the same emphasis on equal interaction. They were presented with a map of relevant stakeholders, which enabled them to get a better overview of the competing interests relating to the sector. The different stakeholders were also placed by the participants within an AIC table, to illustrate whether the stakeholder had appreciative, influential or controlling power, and which consequently made it easier to work out strategies in relation to these stakeholders.

On the third day of the conference, the facilitator moved on to the 'control phase'. In this phase, the participants who had the power to implement changes and solutions were asked to volunteer as 'champions' of different themes and organize the other participants in groups (ibid: 42). The groups were then asked to prepare action plans, and their conclusions were finally reported to the plenary. According to the task manager, their work was 'accepted with little debate' and after three days of working in a participatory way, 'they had arrived at a consensus' (ibid). As the conference came to its conclusion, the Task Manager described an energy of electric proportions:

The team spirit and commitment to action could be felt in the air. In one way or another, they said, 'For the first time, we know what is happening. We came up with the answers, and we know what to do'. As people were making their own commitment about the future, their voices were filled with emotion (ibid: 43).

Facilitating Stakeholder Participation

According to Green (2003), the central figure in participatory approached workshops is the 'facilitator'. Facilitators are generally self-employed consultants, hired specifically to organize workshops. They may also be asked to prepare key components for project documentation. These external consultants face certain expectations by their employers; the workshop has to produce the right relationship between input and output, between investments and results, a concern that clearly relates to Mosse's notion of 'dual logic', and then specifically to the logic concerned with the operational demands of delivery.

According to Green, the facilitator often presents a 'logical framework' which consists of a chain of causality that can be reversed to design a project; for example, local poverty due to poor farmer prices, due to lack of access to markets, due to poor roads (ibid: 136). According to this chain of casualty, local poverty can be solved by strengthening infrastructure. This logical framework often determines the sequences of dialogue and group work that constitutes the participatory approach of workshopping. A common outline of the group work can be as following:

Groups may be asked to produce lists of key problems using marker pens and flip charts, or state reasons why certain things occur. These are then reported back to the wider group and stuck on the wall for people to look at, literally enveloping participants inside the project text (ibid).

Reporting provides the facilitator an opportunity to edit the recommendations and suggestions derived from the groups. The facilitator can do this by rhetorically questioning the points that would threaten the policy objectives of the project. He or she may also seek support from professional participants when rejecting a certain point or suggestion. Once suggestions have been edited, they are written up on new flip charts,

which eventually will form the basis of the project management documentation (ibid: 114).

Similar tasks were given to the groups in the Colombia Electricity example. In the appreciate phase, the participants were asked to engage in role-play, playing the role of 'ordinary citizens' to come up with an ideal future for Colombia. After ten minutes of individual reflection, the participants would contribute ideas within the group, which then was summarized for the plenary. In the influence phase, the groups discussed the themes and priorities for change and understanding the potential reaction in the political environment. Once again, the participants debated within their respective groups, then made a preliminary report to the rest of the groups. A list of main themes emerged, and the participants then proceeded to vote on four themes that should be prioritized. These included (a) a new direction for policy, (b) finance issues, (c) permanent improvement in management of the entire sector, and (d) a new climate of collaboration among the different stakeholders. According to *the Sourcebook*, the control phase was structured in a way that allowed the conference to produce clear outcomes and commitments (1996: 42). This phase also used flip charts, each listing the main themes developed in earlier phases. Divided into groups, the participants were asked to prepare action plans, specifying concrete tasks that were to be solved, which then was to be reported to the plenary. Among the concrete recommendations were:

- Institutional reform. A 'rector' or some kind of governing entity for managing the electricity sector in the context of the whole: investment policy, financial reform, technology, and so on.
- New policy direction. A freeze on new construction for five years; diversification from hydroelectric to other power sources via conversion of existing power plants; and geographic diversification.
- Financial issues. Change in the structure and levels of tariffs; external borrowing to buy time (ibid: 43).

All the phases during the conference, as described above, were structured in a similar way. The participants were divided into smaller groups, and were asked to solve problems through different forms of interaction, which could be role-play, debating etc. After the groups had worked out solutions and suggestions, the work was then

presented to all the present participants at the conference, and often put down on to flip charts. The role of the facilitator in these plenary discussions was not mentioned specifically in *the Sourcebook*, except during the appreciate phase, where the AIC consultant helped the plenary ‘to reduce all of the thinking into one overarching vision’ (ibid: 41). However, when one looks at the consensus of solutions sited above and compares these to the solutions formulated by the Bank experts described at the beginning of the Colombia case, there seems to be little difference between them. The table below shows the solutions proposed at the World Bank workshop held in Washington by external agents opposing the proposed recommendations presented at the end of Colombia workshop:

World Bank Workshop	Colombia Workshop
A nationwide energy board as an institutional mechanism to provide oversight to the entire sector	A “rector” or some kind of governing entity for managing the electricity sector in the context of the whole
Stop new construction in the electricity sector, such as the planned \$3 billion hydroelectric project called URRA	A freeze on new construction for five years
Make better use of installed capacity	Diversification from hydroelectric to other power sources via conversion of existing power plants
Increase tariffs	Change in the structure and levels of tariffs; external borrowing to buy time

Among the top prioritized solutions to the electricity sector problems were institutional reform and more specifically the establishing of a ‘governing entity’:

A ‘rector’ or some kind of governing entity, for managing the electricity sector in the context of the whole: investment policy, financial reform, and so on (1996: 42).

A ‘governing entity, for managing the electricity sector in the context of the whole’ is just a reformulation of an ‘institutional mechanism to provide oversight for the entire energy sector’. The latter formulation was, as mentioned before, the solution proposed at the World Bank workshop consisting exclusively of Bank staff. Moreover, the other recommendations that was worked out during the participatory approached conference included a ‘freeze on new construction’, a ‘diversification from hydroelectric to other

power-sources' and 'change in structure and levels of tariffs'. The Bank workshop concluded that the Colombians needed to 'stop new construction', specifically the planned hydroelectric project called URRA, to 'make better use of installed capacity', and 'increase tariffs'. The results produced by the Bank workshop and by the participatory approached conference held in Colombia, appear to be close to identical. Note also that the Colombia workshop proposed external borrowing to buy time. As mentioned earlier, the Colombian government initially resisted the presence of World Bank representatives at the workshop, thinking that they just sought 'the chance to put another loan in place' (ibid: 40).

Were the Colombian participants aware of this similarity between their solutions and the ones proposed by the Bank experts? This is not commented on in *the Sourcebook*. What is mentioned however is the way participants expressed their feelings about their involvement in a World Bank initiated workshop. Once consensus had been achieved, the minister of energy and mine took a microphone and walked around the room giving it to whoever wanted to speak, which according to the task manager, almost everyone did (ibid: 43):

In one way or another, they said, 'For the first time, we know what is happening. We came up with the answers, and we know what to do.' As people were making their own commitments about their future, their voices were filled with emotion (ibid).

As described by the task manager, the Colombian participants certainly felt that they had generated their own solutions to their own problems. What then could explain the consensus achieved by the Colombian participants at the workshop? How could a large group of stakeholders, mostly Colombians, divided by power and interests, collectively find the same solutions to a problem as fifteen external experts 'familiar to Colombia'? I argue that the answers to these questions can be found by looking at the ways in which 'power' operates through stakeholder participation as a social process. In the last chapter, I used Latour's model of translation to illustrate how the different translations of participation simultaneously allows the World Bank to enrol others and to manage the contents of participatory development efforts. In the next part of this chapter, I will

use the model of translation to illustrate the different ways in which the World Bank is able to control the behaviour of those enrolled in participatory efforts.

