The Function
of
The Internet in
The Moroccan Public Sphere

Brigt Hope

Abstract

In this thesis I make an attempt at tracing the development of the internet in Morocco aided by the epistemology of Peirce. In particular the experimental and abductive nature of adoption of technology may be viewed in light of this theoretical framework. Following Peirce; abduction is a process that starts with several creative assumptions as a reaction to newness, followed by investigating the logical consequences of these assumptions, called deduction, ending with experimentally testing the abductive theses. One main suggestion on the basis of an extensive field-work from Morocco suggests that what started out with a situation where the Internet opened up hegemony, too a certain extent closes a new hegemony.

The initial ambition of flattening the power structures, as highlighted by the workplace of an Internet-portal provider, did not come in to place. The original idea was to create a space for debate, but eventually difference of opinion was not accepted. Additionally, somewhat contrary to Hofheinz findings, discussion forums on the internet were one disagrees are practically never happening.

One common aspect of these failures of creating a new order with the use of the Internet was how postcolonial structures   functioned in the performance of mistrust and in this way reproducing centre-periphery relations. Moreover traditional media played a much more important role for debate. The most important role of the Internet is to create new spaces and to change the position of the marginalized, and the Internet became an important catalyst for the development of a multiplicity of civil societies. In particular the Internet created a way of bypassing the elites in the urban centres. The Internet can be said to malfunction as a mediator between the Public and the private interests, and can be seen as a tool for sectarian interests in the Morrocan context.

Concluding the thesis, and following the earlier theoretical reflection of the thesis, a prospect for further comparative studies of the Internet (and other technologies) within different ethnographic localities is suggested.

Contents

CONCLUSIONS BY INDUCTION, OR THE EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS OF THE ABDUCTIONS

Introduction

The postcolonial city in the age of telecommunication

Long before the kind of cosmopolitan European cities became what they are today, many of the same hybrids, and the same conflicts, evolved in the colonial centre. Casablanca is a pure product of the global capitalist system, the centre of local rural resource accumulation, and a periphery city in the colonial system, and the essential centre in two (or more) centre-periphery exchange relations.

A major point in the urbanism and telecommunication literature is how the new technology alters the old centre-periphery power structures. The process is both marked by centralization and decentralization. In the ultimate centre there are a few truly "global cities" like New York, London and Tokyo where not size but the connectedness to the rest of the world is the main criteria. These cities house the main transnational corporations, and have a broad range of important information and knowledge institutions. Different specialized knowledge and bureaucracy might be scattered around the globe where costs are low (Wheeler, Aoyama and Warf 2000).

Casablanca is far from developing toward a "global city", rather the opposite; it is losing the important place it had during the colonial period. But the transformation is still important. Casablanca will not fade away, transportation of goods are still as important as it was during the industrious colonial period, but the economical organization is very much different. And as the economical system that created the city is changing, the symbols of domination the colonial period created will probably change as well. All of my informants, from the technology expert, to the marginalized semi illiterate are aware of this transformation. And most have strategies that take this transformation into consideration. For them strategies of breaking the old centre-periphery structures were important. The main actors in the Internet Service Provider (ISP)-company "Macroweb" had a strategy to develop a local hub based on local economy, and to emancipate

themselves from French and metropolitan domination. Rural immigrants had strategies for breaking the national centre-periphery axis.

As we will see, the colonial history of Casablanca has relevance to the limited loyalty felt to the city. The Fassis (those from Fez) always had an ambiguous relationship to Casablanca. Fez was the old centre of knowledge, and the defining place of the Moroccan way of urban life. The strength of Casablanca would always remind people of the French destruction of the old urban elite by accentuating all economical incentive to their new cities.

The colonial city

Communication technology can be an extremely important part of the development of a city. It is obvious when you consider the development of Casablanca. Casablanca is also a city that in itself is extremely connected to the colonial period in Morocco. Casablanca is very different from the other cities in Morocco.

Most of the other cities in Morocco have a history from before the time of the protectorate that is apparent when you move in the city. Even though Casablanca existed before the French arrived it was not a very big or very important city. Casablanca was an international city already before the French protectorate. In 1900 France, Spain, Great Brittany and Germany all had consulates in Casablanca. But Casablanca had only a little harbour and there was no roads connecting Casablanca to the areas around the city. The architectural development of Casablanca was made with very little resistance in its early period. With no important city structure before the French started to build Casablanca, and with the French ruling system very little developed, what architects in France could not do in France they could do in Morocco, so Morocco became some sort of an architectural and

social laboratory for the French. The development of Casablanca was an integral part of developing new architecture in France (Rabinow 1989).

Casablanca got connected, and it was connected well. The French wanted to build a city where they could ship phosphate from the rich for hat mines, and since Casablanca also was in an area of rich farmland close to the city, it was the perfect site for the economic metropolis in Morocco. First of all the French build an enormous port, through which Casablanca and Morocco was connected to the rest of the world, and the French build railways, and roads connecting Casablanca to the rest of Morocco. Casablanca was well planned and even though the growth of Casablanca was so big that it the French word for shantytowns "biddonville" originates from Casablanca, it has a well-planed infrastructure. Both the growth of the city itself and the use of automobiles have been far bigger than anyone could have expected in 1917. The city plan from 1917 was planed for automobile transport (Cohen 1998), and is still functioning today, even though some extent of traffic jam is not to be avoided, to put it mildly. That is the impression it is not possible to avoid when you move into the city, a very beautiful, modern and well planed city...it was, but the road system has not been updated since. Only growing while the inner city is decaying like all other cities where transport by car is the most important way to move. And to not have a car, which a large majority of the inhabitants still does not have, is a serious drawback.

The connectedness does not seem to be up to date, Casablanca was booming while it had the most modern infrastructure in the world, something that is very apparent in the city even today. But how does the city keep up with the telecommunication revolution? Still Casablanca is the Moroccan city where it all happens; Casablanca has still by far a more vivid economy than any other city in Morocco. However the new economy and the new technology enter the city today in very different way than it did when the transportation revolution changed the look of the world in the 20th century.

The Moroccan Atlantic coast was never an important part of the old Morocco. It gives very few natural harbours, and the Mediteranian coast was closer to Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Since North Morocco became a Spanish protectorate, the French needed the Atlantic coast to develop a big harbour. Casablanca became a central part of the French access to Moroccan recourses (Cohen 1998). Today telecommunication enters what is already the main city of the Moroccan economy. The new technology enters the city in a postcolonial setting. Where the ideology of the technology as dominance was an obvious strategy for the French, it is the intention of the new Moroccan engineers to avoid exactly this. They are however bound to maneuver in unclear waters where technology is an everlasting sign of dominance from the former colonists.

What this difference also shows us is that technology is not something that is not the same wherever you go. Technology is what it does and says, and this can change. Even though telecommunications are a part of the Casablancan reality today, it operates in a local context in a local manner. And what is more, the result of a material structure is far from given when the material structure is given. The French city is itself a good example of exactly that. The architecture was build for single male French functionaries often with their own car. It was also how it functioned for the first decades. Living in a simple but nice flat with no kitchen, the city gave a lot of possibilities for eating and entertainment. Other parts of Casablanca were build for the Moroccan population. After the Moroccan independence the European population left the inner city and Moroccan families moved in changing the use of the architecture completely, opening their shops and cafés, with strong neighbourhoods and community feeling. The way of life in the old European part of Casablanca is nothing like it was planned, the habits of the people living there is far stronger than the structure of the architecture. You can not say that the architecture determines the way people in Casablanca live their lives.

Each reader will read the architecture and the life within it differently. Even though downtown poverty is a common problem in many cities, some will see the decline in down town Casablanca as a lack of ability to organize civilized life when the colonist have left. A romantic reading of this process, sees the beauty of life itself, constantly renewing the dead buildings and the symbols of colonial rule. Very few things can match the sublime experience of veiled females and the total domination of jelebas in the streets surrounded by chic art-deco architecture. Or more important the kind of social structure this part of city was planned for single, male civil servants, are now nearly totally taken over by families with a broad range from older Casablancan families to families newly arrived from the countryside. The French could plan the city pretty much from scratch, but as people moved in, it did not happen without resistance.

The conflict between cities of great incitements and neglected regions, are still even less evident than the conflicts within the city. While the European "modern" city of experimental architecture was raised at great expenditures, the poor and the rural was crowded into the old medina, the old city, and when the old medina was packed, the biddonville was the only solution (Abu-Lughod 1980). In urban sociology on the transformation of urban space and power relations in a changing technological environment, the postcolonial city has been an absent subject. This is a absence which is difficult to explain, the kind of changes of power relations and urban space much of the present urban sociology tries to explain, is power relations clearly defined in the studies of postcolonial cities and postcolonialism in general. In the postcolonial major cities the colonial power structure is reproduced. If telecommunication technologies are both creating centralisation and desentralisation on a global level, then the postcolonial urban centres should be a perfect place to study this process, since these urban centres should then loose much of their global importance.

Theory

French and Moroccan postcolonial studies

Even though much of the postcolonial theory draws much of its inspiration from French postcolonial writers, postcolonial theory has basically been a concept in Anglophone literary and political theory, and the model colonisator the British Empire. The main postcolonial scholars like Said, Bhabha and Spivak are based in USA and have a background in former British colonies. In many French university departments postcolonial theory, and other «schools» like queer theory and cultural studies have been met with considerable suspicion (Forsdick and Murphy 2003). The French tradition has to a greater extent been based on universal principles than grounded theory and committed readings.

But both French postmodernist thinkers and postcolonial writers have had an immense impact on postcolonial theory. Not at least literature and theory from Maghreb, and especially from Algeria, have played an important role in postcolonial myths of origin. The maghrebian situation was an important aspect of writers such as Fannon, Memmi and Sartre. And the most prominent postcolonial theorists draw much on French literature such as the writings of Derrida, Foucault and Lacan. The colonial and postcolonial experiences of France and its former colonies has been an under represented field of research compared to Anglophone areas. However, French orientalism played an important role in Said's research (1978). correction 83

In Francophone postcolonial studies Moroccan academics have been among the major theorists. The two giants of Francophone Moroccan postcolonial studies is Abdullah Laroui and Abdelkbir Khatibi. Laroui's influencial work *L'ideologie Arab contemporaine* from 1967 has set the standard for analysis of how Arab intellectuals have been related to the west. Laroui draws three distinct categories, the religious traditionalists confronting the west, the political liberals inspired by the west, and the technocrats, also inspired by the

west (Laroui 1977). Another standard work by Laroui is *L'histoire du Maghreb* from 1970 which is just as influential in the way he rewrites the historic works of French historians (Laroui 1977b). Less noted, but in many ways distinguishing Moroccan postcolonial theory most, is *Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme Marocain*. Here Laroui makes the point that modernity did not start with colonialism, and stresses the continuity, rather than discontinuity of colonialism. The signs of authority applied today, were also used by the French, and originates from before the French protectorate (1977c). This work has been followed up with other Moroccan postcolonial theories that does not start with colonialism in discussing postcolonialism but draws long lines from long before the French protectorate.

Abdelkbir Khatibi writes in the tradition of Fanon and Laroui, his concern is to deconstruct the duality of self and other as they are expressed in both the occident as well as the orient. This Khatibi calls "Double critique", and is meant to be a way of dealing with impurity. According to Khatibi the postcolonial subject should try to refuse all kinds of dualist thinking. Instead the postcolonial subject has to find his identity in eternal nomadism (Khatibi 1983)

More recently we have examples of Moroccan anthropologists working at universities in the USA producing monographs of Maghreb within a Anglophone postcolonial frame. Still Abdelmajid Hannoum and Abdellah Hammoudi are following Laroui in drawing long lines when analysing symbols of French colonial rule. Symbols that has a distinct existence from before the French, but through the time of French colonialism has been marked by the French presence. Hannoum follows the creation and recreations of the Kahina myth, the history of the Amazight queen who resisted the Arab invasion. The French historians invented an alliance between the Amazights and the Byzantines, and a roman culture the Arabs destroyed. The role of the French was to restore roman culture, and saving the Amazights from the barbarian Arabs. In postcolonial North Africa, the

French invention has not been abandoned but reinterpreted in the light of different ideologies (Hannoum 2001). Hammoudi writes like Laroui on the Moroccan authoritarian structure. According to Hammoudi the master-disciple pattern rooted in the sainthood, is at the basis of all legitimization of power-relations in Morocco. The French colonialism did not weaken this, rather the opposite. The French were using this structure for their own legitimation, as a protectorate of the Moroccan sultan, and through the period of French colonialism, this powerstructure got a total hold on all aspects of the Moroccan society (Hammoudi 1997). These points in Moroccan postcolonial theory, to avoid binary colonist-colonized opposition, and to analyse the restructuring of symbols within different systems, is points I find valuable. And it is reflecting the French colonial system in Morocco, that differently from French Algeria, was based on using the Moroccan social reality to their own advantage, rather than opt for destroying it. Thus in Morocco dichotomies like traditional-modern, and oriental-occidental, is much more difficult to use in a simplified scheme.

The major texts of Francophone Moroccan postcolonial sudies are also influenced by Frantz Fanon. Fannon is essential for his critique of both the colonial rule and the national representation as a new national bourgeoisie enters the positions of the former colonial businessmen and civil servants. It is generally said that Fanon has to be read in his historical context, the Algerian liberation war. The Algerien and North African context in general is important since Fanon is to such a large extent accurate in his descriptions of the "pitfalls of National Consciousness". The strong association between the corrupted new national bourgeoisie, the nationalist movements, economical nationalism, the strong leader and the cult around him, and the capitalist interests of the mother country (former coloniser). Interestingly what is Fanons starting point in this description is how a weak and little middle class gains control over the technology and resources developed by the entrepreneurs of the colonisers (Fanon 1963).

Technology and colonialism

The problems concerning technology are many. I started to point out one of the more common one. The French objective in Magreb was to bring civilization and progress. The early Algerian colonialism were drawing on both the industrial and democratic revolution, it should bring both political as well as technological change. More generally than colonial administration, technology is a major contributor to our society and has a huge effect on how we live our lives. In postcolonial theory this is a major topic: The relationship between the knowledge of the west and feeling of weakness of only being the users of others technology in the postcolonial countries. The case of French architecture clearly shows the no-neutral and ideological technology when it was met by resistance when the social and technical construction of a French Morocco became dominant. I think the use of technology (partly) imported from a former colony, puts the democratic problems on technology most dramatically into action, and also very clearly, it activates a lot of dimensions. Is it so that the Internet in this case actually can be a tool for the oppressed against their own purely undemocraticly regimes? Well then certainly technology is not a one-dimensional power structure. Any kind of assumption that there exists something like the occident against the orient is difficult and might obscure more than it can explain. And in the case of Morocco the Arab-Amazight structure, also a question of centre-periphery domination, blur the orient-occident structure.

Postcolonial studies: committed and psychological

Fanon created a postcolonial description of dependence, in the dialectic between master and client, based on psychological effects of colonialism. It was meant as a psychological description of a dependence mentality, but it has been an important part of the creation of

postcolonial discourse and this discourse is at least just as important as the insights from the psychological descriptions. Either you try to write off the domination culture or accept parts of it; you are doomed to be hit by the psychological deterministic description of your own dependence. If a person from an ex-colonized country has any relation with the former colony, one is either dependent or have become an agent for the former colonizer. The worst cases of post colonial discourse, that is to be found goes along these lines. This is not entirely Fanons fault, he is probably right in the description of the disastrous effect postcolonial elites often has played in the former colonies. There are however never easy to agree on who is the ones who are keeping dependency to the former colony alive, and who is not. Some of the most prominent postcolonial theorists have made a strong point in avoiding exactly these reductionist stigmata in their own theories, and Fanon himself saw it coming in the rhetoric the nationalist elites used during independents fight (Fanon 1963). So to give Fanon too much fault on a continued tradition of blaming other for being agent for the former colony is probably not very accurate.

Most postcolonial theorists have continued the tradition of psychological explanations of dependence, often involving the ideas of the French psychoanalyst Lacan. Lacan used Saussure's semiology as a model for how both the unconscious and the self was constituted. Both Spivak and Bhabha use Lacan in their writings and therefore tend to adopt Lacan's use of Saussure. Lacan picked up Saussure's model on the sign. The sign was for Saussure a two-sided psychological entity that unites a concept and sound-image, a signified and a signifier. Both signified and signifier is constituted as a difference of a negative nature, it is not the idea, or material structure that supports it, that matters most, but that it is different from what surrounds it (Saussure 1974). Adopted by Lacan this model is used for a perspective on subjectivity and identity. There are two important kinds of differences in this construction, the 'other' and the 'Other'. Identification begins at the early 'mirror stage', based on discoveries of how children becomes aware of themselves as

beings differentiated from others when they see themselves in mirrors. The formulation of this difference is based on the 'Other', the dominant signifier of close subjects like father or mother, or the unconscious. This is the more powerful 'Other' that gives a language that one can utter ones desire for the absent 'other' (Gingrich 2004).

Spivak transforms this in postcolonial theory where the other refers to the colonized other, those in the colonial periphery who are different from the colonial centre. The grand Other on the other hand is the colonial centre, the knowledge production there, the colonial apparatus that controls and watches over the colonized subjects. It both gives the language and a ideological frame the colonized subjects can understand the world with (Spivak 1996).

Most of the concepts of both Spivak and Bhabha have this doubleness from Lacan that it unites the psychological and the discursive within the reference to domination. Many of these concepts are highly relevant when explaining the function of internet in Morocco.

Difference or alterity is of course important in reference to postcolonialism. What constitutes the difference that regenerates dependence? A first step is to acknowledge the difference that is, and to make visible what have been invisible in a universalistic discourse, where the actual national and local culture of the colonial centre has been represented as universal. Because of this problem of marginality, postcolonial theory shares basic theory with much of the other schools that contests established theory, like feminism, indigenous issues, and queer theory. This can be related to a general quality of the sign that Saussure stressed so much; meaning as well as normality or civilization is made by difference. So in this negative schemata, when one is describing the unit like the colonial centre, one is actually describing the surrounding like the colonial periphery, and the other way around, when one is describing the surrounding one is actually describing

the unit. This is the elementary idea Said uses when he points out the scholarly orientalism as a product of the Western self. The orient is what the occident is not (Said 1978).

This can lead to an oversimplified description of the binary relation between colonizer and colonized. As will become clearer below, the question of agency will be important when the function of the Internet in a postcolonial setting will be discussed in detail. Homi Bhabha is highly influenced by Said but pays much attention to give various examples of cultural difference. In various ways these binary oppositions are used by agents promoting different cultural regimes. In the case of pan-arab nationalism for instance, one universalism was attempted to replace another. Those falling outside this latter universalism, like the Amazightes in Morocco, would often use the French universalism for their own purposes in a new situation of cultural repression. For describing this situation where the colonial representation both creates a structural framework and a potential for new meaning, Bhabha uses the concept 'hybridity' (Bhabha 1994).

One of the concepts Bhabha uses to describe hybridity is mimicry. There is a long colonial and postcolonial tradition of describing how the colonized are taking after the colonizers. They can act like the white man, but never really be the white man. Bhabha uses Lacans definition of mimicry as camouflage; it is to take after in form but not in function. In this way it can be a way of slipping away from the disciplinary gaze of the colonial power. Mimicry does not repeat but rather represent and this distorts the authorial centrality. It creates a double discourse besides the colonial discourse. The bilingual and bicultural colonial elite could never be the same as those educated in the centre (Bhabha 1994: 85-92). The institutional side of hybridity, the structural framework, is problematized in the governability of the colony. The demand for progress and the *white man's burden* or *mission civilisatrices* created a demand for control. Did the colonial civil servants do their civil duty, or did they not. The instances of control that could function in

the centre were not effectively put in order in the periphery. The double language is a part of this. The orders given by the colonial government could be sublimated by a submissive language the colonial rulers did not comprehend in a proper manner. The demand for civil obedience of governing by rule of law from the colonial centre, was not possible to exercise in the periphery, Thus both the colonial rulers as well as the colonized servants came in a position of double communication, of being both "the father and the oppressor; just and unjust; moderate and rapacious; vigorous and despotic." This put the meaning of civility under question (Bhabha 1994: 93-101). Both the problem of governability and mimicry will be discussed in detail when different actors question the intentions of those engineers who promote the introduction of new technology in Morocco. Sly civility and mimicry is ways of slipping away all agents trying to raise a civil discourse or technological competence, thus I will stress how these aspects of post colonial discourse hits all postcolonial actors not regarding their positioning.

Bhabha uses a radical concept of difference seeing a talk of cultural 'diversity' as conservative, he turns the attention to incommensurabilities, and pointing to situations of untranslatabilities where differences are impossible to communicate. Bhabha gives examples from colonial literature where experiences of the"English book" are described. The "English book" is a sign with an open interpretation. In Bhabha's text the "English book" is actually three different texts in three different contexts: *The Bible* in a situation where an early 19th century Indian preacher addresses some Indian peasants; *Inquiry into some Points of Seamanship* in a passage from Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness;* and this same passage from *Heart of Darkness* in *The Scene* by V. S. Naipaul. In all this narratives the "English book" acts as a cultural rupture, where all texts work as different manifestations of English cultural authority in an unlighted black area. In this shape hybridity takes the from of a certain medium as a part of a sign, which creates different signs in different interpretations (Bhabha 1994: 102-122). Thus a seemingly equal text will not have the same

interpretation in all postcolonial topes, this both shows the heterogeneous creation of meaning that extends the binary opposition between colonizer and colonised, and various identity projects within the same colonial topos. Although being genuinely different they will all relate to the discursive meaning given to the colonial texts.

While Bhabha look at the hybridity of signs as a creation of the agency of colonized and marginalized subjects, Spivak gives an example of a situation where this construction of a sign fails due to lack of interprets. In her famous article *Does the subaltern speak?* she points to a situation of total loss of articulation and agency. Giving a critique (in the precise meaning of the word) of what is called the *Subaltern studies group,* she makes a point that those who are working for empowerment of those who do not have a platform from witch they can speak can not easily claim legitimacy. She questions the possibility of solidarity among very differentiated groups, and the problems of representation when western intellectuals speak for the subaltern. Her critique is highly relevant for our purpose here. What she makes clear is that it is not sufficient with a media that can work for a platform to reach out to the world. The question she raises is not one of does the subaltern make utterances, but rather to question what makes up a functioning argument. What the subaltern lacks in Spivak's analysis is not so much media as interprets that can make sense of the subaltern utterances (Spivak, 1988).

The universal the French did propagandate for, a universal status of French culture, is not something that raises a united resistance. What Fanon points to is what happens when this universal culture is exchanged with an other traditionalist universal culture and legitimization for structures of dependence. Fanons critique which is still today right to the point, gives psychological explanations for these reproductions of dependence. My ambition is to translate these psychological explanation into a semiotic model. A semiotic model that is to some extent at hand since besides the inspiration drawn from Fanon in

postcolonial literature, semiotics, and discourse analysis inspired by Derrida and Foucault have been important to the whole postcolonial tradition after Said.

It can be noted that Said in his discourse analysis departs quite clearly from Foucault. Said follows Foucault, in noting that, academic disciplines, do not simply generate knowledge but also power. So the scholarly disciplines that had the orient as its object did create a legitimization of European power in the orient. Here Said is a about to depart from Foucault. The discourse analysis of Said is one that puts much more considerations of the creators of the discourse, the actual orientalists, than orientalism, the discourse itself. For Said it is the orientalism that is in the orientalists, while following Foucault he rather would have stressed the orientalist being in the orientalism (Said 1978, Foucault 1972).

Peirce: committed and plural

For much of the postcolonial literature especially the thoughts of Bhabha and Spivak, this doubleness of the discourse are continued: The postcolonial condition is in the postcolonial subject, just as well as the postcolonial subject is in the postcolonial condition.

One could have continued to build on the discourse analysis of Foucault. I will on the other hand use another theorist: the pragmatist philosopher Charles Saunders Peirce. I believe Foucault does not part from Peirce in the point I will make here. What is more, Peirce's semeiotic, which is more than a theory of sign, a semiotics, but an unparalleled coherent system of philosophy departing from the theory of sign. I will here present my first point of reference to Peirce semeiotic in discourse analysis of postcolonialism. I will later also use the philosophy of Peirce in the theories of media, and also in a epistemological theory of technology.

The point I left last section with is not least clear if on considers the pragmatism of Peirce. Where Saussure created a psychological semiotics, semiology, for his linguistic, the signs are created as a cognitive process, Peirce created a theory that was consistently non-psychological but social, the sign is a fact between people.

As I've mentioned, when building on Lacan, and also to some extent on Derrida both Bhabha and Spivak follows the Saussurian model of semiology as basis for the creation of identity in the relationship between the other. As I also have showed, also to some extent following Lacan, they have made much effort in departing from this binary opposition as the sole source for both identity and meaning. I will argue the Peircian semiotics (semeiotic) is a better theory of semiotics for some of the most important postcolonial discussions than Saussurian semiology. Let me briefly sketch why this is so.

The principle of difference is also prevailed in semeiotic, Peirce point out that there can not be one without a second. One alone does not exist except as pure possibility. So "one" can only exist in pair. What Peirce notes is that once you have a pair you also have a third, a difference that is mediating between the two. There has to be something that qualifies for a difference. So semeiotic is first and foremost a principle of logic. This is also why Peirce restricted semeiotic to an instance of three, Peirce proved that all facts can be analyzed in combination of threes (Peirce 1880).

This principle of difference is more in line with attempts to not theorize colonial relations in binary oppositions between colonizer and colonized. Peirce took some steps toward a relativistic yet continuant and universal semiotics, which goes to the heart of the kind of variation Bhabha and Spivak makes. Any sign is given a context, something which has been prominent in much of the hermeneutic and semiotic writing of the latest decades. Peirce is also criticizing those who believe any sign can have a meaning without context. However the idea of pragmatism in Peirce writings is a strong stance for translation. To him a sign is defined by what it does, it is this that gives the sign meaning, by other means

it is a rule of action (Peirce 1878)(a point that has created behaviorist miss-readings). Thus meaning is not something which is to be found in the head, but as a social fact between not subject but carriers of signs. Signs are therefor also taking part in a continuant process, where the sign is related to other signs, what Peirce called semiosis. The triadic structure of signs is continuant with other signs (Peirce 1907).

The triadic sign is made up of a representamen which is the character of the sign, an object witch is what the sign stands for, and an interpretant witch is the thought the sign creates (Peirce 1903). Representamen, object, and interpretant are not qualities of a sign but functions of the relationship a sign makes. An interpretant in one sign can be the representamen in an other sign in Peirce semiosis, continuant thought (Peirce 1903). Each of the three functions of a sign can have three different functions. A representamen can either be a qualisign, a sinsign or a legisign; the object can either be an icon, an index or a symbol, and the interpretant can either be a rhema, dicent or an argument (Peirce 1903).

If the character of a sign is a potential, it is a qualisign; as a given sign, a sinsign; or as a codified sign a legisign. If the sign resembles the object, it is an icon; if it indicates it, an index; or if it stands for the object, it is a symbol. If the sign is simply conceived, it is a rhema; said or shown, a dicent; or interpreted, an argument (Peirce 1903).

One functional aspect of the sign is always determined by the other aspects, and therefore can the sign change, it is never fixed.

Peirce semeiotic is maybe helpful in understanding Bhabha's ideas of hybridity. The "English book" is the representamen. As an object in the dark with no relations to interpretants it is a qualisign. As being a unique printed book it is a sinsign. Recognised as an English book it has become a legisign. In reference to it object it is an icon as long as it is a lone presence of English, an index as it is pointing to a presens of English civilisation and a symbol that stands for colonial rule, desire, discipline, or ambivalence.

This process can not be properly understood without the interpret. The English book in reference to its interpretant is as a rhema the potential meaning of the word, it is a term with an unknown number of definitions, as a dicent, it is a proposition witch can be followed with a yes or no in an actual context which will make it to possibly qualify as an argument (in the case of yes). But there is never an end argument, there is always either actual other or potential other interpretants (Peirce 1903).

Mimicry and metonymy, points to a continuous process, where the sign changes its object in different context, and with different media. It is as a first instance a (rhematic) iconic legisign (metonymy, synecdoche, or metaphor is always a legisign) the mere appearance of a rule, a magical act, that is transformed into an argument (symbolic legisign). Interestingly Roland Barthes gives a description of a situation where the sign is without argument, and only a rule. He notes how a colonial political agenda enters the reporting on North Africa in French newspapers. In the jargon of the French press norms and facts should not diverge, so the colonial realities had to get a moral stamp. This disrupted the meaning of the words. The state of war should not be acknowledged and the North Africa were described as if it was France. By analysing words like, "une bande" for the independence movement, or "communauté" for the French and the French institutions in the colonies, showed the locality of the French discourse (Barthes 1972). As shown above, in Morocco the French had a strategy of using the Moroccan political system to their own advantage. Thus the double discourse got another flip-side as well. Not only was Moroccans mimicking colonial authorities, the French were mimicking Moroccan authority. The work on postcolonial authority by the Moroccan anthropologists Hannoum and Hammoudi is especially interesting since the postcolonial discourse does not start with colonialism, but with myths and symbols of authorities going back before the time of colonialism. Thus these symbols are not constituted by the relationship between the colonial other, but is symbols that have been changed through the colonial discourse. The

psychological aspect of the other becomes less relevant. The semiotic aspect of mimicry is becoming more central. The Kahina myth where Kahina stands for the Amazights, or the analysis of power relations in Morocco where the Makhzen stands for the Moroccan authority, are metonyms the French colonial rule used for arguments of their own legitimacy The Makhzen (meaning warehouse, magazine) whas the royal system basically existing of the army and a rather limited bureaucracy, during the French protectorate this sytem was extended to the eductional system and the economic elites (Laroui 1977c). The strategical use of metonymy in discourses of power relations and authority is found in different colonial discourses where the sign can mirror the authority of the other, a strategy that involves acts similar to mimicry. These examples of Moroccan postcolonial theory, shows that, a continuant model like Peirce's, can present other aspects of mimicry, than a model, that starts with the binary opposition of colonized and colonizer.

Mimicry activates questions of difference. Even though the object is equal, the sign is not the same. What is it that makes a sign not being what it seemingly is? It lies in the true functions of the sign. The habitual interpretation of a sign is discontinued, There is in Peirce semiosis never a perfect or final interpretant of the sign, one interpretation all will agree on, when the sign is sufficiently considered (Peirce 1909). However the mimetic men are creating one that is further away from the immediate interpretant. The immediate interpretant is opposed to the dynamic interpretant which is the actual effect of a sign, the immediate interpretant is the intended understanding of the sign. The most common dynamic interpretant of mimicry is ambivalence. One can not know or trust the function of a sign-represpresentamen when it is relocated.

The mimicked sign when it is functioning successfully as mimicry is not developed into an argument but is a dicent indexical legisign. Sly civility is a way of keeping it that way.

The continuation of the interpretant of the sign the "English book" as colonial power in the example of the bible where the Indian readers of the bible do not think the European christians know the message of the bible, gives the colonised a meaningful way of resistance. They can speak their resistance. However the "English book" in other replacements gets totally different meaning, a radical difference. This is one of the vices of Peircian semiosis, that the theory of sign-action takes hight for radical difference. The same representament can have genuinely different functions in different contexts. In my opinion one possible definition of Bhabha's concept of hybridity is postcolonial semiosis.

Difference take another role in Spivak's examination of the subaltern widow in the case of sati (widow burning) interpreted by British. The sub-altern in this radical way can not speak (Spivak 1988). Spivak too start with the question of radical difference, but Spivak is criticising the way Foucault and Deluze sees the possibilities of a continuant difference. Spivak claims Foucault and Deluze is not effectively discussing ideology, and that they have a too simple notion of opposition. Opposition is not simply an alternative discourse, alternative arguments, but in an ideological way to undo the dominant universal discourses (Spivak 1988). This point can also be made about Peirce semiosis, he is not discussing power. I will however argue that since Peirce semiosis is temporal, it opens for a historicist approach that has actual room for ideology. The categories firstness/representamen, secondness/object, and thirdness/interpretant is one of a temporal process. to have an interpretant you already need an object, and to have an object you already need a representamen. A representamen is always the interpretant of a prior sign. The interpretant is never arbitrary in its social context, thus not any interpretant will do, there is a limited possibility of interpretants, the rhema. To have a sign you need a interpretant, there is no sign if the representamen does not mediate an object to the interpretant (Peirce 1905). A consequence of this semiosis and Peirce pragmatism is that a representamen can end as a potential. So if we use Peirce to interpret Spivak's famous

essay, we no not need end up with, the subaltern can speak, or the subaltern can't speak, but with the question can the subaltern speak, a potentiality, a rhema that needs a critical inquiry then it is put in an actual context. The answer is far from given.

