TO FLY A PLANE WHILE BUILDING IT

NGO's Role in the Development of REDD+ in Tanzania

by Heidi Resset

Thesis of Masters Degree by the Department of Social Anthropology

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

June 2012

TO FLY A PLANE WHILE BUILDING IT

NGO's Role in the Development of REDD+ in Tanzania

By Heidi Resset

Thesis of Masters Degree by the Department of Social Anthropology

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

June 2012

2012

To Fly A Plane While Building It – NGO's Role in the Development of REDD+ in Tanzania

By Heidi Resset

IV

Abstract

In 2009, Norway started funding "REDD+ readiness" in Tanzania, which includes nine pilot projects, with a maximum amount of 100 million NOK yearly for 5 years. These pilots are all implemented by different nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Before they move to a full-scale implementation, the countries are going through this so-called REDD+ readiness process where consultation is received, policies are designed, and mechanisms are being tested and evaluated (Angelsen et al., 2009, p. 3). Based on my fieldwork where I spent time with a NGO, and stayed in two of their pilot villages, this thesis aims to give an insight into processes that are going on at project level under an unfinished framework of the REDD+ forest regime. It concentrates on REDD+ as a discourse in the making, and on levels and locations of agency and accountability in the process. Here I perceive the events that are driving the discourse into being as what Anna Tsing (Tsing, 2005) terms frictions related to the project, where agencies are unfolded. Similarly, I also consider some situations where I propose that the necessary frictions are not taking place to detect accountability in the process of project implementation. My analysis here recognizes two reasons for this; one is that the discourse in the making also draws on similar discourses that already have a strong presence in Tanzania, like those of conservation and development. The second reason is the respect for what is stipulated in contracts and agreements as opposed to what is not. It is represented by two forms of the project – one in the form of the Design, another in the form of Real action. Annelise Riles (2000) made this distinction in her analysis of NGO work in Fiji, and I draw several parallels to her work on the aesthetics of information, form and facts throughout the thesis. I look into aspects of how information sharing is happening through documents in the NGO, and how the mechanisms of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) can have significance for the project in Tanzania. By doing all this I present ways that the project is in process, and argues that ambitions through designs can show that elaboration and implementation of the project at the same time is possible, but suggest that the reality of the project can be perceived differently by the people in the areas where it is implemented.

Abbreviations

AWG LCA	Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention
CBFM	Community Based Forest Management
CBNRM	Community Based Natural Resource Management
CFM	Community Forest Management
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CCIAM	Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and Mitigation
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
EMPAFORM	Strengthening and Empowering Civil Society for Participatory Forest Management in East Africa
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FPIC	Free, Prior and Informed Consent
GO	Governmental Organization
ICDP	Integrated Conservation and Development Projects
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
JFM	Joint Forest Management
LGA	Local Government Authorities
MDG	The international Millennium Development Goals
MJUMITA	Shirikisho la Mitandao ya Jamii ya Usimamizi wa Misitu Tanzania (Federation of Community Forest Conservation Network in Tanzania)
NFP	National Forest Programme
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NICFI	Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NSGRP	National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
PES	Payment for Environmental Services
PFM	Participatory Forest Management
REDD/+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation in developing countries. (+ includes the role of conservation, sustainable

management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. This is today the correct use of the abbreviation, but I also use the older version (REDD) at some occasions where the discussion refers to a time before the recognition of REDD+)

SAP	Structural-Adjustment Program
SUA	Sokoine University of Agriculture
TFCG	Tanzania Forest Conservation Group
TNRF	Tanzania Natural Resource Forum
TRA	Tanzania Revenue Authority
UMB	Norwegian University of Life Sciences
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UN-REDD	The United Nations Collaborative initiative on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation in developing countries
VEO	Village Executive Officer
VNRC	Village Natural Resource Committee

Acknowledgements

My fieldwork and thesis are results of an initiative started at the Institute of Social Anthropology at the University of Oslo, by my supervisor Signe L. Howell. Howell encouraged students to go to areas where the REDD+ forest-project in question is being implemented. Tanzania sounded appealing as a site for doing anthropological fieldwork, and I was excited to join the initiative. It has been a bigger challenge than I imagined, partly because I had limited knowledge of the region at that time, as it was the first time I had been to Africa. Ultimately, it has been extremely rewarding in so many ways. Before giving thanks I will start by acknowledging a few quotes from wise men and women:

"Gratitude is merely the secret hope of further favors"

- Francois de La Rochefoucauld (1613 – 1680)

"La reconnaissance est la memoire du coeur"

- Jean Baptiste Massieu (1743 – 1818)

"We often take for granted the very things that most deserve our gratitude"

- Cynthia Ozick (1928 –)

Regardless of the era and locality, the value of gratitude is a matter of definition, as are many other things, which is also part of the point that has emerged in the work of this thesis. What I personally fear the most is to do as the last quotation suggests. Therefore I want to emphasize my gratitude to everybody that has supported me throughout the compilation of my thesis. First and foremost I want to thank my Tanzanian friends and co-operators, and it should be in Swahili: Wakazi wa Lunenzi na Ibingu – asanteni sana kwa ukarimu wenu, Mungu awabariki; Alice Mujuni – pole sana dada kwani tulikuwa pamoja na tulipanda milima mingi! Asante kwa kampani na ulinisaidia sana kijijini; Georgina Misama – asante mpendwa kwa msaada wako, ulifanya kazi nzuri sana kule kijijini. Nakushukuru kwa namna ya kipekee David Loserian kwa maeleza na majibu ya maswali yangu

VIII

x

Contents

Overview and Methodology

"Welcome to the 'Breakfast Debate', today we will talk about a rather scary topic called REDD …" These were the words of the facilitator of the weekly debate at the British Counsel in Dar es Salaam that introduced the meeting with those words in early February 2011. Describing what has been by interested parties seen as a newly established international forest regime, REDD,[1] as a scary topic at the time reflected the uncertainties surrounding it. What was primarily at stake in international and national discussions regarding the program were the undeveloped mechanisms of payments to local communities for their work in enhancing the forest cover, the lacking methods for monitoring and verifying the carbon sequestration as an indicator for the payments, and the risks of corruption, land grabbing and potentially undefined tenure-rights. An abstract from a Christmas-letter to TNRF[2]-members two months earlier expressed a similarly worried undertone among the nongovernmental actors of natural resource management issues in Tanzania:

> As to the REDD projects … we will try our best to continue implementing them in close collaboration with all those involved. We need to join hands and be stronger during that period. We need to be heard more through evidence building. We need to see how we can engage better with the government and the private sector. We have a lot of challenges ahead of us and we have to be prepared. One of the challenges is related to cost benefit sharing and tenure which we need to take it seriously next year. This is not only for the REDD projects but for the TFWG as a whole. This can have a negative impact on both REDD and PFM processes which have been going on in the country for years.[3]

The uncertainties related to the project made me curious about how they were expressed and whether they were expressed, and if not – why not? If yes – why? What kind of expectations and perceptions rested with different stakeholders regarding the project? What kind of narratives emerged, and how was the REDD+ discourse formed into what? Having raised these questions, it further led to look at how the project was planning to be implemented, or piloted, as a form of working on the design of it to suit the Tanzanian context of related issues like development work,

---

[1] I occasionally use REDD instead of REDD+ either in referring to what people have said, or when referring to the discourse that took place before the + was added.

[2] Tanzania Natural Resource Forum (TNRF) is a NGO that is concentrating on advocacy- and capacity building within the nongovernmental natural resource management sector in Tanzania.

[3] Abstract from letter: "End of year remarks" circulated to the subscribers of TFWG mailing list, and written by Cassian Sianga, Senior Forest Program Officer of Tanzania Natural Resource Forum.

forest conservation and Participant Forest Management. I noted to which degree agency and accountability was present in different acts. I also had a look into how information was distributed, developed, and argued, in documents and how some of it was disseminated to the villages. During my fieldwork I was not aware of the significance that the highly legitimizing strategy of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) was supposed to have for this project, and this was something I became interested in during the stage of writing. I will explain more about this strategy in chapter 5.

One can say that REDD+ has emerged from the faith in trade as a more sustainable way of development cooperation than funding. It is hoped to be a new solution to present problems within development thinking. This is a brilliant idea, and at the international level it still continues to be. The importance of REDD+ events have on several occasions been expressed by stakeholders, for example when they use a considerable time during their speeches to say that this is the first time in history that we are arranging a meeting of this size to discuss [the component of REDD+] at the international level. This is an example on how creations of an aesthetical side of the project is taking place among stakeholders, as they start feeling that they are part of something very big and important since it is the first time in history that the events are taking place. My thesis is aiming to unfold some ideas on the aesthetics of working on this "new", large project, which contains a lot of money, and where several project proponents can have a lot to say on "lessons learnt"[4] from the project.

Background: What is REDD+?[5]

REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) is believed, by many actors in the field of environment- and development policy and research issues at international level, to be the best possible solution to cope with today's climate changes and environmental threats to the world. It is based on the idea that it is possible to increase carbon sequestration by more sustainable management of the world's tropical forests while companies in developed countries can pay the communities that are preserving those forests through a REDD carbon market . The REDD+ implementation plan has been based on ideas about land tenure reforms, forest

---

[4] "Lessons learnt" is an expression that is frequently used within aid-business and development-work, and it has also been mentioned a lot in relation to the REDD+ piloting.

[5] The Carbon Positive web-pages explain REDD as: "An initiative to cut greenhouse gas emissions associated with forest clearing by the inclusion of 'avoided deforestation' in carbon market mechanisms. More simply, payment in return for the active preservation of existing forests." REDD+ is further described as: "The extra consideration in reducing greenhouse emissions beyond deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) being given to sustainable forest management and afforestation/reforestation in developing countries" (CarbonPositive, 2010).

management planning, reduced impact logging, expansions of forest reserves, wildfire prevention, forest law enforcement, and Payments for Environmental Services (PES) amongst other things.

In 2009, Norway started funding "REDD+ readiness" in Tanzania, which includes nine pilot projects, with a maximum contribution of 100 million NOK yearly over a 5 year period. These pilots are all implemented by different nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Before they transition into a full-scale implementation, the countries are going through a so-called REDD+ readiness process where consultations are received, policies are designed, and mechanisms are being tested and evaluated (Angelsen et al., 2009, p. 3) The intention has been that the Government is meant to be responsible in having the ownership of the process, and emphasis has been put upon the single country's extended opportunities to impose on the design of the projects through preparations of national frameworks and strategies (Angelsen et al., 2009, Tømte, 2011). In parallel with this, a 5-years CCIAM Programme is also introduced as a cooperating initiative between four Tanzanian research institutions and UMB, which aim is to provide research on relevant issues on climate change challenges in Tanzania. Related to this, the word *design* is important. The processes going on at almost every level are about designing. The design must fit into an already well-known pattern, and making initiatives link in a way that will promote a smooth national adaption of the project. More of this will be elaborated on in chapter 4.