The Model of Translation: Controlling Behaviour

In this section of the chapter, I will turn to the second part of Latour's model of translation, titled 'keeping the interested groups in line' (2003: 121). Whereas PART A illustrates how to interest others, PART B offers strategies in how to make those enrolled and their behaviour predictable. The first strategy of controlling others is formulated as (1) 'a chain is only as strong as its weakest link' (ibid). Once the process of enrolling others have been achieved, the web of interests that tie these together may easily be undone. Latour writes:

Something more is needed to turn the temporary juxtaposition of interests into a durable whole. Without this 'little something', the assembly of people...will behave unpredictably: they will dissent, they will open it, tinker with it; worse, they will lose interest and drop it altogether (ibid: 122).

The only way to stop this from happening is 'to link the fate of the claim with so many assembled elements that it resists all trials to break it apart' (ibid). In the Colombia case, this is done by linking stakeholder participation as a method of finding solutions directly to the problems of the electricity sector in Colombia. The importance of using this method (in the eyes of the World Bank) is evident on two different occasions of conflict as described in the Colombia case. First, it is evident in the situation in which an influential government representative vetoed the participatory approach, stating that ministers were not interested in what she regarded as 'playing games' (1996: 40). As the argument went on for hours, the AIC facilitator eventually threatened to pull out of the project stating that they could not 'run this conference the way you want it' (ibid). The task manager backed up the facilitator with the argument that the project management could not guarantee results with a traditional format. The 'weak link', i.e. the representative that vetoed the participatory approach, eventually backed down as the task manager argued that the conference would only happen along the lines of

stakeholder participation. The situation describing the conflict involving the disgruntled CORELCA manager, also illustrates how 'weak links' are dealt with. Angered by the fact that the proceedings of the conference had yet to address the URRRA project (of which his company was heavily involved with), eventually led to him being asked to leave the conference. As the first situation offered an example in which a disruptive element were given an ultimatum of whether the conference would happen at all, the second situation offers an example of which the disruptive element was altogether removed from participatory process. Both situations offer examples of how opposing elements that threatened the framework of stakeholder participation were dealt with. The fate of the electricity sector is presented as intrinsically linked with stakeholder participation. If the conference was not approached in a participatory manner, the task manager could not guarantee any results (ibid). In the Colombia case, stakeholder participation was translated as the most efficient way of dealing with the problems of the electricity sector. In order to achieve a clear outcome, all participants had to comply with the principles of stakeholder participation.

A second strategy of controlling others is to (2) 'tie up with new unexpected allies' (Latour 2003: 124). The first strategy of controlling those enrolled protects the ties between different interest groups through the disarmament, or altogether elimination of disruptive elements. The second strategy involves bringing in a new element in cases where old links are disrupted, a new element that is able to make use of dismantled elements and reattaching them to each other (ibid: 125). In the Colombia case, the different key stakeholders invited to participate at the conference can be viewed as what Latour calls 'dismantled elements'. The fact that these different groups inhabit different interests is evident when looking at the different situations of opposition; in addition, differences in power and locality (whether it be central or local) means that the stakes are different from group to group. The most important ally for the World Bank in this specific example is the *facilitator*. *The Sourcebook* itself comments on the importance of a strong facilitator:

A skilled facilitator is trained in navigating around tough spots, guiding the entire group through new experiences, and stimulating open discussions and negotiating. The facilitator is a critical

catalyst for setting the AIC conference in motion and for steering participants towards a conference closure that leads to action (1996: 185).

The use of the words 'navigating' and 'guiding' in this statement is interesting. Arguably, in order to navigate or to guide, one has to know the destination. If the workshop is to function as a space where participants define solutions collaboratively, why then the need for a facilitator to guide and navigate? What is the purpose of a guide if the destination is yet to be decided? As earlier mentioned, there was an uncanny similarity between the solutions proposed in the World Bank workshop and the solutions proposed at the end of the workshop. I argue that this was not a coincidence, but rather a consequence of similar kinds of operational pressures that created the effects of management and simplification described in the Nigeria case and the Egypt case. According to Green, an important aspect of development planning is the concern centred on the notion of 'outputs'; development activities are meant to produce measurable outputs, or results, within a limited frame of time. Because of this, development activities are often more concerned with fulfilling its own standards; standards which are products of and limited by an institutional frame which usually in directly related to investments (2003: 107). In terms of the participatory workshop, Green writes:

...workshops serve two purposes. In constituting projects as social institutions they make projects tangible, and by creating a category of stakeholders they create a social group with a stake in perpetuating project space from which more immediate benefits of development derive (ibid: 110).

Green argues that the facilitator is brought in with the expectation of producing the right relationship between investment and result. The dynamic of participation in a workshop or conference must therefore be 'controlled' (ibid: 113). In order to achieve this, one is dependant on a certain degree of control. The facilitator in the Colombian case and his role in the context of the workshop should not be underrated. With the introduction of AIC method, the interaction between the participants attending the workshop had already been narrowed and was now guided by these fundamentals; the purpose of the

conference was to find solutions through the understanding and managing of the three levels of environment. While the AIC method dictated a structure of content, in terms of what subjects participants should address and in what way, the dividing of participants into groups dictated a structure of interaction. The facilitator also observed the interaction, physically moving from table to table to make sure that his rules of conduct were being upheld. The role of the facilitator can thus be viewed as a 'guide' in the right sense of the word. By directing interaction and controlling the movement of participants from one place to another, the facilitator took the participants on a 'journey' with a set destination; a destination that I argue had already been formulated at the Bank staff workshop. Green suggests that 'the social constraints on workshop formats and the rules of participatory engagement and facilitation' reproduce manageable social realities, which conforms to the representations contained in project texts (ibid: 137).

Accordingly, I argue that the 'consensus' reached by the participants at the end of the workshop, was to a higher degree the outcome of the structural limitations of the workshop, as opposed to the workshop as a participatory process. The workshops are structured in a way that takes the participants through different sequences of discussion and group work determined by a specific framework provided by the facilitator, which make her/him an important ally of the project management. In the Colombia case, the facilitator was able to make use of dismantled elements in terms of government representatives with different interests, and to reattach them to each other by placing them inside a 'framed' workshop composed by different components that in effect directed the participants towards a predictable outcome.

From Latour to Foucault

In this part of the study, I have identified two different strategies of translations that enabled the World Bank to control the behaviour and interaction of participants and thus influence the outcomes of the workshop. In chapter two, I utilized Latour's model of translation to illustrate how translations affect, manages and simplifies the contents of development, either as contents of 'space' as described in the Nigeria case or 'social' content as described in the Egypt case. The model of translation has been a useful tool in showing how the World Bank is able to manage and simplify different aspects of the

complex realities of the three case studies I have described. I think the next and natural step would be to find out *why* participatory processes are arranged in certain ways. Why would the World Bank go to such lengths of introducing participation to its own activities, and even formulate a lengthy document specifically concerning participation, if their translations of participation in different degrees inhibit the collaborative efforts of different stakeholders. I argue that the answer to this question might be answered by focusing on the perspectives of power as offered by Foucault. How stakeholder participation is translated and effectively arranged to produce specific outcomes, clearly indicates that some form of power is exercised. The situations of conflict as described in the Colombia case can surely be interpreted as instances of domination. However, ‘domination’ does not explain why the Colombian participants expressed emotionally that they had formulated their own solutions. In addition, I have also identified translations of stakeholder participation that catered to the ‘interests’ of stakeholders that further complicates the view of dominance.