The teleologic and deterministic universals that have so forth been deconstructed within a psychological frame have been known by the dialectic between master and client, hegemony and marginality. By making the context of the universal signs visible, and deconstructing the hegemonic sign, the excluded elements have been made visible. The most elementary part of Peirce semiosis is a critique of this binary construction. While a straight line between to poles can only connect those at the edge of polarity a road that is split in two with three directions can have an infinite numbers of number of points in its edge. This semiosis creates a model of continuant plurality that is no less committed and contextualized.

Difference and technology

The point of radical difference or incommensurability will not be left when we are moving into the other major theoretical topic, technology and media. One who developed the point of difference and computerized media is Jean-François Lyotard. I will first present Lyotards description of the consequences digital media has to create a differentiated discourse, before I will take a closer look at theories of technology in general.

Lyotard made a point of difference that was similar to that of both Bhabha and Spivak. Lyotard, Bhabha and Spivak is all concerned with a possible place to speak from. In his famous report on knowledge in the computerized world Lyotard identifies the variation of status of knowledge as on of legitimation. What give legitimation to knowledge and cultural practises is the metanarratives, enlightenment and progress of knowledge. According to Lyotard we have moved from one age of metanarratives,

modernity, to an age of where metanarratives have disappeared, post-modernism (Lyotard 1984). Metanarratives is a bit like final interpretants there is one known interpretant to each representamen, while post-modernism is a state where dynamic interpretants, the actual effect of the signs, is the only thing that is. The prime mover has been computerization, and the technological changes have radically changed the basis of knowledge to a question of government. Knowledge has become a commodity and thus is metanarratives peripheral to decide, what is relevant knowledge while commercial interests, has become central (Lyotard 1984). In one way Lyotard describes metanarratives as final interpretants imposed on a world of many incommensurable narratives, or language games where moves in one language game can not be translated into another one. When the metanarratives are gone the natural world of difference in relived, but also under the post-modern condition the difference is met with a legitimization that will be imposed on difference. Lyotard sees a danger when performability is being the only criterion for legitimation of knowledge, the truth-value will be lost and only use value in a marked will prevail. This will lead to a process where player will be excluded from the language game, something Lyotard calls terror. (Lyotard 1988). As a sociological description of the effect of computerization Lyotard is very interesting. I believe Lyotard has managed to do something very few have made, a precise description of a process commenced by new media, but this should be seen as a frozen image of a process from one rather stable discourse to another. Seemingly Lyotard makes many of the same points as Spivak, in different language games people are excluded and this is terror. However Spivak does not give only the difference legitimization as Lyotard does. Rather the opposite, while pointing on exclusion from discourses she does not follow the degree of incommensurabilities that Lyotard does, both Spivak and Bhabha is critical to the utopian self-marginalization of the minorities. One can not easily escape the power of the

dominant discourse, thus ways of being able to speak within the dominant discourse is the ideal (Bhabha 1990, Spivak 1993).

While Lyotard was pointing to the differences technology made, he did not really investigate media in general, he never made any attempts to make a media theory

Technology, function and semiosis

Functions of tools have traditionally been seen as essentialism of purposeness: A chair for sitting, a screw driver for screwing screws etc. This is a clear teleology and causality idea, I will oppose. To do this I will make my second point of reference to Peirce. Let's start with the idea of function. Peirce semeiotic is as we have noted functional. And functions are relational, whenever there are relations there is a third. Technologies are the functional triads of tools as representamen, the "ideal" use is object, and the product of the actual use is interpretant.

Another non-teleologic and functional approach to technology is to see it as tools applied in four-dimensional process, there is no other intentionality than what is obviously at hand, a human purpose. A four-dimensional process is one described in space and time (Johansson 2004). Instead of saying the function of the chair is to sit in it, which is of course not always the case. Who has never used the chair for standing on to reach something placed on a too high level to reach without extension. Tools are extension of man, and the process man is involved in. The intentional question is "If one wants to reach this goal and if one can choose the means and if one wants to do so in an efficient way, then one ought to choose the entity that is the best possible means to reach the goal" (Johansson 2004). That is, if you want to sit then you use the best device for doing this at hand. You do not have to describe such a *process* in terms of causes, all causes are perfectly

external. So what we can use as a staring point is that technology is not designed use of tools, but pragmatic use of tools.

A tool can be perfectly described in its possessions without being in process. An engineer will design its three-dimensional qualities, and it will have the same functional potential, and thus function weather in use or not, even use will be a four-dimensional process (Johannson 2004). This is to say a tool can be a sinsign, a differentiated existence.

In the example of an organ the non processing organ will be impossible to describe. An organ is not quite an organ without an organism, but it is possible to give an isolated description of the process it is involved in without the organism. Technology is not quite a tool; it is more like an organ that can not be described outside its functioning. Technology is a social phenomenon that a tool is not.

This resembles the common use of the word technology. In daily language we are often talking about a certain technology related to a process, more than an object. We talk about communication technology, irrigation technology or printing technology, all relating to a process.

If there are functions there are malfunctions as well, of course when you want to dry your cat, the micro wave is not very likely to to be the best mean available. This is not because the cat is not drying, but because it will explode. So there are expectations to a tool (the cat will dry), and there are unforeseen effects (the cat will explode). There is a certain incommensurability between certain beliefs and certain effects that lies in the potential of the tool. This is a clear example of why tool will have a certain deterministic effect; if its users are able to learn from experience (a lack of such abilities will certainly have effects on other systems, like reproductivity).

However technology is not only a social organ, it is not, generically made. The pure engineering, and some level of intentionality laid in the tool might be generic, but as a whole it is not. The tools is not in itself coding for a special use, and tools are in varying

degree following a pre-described use, unlike genes coding the organs functioning in an organism. This is why it will be wrong to see technology as a meme.

All technology will be part of a semiosis. Let us take the car as a starting point. And consider one of its many functions, driving kids to kindergartens. Seeing it as one of the many practical and good things a car can be used for. One can say that driving kids to kindergarten is a good use of the car, while it obviously has some damaging sides on both urban and global environment. So the conclusion is, there are good sides and there are bad sides of a technology. Well, this is a totally naive way of seeing technology. To say the use lies within the car, to just study the engineered qualities of the car, that it has the potentiality to move people reasonably fast from one place to another is not sufficient. What is interesting is how it is functioning within the environment in which it is set, that it might unlashes possibilities that have not existed before and that it thus "creates" a new environment. The kindergarten witch you a driving your child would most probably have not been possible without the car. Since young children are not let to travel by themselves they have to be transported by a concerned adult. Pre-car ideas of making what traditionally have been women's work, caretaking of children and elders were in some utopian work of urban planning in the late 19th century placed within big living machines, where women's work could be changed into paid labour, and in this way creating independence for women (Doorly 1985). This was never realized before the car came into existence, then participating in both the making of kindergartens, and women's liberation. Now this is just a small part of many functions of the car that makes it nearly impossible to not have one self, and thus be "relieved" by the car when you have to transport your children to the kindergarten. So my first assumption that a tool is used intentionally, like "If one wants to transport the children to the kindergarten and if one can choose the way of transportation and if one wants to transport in an efficient way, then one ought to choose the entity that is the best possible means to reach the goal", is a choice that does not

tell the whole story because by the choice of many people the car is often the obvious choice.

So what is this intentionality worth then? For studying technology in process it is still useful, and also on an aggregate level it is obviously interesting. Cars have the potentiality for kindergartens, when highly realized in a society it is nearly unavoidable to both have children in kindergartens and use cars. However there are societies where kindergartens are not so much frequent even though cars are. So what is important for technology and makes it different from what I call tools is that it is not (simply) generically made, but (also) strategically made. Cars have been able to participate in the building of kindergartens where the social will have been sufficient. There is a choice of how car is used, both on a individual level and a aggregate level.

So unlike a tool that can be studied in its form, a screwdriver for screwing screws can be analyzed in is form, and its sufficient to know its shape, its hardness, its weight, and is elasticity to know if it will be a good tool or not. And unlike an organ which is sufficiently analyzed when it is in process, a technology have to be analyzed strategically as well, with both its toolish, organic and strategically intentionality. This is a parallel to the semiosis noted above.

Technology is seen as a mean to achieve something, as means of production. It is the real drive of the economy. Ideology is sometimes seen as beliefs that control the technology, but ideology is not external to technology. Certainly, control over technology is power and control over technology requires power. The control over technology is a highly political theme, even though it is also something that is believed to be beyond the control of the political power. Corporations and engineers rule all those technical systems. In traditional Marxist thought ideology is what obstruct peoples control over technology (Feenberg, A 1992).

It has been pointed out that it is difficult to find institutional differences between technology and ideology (Godelier 1978). This is so because things say something, they are social facts that inform us and are themselves ideological. When you keep this in mind, the discussion between technological determinism versus social determinism, the latter saying the society makes technology and uses it for good or bad, becomes a little pointless.

Technology is a part of social process and structure; technological determinism is social determinism (Sørhaug 96). Tool or technology are then both a means to real goods, and power as well as it is a disciplining factor. I believe it gives more sense in keeping the notions technology and ideology together than splitting them up. Even thought it is difficult to find ideology and technology as different institutions, there are certainly a truth to the democratic point that some makes the technology others use. Some makes the World Wide Web, while others are just caught in it.

The question of what makes us use a technology is an interesting on, why do we say take internet into use? According to McLuhan technology and media are an extensions of man and of the sensory organs. Like other organs we simply use it continually with no regard to the content. So while there is no demand for cars before there are cars, it will exists as soon as it is in place (McLuhan 1964). This notion on extension of our own bodies and senses is quite in line with the intentionally way of seeing technology in function. Since we use what is available for our purpose, we sort of constantly "use" our technology, when we have a chair we prolong our legs if we have to, with no regard to the "content", or underlying idea of how to use a chair. So what McLuhan in this regard is not is a determinist.

A fundamental part necessary to understand McLuhan is the relationship between a medium and its surrounding, the narration and the cultural surrounding. In the terms of McLuhan the message and the media, the message is just another medium containing another medium (McLuhan 1964). McLuhan is known for writing deterministic on the

impact of media like writing, industrialized printing, or the TV. It is true that he admires determinist like Innis, and also expressed himself in words like cause and effect. However the most important he did was to change attention from content to media, or environment in a way similar to functionalistic anthropology. McLuhan wanted to understand the function of media. Function understood correctly is not causality, but description of relations. For a scientist McLuhans hard-boiled modernist style might be difficult to understand, but it is more holistic than deterministic.

This is a often overlooked point that McLuhan made, when he says the media is the message it is not an idea that the media determines a certain message. A chair determines sitting. No the contrary it is of course the use that makes up the technology, but people just use the technology available, and as we have noted above, there are limits to use. But still McLuhan does in fact talk deterministic about technology. How is that? Going back to the chair on can say that while the chair does not determine sitting, because sitting we would do otherwise, what it determines is the habit of putting objects above a reachable level when standing on the floor. This is obviously not true, and technological determinism in any strict sense does not exists. However there is a rising probability of putting object on a unreachable level when standing on the floor. So if one can talk about technological determinism it is due to probability and on an aggregate level. One can not know the individual use of technology, there are more reasonable to guess the use of the multitude. McLuhan was often making remarks on the difference of how different technologies are used in Europe and America, so determinism was not a absolute, but rather a result of system.

McLuhan wanted to put the light on the relationship between technology and context, but admitted a lack of systematic approach. By making the point of determinism that is not really determinism but probability aggregates, and as such a little out of reach for this study, I can not leave this subject behind. I am on the contrary interested in

advancing this question in a different way. Noting that technologies have certain incomensurabilities with thoughts of use, its not a good idea of drying your cat in a microwave oven. But then there are malfunctions that are commensurable. You can use any origami pattern to make a paper hat, a bad hat maybe, but a hat. Bad hats, not intended or forgotten origami pattern will however tend to be discontinued (Dawkin 2003) and not make much of an impact. You can use foam as a chair, it will function, but it will not give to much support for sitting. These examples shows, that there are commensurable use that are functioning at a very different level of scale, and there are commensurable use of different tools for the same purpose that are functioning at a very different level of scale. Peirce distinguishes between immediate and dynamical object. The immediate object is what is within the sign (Peirce 1908), that is, within the technology. This can produce an inaccurate interpretant of the dynamic object, what is outside the sign, or technology. One can never know the dynamical sign, by the use of the actual immediate sign, but one can be comparatively close of far off with the different signs. There are continuations on both use and choice of objects. This is all in accordance with McLuhan, he also made this point when noted the fact that when somebody lose as sense the other senses will fill in (McLuhan 1964). But it also points to the inventious use of the new technology, and in the example of McLuhan, inventious use of one owns senses.

The abductive use of technology

McLuhan made a point that every new technology released enormous amounts of energy when it enters a new milieu and at will penetrate the milieu until every institution is saturated (McLuhan 1964). But McLuhan gave very little importance to this process, it was a before and a after, with a stability McLuhan exaggerated. His lack of understanding of process makes him of little use, when a new technology like the Internet is studied still

realising energy and penetrating institutions. It will not help to make references to "Global village", which is not describing electronic media in general but radio (with great accuracy).

To help me in describing process, I will make a third point of reference to Charles Peirce. What I have described above is a process of discovering functional qualities of a technology. So the epistemology of it all will help us on the way. McLuhan description of a technologies impact on its environment is in many ways similar to the idea of a shift of paradigm. In the same way Mcluhan gives a historical description of the normal mode of technology before and after the introduction of a new technology, so does Kuhn in describing the normal science within each paradigm (Kuhn 1962). Both Kuhn and McLuhan describe a state of equilibrium before and after the introduction of a new technology or a new paradigm. But how does this change come about? What takes place between the two states of equilibrium? Feyerabend makes a point in the introduction of the theory of the rotating world, and the heliocentric, or rather relativistic world view that Galileo argued. If the world is moving, then an object would not fall in a straight line when dropped. To argue for a moving world, Galileo gave the example of a ship moving, as a person placed on this ship you would not have to move to keep an eye on an object on the ship. On a rotation world you will not see the stone relative movement to the sun. What Galileo did was to relate to unrelated facts, the moving boat and the seemingly stable world (Feyerabend 1975), through abduction as Peirce described it; to infer "something which it would be *impossible* for us to observe directly" (Peirce 1877) (my emphasis). So while Kuhn describe context and paradigm dependent science, Feyerabend advocated constantly seeking *lines of flight* (Deleuze and Guattari 1987), which is what Galileo did. Peirce has a similar idea of scientific process, but he had a more continuous idea of the inquiry than Feyerabend, and certainly more continuous than Kuhn. Peirce method to inquiry was not a either inductive or deductive way of thinking, but a model where the

abductive, deductive and inductive is establishing a consistent whole in inquiry. The terms

deductive and inductive is misleading if on interprets them as classical concepts of inquiry.

The abductive inquiry resembles more to the "rhizome" of Deleuze and Guattari (1987).

Thus deduction is deterritorialization, and induction is reterritorialization. And as noted

above the abduction is the "line of flight". Abduction and deduction is that closely related

in the thinking of Peirce as well: "[Deduction] merely evolves the necessary consequences

of pure hypothesis. Deduction proves that something *must be;* Induction shows that

something *actually is* operative; Abduction merely suggests that something *may be"* (Peirce

1903b). The abductive-deductive element might be connected to the environment in a

plurality of manners through induction, in this way he resembles Deleuze and Guattari.

The experimental side might resemble falsification, just like the cat drying example above:

Abduction: It *might be* a good idea to dry the cat in the microwave. Deduction: It *must be*

the most effective way, since it is the most effective oven (remember the intentionality of

functional use of technology). Induction: Boff, no *actually* not. But according to Peirce there

is a continuous reason for experimentation (Peirce 1901).. That would make it more

reasonable to speak of incommensurability than falsification, the idea of pragmatism is to

acknowledge alliances and connection that actually functions. While Kuhn and McLuhan

describes phase transitions, like from liquid to gas, and the incommensurable behaviour of

the equal molecules in the two steady states, At least Peirce, and I would argue in principle

Feyerabend and Deleuze as well, describes a possible pattern of this transition.

Peirce explicitly points to abduction when he wants to describe ways of thinking

when newness enters the world. Take a object which is white, and which is a crow, and the

fact that all crows are black. This would require an explanation; it might be an albino or a

new species or variety of crows (Peirce 1901). When a new technology is taken into use, it

is not taken into use arbitrary. There are certain preconditions for the choices of use that is

taken. Thus the alliances made between the new technology and the society is not

arbitrary. It requires great leaps into the unknown, where the process of making new alliances is joining social and political strategies with a epistemological consideration. An adventurous use of new technology for reaching the new utopia, within a curve of learning the incommensurabilities of the new technology, and the competitive use of the technologies, where people who search for other goals than one self and those who are searching goal that resembles oneself on an aggregate level changes the environment.

On the enquiry of the general approach for the function of new technology we can now conclude. For describing the function of a technology, and especially the function of a new technology it is not sufficient to describe its form or predescribed causalities, but also how it is processing within its operating environment. But as social facts we have to see how this technology is strategically and epistemologically connected to the world by its intentional users. A technology is not uni-functional, but multifunctional.

Just as the users have to make abductional assumptions on the use of technology I have to make abductional assumptions together with them. And I have to make an abductional leap into the unknown of what is the most central function of the technology, What kind of relations to the context, the actual society is the most important. This is of course based on well informed guesswork. And if I happens to miss the most central, or rather central functions of Internet, the functions I will analyse here could still be just as real. But it would also be a possibility that due to the aggregate use of Internet, less central ways of functions would show up to be a dead end.

Comparing different theories of discourse, media and epistemology, we can but the in one model of structure and process. As we have already noted, McLuhan and Kuhn describes a phase transition with no regard to the process between the phases. Deluze and Feyerabend is describing a 'ahistoric' process where anything goes, all interpretants are possible. Lyotard gives an accurate description of the phase process but freezes it in time, and presents it as a transition ignoring the potentiality for immediate interpretants. In

many ways Spivak and Bhabha is "mediation between Lyotard and Deluze, insisting on both process and difference.It is not the technology alone that does something, the screwdriver that screw screws, but technology link between intentionality and the realization, the hand and the fixed screw to the wall.

I will throughout this work focus on a few choices of Internet. The hand of media, the instance that sets Internet into function is the messages. An Internet without content would be mere possibilities. So I will choose some few situations where certain messages are the active aspect of internet. Then I have to consider the new fixed firstness this use will make. For any media the public will be the interpretant of the media. Several theorist of nationalism have pointed to the importance of print for the raise of nationalism, McLuhan with Gutenberg galaxy (1962) , Gellner with Nations and Nationalism (1983), and Anderson with Imagined communities (1983) to mention some central theorists. They point especially to the creation of an urban intellectual elite of both critics and functionaries of the state. This resembles also the process those who have been most concerned with the emergence of a new Public Sphere have pointed to. The role of the critic in the major English journals Tattler and Spectator (Eagelton 1984), while Habermas puts much emphasis on the coffee-houses in the emergence of the Public Sphere, he gives changing media the role of a major actor in the transformation into the spectacle and culture industry of the 19th century (Habermas 1989). It is exactly the possible functions the Internet can have in the structuration of a political domain. This kind of questions resembles very much the questions people made when Internet was first taken into use. What are the possibilities, that lies in the Internet when one wants to transmit message to the public and if one can choose the means and if one wants to do so in an efficient way, then one ought to choose the media that is the best possible means to reach the public. They also asked question on how this might could change the public, and influence ones own ambitions.

In the 2nd Chapter I will investigate this abductive process. First I will give a short presentation of how Internet entered Casablanca and Morocco. Then I will take a look at what kind of abductions people actually made, hypothesises of what difference Internet *may make*, and what Internet following this hypothesis *must be* like. This gives guidelines of action that is followed; into these actions people put their own aspirations, hopes and ambitions. In negotiations with others in this creative process, they find out what *is actually* working. I way lucky enough to be involved in this process as I worked for the biggest internet provider, and Internet portal that was vital in creating Internet in Morocco during the first years. I had a close look at this negotiation between different ambitions. The point was rarely falsifications of what Internet is not, but regularly negotiations between different actors that actually made Internet work.

In the 3rd chapter I will move into the creation of a discourse. As we will see this involves much of the same interpretations of action that was involved in the negotiation. But the discourses I will analyze here are pointing toward a higher aggregate level. The ideas of legitimate political authority and the public sphere will be analyzed in detail by concentrating on two debates that has been of great importance in Morocco the last years: The existence of terrorism on Moroccan soil, after the 16th of May terror attacks in Casablanca 2003. And the discussions of reformation of new family law (Moudawana). What is of major interest is when internet is the media for these discussions. The interpret public is here analyzed through some important ideas of authority of the nation and religion and influence from the outside in a postcolonial frame.

In the 4th chapter I will rise on level, and put the semiotic structure "the discourse" as a second instance, the object in a semiotic structure one might call "the public sphere/nation". I will add one element that has not been considered until then, but is important in this context, the linguistic communities. This is a aspect of the function of Internet that was not from the beginning an important part of the abductive process of

Internet: It has however showed to be a very important part of the use of internet. Another important use has also been the chat, and especially for translational communication between friend, family, and potential media for leaving Morocco. This is other second aspects that points toward a reconfiguration, or a reterritorialization of a Moroccan Public Sphere, and the Moroccan nation.

Method

I was looking for several parameters when I chose to do fieldwork in Casablanca. Some of them were not important for the study, but I had some ideas following the problems I wanted to investigate. Firstly it had to be a postcolonial site, looking especially for continuing dominance of the former colonist through the use of technology. Second I wanted a rather well industrialized zone with a lot of economic activities, since I went to the field with-out a any agreement to enter any kind of business or community. Thirdly I hoped for getting into contact with somebody working in the telecommunication field, or having this as an essential part of their work. Especially I was interested to test the commonly held idea at the time I started my fieldwork, the one of the Internet that could help building democracy and open up for information formerly censured. These ideas about the Internet where based on ideas developed from the use of the Internet in Europe and North America, I wanted to see what actually was taking place on the ground. Casablanca was such a place that I needed, a generator in a less developed country.

Settling in Casablanca and making contacts

I was basically using two different strategies in my field-work. One is where I trace telecommunication within Casablanca, another where I go more specifically into an Internet portal placed in Casablanca. Peircian pragmatism has some common traits with both Barthes and constructivism on one side and, Actor-Network-Theory (ANT), on the other. These theories have inspired anthropological method. A book that traced a similar technology in Casablanca followed Barthes is Susan Ossmans «Picturing Casablanca» which describes the use of images, from photos, to cinema and television in different parts of Casablanca (1994). By tracing the image media she is able to describe broad aspects of Casablanca. The way ANT is given as a method In "Laboratory life" by Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar (1979), a clear methodological framework is developed. The fieldwork takes

place in a laboratory where science in action is the object of the fieldwork. Marianne Lien also used this method in "Marketing and Modernity" to describe the work of the Marketing division in a company producing frozen pizzas and chicken meals (1997). My intention was to get into a company and to stay there, and observe their knowledge production. I felt that getting into a company was valuable to avoid a shallowness that was not really based on thorough studies of real people, and also that it would help to have somewhere to go most of the days. Still I valued the kind of information that Ossman got and since she had written on images and a lot on television I had something to use in a comparison with different media in the same ethnographic area.

I was in Cyber-cafes as a user, and I talked to people there. I had friends who used the Internet, and I talked to strangers who never became friends. I had friends who used cell phones, and I discussed the use of cell-phones with them. I rarely talked to strangers about cell-phone, but it occasionally happened, in the dressing room at the gym, on the bus etc. People told me how they got their phones and computers, so I checked Darb Ghalif the market where basically all consumer goods are sold. I bought pirate copied music, and found out how they used the Internet to get hold of new music they could sell.

This made a new connection, I had not thought of, I was not looking for it, but of course I was aware as I went along. I did very few surveys (I counted the gender mixture at some cyber cafés) and I did not do any interviews. How should I be able to ask the relevant questions? On the other hand I talked with people. I found people who used the technology and I talked to them and I listened to them. I gathered information as a friend or as a friendly person.

Most of this data are collected with the informants unaware of being informants. The reason for this is very simple, I didn't always know myself I was collecting information before I went thru the day in the evening. I also experienced problems with

using a notebook since informants tended to talk nonsense, and official propaganda, when I brought a notebook to my conversations with them.

In the company where I worked from February 2001 to May 2002 the situation was very different. There are two aspects of good ANT I certainly did not follow; one is the reluctance to framing the object of observation. When you can follow the network rather freely, I believe framing can be avoided. However when I entered the company, I was desk-bound most of the day. I experienced a limited access to the information I wanted. I will therefore use quite a lot of existing descriptions of what might be called Moroccan culture that can explain the data I have. Second is the symmetry between different kinds of actors. The quality of a human is not different from an object or a text. The reason behind this is to keep to the facts that are present, and to avoid conspiracy theories, speculation on intentions behind actions and ending up with cultural reductionism. Moreover you are also supposed to have a professional disinterest in the truthfulness of local knowledge, and the truthfulness of people. This is not different from what we have always learned in social anthropology; you are always supposed to see it from the natives' point of view, but not necessarily believe.

Enacting the co-worker role

To be an anthropologist and to explicitly say you are an anthropologist when studying a technological company in Casablanca was problematic. Anthropology is seen as a study of primitive societies. So when I came to Casablanca to study Internet as an ideological system there, I had to stay among people who absolutely not wanted a European young student to see them as primitive. It was to some extent difficult to make people understand what I really was up to. And naturally some were sceptical to how I would present them and their activities. I met a lot of friendly people who was willing to help me, but they

would be suspicious to let me into their arena, their companies. Eventually I ended up in one company, and I could hardly be luckier, if I wanted to place myself in the centre of the development of Internet in Morocco. I got into this company as a friend of the boss and the owner of the company. This had clearly some advantages and some disadvantages.

The main disadvantage was how other people in the company would perceive me when I was first introduced as a friend. Could I be some kind of a spy for the head of the company? The boss understood this problem clearly, and he was reluctant to let me enter the company as an anthropologist on basis of just being his friend. So when he wanted to have me there as a regular employee, it was an excellent opportunity to change role, still being a friend of the boss, but also a worker. Being employed because I was a friend of the boss was a position everybody could accept. I was totally explicit on being in Morocco as an anthropologist writing my thesis on the Internet in Morocco, and that I intended to use data from the company as the basis of my thesis. The problem of being perceived a spy was something I never got rid of. I had a big advantage being inside the company because the suspicion to me as an anthropologist studying the primitive was too big to accept me and let me collect data otherwise. One could say that I choose to go native because I already experienced the disadvantages from going native. So I had to bow to the local knowledge, I had to choose side.

In Macroweb I had regular work. Working hours from 8:30 to 6:30, with a two-hour lunch break from 12:30 to 2:30. Often I didn't arrive at the office on time, but stayed until quite late. I met with my friends from work who where few, after work. The people I met were mostly the bosses and the journalist who had worked longest for Macroweb. They were my closest friends, and my key-informants. They had the most information to give. In April 2001 there was a major conflict between most of the web-developers and the boss. So four of them left and were replaced. I had better contact with the original group and continued to have a certain contact with some of them even tough I didn't see them often. I

got the possibility to talk with them on the situation in the company before I arrived. So they are important when I reconstruct some of the things that happened during the history of Macroweb. On the development in Macroweb after I arrived I have my own observations.

I had my desk among the web-developers, two of the journalists, sitting close to my key-informant, a webmaster of the city-guide, and an advisor that stayed at the company for a longer period. When he was a friend of the bosses we used to go out drinking in the evenings. It was when we left the office, Said (the real boss), Foad (the official boss and Saids cousin), Pierre (a French advisor), and me, I got most of the information on strategic issues. The information I got in these evenings will of course be dealt with carefully. With the journalist I went to cafés in the evenings. Sundays were often spent from breakfast to the evening with a journalist that held a central position in Macroweb as some kind of star because he was the first journalist there, and made an important contribution to Macrowebs early success. Certainly a lot of information I didn't get directly myself, I got through him. He had a position in the company as more independent than I was; people were more interested in talking to him than me because he of course had something to give back. Another aspect of his relationship with the rest of the company was the he was constantly in conflict with somebody; this of course makes him a very valuable informant.

Using biography as a methodological strategy and making use of existing ethnographies on Morocco

I see the lack of separation between persons acting strategically and non-strategic things as a certain weakness with the ANT. However, keeping the Apollonian aspect from the ANT method blended with the Dionysian personal history of actors makes me able to write the tragedy of Macroweb. Still the ambition was to produce data that was general and giving me the scope to compare. The concern I give some of my informants and their personal

strategies are to some extent corrupting the general value of some of my data. So be it. I believe it is so essential for what was actually taking place that the reader should know this aspect to have a fair opportunity to evaluate what I write.

Examples of attempts at overcoming these methodological difficulties can be seen in ethnographies concerning Morocco. Ethnography in Morocco consists of a long list of biographies; this is a choice of method in complex societies where the complexity of the social reality makes it impossible to give a impression of being able to describe society as a whole. Ossman have chosen to follow a phenomenon, pictures, but the biography of a person has been far more common. In ethnography with a partly psychoanalytical approach to a Moroccan the ethnographic situation and its relationship to truth is discussed (Crapanzano 1980). In the biography of a notable educated in the pre-colonial educational system, both the changes in the educational system and the judicial system of 20th century Morocco is depicted though a deep cooperation between ethnographer and informant. This tradition of letting the informant speak is a tradition I follows as well. Much of the analysis provided in this text is developed in cooperation with my informants. What I provide is the possibility to supply multiple voices; I let my informants speak, often in open disagreement with me.

What is more I have an experimental approach to the function of Internet. When Internet entered the world nobody knew exactly how this technology would function. I have chosen to take extra note to the abductions I could find among Informants. Much of this thesis will be developed around the informants' abductions of what the new media is, and my work was to a large extent to record these experiments by the informants in the field.

The obvious conflict between what I regard as the essence of anthropological research; the description of real social situations, and then the ability to grasp the function of social facts, and systematically collect data to provide maximum representativity are

present in more than just a very close connection to a few informants. I guess the most important is some difficulties of having female informants. Within the company it was rather simple, except from the two main informants I had a lot of contact with the female co-workers. On the other hand this was more difficult in the public. Here it was difficult to get in touch with a lot of female informants, but I managed to get a few good informants. And I made a whole lot of concern in getting some experiences showing the gender differences.

A very rewarding reference here has been a great literature on women's experiences in the Moroccan ethnography. It is not only an anthropological (or sociological and linguistic) literature, but also a huge intervention by female academics working with such questions that I deal with here in both international and national political debate and media. This makes up a very important background for my ethnographic data. There is a quite considerable literature on exactly women and their use of new telecommunication-technology, and Moroccan women's intervention into the public.

Of course telecommunication makes its appearance in a broad range of situations with people of different background. I can't cover all of them. As I will point out later on, people live in rather different worlds within the same city and do not give much concern for each other. However, I believe I managed to access different people to a broad degree and that this makes it possible to describe these differences.

Duration of the fieldwork as a basis for exploring change and process

A quality of my fieldwork due to its long duration and closeness to some informants is the ability to describe change. This is something functionalism and research giving much regard to comparison sometimes lacks. This aspect of exploring the process that was taking place while I did my field work also add something to my whole work One can

question the lack of surveys and statistical data I chose to produce, when this might be important when ICT is a technology were most people have such a limited admission to it, and the simple difference of access is of such an importance. This kind of surveys was offered by people who was able to do it much better than I'll ever be able to do. I will of course use those surveys in my analysis.