In its initial stages, REDD+ was not really perceived by national stakeholders – like governmental staff, professors and NGO-staff – as a more unique chance than other developmental projects by the leaders themselves, but rather as ordinary funding with external obligations attached to it. I will come back to this in chapter 2. The cause of this perception might have something to do with all the uncertainties and lack of information attached to the project at this stage. Nongovernmental stakeholders have first and foremost been the ones requiring answers to uncertainties surrounding the international standards, and this is something I will revisit in chapter 5 as it relates to the accountability and agency of NGO-actors.

Natural Resource Management in Tanzania

A brief Historical Excerpt

In the 20 years, between 1990 and 2010, Tanzania lost 19,4% of its forest cover, equal to 8 067 000 hectares (Butler, 1999-2012). The most likely causes of forest degradation are the expansion of agriculture, pasture, wildfires, unsustainable use of the forest, illegal harvesting, firewood- and

charcoal-production and illegal mining. 90% of Tanzania's consumption of wood goes for charcoal and wood fuel (URT-MEM, 2012), the first goes mainly for towns.

In Tanzania, as in many other African countries, the right to land has been perceived as something so essential for existence that to be denied the access to it has been equated to being denied the right to live (Barume, 2011, p. 55). By 2009, a quarter of Tanzania's land had been put under so-called fortress conservation, a term that "… expresses the conservation strategy that sets aside protected areas such as national parks or game reserves and restricts local people from living, hunting or herding there." (Townsend, 2009, p. 93) The Land Ordinance of 1923 said:

> WHEREAS it is expedient that the existing customary rights of the natives of the Tanganyika Territory to use and enjoy the land of the Territory and the natural fruits thereof in sufficient quantity to enable them to provide for the sustenance of themselves their families and their posterity should be assured protected and preserved; …
>
> BE IT THEREFORE ENACTED by the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Tanganyika Territory as follows:
>
> …
>
> 2. The whole of the lands of the Territory, whether occupied or unoccupied, on the date of the commencement of this Ordinance are hereby declared to be public lands.
>
> (Governor Byatt, 1923)

The first formal land law in the former Tanganyika[6] was introduced in 1928, and involved regulation of tenure for authorities and white people, whereas other people had the tenure regulated under the old law of customary rights adjudicated by local authorities. State forest management in Tanzania started under the German colonial rule as a way of securing control over access to natural resources. This implied symbolic control and revenues to the state. It happened at the expense of traditional property-ownership systems of customary rights to resources, and caused several conflicts between peasants and the state. The problem was solved, by combining peasant resistance and labor shortage with licensed forest cultivation. As a result, the people living in rural areas have mainly had an understanding that they have access to forest and woodlands as basic rights, even during colonial times. However, due to Tanzania's National Forest Programme (NFP) of 2001 they are now perceived as the main cause of deforestation, who need to be reigned in through stricter

---

[6] Tanganyika was the name of the Tanzanian mainland from the time before the union with Zanzibar on 26th April 1964.

controls (Sunseri, 2005). In the 1980's there was a paradigm shift in the perceptions towards peasants' residences, which became seen as a threat to biodiversity, and people were forced to migrate as a result. Beginning in the 1990's the international blueprint of community forest management emerged in Tanzania as an alternative to fortress conservation. It has been criticized for its injustice in terms of dispossessing people of their traditional ways and livelihood. (Loiske, 1995, Neumann, 1998, Sunseri, 2005, Townsend, 2009) In the following part there will be more about the history of these projects in Africa that fall under the category of Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM).

Conservation-NGOs, like the one I have been allowed to follow in different settings throughout my fieldwork, have come to have a major influence on the policies on forest and biodiversity that have flourished in Tanzania the last two decades, something that resulted from the National Forest Programme. Thaddeus Sunseri (2005) describes this as hegemony of biological preservationists, donors and NGOs that have been growing since 1989.

The expanded formalizations of land and natural resources are in conflict with the traditional Tanzanian way of relating to the land and "the natural fruits" that are referred to in the Land Ordinance. However, the long history of forest conservation and the well-established presence of conservation NGOs in Tanzania have increasingly changed the way of thinking about the natural resources. In the villages where I stayed people had heard about the importance of conservation through radios. "I am happy to stay nearby the forest," the much respected Babu Jema from Lunenzi village told me. As he was rolling his tobacco, he raised his eyebrows and pointed with his chin towards the forested mountain-ridge right in front of us from where we were standing. "It makes the soil fertile because it gives us the rain. I remember one time somebody from another village started to clear, up there in the forest, I went over with two other men and we convinced him to go somewhere else." They had tried to conserve the forest themselves, as several villagers had told me, but without a respected law-system there were still people clearing in areas where there were village-rules that said they should not. The village rules were also vague, and few people knew for instance where the boarders of where they could cultivate were.

In cities, I found that various people were quite focused on the issue of climate change. It was like an established truth to them – I would say much more than to the average Norwegian. "It gets hotter every year in Dar," said the cook at my guesthouse. Her next sentence was followed by two confirming nods by her friend, a taxi-driver who sometimes stopped by; "It's because of the global warming". I did not hear anybody say that they did not believe in the climate change threats, and people believed that they had seen or experienced the effects. One of my informants, Makaa, was

5

quite negative to forest conservation because he saw that farmers did not get the promised benefits. At the same time, he was absolutely sure that he had *seen* climate change in the forms of floods and droughts. The reason for the establishment of this truth can be a mixture of the high emphasis of it in the national debate, similar to how Agrawal (2002) describes the making of environmental subjects and "environmentality" by changing through politics the way people think about the environment in India. This happens in Tanzania by producing extensive information[7] about it through radio, and in relation to occasions of uncontrollable environmental events like unsteady rainfall and floods.

On Participatory Forest Management

Participatory Forest Management (PFM) was first piloted in Tanzania in the early 1990's and as it coincided with reviews of the national land policies at the time, the PFM mechanisms have received a strong legal foundation of support, and has been distributed through GOs and NGOs all over the country (Blomley and Ramadhani, 2005, Malimbwi and Zahabu, 2008). PFM can be described as a system on how to engage people living near forest-areas to participate in the "planning, management, use and conservation of forest resources through the development of individual and community rights" (URT, 2002, Sect II, 3(b)). It became part of the Forest Act enacted by the Parliament in 2002, and has been implemented through the work of several NGOs before and after.

There are several terms worldwide that can be used on these kinds of forest management initiatives that roughly signify the same phenomenon of "local participation" and "benefit sharing". (Neumann, 1998). For example is Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) another term, which is not only about the forest, but all natural resources. There seems to be small differences between those terms, and that the differences lie in the way that they are translated by different organizations and in different countries. CBNRM is based on the principles:

> … that local populations have a greater interest in the sustainable use of resources than does the state or distant corporate managers, that local communities are more cognizant of the intricacies of local ecological processes and practices, and that communities are more able to effectively manage those resources through local or traditional forms of access. (Brosius et al., 2005)

---

[7] I have heard about several media-organizations focusing only on environmental issues in their communication. Those that I know the names of are "The Journalists Environmental Association of Tanzania" (JET), registered in 1991, and Environment Media Network (EMNet), established in 2008. The NGOs that I followed during my fieldwork cooperated with the latter.

The common term used in governmental documents and by implementing organizations in Tanzania is PFM, which has been emphasized and included within the Forest Act (URT, 2002).

A keystone of success is realized when the forest and its environs are enhanced as a result of these projects. While the village forest managers have made great efforts to take care of the forests, the vast majority of the people living in those rural areas have unfortunately been shut down from receiving any incentives as a result of quitting their former activities. The MJUMITA Executive Director expressed in an interview in Southern Voices: "… they have actually been protecting the forest for nothing, as volunteers", instead of receiving the 40 % income from the sale of forest products, which is the aim (SouthernVoices, 2011). In the end of chapter 2, I will describe how technical advisors in the piloting organizations where I did my fieldwork explain how this relates to their organizations objective for implementing REDD+. These were the cooperating organizations Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (TFCG) and the Federation of Community Forest Conservation Network in Tanzania (MJUMITA[8]),

There are two versions of PFM that differ in terms of ownership. Joint Forest Management (JFM) and Community Based Forest Management (CBFM) are both implemented under REDD+ piloting, but TFCG / MJUMITA excluded the first version although their Project Proposal opened up for implementation of both versions. The explanation provided by Technical Advisor and other staff in TFCG is that; as JFM works as a joint agreement between the local or central Government and the villages in reserves, where the Government is the owner of the area and the people managing the forests are from the surrounding villages, under REDD+ there could be a high risk that the governments would get all the revenues, and the managers nothing. CBFM, on the other hand, is perceived as a highly viable option under REDD+, since the forests in questions are normally located on village-land, and hence the management of the forest and the revenues from it is not owned by anybody else but the villagers. In the part about land tenure in chapter 3 I will later come back to some surprises that the NGOs got regarding this after the site-selection for REDD+.

More specifically, I learned TFCG's basic steps of CBFM while I was staying in one of the villages where they did another project: One was to locate the area of the forest, and then a Natural Resource Committee was to be selected. Third was to make a synopsis of all the species that can be found in the forest before making a plan on how to conserve the forest, and bi-laws were to be made in relation to this. After some time they would test whether the forest management is working. In addition to CBFM, they would start up income-generating activities depending on what the villages

---

[8] MJUMITA is an abbreviation of the Swahili name of the organization: Shirikisho la Mitandao ya Jamii ya Usimamizi wa Misitu Tanzania.

would want, for instance beekeeping or butterfly farming. After some time they learned that what the villages needed, were improved mechanisms for doing agriculture. Therefore, they have hired an agriculture-expert.

Research Questions and Positioning

To what degree can anthropological research contribute in these early stages of REDD+ implementation? I want to refer to a working paper developed as part of the multi-country project Poverty and sustainable development impacts of REDD architecture led by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) and the University of Life Sciences at Ås (UMB) where it is stated that:

> … it can evidently be argued that there is dearth of empirical evidence on REDD, and as such, available theoretical support cannot be generalized for REDD policy prescription and strategies for a specific country or local communities. Many developing countries and their local communities differ in many aspects, such as … institutional capacities; REDD options to be offered and their associated costs and benefits; and the ways in which REDD mechanisms will be designed and implemented.
>
> (Mwakalobo et al., 2011, p. 1)

This is true for the REDD+ Programme overall, and part of what is interesting with the anthropological fieldworks done on REDD+ is therefore to see details of how differently they are designed and implemented from one country to another, and especially from one continent to another. If one for instance compares REDD+ in an African setting against a Latin-American setting one would find quite considerable differences because of both socio-historical and environmental variations. In Latin-American countries the term indigenous is a politically charged term that is frequently related to situations where a group of people get unfair treatment. Larson and Aminzade (Angelsen et al., 2009) are explaining how political actors in Bolivia and Peru have used the term indigenous as part of mobilization for electoral contests. In an African setting a lot of people do not relate to being either indigenous or not indigenous, and in many places they are not always as active in claiming their rights as groups that are treated badly. Therefore, one could assume that a new project like REDD+ would meet more debate, and also resistance, among the target populations in Latin-American countries than in the African countries. Ingunn Bardalen

(2011) described in her thesis how indigenous groups in Bolivia have strongly resisted REDD+, in reluctance of doing what they understood as having to sell their oxygen.