In the next chapter, I will turn to Foucault’s notion of *governmentality* as the *conduct of conduct*. By approaching stakeholder participation as an *organized practice*, or as a *regime of practices*, I aim to explain more adequately why the translations of stakeholder participation manage content and thus take on the appearance as a form of *government*.

4 Participation, Ideas & Power

Alternative 1 Multilateral development policy is determined by institutions driven by the common good. New ideas are welcomed, and those which are well founded empirically and analytically are adopted as the basis for decision-making.

Alternative 2 Development policy is determined by neoliberal forces, epitomized by the US treasury, which use multilateral institutions to further their own agenda. Ideas that run counter to this agenda are either suppressed or distorted.

Bøås and McNeill argues that these two extreme and caricatured positions should be avoided when analyzing the relationship between power and ideas in multilateral development institutions such as the World Bank (2004: 206). The former is naïve and ignores the powerful interest at stake both internationally, and within and between multilateral institutions. The latter is simplistic, ignoring the power of ideas and institutionalization, and the complex nature of power relationships within multilateral institutions (ibid). Bøås and McNeill thus propose a third alternative, more complex and mixed in its approach to the relationship between power and ideas:

Alternative 3 Policies are the outcome of interplay between institutions and ideas; and each of these is influenced both by material interests and norms (ibid: 220).

In the past three chapters, I have described three different case studies that illustrate the different ways in which participation is applied to development processes. In the first chapter we saw how the operational insistency on government inclusion, consequently led to the exclusion of direct beneficiaries. In the following two chapters, I utilized Latour's model to illustrate how the World Bank was able to enrol and to control participants by subjecting 'stakeholder participation' to a series of *strategic translations*. A common denominator that I have identified in all the case studies is how participation is understood and translated according to an operational logic that emphasizes 'participatory efficiency' and 'project efficiency'. Moreover, I have

described how these instances of stakeholder participation in effect arrange the content of participatory processes. How stakeholder participation is understood and how it is translated affect who is included and who is excluded; they affect the social by constructing groups that are meant to act homogeneously as ‘one voice’; they affect the ways in which participants are allowed to behave and interact. As a term that in its most fundamental understanding is characterized as collaborative and democratic, stakeholder participation is translated in various ways that allows it to control the content of development activities. I have thus described *how* participation in effect manage, simplify and control different aspects of development activities. In this chapter, I aim to describe different perspectives of power that can illustrate *why* such instances of control occur in participatory approached World Bank development practices. In other words, what can explain *stakeholder participation as a form of government?*

Stakeholder Participation: a Dominant Ideology?

In *Power: A Radical View* (2005), Lukes argues that power is not only exercised in situations of conflict, as power also can be exercised by *A* through ‘influencing, shaping or determining [*B*’s] very wants’ (ibid: 27). Thus, Lukes extends his analytical framework by looking at observable conflict, but also by taking into account instances of ‘latent’ conflict. In relation to this notion of latent conflict, Lukes’ ‘three-dimensional view’ is also interested in studying subjective and real interest that exists outside of the realms of policy preferences and ‘grievances’ (ibid: 29). Lukes defines the concept of power as ‘*A* exercises power over *B* when *A* affects *B* in a manner contrary to *B* interests’ (ibid: 37). In accordance with this concept, the three-dimensional view offers a sociological approach to the study of how political systems prevent demands from becoming political issues. The three-dimensional approach seeks to explain power by paying attention not only to decision-making, but also by looking at non-decisionmaking and how latent conflicts are suppressed and ‘real interests’ excluded (ibid: 40). The third dimension of power as understood by Lukes is ‘securing the consent to domination of willing subjects’ (ibid: 109). The spatial and social arrangements described in the three case studies certainly illustrate how decision-making processes are managed and arranged in ways that affect the outcomes of

participatory processes. Arguably, these rational arrangements of participatory content secure order in terms of which decisions that are made, and which are not. Thus, my analysis aligns itself with Lukes in terms of how power is exercised by looking at non-decision-making. However, the three-dimensional view of power has its limitations.

The first problematic feature of Lukes' approach is its tendency to approach power in ideological terms. This Marxian approach to power suggests that dominant ideologies are able to create 'false consciousnesses' among its subjects (ibid: 145). Lukes argues that power as domination is 'constraints upon interests' and that 'compliance to domination can be secured by the shaping of beliefs and desires' (ibid). However, in relation to the case studies I have described in this study, I do not relate the exercise of power to a specific ideology of the World Bank. When analyzing power, Wolf argues that it is important to draw a distinction between 'ideas' and 'ideology'. He does so because 'ideologies suggest unified schemes or configurations developed to underwrite or manifest power' (1999: 4). Wolf sees the term 'ideas' as encompassing the entire range of mental constructs that is present in public presentations and that equating ideas with ideology blurs the way in which ideas are linked to power (ibid). The division between ideas and ideology in relation to power should also be applied to the notion of stakeholder participation as an exercise of power in World Bank practice. I suggest that it would be more fruitful to approach stakeholder participation primarily as an idea, or as a term consisting of several ideas. The three case studies I have presented in this study, illustrates three very different examples of participatory approaches. As the task managers are confronted with three different complex realities, participation is applied differently in the respective cases, which in turn create different forms of social arrangements; accordingly, power is exercised in different ways.

To approach participation as consisting of multiple ideas is reasonable when looking at the way in which the definition of 'stakeholder participation' is limited when translated into practice. The external expert stance is claimed by *the Sourcebook* to be a process in which the World Bank takes a stance outside the social system they are investigating and of which they are making decisions (1996: 4). Stakeholder participation on the other hand, is viewed as a stance that places sponsors and designers inside the social or local system. The main difference between the external expert stance

and the collaborative stance is how Bank representatives position themselves; instead of ‘dictating’ development and change, they become participants of development. This change of role comes out of the idea that development as social change is more likely to happen and sustain when development initiatives are done in collaboration with those who are or will be affected by it. In addition, stakeholder participation has a moral connotation. The shift from external expert stance towards more participatory methods has an undercurrent of sacrifice as the World Bank offers to share its power to make decisions with the beneficiaries of development. The fundamental understanding of stakeholder participation suggest that stakeholders influence and share control over the development initiatives, decisions and resources that affect them (ibid: 3). A further implication of this definition is that power is ‘levelled’ between the different stakeholders; they all have the same supposition to exercise power, i.e. to influence, manage, and decide the outcome of development initiatives. If ‘ideology’ is understood as ‘a system of social and moral ideas’ (Bloch 2003: 293) and the definition of stakeholder participation is understood as a part of an ideology, then the translations or ideas that I have presented should *emphasize* the elements that define stakeholder participation, rather than *constraining* them. To approach participation analytically as an ideology in World Bank practice would be insufficient, as stakeholder participation as ideology by definition, is concerned with the sharing of power between stakeholders. Instead, I have identified instances of arrangement and management by looking at the ways in which stakeholder participation as ideology has been interpreted and reformulated through a series of translations.