Other literature valuable to me is, as previously explained, the broad existing ethnographic data from Morocco, produced by both Moroccan as well as foreign ethnographers. This plays an important role in putting the pieces together, and is in fact also an important part of the data that I have.

Introduction of ICT to Casablanca

Casablanca was not a place different from any other place on this planet when I first arrived late 1999. Or at least that is if we are supposed to believe in Slater and Millers point of view; Internet as extreme globalization (Miller and Slater 2000). All over the world everybody, especially those who were supposed to be the best informed, said the old world will fall, and a totally different one will rise. People there as in the rest of the world, knew this new stuff would change their lives and they knew it would change their lives well. So why not for better? The only rational way I think is to say that here we have change, we don't have the clue of what it will be, but this is our wildest guess, our braves dream etc, so go for it. And so they did, and it went bang, because they made a bobble out of it. So in afterthought this was very very irrational. As Woolgar puts it "The early enthusiasm has given way to a realization that discussions about virtual community often embodied some confused ideals about what community entails» (Woolgar 2002). Maybe so, but newness is newness.

So what I will recall is not the irrationality, because I never saw it. I only met brave women and men who went to the battle, and lost. It was a fair match, no windmills involved. Modern telecommunication entered Casablanca in many ways. Compared to other countries in the region the introduction was liberal and rapid. In the mid nineties the former Moroccan king Hassan II made several initiatives to make the telecommunication sector one of the most important tasks in Moroccan economy. The relative success of the policy in the mid nineties can be seen the trust this sector have had among foreign investors. In 1999 the second GSM license second GSM license for Morocco was sold for 10 billion Dirhams (1 billion €).

Even some people would argue those multinationals threw money at any «strategic» investment object those times, compared to other north African or Arab state, this was a success. Especially cellular phones were fast becoming a part of everyday life for the vast part of the Casablancian population. The numbers of cellular phones rapidly

passed the number of fixed telephones. 5% of the population had access of fixed telephones before the entrance of cellular phones.

The importance of cellular phones change can not be ignored even though it is the Internet that is the most important subject in my thesis. But the web and the portable phones are connected. Partly as slightly integrated technologies, and partly as its private use, chatting language, and change of public space is related. The Internet itself is not so broadly in use. But the Internet is used more diversely. And were are no restrictions on access to neither content on the Internet, starting a cybercafé, nor ISP services. The Islamist group al-adl wal-Ishanhave had some of its sites closed, but attempts at making unpopular parties dissapear from Internet has never been successful. The number of ISP-companies was on a top in 1999 with more than 100 companies providing access to the Internet. Few of these were able to keep up with the demands, so during 2000 and 2001 most vanished. The number of cybercafé are high and in 2002 in was said that the number was as high as 2000. And cyber cafés is the most popular use of the Internet.

Very few have Internet connection at home, but the Internet has become important for the large young population of urban Morocco. For news services the Internet is most used for obtaining information internationally. Most newspapers have some kind of websites, but the general visitor of the cybercafés does not use these. Mainly the people who read the Internet editions of the Moroccan newspapers are Moroccans in Diaspora. This is a fact that can easily be explained by economical reasons. It is a lot cheaper to buy a newspaper in the street than to go and read the same newspaper on slow Internet lines when you have to pay 7 or 8 DH per hour.

This is the same price as for the most expensive weeklies, and the heavily subsidized newspaper Le Matain costs only 3 DH. But this has also created an Internet use very different from the regular media use. Internet is basically used for totally different means than other media. Due to the strong censorship in Morocco, the general media, like

TV, radio, newspaper, were not highly regarded. For the opposition there were other media. Students active in the political left have told me how the were smuggling literature across the Algerian border. How photocopies were circulated. You got one text, with the order to read it and to memorise. This was how crucial information was circulated. The need for trustworthy information is high. Information relatively difficult to access were read and spread orally, on the street corner, cafes, and in homes.

This dangerous oppositional information is marked by high trust in its importance, and uncertain accuracy. Authorative texts are actually interpretations. As one Marxist have told me from his daring crossing of the Kiss river to get Marx' writings into Morocco. As he later left for Europe and joined a Marxist party was asked why he was a Stalinist, he said of course he was not, he only cited Marx. Later he found out he was actually citing Stalin, or sometimes Spinoza. When he thought he read Marx he was actually reading Stalin or Spinoza. Other information which circulated could be decisions the party had made, or rumours on the King and his ministers.

This kind of media is easily brought into the Internet. Web pages can be printed and read, articles can be read and memorized, chatting, e-mail and SMS' are used to spread the rumours. So even the technical access to the Internet is limited, the actual impact is much wider, as it fits with the established public sphere.

Due to the liberal policy held by the Moroccan authorities on the digitalization of telecommunication, it attracted people who saw this as Morocco's big opportunity. Inspired by the general view of what possibilities this new technology could give. My case is one of the «success stories» in the development of digitalized telecommunication. It started as a cybercafé in 1996, developed to ISP-service and established itself as Morocco's most popular Internet-portal, and was later bought by "TéléM".

The young entrepreneurs that left their Diaspora in Europe to go back home and start Macroweb were not the only ones. Internet gave possibilities for others to move home

start their own companies and still be able to sell their services to both Moroccan and global customers. An entrepreneur with a similar background as Siadwent to Morocco to start a company selling advanced mathematical engineering solutions. Both can work as an archetypes of the «brain immigrants» who in different ways saw possibilities in Morocco by the help of telecommunication. Like the one who started the advanced mathematical engineering services showed, it is not only a Telecommunication revolution, but also a revolution in the whole economy, giving new opportunities for the «knowledge economy» to operate from anywhere on the planet, only demanding an Internet access.

Both Yousuf and Yossufwere born in Fez and went to Europe for studies. In 1996 they went back to Morocco to start their own businesses. A companion who actually started Macroweb convinced Said back to Morocco, but Said soon took over the whole business and put his own cousin as chairman and held a close companionship with a friend that he had cooperated with in Europe before. Both men shared many of the same ambitions. As men with a technical background and with a reasonable success they wanted to create something that the Moroccan society could benefit from as well. They brought with them values from their background. Not only should Morocco benefit from their knowledge, they wanted to create a totally different business and organizational culture in the companies they controlled. To a large extent they shared the same values as most of the people who were seen to be in front of the «knowledge economy» at the same time. They wanted to overcome hierarchy and the rule of people who was born to power. They wanted flat structure and meritocracy. They believed this were values they brought with them from Europe. In their eyes the technical and scientific expertise was the most important aspect of what could help to develop Morocco.

In a way they were different form most of their colleagues in Europe. Most of them would believe the Internet could change Morocco in very much the same manner as the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman (2000) believed the new medias would

change countries with dictatorships: As soon as the Moroccans can get access to the knowledge the Europeans have, they will revolted and change the systems. Said and Yousuf knew this was not the situation; the big question is not information, but communication. On the other hand they had a firm conviction that scientific thought, that Europeans and North Americans to a lager extent was learnt to use, would help solve the problems of Morocco. I experienced this with them, and with others that they supposed I was some kind of engineer, who could find a problem, describe it, and solve it. This is what they wanted from me, and this is what they wanted from the authorities as well.

«I'm an engineer, so of course I'm not satisfied with good intentions from the new governments, I want to see some results. If they can't provide them, they should find an other job», Said once said.

Both Said and Yousuf had their offices in the same area, inexpensive and small offices. The offices were not glamorous, simply what was needed to get the work done.

The Macroweb office was a chaotic and small office in Boulevard Abdelmoumen, one of the main business avenues in Casablanca where all kinds of businesses dwell. One can know this boulevard by its lack of shops selling consumer goods and its density of service related businesses. The boulevard was cutting through the layers of different economical spheres. The Macrowebs office was in the same building as several doctors and dentist. Just outside the bank sphere. Going further out along the same boulevard the economy would rapidly change from banking, financial and assurance companies to clinics and dentists and further to workshops of different kinds. Spread along with the other businesses, where the common alimentary shops and cafés that changes in price and style as the kind of economical sector changes. Abdelmoumen ends in Route de l'oasis, one of the main roads leading in to Casablanca, and Derb Ghalif, an enormous area of informal markets of different informally imported consumer goods. The number of shops is said to be around 2000. Here you can buy English handmade shoes for 300DH, or suits by Italian

designers, more celebre than famous, for 500DH, cheaper than you can buy very simple suits or shoes in the down town magazines. Most people who can afford a computer would go here to purchase one. Here are also technicians who can sell and maintain a decrypting chip for your satellite dish for only 50DH, or sell you software for a couple of dirhams, and of course you can buy pirate DVDs or CDs in varied formats.

In the small Macroweb office every one worked together on a minimum space. When you first entered the Macroweb office you would find the secretaries on a desk to the left. Then in the same room you would find the general director, on a small desk, opposite of the woman selling advertisements. There were two small offices at the end of the main room, one for conferences, and one for the sales manager, and a couple of co-workers. The main room was split in two halves with a partition wall, so if you turned right when you entered the Macroweb office you would meet the technicians who repaired the company's or the consumer's computers. Behind the partition wall you would find the web developers on their desks and later the journalists would sit there to. There you would find the door to the last office where the managing director would sit with the servers and a couple of co-workers. It was the managing director who was the brain behind Macroweb. It was in this office the Macroweb people had their greatest time together.

One could hardly miss the atmosphere in the office. The warm laughter when one of the technicians played one of his practical jokes, and the cheers for the web-developers when they had reached one of their goals. After work on Saturdays the boys in the company, the general director, the managing director, the sales manger, most of the web-developers would go to the beach to play football.

The end of the hierchical working place

As one of the technicians told me: «I would never have thought I would leave Macroweb. I really liked working for Said. It was an atmosphere at the office at that time I'd never thought I would experience. We were so close; I thought I would work for Said the rest of my life. We worked day and night but at that time it didn't matter. It was a lot of fun: We sat there puzzling on our work, and that Said came out from his office thrilled with joy 'yes we've made it', he would scream, when finally something worked in a satisfactory way. "We're the best crew in Morocco, you are the best crew I could have." And like this it would continue. On Saturdays all of us would go to the beach to play football. I don't think any other company in Morocco have been like this. We were peers, and Said was only number one».

Said: «I'm a simple engineer, that's all. I don't need a fancy car, or fancy clothes. I don't respect anyone if they wear expensive suits. They way they talk, yes. Respect, diplomacy, that impresses me, but not simple expressions of power».

A fundamental part of Moroccan and Arab authority is the master and disciple relation. In the Moroccan instance the ultimate authority is that of sainthood. In transcending the dependence on woman for reproduction, Hammoudi finds the exemplary master- disciple relationship in the existence of the saint. The master express himself in many ways, or rather there is several ways to show his masculinity (Hammoudi 1997). To show his possessions is certainly one of them. And it is of course this Said is opposed to. He is rather a subordinate to the technology. This is definitively not specifically Moroccan to oppose this. Not necessarily playing with the common signs of authority is something the information technicians were famous for. But in a context where

to show of one possessions as a man is more severe than most other places, this becomes an even more distinctive performance.

This common way of showing ones wealth and ability to bind people to oneself is often met with distress and opposition by the subordinates. The popular opposition is to be found in what is seen as the decadent and un-Moroccan behaviour from the elites. This shows a lack of values and either Arab, especially Saudi, decadence, or European decadence.

«What I'm really proud of is that we're showing people that you don't have to tread down on people to have things done».

Both Said and Macrowebs general director Foad always kept a low profile on signs of authority and wealth, even when they eventually made money. Much of the popularity of the Islamists is due to their stark avoidance of this corruption. Said played on the same strings but for totally different reasons. When in opposition many groups have performed in the same manner. The opposition to the Makhzen can be viewed as an antithesis to the Makhzen. Istiqlal (the nationalist party) was probably the first who played this role. The French did not in any sense try establish a different political logic in Morocco. They did the opposite; they developed this logic to new social spheres. Their «dragger» in the South, al-Haj Thami Glaoui, pasha of Marrakech, was the greatest symbol of excessive use of men and things. The leader of the Istiqlal, Allal al Fassi, was the total opposite, never demanding any servile form of submission. However as they succeeded, and got their independence, they were not able to keep in power by not surrender to the Makhzen system. Then we got a left-wing opposition with Mehdi Ben-Barka as leader figure, a technocrat and mathematician. He started as a member of the Istiqlal but left when they changed along the lines of the Mahkzen. As he was impossible to reintegrate in the political centre, he was eliminated. Today the most popular figure is Abdessalam Yassine,

leader of the most popular political movement, al-Adl wal- Ihsan (Justice and welfare), and an Islamist movement banned in Morocco.

There are two traditions which clearly Said operate within. The first one was a great tradition among the technitians first setting the Internet into operation. A sort of cultural figur that was imphazised through much of the global culture industry. The independent engineers, especially the IT-engineers who was changing the world and didn't pay attention to the well estabished hierchies. This sort of hero is also echoed in a simmilar hero within the Moroccan frame, the one who oppose the whole submittive regime of authority, by not demanding any signs of submission. This used to be a quality of distinction for both the nationalist leader allal al-fassi, the socialist oppostion leader Mehdi Ben Barka. Even though Said personally did not have high thoughts of Ben Barka, he was equally technocratic. Filling these roles, and being in fact an important figure of getting Internet to work in Morocco Said was a mediatior of the great image of what should come and how old powerstructures should be broken.

The end of the «feudal economy»

The new economy credo that said with the new knowledge economy old elites will fall, was one that Said held. And of course in Morocco this could create even greater changes than in countries where some degree of meritocracy already existed. In Morocco the strength of very few families, and the way responsables is recruited is generally seen as a major drawback for economical growth as well as human growth.

All elites in Morocco are under direct protection of the makhzen (the royal house), this goes for the army and the police, the bureaucracy, the educational system, and the economical elites (Leveau 1976). This total control by the makhzen did not appear before after the independence. The structure of the relationship is to be found in the pre-colonial

period. But then only as control over the army and in a limited sense the bureaucracy, dar al-mulk (Hammoudi 1997). Partly as a result of alliances the French protectorate made to local houses of power during the protectorate, and partly as a need for the makhzen to expand and make new subordinates during the first decades of independence, total control by the makhzen appeared (Hammoudi 1997). The reference to the feudal economy is the fact that this total control to some extent is distributed to local notables.

On the other hand different elites are present in this system, and the makhzens ability to balance the influence of the elites is what makes the king in power or not. In the postcolonial period several groups in the Moroccan society have dominated the army. The army is the part of the power stock where the possibilities to gain positions for the general population is highest (Hammoudi 1997). Elites that are operating too independently can either be embodied by the centre or eliminated. The possibility to embody one elite when it is necessarily weakened is important for not making another elite too powerful. The parliament contains an abundance of political parties once exercising some kind of opposition, now totally under the control of the king. So the existence of elites in conflict is in the interest of the power. In this way Amazight and Arab, rural and urban (witch is basically equal to the Amazight / Arab dichotomy on elite level), reformers and orthodox, and of course in the cold war era socialism and economical liberalism was a perfect dichotomy for the makhzen. Different urban elites are also a part of the picture. The most important is by far the Fassi elite, that also was the most important force in the nationalist independence process, and they were also in the forefront in the allocation of former French possessions after the independence and they have certainly an important intellectual elite.

The relationship between hierarchical exercises in power and the authoritarian system in all organization are something most Moroccans would point out. In Macroweb the technology or new economy would not only be a mediator for change, but success was

also based on the ability to change. This system that is not based on trust, but actually on mistrust, could be harmful to «knowledge society.»

One of the real big ambitions Said and Yousuf had with their projects was to create a meritocratic system. It was certainly also one of the strategies for Macroweb. And one of the reasons they would have such a development. They wanted to create opportunities for other companies in Morocco by offering herbergement and web development for Moroccan companies, cultural events, and media.

«What we are doing have little value in itself» as one of the web developers exclaimed. «I believe to give good services to companies are our reason d'etreâ. We don't have the competence to develop content, but herbergement is our main purpose.»

Said: «Information technology is nothing, really. Technology isn't anything if it isn't based upon some natural advantages. All we can do, and should do, is to help making things better. We have to look at what we are actually good at in Morocco, and then be able to cooperate. That is my vision really.»

Macroweb made several services directed to the economic life of Morocco. They had rubric announces, an international trade board with announces directed toward the Moroccan marked, they had web hosting and web development services, and later they created a communication system form Moroccan companies, the idea was all the way to create a infrastructure for a more independent economy. For this to work one had to move from "feuda economy", to a "trust economy"

Breaking up the colonial centre-periphery axe

Said made a point of his Scandinavianess not so much confronting a Moroccan reality as a French domination. «What people like with Macroweb is that we do things so differently from the French. We don't like the French arrogance here (in Morocco), and still we have

them everywhere. I really hope Morocco develop better relationship with other countries than France».

Of course he was himself a mediator of this, showing that technological advances could be made independently from France. The dependence on France and the occident is apparent on several arenas: Technological and knowledge transfer, media domination, cultural domination, and political and economical domination. These areas are linked together and the different forms of dominance are strengthening each other. The more technological advanced societies, are exporting technology and expertise to the periphery, and generally former colonies. Yousuf crated his own company in Casablanca in 1996, was an advanced mathematician, working with major French industry since the earlies days of computer aided design in France. Being involved in different projects and connected to French car industry. With the emergence of the Internet he become able to move home, and still have Peugeot as a client. Now he could interact with the polytechnic school in Rabat, and give opportunities to students.

He could operate independently from the local economical structure, and thus also subvert the local elites control as technology importers.

To go to the centre raise, and come back as a local elite, is by many seen as the Fassi way. Fes was the old capital and where the traditional centres of learning existed. During the protectorate they lost much of their traditional economical, bureaucratic and academic power, but the nationalist movement had a strong base in Fes. What the nationalist Fassi elite is notoriously famous for is raising the struggle against the French, sending their sons to France for education, and putting them in power when Morocco gained their independence. This is the same story I heard time after time. It is easy to think of Said and Yousuf as two Fassis doing exactly this. But on the other hand Yousuf did break this convention by not being a part of the local elite, but keeping his economical position to European societies and universities and by this was able to emancipate himself from the

local elites. Said however were not educated in France, and he was very much contesting the francophone elite in Morocco. While most of the francophone elite would say, that for them France is their natural language, Said claimed the opposite. As much as Said would have liked to see the French language and the French educated, and the French themselves less influence in Morocco he was himself forced in situations where French was the only possible language. Since Said resisted the French language, but in many situation succumbed to the use of French, to observe Said in diverse situations were to his French should not have been the preferred language is clear illustration of how Moroccan elites use French as their language of domination. In business settings among Moroccans, in the tennis club where they met in informal settings French was the only language. Macroweb itself as much of the other written media in Morocco was based on French.

For Said the status of French was an example of both the status of education, and the status of democratic values as well.

This was an issue Said often came back to:

Said: "The 1981 reform (arabisation of the elementary school) has really been great. Today we can hear on TV, or when the young people speak they use a vocabulary which I myself, only learning subjects in French, sometimes don't understand. Often very technical terms, it is great that we use or own language".

Me: "Isn't the point of language to understand each other, what's the point of using

Arabic terms that are better understood when using french terms?"

Said: "It is important, because this means everybody can have equal possibilities for education, so that not only the children of the rich can have possibilities in this country. That the only knowledge that is of any value is what is learned in France".

For Said this was a question on democratic control of the technological and bureaucratic control. That education should not only be an "opportunistic" question of

getting into power, but rather raising a diverse educational basis of technical and humanistic thought.

Breaking the national centre-periphery axe

This was also a point of view one of my informants in a totally different social setting had. Khaled a young man working in his fathers café, and a school dropout shared much of the same ideas. But he was far less concerned with technical education and far less enthusiastic over the development of Moroccan school lately.

Karim: "Why go to school there was no purpose any more. There are only business schools basically beneficial for those who have the right name. Technical schools are all the same.

Or you can go to the university and study something that will never give you any job at all. Why educate for unemployment. The Moroccan education is of no value".

Me "What is an education of value then? "

Karim: "It is different things. A school where you learn to do all those things we actually need, and not only to govern. And we need a school where you develop civil consciousness, critical thinking, and responsibility".

Me: "What are the things you actually need? "

Karim: "I've heard from a friend in Germany how the schools are working there. There you can get a good education to be a carpenter, painter or cook. You learn how to deal with practical, bureaucratic and economic problems besides the handcraft. We have to look at what people actually do, and to make a school were we can improve on what we do, not imagine we all can be managers. A good school is one that mixes the practical needs with a social consciousness. Now we are only educating a French speaking elite, and legitimate all kinds of domination".

This way of giving more value to practical knowledge was not supported by one of my other informants, Malik, who had studied language and literature at the university. For him the common disregard of "unpractical" university studies like the one he had was one of the big problems with Morocco.

"I have big problems with my family, no-one in my family understands why I studied what I did, and they think I am mad. And no-one can understand what I'm talking about. I'm really lonely, because they can't see the value of what I can; I have no one I can converse with. The only thing people here respect is money, and if you don't have money they don't respect you".

To illustrate how wealthy and powerful men without knowledge think of themselves compared to the poorer ones he once told me this story.

"One time man in an expensive suit, an Arab, came by. He said he could a language I couldn't, and non in my tribe could or even had hear of. So I said 'ok, let me hear the language'. He said: 'Was heißen Sie' I started to laugh, 'Ok, I can speak German with you, but if you want to speak German we have to discuss a real subject, literature, philosophy or theology'. I said this in Arabic. 'No', he said, 'I can't I've just started to learn German'. 'So why do you say you know German when you can't. I've been studying German at the Goethe institute for a year, but I wouldn't say I can German (he actually spoke German without accent and few would have thought he had never been in Germany), you who know nothing say you can'. Quite amazingly he said sorry, he said he should not have underestimated me".

The only possibility to get the respect he thought he deserved the only possibility was to leave Morocco, then he could meet people he could make conversations with, and he would gain respect in Morocco.

The local intellectual elites are often in Morocco and the Arab world in general are divided into three categories. The first is the religious intellectuals who believe the idea of

society and authority should not be deviated from the religious texts and tradition. The second is the political liberal intellectuals who seek a political change inspired by the west. And the third category is technocrats, covering a broad set of thought from Marxist to supporters of social engineering, all convinced reform must be following universal rational lines, and are not interested in dealing with local cultural traits, also often inspired by the west (Laroui 1977).

This is a categorisation that is difficult to maintain. Religious clerks are of both traditional and revolutionary kinds. The revolutionary clerks are often picking up arguments from later political liberal development of radical cultural relativism; traditional clerks can easily make alliances with a technocratic state and social engineers. One can both have strong liberal values and hail the technocratic legacy of Ben Barka, or the exact opposite. These categories should not be seen as essential categories, ruling the behaviour of the intellectuals, but rather it is discourses intellectuals and especially power elites can change in different contexts. I believe it refers to both colonial and nationalist modernizing ideologies, the political and technological aspirations the colonizers had and which the urban national elite adopted confronting the reactionary religious obscurantism.

Both Said and Yousuf who had been in Europe and Karim and Malik who wanted to go to the USA, saw the local elites as dependent on the global centre, but had different strategies and different ideas on the status of knowledge. While the traditional elites have been dependent on the centre for its own legitimating, the increased globalization and possibilities given by telecommunication can subvert the power of the local elites, because there are increased possibilities for staying in close cooperation with the associations in the centre. This is what Hammouda called "present brain drain", and one can question the difference one is able to make with this strategy.

The other way is to stay closer to the local elites, but have a strategy of a plurality of global contacts to subvert the alliance between the local elites and the elites in the centre.

We will se Hammouda and Said shared exactly this strategy, but had different ideas on the status of knowledge and legitimate authority.

Hammouda the journalist was one of the most important allied to Said. He had been living in NY for several years, but had to live in Casablanca due to his mothers health problems. His dream was to move back to NY, but he also enjoed been part of something he sew as a liberating prosess. Hammouda had never had a formal journalist education, but had been a pilot, but later finding this job demanding too little, changed to journalism. He had worked in some of the major newspapers in the years when press had lost some of its restrictions, and had got his journalist education in the most liberal newspapers intill then.

Interestingly both Hammouda and Said were two former immigrants resently moving back that had not lived in France or an other Francophone country. This probably helped them creating the alliances, and seeing new possiblities with the Internet. Both Said and Hammouda rejected a pure anti-western independent linje. Rather they saw the greatest malice in a too one sided relation to the former colony. They were not so much fearing influence from the west, as the feared influence from just one metropolis. For them a multimethropolic influence and even dependence was far better than just being dependen on France. Of course the structural quality of the Internet was appealing for this goal.

Their biggest problem was not so much with the French, as with the Franco-philia reflects lying in the habits of the Moroccan elites.

Since the freedom of media has been limited and global media corporations have been dominating. The postcolonial states and periphery in general have been media consumers and consumer of cultural expressions produced in the core. Satellite dishes have carpet-bombed the media consumers with European or Egyptian soap operas. While cultural production the other way around has been limited. The satellite dishes has

provided a certain image of modernity and the orient where dreams of freedom and consumptions mixed, so obviously the TV-programs can not be said to directly brain-wash the TV-watching youth, rather the message gets its own local interpretation and life when received.

But the core-periphery relationship is still relevant. The Internet makes the global connection to a two-way communication bridge, but also gives new opportunities to create local production. The music industry has always had limited official marked in Morocco, but the unofficial production has been considerable. The lowering of reproduction cost and also facilitated replication of music and movies makes also new possibilities to the spread of low-cost music production, and video of humorists and dissidents. These productions can be transferred to family abroad and there set in circulation.

The domination of the Makhzen of all the elites has given no place for a civil society. But as it became more and more apparent during the first Gulf war that Islamist movements, that had an important role in killing of leftist during the cold war, and thus had made a big apparatus held a strong position in the popular opposition. It is probably in this light to counterbalance the Islamist reforms to give room for Civil society organization. During the nineties 30 000 civil society organizations have been established in Morocco, many of them on royal initiative. A report from 1995 on "Moroccan Young People's Religious Values and Strategies" showed that 2,2 % of 500 surveyed students had trust in the state.

It also showed that on question on what association it is worth joining, 50,8 % answered one with a civic agenda, 10,6 % Islamist associations, and 6,6 % a political party (Mernissi 2003).

The new emerging media, and communication technologies is a key factor to accomplish this goal. With global associations, communication technologies it has been possible to communicate reports give initiatives, plan, and react on their own realities.

A new brave journalism

The freedom of the Internet in Morocco makes Morocco interesting for those who believe in the possibilities of a new public sphere, and a new journalism in Morocco. Macroweb was the first who presented a different journalism in Morocco based on the Internet. And Macroweb was also an important facilitator to several Moroccan newspapers that wanted to enter the Internet at an early stage. Le Reporter, Le Quotidien, Financenews, Bayane Al-Yaoume, and Al-Bayane both the latter belonging to the progress and socialism party (Parti du Progrés et du Socialisme). The newspapers mentioned above had no clear idea of using the Internet different than the paper medium, and thus was basically the same on web as in print. However Macroweb had a quite distinct strategy of getting people into speech.

Before I enter this strategy. I have to encounter the big picture of journalistic change. Certainly this is not a change that came with the Internet. It came with a different atmosphere after the death of the former king Hassan II. Journals started to be more daring. Actually it was a process that started some years before the death of Hassan II and after his death was accelerating. After the revision of the Moroccan constitution in 1992, the right of free opinion and, and freedom of expression was established in principle. Two years later Hassan II repealed a dahir (royal decree) which suppressed the press, and made all press controlled by the state.

This slight change in the freedom of press did not give immediate change. But during the 90s the change started to be apparent. The first independent publication was L'Economiste, first a weekly before it became a daily in 1999. But the first newspaper that really contested the Moroccan authorises was Le Journal, a weekly since 1997. Demain in 2000, and TelQuel in 2001, also weeklies, followed it. Le Journal and Demain were prohibited in December 2000 and changed name to Le Journal hebdomadaire and Demain

magazine. Demain was once again prohibited in 2003. Besides pressure has been laid on both printing press and distributor to prevent Demain magazine reaching the streets.

The reasons why they were prohibited shows what subjects are the most difficult in the Moroccan public: disrespect of the integrity of the royal family, disrespect of the integrity of the territory, and religiously inflamed questions. Questions concerning the power of the king, and the occupation of Western Sahara are especially difficult. Besides problems with condemnation, and sabotage form the state is the economical strain the press meet. Printing costs are high and numbers of readers and prices are low. The most important revenue comes from advertising. Both Le Journal and Demain have both editions in Arabic (Assahifa and Douman) as well as French, which gives less advertising revenue, and after the affaires they've had with the authorities they lost a lot of advertisers.

With fair advertising possibilities and bounds with neither printing nor distribution, and no censure of content on the Internet, Macroweb had a fair chance of making an independent journalism. Macroweb choose also a different strategy than the critical press, or at least Hammouda who was in the beginning the sole journalist had a different opinion of what was needed:

«What the new weeklies do is to put taboo-words on their frontage. That's it, nothing more. And of course everyone is delighted. 'Look at this incredible freedom of speech we have in Morocco. This is democracy'».

Me: «You too is in favour of making your point heard. This is a way of selling papers and they have substantial critique as well»

M: «There is no way we can do the same thing anyway. An excess of all those taboos can be reached on the Internet. If we only repeat those, nobody would care too much. There is an abundance of French sites giving all kinds of critique of the Moroccan system. Good! And people would rather read those, because of course what the French says is so

much more important. I have nothing against critique of the system, but the substantial parts, or whatever you call it, have a too academically approach. Discussing constitutional questions on a very theoretical level, but leaves out more practical questions that concern people. They are addressing an elite».

A: «Well so do you, you can't say you'll find any resonance elsewhere for your points of vue».

M: «I don't think that's true. Like the thing we did on Royal Air Maroc. We put the light on very unfair treatment of stagiaires. And it gave results, they got a fairer treatment, as long as they went out and condemned what we wrote.»

Said made similar points in December 2000 when Le Journal and Demain was prohibited: «They write about all this old stuff. I don't like it. Are we not supposed to move on.»

And

«I have no problem with it. It's ok with me. I don't care. I think people don't care either; we are tired of this old stuff. If they want to be banned, why can't they be banned for something different than this? Are all these problems back to the sixties and seventies all they manage to provoke with? I think they should have done better.»

In an article called «the newspaper war» (La guerre des journaux), Hammouda made the point that the question was not whether or not Le Journal should be prohibited or not, but «for how long one will continue to show lack of education and elementary ethics, by underestimating the intelligence of the readers, by selling a sensational title and a big image on the front page, accompanied by a treatment without true relevance, and systematically in the line of the official discourse? The second question is to know for how long, for the interest of fame and commerce, one will continue [...] without worrying for lack of vision [...] and [without] embarrassment strengthening the new power»

So then I have to ask, what was the extraordinary capability of critique Macroweb had that more famous newspapers had not? What did the critical voice of the Internet have different from the printed press?

By raising civism! Hammouda did not have high thoughts on the level of civism:

«It's easy to say we should change the system. But who would benefit? Not democracy, not human rights, not women rights, not animal rights for sure, not freedom of speech, not with a population that only cares for fucking and eating. The only times they've moved their butts is when the food prices raise. As long as they're fed and can fuck they wont demand any kind of freedom for anybody. And if you don't dare to say so, you don't want to change anything.»

Macroweb followed the conviction that journalism on the Internet should be different from the printed press. They should provoke discussion and reaction, and possibilities to raise voices not generally heard by neither the state-financed nor the free commercial press.

The lack of civism was one point Hammouda came back to in several articles. His purpose was to raise discipline, rather than blaming the authorities (that was not depicted any better than the genral population). I think Hammouda followed "any kind of freedom is not given, it has to be taken". Only by being able to participate and to be able to respect other Moroccans with completely different values than yourself, can you expect a better society.

To create reactions, not only thru provocations, but creating an environment for «the better argument» was one of the main goals for Macroweb. Reactions on other subjects than letting the readers pour their dissatisfaction over the rest of the world, as if people all ready don't know. They created reactions on subjects that made people rethink themselves.