Something we should be vigilant of is to which degree international agreements on a forest regime can be able to take local contexts and specificity into consideration. In this thesis I have also been concerned about to which degree the projects that have been implemented at the local level also become mutually dependent on the processes at the international level. An anthropological account must be a reminder to the REDD+ dealers at the international level of the actual actions and procedures where the project is taking place in a specific context in order to see what high level decisions leads to on the ground.

To get a picture of institutional capacities in Tanzania is important for understanding how "mechanisms" are "designed" in this context, and why they are designed this way. I argue that this links to the questions; why is the project perceived as "nothing new" to Tanzania, and why is it still so warmly welcomed? I believe it can be necessary to have a look at social interactions. A new world of sociological thinking opened up to me sometime during spring 2011 as we went through Bruno Latour's Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (2005) in a course I attended. The book is still a mystery to me in terms of applicability, but that is also what it is meant to be. It is challenging deeply rooted ideas about "society" and "the social", devices that we do not really grab the content of. He promotes a "sociology of associations", where "connection between things that are not themselves social" (Latour, 2005, p. 5) should be traced. It has inspired me in the work of this thesis – mostly in the way he is making a distinction between intermediaries and mediators as the means to produce the social. The first one transports force or meaning without transformation, which is the less preferred one for what he terms the sociologists of associations, the actor-network-theorists, or the ANTs. In most cases these are the black-boxes, that are assumed to have the same output as input, and hence they produce nothing of what all too easily have been categorized as "network", "power" or other social aggregations. The mediators are on the other hand plural, or endless. Output is hardly the same as input. He points out that it is necessary to discover what entities are behaving as intermediaries and what are mediators, to figure out what are the uncertainties in social interaction. It is important to recognize that also non-humans are included here, and that these can also have agency. Instead of making black-box-theories of for instance "power" or "network" as single social aggregates, we have to trace all the causalities for these aggregates, and usually it has to be done by identifying the mediators, their inputs and outputs. It is, the way I see it, a perpetual project.

It is however possible to use some of Latour's ideas, even though it might be rational to strive for incompleteness. Anna Tsing has made a similar account in her book *Friction* (2005), in where I believe that the different forms of frictions presented are equal to the mediators that Latour describes. One good example is where she describes the different processes in the commodity-chain of coal, where bargaining and strategies meet in different cultural economies in relation to the same commodity. To understand why the miners are not profiting, she examines how time-consuming the bargaining is in every step of the commodity-chain (Tsing, 2005, pp. 51-54). Tsing points out that encounters can be both compromising and empowering:

> Speaking of friction is a reminder of the importance of interaction in defining movement, cultural form, and agency. Friction is not just about slowing things down. Friction is required to keep global power in motion. It shows us [...] where the rubber meets the road. [...] Roads create pathways that make motion easier and more efficient, but in doing so they limit where we go. The ease of travel they facilitate is also a structure of confinement. Friction inflects historical trajectories, enabling, excluding, and particularizing. (Tsing, 2005, p. 6)

There might be several causes of friction, depending on what information is reaching stakeholders, and their interests and agency. Tsing explains how incidents of friction can be a good way of moving forward in processes that are involving several parts. A relevant account related to REDD+, could be that the expression of standpoints and views on the progress of projects creates a positive environment for different ways to reach agreement without necessarily possessing exactly the same opinions about the issue. Friction is not always positive in the way that it can also mean complete disagreement, but these disagreements can evoke new processes that can evolve into something else, which might be good or bad. She thinks it is important to stop and see what really is going on during these events called friction, to understand what leads to what, and why.

In this thesis I have tried to do something similar to Tsing. What *I* am following is the discourse on REDD+ in Tanzania. I will expand on incidents of friction in the REDD+ processes at national and NGO level throughout the next chapter as a way of explaining the dynamics in how the project is being shaped in time and space. I do not have, however, the same scope as Tsing. She has made an ethnographical account of global connections, looking at relatively old local events of friction to describe what is happening in the global present. I have been concerned with what is instrumental in forming the discourse on REDD+ in Tanzania as we speak. Although I do partly go back in local and national history to underscore my points, I use my recent empirical examples to describe why and how the project is progressing in Tanzania. I also use them to see to which degree discursive elements at the international level has a dominate role that influences decision making, or if agency

is also located elsewhere, and which role the project designed by TFCG / MJUMITA play within REDD+ as a discourse in the making. I ask what are the perceptions and expectations of the project among different stakeholders and institutions, and, furthermore, how can this explain the design of the project versus the acting of the project at different stages in the process? In relation to this I look into what way Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), as a mechanism of supplementing REDD+ to ensure the interests and rights of directly affected groups of people, is realized within the project.

I use an actor-oriented approach to follow some events where the discourse on REDD+ is produced, and where friction erupts. There is nevertheless not only mediators to be considered here, I propose that it is also important to consider what appear as intermediaries. The actor-oriented sociology is concentrating on holistic descriptions of encounters between actors and their perceptions and life-worlds (Long, 2001). I have done this mainly by considering certain relevant aspects with what can roughly be termed here as the "world of the villagers" and the "world of the NGO-staff" while describing their internal and external interaction. As a result of my impulses from Latour, I have chosen to give little attention to the black-box of "power", something that is central in the actor-oriented sociology (Kontinen, 2004). What I rather find as a useful expression, is that of agency. Agency is approved by all of them – Latour, Tsing and Long. I find the content of the word "power" too difficult to decide in whether it should be treated as something that the holder of power is conscious or unconscious of. My assumption has been that the latter provides a more fair meaning to the term, but then I have had difficulties understanding the purpose of using it. Again, I think Latour gives the reasonable solution to this in the way he wants to trace the cause of "power" as a social aggregate, which means, again the way I see it, that there is a need to make quite overwhelming accounts. In this thesis I found it more reasonable to see whether agency, as the ability to influence, can be discovered in concrete actions. The way Tsing explores agency is by asking; "what kinds of individuals or groups can make change?" (Tsing, 2005, p. 214) In relation to this euphemization is also considered (Scott, 1985).

Methodology

Fieldwork

TFCG was established in 1985 and with adequate experience within Participant Forest Management (PFM) implementation, was the first organization to receive an approval to go through with REDD+-funding projects in Tanzania. Their Project Proposal is called *Making REDD and the carbon market work for communities and forest conservation in Tanzania*. The main cooperating

organization is MJUMITA – a so-called local community network-organization for those communities that have their forests organized under PFM. I was allowed to follow the initial processes of their project, and spent three months with the NGO in Dar es Salaam and at many different field-sites where I followed their project activities. This was followed up by another three months in two of the villages that they have been chosen for REDD+ implementation. Besides this I have been participating in five workshops and one conference about the project in Dar es Salaam, and the launch at district- and village level during this first stay in Tanzania. I got to follow the site-selection process, which was of particular interest. In February 2011 I went back to Tanzania for two weeks and visited the organization and the villages again. The last observations of the REDD+ processes in Tanzania were done during my six months stay in Dar es Salaam in the autumn of 2011 while I had an internship at the Royal Norwegian Embassy. I did not do any further fieldwork during this last period, but the more holistic picture I got of the project in this period has affected the result of this thesis.

My data is based on interviews and stories from people working in the two NGOs and one ex-employee in one of them, as well as stories from people living in the two sub-villages, and a survey I did of 30 households in both of them. This last method was more a way to get to know and communicate with people, and I have not used all the results from the survey, as I found the outcomes less reliable. I found it very difficult to make people open up and tell my translator and me their stories if I asked them straight out about things, but if I started the conversation with the survey it happened sometimes that they gave additional information that was quite interesting. The data is also based on participant observations, meaning my own experiences of events that took place during my presence, where information and opinions were shared and decisions were made. To some extent I have also used a method similar to that of Tsing, by observing traces of events, which had already taken place. This could be information that I got through conversations with people, but also through official documents I read, such as reports and news-articles. I strived to follow the project in the settings where it was enacted to different times, in Dar es Salaam, on fieldtrips, to the villages or in the district centre of Kilosa. As time went by and there were fewer official activities going on in the project that I could participate in before the selection of villages, I went to one of TFCGs project-sites where implementation of land use planning was going on, and learned about their methodologies of implementation. After the villages were selected, I chose to stay in one of them. I chose the villages for practical reasons, because they were bordering another village where I had a few contacts , and where they had phone-signals, a dispensary and a small guesthouse with a generator. This village did not become a site for piloting REDD+ itself because it did not have enough forest of the kind that the project proponents had evaluated as beneficial for

REDD+. My plan was to stay in only one sub-village, but during my first day there I learned that the dense forest was mainly located inside the other village, and that people from the first village still kept farms up there in the second village. I thought it would be interesting to get to know the people in both of them, to see how they cooperated, and if there could be any potential for disagreements and conflicts on boarders and revenues. What I also later found out was that since the villages were located quite far away from the district centre, the forest was not very much exploited from charcoal-production compared to how it was utilized closer to Kilosa town.

In order to conduct my fieldwork, I employed a translator. As I had only a short amount of time to gather information in the villages, there was no way I could understand a mixture of Kigogo, Kihehe, Kisagara and Kiswahili and at the same time get some useful data for my purpose. To use a translator was of course also challenging, as I lacked the opportunity to take advantage of situations as soon as they occurred. It also created a distance between my informants and me, but what was positive was that the translator also helped me in translating cultural codes, which I then further translated in my anthropological mind. She also served as a research-assistant and a friend.

Doing a focus-group meeting taught me several things, amongst others how almost useless this forum was in gathering honest opinions. This is one of the methodologies frequently being used by Tanzanian NGOs, and also during the implementation of REDD+. I invited some men and women that I had been talking to, and that seemed to be interested in sharing their opinions in the focus groups, but the result was that the men came instead of their wives, whom I had invited, and it was a challenge to engage them in the discussions that I initiated. A reason could be that they did not understand my purpose of engaging them, and another could be that the themes for the discussions were either too challenging or too sensitive to take it seriously. An example was this theme: "How do you cooperate with the neighbouring village of [Lunenzi or Ibingu]?" Generally, answers to these questions were given in consensus, without discussion. When one man took the lead in answering, the other people in the group were usually joining him in his jovial conclusion.