Another important limitation of the three-dimensional view is its emphasis on power as ‘domination’. As earlier mentioned, Lukes radical approach sees the exercise of power as the ability to prevent people from having grievances and to accept the order of things. In other words, power as domination is the ability to make people do what they otherwise would not do; this ‘false consciousness’ makes them act and behave against their ‘real interests’ (2005: 145). To analyze power in such a way, i.e. as ‘domination’ and the removal of ‘real interests’, one would have to identify the interests imputed to and unrecognized by these actors (ibid: 146). The fundamental principles of discourse theory would say that such an ‘external standpoint’ is impossible. As earlier

mentioned, Lukes argues that the exercise of power is ‘constraints upon interests’ and that dominant ideologies shape the beliefs and desires of its subjects. This perspective draws heavily on the Marxian notion that dominant ideologies are able to create ‘false consciousnesses’ by making people act and think in ways they would not otherwise do. The term ‘false consciousness’ implies that the exercise of power denies subjects their ‘real consciousness’, or in other words, that there is some objective ‘Truth of self’ blurred or veiled by dominant instances of power. Foucault however, argues that one will never discover ‘the Truth’ as all humans at any time is bound by discourse; one can not take a position outside of discourse and outside of representation as ‘truths’ are created within discourses (Jørgensen & Phillips 2006: 23). Although dominant power certainly can shield its subjects from alternative consciousnesses, they are not depriving them of a ‘real’ or ‘true’ sense of consciousness, but from contesting sets of discourses. Furthermore, Lukes himself, addressed the simplified view of ‘power as domination’, stating that:

It was a mistake to define power by ‘saying that *A* exercises power over *B* when *A* affects *B* in a manner contrary to *B*’s interests’. Power is a capacity not the exercise of that capacity...and you can be powerful by satisfying and advancing others’ interests: PRV’s topic, power as domination, is only one species of power (2005: 12).

How stakeholder participation has been understood and rationalized have certainly had powerful effects on the development processes described in the case studies. However, I view the power operating in these case studies as a different species than the three-dimensional view advocated by Lukes. Where Lukes views the exercise of power as ‘domination’, and as something that creates ‘false consciousnesses’ and makes people do what they otherwise would not, Foucault approaches power as something that works through the ‘interests’ of people. Power is approached as a ‘productive force’, rather than a dominant force. I argue that participation creates effects of power that operates between the principles of participation and the principles of domination. By utilizing Latour’s model of translation, I have illustrated how different ideas about participation allow the World Bank to enrol participants by catering to their interests and simultaneously to control their behaviour and thus influence the outcomes of

participatory efforts. Thus, I argue that the power exercised in the case studies is not one of domination, but one that to a certain extent operates *through the interests* of its participants.

Governmentality as the ‘Conduct of Conduct’

Foucault redefined ‘government’...as the ‘conduct of conduct’, i.e. as any more or less calculated means of the direction of how we behave and act (Dean 1999: 2).

For Foucault, government means the ‘the conduct of [other’s] conduct’ (1994: xxix). In *Governmentality: Power & Rule in Modern Society*, Dean comments on this definition by looking at the various implications of the word ‘conduct’ (1999: 10). First, ‘to conduct’ means to guide or to direct and implies some sort of calculation of how this is to be done (ibid). The term also has an ethical or moral sense, especially apparent when considering the reflexive verb ‘to conduct oneself’, meaning our self-directing concern and attention towards appropriate conduct when faced with different situations, for example at home or at work, or in relation to clients or friends (ibid). Another sense of the term ‘conduct’ is conduct as a noun, meaning our behaviours, our actions and our comportments, i.e. the articulated set of our behaviours (ibid). When putting these different senses of ‘conduct’ together, government as ‘the conduct of conduct’ entails a deliberate shaping of conduct according to particular norms and for a variety of ends. In addition, government is ‘an undertaking in the plural’ (ibid). According these different senses, Dean offers a more wide definition of governmentality:

Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests, and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects, and outcomes (ibid: 11).

This wider definition of ‘governmentality’ has further implications. First, government implies the attempt of deliberately directing human conduct, from the perspective (of

those seeking to govern), that human conduct is something that can be controlled, shaped and turned to specific ends (ibid: 11). A second implication is the concern of bringing 'rationality' into the calculation about how to govern. Rationality is defined as 'any form of thinking which strives to be relatively clear, systematic and explicit about aspects of *external* or *internal* existence, about things are or how they ought to be' (ibid). This rational attempt to shape conduct is also linked with a sense of morality; if morality is understood as regulating action or conduct according to a set of norms, then government is 'an intensely moral activity' (ibid). As notions of morality and ethics generally rest on an idea of self-government, 'governmentality' as 'the conduct of conduct' is not only concerned with how people exercise authority over others or how we govern abstract entities such as 'the state' or 'populations'; it is also concerned with 'how we govern ourselves' (ibid: 12).

In the attempt to study how the rationality of government works, Dean formulates what he calls an 'analytics of government'. An 'analytics' is a study concerned with the analysis of the conditions under which particular entities emerge, exist and change (ibid: 20). The study of 'the art of government' (Foucault 1994: 207) is not concerned with the actual relations between authority and domination; rather, it is concerned with the study of the organized practices through which we are governed and through which we govern ourselves; these 'organized practices' is what Dean calls 'regimes of practices':

These regimes...involve practices for the production of truth and knowledge [and] comprise multiple forms of practical, technical and calculative rationality (1999: 18).

Furthermore, 'regimes of practices' are fairly coherent sets of ways of going about things; they are institutional practices of more or less organized ways of thinking about and practicing things as caring, administering, counselling, curing, punishing and in the case of this thesis, *participating* (ibid: 21).

Stakeholder Participation as a ‘Regime of Practices’

An analytics of government examines ‘the conditions under which regimes of practices comes into being, are maintained and are transformed’ (ibid). A simplified framework for the analytics of government takes as its concern ‘how we govern and are governed within different regimes, and the conditions under which such regimes emerge, continue to operate, and are transformed. It thus emphasizes ‘how’ questions like ‘how do we govern’ and ‘how are we governed’. However, such an analysis is not only concerned with the empirical routines of government; it also attempt to understand how these routines are thought or rationalized (ibid: 29). To examine stakeholder participation as a regime of practices, is to examine how participation as a practice operates, and more importantly how it *governs conduct*.

Dean argues that there are certain dimensions of government, which allow us to discover how government functions in terms of its regimes of practices. The first dimension is the ‘fields of visibility of government’ (ibid: 30). Dean writes that the fields of visibility that characterizes a regime of government might be discovered by looking at how certain objects are illuminated and defined, and how others are obscured and hidden (ibid). Studies of governmentality thus emphasize the visual and spatial dimensions of government (ibid). The term ‘visibility’ is explicitly addressed when *the Sourcebook* describes the need to ‘build community capacity’ when including direct beneficiaries in development projects. As earlier mentioned, *the Sourcebook* states that it is important to identify informal and often ‘invisible’ groups in beneficiary communities, since it often through such organizations that ‘demands are expressed, participatory processes organized and development services are delivered’ (1996: 152). The expressed need to identify invisible community organizations, i.e. groups that are unlisted or not documented, imply a view of beneficiary communities as disorderly, a view fortified by the fact that such groups must be strengthened administratively and organizationally once they have been identified. The Egypt case described a project that sought to capture the diverse interests and perceptions of members of a Bedouin community. Although the process of collecting diversity was seen as participatory, the community first became an active participant when they were strengthened administratively and organizationally through the formation of so called ‘community

groups'. It was through these community groups, structured through traditional power relations, that the Bedouin community 'came into vision' as a participant that would tailor objectives and help implement and monitor these objectives (ibid: 50).