One occasion Hammouda wrote an article on «Why the USA support Israel», where he pointed out that it is easier to support a democracy, where people hold a very high

political awareness and social responsibility, than countries where both its leaders and common people lack both. This was not a popular opinion; on the contrary it violated the credo of many readers. On another occasion he answered a reader who wondered why «Moroccans avoid each other in foreign countries». Where Hammouda answered by an article where he said they do so in general, and with good reason.

The biggest success Macroweb had in it's early years was a column called «Larbi, the taxi driver». From 1998 to 2002 Hammouda wrote over 50 chapters in a story about a Taxi driver in Casablanca. It was created as a kind of personal website, with diary-like confessions. Here he commented the realities and life in Casablanca, even more than he did in the articles. Larbi became for many readers a sort of hero, by showing an attitude toward life they themselves felt incapable of. Larbi was on one hand a Don Quixote like anti-hero not quite able to grasp the realities of life in Morocco; on the other hand he was putting things in their right place. This ambiguity of the character is Larbi mad or is this world mad, was the basic humoristic formula used to confront the general way of life. The lack of a hidden agenda, or maybe an agenda at all, made him put light on typical value-questions in the Moroccan society: the relationship between the genders, authorities, family relationships, friendship, and the role of religion. If one has to point at something that really made Macroweb attract readers and helped Macroweb to be the most popular portal in Morocco, Larbi would be the natural choice. Meeting people in Cyber cafes who generally not read too much news or political analysis often showed that Larbi was at least one thing they read. And Said laid very much importance on Larbi.

Larbi certainly created most of the reactions, as the readers were invited to give advises to Larbi on what he should do next when he had doubts. What Macroweb did, was new. They created reaction, discussions, and they had an idea of discipline, that awareness, «rational»discussions, could be created for people to participate.

There are two general stories Moroccans tell to describe them selves and to understand each other. The most common, and the one that is realised in most of the jokes is on one side how smart a Moroccan is in the way that he can fool anybody and on the other side is always able to look through all kind of puns. Often the Moroccan can be depicted in a thief-like manner, but the point is never that he is a thief but that he has the ability to create great imaginations. Larbi takes everything for its face value, and rarely has any kind of hidden agenda. In some of the stories this is obvious the correct stance, sometimes things are exactly the way they seems, sometimes the most ordinary things does not need to be a sign of a great conspiracy. A familiar attitude is Larbis reluctance to play along and be very pretentious in situations he is unfamiliar with. Through Larbis honesty Hammouda gave a quite Veblen-like critique of pretentious and conspicuous consumption. Larbi was a critique of sides of Moroccan society that Hammouda also made in some of his articles. And the way he did it was with a hint of insult: The ones who think of themselves as most able to create false images and to look through all kinds of conspiracies are in fact the most naïve. There is a certain accusation of general naïvety, and a point that people are basically fooling themselves.

In Larbi, Hammouda draws points from the other way Moroccans depict themselves, honest, hardworking and honourable. Larbi is in this way a rather conservative moral story. The opposition to opportunism and submission to an excessively violent regime that is described above (p. 19-20) reflects this. Hammouda is like many of the Islamists more concerned with moral questions than the failure of the state to provide a basis for economical growth and welfare security. Totally differently Hammouda does not believe the problem is related to a lack of religious piousness, but rather he is following a liberal Kantian moral stance. It is this moral Hammouda promoted by association to honour with Larbi, and which makes Larbi so much related to Don Quixote.

Larbi was to a large degree a bargain between Hammouda and Said. Often Said developed plot and moral subject, and gave it to Hammouda who provided it with his stamp of reality and hided the most obvious moralism. Said had some rather clear moral ideas he wanted to promote, like gender equality, tolerance, and respect for homophile. Hammouda had more general idea of civilism, and were a bit reluctant to an overt agenda.

In both Larbi and in some of his articles themes like lack of trust and conspiracy theories were followed. Hammouda have a strong interest in conspiracy theories, his favourite is like for many others the murder of John F. Kennedy, but a friend closely following the idea of Jewish conspiracies also inspired him. Hammouda often claimed respect for the way some conspiracy theorist collect data and fit them together, and he has told me that he believes in many conspiracy theories. This is of course not a big surprise compared to for instance the Larbi writing, Hammouda wants to point at the fact that conspiracies, especially on a lower and everyday level do exist. On the other hand he his deeply critical to those who are far to ready to accept conspiracy theories, since it is a clear hindrance to closer investigations into the reality of thing when the answers is all ready found.

A change in the space

When I am discussing space I am not interested in the idea of cyberspace, a new kind of space outside this real world. The Internet and written digital telecommunication is changing the space in this real world as it is dramatically. The politics of space is an important subject in the North African or the Arab world. Especially how men and women have different places in this space. Generally the women's space is in the home sphere, and the menus space is in the public sphere. This general rule changes its social function when space changes. The use of a portable mobile phone changes the space for a young female in

Casablanca. My argument is not that this change of space gives her the access to public space. However that she is able to create a new private space, which helps her to bring the ephemeral meetings in the public space over to the private.

Once I was sitting on the train from Rabat to Casablanca, I started to flirt with a girl on my age (23 then) who was sitting opposite of me but with a couple of seats in between us. The communication was purely based on eye contact. In ain sbaa, suburban industrial part of Casablanca, she had to leave the train with her family; she took up her cell phone showing it to me smiling, it was done in a manner impossible to not get, this was a clear invitation to communicate by cell-phone. The situation was not unique, non-verbal flirting in the public space. It reminded me of what Ossman (1994) describes in Picturing Casablanca. But here a new element was brought into the situation. I soon learned that this object was not uncommon in bridging the divide between male and female communication in the public room. Since I did not have a cell phone myself, the story ended there.

The division between public space for the men and domestic space for the women is important in most aspects of life. In rural village life this is very much a political division. The public space is the political affairs of the village, while the domestic space is just as much public in the sense of wells, and fields where woman is living. In the modern city of Casablanca the spatial segregation takes a different shape. The woman from a Amazight village in the south who moves to Casablanca, were her housebound lives, after getting married, will experience a totally different way of life it the same rules of spatial segregation is applied to the urban environment as it is in the rural environment. This is very often the case when families move; the spatial rules remain, even though the space is totally different.

For many of the immigrant to Casablanca, the way of life there is troublesome, compared to the village life. In the rural villages the spatial segregation is a integrated part

79

of the architecture. So the spatial segregation is not crating a barrier for social life. In a downtown apartment designed for unmarried French men, the situation is totally different. All work is inside the apartment, and it is not evident that the wife is allowed to do the daily shopping for the house. And with very little social network in the city, life gets lonely. Even for the majority in Casablanca the spatial segregation makes some difference, in these parts of town where most immigrants live, it is very rare to see woman in the streets with no special purpose, or in the cafes dominated by men. Aggressive gazes and harassment from the boys hanging on the street corners are common for the few younger women that pass in the streets. Paid labour is more common than spare time in the streets, and universities have a high attendance of female students. Political activism is not uncommon. However those women who have been active in political movements report a lesser chance for a career within the organization.

The rule of segregation tells where the place of the women is and where the place of the man is. This is a space without perspective, a space without time. It is a space that is under the direct rule of the eye. It is in fact not a space it is places, places of conduct.

The cell-phone, and the Internet break the rule of the eye, it creates blindness to the room, and the eye is disciplined under the rule of the little screen. The cell phone creates a new space for young women in different ways. Young students, or working woman, unmarried and living away from parents with a liberal way of life can more easily live their lives they way they want, or at least more often be able to avoid situation where the sometimes aggressive gaze and aggressive cements from the boys hanging on the street corner. But even more important is the possibilities for those living at home under surveillance from their parents with few possibilities to meet on the street corners like the boys do. To them the opportunities to arrange encounters with friends are to a larger degree possible with the cell phones. For many the unheard situation of a woman making advances toward a man can be done with an SMS-message.

In cyber-cafés women are more and more active in using the possibilities the web gives. As for the men they will most likely be there for the chat. Lately the increased possibilities woman to find a cyber date, and to marry has been an issue in the Moroccan press. While men are trying to get a way to leave, women tries to get a man, is the popular idea. It is hard to find any evidence for saying the intentions is any different for men and women.

Telecommunication is creating more public space than just the possibility to avoid the controlling gaze, it is also creates a possibility for decentralized organization. I had no informants that took part in this, but the Moroccan anthropologist Fatima Mernissi have done research in such networks she have put much effort in developing herself. Merniss tells she got involved in this work when she understood how little the government was trusted.

The numbers of non-governmental organisations (ngos) rose quickly from 7000 in 1995 to 30 000 in1999 (Maroc: Rapport sur le Developpement Humain 1998-1999, cited in Mernissi 2003) The large majority of those, were local organisations crated to do social services the state is not able to do. The local caretaker of getting your own village connected to the national road system, or association for cleaning up your urban neighbourhood. What is remarkable is the especially high number of NGOs in mountain and desert areas.

There are especially questions related to civil society and telecommunication Mernissi tries to answer. She lays a great importance in the possibility to communicate, for Sheherazade to allure the Sultan, as she puts it. What Mernissi points out is the possibility given to formerly muted women in a male dominated society, and not only the woman, but also the villagers, and the young. An interesting point Mernissi makes is that all though the urban population, and certainly the western population is more often connected to the information flow than the rural Morocco, the impact on society can be just

a impressive and make more of a difference there. Despite (or maybe because) the high expenses for the rural morocco, cyber-cafés are present in all the major rural centres, and the use of Internet reaches into the civil society, and local economical activity. Woman use Internet to sell and communicate the meaning of their artisan products and in this way even the illiterate women in rural morocco communicate by Internet. Of course this kind of Internet communication doesn't exist in a social vacuum alone in front of the computer, but rather in connection to the work of NGOs and civil society in general (Mernissi 2004a).

Another aspect of the changing public space, which is general for the whole Arab world, is the role woman play in Arab satellite TV. In some of the TV-channels sending over the whole Arab world woman have entered the public in an often confronting and totally new way. Especially Al Jazeera has many very popular female journalists who often have a feminist approach to different subjects. The success of al-Jazeera, have made other satellite TV channels do to likewise, and satellite TV channels directed directly towards women have been started like Heya in Egypt. Both the commercial values of women, and the attractiveness of the powerful women, have been used as explanations for the unquestionable success of female TV journalists (Mernissi 2004b).

When TéléM bought Macroweb

Due to the Macroweb success it became apparent that Macroweb needed investments in equipment that they could not do without taking a to big risk. They needed bigger and faster servers. Macroweb had to sell and with not too many possible choices, it was TéléM that bought 80 % of Macroweb in January 2000. TéléM had tried on their own to make Internet service providers, but failed. With new capital in the company several changes happened rapidly. Macroweb hired several new journalists, moved most of their people to a new place, leaving only the public relation office, and buying new and more powerful servers.

At the same time as Said and Foad where negotiating with TéléM, they were also buying Said' friend out of the company. This happened not smoothly. I never met more than once with Attila, it was right after he felt Said and Foad had had him.

The new place was not far from the old office, in boulevard Mohammed Abdou, in the cartiere palmiere. The building was a villa. On the ground floor the technicians and the web developers stayed, and Hammouda, Later should another journalist, a French advisor, Said and myself have our desks there as well. On the second floor journalist and the editor stayed with the marketing director Said' wife. On the third floor the general director had his office, Said and a web developer had their office in the same room as the servers. The big family that moved to the villa did more and more split. Said seemed less satisfied with his crew, and the spirit didn't seem to be the same. But during the first year under TéléM the direction didn't change too much. The fresh money TéléM provided secured a much bigger journalistic crew and Morocco's first and only example of web-journalism.

The journalist crew was rather different from Hammouda. Very seldom, any of them got any reactions from the readers. And it only happened a couple of times that the journalist on economy wrote something that was not perfectly in line with the official line. What TéléM got was not a very oppositional web portal. Rather the contrary. The journalists never really got into the crew. They had their own separate office the leadership

did not show too much interest in their job, what Hammouda wrote seemed to be more important. Hammouda refused to sit together with the journalists, and he refused to socialize with the other journalists. The journalists regularly went out together, except from the technology journalist, Rachid, who was a very nice and always smiling person, but he was not a regular drinker, as the other journalists was.

Hammouda despised Khaled. According to Hammouda Khaled was an Islamist. «I'm certain [Khaled] is reporting [to the Islamist organizations] on me. I know that he is looking forward to that day when they'll strike and kill everybody like me. I know from security forces that they already have me on their lists. So I do the same thing to [Khaled] I give the police all the information I can have on him».

«[He] is a shitty journalist. It's just like so much of the journalism on economy or technology. If you visit Morocco and pick up a paper you would be impressed, all the stock marked analyses, all the roaming start-ups. All that is just fraud. [Khaled] do the same thing. When you read his stuff it pretty impressive hu? Wow do we really have all this advanced technology in Morocco? When somebody tries something, [Khaled] writes as if it's already functioning perfectly. If something exists, [Khaled] writes as if it has the same scope as in New York or Scandinavia. Actually it's might not there either, but in Morocco, we've got it all here, and it's the top, state of the art really».

Said agreed with Hammouda, and even fuelled Hammouda on the hopelessness of Khaleds writing. Khaled, and his lack of perspective, was something we rather frequently made fun of. But Said also made a point of how pleased he was with Khaled. «There's no fuss with him, he produces all the articles he should». The journalists were supposed to produce three articles a day. «And it is really impressive, he has the total overview of everything that happens in Morocco on the technology front.

Pierre: «Yes he's like a radar, he's got antennas everywhere, when somebody turns on the computer somewhere, hop, Khaled have written an article on the new advances of technology».

The other journalists impressed Said less. He had problems with watching their cards. He didn't really have the competence on journalism, but on the other hand he wanted to remain in control, and decide what should be on. He didn't seem to matter that some of the journalist were in conflict. Rather the contrary, he had most often conversations with the journalist in conflict. Never did I observe any effort to lessen the conflict, rather the contrary conflict made people speak and Said was on their side. Macroweb also established an arabophonic portal. Basically translating what was written in French into Arabic.

The integration of the journalists was definitively a difficult part for Said and Foad. Obviously this was becomming an important part of Macroweb, and also Said was very willing to partake in. Of course being part of a process of liberating speach in Morocco was tempting for Said. But on the other hand he did not have the competence of a editor. Hammouda who was the main journalist, was not cooperating either. He had stronger relationships to the technical staff than the other journalists. When the Macro portal started to produce more content it changed direction from what it used to be. Hammouda was not content with the overall impression this gave, and would not like to assosiate himself to strongly with the general line of journalism. He was however cooperating ok with the editor whoto some extent shared the gereral idea of direction with Hammouda.

The growing numbers of journalist draw more of the time and the resourses of the technical staff over to the portal and the stucture of the paper. This was not popular among the webdevelopers. Some of them felt they were doing work for no good, and what they had appreciated with Macroweb was now about to fade. Especially one of the developers did complain. His image of what Macroweb should do was not to be a centralized unit with a heavy content basis. It would be better to profit from the position Macroweb had

among some of the best newspapers in Morocco. To continue to develop technical services for them, and to operate as a general portal. And also be more active towards hebergement, and making people on a more general basis be able to take Internet into use, for economical or organizational needs. But still all the technical stuff remain very loyal to Said, while the journaists did not develop such feelings for the general deriction of Macroweb.

The conflict with and control over the web developers

The one Said could control best was the web developers, he had the competence, and he had their devoted loyalty. Said who in the Abdelmoumen office had used to sit close to the web developers lost much of the contact when he moved upstairs. Downstairs the atmosphere pretty much stayed the same as it had used to be. The technicians and the web developers remained close, and the practical jokes Youssuf played was there. But according to Said they were not performing as good as they should. Macroweb was growing, the portal became bigger, and TéléM had their own demands. Especially had the head of TéléM got this notion that WAP-solutions were really one of the things the company should be heading at. The service that Macroweb provided to other companies and associations became less important.

The web developers were not happy with the direction Macroweb took, they wanted to do the things they had. But as money to Macroweb more and more came from the owners Macroweb of course also had to pay back with services. The new big company with the big leap toward a general web newspaper was not really making any money on its own. The journalists that were highly paid, but didn't pay much of, did not get much of the blame, except Said' statements from now on then on which a dirty race the journalists

was. It was the old crew that was put under most pressure and, they were also much lesser paid than the journalists.

The first move Said did was to move downstairs. There was a little corner left, with a space often used for prayers. Said installed himself there, and he was now a lot closer to the crew. But this didn't solve anything. Rather the contrary the conflict only exploded, and Said fired four of the five web developers downstairs.

According to Said underperformance: «I know what they should do, but they don't. When a coach sees his team is not performing well, sometimes he have to change some of the players. Unfortunately I have to do this now. It is not that difficult to get new web developers, and this time I wont do the same mistake. I will supervise them better. Only one of the five web developers downstairs kept his job, he got a rise and became the team leader for the web developers. It is uncertain Said intention was to fire all of them, but the four had a strong group solidarity, that made them very difficult to split.

The web developers thought the real reason was TéléM. «Before TéléM bought us everything was fine. It was more than fine. It was so incredibly fun to work for Said. We had a lot of freedom and we made money, why did everything go so badly after TéléM bought us? Said lost control and he had to blame somebody. We couldn't do all the things TéléM wanted us to do».

«Why Said did this to us, to save his own skin... I don't know really. I feel sorry for Said, I'm certain he wouldn't this to happen».

The TéléM boss visiting the new crew

The new crew never developed the same sense of loyalty toward Said as the old crew. The atmosphere was also never the same. In late summer 2001 the managing director of TéléM visited Macroweb. The visit was important in that manner that it showed who was in

charge. Moussaoi questioned Said and Foad in front of us the employees and Said did obviously feel uncomfortable. After Said and Foad had followed Moussaoi out, Imad the one who least confronted Said among the web-developers and the only one who stayed among the former crew after the conflict, performed an imitation of Said in front of Moussaoi, very much to the delight of his co workers.

The message Moussaoi gave was clear; it was TéléM that decided what Macroweb should do. TéléM owned 80 % of the company. He stressed very much the importance of WAP solutions.

When he walked from person to person Imad should show him sites developed by Macroweb. The site was the official «Festival d'Essaoira gnaoua», Moussaoi didn't pay much attention to the product itself. Rather he said:

«Doesn't Meditel sponsor the Essaoira festival?» (Meditel is the Spanish owned competitor of TéléM, they had the second GMS-license in Morocco)

«Well yes they do»

«Meditel is our competitor and we should not have anything to do with them. This is important, you should pay attention to these things, we are as I said one big family now, and should do as such».

By this he showed his supremacy and also made a blow to Macrowebs independence. TéléM paid Macroweb, we should be aware of it and make all or effort to please them, not our competitors.

The clear signs of Said and Foad loosing their grip on Macroweb began to be shown. It was generally assumed that after this visit some of the employees sent regularly reports to the head office of TéléM on the situation within Macroweb.

The conflict between Hammouda and the chief editor

Not only were Macroweb changing four of its web developers at the same period the chief editor due to drinking problem was replaced by a French TV journalist. When Macroweb was searching for a new chief editor Said first wanted Hammouda. For several reasons Hammouda refused. One of the main reasons was that Hammouda insisted on not having a regular contract with Macroweb, he insisted on being able to leave the office whenever he wanted and to have a freelance contract, so he could write for other media also. But Hammouda took the job on finding the new chief editor.

This happened to be a very unlucky choice. The new editor didn't have any perspective on Morocco at all, and he was only sitting in his office deciding what article to be on the front page.

It didn't take long before Hammouda was very disappointed on the choice he had done. One day he left and refused to come back as long as the chief editor was in his chair. It is not a simple case to fire somebody in Morocco, and the chief editor would certainly not leave. The fact that he was not doing his job would not be sufficient. The situation was settled with an arrangement where Hammouda got some fixed places on the front page where he could put whatever article he wanted, the chief editor was not allowed to touch anything of what Hammouda wrote.

For most practical reasons this settled the case, but Hammouda and the chief editor continued to be in conflict Hammouda called Mr. Dupuy a couscous eater. In France this is a expression used on North Africans, or Arabs (Mangeur de couscous). In Morocco it could often have the opposite meaning: A European who tries to be Moroccan, often seen as a pet, under the protection by a Moroccan family, and often married to Moroccans. A

couscous eater in this sense are one who points out all the good thing with life in Morocco, but very rarely has any clue on what actually happens in Morocco.

Hammam Dupuy was married to a Moroccan woman, converted to Islam and had taken an Arabic name.

«[He] actually believes Morocco is a democracy. Do you believe Morocco is a democracy»?

«Of course you have elections here, and a very kind King. Morocco is the only democratic country in the Arab world. You have a free press, and there is total free speech here. Nobody is poisoned, tortured or killed without a free and fair trail».

«Yes, that's it. In fact [he] could seriously say something like that. Even if he knew what happens in Morocco, he would still say it a democracy, with the full respect of the human rights».

Most foreigners who live in Morocco are by quite many seen as couscous eaters. I used this knowledge in the parts of the city where I lived. If I was asked whether I liked Morocco or not, to say «Yes, but I'm no couscous eater", would help me gaining respect because it showed more than superficial interest, and that I was aware that in their opinion foreigners were generally fooled when they visited or even lived in Morocco.

One of the features of the couscous eaters is to be fooled and to go home and tell the story given by the official Morocco. In this way the couscous eater play a role in keeping the legitimacy of power elite in Morocco, and thus legitimizing the repression of the people.

Of course one can not really tell if couscous eaters are fooled or not, but the role they play in sly civility. Mehdis basic concern was with civility and how all those institutions that is supposed to be for a common good are not this but only institutions that can benefit only a slight segment of the most powerful persons. This is institutions like the parliament, the courts, the mass medias, stock-marked, and different civil societies.

The medias can function as an example, the media is an example where most of the methods of how institutions for a common good it subverted. The point with these institutions is that they should appear as they function as they do in the colonial centre while they actually has non of these functions. In many ways this can be described with the use of the French language in itself. Normally when the French language is used in business or politics the meaning these words have can be extremely difficult grasp, the dynamic interpretant is the exercise of power and normally nothing else.

The examples of "African grammar" Barthes (1972) gives is also perfect ecsamples of this which show the continuity of sly civility from the time of the French protectorate. It makes sence when the meaning of "une bande" in the Moroccan word "l-bande" (bandit) is a person who is actually sly. The word "couscous eater" has been transformed in a bit different way. There is no reason to believe there is anything ironic in the use of "l-bande", but "couscous eater", shows that Moroccans know at least two discourses, while the couscous eaters know none, and that is the reason they have ended up in Morocco as pets.

The sly civility is of course a danger to the quite serious ambitions of Hammouda. Not only have Moroccan newspapers with the ambition of being a media for the better argument, several subsidised concurrents that is destructive for the general reputation of journalism, but they are also in danger of having fifth colonists that is actually agents of sly civility. This is exactly what Hammouda thought we had got among us in Macroweb, and that it was jeopardising the whole trustworthiness of Macrowebt's web-journalism.

29th of June and 1st of July 2001 the French newspaper le Monde had a couple of articles where new information on what happened to Morocco's great opposition leader, Mehdi Ben Barka, when he was assassinated in Paris in October 1965. Some of the same information that was given by a former secret service agent was also printed in le Journal 30th of June. Mehdi Ben Barka is still today an important person in the Moroccan consciousness.

For many of those who belong to the left he is the ultimate hero of Morocco. A group of Moroccan businesspersons and people close to the power went to Paris to speak with the editor of Le Monde. They had a message that said they strongly objected to the investigations in the difficult past in Morocco on a time when people want to move on. Hammouda wrote a harsh comment on this trip. Asking who are these persons who could represent the Moroccan people. Had there been a petition, a vote or something? No these people were not representing the Moroccan people in any way.

After a few hours on the web this article disappeared. Had the editor interfered? Hammouda was furious since nobody was allowed to edit or remove his texts. It soon became clear that Moussaoi had phoned Foad and demanded this text removed.

A meeting was settled in Rabat; present there was Mr. Moussaoi, Hammouda, Said, Foad and the editor, Mr. Dupuy. To my surprise Hammouda had no problem with Moussaoi, they had soon found a pleasant tune, and Hammouda had accepted the suppression by Moussaoi.

He only demanded clear lines, and of course a reason for the suppression. The reason Moussaoi had given was the relationship to business partners. It also became evident that the editor had a secure place grained by Moussaoi, he had made it very clear that nobody could touch Mr. Dupuy.

According to Hammouda Moussaoi had even offered him the position of general director in Macroweb in front of Said and Foad. Hammouda had refused. I don't know in witch tune this offer was given to Hammouda. And I never asked neither Said nor Foad on the accuracy on this question. But they confirmed Hammouda had a good time in the meeting with Moussaoi, and that they had made a lot of jokes.

After this meeting Hammouda never wrote anything that could have provoked the official line. And two months after this incident his beloved New York was attacked. For the last nine months in Macroweb Hammouda would only rewrite propaganda offered by the official US-line.

End of the conflict

«Me and the French fat ass are friends now. We are the best friends in the whole world. I have no problem with him».

«What has happened?»

«Nothing, the French fat ass was really surprised. Today he looked, as always, like I should beat him when he saw me. So he didn't understand anything when I was really friendly and made a joke».

«So why have you decided to be friendly with Karim»?

«I don't want to play any of Said' games anymore. I'm tired of it».

«Oh, so this is Said' game.»

«When me and Karim fights he is very happy. This is what he wants, that we are in war with each other. That makes him even more powerful, he knows where he has us».

«So are you and Karim planning a putsch?»

«No, it is only self-defence. I don't want to give Said any good opportunity to put his dragger in my back».

What Hammouda is accusing Said for is that he plays the good old divide and rule game. As long as the one fighting dislikes each other more that they dislike him, they will go to him for help make troubles for the other. In the first years of Macroweb this was totally none existent. But it became more and more common. This and the fact that Said was very reluctant to give away any kind of control, made Hammouda disappointed.

Reactions on Larbi was not directly sent to the Hammouda, but had to go thru Said. This could of course have the positive side effect that Said could stop death threats to Larbi. But it also showed a lack of willingness to give up control. The very popular Larbi episodes was important to Said, and ha wanted to have as much control as possible over it. He had tried to get other people to write it, and Friday evenings were often partly used to figure up a plot and different ideas on the next Larbi episode. The next morning Hammouda would get a piece of the table paper with the notes for the next episode. Hammouda never objected to these ideas even if he was not always satisfied.

It was obvious that Hammouda had believed in Said' willingness, and ability to not to exhibit power and authority in a different way, and was now disillusioned «Said is no different from any other Moroccan, it doen't help that he puts his cap on backwards, talk about women's liberation, tries to be cool, and know the right talk or whatever, he is still a Moroccan».

«I don't blame him really. I can't say I do. The only thing is that I would have liked to do the same thing as he did».

«To fool people»?

«Yeah, if I were paid several millions for something I would gladly do it. Only maybe I wouldn't pretend to be able to continue do anything good. I would never kept lousy 20% of the stocks. It would have been better to sell the whole thing and then just leave it».

«Well Said gave it a try».

«I tell you what. He likes to be playing around with the big guys. But actually he's nothing more than a small time crook».

«It was good times in Abdel Moumen, when you really believed in it?»

«It was. It was the best time I've ever had in Morocco. It was a lot of fun, and we all believed in it. But for Said this was only a opportunity to get rich. For that I don't blame

him. It's only me that has been fooled around and worked my ass off so someone like him can make a fortune».

«Said have done his best. Said is maybe a bit paranoid, and certainly a control freak, but he has never really changed goal, it is the same as when he started».

«Said believes in the new system. After TéléM bought Macroweb, he never wanted me to write anything that could provoke them. Now that he is inside, he says all this shit like, 'they are doing their best', and always excusing abuse».

What we were discussing here is Mimicry, and both do it with the use of their own psychological explanations. Hammouda is very close to the lacanian points to mimicry as a strategy Said uses for camouflage. While he is cooperatiing with a big stateowned company, playing after their rules, and wants to take part of their business, he uses a certain set of liberal, individualistic codes of behaviour to hide his actual interests, to enter the local elites. When I pointed to Said being paranoid, I later made a point that Said maybe did not have the total control over Mimicry himself. More than actually playing a game, he was not feeling confident that what was taking part in his own company was what it seemed. Or this you could be certain he was aware of, Said who had left an egalitarian country and who had been acoustomed to an egalitarian way of making business in the IT-economy had brought this system to Macroweb when he build the company. Now he had to deal with employeers who was mimicing egalitarianism. While seemingly being egalitatian around Said, some empoyees were bowing deeply to the owners. Just as Said himself had when Ahizone had visited Macroweb. Even though my and Hammoudas explanations are related, fear and need of camfulage is not much of a difference, these explanations would probably have more value used on ourself. We were both puting our experiences and background into the explanation. More than giving psychological explanation one could see the mimicry that actually took place as a discourse changing meaning when put into a new context. Not questioning the intention

Said had for introducing a egalitarian culture within Macroweb one could see this as a failing strategy of using egalitarian potential related to the so called knowledge economy, a failure Hammouda was equally experiencing. One could hardly put the insistence of beeing a free lance on Said. Mimicry is the transformation of any sign introduced by powerful and influential persons. No one could have objected the egalitarian rules introduced by Said, even if they had wanted to. However much influence Said could have within Macroweb, he had far less influence on how his egalitarian rules were intragrated by the other people in Macroweb. Egalitarianism within the company had become an institution with is own life. The fact that egalitarianism failed as interpreted by both Said and Hammouda surfaced differences between Said and Hammouda that had been present all the time. As trust were diminishing, they were both increasingly questioning the intentions of the other.

As I interpret their strategies as they expressed them, Said was far more conserned with breaking the difference between symbols of high and low culture, Hammouda on the other hand was conserned with education, of lifting the civility. And this of course relates to Mimicry, Said and Hammouda would generally give different interpretations of Mimicry. Said would emphasize the subversive aspect mimicry has to definitions of high and low culture, while Hammouda would stress, as he often did, how seemingly equal institutions have very different functions. Mimicry could thus be interpreted as camouflage of either bad intentions or lack of abilities.

The early alliance between Said and Hammouda, was to some extent under attack when the egalitarian project were not succeding. In many ways Hammouda had a more definitive loss than Said. As a critic Hammouda were putting forward more context free ideas of qualities of abilities, art, or political engagement; a critical reason to confront the lack of such abilites within the Moroccan elites. What seemed obvious was that

Hammouda had no success with this in Macroweb, and he also felt he no longer had the support of Said. In this situation conflict with the editor had no purpose.

Said was in a totally different situation, he still had confidence in the TéléM directors. To him it was still an important batle in securing the national controll of the growing télecom economy. As he always feared the fear of a too dominant influence of the French.

Said and Hammouda had different perspectives all the way. And at the point when Said cooperated with TéléM the difference became more apparent. Said pointed out a devotion to developing Morocco, to create opportunities, and also to be technically independent from the European countries, especially France.

«I'm totally fed up with always having [the French] on my neck. There is absolutely no idea to stand-alone; it isn't self-sufficiency in that way that will help us. But we should be really independent from France, and rather cooperate with other countries. If only the French were really competent, I could have understood it. That's a big problem here we believe the French are the best even if they are no good».

Pierre

Macroweb didn't make enough money, and Said felt lonely with few persons to consulate after his former companion had left. Even if Foad and Said were close, much fell on Said to develop new ideas. In the early years Said and his companion had been a good team. Said brought in a new person who could give new ideas to Macroweb in the spring 2001. Pierre, a French, and a very charismatic person lived in Tangiers where he had a project of making electronic catalogues.

Pierre was very popular among the Macroweb crew, he was helpful, inspiring, and also had a worldview that worked well with most of the people there. He was hired by

Macroweb to give consultancy services to the company. He also got a place among the web developers, and soon after another journalist was place downstairs as well, and this space became more crowded, but one could also sometimes get the Macroweb feeling one had at the Abdel Moumen office. Pierre concentrated on marketing and publicity. His most important project was what was called «Macro Communication». It was based on governing the databases of names and clients Macroweb had, for publicity services. Macro Communication had a limited success.

Pierre came and went, but most of the time he was in Casablanca. Pierre became a regular of the Friday evenings with Said and Foad, but also other nights we would go to a bar placed on the way to Said' house. I got to know Pierre well, since I also was regular on the evenings, and often Pierre and me would be the only two who stayed in the office late evenings.