The survey I found to be the most effective way of gathering information, although not completely reliable, and not sufficient for a quantitative analysis. The questions in this survey were about their subsistence-sphere, religious practices and use of the forest among other things, and some of the information has been used for my analytical conclusions.

In Dar es Salaam I spent most of my time at the TFCG / MJUMITA office, arranging interviews, and participating in workshops, conferences and fieldtrips. The challenge here was to define my role in the field. I was bound to write a lot during these events, as well as making time for observing

the workshop itself. Even though I sometimes understood that my participation was expected, this was not my purpose while doing research, and I therefore stayed as passive as possible, as it would be difficult to combine this with participation. At the same time I found it morally difficult to just "take in" information, almost like a spy, without anybody knowing really what I would use it for in the end – myself included. "What are you writing?" was a question I got both from the NGO-staff and the villagers, and I usually said it was something that might be relevant for my thesis, but I was not sure. That last part was probably enough in the situation to disarm my notebook and me. I learned early on that if I said I was unsure, or that I did not know, was a way I could express myself in order to avoid appearing as a figure of authority.

That being said, I wish I had been able to do my fieldwork more openly. Maybe a methodology similar to that of George E. Marcus (Marcus and Faubion, 2009) where he describes as a more formal design process would have been a solution to my problem regarding contribution. He addresses the problem of what he terms "double agent-cy", where the anthropologist is trying to produce research for both "us" and "them", both as a contribution within the discipline and for the broader audience. In my case it is for the NGOs and other REDD+ stakeholders in addition to contributing within the anthropological discipline. Marcus believes that it is time for a new focus for anthropological research-methods, and he turns specifically towards scholars and first fieldworks. This should be based on incorporating the "explicit norms and forms of collaborations into the culture of metamethod" (Marcus and Faubion, 2009, p. 30) through a constant feedback from the fieldworker's collaborations and the broader reception. He thinks we should include these responses into the meta-methodological aspects of fieldwork, which he terms as the way that the fieldwork is changing towards the changing environment's expectations, and the conditions for implementation. This will form the design of the project, where a carefully conceived incompleteness should be the norm of the result. The incompleteness is about realizing the limits of fieldwork, and these partial, but specifically argued results should be the norm.

Such an approach could be preferable for anthropological fieldworks that are conducted among NGOs or other organizations, instead of the traditionally individual, what Marcus terms "Malinowskian" approach. It is also important to remember that Marcus does not want the researcher to forget about the ideology of anthropological fieldwork while also receiving impetus or feedback from other places. I went to the field with a wish to do a "Malinowskian" approach, and have followed this to the degree that I could. I was afraid of being biased by too much communication and cooperation with the NGO. I nevertheless realize that a more receptive meta-method like the one Marcus describes would probably have helped me, if I were able to balance it with independency. Putting more emphasis on communicating my limited findings and having

feedback from the NGO on my work could have led to a different thesis, but in the end my analysis has been bound to take a more "Marcusian" direction in the way that the main corresponding literature that I have used has been urging to deploy a vocabulary that is established in the environment where the research is done (Riles, 2000) and to not make use of too many "black boxes" of theory (Latour, 2005). Elaborations of this literature will be done in the following chapters.

Analysis

Besides the empirical data and interviews gathered during my fieldwork, analysis is also based on a study of different laws, regulations and project documents on REDD+. This has been necessary to understand obligations in relation to agency and accountability. It has also been necessary to understand the agency of documents themselves, as part of a "worknet" of social interaction, the way that Bruno Latour's (2005) describes it through an actor-network-theory (ANT). I have had Latour's work in the back of my head while writing, but I have not been able, or even wanted, to follow him completely. I believe it presupposes a quite different methodology for conducting fieldwork than what I have done, where one should trace every single detail of a causality-relation empirically to claim any cause at all. To the extent that I have used Latour's methods, I have first and foremost tried to prevent a tendency of the use of terms that Latour would deny as irrelevant and unreliable "black-boxes". This could be terms as "power" and "society". As he says that his contribution is a proposition, not a refutation, of existing theories (Latour, 2005, p. 12), I think it legitimizes, to some extent at least, my use of terms like "agency", "accountability" and "discourse", which are in the focus for this thesis.

The analysis is mainly concerned with events of human and non-human interaction in relation to the development of the project that has been in my focus, and what comes out of them in the form of a discourse. I use the works of Michel Foucault, Norman Long, Annelise Riles and Anna Tsing mainly in a way that values the significance of interim connections in the way that Latour perceives them. Riles (2000) does something quite contrary to how Latour describes the continuing processes of reconfirming products of events, but is not talking about a "network" that exists in its own right. Riles is describing a "network" within development- and NGO workers in Fiji where the "network" exists in the sense that people are talking about it. Norman Long (2001), in his actor-oriented approach, is not focusing social changes entirely on processes of completely determined, linear and external paths forced by international bodies or the state, but on how the frameworks of social action are composed by the outcomes of actors' "projects".

This thesis aims to give an insight into processes that are going on at project level under an unfinished framework of the REDD+ forest regime. It concentrates on REDD+ as a discourse in the making, and on levels and locations of agency and accountability in the process. I am here specifically referring to the agencies and accountabilities of the piloting organizations in Tanzania, with the work of the two organizations TFCG and MJUMITA in focus. I perceive the events that are driving the discourse into being as frictions related to the project, where agencies are unfolded. Similarly, I also consider some situations where I propose that the necessary frictions are not taking place to detect accountability in the process of project implementation. My analysis here recognizes two reasons for this; one is that the discourse in the making also draws on similar discourses that already have a strong presence in Tanzania, like those of conservation and development. The second reason is the respect for what is stipulated in contracts and agreements as opposed to what is not. It is represented by two forms of the project – one in the form of the design, another in the form of real action. Annelise Riles (2000) made this distinction in her analysis of NGO work in Fiji, and I draw several parallels to her work on the aesthetics of information, form and facts throughout the thesis. I look into aspects of how information sharing is happening through documents in the NGO, and on the significance that the mechanisms of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) can have for the project in Tanzania. By doing all this I present ways that the project is in process, and argues that ambitions through designs can show that elaboration and implementation of the project at the same time is possible, whereas results of real action show that this is a matter of perception.

Terminology and Presentation

The overall topic of my thesis, as part of a discourse within development aid, makes the analysis prone to talk about aspects of power (Agrawal, 2002, Brosius, 1999, Escobar, 1995, Ferguson, 1990), in the spirit of the paradigm in anthropological studies of development introduced by James Ferguson in his book *The Anti-Politics Machine* (Ferguson, 1990) that drew on Michel Foucault's work on power and discourses. Although I recognize that it can be a legitimate expression depending on the basis for analysis, I have chosen here to do as Tsing (2005) and to not go into questioning and localizing holders of power for the reason of the difficulty to determine it, and next, tracing the causality for it can be equally difficult. I find the word agency a more appropriate expression for my purpose. I use it to explain how different people have the opportunity to act and "promote", regardless of whether they have the power to make the results of these acts and promotions become constitutive. The way Bruno Latour (2005) explains the use of the term power within sociology, he says that it has come to be about either rather transient face-to-face interactions, where asymmetries cannot really be accounted, or about those "tautological forces"

16

that cannot be proved empirically viable. What is essential in Latour's explanations of actor-network-theory is that objects, in the sense of material things, have to be included within the work-net of interactions. The objects are forgotten about when scientists are explaining the sociology of the social, and this, he claims, leads to the fact that they are also forgetting about them when it comes to the appeals to power relations and social inequalities. He explains that these objects are mediators where signifiers of power are produced, and to not consider them means to "hide the real causes of social inequalities" (Latour, 2005, p. 85) Instead of emphasizing the use of "power", which he questions whether might only be an expression of the "social explainers'' lust of power themselves, one should do an effort in explaining it through these objects of causes. The objects in between the efforts and the effects can sometimes make the effects into something else than what was the purpose of the efforts. In my case this is why I have chosen to focus on agency as efforts to impose, as effects of the project were hardly to be found at the time of my fieldwork. If one wishes to study "power-relations" and "social inequalities", Latour says that one at least also has to explain the means and efficacy of domination.

Regarding the presentation of data, it has been important to do it in such a gentle manner as possible in relation to the personal life of my informants both in the NGOs and the villages. I have found it relevant to refer to certain positions in the organizations, and I am therefore thankful for the permissions to do that. In a couple of cases I have chosen to give the informants an anonymous name. This is because of uncertainties to whether the person has given me information without considering own security regarding relations to friends and colleagues. I have not considered it necessary to put other names on the villages where I have done my fieldwork, because I find it rather important that stakeholders know which villages I talk about so that the information I give may be useful to the project in these villages. If I in any person's opinion have falsely attributed to the villages through my descriptions, I deeply apologize for that, and the liability is all on me. I have done the descriptions with the idea that they were important to create a contextual picture of the setting for the project in Tanzania, and in the same way that someone can disagree in my presentation, my hope and belief is that many villagers will agree with it, as it is also based on their statements.

The quotations here are not directly cited all through this thesis, except from the interviews with NGO staff where I used a voice recorder. These interviews have been presented in a form of conversation between the person I interviewed and myself. I use the same form to present the meetings held by NGO-staff in the villages, although everything has been translated during the meetings with the help of my translator. The rest of the quotations in the text have the same punctuation regardless if I have written them down immediately or a bit later during the day. In the

villages I have, as already mentioned, used my translators. This can mean that content has been changed or missed, but by discussing with my translators, my understandings of the meanings with what people say can also have been improved. In the context of workshops in Dar es Salaam, information has mainly been written down at once, and quotations are either completely or close to similar to how it was said. In the setting of fieldtrips and random talk with NGO-staff, the conversations have mainly been scribbled down during the evening time, and the quotations are therefore based on my memory, which means that the same content might have been said with different words.

Thesis Outline

Chapter 2 is an introduction to the stage that the REDD+ had reached in Tanzania at the time I arrived. It has the ambition to define some of the expectations towards REDD+ at international, national and NGO level in the early stages of introducing the project in Tanzania. Why did Tanzania become a pilot country? To what degree was the Tanzanian Government interested? What kinds of expectations were there from the NGO's side? It touches also upon some of the themes that I will return to in the following chapters, for instance how the international commitments are crucial for the NGOs to be able to move forward, although the international discourse of REDD+ is still changing in the context at these different levels. I use Norman Long's analytical framework of social interface to explain how the process of defining and imposing on a REDD+ discourse is dynamic.