A second instance of visibility is certainly identifiable in terms of government participation; in World Bank development projects, government or representatives of government are always present, which stems from the expressed need of 'getting government support'. Thus, the government is always visible in the landscape of stakeholder participation. *The Sourcebook* states that 'without government support, the Bank can do little to initiate, broaden and sustain participation (ibid: 122). The Nigeria case described how the presence of government officials as participants, consequently led to the exclusion of women farmers as direct participants in the National Planning Workshop. This case does not only reflect visibility in terms of government as participants, but also the spatial visibility of the workshop as a space of relevant and efficient knowledge. The visibility of government is also illustrious in the Colombia case, where most of the participants were brought in from different positions in government. The rationalization of including government officials and state employees before direct beneficiaries was related to the technical orientation of the problem and the fact that the key stakeholders were 'the people with the power, influence and knowledge to change the electricity sector' (ibid: 40).

What all the three case studies have in common is the implied *bipolarity* of 'visible' governments and 'invisible' beneficiaries. Moreover, visibility and lack thereof are also linked with the notions of 'efficiency' and 'sustainability', terms that I view as inherent elements of the operational logic the World Bank. I argue that visibility is very much interrelated with a 'technical aspect', a relation that can be identified on two accounts; first, visibility in terms of participation is largely concerned with efficiency and technical knowledge; second, participatory techniques can be utilized to increase the visibility of direct beneficiaries.

The second dimension in the analytics of government is called 'the technical aspect of government' (1999: 31). If government is to achieve its ends, then it must use technical means, means that are a condition of governing and often impose limits on its capabilities (ibid). I have already discussed the relation between the notions of

‘participatory efficiency’ and ‘technical knowledge’. For example in the Nigeria case, the technical knowledge of government representatives made them attractive participants. However, their inclusion was also related to the participatory technique involving the use of ‘surrogates’. Surrogates (in the shape of female extension agents) were brought into the workshop under the assumption that the women farmers did not possess the ‘ability to articulate their problems and needs effectively in this sort of context’ (1996: 90). By ‘this sort of context’, the task manager were referring to the participation of government officials in the National Planning Workshop. The technique of using surrogates can thus be related to the characteristic visibility of government in World Bank development projects. Since the participation of government representatives and the knowledge they possess were seen as a necessary requirement, the women farmers were excluded from the decision-making process and replaced by surrogates that were seen as possessing the supposition to participate efficiently with government representatives.

The use of surrogates is explained as one of many levelling techniques utilized in World Bank participatory development projects. Levelling techniques are utilized to counter the limited opportunities of beneficiaries when confronted with other and more powerful stakeholders. The building of community capacity described in the Egypt case is also seen as a levelling technique; whereas levelling power in the Nigeria case involved using surrogates as replacements for women farmers, the levelling of power in the Egypt case incorporated the idea of strengthening the ‘weak structures’ commonly applied to poor communities (ibid: 132). Like in the Nigeria case, ‘building community capacity’ as a technique reflected the fields of visibility of World Bank activities. The expressed difficulty towards including direct beneficiaries, whom usually are members of poor communities, implies a disorderly characterization of beneficiary communities. They are less visible because of their complexity and their distance from the bureaucratic, administrative and organizational reality of the World Bank. By strengthening their operational capabilities in terms of increased administration and organization, they become visible and can act as a stakeholder.

The mobilization and administration of beneficiaries also reflects visibility in terms of identities. *The Sourcebook* does not see stakeholder participation as a social

process of individual interaction, but rather as a process of group interaction. The emphasis on groups is especially apparent when it comes to including direct beneficiaries as participants. The act of mobilizing beneficiaries through community capacity building is to transform the complex inner workings of a community consisting of individuals, into one cohesive group, speaking with one voice. The Bedouins in the Egypt case was given a 'collective identity', as individual identities were obscured in the mobilization of the community as a whole. The women farmers in the Nigeria case were removed from the decision-making process as a collective group, as the task manager disregarded the fact that they as individuals composing a group, would inhabit different capabilities in terms of 'articulation' and ability to handle 'intimidating' and 'overwhelming' situations.

'Workshopping' as described in the Nigeria case and the Colombia case can also be approached as a participatory technique in which participants are given a forum where they can interact on equal terms and define solutions collaborately. Moreover, the workshop as a participatory technique also has a spatial dimension. The workshop is seen as a space that can be 'filled' with both local knowledge *and* technical expertise; participants can thus utilize this knowledge to produce new knowledge in the shape of solutions and clear outcomes that are both locally tailored, financially viable and technically sound (ibid: 91). The Colombia case workshop consisted mainly of representatives from different positions in government. Even though direct beneficiaries were not included, there were still differences in power between the participants. The participants were subjected to a number of 'behavioural rules' meant to ensure that interaction happened on equal terms. For example, the participants were instructed to listen to each other without comment or judgement and questions asked should only clarify, not criticize (ibid: 41). A central figure in the Colombian workshop was the 'facilitator', whose presence can be viewed as a technique in itself. Hired specifically to guide participants through the workshop, the facilitator not only provided participants with 'rules of behaviour', but also played an active role in policing them, walking from table to table to make sure that everyone was heard (ibid).

The third dimension in the analytics governments is 'government as rational and thoughtful activity'. This will be addressed in the following section of this chapter.

Operational Rationality, Efficiency and the ‘Disposing of Things’

The third dimension in the analytics of government is concerned with the forms of knowledge that arise from and inform the activity of governing (1999: 31). Dean calls this the *episteme* (meaning knowledge) of government, which is concerned with what forms of thought, knowledge, expertise, strategies, means of calculation, or rationality are employed in practices of governing (ibid). What knowledge or rationality then informs participation as an organized practice, or as a regime of practices? What could explain the purpose of participatory approaches in these World Bank development activities? On an ideological level, I suggest that stakeholder participation, as development strategy is a response to the critique that has been directed towards the ‘dictatorial’ characteristics of traditional approaches to development in World Bank activities. In this sense, participation can be viewed as a political strategy attempting to increase positive publicity. This view is reasonable when looking at the positive connotations that usually follow participation as a term; words such as ‘collaboration’, ‘democracy’, ‘equality’ and ‘empowerment’ certainly sit better in the contemporary socio-political landscape of the western world, as opposed to expressions such as ‘expert’, ‘top-down’ and ‘control’. In the sense of ‘development as vision’, participation also has an explicitly utopian aspect as it is concerned with ‘making things better’, but not only in a material sense. Participation is also seen as having psychological effects in terms ‘attitudes’ and ‘feelings’. This is evident in the following statements taken from the three case studies:

‘In addition to community empowerment and action, trust and respect have been established between the Bedouins and the government’ (1996: 51); ‘It created a much greater awareness among policymakers’ (ibid: 94); ‘They also gave both sides a feeling for and understanding of the other’ (ibid: 49); ‘As people were making their own commitments about their future, their voices filled with emotion’ (ibid: 43); ‘It helped men recognize that women were experts too and had valuable knowledge to contribute’ (ibid: 91); ‘We have seen...team spirit emerge, often expressed as a feeling of elation and harmony among the participants, generating the energy to move forward’ (ibid: 44).