He too would give more and more negative gossip on Said. In his opinion Said didn't trust his employees. What irritated him most was that all the information had to flow thru Said. He missed a communication system that functioned in a way that one could communicate to all what kind of help was needed, and then the one free could take the case. This was a especially present problem on access to the web developers. I myself felt very much the same problem. Even if I was sitting very close to the web developers, I always had to go to Said for minor demands. This was tiring, and of course it slowed down the speed in process. This also meant that I to a lesser degree got the idea of what the other people in the office actually was doing, and to a lesser degree was able to give comments and ideas to each other.

All the most valuable information was stuck to Said. The web-developer who had the responsibility for the servers also noted that the information that Said gave on number of visitors and the number of visited pages was not correct. Especially the number of visited pages was wrong since also access to the sites thru our closed web address to the

sites was counted. Pierre had a good relationship to all in Macroweb, and was also some kind of a info centre. And it was not just needed information it was also gossip and accusation of bad leadership.

Pierre continued to have a special relationship to Said. As Said closed in as much information as possible, more and more information on the ill judgments by Said was flowing in all direction, and all that MarocTélécoms ears in Macroweb heard, was of course reported. In the early days of 2002 it became clear that Pierre had broken with Macroweb. Pierre said he was not paid, Said said he had borrowed Pierre a lot of money he never paid back. Pierre would as we will see have his revenge. Or if this was a planned plot by Pierre, his abilities was so impressive that he should have made a better hoax than this:

Controlled by a major multinational media company

Pierre didn't disappear completely. He stayed around and he certainly didn't stop talking. To them who went to him to hear what he had to say, he could tell them than Global Digital wouldn't let Said go on in Macroweb. Global Digital had big plans for Macroweb and within 2006 Macroweb would have a turnover of 3 billion Dirams. And of course either if you missed having Pierre around, or just because Pierre remained an interesting person, some went to see him. And also he wanted to be assured everybody would stay and participate in this great leap forward for Macroweb.

Global Digital decided that Macroweb needed advises from a consultancy group. They stayed for fourteen days. Some of the Macroweb employees where randomly picked for the sessions which were held in an office nearby. Most of the Macroweb people seemed to be impressed by the consultants. When the whole thing was finished we got the message from the consultants. There were different opinions one the value of the

consultants presentation. I will not delay too much with it, but for me the whole message from the consultants was a lot of big words with no meaning.

«You will need a clear strategy», it was said, but not a single word of what this strategy would be. When we got back to our offices a big surprise waited for us. Khaled had published an article where he announced that the direction of Macroweb would be replaced. Then TéléM sent a message that this was false, and that the Macroweb direction had the full support from TéléM. So the article was withdrawn. This was quite an extraordinary way for a company to spread rumours on itself, and it happened with no consequences for Khaled who wrote the article.

The situation settled but it was not an enormous shock to us that in May 2002 in was announced that the general director of Macroweb, Foad was replaced by the same man who had leaded the consultancy group that had visited Macroweb a few weeks earlier. On the very same hour as this was announced Pierre showed up in the Macroweb office again. It was clear that his ideas would be an important part of the new management of Macroweb. And what also seemed clear to several of the Macroweb people was that it was not actually a TéléM man who was placed in the top position of Macroweb, but rather a Global Digital man.

One of the persons longest in Macroweb felt this would be the end of a Macroweb as a provider for technical services for the Moroccan society, but rather a portal for business solutions for companies who wanted access to the Moroccan marked.

Said said he felt Moussaoi supported him and Foad and that this was genuinely a plan laid by Pierre, and Global Digital to the hold of Macroweb. To me this was the right moment to leave the company and Morocco, so I resigned immediately. Hammouda who was quite free to leave, also announced that he would be out of Macroweb. Of course Pierre and the new manager tried to convince him to stay. Said continued to stay in the company for some weeks. The general view was that he was humiliating himself by

staying. Imad made a drawing where he pictured Said clinging to the doorframe of the Macroweb office while others tried to drag him away. But Said and Foad had still 20 % of the Macroweb stocks, and he was sitting on valuable information that he had kept to himself, so what he of course tried to do was to sell his skin as dear as possible.

One of my last evenings in Casablanca Pierre approached me in the streets. He did this for only one purpose and that was to send a message to Said. Powerful men directed TéléM, and the telecommunication sector was one of the most important for the Moroccan economy. Said would be best of by cooperating. I considered this treats to be a product of Pierre's imagination, with no substance, and never bothered to pass the message to Said.

The new director and Pierre did not stay in Macroweb for too long. The big talk headed nowere. So in the end on 2002 a technical oriented TéléM man replaced the new general director. He has successfully made ADSL connection something quite large parts of the population can afford, and made Macroweb to one of the most profitable parts of TéléM. The portal is irrelevant, and web journalism is not an important issue for Macroweb, most of the same people are still working there.

The public sphere: two cases

We have now followed the development in Macroweb, the battlefield of important decision makers for the development of the Internet in Morocco. But we also need to take a closer look at the transformation of the public sphere where telecommunication technologies play an important role. I will concentrate on two public debates that have been important in the resent years. The first is the issue of terrorism, global and local. The second is the discussions around the new family law in Morocco. These two cases are interesting in the sense that it is public debates on legal issues, even though they are rather different.

Round up the usual suspects

After the attack on the twin towers in Manhattan the public sphere in Muslim and Arab societies has been increasingly on the agenda for both popular and academic discussions. Since the terror attacks cannot be directly connected to any state, but rather to networks thriving on the discontent that exists in the streets, this public sphere of the Arab streets can give valuable insight to this phenomena. What is of most interest to me is the considerable schism in the explanations after the 16th of Mai bombing in Casablanca 2003. The attack on Manhattan 11th September was not met with very different attitudes and explanations in the different environments I stayed in. But my one month stay in Casablanca November/December 2003 showed a total clash in world views that was socking even thought I often had felt the high degree of lack of knowledge to the current opinions in different parts of the city, my informants showed.

The first people I met with were my middleclass friends, who generally feel the growing Islamism as a treat to them selves. As one put it: «It might sound cynical, but actually the terror attacks here in Casablanca did more good than bad. As you know

people cheered for the 11th September attacks, it was far away from them to understand the danger of the Islamists. Now we have got our lesson. Now we understand the danger, and now we are taking our precautions. The Islamists are loosing their popular support now».

The people I met generally held this view. Some were moderating it, they didn't believe the Islamist were loosing to much support. They thought a lot of people didn't care even if parts of the city were blown up. This, I believe, was entirely wrong, I never met anybody that didn't actually care.

After being in Casablanca for a couple of days I went to see my friends from the block were I used to live. This was downtown, and actually closer to the bomb attacks than my middleclass friends who live in Maarif. When I sat down with my best friend, I was mentioned the point of view I had get, that this was making the Islamists less poplar, that it had been an awakening on the danger of the Islamists.

First Karim was silent, totally taken by surprise, not knowing how to respond. «Brigt, Brigt, Brigt», he said shaking his head. «Where have you got these ideas? People here don't believe it was done by Islamists. It is the CIA and Moroccan government who have done it. The bombers were doped and not Islamists».

«Why do you believe this»?

«I don't, I don't know really. What the government says, I don't believe it I don't trust them. All they say is lie. I don't know who did it. What we know is the terror are back in the streets. We thought we were safe from the police, and those things where changing. But now it's just like the dark years, people are disappearing all over, tortured for their opinions».

«But I'd like to know the explanation why people know CIA did it».

«It was an editor of one of the London based Arabic newspapers who first asked the question. It seemed like a good plan. First at the birth of the crown prince (Early May

2003), the king gave amnesty. So they emptied the prisons, thousands very set free. And then this happened and they started immediately prisoning people from the Islamist opposition. They needed this pretext to stifle the Islamists before the municipal elections (held autumn 2003)».

«And obviously the CIA is cooperating with the government».

«Yes they couldn't do this without the help of the CIA».

As it later should appear, Khalid were moderate, or rather extreme, because everybody else I talked to in this part of the city were certain the CIA, and Moroccan officials stood behind the bombing, with no doubt. To think otherwise was impossible.

«I thought you were more intelligent than this». One friend of mine got angry when I said I thought it was Islamists were behind the bombing. «Don't tell me you believe in the government's propaganda. Don't you know that they are liars. How could you say Islamists could have done it. Look at me, look at me, do you think I could have done it. Tell me.»

«I didn't know you had become an Islamist».

«I have not. I am a Muslim, no Muslim would have done this».

Conspiracy theories are not something new to the Moroccan street corner, or laces where the lack of transparency gives a need for good explanations. What is interesting is how the Internet and telecommunication technologies are related to this public sphere. The Internet is not working as an agent of transparency, facilitating transparency and an open and rational discourse. Rather the contrary, it fits well with the street corner rumours and conspiracy theories. Distribution of information thru chatting, blogs and discussion forums, are not creating forums where different worldviews meet. Editors, family and friends in Diaspora, are essential for spreading the sort of information that confirms most reasonable explanations. It produces a pattern of usual suspects that confirms what one already knows. Rumours on the sexual preference of the king, or who stand behind the

bombings can be checked on the Internet. The rumours whatever they are will be confirmed. What is more: The open Internet that cannot hold the truth away from Morocco. In this way rumours are given extra credibility, because in countries with a free press, the truth is spoken.

In this particular case, journalists presenting interviews with, or announcements by Islamists have in several cases been sentenced to prison under the anti-terrorist law for inciting violence. In this way moderate opinions in the regular newspapers are condemned while the harder stuff is easily found on the Internet and rapidly spread thru informal channels. Liberal intellectuals are of course offended by the repression of Moroccan journalist, but to an extent it is less important because information is to be found elsewhere. The effect of the rather different strategies toward printed local press, and the web, is that a press that are already considered insufficient and subdued is not considered while what is written abroad is given increased importance.

The legal actions taken by the Moroccan government to hit down on Islamists are a situation of conspiracy theory/paranoid schism. Conspiracy theories are the only valid information in some parts of the city. The paranoid style gives reason to the actions taken by the official Morocco.

Explaining conspiracies

The case of 16th of Mai bombings is not unique. If you want to understand Middle East politics you are obliged to count in conspiracy theories (Pipes1996). Even though it should be noted that in the Maghrebian countries conspiracy theories are less frequent than in the rest of the Arab world. On the other hand those conspiracy theories that exist often share common features with the more common Middle Eastern conspiracy theories. To investigate the interconnectedness to Internet it is also interesting to take a look at the

history and phenomena that are closely connected to conspiracy theories. The total actuality of conspiracy theory is actually quite new to Middle East societies, according to studies of conspiracy theories in the Middle East; it cannot be separated from European presence in the region. This goes of course for greater conspiracy theories, involving a huge system, not theories of fraud, which is as common as fraud itself, and has been common to all time and all societies. The vast majority of conspiracy theories include occidental influence. It is therefore tempting to compare it with occidentalism: presentation of the west and the western way of thinking in oriental narratives. Pipes (1996) theory of Middle Eastern conspiracy theories and Buruma and Margalit (2004) theory of occiedentalism both explain these histories and explanation with influence of European nationalism exported to the Middle East as pan-Arabism. Both Pipes and Buruma and Margalit fail to see the connections between colonial ideology and the early postcolonial inversions of these colonial ideologies by the independence movement in Arabian states. Most of the popular theories either you call it conspiracy theories or occidentalism seems to share a pattern of inverted orientalism. The orientalism or colonial ideology is merely invented for the sake of the national independence movement, and these inverted orientalist histories are still reproducing themselves in the public.

Not all conspiracy theories seem to have this mark of being a part of an inverted orientalism. To mix conspiracies, occidentalism, and reinterpreted orientalism is maybe not very accurate. However, all these kind of narratives have in common of being dysfunctional and irrational in the sense Pipes argues. Conspiracy theories are according to Pipes the main reason for a dysfunctional public sphere in Arab states, an effective blockage for rational discourse (Pipes 1996).

In an original work Abdelmajid Hannoum shows how the Kahina myth have changed from early Arab historians in the ninth century giving the first written narratives about her, over a hundred years after her death. Kahina was an Amazight queen that

resisted the Arabs invasion in the end of the seventh century. The first narratives written in the eyes of the conqueror, depicts Kahinas cruelty. Except from Ibn Khaldouns synthesis in the fourteenth century, the history was not changed before the European and especially French historians began to rewrite the history of North Africa. After the French conquered Algiers in 1830 they sought a legitimating for their presens there. They added an alliance between the Amazight queen Kahia, and the Byzantine empire: between the Amazights and the Romans. In their encounter the Arabs did not create a Moorish civilization, but destroyed a roman one. The French were back to free the Amazights from the Arabs. The part Kahina played in these narratives was not a special one, the main objective was to establish the proof of a roman North Africa. What have made the Kahina myth so special is that it is activated, adopted, transformed by so many different social groups. The most important in North African identities: The early Islamic ideology, the medieval Moorish ideology, colonial ideology, anti-colonialism, Arab nationalism, North African nationalism, Amazight nationalism, Zionism (according to some Kahina was a Jewish priestess, and Kahina the same name as Cohen), and feminism. Like words change in transition, myth change and as the ideology changes one myth it changes other myths. Hannoum describes only the transformation of the Kahina myth, but by using the pattern of the transformation of this myth one can see how different narratives changes in transition from one social group to another (Hannoum 2003).

Instead of seeing what might be conspiracies as a part of a irrational public discourse, I will see it relation to different social groups. I will not only concentrate on what is obvious conspiracies, but also other kind of narratives used in the public as well.

The French historians established a historical sequence of early roman empire and civilisation, destruction for civilisation by the Arabs, and the modern roman empire of the French. The nationalist narratives replaced the colonial with a similar sequence; pre-colonial, colonial, and postcolonial. Since the nationalist spoke for the people only in

name, but in reality only represented a minor urban elite, the same sequence was used for legitimizing this urban, basically Fassi, elite. Just like the orientist writing the nationalist writing of the early postcolonial period created a "homogenized and essentialised vision of both Self and Other" (Bruke 1998)

It is especially tempting to see the situation described above as one where political elites and the main actors in the media, strives for transparency, but are met with a wall of conspiracy theories.

The first reactions to the 16th of Mai bombings were a urge for a open process, and a fear any kind of abuse would be used for cracking the terrorists organization. When these bombings hit a society in a fragile situation, moving toward more democracy and openness, the fear was the progress over the last years would be set back. The day after the bombing a group of civil society associations and political parties made a statement where they claimed to have been signalling the problem of violent islamism, racism and anti-Semitism. They now again said their plans for action should be implemented. Moroccan officials said international terrorism that had hit Morocco (Le Matin, le 19 Mai 2003). Other papers focused more on the internal Islamists. Violent islamism was preached in the mosqs. And leaflets with a message that Morocco had become a society of non-believers were distributed. In a society where the non-believers are in total control of the propaganda means (TV, radio, papers), no peaceful method would be sufficient. Killing of non-believers is legitimate in Islam, and now it is necessary (Maroc Hebdo International 559). And in the suburbs of Casablanca, in the famous biddonvilles where violence historically has been low and the optimism by the newcomers have been higher than in the more established poorer areas in the centre of the city (André 1968). To day the situation has changed and the biddonvilles are places with deep and well-established social problems. In this environment radical and violent islamism have become an increasingly important part of local authority. And this violent islamism had developed without much

concern from Moroccan authorities as long as the terror was local within the biddonvilles. The total mass of islamism was put under question after the suicide bombings and, what will the result of the possible islamization of Morocco be and who stand behind (Maroc Hebdo International 559).

16th of Mai in the Media

On 25th of Mai civil society organizations like human rights organization and women's organizations and the political parties, organized a rally against terrorism. These organizations put emphasize on the growing menace of islamism, the need for programs for bettering the situation in the depraved parts of the suburbs in Morocco, and to battle the terror with more democracy and an open system. The only legal Islamist party, the Justice and development party PJD, was prevented from taking part in the march.

The established Islamist parties in Morocco, especially PJD, put much effort in cleansing themselves from what they saw as a poorly hidden accusation from both the liberal, leftist and power holding part of Moroccan politics. After the good result PJD had in the 2002 parliament election and were assumed to well in the local elections that were held later 2003. Commentators accused the political establishment of taking advantage of the situation, and using it for what it was worth to weaken the PJD.

One of the leaders of PJD tried to turn the tables by asking who benefited from the bombings. It was definitively not PJD that was running well in it election campaign (Maroc Hebdo Internatinal 560). This was the first time the questions of motive, and who benefited from the attacks were asked. Later this should be the main question for those who questioned the official narrative.

The different political parties and NGO's active in the aftermath of 16th May, were dividing along the same line here as we have seen in many major clashes thru up the

eighties and the nineties. The liberal and leftwing NGO's that tried to take advantage of the 16th of May bombing to make people aware of the dangers of islamism. Interestingly the normal sympathy and antipathy for these two groups was not the main division line in perception of the 16th of May. The ones who saw it as a plain terror attack by Islamist groups were closer to the political, economical and academic elites, than those who made conspiratorial explanation of the 16th of May bombing. When Islamists and the socialist student union had many violent clashed in university campus in all universities in Morocco, both Malik and Karim had sympathies with the socialist student-union. Malik had himself been a student during the most violent time in Casablanca, and as a Amazight activist he was bound to be sympathetically to those who supported the Amazights cultural rights. Karim had lost family members that had been active in the student movement, but according to Karim only the government had been responsible for the disappearance.

The fierce combat for political control over the student movements had involved several assassinations: Islamists groups attacking the auditorium, dragging their enemies out on campus and slaughtering them in front of the eyes of their friends, or the use of road blockage to attack political leaders of the student movement. This happened in the time when the left wing was seen as the most dangerous opposition, and nothing was ever done to track the assassinators.

The ones who had been involved in the student movement on the left, and had experience the loss of friends due to the assassinations due to the Islamists movement, would take a much more supportive standpoint in the reactions that were to come against Islamists after 16th of May. Seeing governmental terror as a lesser evil. Karim would take a different, consequently anti-governmental, position:

Karim: We thought we were seeing change in the regime, now we see that this was all lies. We are back to the years of led. Certainly there are justifications for these actions. It

was back then and it is now. But the government has no intentions to defend the people against political extremist taking to terror, but to terrorize the people themselves. They can use any pretext they find, or they can even create such a pretext. To say that I know who did it or not, would be totally false. However what nobody can hide, the police forces creating terror in the streets, is the real issue here.

On the 25th of May a new anti-terror law also passed the Moroccan parliament. The antiterror law was as many feared, one of many restrictions to civil liberties defining terrorism as any disturbance of public order, and gave the police extended means.

Only a couple of days after the new law was set in action the first case of terror suspect death were reported. The suspect was assumingly killed after torture, and died by severe heart and liver problems.

The new anti-terror law was also used for controlling the media, and what information the media was allowed to transmit. On June 5th the editor of the Arab weekly al-Ousbou was arrested for publicly violated the anti-terror law by printing on the front page a statement by the rather unknown group as-Saiqa that claimed responsibility for the bombings. On July 11th he was given a one-year suspended prison sentence.

On June 13th three editors of the two newspapers ash-Sharq and al-Hayat al-Maghribiyya, were hold for questioning. On May 5th prior to the 16th of Mai bombing al-Hayat al- Maghribiyya had printed an interview with the Islamist Zakaria Boughrara where he praised the activities by the jihadist movement in Morocco. A month after ash-Sharq printed the same interview. Ash-Sharq had also printed in the same issue an interview with the Islamist preacher Mohammed Fizazi. They were sentenced to prison terms from one to three years for inciting violence. It became thus clear for the press and the people in general, that transmitting or discussing different view of what had taken place on the 16th of May was not allowed. When these questions were not accessible in the

printed press, or the broadcast media, it was of course vividly discussed on different Internet forums.

The reports on torture, aggressions by the police, and a feeling of insecurity, were a growing concern for people. But contrary to former operations by the security forces in Morocco, this time the leadership was both publicly known, accessible for comments and even active in the public (See for instance Maroc Hebdo Intenational 605). Even though there is a reasonable doubt on the methods used by the investigators, their findings and numbers of arrests and sentences is publicly known. Despite this openness the popular opinion on the 16th of May bombings often evolved in a direction of conspiracy explanations.

Conspiracy theory is basically a way of explaining a hidden truth. And while the government one some aspects showed an unusual openness, they where clamping down on other questions. Why? What did they want to hide? To answer this rationally, one has to ask, as one does in all crimes, who benefited from the crime?

Another aspect often connected to conspiracy theories is that an already established theory can explain the events. Conspiracy theories repeats one self (Stewart 1999), it puts the hidden events in a known pattern. What is already known and repeatedly executed by the government is to fond a pretext to break down the opposition. And when the pretext is lacking the government needs to create one. But how much is crated?

The main reaction against the process was the way police and the court worked. As numbers of arrested for playing a role in the bombings raised to ridiculous numbers, and the police undubtly used torture and the arrested rarely went thru a case with the possibility to defend themselves, and investigation were accused of being shallow. In early July 2003 the justice minister stated that 700 people were judged for their direct or indirect connection to the bombings.

The paranoid topos

Another common remark was the Jewish motive. Three of the five targets for the bombing were Jewish. The first target was a Jewish cemetery, the second the Jewish Alliance Centre, and the third was the restaurant "Le Positano", often frequented by the Jewish community in Casablanca. Neither of the explosions killed any Jews. The Jewish cemetery had not been used for several decades, and the explosions took place several blocks away. The bombings were executed on a Friday night, when the Sabbath had started and then not many Jews out. The Jewish Alliance Centre was empty, and no Jews were at the restaurant. If the bombers really wanted to harm the Jews in Casablanca, wouldn't they have planed to do it on another day, and wouldn't they went to places where there really are Jews, and not a cemetery that has not been in use fro many years.

The last two targets were the Spanish Chamber of Commerce and restaurant, and hotel Safir. Some thought the targets showed no real consistency, and that it showed there were no real targets in the Casablanca bombing; terror could not be the real motive. And like the PJD stated: if it was Islamist that stood behind. Why did they do something that would harm themselves just months before an election where they were assumed to have success? This question was not only used for cleansing PJD of suspicion, but the whole Islamist branch.

This was of course the opposite of the results from the investigation preceded by the Moroccan authorities. They found link to several Islamist organizations. Many of these connections ended up with financing from abroad. From Saudi Arabia, or Islamist organization in Europe. The leader of the investigation explained that even though many of the terrorist found in European terror-cells are of Moroccan origin, they are brewed in Europe and not in Morocco (Maroc Hebdo 605).

The alleged support of Moroccan Islamist terror cells by international terror was also popularly questioned. The poor and wretched from the biddonvilles are not the people with an international connection they said. The operation was also too neatly arranged. How could they have coordinated the travelling with explosives in taxis from the outskirts of the city to down town Casablanca, and blow it all up at different places on such a short time laps. And why are the bomb men so clever at one organizing point, but not aware of the Jewish club being closed on a Friday night?

All these facts summed up shows that the government does not tell the true story. So what could possibly have happened? Not all thought really the people that carried out the bombings where the bodies from the biddonville. The Islamists does not come from the biddonvilles anyway. They are educated, unemployed university educated, not from the biddonville. So the dead bodies could just have been placed on the spot by the conspirers. A more commonly held theory was that the bombers were drugged and the explosives were controlled by some kind of remote control. That would also explain why it was difficult do get the said suicide bombers to get to the actual targets.

So what is the motive behind the bombings? Well obviously one motive is to clamp down on the Islamist opposition in Morocco. Another part of it is that this also makes it possible to harmonize the political development in Morocco and the western countries. That is to give the same kind of legitimating to the suppression of independent media and political parties under the fictitious reason of war against terror.

Those who supported the conspiracy theory had different versions of why the official story was wrong, and what could be the real story and the real motive. However all was variation over the theme showed above. These theories were not discussed in neither newspapers, radio nor TV, even though it was sometimes commented that these kinds of theories actually is popular.

Popular conspiracy theories spread fast, from mouth to ear. And just like Friedman and others said, with the Internet the government cannot hide the truth from people. What the other medias would not say, several news sources were on the Internet. <find a citation> The effort from totalitarian regimes to quiet voices telling the truth will not be possible with the Internet in reach. The Internet will make it impossible for repressive regimes to keep the truth away from people.

This was certainly the case here. Most of those who did not believe in the official line could affirm that they directly or indirectly had got information from different resources on the Internet. Not all was going to the cyber café s to read discussion boards or different civil society sites, but the information spread thru these sites had quite a massive scope.

It is sometimes difficult to make a difference of where the information came from, Internet discussions or simply conventional wisdom.

I asked from where people had gained information on the 16th of May bombing. Karim above made a point the editor of the Arabian newspaper based in London, his message could have been transmitted true both Arab satellite TV or the Internet. But both here represent the new media, breaking the old information control by the government.

Those who where using the Internet more regularly told me where information could be accessed:

"Discussions boards, and international newspapers. We are discussing the issue on chats as well".

Me: "what discussion boards and newspapers"? "This is everywhere really. Even on emarrakech you can read this. And you can read it on the salafist sites, I normally don't visit those. It depends really, I search information where I can get it".

(E-marrakech is one of the more popular Moroccan web portals, with a quite popular discussion board. Here all kind of discussions are held, but religious discussions are rarely held here).

Me: "What salafist sites"?

"You know, European, Saudi Arabian. It could be "alminhadj" or "saaid.net", but just as normally we discuss this at normal chat sites".

Me: "And you trust the information you get"?

"Listen, I use my good judgment. I know that the information the government gives is not the truth. So I want to know what really happened, who stood behind all this. Then I have to find those who want to speak the truth, whoever they are".

In the whole Arab world Islamist organizations have been willing and have had resources to develop sites who gives information to those who are willing to know the truth. These are far from being the most popular sites, but on this occasion what they had to say could be relevant.

On the Moroccan scene one group is especially interesting here. Al Adl wal-Ihsan, leaded by the charismatic, populists sheihk Abessalem Yassine. He entered the scene in 1974 when he wrote a public letter to king Hassan II, in his very long letter he asked for many different services from the King. For instance he proposed for the king that they should cooperate to eliminate the content for Islam, and he also said the King should give back all his possessions he hat taken from the people. For this he was put in an insane asylum until 1979, when he was let free from the asylum he got inspired by the revolution in Iran an how they got rid of their tyrant there and wanted the same process to happen in Morocco. It was in the early eighties his organization really was set into work. In the Rabat-Casablanca where he had his basis then, his organization soon started to show strength among the student organizations. This started a process where the left lost its control over each and every university staring from Casablanca ending in Fes and Agadir.

His organization was also the first Islamist organization to get a strong hold of the civil society. In 1983 he was prisoned for a couple of years. After 1985 we was put in house arrest, and he stayed in house arrest until 2000. For him the Internet has been useful in spreading his word. He is the most popular of the Islamist leaders, and his organization is also probably the most popular. Where he has the strongest hold of the population is in his condemnation and his analyses of the corruption of the state and the Makhzen. This message is effectively transmitted on his website yassine.net. Now writing open letters to the present King, with very much the same message as thirty years ago, is effectively done and easy to access for everyone who wants to read it. In this situation house arrest is of little value. The main activity on yassine.net is not letter writing to the King. Developed from Sufi traditions Yassine gives interpretations of dreams, this is an important part of how they gets their messages. Yassine.net has a great catalogue of written, audio, and video recordings of dreams the supporters of Al Adl wal-Ihsan have. And every Sunday morning Yassine gives real time interpretations to his followers in a audio chat-room with use of paltalk.

Within the conspiracy theoretical frame it is easy to get information that is persistent with the frame. And in search for such information one does not find open and transparent discussions of the nature of the issues one is about to discern. Rather the opposite one is finding one-sided uncontested information.

The other camp is equally concerned about the information and goes to the Internet to find information on how Islamic terror organization is financed, the history of Saudi Arabian Wahabism, and connections to local preachers. Both camps sit in their respective pars of the city connected to two totally different and closed global networks exchanging information on the terror they are exposed to.

It is difficult to label one of the camps less rational than the other. The exaggerated war against terror with the persecution of Islamists is perfectly in order with the paranoid

style describing the communist hunt in the American fifties. The use of terror as a pretext for clamping down on opposition is a perfectly rational, and probably a correct, way to see it. Somewhere along the line you'll find the border between "paranoia within reason" and "full-blown conspiracy" (Marcuse 1999). When the paranoid current does not meet resistance in its way thru the Internet and local rumours, but expand in two closed circuits, the way to full-blown conspiracies is close.

In my next example the paranoia, and conspiracy theories, will be just as important as in the case above. But the discussions ended up in different circuits.

Moudawana (Family Law)

In February 2004 Morocco adopted a new Family Law. In several ways it meant a radical change in women's rights in Morocco. The most important changes are: Both men and women are considered as heads of the households, minimum age of marriage is set to 18, women can appeal for divorce, and restrictions are set on polygamy that makes it very difficult to practice.

Many groups objected this radical new law. Especially Islamist organizations have arranged campaigns against the new law. Therefore a very common presentation of this process is the brave new king struggling through new democratic reform, against the will of conservative Islamists. This then shows the important of supporting the new king, with his good intentions to promote democracy.

It is obvious that the political elite, King and government have put much prestige in the new law. And it is also certain that in the present political landscape in Morocco, to fight the influence of the Islamists is an important task, since the Islamist present are the only real opposition that could potentially overrun the political powers. But in their

strategy to balance the oppositional powers, the Moudawana could never have been applied if it had not a considerable popular support. It might be true that the new Moudawana would not have passed a general vote, but if there was not considerable support the king could not have let the Islamist opposition strengthening their position by passing a very unpopular law.

How the debate around the new Moudawana has been established is very interesting. I will stay in the same street corners and see the discussion of the new law thru the debate there. To my friends in the street, the government and the king have no legitimacy at all. If the debate had been solely based on the authority of the state powers and the Islamist opposition, the Islamist opposition would easily have won the total support of the streets. Since this is not the case it is necessary to take a closer look at the strategy of the civil society groups that have fought and won.

It is commonly assumed that the attitude towards the reform of the Moudawana is divided along the same lines as we saw above. Liberal middleclass, university educated, or the wealthier supporting the reform, while most of the people in the popular district being against. This is also the case, however while seeing the world in the same way as the middle class in my popular district was a clear prove of madness above, we'll see here that most people could accept the value of the other argument in the case of the Moudawana. And it is necessary to note that all the way you would easily find in both socioeconomic backgrounds, somebody who campaigned for one of the two positions. The one I met who most furiously attacked the Islamist manifestations against the reform during the heated debate in 2000, was a semi-illiterate shopkeeper from the countryside.

Male-female relationships were a common theme when I sat with my male friends of my same age on the cafe, or was hanging on the corner. And since Moudawana was highly debated during the period I stayed in Casablanca I got many occasions to discuss the new family law.

In July 2000 Karim said:

«Those who want to change the divine law do it because they want destroy our society, they want decadence, and they want to destroy our families».

December 2003 he said this:

«I don't agree with all the propositions to the Moudawana. You know it will put man and woman on equal foot in the family, and that is not right. There should be only one head of the family. […] What is good, and the reason I'm supporting the new law, is that women are given the right to divorce. If everyone respected God this wouldn't be necessary, however there are many men that are not real Muslims, and beat their women. So as long god's law is not obeyed women must have their right to divorce.[…].«[Violence against women] is a big problem in Morocco. My cousin is married to a violent man; there is nothing she can do now. How can she prove this»?

This argument seemed to be valid also among those who did not support the new Moudawana.

«Isn't this law necessary, as long as there are violent men, and it is a fact that violence against women is common. They are not following the Koran, but are very hard to punish. As long as we are not living in a perfect world, isn't this law good»?

«Such a law can newer be good».

«But necessary!»

«Maybe, but it should be done more to punish violent men».

«But this is very difficult to do, it is not possible to prove what happens within the family, so the right to divorce is the best way to prevent violence in the family».

«That is right».

«And isn't a law that makes people to do the right thing a good law».

«To a certain extent it is good. But it also creates evils as well. A divorce is always a evil».

So what had happened, from being against the plan for reform of the Moudawana, to be for or at least question the need for reform?