Chapter 3 gives a presentation of the local settings for REDD+ implementation before any activities have yet been started. It aims to give an understanding of why it can be important to have considerable knowledge about the villages and preferably some attachment to the place in form of earlier co-operation before project implementation. A second aim is to question whether the two terms that are part of the REDD+ discourse to address target populations for REDD+ revenues, local communities and indigenous people, are really the best terms to be used in the Tanzanian setting.

Chapter 4 is concerned with some elements of the REDD+ discourse and how they interact and counteract. It also surrounds the accountability and advocacy of the NGO in relation to REDD+. I draw relations mainly to Annelise Riles' (2000) studies on NGO-work in Fiji when talking about the aesthetics of information, form and facts in the work of NGOs.

Chapter 5 is surrounding how the NGO shared information with villagers at the initial stages of the project, and gives some possible reasons as to why the NGOs chose to include the mechanism of FPIC at a later stage in the project. In relation to this it also considers why an aspect of the project, the land use planning, is late in the process of implementation.

REDD+ in Tanzania

There were several issues already resolved and set for REDD+ to be introduced in Tanzania prior to contract-agreement between the Norwegian Embassy and the Tanzania Forest Conservation Group on the 20th August 2009. There had been a major focus on improvements of environmental conditions in Tanzania, and the Vice Minister's Office had already started developing a National Adaptation Programme of Action in cooperation with UNDP and UNEP in by 2007 to plan how they should approach the climate challenges. The Government formed a National REDD Task Force to plan and coordinate several issues at the national level before any of the organizations received an approval to start the project. In 2008, Tanzania and Norway signed a letter of intent for a Climate Change Partnership that involved piloting REDD+. The national aims and co-ordination in Tanzania already seemed to be moving in the right direction toward engaging REDD+ initiatives, but to what extent was REDD+ really ready to be implemented?

In the previous chapter I elaborated on the basic overall and original idea of what REDD+ is within an international discourse. In this chapter, I look into some of the expectancies and uncertainties that were attached to the design of REDD+ among project proponents[9] and national and international stakeholders. This I believe provides a necessary background to what the discourse about REDD+ is coming into in Tanzania. I give some insights as to how Tanzania, a quite arid country in comparison to several other countries that could be a fit for REDD+, was chosen for the project, how the idea has been "sold" to the Tanzanian stakeholders, and how it has been further elaborated in different forums. The purpose of this chapter is to show the visions and intentions behind REDD+ in Tanzania. It contains one empirical example from a workshop in Dar es Salaam, the UN-REDD Inception Workshop where both national and international representatives have been present. By using the idea of friction in several events to different times in different places, I seek to develop an understanding of how the content of REDD+ is diverging in local, national and international levels, and the dynamic processes where something is created. I also explore whether something new or different has emerged from what could be determined by the preconceptions in any of those given levels.[10] This is also inspired by Latour's (2005) arguments that a "network" is

---

[9] With the term "project proponents" I mean the ones that have signed contracts with the Norwegian Embassy on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD) to do REDD+ initiatives, whether they are representatives from the NGOs or the cooperating university institutions.

[10] The way I use levels in this thesis is not in a hierarchical matter in the sense that decisions in one "higher level" has the power to control the "lower level". Latour (2005) is saying that we have to flatten the landscape when talking about "networks" of relations, that we should talk about it two-dimensional instead of three-dimensional, or hierarchical. In this thesis I see the notion of levels besides each other, but flexible, so that in some situations at some times one level

confirmed by the meetings between actors, where something new from what was there in the beginning is created in the meeting. Although I am not adopting the notion of "network" in this thesis, his work on interactions is still important here.

To Fly a Plane while Building It: International Aims

Tanzania was one of the first three countries to develop a REDD+ National Programme together with Vietnam and Indonesia. Some questions have been raised and some speculations made as to why Tanzania was chosen in the first place, since there has been a general emphasis on the value of rainforests in what has been referred to as "major carbon sinks", while there has been less focus on other types of forests, like the miombo woodland which covers about 96% of all forest in Tanzania.[11]   The two other types of forests that you can find are the lowland and montane forests (3%) and mangroves and plantations (1%) (URT 1998 cit. in Zahabu and Malimbwi, 2011).[12]

 The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam is now administrating the funding for these REDD+ initiatives in Tanzania. In contact with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they had told them that if they needed a pilot-country for REDD+ the Embassy had several contacts within the forest sector, which could be helpful in a development phase of the project. In addition, and as I have mentioned, there were several requirements that were already in place for Tanzania to become a pilot-country, but none of these were really linked to what has been the core of the REDD+ philosophy; the biophysical potential for carbon-sequestration and benefits from REDD+. As this chapter will show, there were only very small doubts to the belief that the potential in Tanzanian forest is much lower than in rainforests when it comes to storing carbon, and hence to get revenues from REDD+ in the way it is designed. The emphasis is rather put on the catastrophic scenario of how these areas around the Eastern Arc will be affected by climatic changes in the

---

might move above the others in terms of displaying power, knowledge or agency, but might not stay there. Even though the chapter is divided in three parts based on three levels, the different discourses and perceptions are in reality floating slightly into each other. They are dynamic on cross and within each other, and also depending on the distribution of knowledge and what stakeholders are learning from each other.

[11] Compared to 1988: According to Abdallah and Monela (2007), Ahlback gave a percentage of 90% of all tanzanian forested land area, which would constitute 44.6 mill. hectare at the time.

[12] More numbers on the magnitude of forest and deforestation: According to Tanzania National Forest Programme 2001–2010, about 38% of Tanzania's 886 000 km2 total area is covered by forest and woodlands (URT, 2001). Zahabu and Malimbwi (2011) give a number of 35 million ha of Tanzanian forestland (which actually is a higher number than what was estimated within the Forest Programme) of which 18.3 million ha are reserved, and 17 ha are unprotected forests in general lands. About 412 000 ha a year is the estimated deforestation and degradation rate (Zahabu and Malimbwi, 2011), in general because of main-drivers like shifting agriculture, wildfires, illegal logging, mining, wood-fuel extraction and large-scale farming of bio-fuel production (URT 2010).

future, a scenario that has been promoted in Tanzania by forest- and wildlife conservation NGOs for a long time, and for that reason they should be included in the project. Hence, the project would resonate with people's opinions and perceptions towards risks, and therefore it would not be too difficult to get consent to go through with the project in Tanzania. The risks of climate change are put up against the risks of going through with the project. When talking about the latter, there are usually two groups that are mentioned: The first group that is taking risks is the funders of the project. To prevent them, a principle of zero tolerance for corruption is stipulated in the contracts between the Norwegian funder and the project proponent. The second group is the villagers, termed as indigenous people or local communities, together with the bio-physiological environment where they live. To prevent these risks, the decisions from the international negotiations in the COP 16 conference affirms that safeguards should be promoted and supported in the initiatives, and this is considered a national responsibility (UNFCCC, 2010).

In a publication by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) emphasis is put on the necessity of doing REDD+ in so-called dryland forests, like the type that we can find in Tanzania, through what is termed a pro-poor approach. This is broadly defined as policies that are aimed at towards increasing "assets and capability of the poor" (Bond, et al., 2010, p. 53). As it is further explained, in defiance of the critique, that including issues like poverty and biodiversity is simply too much to address at once taken into consideration the urgent action that was needed through REDD+, "unless REDD+ is pro-poor in southern Africa it is unlikely to be successful because so much of the deforestation is being done by poor people." (Bond et al., 2010, p. 53) The main thought is that REDD+ can provide a source of income to the local communities that can help them manage their resources more sustainably and efficiently, and that this can lead to a more secure living situation in the future. There is no doubt that this would be a dream-come-true, but the IIED publication is also mentioning another issue that makes us apprehensive – the issue of how the payments should be done. It suggests that most likely, the fund-based approach would be the best way, as "regulated markets are likely to involve larger financial flows, will be more focused on efficiency rather than equity and therefore targeted at major rainforest nations with high rates of deforestation such as Indonesia and Brazil." (Bond et al., 2010, p. 52) In that way, as it is explained, it would not be generating as much money, but a fund-based approach would be more flexible and could signify fewer risks in Tanzania. Assumptions that I will get back to later, are that a "carbon only" focus can make Tanzania vulnerable at a competing market. This is an example of how the discourse is already starting to be about something else but payment for environmental services in the form of increasing carbon-sequestration at the national level. Moving closer towards the specificity of a pilot-project, the discourse is changing even more in the direction that the project

should be more about conservation and development concurrently, whereas the revenues from REDD+ are downplayed because of the insecurities surrounding carbon markets. What is in force is that everybody sees a road and can imagine a goal, but they do not know what challenges await them along the way, and sometimes whether they are picturing the same road with the same goal or not. These events where something new is adding up to the REDD+ discourse in Tanzania, I perceive them here as frictions. It shows here how other existing discourses of conservation and development in Tanzania are adding up to the discourse.

My experience by following the project in Tanzania was that these frictions were not that easy to discover sometimes, and I believe that compared to other places where indigenous groups have shown clear reluctance in approving the project, the process has been closer to a "flow" in Tanzania, and the wheels have been turning really fast. This is not to say that Tanzania is the only place where stakeholders have not had the opportunity to see the whole scope of the project before implementation-phase. On the UN-REDD official web-pages in March 2010, after the three first inception-workshops had been held in Vietnam, Tanzania and Indonesia, an article of Chris Cosslett – an independent consultant engaged in UN-REDD with experience in formulating international environmental projects – gave an impression that things were rolling a bit fast. A wide range of questions and uncertainties had emerged from different parts during these workshops, and the article gave stakeholders an invitation to pause and remind themselves what the intention was really supposed to be grounded in the UN-REDD National Programmes.[13]

> … it may be worth pausing to reflect on the meaning of these events. They are in fact important moments marking each country's entry into the emerging international REDD+ regime and, indeed, in the emergence of the regime itself. …UN-REDD Programme pilot NPs are among the first efforts to take a systemic, national-level approach to the many challenges of national-level "REDD readiness." And while the international community continues its efforts—see Copenhagen, Paris, Oslo, etc.—to fully construct that regime, national governments, with support from the UN-REDD Programme, are wasting no time, in the hopes of being ready for REDD+… when REDD+ is ready for them.