These statements imply a view of participatory approaches to development as a sort of ‘collective psychological healing’ that transcends and levels differences in terms of gender and power. Dean argues that government is a fundamentally utopian activity that is based on certain values. Dean underlines however, that is important not to view regimes of practices as expressions of values; instead one should question what functions these ‘values’ have within rationalities of governments (1999: 34).

I argue that the functionality of stakeholder participation as a ‘value’ or as ‘the improvement of mentalities’ is evident when *the Sourcebook* discuss the conjunction between the participatory approach and project sustainability. Participatory approaches to development are seen as more likely to achieve stability and sustainability for development projects after implementation, as opposed to projects designed and implemented by external experts. The explanation for this, is applied to the ‘social learning’ that happens during participatory approaches. *The Sourcebook* states that the social learning that stakeholders generate and internalize during participatory planning and/or implementation *does* enable social change. The knowledge of how to increase the sustainability of World Bank projects, in addition to participation as a strategic political tool, can both serve to explain *why* stakeholder participation is both advocated and practiced in World Bank development activities. However, I argue that neither *informs* stakeholder participation as an organized practice, or as a ‘regime of practices’. The World Bank is after all a *bank*, an institution that invests money and resources towards projects that should produce results accordingly. Sindzingre corroborates this view (2005):

The Bank is, first and foremost, a bank and not a research institution. It continues to be dominated by economists and financiers (and also engineers) (ibid: 166).

I argue that the knowledge that informs the participatory efforts of the World Bank are the *rational* or *logic* concerned with the right relationship between input and output, between investment and result. Stakeholder participation as different versions of organized practices is primarily informed by an operational rationality that emphasizes delivery through technical means. McNeill states:

It is accurate to state that the World Bank is dominated by an economic perspective, and a technocratic perspective. There are perhaps some signs of change with regards to the first; the economic perspective is perhaps being modified to a limited degree. But the second can, perhaps, never be changed. The very nature of the World Bank – and other multilateral assistance agencies – is technocratic (McNeill 2004: 121).

I certainly support McNeill's assessment of the World Bank as fundamentally 'technocratic'. Moreover, I argue that the emphasis on technical knowledge and solutions affect and limit the participatory efforts described in the three case studies, and most commonly in ways that benefit the operational standards of the World Bank. The first and most evident indication of this is the earlier mentioned inclusion of government as participants. First, including government as participants is seen as vital because government is 'the one who repays the Bank loan or credit' (1996: 125). Thus, stakeholder participation as a development practice certainly incorporates an economic perspective. Moreover, this economic consideration of government inclusion also has a technical aspect. I have earlier related the visibility of representatives from government to their ability to bring technical and economical perspectives into the participatory process. *The Sourcebook* states that the experiences described in *Sharing Experiences* indicate the growing support by task managers of stakeholder participation, i.e. as processes in which:

...stakeholders contribute their experience and expertise – for instance, the experience of what it is to be poor or the expertise to develop specifications for a new road or educational program (ibid: 5).

This statement implies a division in the sorts of knowledge brought into participatory processes. Direct beneficiaries, i.e. the poor contribute 'experiences', whilst government representatives and 'experts' contribute 'technically orientated expertise'. The Nigeria case in particular, but also the Egypt case, described how direct beneficiaries were measured in terms of ability to participate efficiently, and the 'standard' of efficiency was directly related to the inclusion of government and other

experts. This standard of efficiency has three further implications. First, it is certainly an implication of what types or forms of knowledge that the World Bank deem most important. Second, since the technical knowledge and efficiency of government representatives are seen as important arguments in favour of their participation, technical means must be utilized to 'level' the field; in other words, measures must be taken to ensure that direct beneficiaries can participate on the same level of efficiency as their more 'powerful' counterparts. The third implication is a consequence of this operational emphasis on efficiency. Whereas the technical knowledge of government furthers the operational demands of the World Bank by its characteristic 'efficiency', participatory efficiency in terms of direct beneficiaries relies on the 'management of complexity'. In other words, it relies on the ordering and simplification of the complexity of beneficiary groups in order to counter their invisibility.

It is primarily at this stage that the 'governmentality' of stakeholder participation becomes evident and identifiable, inasmuch as the case studies all describe stakeholder participation as organized practices that in different ways 'arrange' and 'dispose things'. Foucault views government as a practice enabled by a specific rationality concerned with the proper way of managing populations, and to arrange things in such a way that it leads to a 'convenient end' for the population as a whole. Thus, government as 'the conduct of conduct' works through the interests of the population and for the common good of those governed. Stakeholder participation illustrates a similar process of arrangement, not through laws, but through a number of strategies that arranges stakeholders in a specific way that allows the achievement of specific ends. An important arranging factor is the already mentioned inclusion of government as illustrated most clearly in the Nigeria case. However, I have also identified a number of strategic 'translations' of stakeholder participation that in effect arrange the content of participatory processes. According to the model of Latour, I divided these translations into two different stalls with specific purposes. The first set of translations is concerned with the enrolment of others. In terms of stakeholder participation, these strategic translations aim to push for participatory approaches to development, by catering to the specific interests of stakeholders. In other words, stakeholder participation is argued as the optimal way of finding solutions to the problems that each case study describes.

However, even though these translations emphasized the positive qualities of stakeholder participation as a way of finding solutions that benefits everyone, they also had a number of arranging effects. I illustrated how one strategy offered a detour that excluded women farmers on behalf of overall project efficiency. Another strategy was to invent a new group through the extensive mapping and later capacity building of a Bedouin community. These enrolling translations certainly illustrate ‘governmentality’ on two accounts. First, they are informed by a rationality that views stakeholder participation as a practice that benefits all stakeholders; in other words, it is in everyone’s interest to agree to and participate in such an activity. Second, the translations arrange stakeholder participation in a way that limits and controls conduct; how stakeholder participation translates decides the ways in which stakeholders are allowed to participate. This was especially illustrative in terms of the participation of direct beneficiaries as described in the Nigeria case and the Egypt case.

The second set of translations is concerned with the strategic approaches that enable the ‘control’ of those enrolled. I identified two such instances of translations in the Colombia case. The first strategy involved the removal of weak links that threatened the participatory process; I applied this strategy to two instances of conflict, and more importantly how these conflicts were resolved. The other strategy involved tying up with new and unexpected allies. In the Colombia case, the most important ally of the task manager was the ‘facilitator’; brought in as an external consultant, the task manager is viewed by the World Bank as a ‘guide’ that navigates participants towards clear outcomes. In the third chapter I discussed the further implications of the facilitator as a guide; by ‘framing’ the workshop in a way that shaped and limited interaction among participants, the Colombia workshop consequently produced solutions identical to those proposed by Bank experts.

The three case studies that I have described in this thesis all contain instances of ‘governmentality’ as in how stakeholders are governed within stakeholder participation as an organized practice. However, The Colombia case also offers an example of how stakeholders govern themselves. Note that I here speak of ‘self government’ in a narrower sense than that encompassed by the phrase ‘conduct of conduct’. I first and foremost discuss ‘conduct of the self’ as evident in a participatory project, i.e. as part of

a regime of practices and thus largely ignore the notions of ‘conduct of the self’ that operate relatively outside and independently of government practices. An instance of the ‘conduct of the self’ in the Colombia case is evident when looking at how the task manager described the situation in which participants reflected over their own achievements:

In one way or another, they said, ‘For the first time, we know what is happening. We came up with the answers, and we know what to do.’ As people were making their own commitments about their future, their voices were filled with emotion (ibid).