Role of the media

What are interesting here, are the arguments used, which are an echo of the debate running in the Moroccan media. The posses started in the early eighties, and were generating much debate between woman activists and conservative forces. The influential woman associations L'Association Démocratique des Femmes Du Maroc (ADFM) were established in 1985, and L'Union de L'Action Féminine (UAF) in 1987. The UAF developed from the activities around the women's press. Both associations were connected to different political parties. ADFM were more based on principles of universal human rights and support from western feminists, while the UAF to a greater extent leaned on islamic values. In 1992 Association Marocaine des Droits des Femmes (AMDF) were establish. The founder had also been a part of the women's press. AMDF is independent from political parties, but is like ADFM more connected to universal rights (Ghazalla 2001). In 1992 UAF organized a petition for a new family law, and the year after Hassan II undertook reform, it was not let to the parliament and the political parties to decide because Hassan II were weary the subject would divide the country (Buskens 2003).

The reform of the law did not settle the case. Rather the opposite, it showed that also the Moudawana, that is the only part of Moroccan law that is based on Islamic law, could be changed.

In March 1999 the new government announced a national plan of action to change the Moudawana. It was formulated thru cooperation between the government and woman activists. Much of the base was the international work laid by the woman activists. Much of the argument was to harmonize Moroccan law with international standards like the

Convention for Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). This plan triggered the broadest public debate in Morocco's history. Differently from Hassan II in 1993, Mohammed VI did not interfere. The debate rose and both woman activist and Islamists took advantages of what they then felt was a new given right to speech.

One the most important issues to be settled was the right each believer has to use one owns understanding, ijtihad, of islamic law in the public debate. The government itself started this debate. The secretary of the state for protection of the family, Mohammed Saâd Saâdi, presented the report and made it clear that reforming the Moudawana was a legitimate demand from the woman activists, and civil society(Le Matin du Sahara et du Maghreb (LMSM), July 18, 1999, in Ghazalla 2001). The minister of religious endowment and Islamic affairs, Abdelkebir M'Daghri Alaoui, said the women's problem were not because of flaws with islamic law, but wrong application of the sacred text. The ulama, religious specialists should settle the question and not personal opinions (LMSM, January 25, 2000, in Ghazalla 2001).. The government did little with the plan it had presented, it seemed like it was backing off from it. This left the stage open to the civil society.

The Islamist groups both those which had sworn alliance to the king, and those which were banned reacted against the plan. They said it was a plan that was based on western references that it was subverting islamic traditions in Morocco. And only ulema should take part in ijtihad. This was in many ways in accordance with the Maliki tradition in which the Moudawana was first written after the independence. Under the French system, different systems of law were developed, one for the Arabs and a custom system for the Amazights. This stirred both national and Muslims sentiments, because all saw their own system of law as based on Islam. After the independence and development of a national unity the legal system was unified. To develop the legal system in accordance with Islam was one of the goals for parts of the Salafist independence movement. However, only the Moudawana ended up being based on Sharia (Buskens 2003). This part

of the juridical system is an important part of national unity. So the when the Islamic opposition blamed the reformist to be undermining the nation and the family it was in line with the importance the independence movement laid in the family code. The Islamist opposition also lay much of its rhetoric on the grounds of the Salafist independence movement.

Ghazalla reports from a seminar as an early response to the plan made by the Islamist association Al-Balagh - Association for education and culture. Their first remark was an absence of reference to Islam in the plan to reform a law based on Islam, secondly that in the process leading up to the reform plan no Islamic scholars, ulama, had been giving advice, and thirdly there were several references to international conferences that contradict sharia. Members of the panel made the point that the international law was put in place during the time of western colonialism, and attempts to apply this law is a continuation of western colonialism. Giving after to the plan would be cultural surrender to the other. The position held by woman activists and civil associations destroying Moroccan Muslim unity. Another important point made by the speakers was that ijtihad is reserved specialists on sharia (Ghazalla 2001).

Through the National Association for Protecting the Moroccan Family, these ideas were spread thru the national newspapers. The political parties PJD, and Mouvement Natioanl Populaire (MNP) made the association. Its position was that only the ulama could partake in ijtihad (LMSM, December 4, 1999, in Ghazalla 2001). Also in early December 1999, the leaders of PJD and MNP sent a statement to the Moroccan press agency (MAP) saying: "We are opposed to the standardization of the Moroccan woman in accordance with Western values and to limiting the references of this plan solely to Morocco's international engagements", and "The destiny of Moroccan civil society should not be uniquely dictated by an international institution or a world congress". They also accused the women activist of only working for the interest of rich women who have no

need for an action plan for their development. What is important is to give woman their basis needs "before flattering their egos with a hypothetical percentage of representation that only profits the elite" (LMSM, December 4, 1999, in Ghazalla 2001).

Some of these points had a broad basis in the realities; the women associations were generally importing values from abroad. And the salafist rhetoric met resonance in the public opinion.

12. March 2000, the two fronts had their big manifestations; the women activists had theirs in Rabat, while the Islamist had theirs in Casablanca.

The Islamist manifestation was far bigger than the one women activist arranged. The government seemed to be leaving their plan. It seemed like the woman activist were losing the battle.

Iman Ghazalla wrote "Sculpting the rock of women's rights" in the context of giving answer to the need for a strategically reorientation for the women's activists. After stated the women's association had overestimated the possibilities of the alliances within the government, and underestimated the strength of religious civil society groups to forge the public opinion, Ghazalla ended her article with the question: "How can women's NGOs sculpt the rocks of woman's rights out of both universal principles of equality and human rights and Islamic values"? (Ghazalla 2001) This was written in midst of a process where the women's associations were seeing they were about to loose the battle, and form the pressure of religious civil society groups saw the need to meet their opponents on the same battleground.

The woman's associations had stated to debate the claims given by the Islamists. A part of this process was to activate the experiences, ideologies and myths that were in opposition to the nationalist salafist myths. One was the religious heritage of Morocco. The woman's association met the demand for giving only the ulama the right to ijtihad. They

claimed it was the Islamists that was turning away from Moroccan traditions by trying to create a rule of theologians.

"The scholar ambition to establish the law themselves in entirely foreign to the Moroccan Maliki tradition of amir al-mumin (commander of the faithful)", and that sacred law should serve public interest (Zaoui 2000, cited in Buskens 2003)

While the Islamists organization correctly claimed the women's associations was financed by western money, the women's associations equally correctly pointed at that the Islamist movements were financed by the Saudies.

Social differences and attitudes to the reform

The debate was running in all the newspapers, but at least equally important was the reports, pamphlets, and photocopies distributed by the traditional channels of the public sphere. The newspapers were normally taking side in the debate; PJD newspaper al- Tajdid was the one reproducing most of the fierce attacks on the reform proposals. The USFP run newspaper Libération, were among the defendants, al-Bayane, the newspaper of PPS, and Le journal was also active in the pro camp.

The islamsist organizations used the mosques, to spread pamphlets and petitions. And imams where often speaking against the plan in their speeches. What is more remarkable is that the woman's associations managed to have an equal outreach.

My friend, who was not favourable to the reform of the Moudawana, once gave me a book by the sociologist Fatima Mernissi "Les Ait-Débrouille", a description of a High Atlas mountain village NGO that managed to motivate the city dwellers to empowerment. My friend had it from the Amazight association he attended. What was apparent in this book was the woman's perspective. The Amazight association and other NGO's especially women activist were cooperating.

He could also tell some of the activists in the Amazight association were involved in producing a brochure on legal rights. This was a program directed towards women were several women's associations were involved together with Amazight associations. The brochure was made in Arabic, and the translation to Tamazight was not a straightforward issue. Here again the choice of letters involved was a difficult one. The question of legal learning for women was also showing the need for legal learning in Tamazight, and this question in general was discussed when i went to the Amazight association my together with my friend.

Apparently the one who advocated reform had reacted. To use the same reference to international law and spreading this information was not sufficient. Instead they managed to make a strong alliance with the Amazight movement. The Islamist were following a very un-Moroccan Arab attitude toward women, in the traditional Amazight society women had more freedom, was the credo. Partly an invented Amazight tradition, partly relevant Amazight women had for instance, the right to divorce.

The class perspective that the Islamist also had used, only rich decadent women advocated reform, was also effectively contested. The woman activist used much energy to prove otherwise. One big report on violence against women was produced (Centr d'Ecoute et d'Orientation Juridique et Psychologique pour Femmes Agressé, 2001), and it got much coverage. Violence against women is not something that threatens rich women, but all Moroccans. Just like Karim above, most people could relate to some relatives being victims of violence.

The high temperature in the newspapers, were to be found on the street corners as well. The arguments of dependence on the west, destruction of Islam and the Moroccan family found resonance in the streets.

Brahim: "It is a part of the Zionist plan, the king's advisor, […], Azoulay, has laid out the whole plan together with the Americans. They want to destroy the Moroccan

family, and they want the women to rule the society. They know then it will all go astray. They control the King, he is weak, and only wants to defend his own interest".

Me: "What do you think will make the women suddenly rule the society?"

Brahim: "It will be impossible to have control of the society when the men loose their daughters respect, what will happen when girls can leave the family whenever they want?"

Me: "Not much probably"

Brahim: "Nobody will marry anymore, the women are free to leave whenever they want, and take with them half of the positions, and leave the men impoverished, unable to remarry".

Some of the supporters of the new law were equally interested in the real reason behind the resistance against the law.

The many manifestations on the beaches held by Islamists during the summertime 2000. Large groups of Islamists gathered on the beach to do the prayers, and sometimes preventing ordinary beach visitors from bathing. This provoked one of the shopkeepers in my street:

"These obscurantist are afraid of progress, they want to keep the people in backwardness, so they can continue to have their privileges. If people got informed they would make revolution. It is the same reason they had the manifestation against reform of the family law, they are against progress".

Buskens discussing the Moudawana reform on an early stage (until 2002), divides the pro et contra camps in a modernist and a traditionalist camp. The modernist camp consists mainly of an urban educated middleclass. And the traditionalist camp consists of lower middleclass, and recently urbanized immigrants from the rural Morocco. In this pattern there are lots of exceptions of course, my super modernist shopkeeper have quite recently arrived to Casablanca from his village in the south. But he is also an unusual

modernist. Because the division between modernists and traditionalist have existed all along since the times of the independence movement, the salafist independence movement soon became unpopular among the modernist, but both had a project on national unification (Hammoudi 1997). This project has in some respect lost its credibility as well. In the new alliances during the reform discussions this became more apparent. These new alliances are created along two possible lines, negation of cultural and political domination, and creative spaces new speeches.

The ways the pro et contra camp changed, not changing attitude of neither the modernist nor the traditionalist, but those cramped in between, tell us something of a different discourse. Even though the Islamist fighting reform of the Moudawana not generally can be alleged traditionalist, al Adl wal-Ihsan is clearly not in this group. When we are speaking of traditionalist in Morocco, we are speaking of the group connected to the Salafist independence movement, a group that have had privileges since the time of the independence movement. A group of ulema, that have had political privileges as Islamic scholars. The process of reform of the Moudawana contested their authority. PJD traded some popular credibility with a place in the political system when they defended the traditional ulema and standing closer to the king. Some of my informants said is PJD not Islamists, what they meant was PJD had become traditionalist. "Islamists" is often a category left for the groups not defending the traditional powers. The clearest example is al Adl wal- Ihsan. While the conflict between traditionalist and proper Islamists are apparent, the case is less obvious for the modernist camp. As they changed strategy towards broader alliances with different civil society groups, they left the project of reforming solely thru their power in the parliamentary system. Both the women's associations and the Islamists of PJD and allied groups went to the king and appealed to him as Amir al-Muminin, commander of the faithful, to settle the case. As a commission was created that should take in consideration both the ulama and civil society groups, the

Islamists even more strongly drifted into supporters of the ulama, and the women's association to the civil society. This gave them a better possibility to distance themselves from the modernist in the government, and associate themselves with the troubles of the people.

In my part of town the traditionalists were the most discredited group of all elites in morocco. All those who take either a class, ethnic Amazight, or religious perspective or alternating between those positions opposes themselves most clearly to the traditionalist. Those with strong connection to their countryside of origin where civil society association are very active, could see the fruits of the work and see the process as something important to them. The growing pride of being Amazight and the argument of Amazight tradition as opposed to Arabs, and the pan-Arabic nationalist movement, and more in line with universal rights and international law, were appealing those who had used similar arguments in many discussions. In this situation it became difficult not to consider many of the arguments used by those who wanted a radical revision of the Moudawana as valid.

Representations

In the Algerian movie "El Manara" (2004) you see the same conflict. The movie evolves around three friends in the oppositional environment in Alger in the late eighties. The heroine Asma is torn between the gap that emerges between the two friends she lives together with, a left wing journalist Fawzi, and a doctor with emerging Islamist sympathies, Ramadan. As the Islamist terror grows in the late eighties, the journalist becomes more and more radicalized, the doctor on the other hand is tiered of both the government and the liberal left inability to consider the problems of the poor. The movie points at the strong motivations and the desperation that moves the friends with an early common motivation, in different directions, with great accuracy. While both men move

more and more in to their respective great traditions, the heroine stands with her great project: The creation of the association for preservation of "el manara", the traditional celebration of the birth of the prophet in its traditional Algerian form. While Ramadan, the doctor, moves into the countryside, to cultivate his Islamic traditionalism, Asma fights for the urban and vulgar traditions. As a sociologist she writes a paper on the Manara at the university, something witch makes her Islamist brother angry, since it is contrary to proper Islam. The move ends up showing the eruption of violence as Fawzi and Asma are captured by Islamist terrorist at the rode and find both her brother and her friend Ramadan active in the terror group.

In the fragile situation in North Africa, Asma, and others promoting tradition based civil society groups, are presented as a third way. She is more than a moderate in between; she is the solution seeker never leaving the rootedness to the wrenched. Seemingly the women's association in the case of reform of Moudawana succeeded in creating a third way, before they lost all credibility as merely being useful idiots for the cultural domination of the west and repression from the Makhzen.

One can see this writing in the light of Kafkas writing as he was a Jew creating literature in Prague, using German as a escaping line, these women write in French their escaping lines. French is deterritorailized thru the use of it by marginalized position of individuals within the former French colony, creating collective value (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). This is the essential parts of a minor literature. What we see is the revolutionary force of this minor literature that escapes mimetic representation and symbolizing conspiratorial powers.

Mernissi makes a similar point most clearly. In her analysis of the writing and self expression of rural people on the Internet. "The Internet seems to give that century-old longing among Moslems of modest background to draw of themselves a flattering images

which reflects not so much what they own, as much as what they aspire to be". (Mernissi 2001).

Communicative rationality

In the very different discourses in my examples here, the seemingly same kind of conspiracies and occidentalism is present, but the discourses are functioning in a very different way anyway.

As we have seen in both cases conspiracy explanations, and reinterpretations of colonial ideology occur. The existence of these theories doesn't necessarily seem to create a irrational debate, or the opposite the lack of conspiracy explanations, and reinterpretations of colonial ideology doesn't seem to be a necessity for a more rational discourse and a more open public sphere.

As one example of orientalist writings the Kahaina myth written by French historians explained the relation between the French and the different ethnic groups in North Africa. The French policy of Arab and Amazight segregation, by different rules of law, found its legitimating in a invented historical connection between the Romans and the Amazights fighting side by side to prevent an Arab invasion. They also fought to keep a shared civilization intact, a civilisation later destroyed by the Arabs, but with strains of Amazight resistance. Contrary to any historical recordings the French found a alliance between the Byzantine and Kahina. And as long the alliance was intact the Amazights were able to resist the Arab invasion. When the alliance broke down, internal conflict weakened the Amazights (Hannoum 2003).

In many ways the Istiqlal, and pan-Arab nationalism, did not change this myth. They only changed the morality and the internal relations among the different ethnic groups. In their story the Arab invasion was a project of creating order and civilization

where you earlier found chaos and violence. They did not remove the Byzantine, and effectively the French from the myth; rather they rewrote the oriental myth. In their revisions the Amazights were actually Arabs, and in conflict with the Byzantine who tried to conquer North Africa, an ambition the Arabs effectually put an end to.

In the decades of independence the national ideology have not let any acknowledge of the Amazights. So the conflict between the national movement and the interest of those who defend Amazight cultural rights soon became evident. In the raising Amazight consciousness the history also changed. My many Amazight friends attitude toward the Arab cultural dominance ranged from pitting the lack of knowledge of one owns culture, thru aggression against Arabs, to thinking envying the Algerians who were lucky enough to have had the French educational systems in 13o years and not only 40. Especially the Kabyles in Algeria are respected in the fight towards Arab cultural dominance. Hannoum shows how the Amazights seeing religion as a separating force that brings conflict to the people who have been Jewish, Christian and Muslim, sees Kahina as fighting against religious dominance in defense of a secular Amazight culture, while others lay more weight on Kahina were fighting the Arabs. Basically these are reproductions of the colonial myths, even some would point out the French role in dividing the people. The French claimed Kahina was of a special religion.

These myths are useful when you will look thru the "manipulative powers" in the Moroccan public. The salafi mythology was useful to show how the government was conspiring with the western powers against the people to break down opposition to the western dominance. The same myth had a considerable success when the islamst used it against the proposition to revisions of the Moudawana. An important factor of success for the feminist movement was when they referred to the Amazight traditions, using the myths of the liberal Amazight societies, Amazight traditions, and the separating powers of manipulative foreign Saudi Arabs and Wahabist. In my part of the city this strategy gave a

significant popular support especially among the Amazight population. The one who first told me of his support for a new Moudawana was the one who aggressively opposed the Islamist manifestations, was the same who would have wanted the French to have staid longer, so democracy could have evolved without Arab dominance.

In the first case, due to lack of possibilities for a public sphere with plural points of views single kinds of paranoid thought for disclosing the manipulations easily evolved to full-blown conspiracies. In this process the Internet and telecommunication in general was useful to access proves, and strengthen the case.

In the second case the same kind of myths were in use. But here, a never seen before, public sphere evolved. In this case the debate did not develop in the new media, but in the old media. Especially the newspapers were the part the discussions took place. As far as I know nobody ever were ever discussing pro et contra in discussions boards on the Internet, or in a chat. But the new media was extremely useful when strategies and new alliances were created. Campaigns where spread among the participants in the networks, campaigns who reached the greater public thru the traditional media. The network connections where also useful for fast reporting on success or failure, and for collective restructuration of alliances and strategies.

Communication on the Internet is more like the street corner discussions than discussions in papers. But the medias are interconnected differently.

When just the liberal and the governmental elite are the only one who are allowed in the national media, the debate loses value on the street and rumours are more credited, this social life are brought into the Internet. And when national media, like national TV and major newspapers, lets more social groups be represented, the media are also strengthened in the streets and the same debate that takes place in the newspapers is brought to the streets. The Internet seemed still to be less diverse, and the same debates as the one found in the streets less common. On the other hand the social organizations

needed to create debate in the papers are present on the Internet. So while the open public

debate is never a part of Internet communication, the function of Internet communication,

and street corner communication are different when one media change.

Transformation of the Public Sphere

Even though a open public debate on the Internet often is widely overrated, the Internet is far from unimportant in shaping the public sphere. The most important democratic principle in Habemas' "Structural transformation of the public sphere" (1989 [1962]), is political participation, the ideal of the Athenian democracy. Habermas shows this by contrasting the revolutionary democratic forces of different kinds of participatory bourgeois public spheres with a privatized spectator public sphere controlled by the media elites in the bureaucratic industrial society of the mid twentieth century. The main story is the genesis and damnation (transformation) of a democratic public sphere in Western Europe. The damnation is not due to the introduction of workers and woman in political decisions (that is pointed out also make up a considerable difference from the early public sphere), but the domination of the public sphere by corporations and governmental organizations making citizenship to a consumer and client of manufactured goods, services and bureaucratic administration. The hegemonic culture industry can also be seen as corruption of an ideal of political participation emerging in the 18th century, but never really being a reality.

I will not draw any clear conclusions of the impact the Internet has on the Public Sphere. It is not necessarily a part of a transformation of the same kind as Habermas describes. Seeing the bourgeoisie Public Sphere as a hegemony established after the introduction of printed press, the transformation Habermas describes is one away from the democratic hegemony. One could see the transformation I am describing here as one not moving away from a democratic hegemony, but a transformation created by an increased influence of smaller Public Spheres in developing toward a new kind of hegemony, or slightly changing the established hegemony.

The introduction of new media distorts the established hegemony, resurfaces other and smaller hegemonies.

There is not only the abductive use of internet that has created a differentiated use on Internet, but also processes that shows probably some of the strongest qualities of Internet, not so much expected as other possible ways of application, but then showing qualities one can expect will prevail with Internet.

Morocco has recently seen the establishment of two strong linguistic nationalisms, both reflecting the linguistic realities in Morocco, where two major oral languages lack official status. And also this linguistic nationalism is related to transnational relations that might change the idea of a nation. How is this related to the most successful uses of Internet in Morocco in the meaning of reaching out to high numbers of followers.

The hegemonic Public Sphere

The function of the public sphere, to mediate between the private interest and the public interest, is essential. The public sphere is not one sphere but many. The street corner, newspapers, national TV, satellite TV, radio, Internet, associations and parliament are all part of what is, under the right conditions, the public sphere. But as noted above, the different medias are interconnected to a degree they would justify a notion as working together as one. I will argue the public sphere is never working in a constant manner, but depending on its content, the debate itself. And that the different institutions are not necessarily equal, but have different functions within the public sphere.

For a public sphere to exist there has to be a space for open and free public debate of all matters of public interest. Essential for this is liberty of speech, assembly, and a free press. For these rights to be protected a juridical system that meditates between different individuals, social groups and the state, as was established after the democratic

revolutions is needed. Thus the case of Moudawana can only be said to be showing a potential for a "bourgeois public sphere" as Habemas depicted it.

However, the process of Moudawana is also much more radical than most commentators have understood. Since the Moudawana is more than a process guided by the king and the government, giving new freedoms to the Moroccan woman, but also a process showing a radical democratic potential. Besides corporations and private interest occupying the state and media, the state also entered the private sphere, nivilating the basic difference between civil society and the state. The role of the civil society in crating public debate, public opinion and consensus in the public sphere, are taken by economical and media elites, that thru bureaucratically and political manipulation creates public opinion and social control. In an ambiguous way the participants in the Moudawana debate had to disassociate themselves with the state and government. In a similar way the struggle against the absolutist state in the eighteenth century created a public sphere based on criticism in journals as the Tatler and the Spectator. Differently the public sphere was exclusively based on the bourgeoisie; the rational discourse based on lack of self interest was only possible when all the participants had a certain degree of common social or class interest (Eagelton 1984). The women's movement is not a basis for a rational disinterested bourgeoisie public sphere, but it might be a "counter-public sphere". As the different ambitious and hegemonic political movements, the nationalist movement and the socialist movement, have failed to represent the general population, and the Islamic movement with the same ambitions today probably will fail as they tend to maintain the same homogenised and essensialised idea of society. The woman's associations, and the Amazights movement have a different approach and also a different role in the public sphere. The reconstellations of the alliances these movements make are good examples of a movement from a traditional bourgeois public sphere to a less general sphere. The birth of these movements is certainly both the nationalist and socialist movements. The leaders of

both the Amazights and the women's movements has started their political activities either in the parties on the left or within student organisations. Social and human sciences are popular among the Amazight youth (especially the south), and the women's movement have as strong basis within the university. The crisis of national legitimacy that hit these sciences in most of Europe and North America also happened in Morocco. As university education was largely democratised during the 60s and 70s, the state legitimating hold of the education lost its strength. Especially since the ability of the state to find jobs and lack of resources to employ them have made "jobless diplomas" a common term in Morocco. When the room for civil society was opened in the mid 90s university educated activists became an important resource, both for the Islamists as well as the women's movement and the Amazights.

Identity politics became the most common form of action for these activists, and different Islamist organizations have been by far the most successful. Especially the educated have changed their political focus from a national identity to a religious identity (Eickelman, 1999)

If the concept of a counter-public sphere is based on a public sphere exactly outside the bourgeoisie and state legitimating institutions, like the university, I'm doubtful this is a precise concept for the process I'm describing. Rather the heterogeneity of the public sphere that makes it difficult to speak of it as if it was one, makes it more accurate to speak of minor public spheres, and polyphony. As relative open debate was never possible in a general public sphere under the totalitarian regime, the only possibilities were the hidden and underground organs, but these never had a tradition for plurality. Following the political liberation of civil society, some tendencies towards greater freedom of speech, and technological changes have opened up a possibility for a extended public sphere, the role of the continuing minor public spheres is still important.

This doubleness of the Public Sphere concept, that it operates as a whole within one legal framework, and that one public sphere contains a polyphony of minor public spheres is noted in a wide rage of theoretical debates. To understand the dynamic between the Public Sphere and the minor public spheres is important, especially when it is evident the new communication technology is a part of a change of this dynamic.

There is of course an essential difference in the ambitions of different actors, both as contributors to the public sphere, and related to this, in nationalisms, as we will see below. Both "counter public spheres", and proto-nationalists have programs for radically changing the state, either by setting up a new state for a nation, or creating new elites within the state. It is exactly this that is generally seen as a collective political ambition. However there are actors that are equally political, equally in opposition to the actual regime, but are more hesitant to impose a new elite on the state. It is interesting to see what this ideology consist of. Is it a more realistic approach to a changing set of rules that the emerging public sphere where new communication technologies takes an essential part? Or is it simply just the need to protection from the regime that has created a less revolutionary tune?

The minor public spheres

Since the concept of counter public spheres is describing a situation where the main element is an opposition to the present public sphere regime, I will refrain to use this concept and rather choose to call all public spheres that is not a common ground for lawmaking and the affaire of the state or local authorities minor public spheres.

The minor public spheres have many functions related to the general Public Sphere. Often civil society organisations are an important part of these minor public spheres. Both Islamist and women's organisations had this advocacy function when they proposed

different kinds of Moudawana. But the minor Public Spheres can also have educational purposes or have ambitions to evolve into the position of a general Public Sphere. Most public spheres of revolutionary movements will have this general Public Sphere ambition. It is probably correct to see proto-general public spheres as developed from the bourgeois public sphere, just as Habermas do with the proletarian public sphere. In the same sense some Islamist movements have been analysed by political scientists as having a truly democratic core. With reference to the democratic core of much enlightenment philosophy this might be true, but an essential point would be how the Islamists movements would regard a more polyphonic public sphere, how they in general deal with plurality. One interesting point here is how proto-general public spheres without the gravity of a central juridical- bureaucratic system and the state monopoly of violence are able to keep its public sphere together.

The problem both a general and a proto-general public sphere meet is disintegration and fragmentation. On a more general level computerised fragmentation of information is dissolving the meta-narratives (Lyotard 1984) necessary for a general public sphere. Or more specifically Internet is dissolving the territory of the state (Virilo 2000). Habermas has also questioned whether growing systems and networks with a greater set of contact will lead to an expanding public consciousness based in the life world or publics that are more or less closed off from one another (Habermas 1998).

It seems like the virtual umma is loosing its ability to perform as a general public sphere, while most Islamic organisations have the ambitions to create such a general public sphere. The Moroccan nation(s) still have by several means strong enough glue to frame a general public sphere; law enforcement, forces of violence, common languages, and national symbols, while religious publicity seems to be more fragile, and the need for glue more urgent. This might be in general a bigger problem for proto-general public spheres, than more established powers. Counter publicity will in some aspects have greater

difficulties than the established discourses. The publicity gained by the women's associations was through their ability to create alliances with other minor public spheres than through a counter alternative. Both concepts like alternative public spheres and counter public spheres will not create the analytical difference I want to make here, concepts that can grasp the radical different strategy towards the dominant public sphere, and strategies that deals with fragmentation in a totally different manner. What I call a proto-general public sphere will be a more stabile public sphere where the essential is its opposition to the dominant regime, the classical bourgeoisie public sphere, and the proletarian public sphere were both examples of proto-general public spheres. Counter-public spheres stresses its opposition to the dominant public sphere but does not necessarily have any general ambitions, environmentalism and feminism is thus good examples of movements that have counter-public spheres.

There is a tendency to place fragmentation solely on the dominant public sphere, and give too rapid conclusions based on a presumption of a great extent of unification of the so called counter-public spheres. I believe the fragmentation is more urgent for some kind of counter-public spheres, than the dominant public spheres. Even questions that have an enormous outreach on the Internet might be to a very little degree a counter-public sphere. This of course does not say something of the capacity of violence some civil society groups have, but is essential for how they can perform politics.

The last aspect of the "Structural transformation of the public sphere" is the role Habermas gives the changing media to explain the transformation. In order with "the Frankfurter school", and "civilization ou barbarie" in France, he claimed media had changed from mediating rational debate in the public sphere to create a spectacle and a culture industry limiting the rational debate. For the bourgeois public sphere to reappear, the media has to change into a transmitter of critical debate again.

Nationalism and liberal democracy evolved in the time of the industrial printed press, and this is not coincidal. By making common language standards and centres of debate possible the modern nation rose (Anderson 2003). The transformation was created within the realm of new medias like the radio and the TV, drawing enormous resources and creating a stronger centralized state. This techno deterministic point of view is maybe wrong, but these institutions evolved together. The essential here is how the telecommunication evolves together with the other public sphere-institutions.

As noted above Habermas does not clearly distinguish between the function between different medias of the public sphere. What is transmitted in the different medias are not the same, to give a sufficient description of a potential public sphere, this have to be investigated closer. More than just being a media for rational argumentation, and consensus, or after the damnation, spectacle and manipulation, media is also a part of social organization, and knowledge systems. Habermas makes it clear the public sphere is fundamental for democracy, but Habermas does not discuss it as a part of media.

Two very important functionalist approaches to nationalism might enlighten us on this aspect of the public sphere. So let's for a moment move media from the left side of the equation sign to the right side, and nationalism to the left side, and investigate the function of nationalism.

Internet adapting to the old street

As mentioned above the old media of the street flips into Internet. The Internet facilitates circulation of photocopies, videos or sound recordings. Before the revolution in Iran audiotapes of speeches were spread, Muslim organization uses this method today. These files are normally too large for downloading at cyber cafés, but production of CDs and

distribution of speeches found on Islamic web-sites are taken hand of by brothers all over the world.

The cyber cafés are most commonly used for chatting. Scanning the history of webbrowsers at cyber cafés showed that the chat service of the French chat forum and free mail provider, "Caramail" was by far the most popular site. And speaking with people clearly showed how an important part chatting was of their Internet use. Being at a cyber caf was often simply called chatting. To mainly keep in touch with friends and family that had left the country was the main reason for chatting and use of cyber cafés. Most of my friends had friends from school, former neighbours or relatives abroad. The ability of staying in touch with morocco is also important for the people in Diaspora, with chatting people are normally keeping contact with more people that they would if they were only dependent on the phone. This aspect of the chatting is probably more of a difference for the Diaspora to strengthen their roots than it is for the one who still lives in Morocco.

«It's important to [my brother] to be updated on all the gossip you know. Of course he gets most of it when he's the phone with my mother, but there are some rumours that has passed her by as well, so then I fill in, my sister fill in some, and then his best friend from school keeps him updated, and then he has friends in Nimes that tells him even more. So actually it is the other way around it is he that keeps me updated on all the gossip".

"I always feel I can tell him more than I can to anybody else, maybe that's why he knows so much".

The relationship between migrants and stayers have for decades been important for Moroccans. Migrants and second generation have tended to marry within the network in Morocco. Also are remittance transfers a very important aspect of the Moroccan economy and is one of the most important export sectors for Morocco.

An importan goal with the chat is often to find a cyber date in Europe or North America and get a possibility to leave. There is a current joke about Moroccans with a fat, old or ugly spouse from a western country found on the Internet. And many confirmed finding a way to leave is an important reason for chatting.

"I'm chatting with a Canadian girl, I try to get an invitation to go to Canada. […] I think Canada is the ultimate dream, they speak French and people there are nice".

Internet is also a popular tool for participate in the green card lottery. But there is often too much traffic on the green card lottery site to get thru. As I sent in the formula to the lottery once I asked my friend, married with three kids why he wanted to leave.