> (Cosslett, 2010)

His last comments imply certain scepticism towards the fact that the project is in such a hurry that there is no time to make sure that the countries themselves are actually ready for the challenges of integrating REDD+ in the national politics. He ends the article with the last sentence that reflects a

---

[13] These workshops were part of the process of developing the National Programs.

touch of cynicism, that despite all the uncertainties, he gives the signal for starting – now that the ball is already rolling: "So sound the gong and let the National Programmes begin!" (Cosslett, 2010)

UN-REDD Inception Workshop, 29.01.2010

This was my very first meeting with negotiations in the development aid-business in its most common forum – the workshop. I was sweaty after spending the last 45 minutes in the traffic-jam in a taxi without air-conditioning, nervous, as I was late because of the jam and I thought the trip would be shorter; because I had no idea what kind of people I would meet; and unsure of what this "workshop-concept" was all about. I rushed into the hotel-lobby and found three Europeans that seemed like they were going to a conference as well. I later learned we were going to the same meeting, and I realized that I overestimated the need to be on time for a Tanzanian workshop as we entered the empty conference-room – the others arrived during the next hour. They were representatives from the Government, the newly established National REDD Task Force, the United Nations, the Norwegian Embassy, Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA) in Morogoro and piloting NGOs. The purpose of the workshop was to exchange opinions about the REDD+ project in Tanzania and to plan the first phase of the project by presenting a UN work-plan. The vantage point for the work-plan was the four outcomes that had been developed in the program document for Tanzania, which was presented to the UN-REDD Policy Board in March 2009 with some elaborations on what has to be done on different levels to fulfill the outcomes.

In the following I will explain this meeting as a case of social interface, an analytical framework developed by Norman Long (2001) "for depicting organizing practices and processes of knowledge/power construction". This was a workshop where several REDD+ stakeholders in Dar es Salaam were participating, and where different perceptions of REDD+ were presented.[14] Long says that we should not have the idea that knowledge and power is something that can be possessed by people, but it is context-based. It does not mean that if someone has knowledge or power others do not, because they emerge out of social interaction, and are not unquestionable givens that remain the same for all the parties. It is the struggle over the right to define and to include other people within one's project by making them change their points of view that would generate power. He says that the actor-oriented approach in small-scale interactional settings are crucial to understand emergent structures and contexts, and suggests some tools for analysis; "to identify and characterize differing actor practices, strategies, and rationales, the conditions under which they arise, how they

---

[14] At this stage no one knew where in the country that the projects would be implemented. No people from rural communities were represented.

interlock, their viability or effectiveness for solving specific problems, and their wider social ramifications" (Long, 2001, p. 20). I have decided to not use the concept of "power" as something that is crucial for my analysis, what is crucial, is to illuminate those "emergent structures" Long is talking about, as it would in this analysis be about the emergence of a REDD+ discourse in Tanzania.

In an effort to try to characterize practices, strategies and rationales I would like to compare the interaction during this interface-encounter with a "seller/buyer" situation, a situation where the issue of power is dynamic, bidirectional, elaborated and not quite set. I do this only to describe the type of interaction during the workshop, not to say that it was actually about taking the offer of REDD – but in some way the negotiations were still going on, and therefore one could sense a certain kind of anxiety mainly between the Government people, one post doc. from SUA, and the representatives from UN. The representatives from TFCG and MJUMITA were not engaging very much in the debate, but were rather working as mediators between the main other main parties.

One would maybe think that the Tanzanian Government representatives would take the "seller-role" as the country will be selling their services of improved carbon sequestration. Meanwhile the UN-representatives should be representing the "carbon-buyers". However, the situation brought to the surface during the meeting was that the UN-representatives are to a greater extent resembling the ones that are disseminating notions about rich countries that are offering to buy the carbon. In this way all of them – the two Scandinavian men and the Tanzanian woman – were all acting similar to sales people, the non-aggressive type, smart and fairly convincing, with no visible form of pressure – acting as if it was they that had a really good offer and several potential buyers, so many that it does not really matter whether you take the offer or not, as if they were doing you a favour. One can assume that it is just a farce, taken the time and progress of the project into consideration, it was necessary that the offer be taken. The real situation between the different parties indicated that the offer had already been taken. The UN representatives had quite a lot of confidence since the preparations for REDD+ were already processing, and envisioning the opportunity that the project could amount to in the sense of development in Tanzania, which leads to the question of whether there was a way the Government would say no to this source of money? In some way it seemed that some representatives from the Government would like to, or they would like to show more agency. It became obvious that they felt buyer's pressure as one representative from the Vice President's Office stated: "Sometimes I just have to ask why other people have to tell us what to do!" The governmental "buyers" were sceptical, and wanted to know everything about the "product" before going any further with the bargaining. This was also the case among the academic representatives.

One professor's statement was: "This work-plan has not got enough details. I need the details before we move on".

The people from the UN were polite while explaining their case, still keeping their authority by using facial gestures like raising their eyebrows, panning and peeking above their glasses. They explained to the partakers in the meeting that they were there to listen to their opinions and thoughts about how REDD might work out in Tanzania. Comments from this side of the table were; "We are trying to fly a plane while we are building it. We depend on having the village-communities' trust to succeed." This statement came after stories about unwelcome projects in Uganda, and show the transparent way of talking about how uncertain the project is. In response to sceptical comments to the work-plan, people from the UN explained that the work-plan was actually prepared in Tanzania, and there was no reason for people to think that it would be a blueprint.

While going through the work-plan, one post doc. from one of the Tanzanian universities was constantly arguing that nearly all the outputs were already covered, and there was basically nothing new to accomplish that they came up with in the work-plan. This took a lot of time without really opening up for a discussion about the different points, and I could recognize that at least one of the UN representatives that was taking notes from the workshop started to loose his patience.

The reason why the post doc had the opinion that all the outputs were already covered, was that he, as well as many other stakeholders within the project, had come to the conclusion that all the project was about was to continue the same kinds of PFM-activities that they had done already, and then the money from REDD+ would come as something extra that would not really mean anything new in the form of new institutions, implementation-strategies or anything else. He did also say that he thought there was no piloting going on, and that they had already tested these projects through the present PFM-projects. What he obviously wanted to underpin was that there is hardly anything new about REDD+ in Tanzania. The response to this from one of the UN representatives was that "this is only true if we assume that we already have the best solution. To me, that is not the best way to advance." This shows the oppositions and divergences in views that I argue is what Long is talking about as preconditions for social interface-encounters, and what came out of the situation was that the UN people finally got him and maybe other attendants enrolled into their project, as this comment made them realize that the project might be about other issues than what was anticipated. The Government was also offensive and asked critical questions. At this point the level of knowledge about the project was a bit higher among the UN staff than with the Government, but the Tanzanian representatives, like any other potential buyer, wanted to give the impression that there was nothing to the project that they themselves needed, so as to "lower the price" in terms of loss of

26

independency and agency, which is often the high price that has to be paid when one enters into agreements for development projects. In these matters the REDD+ project might not become very different from other development projects.

I experienced that several Tanzanian stakeholders had either the opinion that REDD+ was "nothing new", or they thought it was diffuse in the way that it was very difficult to really know what REDD+ contains. Everybody knew that it intended to pay people for conserving the forest or using the forest in a non-destructive way, which can increase the carbon sequestration, but since there are so many unknowns in terms of payments, leakage-management and monitoring, many people were concerned that it did not seem to contain anything different from what had been practiced through PFM. As one officer from a cooperating Ugandan organization said: "Besides the money there's nothing new to REDD. I'm worried that there is too little talk about money since that is really what REDD is all about." She meant that the mechanisms that REDD+ is based on in Tanzania through PFM are already there, and that the money to the people in the villages should be more at stake. She explained her doubts if the money from selling carbon-quotes would be enough for the people considering the loss of freedom regarding land-resources, and said that; "we are testing REDD+ now in the communities, but I ask whether it is even worth testing. To what prize, and on what people's behalf are we doing this?" She was then touching upon another important question in relation to the REDD+ activities going on at the present stage – whether the emphasis on piloting REDD+ is genuine, since the general opinion seemed to be that the differences between REDD+ and PFM were small, more important is it to consider the consequences for the villages where a sort of testing is done – whether they would be more or less the same if we did not use the term "pilot".

In one of the later chapters I would like to take these statements into consideration as I elaborate on ideas about how people make decisions to go further in the process of REDD+ implementation to different stages by making an analysis on how terms and discourses are made to legalize the process. At all stages there are a lot of doubts, and sometimes these doubts are expressed, sometimes they are covered by terms like "lessons learnt" and "pilot project".

A Package in Our Country: National Aims

"REDD is a package in our country" – the statement was made by a representative from the National Task Force during the Inception Workshop in January 2010 described in the previous part. The meaning behind this was not clearly expressed, but taken different dictionary-definitions of the word package into consideration, like "a finished product contained in a unit that is suitable for

immediate installation and operation … or a group, combination, or series of related parts or elements to be accepted or rejected as a single unit", I think in this context REDD+ could be translated as a multi-level solution made by external agents adapted to fit not only one specific recipient, but several.

Despite the "show-off" through claims of agency during the workshop I have been describing, there were no realistic way that people from the Government would raise significant resistance towards the project, and neither was this the forum for decision-making, it was only an introduction to the project where information-sharing and exchange of opinions took place. REDD+ could comprise a major opportunity for Tanzania in terms of funding and other income. What seems to be different from other kinds of development-programs is that this time the Government is given a kind of responsibility that is containing close cooperation with NGOs as well as international stakeholders. In conversation with one stakeholder at the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam, the perception of how different REDD+ is to other projects is due to the fact that Tanzania has to show measurable results that would not allow for corruption in the long run, which strengthens transparency. When I went back to Dar es Salaam in 2011 I also found that there had been pressure put on the Government from TNRF (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum), which had criticized it in the newspaper Guardian for not making the REDD+ National Strategy official. During a debate at the British Council one of the representatives from the REDD+ National Task Force made it clear that the document was now official, whereas a representative from an environmental organization also said that there was "no use of confronting each other when we are all working for the same pro-poor project". This was a common way of calming down debates that I met under several circumstances, and it could also prevent the positive effects of friction. Even though the goal that he spoke about would be somewhat similar, pressure and debates create energy for new ideas and insights. Frictions should be producing energy to the development discourse in Tanzania. To put it in one former Embassy Counsellor's way of seeing it: "The Government is not used to meet the public, and to see the positive aspects and potential for improvements that lies in criticism."

In the debate I recognized that a new group of people that I would say constitutes new stakeholders had appeared. This is the audience that is being reached through media, beyond the group of researchers, students, journalists and environmentalists. The first time I came to Tanzania very few people knew about REDD+, as was expected. This time I understood that the organizations and other stakeholders had been emphasizing the promotion of the project through media. I found that the TFCG had been the initiators of a video-production on REDD+, there were articles in the paper specifically concerning REDD+, and a debate on REDD+ at the British Council was arranged through TNRF which was open for anybody that was interested. As I attended this debate, my

28

impression was that compared to previous meetings surrounding REDD+, more critical voices became apparent in this one. The group beyond stakeholders wanted to know how the payments would be done, how we can assure that women will be represented, how land-rights and incentives to people in the villages will be guaranteed. As one gentleman stated; "we need to be sure of this!" Questions were starting to turn from "if" towards "how". There was a statement from a woman in the audience that alleged land-grab as a component of the project. A young man raised questions to the effect of whether urban planning in his town would also do some good, and thereby decreasing the pollution instead of troubling the poor people in the villages. A western man, or commonly called mzungu,[15] confirmed that this breakfast-debate was certainly not a debate in the sense that they were for instance contesting issues of "nested approach" versus "national funding". He claimed that it only consisted of already established statements and assumptions of how REDD+ should be done through a nested approach. "These are things we have to discuss", he said. A lot of engagement was uncovered during this meeting, and these questions being put at stake demonstrated to me a variety of perceptions to the project that had not been so openly uttered in those small, national forum that I had been attending earlier. It shows how public debates can be important to create sufficient frictions, so that for instance common assumptions on what are the best solutions are not automatically applied onto an existing system. That would be what Latour terms a complex intermediate – the discourse is not adding anything to itself.