The participants certainly felt that they had generated their own solutions to the problems of the electricity sector; however, these solutions had already been formulated at the World Bank workshop. In *The Guru and the Conjuror* (1989), Barth describes the transaction of knowledge in New Guinea between the initiator and his novices. The initiator possesses the sacred knowledge of his culture and commands this body of knowledge in the context of the ritual, by manipulating concrete symbols and placing items within the different stages of the initiation. The purpose of the ritual is to reveal secrets by manipulating these concrete symbols; however, it is the performance itself and not its content that enables the transformative effects of the novices (1989: 643). I argue that the Colombia workshop illustrates a similar process; the facilitator takes on the role as a sort of ‘technocratic initiator’ that manipulates interaction and takes the participants through the various stages of the workshop. As earlier mentioned, *the Sourcebook* claims that ‘social change’ is more likely to happen when stakeholders are given the opportunity to ‘generate’ and ‘internalize’ these changes themselves (1996: 5). However, the Colombia case illustrates a very limited way of ‘generating’ decisions. The workshop as a space of knowledge was limited by its framework, as defined and monitored by the facilitator, and thus created a predictable outcome that explicitly aligned with the technical standards of the World Bank. I argue that the most important characteristic of the Colombia workshop was not the notion that participants generated solutions themselves. Much like the novices of the initiator in New Guinea, the Colombian participants were drawn into a ‘performance’ of participation with chronologically structured ‘acts’ that lead towards a ‘grand finale’. The participants

were not spectators, but part of the performance. It is not the content of the performance that was important (considering the fact that the World Bank already had defined solutions to the problems of the electricity sector), but rather the performance itself that had transformative effects on the participants. The Colombia workshop was not a space in which knowledge was generated, but rather a space in which a specific type of knowledge was ‘internalized’ by participants. I suggest that the framework of the Colombia workshop on the one hand, directed the participants to ‘generate’ specific solutions that benefited the operational demands of the World Bank, whilst simultaneously allowing them ‘to learn’ by internalizing what was produced.

The Entry Point of Power

As mentioned earlier, ‘governmentality’ implies the notion that human conduct is something that can be controlled, shaped and turned to specific ends (Dean 1999: 11). In *the Sourcebook*, the control of human conduct isn’t just identifiable in terms of the control of behaviour, but also in terms of the relationships between stakeholders; more specifically, it is identifiable by looking at how *the Sourcebook* describes power and how power can be ‘levelled’. In *The Anti-Politics Machine* (2003), Ferguson illustrates the unforeseen effects of a depoliticized participatory approached development project in Lesotho. Because of improvement in infrastructure and the creation of an administrative centre, the Lesotho government eventually expanded their state power to a mountain region they did not have access to prior to the development project. Ferguson offers a perspective that sees the development apparatus in Lesotho not primarily as a machine for eliminating poverty, but rather as a machine for reinforcing and expanding state power which takes ‘poverty’ as its point of entry (ibid: 255). This powerful effect might not have been the intention of the development planners, but it happened by reducing poverty into a technical problem, whilst undermining the significance and power of the state. By suspending politics from even the most sensitive political operations, Ferguson calls the development apparatus in Lesotho ‘the anti-politics machine’ (ibid: 256). So how then does power operate in the case studies I have presented in this thesis? Alternatively, what is its point of entry? The answer to these questions, I argue, can be found by looking at how the World Bank perceives power and

more importantly how it ‘manages’ power. First, *the Sourcebook* applies power primarily to those with centralized and institutional power, i.e. government officials and ministers. Moreover, these groups of people are always included as participants in participatory initiatives. This creates a powerful premise for stakeholder participation as a social process; since government representatives always participate as stakeholders in World Bank development projects, other stakeholders will interact in social processes with asymmetrical relations of power. According to *the Sourcebook*, this is especially true when dealing with direct beneficiaries. These groups of people are usually those furthest removed from the institutional centre, and thus have weaker positions. Ferguson describes how a project creates powerful effects by depoliticizing development, i.e. by undermining the significance of the political landscape within everything operates. The notion of ‘levelling’ power in *the Sourcebook*, tell us that the World Bank sees power as something that can be controlled and manipulated by participatory techniques. Inasmuch, the World Bank does not depoliticize politics, as attention to powerful stakeholders must be maintained to ensure that participatory projects sustain. The World Bank does however *depoliticize power*. When ‘weaker’ stakeholders such as Nigerian women farmers or a Bedouin community enter development processes, power must be ‘levelled’ to ensure that all stakeholders has equal opportunities to let their voices be heard, to make decisions and to handle resources. However, as described in the case studies, to ‘level’ power is to arrange things and people; to ‘level’ power is to exclude and to include; to ‘level’ power is to create new groups with administrative and organizational capabilities; to ‘level’ power is to create specific frameworks of interaction and to put limitations on how people are allowed to behave. To ‘level’ power in World Bank participatory processes is thus a contradictory endeavour, as *to manage power is also to exercise power*.

Stakeholder Participation as a Productive Practice

In this thesis, I have discussed and illustrated the importance of technical knowledge in participatory approached World Bank development activities. McNeill stated that ‘the very nature of the World Bank...is technocratic’ (2004: 112). As earlier mentioned, Dean argues that if government is to achieve its ends, then it must use technical means,

means that are a condition of governing and often impose limits on its capabilities. The descriptions or performance of stakeholder participation as depicted in *the Sourcebook*, certainly corroborate the view of technical knowledge both as a ‘condition’ of stakeholder participation and as something that ‘limits’ the capabilities of stakeholder participation. How stakeholder participation is limited is most evident in how it arranges content and disposes things. In the Nigeria case, stakeholders were arranged in order to create an *operational space of decision-making*. In the Egypt case, the Bedouin community was arranged to create an *operational community group*, reinforced administratively and organizationally in order to participate efficiently. In the Colombia case, interaction was arranged so that participants could perform and internalize *operational knowledge* that would produce clear outcomes. I argue that the power that operates within stakeholder participation as an organized practice does not have domination as its goal; rather, it is an exercise of power informed by an operational logic that emphasizes *productivity* through ‘efficiency’, ‘good results’ and ‘clear outcomes’. To achieve these goals, task managers have sometimes gone against the interests of certain stakeholders, for example as illustrated in the two instances of conflict during the Colombia workshop. However, the way stakeholder participation is arranged in order to achieve certain results is also explained as an approach to development that benefits all stakeholders, whether they participate directly or not. Stakeholder is thus understood in *the Sourcebook* as an approach that caters to the *interests* of those affected by the outcomes.

Bøås & McNeill suggests that policies in multilateral institutions are the outcome of interplay between institutional demands and ideas (2004: 220). It is explicitly expressed that *the Sourcebook* is not a policy document on participation (1996: xi). However, I suggest that this reluctance towards being definite about participation underscores the conflict between the traditional external expert stance and the participatory stance. The external expert stance offers a high degree of control that certainly benefits the World Bank’s operational demands, but history has shown that projects designed in this manner often fail after implementation. Projects designed and implemented collaboratively on the other hand, offers higher degrees of sustainability; however, the mere inclusion of other interests in decision-making processes makes

development activities less predictable, which can threaten the operational demands for delivery. The opposite characteristics of participation and operational demands thus become a quandary for the World Bank. I argue, that the solution to this quandary lies in the how the World Bank *translates* stakeholder participation *rationalizes it as a practice*. The examples of stakeholder participation described in the three case studies are all human-centred approaches to development in the sense that they address, and in different degrees incorporate local stakeholders in development activities. However, the ways in which stakeholder participation is translated and arranged, produce results that reflect the World Bank' operational demands for delivery. On the subject of the relationship between ideas and power, Bøås & McNeill states that:

We argue that power relations in the multilateral system are used to promote some ideas and some specific interpretations of ideas over other possible ideas and interpretations of ideas (2004: 207).