«Of course I want to leave, everybody want to leave».

«Yes but everybody have their own reason».

«You know well that Morocco is a country where you'll have no opportunities, I want to go to the USA to have the possibility to make a good life for me and my kids. And I am sick and tired of being a laugh for everybody. When I go home to my village, they ask what have become of you. You went to the university for so many years, and now you are nothing. Nobody here appreciates what I can and what I learned. So I want to go and then I can show to my neighbours in the village, then I can stop their mouths».

A often cited survey taken by «le Journal» in 1998 shows 72 % of the Moroccan population wants to emigrate, and 89 % of the 21- 29 age group wants to leave. An other survey shows 20 % of the population are intending to leave (Fadloullah et al. 2000) Casablanca which is the big city that sweeps up most of the people that are leaving the countryside rarely gives much possibilities, and would probably show even higher numbers. There is a growing tendency toward increasing numbers of middle-income leavers, while the people in the poorest regions are staying. But since family reunion and marriage is the most likely way of getting a way out of Morocco, traditional emigration pattern is to a large degree reproducing itself. As for my friend with a university education

from Casablanca, is a typical example: The young man who leaves the countryside to go to schools in Casablanca. Business schools and technical courses are also a popular education in Casablanca because most such schools are to be found there, while the other big cities in Morocco also have universities. Whatever education he has chosen he ends up unemployed and marginalised. Very few see Casablanca as their future, or have any feeling for Casablanca, it is actually for many a way to leave. Women are following the survey even more intended to leaving than men. But most of the rural immigrants to the cities are men, later marrying a woman from the place of origin.

Language changes

Classical Arabic is the official language in Morocco and French is still an important business language, French is also common on TV and several newspapers are written in French. Neither classical Arabic nor French is the mother language to Moroccans (nobody have classical Arabic as mother language), the Arab population speaks Moroccan- Arabic, a language very different from classical Arabic or Modern Standard Arabic and a large part of the Moroccan population has Tamazight-languages as mother tongue. The common spoken language in Casablanca is Moroccan-Arabic. For basically political and politicalised religious reasons are Moroccon-Arabic not seen as a language, but as a dialect. Its users call Moroccan-Arabic Darija, Darija meaning dialect. Very few have dared to confront the lack of recognition of the half of Moroccans that have Moroccan Arabic as their mother language.

Since there have not existed an official system of writing on Moroccan Arabic the few texts that have existed in Moroccan-Arabic, in Magazines, booklets and of course letters. But the variation these texts have shown pointed to the fact that there existed no fixed writing system. Linguistic researchers have written Moroccan dialects in phonetic

letters, but this is not a possible way of common writing. Both the Latin and Arabic alphabet have been used depending on which alphabet the users are most used to. Most examples of writing in Moroccan Arabic until recently have been with Arabic alphabet.

Even though there exists no such thing as a official or common Moroccan -Arabic writing system, Moroccans have communicated with no problem with the use of SMS and chatting on the Internet.

«In the beginning it was very hard to understand the chatting language. You learned to understand your friends rather good, but sometimes I had try really hard to understand the meaning», one chatting veteran told me. «Today it is much easier. We have learned a common way to write in Arabic with Latin letters».

The generation that started to school later than 1981 know to a lesser degree French since all education after 1981 is in Arabic. For most of them sending SMS in French is not an option.

A driving force for learning to use the Latin alphabet was the popularity of SMS.

«Brigt look at this» Karim showed me a SMS message he received. «Look at this message I got from a girl, I don't understand what is written in it, this Arabic spelling is foreign to me. Sometimes this happens I get messages very difficult to interpret. I don't know the number, but it is a girl, or a pun». Khaled had not had a mobile phone for a very long time and had never been to the cyber cafés at that time. The message was one of a mixture of latin letters and the numbers 3 and 6.

What had never been achieved with a printed press, and the centralised official language, was actually to a large extent achieved with chatting. In all Arabic languages this use of Latin letters for chatting or SMS-messages are common. But there are slight differences in the symbols chosen for this transliteration. In Moroccan Arabic «3» and «9» is commonly used symbols for sounds that does not exist in the Latin alphabet.

At the moment there is no linguistic studies of the emergence of a more consistent Moroccan Arabic writing system, and the degree of consistency among it's users. Observations made by my informants suggest it has been established standardisation sufficient for easy communication.

Popular culture has been, and is still an important part of Darija culture. Classical Arabic has high status and can be found in high culture, Darija that has much lower status is limited to popular culture.

Brahim: "We have our own rap now you know, and what a language, there is no limits to what they say in these rap texts. They rap of our own reality".

Me "How do you get it?"

Brahim: "In the shop"

Me: "The copy shop?"

Brahim "Yes, they down loads the mp3s, and I go there and ask if they can make me a CD, you can get it there".

In darb ghalif, and in some down town shops they have several PCs connected to the Internet constantly down loading music for demand, or double copies when they copy CDs on demand. In this way they have an enormous catalogue where you can get a large varieties of music copied to a CD. Chatting and search on some specialized sites give information on who has produced a new song, or remix. Few have the possibilities to actually down load it in the cyber cafes, but the CD copying shops will have the means (here I will presume there have been changes after all cyber cafés have got a lot faster Internet connections).

In these shops you can get the complete production of Egyptian classics like Oum Khatoum, Mohammed Abdel Whaheb and Abdel halim Hafez (Which you of course can get a copy of in similar shops in most European cities as well), my own favourites, popular

Moroccan music from the seventies, like nass el-ghiwane or lemchaheb, which is sometimes difficult to get other places on CD, and a growing numbers of Moroccan artists.

Nass el-ghiwane is important in the history of local popular culture. Like the rappeus of to day they were part of a global phenomenon. As Brahim called them "The Rolling Stones of Morocco", this is actually not an invention of Brahim but something the American Producer Martin Scorcese came up with (Abbadi 2005). Partly this has some truth to it, partly it is quite misinformative. Their music was rough and rhythmical, and grew out of a global movement hailing the locally unique. The mixture of music and emancipatory politics still has a strong position in Morocco, Bob Marley has, as in many postcolonial countries, a special position, but also much of both the hippie and folk movements have a strong standing still today.

Nass el-Ghiwane wrote in Darija played with purely Moroccan instruments, and had tests which told the truth about Moroccan society. Many a social phenomenon has been explained to me by the use of Nass el-Ghiwane lyrics. To many Nass el-Ghiwane gave a conceptual basis for talking about and analysing ones own society.

When Brahim talked about one own rap, he was more willing to underline the continuity, than the discontinuity. In these rap texts, which could just as well be made by a French resident of Moroccan origin than a rappeur living in Morocco, somebody was again using Darija to speak provocatively, but essentially truthfully. And even Brahim that was a great admirer of this rap culture, acknowledged what most people would held against the rappeurs that they are not even close of reaching the level sophistication Nass el-Ghiwane had, neither musically nor lyrical (as if somebody ever has).

One other difference seems to be ideological. While Nass el-Ghiwane was driven by this local purism, and a strong towards their rural roots, the rappeurs (as well as a mixture of other often electronic based music) is helped by a more constant and transnational flow

of music-bits and bytes to develop their local musical production, the purist ideology does not seem to be necessary for the rise of Darija in popular music.

The flow goes between European suburbs especially the French banlieus, and the Moroccan suburbs, so naturally in this process the musicians of to-day that happens to be in Hay Mohammedi, the Casablancian suburb where Nass el-Ghiwane started to play, is not searching for their roots in the Moroccan countryside, it is maybe the rappeurs of the French banlieus that are searching for their roots in Hay Mohammedi. Nass el-Ghiwane has long ago stopped searching for its roots, they have themselves become roots. One could easily argue the main difference is the position of nostalgia, and that the centre periphery axe has moved from rural/urban Morocco, to urban Morocco/urban Europe, as the main migration have changed from within Morocco to from Morocco to Europe. However I believe this music does not reflect such a centre-periphery relationship, but reflects a similar kind of cultural domination that exists both within France and Morocco, and that urban Morocco in no more receivers of cultural expression, and basis for nostalgic roots, than the other way around.

It is one common answer to the fact that the postcolonial experience is not uniquely connected to the domination of the colonial culture and invented traditions, but also the nationalists' culture and invented traditions when the nationalists took over the colonial apparatus after the independence. Nass el-Ghiwane is certainly a myth, and the main conflict still exists, but this specific colonial and postcolonial experience has expanded from the suburbs of Casablanca to the suburbs of any Maghrebian city and to many European suburbs as well (and of course in some cases to the urban centre, depending on where the working class used to reside). Telecommunication is strengthening the common project of battering a place from where they can speak.

In Maghreb as well as in Europe there are several conservative forces in play. In Europe, and especially in France where the immigrants have been met with the French

universalism, the lack of cultural acknowledge has been severe. But also religious groups puts individuals under pressure by claim to be universal.

Tamazight

The other language issue in Morocco has taken a rather different direction the last years. Also for the advocates for Tamazight, telecommunication has been an important tool, but not with chatting or SMS. My Amazight-informants sends SMS in Moroccan Arabic to other Amazight friends they normally would speak Tamazight. This is, however, changing, Tamazight are more and more frequently used in chat and SMS.

For the Amazights the process of getting acknowledged is very different than the use of Moroccan-Arabic. The Amazights have met some of the same arguments against their language as those who might try to advocate Moroccan-Arabic have, that it is rioting the authority of the language of the Koran, and that they as Muslim should speak Arabic. However, repression of Amazight cultural rights is more difficult to accept, and more obvious than the repression of the other half of the Moroccan population, so this repression has met active resistance.

The Amazights have strong civil society groups working for standardising the dialects to one written system, to develop media, learning and the general cultural situation for the Amazights. In 2002 after, after the Amazights in Algeria had had many big manifestations, the Moroccan government were afraid the situation could spread to Morocco and in the throne speech Mohammed VI finally acknowledged Tamazight as a language in Morocco. And now program for education in Tamazight is in the starting process.

One of my informants active in one of the Amazight association working for the cultural rights for the Amazights, was not a web-user, he would sometimes use me to help

him get information on Amazight issues from the web. For these associations the web is a very useful tool. First Amazights scattered all over the world are involved in the project of strengthening Amazight rights. A part of this work is to establish Tamazight as a written language. Activists in Canada, France, Netherlands or Denmark are involved in work to be able to create a standardised written system for the very different Tamazight-dialects in Magreb. In organizing and keeping track of all this work the web was in active use. And especially before 2002 when the associations worked under worse condition than they do today.

From what I experienced in the association the Amazight movement was also very interested in what work different indigenous people had done. Here global information on what they saw as an equal fight, were valuable.

The way Amazight associations used the Internet, is very much similar with the way women's associations do: To organize both locally and globally, and to get special interest information. Interestingly it existed also some extent of cooperation between the Amazight associations and the women's associations.

While Casablanca is the centre for this urban transnational culture, where Darija is developing, Casablanca and other cities is becoming less important for the Amazight movement. Arabic has always been the language for the urban elites, and the state, while Tamazight is totally dominating in some rural, especially mountainous regions. But after the independence the Amazight movements have had their central organisation in the cities. One informant told me how she got central missions for one Amazight association even though she did not reside in Rabat or Casablanca. As she was one of the first who took the Internet in use, had an e-mail address and could speak English within the association. Since the Internet was expensive to use in the mid nineties it was not very often she could go to the cyber cafe, but she could once in a week go to the cyber cafe download the emails to a floppy disk, go home and write answers to the mail on an off-

line computer then go back to the cyber for sending e-mails. This gave her international connections made her to a part of the associations communicating strategy with the possibility to operate quite independently from a less central place than the leadership of the association. This is an excellent example of how a rather limited Internet access still can have great impacts.

Rather than having the central part of the association in the urban or colonial centres for staying in connection with researchers and activists in European and North American universities, these researchers working for the development of a standardised Tamazight can more easily stay in touch with the major regions for Tamazight.

Nationalism and linguistic culture

For Gellner in his first theory of nationalism (Gellner 1965) the rise of nationalism was closely linked to a new linguistic culture in the cities where uprooted countrymen were coming together with different languages in the early modern period. In the urban setting language became the dominant factor of political organization. In this light one can see both the Darija users and the Amazight movements as nationalist movements. However differently from other nationalist movements they are not oppositional or exclusively promoting the urban culture, and they share a lack of quality that for Anderson define nationalism, a community that is inherently limited and sovereign. The Amazight movement is the most traditional. Even though the Amazights is at least half of the population and have a near total domination in large parts of Morocco few have proto-nationalist ambitions, and certainly no Amazight movement have such a policy. In many ways it can be seen as an indigenous people movement. Their biggest problem is to be acknowledged by the urban elite, telecommunication tools have been essential to organize independently from the traditional urban centre, and their major ambitions has been to

create a standardized language, in a well-known nationalist way, to be able to integrate into the state, and being recognised by the urban elite is still an important part of their goal.

The case of Darija is certainly different. The project is not to create a less hybridised, more standardised, more essentially correct language, but rather picking up the language of the street, and to say whether we are in Casablanca or Europe it doesn't matter, our language is a blend of Arabic, Tamazight and European languages, that's our language, and it is a proper language. The use of ones own national language, is just as legitimate in Europe, as it is in Morocco, it is the same battle. The language is not based on which territory it is in use, but where there are most connections in the communication network. Standardisations appear most effectively where the networks are most tightly knit together.

There are more than just groups working for language reform in Morocco, but also groups with political implications. Both give a way toward a new definition of citizenship, and they have both broader political alliances. But it might be doubtful the political integration is sufficient to call the linguistic movements for nationalisms. I believe it is because both movements have as a basic line that there should be a congruency between political and cultural borders, they want to redefine citizenship and participation in the public sphere on the basis of cultural facts. Both have are working toward the recognition of difference, but this is dealt with in totally different ways. The Amazight movement is multiculturalists; they want a centralised juridical recognition of their own group. The Darija network is differently organised and have an other goal, the congruency is different, as I see it they still want a congruency between the cultural and the political, but the political unit is not necessarily the state and not the territory. The name these activities have chosen lately is probably the most exact: "Boulevard".

In the present situation with the available symbols, media and ideologies there is, "Boulevard" has a growing credibility and legitimacy, but is still met with strong resistance from traditionalist religious view that wants to keep the official language closer to the language of the Koran. The Amazight movement on the other hand are still caught with a problematic colonial legacy, as so much of the strategy colonial rule was to liberate the Amazights from Arabic domination, multiculturalism in this way is interpreted as divide and rule. The state without nationalism is also discredited by both French colonialism and eastern Islamic imperialism experienced today, as it is clear that hidden behind these claimed universal powers there is in-fact a very local elites with their limited cultural values. "Boulevard" is the exact opposite: nationalism without the state, and in direct opposition to both these provincial universalisms. At one side they are engaged together with their network in France to point at the immense contribution by Magrebians to the French society without recognition, at the other side Darija is in the forefront in the whole Arabic world in getting recognition as a proper language of it own. When inventing a language tradition it is not its pureness that is underlined, but its hybridity.

One obvious consequence of these nationalisms is that they let death go, it up to others not the nations to deal with death. What is remarkable with nations according to Anderson is that it makes its subjects willing to die for it. By scarifying oneself, the nation might be able to continue to live. Another possibility is that it is not examples of nationalisms, but rather movements who want to change the definition of the existing nation. The main question is thus not sovereignty, but elite construction. I believe it is partly a nationalism and partly an elite discourse, but differently from the "Mezzinian phase of nationalism" (Hobsbawm 1990) not both at the same time. As a nationalism it fails on sovereignty, as an elite discourse it fails to create a general public sphere.

The Moroccan nation was never dependent on a print community or a print language to develop. Rather it was colonial France who educated those who became the

national leaders. Obviously language was not for a very long time important in defining the Moroccan nation. In the early eighties this changed, but extensive arabisation in Arab world, based on the religious language, created obvious democratic problems. When linguistic Moroccaness now are more debated, and have made Morocco in the forefront in the Arabic speaking world this has happened in a distinctively different way than the impact print-language had on European nationalism (described by Anderson 1983). Rather the Internet and the telecommunication technologies are subversive to Death and Babel of Nationalism.

If linguistic nationalism necessitates a linguistic community that is inherently limited and sovereign, then the current linguistic struggle in Morocco is an example of fragmentation of national identities that have lost their hold on people (Bhabha 1990). This should be the logical end to national identity in a linguistic community so much connected to the exchanges of symbols from a shared postcolonial urban reality. The cultural reality of the streets wins over the fictitious national narratives of the national self, intended to create cultural homogeneity (Bhabha 1990).

However since at least in Morocco, a linguistic community was not necessary for creating a national unity, the possibility that such a hybridising linguistic project can exist either independently, or in alliance with a national identity has to be developed further. Seemingly the use of Darija is not in conflict with national identity, or at least there is enough glue in the existing national identity to continue without a total cultural homogeneity.

According to Hobsbawm the only reason for nationalisms to exist is to build nation-states, nations without stats is of no interest or consequence. Nationalism is clearly an ideology that at one point of the global capitalist system suited the capitalist marked. In the last century this ideology has had significantly lesser value as the marked have changed into a more integrated global system (Hobsbawn 1990). Looking at the failure of

postcolonial nationalist programs of political integration of the masses this might make

sense. But still for the local elites nationalist ideologies have created substantial legitimacy

for their place in the postcolonial urban centres, operating as mediators between national

resources and the former colonial marked, with the necessary hold on both knowledge,

technology and resources (Fanon 1963).

Changing nationalisms

This makes us able to take a closer look of what Hobsbawn among others have argued,

that nationalism has lost it's role as frame for political decisions (Hobsbawn 1990). The first

aspect of nationalism is what Gellner has called "modular man", that nationalism has been

a ideology for the industrial society where a common educational system was important to

create culturally similar men, who can easily replace each other in the modern state and

industry (Gellner 1994). In pre-modern and pre-industrialized societies cultural difference

was a lot greater, there were more languages, and a greater varieties of cultural and

political ties. There were a few high cultures with a written language, usually related to

religion. These few high-cultures belonged to a very limited segment of society and

consisted of a little cosmopolitan elite. Industrialisation brought a demand for a skilled

working force that could do the same operations and read the same manuals, thus the

need for a standardised culture must be understood in relation to the creation of nations

(Gellner 1983). The elites converted from a cosmopolitan elite to a bourgeoisie national

elite. The instrumentalist use of nationalism to create an ideology of legitimacy for the

bourgeoisie elites is the second aspect of nationalism, and is what Hobsbawm describes in

«The invention of traditions» (Hobsbawm 1983) and Anderson in "Imagined

communities"(Anderson 1983). The inventedness is clearly different in the two theories,

but the function that I'm most concerned with here is rather similar. Anderson is more

concerned with the function of experiences that can define a inherently limited and sovereign community than whether this is invented experiences or not.

Gellner describes how nationalism has been essential to create cultural similarities, but I believe nationalism has changed it's message in different media (McLuhan definitions). The bourgeoisie Public Sphere were the first inventors of national traditions, but other proto-public Spheres have been able to reinvent traditions to a slightly different nationalism. Especially in Northern Europe social democracies this have had considerable success. As long a new proto-public spheres are able to reinvent national traditions, nationalism will continue to have this function and will continue to thrive, and I believe such a success depends on it's use value. Ultimately the success or failure of nationalism is whether it continues to be important in the daily life of people or not, not it's accurate functions, use value can change.

In an era of global economy, telecommunication and "new wars" i.e. Terrorism, Mary Kaldor argues, nationalism can continue to have use value in spectacular events and to create a violent mass and an exclusive nationalism, as such Hobsbawm might be correct that nationalism is dying, the only thing needed is a potent alternative for political action. This "spectator nationalism" in rather open and free states, and "new nationalism" in more totalitarian states is the leftovers from the traditional national-states. "New nationalism" often co-operates with religious fundamentalism, and has religion as the national defining group (Kaldor 2004). Actually Kaldor sees these "new nationalism" and some religious fundamentalist groups as part of the same phenomenon.

"New nationalism" and fundamentalist religious groups occur when the political integration of mostly young men fails. This happens in diverse postcolonial states, both in the ex colonising and the colonised states, especially among many migrants both to Europe and to urban centres. Then an ideology based on nostalgia and the fulfilment of an uncorrupted pure past is convincing. Kuldor sees war as a fundamental part of this

process. The war is essential for these ideologies to exist, as long as political elites that lack legitimacy exists the group most willing to destroy the corrupt centre is bound to gain support. The most effective violence is therefore "symbolic violence", the most extreme and abnormal murders with the maximum of visibility are "performance acts" that are meant to stage scenarios of conflict (Juergenmayer, 2000 in Kaldor 2004). This is exactly what takes place in Morocco as well, Islamist groups are the only party in town that is seen to have the needed means and will to resist the most corrupt elites, national or global.

Just as nationalist movements in the former Yugoslavia were transnational organisations with network and funding from Diaspora supporters using a broad range of "new media" to reach the streets, the Islamists do the same (Kaldor). I think it is important to note that these groups does not necessarily benefit from these media more than other groups that don't have official support. It is simply their popularity due to the actions of "symbolic violence", and presentations of ideas that gain support, which makes them more present more visited and have a broader reach. But if they are organisations that have ambitions of political powers within a national frame their success in more limited.

Islamic movements are more than these very violent groups. Most have also a much more pragmatic political side, with elements of modern civil society groups. Some are purely violent, like al-Qaida, some are more democratic, but most makes different constellations where both these sides are important for the organisations. As most revolutionary groups with proto-public sphere ambitions, they have both an intelligentsia and black shirts. For the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt this is very apparent. It seems rather clear that new telecommunication technology, especially the Internet changes the equilibrium for such organisations and makes the violent branch more successful than the part of the organisation that wants to create space for political participation.

However in Morocco we don't have the Muslim Brotherhood but Al Adl wal-Ishan. At least Al Adl wal-Ishan is the only Islamist organisation that tries to create a proto-public

sphere. There are several types of Islamist organisations in Morocco. There are Islamist that are violent and allegedly in contact with al -Qaida. What is certain is that Mujahidin veterans formed eastern inspired Islamist organisations in the worst of neighbourhoods and biddonvilles in the biggest cities in Morocco. A popular name for such neighbourhood is Chechen, which illustrates the hold of such groups. In general these salafist or jihadist groups have a limited out-reach, and they have after 16th of May 2003 been under harsh control. On the other side of the spectre of Islamist organisations with little political outreach you will find those who does not confront the existing regime in any way and are based on traditional Moroccan Islam, they are numerous small and local, and vary from a possible basis for more radical Islamist, to government-supported groups to prevent the growth of radical Islamist and independent traditionalist who normally contest more radical Islam . The two biggest interesting Islamist organisations in Morocco, the political party PJD and Al Adl wal-Ishan, differs mainly in their relation to the public sphere and the existing political system. Since PJD have accepted the King and the political system, they have played an important role for Islamist points of view to reach the general public-sphere as the case of Moudawana clearly shows. When something like a public sphere in this case seems to exist, PJD plays a far more important role than al-Adl wal-Ishan that does not participate in the existing political system. But when tendencies toward a general public sphere are non-existent, like the after 16th of May bombings, the table is turned. Thus the question is how telecommunication relates to the project of al-Adl wal-Ishan of creating a proto-public sphere.

An Islamist proto-Public sphere

Al Adl wal-Ihsan, leaded by the charismatic, populists sheihk Abessalem Yassine. He entered the scene in 1974 when he wrote a public letter to king Hassan II, in his very long

letter he asked for many different services from the King. For instance he proposed for the king that they should cooperate to eliminate the content for Islam, and he also said the King should give back all his possessions he had taken from the people. For this he was put in an insane asylum until 1979, when he was let free from the asylum he got inspired by the revolution in Iran an how they got rid of their tyrant there and wanted the same process to happen in Morocco. It was in the early eighties his organization really was set into work.

Al Adl wal-Ishan has the typical features of an organisation that grow its own public sphere. It seeks to create a strong basis in the universities, and has its own canon. After inspiration from Islamist movements like the revolution in Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt al Adl wal-Ishan has a strong hierarchical structure build in the 80s and 90s. The main communication within al Adl wal-Ihsan is face to face, and through social work where the state has failed. The strong limitation on publication, and grave hindrance for printing and distribution, has made printed communication difficult. And broadcasting media has of-course been out of reach. However similarly to their main opponents at the university they developed a structure of distribution of printed materials and audiocassettes as well as an organisational structure. Just like many other popular preachers, sheihk Yassine began to produce audiocassettes that were spread through his informal distribution channels. As the organisation grew on the university campus, the number of follower who were receptive for written and more advanced messages grew too. Already early in the eighties had Yassine published a book of how the social and Islamic revolution of Morocco should be organised, with a bottom-up revolution. This book has been essential for his organisation, and enforced the hierarchical structure with him as the uncontested central source. Since the ambitions of al- Adl wal-Ishan is to renovate the whole Moroccan society after the ideas of sheihk Yassine, they also need their

own public sphere, the obvious goal is to gain control over the state, but their revolution is limited to the Moroccan borders.

The battle within university campus is extremely important to understand this development, seen in relation to changing media. During the long period where there existed no room for open debate in the Moroccan society in general, the university campus held a totally unique position. It was the only space in the Moroccan society where something similar to a free and open debate could take place. In long periods the police and military where kept outside the campus, so here the state did not have the same territorial control as they had outside. This was obviously significant for the development of open spaces for debate at the university. Since publishing was limited and major media was totally out of reach, the physical control of university campus was extremely important. The socialists controlled university campus until the fall of the Soviet-Union, after that the government supported Islamistes started to become more important (Tozy 1999). The university of Fes is a good example of this process. Unlike the other major universities, all faculties are one big unit. The faculties surrounded an open space where there existed a intense activity. The political debates were intense, and the power of the student unions immense. When the cry for a new demonstration or general assemblages rung thru the university, all professors new there was no purpose for continuing the lessons, the students had more important errands.

A first step to break up this vivid space of social and political debate it was decided to build walls splitting up the whole campus, so one could not easily move from one faculty to another. This created more tension as this made it easier for the Islamist student organisation to get a hold of parts of the university. The faculty of medicine, and science faculties were more likely to fall into Islamist control while the humanities and social science faculty was more likely to be under control by the socialist fraction. During the most violent clashes between the hostile sides the police had a pretext to enter the campus

to create safety. This ended the territorial rule of the socialist and confirmed the control by the Islamist.

To create territorial control was essential for al-Adl wal-Ishan to spread its media. The importance for territorial control also created the need for violent confrontations. Al-Adl wal-Ishan has also sought confrontation in other public spaces, like during the summers of 2000 and 2001 when al-Adl wal-Ishan wanted to enter the beaches for their prayers.

The consistency of books and the control of public spaces were fundamental in the project of al-Adl wal-Ishan to educate people so they could be able to participate in their public sphere. Education and the entrance into the social life of ordinary Moroccans has been the main objective for al-Adl wal-Ishan. They have programs for literacy and Islamic education, and they have given basic heath services, and organised youth camps with a broad range of activities. Generally they have entered the social fields where the state has failed most.

As students and university-educated people are the first who took the Internet in use on a broader scale, the strong grip Al-adl whl-Ishan have on this group also reflects on the Internet. It soon became one of the more popular Internet resources for these persons, and by far the most important Moroccan Islamic Internet source. In a situation where circulation of Al-adl wal-Ishan publication was strongly limited, the possibilities to take Internet in use with very few limitations must have seemed as an dream for sheihk Yassine. And certainly Al-adl wah-Ishan have been able to grow quite freely, with the exceptions of a few failed attempts by the regime to close down al-Adl wal-Ishan sites.

For him the Internet has been useful in spreading his word. Where he has the strongest hold of the population is in his condemnation and analyses of the corruption of the state and the Makhzen. This message is effectively transmitted on his website yassine.net, and on several other al-Adl wal-Ishan sites. Now writing open letters to the

present King, with very much the same message as thirty years ago, is effectively done and easy to access for everyone who wants to read it. In this situation house arrest is of little value. The main activity on yassine.net is certainly not letter writing to the King. Developed from Sufi traditions Yassine gives interpretations of dreams, this is an important part of how they gets their messages around. Yassine.net has a great catalogue of written, audio, and video recordings of dreams the supporters of Al Adl wal-Ihsan have. And every Sunday morning Yassine gives real time interpretations to his followers in a audio chat-room with use of paltalk.

Yassine operates within a national frame, his organisation is based on national political and economical questions, his organisation also uses many symbols and traces from traditional North-African low- Islam.

I many ways the process of building up a strong proto-public sphere within a national frame follows many of the basic theories of nationalism, but how has is performed when choice of media has changed? Mary Kaldor certainly has a point, but when it comes to Islamist organisations she does it a bit to simple for herself. The Islamism she depicts is the transnational salafist terror networks, and they don't really have that high numbers of supporters. On the other hand one can justify seeing them as part of the same movements. When al-Adl wal-Ishan won the university battle they certainly took advantage of those Islamist that murdered political enemies (the socialist loosing side did not use this strategy).

Al-Adl wal-Ishan has certainly on a broad basis taken the Internet in use, but in general they have taken it in use as a broadcast medium, maybe as a logical consequence of its organisational structure.

The vitual umma

Even the Internet strategy of al-Adl wah-Ishan in many ways has been a success what is worth noting is that even among students and university educated people their sites did not seem to be the most popular religious sites, but rather the bigger and more important international Islamist sites like Islam-online.com (Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt), and associate sites (I don't have a real statistical prove for this) were more. An other interesting aspect is competing Islamic sites with an educational content: When religious pages that are not based in Morocco were visited, it was often for the sake of finding answers to religious questions, not necessarily of a very radical nature. Religious sites are quite often visited even though religion has a stronger position on the Internet in rest of the Arab world than in Morocco. For the Arab world in general 10 % of the most visited sites are of a religious nature (Hofheinz 2005). The religious questions are still important, and the discussion and the information searched for are very much similar, in Morocco fewer religious sites are among the most popular, however religious questions are popular on discussion forums. Hofheinz notes that in the meeting with different interpretations, and different ways of practising Islam on the Internet, young people tend to develop a more personalized form of religion, "my.Islam" (Hofheinz 2005). This is the same thing that happens in discussing different political events (like 16th of Mai), or cultural heritage. Hofheinz give a positive view of this process. According to him, this is a process of being aware of one own positions as different from others, and thus a way towards acknowledging and respecting others positions. It is a kind of political socialization through choosing sites and participating in online debate. They are learning people have different opinions and values more clearly that a tight social community does, one owns ideas are not self evident, and then teaches the youth on the web to give good reasons for

one owns belief, and learn to accept that one will not be able to convince everybody. There is no doubt this is one of many passages into modernity and self reflectivity (giddens 1991), but it is not necessarily a way towards mutual respect. What is evident is that it is not exactly the same thing that happened on the Internet, as what normally happens in real life. A for political open discussions, the rumours, the total mass of believers have their common ground. On this common ground religious affairs have been settled, thru a debate between different ulemas. These have been different localized debates, but the essential ability to accept other believers as a part of the umma has traditionally been present. If these institutions loose value, or as in the case of political debate, never gets the possibility to develop, because it is moved into spaces of "my-Isalm", my-policy, my-conspiracy, or my-war, the dystopic analysis of the Internet by Virilo is close to being a reality. This is also one of the concerns of Islamic scholars operating on the Internet, pointing on the same dangers in reference to Hofheinz . The well-organized Islamic sites, with their different followers sometimes clash in the discussion forums, and also make it to the newspapers. From autumn 2005 during the winter and spring 2006 a group of Islamists started a well organized campaign against Al Adl Wal Ishan. The main force in this campaign is khorafa.org. According to themselves khorafa.org was made of earlier members of Al Adl wal-Ishan, but it is reasonable to believe there is somebody else standing behind financially as well. Besides yassine.org, khorafa.org is the most advanced Moroccan website, the professionalism of their web strategy, with lots of web-pages supporting the main site, makes the impression of being more than just a few dissidents breaking out and creating a info page. The dreams posted on yassine.net are often quite explicit messages where God and the messenger have chosen sheihk Yassin to take power in Morocco and create a new caliphate. In one dream Mohammed the 6th (called the young one) is seen fleeing the country and leaving all of his positions, Yassine comments this dream saying we can not only sit a wait for the visions come true, we have to act to make it happen. In

other dreams sheihk Yassine is even seen as in the role of the prophet. The people in the close circle around Yassine and his family are often seen as chosen by god. It is these kinds of visions where Yassine is seen in a prophet-like manner, and his affirmation of such visions that have provoked the religious campaign against Yassine (Tel-quel 220, 7th April 2006). Khorafa.org appeals to religious pious sentiment, picking up evidence (most of the cases are found on yassine.net) of how they mis-use Islam and put themselves in a tradition they, and sheihk Yassine do not belong. Yassine is neither a prophet nor a caliph, and the way he wants to be pictured is showing a lack of honour to the most important figures in the history of Islam.