What can the overall national goal for this project be? I am not even sure if there originally was any strong national engagement in this, since the primer engagement came from the Norwegian Embassy, and the funding went directly to the organizations. In the same debate at the British Council one of the participants also asked whether there generally was a problem of low engagement from the Government's side. This could be true, since it does not seem like the REDD+ payments for carbon-quotes are going to take the route through national authorities easily.

Besides the matter of funding, it is clear that there has been a priority from the Government's side to map and manage as much land as possible under the two different versions of PFM.[16] Roderick P. Neumann (2005) gives a short history of the governmental interests in this by referring to the African continent as a whole, but specifically emphasizing Tanzania and Zimbabwe. He explains African populations' resistance in colonial times towards the displacements forced on them by European settlers who were working towards creating naturalized landscapes of protected areas. To enhance the situation created and correct the past injustices towards local concerns, programs like CBNRM and Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDP) were developed to involve

---

[15] Mzungu is a common term among Tanzanians, which mainly refers to a person with white/caucasian skin-color.

[16] See the introduction for more details on PFM.

the local communities in the management of the resources. Neumann writes of an early version of CBNRM in the colonial Tanganyika's system – the Native Authority Forest Reserves, where responsibilities of protection were delegated to Native Authorities who were working through indirect rule, and where all the benefits would go back to the Native Authorities. He argues that the new programs were not really a break with the tendency of spatial segregation of nature and society during colonial times, because "local participation and local benefit sharing … are not the same as local power to control use and access." (Neumann, 2005, p. 190) These projects could be designed not to improve livelihoods, but to defuse local opposition.

In the same way as CBNRM could be understood as part of indirect rule in colonial times, Neumann argues that recent programs can also be seen in relation to the larger political and economic processes going on that are encompassing most of the continent. The most significant one that he mentions is the Structural-Adjustment Programs and its neoliberal philosophy which puts pressure on governments to promote privatization, and also the privatization of land that evicts customary rights. Most African countries have tried to develop these more modern forms of land-tenure with the vision that it would increase the levels of agricultural production due to higher investments. The idea is also applied to conservation-policy and CBNRM projects – that firm land-ownership will make it easier to secure conservation. Neumann is sceptical to this kind of thinking about tenure, and refers to case studies that show contradictory results. These Structural-Adjustment Programs have also had major influence on what the Government can provide for rural education and health care. As the Government has increasingly become legitimized due to what it can deliver in the form of jobs and services, they have given rural communities less precedence. Hence CBNRM and similar projects implemented by different kinds of organizations can sometimes go through with the work that the Government is no longer prioritizing, and in that way those organizations function as elongations of the Government.

In addition to the argument of firm landownership through CBNRM as the best way of securing conservation, Skutsch and McCall (2011) is also highlighting some advantages through CFM: "The community gains by no longer living in conflict with forest officials, and by the increasing health and productivity of the forest; the state gains because this kind of management is often quite effective, and much cheaper and easier than protecting the forest by force." (Skutsch and McCall, 2011, p. 5)

Without going in depth, I would also like to mention another way of understanding the national interests in REDD+. According to Zahabu and Malimbwi (2011), REDD+ could potentially be a part of the contribution to the international Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of

30

environmental sustainability and rural poverty reduction to 50% from 1990 to 2015. Here the definition of poverty utilized is having an income of less than US$1 per day per head. In Tanzania, the MDG on poverty reduction became part of the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP) with a more ambitious hope of fulfilling it within 2010.

Focusing on "Lessons Learnt": NGOs Aims

Heidi: What was the reason why TFCG and MJUMITA signed the REDD contract in the first place?

Technical Advisor of TFCG: Yes, good question. Essentially – because TFCG has been working with communities and forest conservation for the last 25 years, we've seen some patterns emerging. I think – number one, we've seen that getting communities involved in forest conservation is a good thing. They are good forest managers, provided sufficient training and so on. But, the other pattern we saw was that the cash income was quite low for people. And that was providing challenges to the communities, natural resource communities, in terms of getting in money to carry on doing this hard work actually, so we've kind of seen that pattern. I guess we're also seeing this pattern is growing actually worse, so wanting to find ways to provide full time incomes which are actually good for the society as well as covering those costs. We saw some success within side the butterfly-project, so we have seen where, you know, livelihood activities outside of the forest change people's behavior in terms of forest management. When we started hearing about REDD it seemed clear that there was an opportunity there for the communities, but that they needed to get organized. Their weakness is that they are not organized; they don't have the technical capacity to engage in the debate and therefore engage themselves so that they can be not just kind of trailing along the highway, but can sit in the driver-seat. So, at the same time TFCG has been supporting this community forestry conservation network MJUMITA since 2000/2001. And again, that network kind of needed the role and the message which was coming out from the communities and went back to their livelihoods. So the two things kind of matched. And it was from there that we got the idea of organizing with MJUMITA in such a way that it could be a channel whereby individual communities could benefit from REDD and access REDD and engage in the debate on REDD …

… Communities would get low income from PFM – they were not getting very much money. Particularly from high biodiversity areas where there wasn't much potential for logging and so on, so they were doing a lot of work, and they were not necessarily getting very much money for it. While the projects are there they can in some way subsidize it, but in the longer run there needs to be other sources of income, and then relatively REDD being the only source of income we still, we don't wanna put all our eggs in one pot, in other means we still wanna carry on with butterfly-farming and general environment raising and all the other things we've been doing but this REDD is particularly attractive because it adds an amount of cash which can pay for all the hard work and I mean money buys you flexibility even for the institutional things …

… How much individuals can get? Yeah, we kind of worked out rough figures per hectare; I mean it's not a huge amount of money when you break it down per capita. So that's why in a way I think that it's important to put it in a context of other activities; you don't wanna

throw all the other things out. And only focus on REDD or even emphasize too much the financial elements.

Heidi: Somebody gave me a number of 10 dollars a year per person?

TA: There are so many variables in it. That actually we still have to work that out and evaluate it from side to side – it depends on population density, it depends on carbon density, it depends on what is the historical deforestation-rate is, it depends on how well you can measure it. So there are a lot of unknowns. But there's not gonna be huge money, no.

Heidi: What kind of income do you think that communities could be likely to generate through REDD?

Technical Advisor, MJUMITA: It's totally up in the air. Nobody knows. Because there is a lot of different variables in place, and one is how much deforestation do you think that we are preventing, and that transits into the amount of carbon you are saving and the value of the market. The other thing also is that it depends on where REDD stays, so like at the moment, you know under the official climate agreements like the Clean Development Mechanism and all that, the only thing that counts is reforestation, so that you can do REDD and there have been done plenty of REDD projects before this, but that has been on a voluntary basis, so the price that you get for carbon on a voluntary market would be significantly lower than what would be available in a regulatory market. So in 2012, if we come together and people say yes, let's make REDD part of the global climate agreement, that could significantly increase the value like maybe 3 or 4 times ...

… I think that there are some risks that you are going to find that is particularly challenging in Tanzania, because the highest rates of deforestation are actually in areas that are fairly dry forest which are such low carbon forests, so the actual value might not be that high. And as a country maybe you find that there are other countries where you have higher carbon-forests, they have maybe been deforested maybe for some time, maybe for agriculture or something like that, but it might be more economical to do that agriculture someplace else under REDD. And maybe that will be in places where you have lower carbon forest, you know, such as Tanzania, so REDD can actually displace deforestation from areas where you have high carbon-forest to places where you have low carbon-forest. And from what I've seen Tanzania has got, I mean, we have high carbon-forests here, but that is not the places that is being cut down. It's mostly the low-carbon forest that is being cut down so that is also going to affect how much income people are going to get and whether this whole thing is going to work.

Heidi: What you're saying is that you don't think Tanzania is suitable for piloting REDD?

TA: I was surprised when they were like, like… you know! Indonesia, yeah makes great sense! Tanzania? I don't know! We'll see. There are montane forest too, and coastal forests, the coastal forests might work because there you have some kind of medium amount of carbon and some places very high deforestation rate. But most places in Tanzania is just dry miombo, you know, probably about 40 tonnes of carbon per ha. You know, and if it could be irrigated or some way of farming it, it would probably be a better opt to go than just trying to save this REDD forest. But we'll see!

By introducing this part with the excerpts of the two interviews, I want to show the ambivalence in the TFCG / MJUMITA visions for the project. At the same time as it is perceived as a considerable opportunity for payments to local communities, the assumptions are also that there will probably not be much payment at all. Zahabu and Malimbwi (2011) is also emphasizing the same issues and reasons for these issues: "Whether placing PFM under a REDD+ regime would result in reductions of rural poverty as a result of payments to communities for the credits depends essentially on the price of carbon on the international market, and the proportion of that price which would be made over to local communities." (Zahabu and Malimbwi, 2011) They have estimated the opportunity cost per household under REDD+ project to be between US\$3.20 – US\$12.20 a year when management and implementation costs, transaction costs are taken into consideration. This is not enough to replace any present subsistence- or economic sphere for anybody living in the villages. They also mentioned that there are risks of elite captures. I did those interviews in February 2010, and the prospects for REDD+ in Tanzania on the carbon market has not changed very much two years later. Prospects at the international level have also changed, as the discourse has started to move towards an understanding that there might not be created a carbon market specifically for REDD+ after all.

Local Settings

REDD+ initiatives intend to compensate indigenous people and local communities which live in selected forested areas for their contribution to sustainable forest management. Poverty levels have led to the vulnerability of people and environment. In many of these areas stakes are high, considering the risks related to the project, which threaten the forest and the inhabitants of its surrounding villages.