I argue that stakeholder participation and its various interpretations as described in *the Sourcebook* are the consequence of tensions between the opposing ideas of the 'external expert stance' and the 'collaborative stance'. Moreover, the way in which the quandary of these conflicting ideas is solved creates relationships of power through technically orientated arrangements that seeks specific ends. Thus, I suggest that the examples of stakeholder participation as described in *the Sourcebook* can be viewed as *operational participation*, i.e. as *participation to the extent that the operational logic and rationality of the World Bank allows*.

Conclusion

In this thesis, I have described and analyzed *the World Bank Participation Sourcebook* as a *performance of stakeholder participation*. As a performance, *the Sourcebook* tells stories of struggle, drama and conflict, but also of sacrifice and altruism. It tells stories of people that are divided, but still manages to come together against the odds to battle their problems for the common good of all. Written primarily towards people who already have decided on using participatory approach in their professional work, *the Sourcebook* tells them that participatory approaches to development can be hard and sometimes frustrating, but also rewarding. Rewarding not only on a professional level, but also on a human level as participatory approaches to development is viewed and described as a thoroughly human activity. *The Sourcebook* views stakeholder participation as a sustainable strategy to development that empowers those affected by it by allowing local stakeholders to participate. I argue that this is what *the Sourcebook* as a performance is *trying to communicate*.

However, my approach to the participatory processes has presented a perspective that differs quite drastically from what *the Sourcebook* is trying to communicate. Prior to the writing of this thesis, I was largely unfamiliar with the intricacies of World Bank development activities. With this rather naïve starting point, I soon became aware of just how directed the participatory approaches appeared. I discovered that participation as depicted in *the Sourcebook* was not only considerably removed from the notion of ‘popular participation’; the ways in which participation was rationalized into practice, also illustrated a number of constraints that limited the very definition of stakeholder participation. In the first three chapters of this thesis, I described three case studies that illustrate different versions of arrangement and management. The Nigeria case in chapter one described a project that sought to formulate solutions that would strengthen the inclusion of women farmers in agricultural extension programs, and did so ironically, by *excluding* women farmers from the space of decision-making. The Egypt case in chapter two described the social mapping of a Bedouin community, which consequently led to the invention of *a new group* through the formation of a community

group that would act and make decisions on the behalf of the community as a whole. The Colombia case in chapter three described the participation and interaction of government representatives within a meticulously *framed* workshop that eventually produced predictable outcomes.

In chapter one, I referred to the *participatory concerns* of the World Bank to explain the management of stakeholders in the Nigeria case. The first concern focused on the importance of government as participants. The other two concerns commented on the importance of levelling power and interaction when beneficiaries were to participate in processes with other, more powerful stakeholders. Levelling techniques such as the use of ‘surrogates’ and ‘building community capacity’ fundamentally impacted the participatory efforts in the Nigeria case and the Egypt case respectively. In the second and third chapter, I utilized Latour’s model of translation. This model allowed me to formulate a number of translations according to specific strategies, which illustrated how the World Bank was able to enrol others (meaning stakeholders into participatory processes) by catering to their specific interests, whilst simultaneously controlling their behaviour. By translating ‘stakeholder participation’ the task managers were able to arrange and manage the complex social world they were faced with; in other words, participatory content was translated and arranged in ways that produced predictable and ‘operational-friendly’ outcomes. To continue the analogy of participation as a performance, the stakeholders in the three case studies were not writing their own stories; they were rather acting out an already written script. This script may have allowed a certain amount of improvisation, but only within a set structure that limited the extent to which participants could act. This script divided stakeholders into extras, supporting actors and stars; the script defined the sets in which scenes were acted out; it was a script in which stakeholders performed a narrative that lead towards ends that, at least in the eyes of the World Bank, appeared to be happy.

The participatory activities described in the three case studies all contain instances of control; I have argued that these controlling mechanisms are the results of how participation was translated and arranged. In the fourth chapter of this thesis, I turned to Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’. Whereas Latour emphasizes the formulation of strategic translations that allows enrolment of others through interests

and simultaneously control those enrolled for specific purposes, Foucault focuses on how the mentality, or rationality of government arrange things in such a way that it achieves certain ends. I approached participation as a 'regime of practices' and showed how 'the art of government' could be identified in World Bank participatory projects. I did this by looking at participation as a practice, and more importantly how participation as a rational activity was affected by dimensions of knowledge or discourse. These dimensions appeared in different forms and interrelated with the translations of stakeholder participation. How *the Sourcebook* explains and perceives visibility, its expressed reliance on technical solutions, and institutional knowledge and operational demands, affect how participation is rationalized and translated when transformed into practice. Moreover, how stakeholder participation was translated had effects on the 'arrangement of things' in participatory processes, and affected the way in which people were able to participate, i.e. their conduct in participatory processes.

The ways in which stakeholder participation was informed by certain forms of knowledge and rationality did not just illustrate ways of governing, but also how government works through those governed. Governmentality as the 'conduct of conduct' offers a perspective that views power as something working through people, rather than something that is imposed on people. By referring to the Nigeria case and the Egypt case, I showed how translations enrolled and arranged stakeholders by catering to their specific interests. In the Colombia case governmentality as 'the conduct of the self' was more explicit. The Colombian participants openly and emotionally expressed the empowering feeling of finding solutions to their own problems. However, I related this instance to the way in which the workshop was framed; the extent to which interaction was guided allowed me to view the Colombia workshop, less as a space in which knowledge was 'generated' and more as a space where a specific kind of knowledge was 'internalised'.

This thesis have tried to identify how the participatory processes described in *the Sourcebook* are managed and arranged in ways that constrains the more inclusive definition of stakeholder participation. I have also tried to explain *why* such arrangements occurred by focusing on the result orientated aspects of the three case studies. How stakeholders and spaces of decision-making are arranged and managed

seemingly, favour a logic that emphasizes participatory and project efficiency. Thus, the knowledge and rationality of the World Bank that informs stakeholder participation is largely concerned with the operational demands that link investments with clear outcomes. Mosse's notion of 'dual logic' comments on the tensions between a logic that wants development projects to be perceived as participatory, and a logic that emphasizes the demands for operational delivery. I have argued that the way stakeholder participation is transformed into practice through various translations aims to solve the predicament of this tension. I have suggested that stakeholder participation, as a practice is a rational response to the quandary of opposing ideas of how to approach development. In other words, the World Bank solves the conflict between traditional approaches to development as 'ready made policy' and participation as 'policy in the making' by translating and arranging stakeholder participation in ways that create manageable development processes that produce predictable and 'operational-friendly' results. The power that operates through the practice of stakeholder participation is thus the result of tensions between ideas. I have suggested that stakeholder participation as performed in *the Sourcebook* takes the shape of what I have called *operational participation*; stakeholders are included in development initiatives, but their participation is limited to the extent that their interaction does not disrupt the operational demands of delivery in World Bank activities.

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