There have been rumoured PJD are standing behind korafa.org, something they denies (tel-Quel). Whoever is standing behind khorafa.org, it is someone who wants to contest the populist, low-Islam tradition Al Adl wal-Ihsan is based on, and they are to a greater extent based in a broader Muslim publicity. Supporters of both khorafa.org and Al Adl wal-Ishan have been active in different discussions and chat room on the Internet. This is a late and rather unusual example where people standing on very different grounds have broadly discussed subject of public interest. The khorafa.org campaign has also reached the traditional media in Morocco. The liberal and independent weekly Tel-Quel, had "Yassine le dernier prophete?" as their main story in April 2006. Their critique of Yassine was mainly based on the information and analysis provided by khorafa.org. The case is undoubtly interesting, this is the first time in Morocco a Internet based debate reaches such proportions, and what is heatedly debated is the virtual life of sheihk Yassine. Like many of the other popular web sites on Islam, Yassine, net gives an alternative to traditional Islamic authority. But differently from most of the other who are preaching a personal and moral message of Islam and not a political one. In this respect Yassine is different; he is preaching a political message of the new caliphate, with himself as caliph. The strong political implication of sheikh Yassines preaching have made his activities on

the Internet a public issue, where the umma (Islamic community) have reacted. Probably are some kinds of political actors beyond the umma supporting khorafa.org, but they are trying to involve the virtual umma. Different interests like political power in Morocco and traditional Islamic organisations calling for proper religious conduct made what was originally a minor public sphere for the al-Adl wal-Ihsan on the Internet a part of the greater Moroccan and Islamic public sphere.

Educational organization

The new Moudawana might be a radical new law in Morocco, but it will not necessarily change the praxis radically. How can a change of law that gave new rights to woman be applied if woman doesn't know what the new law says? Immediately after the law passed, women's association saw the need for educating the, often illiterate, urban and rural women. As a direct mean in this education the Internet cannot play a part. To inform illiterate women by a medium mostly transmitting text is not possible. But again, in the organization of civil society association, telecommunication is important. They use any media available, radio, theatre, pamphlets with pictures; they have campaign busses covering most of Morocco. Reform of the Moudawana has always been an important issue for the women activists,

This increased network of activist cooperating producing information, spreading information, communicating, planning together would not have been possible without the high access to telecommunication technology. Even home computers are rare, cyber cafés exists in towns all over Morocco. And not only did it activate more people, it did also change the message, it gave new reasons for the need for reform. This is a process that started with the work for reform of the Moudawana, and has continued to develop and formalize. One of the main actors on the Moudawana campaign, ADFM started together

with L'Association Marocaine d'Appui la Promotion de la Petite Enterprise (AMAPPE), Association Marocaine de Solidarité et Développement (AMSED), and the Internet consulting company MTDS the web portal tanmia.ma in late 2004. This portal has contact information for thousands of liberal civil society associations, discussions forums of all kind of political concerns for Moroccan civil society and databases of studies and reports of activity. Activities show a high degree of cooperation between the overwhelming abundance of civil society associations in Morocco.

The organizational work involves three forms of telecommunication, e-mail/Internet, fax and cell phones. The Internet is the cheapest, but few have the means for constant access. So Internet is used for bigger messages, spreading the word to many, but not for rapid communication. For this fax is more common, and cell phones for faster reactions

Typically cell phones are used for instant local organization, to make sure no one are prevented from participating, and to help and sort out any kinds of trouble if one meets obstacles form family members and relatives. One can not expect quick responses if one uses e-mail, most activists are not connected every day, it can take days before you get a response

Even though telecommunication has created a space for women participation, in the spaces within the cities the acceptance of women without covered hair, is diminishing. While some see this as a free choice some women do, certainly some women feels this as a narrowing of their liberty to move as they like, dressed as they like. It seems like there has been a homogenisation of the public appearance of the Moroccan woman. In one way this can be seen as the acceptance of women's place in the Public Sphere. Liberal feminists who does not personally like the increased dominance of Islamic signs in the urban space has acknowledged the feminists of the Islamic parties to be present in the public as they wish. On the other hand the PJD has acknowledged the new Moudawana. To an increasing

degree both liberal and Isalimist feminist are working together for better representation in the Moroccan society, with an ever increasing Islamic frame.

The empirical evidence of continuity between groups that have been standing far from each other in Morocco, is a good stance for diversity, and the ability to find lines of flight for marginalized or subaltern groups. The way Moroccan women have been fighting for, and obtained a reasonable success, has been a subject for several studies of both media and post-colonialism. The way islamist, liberal and socialists feminists are cooperating in Morocco for what is common goals has been represented as a modern form of Islam. This is a process which is better described by Deluze and Guataris theory of the rhizome, than Spivaks theory of the subaltern.

This does not necessarily mean that Spivaks critique of Deluze is wrong, but that there might be room for different theories in different situations.

Conclusions by induction, or the experimental results of the abductions

My starting point was that the introduction of Internet has released enormous amounts of abductive energy. Following the epistemology of Peirce abduction is a process that starts with several creative assumptions as a reaction to newness, followed by investigating the logical consequences of these assumptions, called deduction, ending with experimentally testing the abductive theses. Not just in Morocco, but all over the world, as others have noted, there was a quite similar degree of optimism regarding what Internet could do. This was not a part of an irrational belief, but quite the opposite as good a guesswork as it could be. So what I have described is a situation where hegemony has been opened up, and the closing of a new hegemony is taking place. This is not to say that after closure the process will no longer take place, but rather that the process will continue on another level. If these assumptions are correct we are entering a world where the need for ideology critique will be increasing, while the need for network theory, and the rhizome will decrease.

In the first part of the history of the development of the Internet in Morocco, I presented several strategic abductions where some were functioning better than others. Building on the inventions made by individuals in use of the media, and gradually building the picture of an aggregate level, where the choices of many are starting to shape the picture clearer, we are now able to say something about the inductions that have been made.

I made all the abductions in the style of radical discontinuity of established hegemony in Morocco, so I clearly choose the opposition rather than the establishment as heroes in this narrative. Along with the abduction I have introduced some evolutionary possessions of Internet that have become more and more evident, elements that have been added to the media during the time I started this study.

The hierarchical work-place

The young engineers that came back to Morocco with technological expertise after staying in Europe also brought with them a strong idea of equality. An ideology that was especially strong among young engineers in the information technologies in the last years of the ending millennium. If the feeling of technological competence were turning power-relations upside down was popular in Europe, it was no less popular in Morocco. Said can be said to be the archetype hero of this time. However, Morocco was not different than other countries; it soon became evident that the old power was not quite ready to leave the stage. Even though I believe the abductive energy made a real difference, it was not of such a kind that it flattened all existing power structures: No it made several smaller valleys in the mountains of power that is. One of the first abductions that were falsified was the one I called "end of the hierarchic working place". This was not the most dramatic end story of all the abductions, and still it could not prevail. As long as Casanet was rather independent nobody could question the atmosphere of equality that the directors of Casanet insisted on, but it soon became evident who had the money when the TéléM boss visited Casanet, and after that equality was turned against the Casanet directors.

The "feudal economy"

A related abduction was the one I have called "the end of the 'feudal economy'". This one is related in the sense that its success was based on changing from "feudal economy" to "trust economy". Hammoudas journalism was also directed at these questions, an open debate where the best argument should win, is in many ways the foundation for an economic system where competence could be a major factor. And Casanet made a portal

with a pure Internet based journalism, along with creating a basis for several Moroccan newspapers. Both the "end of the 'feudal economy'" and the "brave new journalism" were abductions that did not prevail. Casanet is a story of the failure of both. The trust that is needed for both the economical actors and the participants in an open debate is not supported by the functions of Internet. Casanet was very much an attempt to create an infrastructure for both, the failure of Casanet is not a story of one company that did not make it, but an idea that was impossible. Still (five years after the failure of Casanet) there is no web-journalism in Morocco, several of the newspapers publish some of their articles on their website but there is no debate related to it. Very little of the economic activity has been able to use the internet. All those attempts Casanet made from rubric announces, an international business portal, web hosting and support for companies, to communication systems for companies, has failed. This failure, which is also to be found in general since nobody else has managed to create what Casanet tried, is not explored further in this text, but is of course a theme for many reports on Moroccan economy.

The strategic attempt I followed in more detail was the one related to journalism and the creation of an open debate. In this Casanet failed in many similar ways as they did in the attempt to help the development of a trust economy. The original idea was to create a space of debate. Casanet did this through publishing a choice of responses to the article they wrote. The failure can be seen in that only one journalist managed to create reader reactions, but also in the way people reacted, difference was not accepted.

Civility

Here the failure outside Casanet is maybe not as evident as above, but the lack of web journalism in Morocco and the way my informants is addressing debate on Internet shows the same point quite clearly.

Hofheinz has argued the discussions on Internet forums started with high temperature and the same kind of reply to difference as experienced in Casanet. However he argues Internet forums has created an acceptance of difference, and developed a self reflective my-Islam (Hofheinz). This I have not observed, but the way discussion forums rapidly changed is confirmed. To participate in debates were one disagree with others are practically never happening, rather one stays with ones own kind. Here we also find the success of the Islamist portals among the political websites, and the use of Internet for strictly non-political purposes for majority of the Moroccans. The popularity of Islamist political web-pages is a reflection of the popularity Islamists has, and a popularity developed independently from internet.

The facts behind the 16th of May bombing in Casablanca 2003, was one case where I observed the use of information drawn from the Internet. Here many of my informants were well aware the information they got from the major media was wrong, and Internet was a tool for putting the pieces together. The information they got was even so certain that the kind of street-corner discussions we normally had was made difficult, difference was not more accepted but less.

One common aspect of all these failures of creating a new order with the use of internet was how postcolonial structures functioned in the performance of mistrust. When trust relations and equality dissolved in Casanet, the ambivalent feeling people within the company got to each other, can be analysed along the lines of mimicry. The way Said and Foad appeared to be for equality, was no longer seen as honest. Rather some saw it as an example of playing with popular contemporary emancipatory signs originating from the west, while they were following their own ambitions of climbing into the ranks of the local elite. Perceived from an opposite point of view, when the social rules of the company was set to be working on equal terms, the equality-rule was apparently followed but subverted

by reporting to the central authority, thus forcing the Casanet direction to follow the usual pattern of authority.

Closely related are the sly civility found in the "feudal economy". Not at least in institutions like free press, stock market, or parliament, where the point is that these institutions shall have an immediate object that does not slightly resemble the Moroccan dynamic object. In Morocco, as most other post-colonial states, one acts as if these institutions were a lot closer to what they are in the colonial centre, than they actually are. To create institutions that actually does function for the common benefit and not only a very small segment of society is difficult since there are always a danger of being invaded by actors who wants to continue these practises or out concurred by the subsidized parallel institutions. The media in Morocco is mainly actors of this kind, and this corrupts the popular general view of these institutions.

Centre-periphery distortions

What is at heart of these post-colonial facts is a reproduction of centre-periphery relations: Both the centre-periphery relation between the colonial metropolis and the colonial-centre, and the relation between the colonial centre and periphery. Two of the abductions I presented was that these centre-periphery relations would break, and also a change in space especially for the women. All these abductions have been seen to be fruitful. This is in particular apparent in the example of the discussions around Moudawana. And the two kinds of linguistic nationalism show how the centre-periphery relations have changed.

The Moudawana (family law) was reviewed in a process that started in 1999 and ended in 2004 with a new law. What is unique with this process is the debate that was allowed since the King did not interfere before 2003. This resulted in a debate which was

totally unique to Morocco. Internet did not play an important role as a forum of debate, the traditional media played a much more important role as forums. Especially newspapers were important in this process, but also street-corners and cafés was as always important forums for debate. The most important role of the Internet is in creating new spaces and to change the positions of the marginalized, this is especially important within the women's movements. The most important women rights advocates were to be found in the Casablanca and Rabat, the colonial centres. As university educated, often professors at the humanities of social science faculties, they were moving between international fora, working with international rights, and the Moroccan periphery educating local representatives in human- and women's rights. When they worked with the process of reforming Moudawana, they managed to get the support of the new government in1999 to launch a revision. This proposition of reform was met with much resistance from the Islamisits parties, and their press. Most active in the traditional media was the only legal Islamist party PJD. With no doubt the reactions from PJD were supported by the broad popular sentiments of the people. The Islamists had most success in their campaign against the proposition pointing out that it was a form of neo-colonialism, meant to destroy the Moroccan family. While the women activist pointed the same finger at the Islamists, arguing they where importing totally foreign ideas of Islam from the eastern Arab countries.

After the big manifestations in Rabat and Casablanca 2000 where the Islamists totally outnumbered the women activists, and the sentiments generally was not in favour of the reform proposition, and the government was not united in their support of the reform either, it seemed like a lost battle for the women activists.

This was not the case: the women activists were able to take several institutional possibilities where the Internet was only one, to their own advantage. One fundamental aspect the raising number of civil society organisations, that were being set into action, as

the state had failed in providing any kind of social services was the space for civil society that was opened in the mid nineties. Civil society is of course a concept that hides an extremely heterogeneous sort of social activities, but these activities play an important role in the formation of a Public Sphere. The development of these civil societies were also a result of many young university educated unemployed persons, the system of free education had created, finding their way back to their place of origin. In this situation the Internet became an important catalyst for these young persons finding their role in civil society.

The effective participation of the periphery

In the late development of the Moudawana process, the three abductions of breaking the colonial centre-periphery relations, the local centre-periphery relations, and a change of space for public appearances, were effectively tested. The traditional code of division of space, has been a restriction to the appearances of women in the public, and this has restricted the participation of women in all kinds of public relations, except for those who for several different reasons were able to transgress this division line, and in Morocco they were in fact numerous. The telecommunication technologies have created a space for those who were not able confront the male ruling gaze in the streets.

For those university educated at the periphery the only way of avoiding marginality was to either succeed in the local centre or in the colonial metropolis. The women associations were good examples of exactly this: the women rights activists placed in the colonial centre were representatives for the marginalized in the periphery. There is no doubt the Internet created a way of bypassing the elites in the urban centres, and communicate directly to both other parts of Morocco or the metropolis, and more often than the urban elites, also with other parts of the world. While the urban elite had French

as their language of communication, students of a variety of language skills and an e-mail account could easily be a communication node, even if they were not placed in Casablanca or Rabat, creating both international and national connection. From the Amazight movement I have examples of participants who would not otherwise have had the opportunity to go to international conferences who were now sent, because they had been a node for the association.

Internet makes two kinds of participants participate that would not have participated otherwise, those in the geographical margin, and those who would not otherwise have transgressed the line of separation. Even though this is not activity on the internet that ranks high in traffic density, it got real consequences when the women associations took the critique of neo-colonialism from the Islamists seriously. The narratives of the cosmopolitan urban elites of international law, was now in greater degree directed towards narratives that suited the Amazight movement: The relative liberty of women as a cultural pride; problems that were closer to the reality of the rural women; and the urban immigrant women. The university educated women placed in the geographical margins played an important role in the development of these narratives, and in making alliances between the women association and the Amazight movement.

That these narratives were affecting my male friends in Casablanca that had immigrated from the rural south, was quite obvious. Those who had opposed the reform were now, if not supporting it, accepting many of the legitimate demands in it. When the King decided to reform the Moudawana, he could do so without being accused of being led astray by evil jewish and occidental advisors. After the decision to reform the Moudawana, the Islamist party PJD, which has sworn alliance to the King, has now also said they are supporting new Moudawana. And there are even some examples of feminists in the different political camps cooperating for greater participation of women.

The examples of linguistic nationalism are more related to the different centre-periphery relations, and also an effect of both Internet and cell phones to establish written versions of oral languages. The Amazights are using a worldwide network of Amazights linguistics, and linguistics sympathetic to the Amazight cause, for developing Amazingt standard and to connect Amazights to the Moroccan nation as as a natural part of it. The equally neglected Moroccan Arabic, Darija, is also being strengthened as some unofficial written standardisation has appeared due to the popularity of chatting. Darija is a language that is used in the transnational network of Moroccans around the globe. Darija is adopted to global popular culture, and a tradition of expressing the local realities, often marginal Moroccans in urban and suburban settings. These groups are building on ideas of cultural nationalism, but a political commitment that is more local and transnational, than related to the state. Darija as it is developed in these settings is strengthened not by purifying language along national terms, but rather acknowledging linguistic hybridity: Darija has an Arab, Amazight and French heritage.

Semiosis: putting the pieces together

Modelling around Peirce semiosis, the function of Internet is analysed with respect to the way post-colonial symbols are used in public discourse and how it is effecting upon what might, after the Moudawana debate, be called an emerging Public Sphere. As the examples of the discussions after the 16th of May bombing and the Moudawana discussions shows, the Internet does not have a constant function. It is the representamen part of a functional sign creation with different objects and interpretants. As a space for open debate the post colonial *symbols* are not determining interpretants of trust and openness, but a perfect representamen for conspiracy theories and paranoid thought, but as a representamen for

182

the minor Public Sphere of different Civil Society associations it is undermining the post-colonial centre-periphery structure.

Is this semiosis a process where Interent has a transforming function of the Public Sphere, or is it on a wider scale regenerating one? And also can Internet have a transformative or subversive function on nationalisms? According to Habermas the role of the Public Sphere is to mediate between the private and public interest. If generalizing from the examples of the Moudawana debate, and the debate following the 16th of May bombing, Internet has two radically different functions within the Public Sphere at the present time of semiosis. It is malfunctioning with respect to mediate between private and public interest. It is on the contrary a tool for sectarian forces. A proper understanding of the Public Sphere is not one of neither parallel nor competing media, but a configuration of different media. When newspapers are functioning as a space for open debate, Internet has a supportive function of what I have called the minor Public Spheres, the Public Sphere of civil society associations. The internet was in the case of Moudawana functioning as a mediator of cooperation's within, and between different civil society organisations. Thus the functions of Internet have not been to create an open and rational debate where consensus is obtained, but consensus by creating alliances.

If the Internet has been successfully used for political organization avoiding the national and colonial centre, can it be used for maintaining the nation? The fact that the very structure that supports the failure of the attempts to make an infrastructure for open debate, economic decentralisation and more equality, is being undermined, is indicating that even this failure does not have to be final. Morocco has two examples of highly interesting linguistic nationalisms. The Amazight movement and the Darija-activists have both been strengthened by SMS-messages and chat as it is the basis for communicating with family and friend in Diaspora. The Amazight movement is a traditional linguistic nationalist association working for a purified standardisation of Tamazight. The Amazight

movement is also working for a better political integration of the Amazights in the Moroccan nation. It has played an active role as a part of a network of civil society associations participating in political reform like the Moudawana. The Darija-activists are certainly of a different kind, they are following the Moroccan postcolonial writer Khatibi in not choosing purity, the orient more than occident, and a fixed identity. Since the language has been strengthened in a truly transnational process, nomadism is just as strong as the state. Creating a foundation for a democratic Public Sphere where the willingness to true speak is a slogan, with a goal of creating a match between the cultural stuff and political participation, it is a true product of cultural nationalism. It is on the other hand, also since it is a transnationalism, not what most have perceived as nationalism. Are they willing to defend a territory or actually die for the nation, it is not an answer to the need of cultural homogenisation and standardisation. And that is what can be the paradox. The Darija-movement is at the same time in need of the traditional nation-state structures, and at the same time undermining the very same structure.

This paradox is the core of this semiosis, the question is essentially what can a nation be. Following the development of the Darija movement will be valuable for finding out what can be the more stabile function of Internet in postcolonial nations, and probably the frame of political participation in general.

Experimental method

Studying process, and strategies over a long period, can be said to be experimental. When newness is studied, such as introduction of new technology, experimentation is to a high degree a social fact. However the social facts surfaced by experiment are what is of interest. The functions of Internet in Morocco is more than what I have shown here, I have

shown but a few of the strategies that has been used. I have merely documented some of the experiments of the function of Internet that has been made in Morocco.

Describing process is very different from describing the actual mass of use of internet. I believe counting the most popular sites, is basically a way of counting the most popular ideas. Rather I have chosen to show some of the ways people use the Internet strategically when still much of the Internet's potential functions are unknown. However popular use, in a broader sense, not so much regarding the content, is of course, a major indicator of when Internet is functioning comparatively well. A great advantage when studying experimental praxis is a certain time span, or historical data. Even though I was in the field for two and a half years, and followed up with a visit one and a half year after I finished my major part of the field work, I also had good use of narratives of the close history of the field. Some of the failures of the strategic choices made by some of the actors was actually beginning to show at the time I entered the field. So this work has been an attempt to reconstruct the abductive thinking.

Abductions and experiment gives good data regarding how things are working in the society not at least when the inductions shows failure and malfunctions. Malfunctions is more often that not just something functioning comparatively worse than something else and thus is discontinued. The tragic element of how some ambitions are bound to fall, gives good data of what is functioning in a society. The way the people who made Casanet a success, later failed to live up to their ambitions ended up being the most informative on Moroccan society.

Semeiotic of high and low precision

Semeiotic is both a strictly logical approach to anything that can be studied as sign, and a more general approach of discourses. Semeiotic can be hinting at both a logical and

statistical approach that can be applied to both analysis of process and structure, and hermeneutical data. However I have been using semeiotic with low precision, in a process of what I call high abductive energy, I believe high precision would be very unlikely. Semiosis as I have used it here is not a model ready for application when studying constellations of media and Public Sphere. What I have been doing could more likely be called hermeneutics put in a semeiotic frame. This gives however a reasonable frame that could be used in comparing the use of the same tool, or media, as different technologies, the same tool in different ethnographic localities.

Bibliograhpy

Abbadi, Imad 2005. *Nass el -Ghiwane.*
   http://www.public.iastate.edu/~abimad/nasselghiwane.html

Abu-Lughod, Janet L. 1980. *Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco.*
   Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

André, Adam. 1968. *Histoire de Casablanca, des origines à 1914.* Publications des
   annales de la faculté des lettres, Aix en Provence.

Barthes, Roland. 1972. *Mythologies.* New York: Hill and Wang.

Bhabha, Homi K. 1994. *The Location of Culture.* London: Routledge.

Bhabha, Homi K. 1990. "Introduction". In Homi Bhabha, ed., *Nation and Narration.*
   London: Routledge.

Buruma, Ian and Avishai Margalit. 2004. *Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies.*
   New. York: The Penguin Press

Buskens, Leon. 2003. 'Recent Debates On Family Law Reform In Morocco: Islamic

 Law As Politics In An Emerging Public Sphere'. In Islamic Law and Society. Volume.

 10. Number 1.

Cohen, Jean-Louis and Monique Eleb. 1998. *Casablanca: Mythes et Figures d'une Aventure*

 Urbaine. Paris: Hazan.

Dawkins, Richard. 2003. *A Devil's Chaplain: Selected essays by Richard Dawkins.*

 London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. 1987. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*.

 Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press.

Doorly, Mayra. 1985. "A Woman`s Place: Dolores Hayden on the 'grand domestic

 revolution'". pp. 219-223. In Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, ed. *The Social*

 Shaping of Technology . Milton Keynes Pensylvania: Open University Press.

Eagleton, Terry. 1984. *The Function of Criticism: From the Spectator to Post-structuralism*.

 London: Verso.

Eickelman, Dale F. and Anderson, Jon W., eds. 1999. *New Media in the Muslim World.*

 The Emerging Public Sphere. Bloomington, Ind. : Indiana University Press

Fadloullah, Abdellatif; Abdallah Berrada and Mohamed Khachani. 2000. *Facteurs*

 d'Attraction et de Répulsion des flux Migratoires Internationaux. Rapport National: Le

 Maroc. Rabat: Commission Européenne

Fanon, Frantz. 1963. *The Wretched of the Earth.* New York: Grove Press.

Feenberg, Andrew. 1992. "Subversive rationalization: Technology, power and democracy".
In *Inquiry*. vol. 35, no. 3/4.

Feyerabend, Paul. 1975. *Against method: Outline of an anarchistic theory of knowledge.*
London : NLB.

Forsdick, Charles and David Murphy. 2003. "Introduction: The case for francophone
postcolonial studies". In Charles Forsdick and David Murphy, eds., *Francophone
Postcolonial Studies: A   Critical Introduction.* London: Arnold.

Foucault, Michel. 1972. *Power/Knowledge.* New York: Random House.

Gellner, Ernest, 1965 Thought and change. Chicago : University of Chicago Press

Gellner, Ernest. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Gellner, Ernest. 1994. *Conditions of liberty : civil society and its rivals.*
London: Hamish Hamilton

Ghazalla, Iman. 2001. "Sculpting the Rock of Women's Rights: The Role of Women's
Organizations In Promoting the National Plan of Action to Integrate Women in
Development in Morocco". In *WPP Case Studies.* Humphrey Institute of Public
Affairs. University of Minnesota.

Gingrich, Andre. 2004. "Conseptualizing identities: Anthropological alternatives to

    essentialising difference and moralizing about othering". In Gerd Baumann and

    Andre Gingrich, eds., *Grammars of Identity/Alterity: A Structural Approach.*

    New York: Berghahn Books.

Godelier, Maurice. 1978. "Infrastructure, societies and history". In *Current Anthropology.*

    vol. 19, pp. 763–77.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1989. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a*

    Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge : Polity.

Habermas, Jürgen . 1998. *Between Facts and Norms.* Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

Hammoudi, Abdellah. 1997. *Master and Disciple: The Cultural Foundations of Moroccan*

    Authoritarianism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hannoum, Abdelmajid. 2003. *Colonial Histories, Post-Colonial Memories: The Legend of the*

    Kahina, a North African Heroine. Portsmouth: Heinemann.

Hobsbawm, E.J. 1990. *Nations and nationalism since 1780 : programme, myth, reality.*

    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press

Hobsbawm, E.J. 1983. *The Invention of tradition* ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger.

    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

Hofheinz, Albrecht (2005). "*T*he Internet in the Arab World: Playground for Political

    Liberalization*"*, in *Internationale Politk und Gesellschaft. No. 3*

    http://www.fes.de/ipg/inhalt_e/b03_05_2e.htm

Johansson, Ingvar. 2004. "Functions, Function Concepts, and Scales".

    In *The Monist* 86. pp. 96-115.

Kaldor, Mary. 2004. "Nationalism and Globalisation", in *Nations and Nationalism* 10 (1-2),

    161–177.

Khatibi, Abdelkebir. 1983. *Maghreb pluriel.* Paris: Denoël.

Kuhn, Thomas S. 1962. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.* Chicago: Chicago University

    Press.

Laroui, Abdallah. 1977. *L'ideologie Arabe Contemporaine: Essai Critique*. Paris: Maspero.

Laroui, Abdallah. 1977b. *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay*. Princeton, NJ:

    Princeton University Press.

Laroui, Abdallah. 1977c. *Les Origines Sociales et Culturelles du Nationalisme Marocain.* Paris:

    Maspero.

Latour, Brun and Steve Woolgar.1979c. Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of

    Scientific Facts. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

Leveau, Remy. 1976. *Le Fellah Marocain Defenseur de Trone*. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.

Lien, Marianne. 1997. *Marketing and Modernity*. Oxford: Berg.

Lyotard, Jean-François. 1984. *The postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Lyotard, Jean-François. 1988. *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*.

Marcus, George E. 1999. "Introduction to the volume: The Paraniod Style Now". In George E. Marcus, ed. Paranoia Within Reason: A Casebook on Conspiracy as Explanation,

Maroc Hebdo International 559, du 23 au 29 Mai 2003

Maroc Hebdo Internatinal 560, du 29 Mai au 6 June 2003

Maroc Hebdo Intenational 605, du 14 au 20 Mai 2004

McLuhan, Marshall. 1962. The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man London: Routledge & Kegan.

McLuhan, Marshall. 1964. *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man.* New York: New American Library.

Mernissi, Fatima. 2001. *Is the Internet Setting Free the Simorgh? Cyber-Islam as a fabulous mirror*. http://www.mernissi.net/books/articles/simorgh.html

Mernissi, Fatima. 2003. Synergie Civique Research Project. http//mernissi.net/civil_society/synergie_civique/syn_civ.html

Mernissi, Fatima. 2004a. Les Sindbads Marocains Voyage dans le Maroc Civique. Rabat: Editions Marsam

Mernissi, Fatima. 2004b. The Satellite, the Prince, and Scheherazade: The Rise of Women as Communicators in Digital Islam. *TBS journal* 12. Spring-Summer 2004.

Miller, Daniel and Don Slater. 2000. *The Internet: An Ethnographic Approach.* Oxford New York: Berg.

Ossman, Susa. 1994c. *Picturing Casablanca: Portraits of Power in a Modern City*. Berkeley: California University Press.

Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1909. "A letter to William James". In Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel. eds. 1998. *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings. vol. 2*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1907. "'Pragmatism". In Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel, eds. 1998. *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings. vol. 2*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1905. "'What pragmatism is". In Nathan Houser and Christian

    Kloesel, eds. 1998. *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings. vol. 2.*

        Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1901 "On the logic of drawing history from ancient documents

    especially from testimonies". In Arthur W. Burks, ed. 1958. *Collected Papers. Vol. 7.*

    Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1903. "'A syllabus of certain topics oflLogic". In Nathan Houser

    and Christian Kloesel, eds. 1998. *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings.*

    vol. 2. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1903b. "Sixth lecture of pragmatism". In Charles Hartshorne and

    Paul   Weiss, eds. 1960. *Collected Papers. vol. 5.*

    Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1880. "One, Two, Three". In Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss,

    eds.1960. *Collected Papers vol. 1.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1878. 'How to make our ideas clear". In *Writings of Charles S.*

    Peirce: A Chronological Edition. vol. 3. 1986. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1877. "Deduction, Induction, Hypothesis". In Charles Hartshorne

    and Paul Weiss, eds. 1960. *Collected Papers. vol. 2.*

    Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press.

Pipes, Daniel. 1996. *The Hidden Hand, Middle East Fears of Conspiracy.*

    New York: St. Martin's Press

Rabinow, Paul. 1989. *French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment* Chicago:

    University of Chicago Press.

Said, Edward W. 1978. *Orientalism*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Saussure, Ferdinand de. 1974. *Course in General Linguistics.* London: Owen.

Spivak, Gayatri C. 1996. *The Spivak Reader,* In Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean, eds.

    New York, London: Routledge.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1993. *Outside in The Teaching Machine.*

    New York: Routledge.

Spivak, Gayatri C. 1988. "Can the subaltern speak?". In C. Nelson and L. Grossberg, eds.

    Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. London: Macmillan

Stewart, Kathleen. 1999. "Conspiracy Theory's Worlds". In Paranoia Within Reason: A

    Casebook on Conspiracy as Explanation, ed. Theorizing the histories of colonialism

    and nationalism in the Arab Maghrib - Beyond Colonialism and Nationalism in

    North   Africa. Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ), Spring, 1998 by Edmund

Burke, III.

Sørhaug, Tian. 1996. *Fornuftens Fantasier: Antropologiske Essays om Moderne Livsformer*.

Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Tel-Quel 220, 7th April 2006

Tozy, Mohammed. 1999. *Monarchie et Islam politique au Maroc*. Paris: Presses de la
Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.

Virilio, Paul. 2000. *The information bomb*. London : Verso

Wheeler, James, Yuko Aoyama and Barney Warf. 2000. *Cities in the Telecommunications Age*.
London: Routledge.

Woolgar, Steve. 2002. "Five rules of virtuality". In Steve Woolgar, ed., *Virtual Society?*
Technology, Cyberbole, Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.