> The risks and opportunities that REDD may raise for [Indigenous People] and [Local Communities] include, on the one hand, potential loss of access to land and other natural resources, and on the other hand, potentially increased resource flows to poor rural areas and improved forest governance. Effective participation of [Indigenous People] and [Local Communities] in REDD implementation would increase the likelihood that their risks will be mitigated and their opportunities enhanced.
>
> (Angelsen et al., 2009, p. ix)

This citation includes what I would say is the perceived main risk as opposed to the main opportunity of REDD+ in the very "simplest" form of the international REDD+ discourse, in addition to the "simple" solution to doubts about including local participation. There are several other risks, some of them I will come back to in the last section of this chapter. There are two other aims for this chapter. The first is to give a presentation of the village setting where REDD+ were to be implemented. This is crucial for my later chapters that surrounds how these villages were selected, and gives a basic impression for why I propose that it is important to know quite a lot about the village setting before implementing any projects. The second aim for the chapter is reflected in the citation above, and has something to do with an expression by Riles (2000), the "opacity of facts". The way I understand it, is that this can be an opposite or a threat to the transparency of information. What she gives a thorough account of with this expression, is how one takes for granted that facts are reality, whereas the reality is much more complex "… as statements that mask the true complexity of information and the reality of political contention." (Riles, 2000, p. 139) I suggest that the quotation above is one example of this, where one assumes that the people in question are either indigenous people or local communities. In Tanzania, the last term is the one that has been commonly used when talking about the populations of rural areas. I argue that the term should be reflected upon.

Village – Local Settings for Project Implementation

Ibingu and Lunenzi – the two villages where I spent my last three months during fieldwork – are situated on the mid-western part of Kilosa district, two hours walk from the boarder of the Dodoma region. They used to be one village until year 2000, but because of high migration into the part of Ibingu that is now called Lunenzi, they found it necessary to have two separate village governments, and thereby decided to split the village through the natural topography of a mountain ridge which stretches in each direction towards the boundary markers that define the borders of the surrounding villages. All the information that I have about the area from earlier times is based on stories told by the villagers, as there is no written history to be found about this area. Ibingu was registered as a village in 1974, as part of the comprehensive villagization, but there have been people living there since before this formalization – 1907 was the earliest date of establishment according to some of the elders who told me that a few members of the Sagara-tribe had been living there since then. Old beliefs about spirits residing in the forest were inherited from them.[17] People had been more spread out back than as compared to now. Starting in 1974, members of the Hehe- and Gogo-tribes arrived and started cultivating the same land. Today the same three tribes are living there, but other people occasionally immigrate or stay for a season or longer while they are renting a piece of a plot or selling local beer.

Ibingu is a beautiful valley densely inhabited in some parts by houses or utilized for cultivating fields, of maize and beans. Another considerable part of the valley consists of bush-and grassland. The village is situated close to the road between Kilosa town and Dodoma. It takes three hours to go by motorbike from Kilosa town to Ibingu, the only vehicles that can manage these roads except for trucks and Landrovers. The neighbouring village, Lunenzi, has only got walking-paths, and there had been no attempts to build roads in the rugged environment at the time I was there. To get there from Ibingu primary school takes about two hours on foot, and is daily trip for Lunenzi children who were able to attend. Lunenzi has an amazingly rugged and beautiful landscape of farming-plots patchworked and houses constructed on top of every hill. A dense evergreen forest lines the mountain ridges that surrounds the village, which functions as a catchment forest, and is efficient in

---

[17] There is a belief that a certain bamboo-area called Mianzini in the forest is hunted by spirits. As I visited this place I was told to be careful not to say, not even think about, something bad or evil at all, but keep positive thoughts even though the path was slippery and steep. If not, the belief is that the person will get lost in the forest as a result of the spirits playing a trick on him or her. Since they kept this belief in the villages, it could be a way to conserve the bamboo area. I did not get this confirmed, I only experienced that there was a certain laugh about it. One old man from Lunenzi said that it was only when people went alone in the forest that they came with mysterious stories afterwards, so he did not know if he could believe them.

preventing erosion and securing stabile water-flows. The soil here is very fertile, and many people from Ibingu still have their farms in this part of the old village-unit. The farmers do not need to do shifting cultivation to the extent that is common in most of the Kilosa district because of this fertility. Instead they have a more systematic use of the same plots for different kinds of crops and at different time of the year. The people of Ibingu said, that during the rainy season they were completely dependent on the plots in Lunenzi and on the mountains bordering it. At this time the soil down in Ibingu valley can be too over-tilled to handle the large amount of water pouring down, so that crops are washed away with it. I experienced the sight of this as I went back to the villages in February 2011, all the crops down in the valley were destroyed, some fragile houses had been completely decimated, and some inhabitants looked thinner and gaunter than before.

I consider a description as simple as this to give the sufficient basis for this thesis in understanding the poverty level and vulnerability among the people living in the village. Although they might be generally more fortunate than people living in less fertile areas, people here are vulnerable, and some are more exposed to hunger than others, depending on their age and abilities for cultivating relations.

Alcohol Consumption

In this rough context one finds a lot of alcoholism. This is nothing peculiar for these villages compared to other rural areas in the country, and several anthropological works surrounding Tanzania and other African countries have put the issue forward (Snyder, 2005, Talle, 1995, Willis, 2006). Beer does for some people serve the same purpose as a meal, and therefore the expression "kula pombe!" – which in this setting means "eat beer!"[18] – is often uttered while offering somebody a sip of the plastic-tankard. True enough, it is made out of exactly the same ingredients as what is commonly used for the porridge that is eaten every day called ugali, which consists of maize-flour and water. Many social activities are tied to the consumption of local beer, but the frequency of this is a bit different between the two villages where I stayed due to their topography and location. Ibingu is the most "central" one, located near the road, it has its own tiny little market with the popular "kilabuni"[19] – a square building with a cassette-reader that plays Tanzanian gospel music. Here people sit down to drink "pombe". There are also areas for selling fresh meat, a woman

---

[18] The correct translation of pombe is alcohol, and it is more common to have a specific name on the type of local beer made other places.

[19] Kilabuni" means "in the club", and originates most likely from this same English phrase.

baking "mandazis" and "chapatis"[20] for sale, and there are small stores containing staples like vegetables, soaps, salt, dried fish, matches, cooking-oil and kerosene. Lunenzi has not got a centre like this. Notably, one of the perhaps positive effects from this is less consumption of beer in Lunenzi. In Ibingu the women cook at least two barrels of pombe every day, three on Sundays and on special occasions. In Lunenzi they only cook every second day, and one has to consider the "kazi"[21] to traverse the distance and difficult paths to the place where the beer is sold that day.[22] I believe this was a significant cause to the appearance of fewer quarrels and conflicts in Lunenzi, compared to all the violence that was part and parcel to the club in the neighbouring village of Ibingu.

The different degrees of alcohol consumption were noted by me as well as the TFCG field-officers. It had some implications for their initial presence in the villages, in terms of cooperation and engagement. One of the officers also claimed that the villagers were more "polite" in Lunenzi than in the other village, where there was more "aggressiveness" attached to beer consumption. According to a group of three elders from Ibingu it had been the reason as to why people did not trust each other in the same way as back in the days before villagization, when people were living more scattered. At that time, they explained, people had been cooking beer for their own family, not for sale, and therefore it was not always accessible because of the time it takes to cook it. Willis (2006, pp. 6-7) writes about how alcohol-consumption grew with the establishments of towns, never as traditionally reciprocal elements, but as sales-elements. The information I got from the elders show that the sale of beer was similarly established with smaller "centralizations" in villages, or villagizations. At the same time as one should keep in mind that the sale of beer is the most important source of income for women in the villages, the moderation of this in Lunenzi served as the social interaction, and engendered sustainability, of a peaceful communal feeling. In writing about rural development among the Iraqw in northern Tanzania, Katherine A. Snyder (2005, p. 130) points out that many people she had been talking to perceive alcohol as the biggest social problem and the reason for development to falter in the area. High alcohol-consumption is not an uncommon phenomenon in rural areas at all, but as I have described, there are differences between villages, and therefore a careful selection of cooperating partner-villages could be an advantage for the feasibility of the project.

---

[20] Mandazi is a cake made out of wheat flour, sugar, water and baking powder and fried in a lot of cooking oil, similar to doughnuts. Chapati is made out of wheat flour, oil, salt, water and sometimes butter, and fried like a tortilla.
[21] Kazi means work. To walk a long distance is often perceived as kazi in the sense of struggle.
[22] There are different women cooking each day in the month. One has to apply for a licence to cook at the VEO's office.

Land Tenure

Accumulation of land in Ibingu and Lunenzi happens simply through clearing it. Since Ibingu was registered as a village in 1974 there has been one important regulation to follow regarding land-distribution, and that is to not clear the land against the dense forest on the mountain-ridges towards Lunenzi. This is to prevent forest fires and deforestation through the clearing of land. The rule has become less respected in the recent years, and according to the chairman of Ibingu there have also been some troubles with people coming from other villages who are not respecting the law. Some people also claimed that payments to the village leaders for permission to clear happened to frequently.

According to the information from the representatives of the two village counsels in Ibingu and Lunenzi, the villages have been registered in the district, but they said that they have no legal rights to the land and the forest there. The villages were, at the time I was there, situated at so-called "general land", which is understood as all public land, and is neither reserved nor village land. The type of land is regulated under the Land Act together with the "reserved land" which is land set apart for national parks, game reserves, forest reserves, marine parks and public recreation parks. "Village land" is owned by the village itself, and is regulated by the Village Land Act, which was adopted in 1999. (Barume, 2011, p. 145)

TFCG field-officers were surprised that the land in the area was not village land. They told the villagers that they were going to help them get the legal rights to their land, but later explained to me that it would take some time due to slow processes at district level, and also that it would include some more expenditures. The last thing I heard surrounding this theme from the senior staff in TFCG, was that it did not matter so much whether it was general land or not – there could be a parallel rights-system that defined the owners of the revenues from carbon sequestration that did not interfere with the present land-rights. A leaflet published quite recently by the organization on REDD+ rights (See annex 2) problematizes the issues of land-rights and revenues, which can be a signal that these issues are still not completely under control by the project proponents. The positive aspect of this is that it shows the organization's concrete efforts of agency and accountability, and several of their publications and leaflets are emphasizing similar issues that are important for making the project work for the people living in these villages.[23] The challenge is usually to communicate the villagers needs in an effective way, so that stakeholders at national and international levels are pushed to legislate rules that are benefiting rural population.

---

[23] See the publications in pdf. versions here: http://www.tfcg.org/makingReddWork.html

I should add here that there was a lot of positive interaction in the villages. The children would learn very early how to help out both at home and for other families. If one saw somebody was working, like a woman outside her house preparing food, it was a common gesture for anybody to stop by and help out a bit, instead of passing directly. The woman selling mandazis would sometimes add another extra. The children would be sharing their sugarcane with each other. Leaving the children back home for the neighbor to look after them was never a problem.

The purpose in presenting the villages by emphasizing a high consumption of alcohol and their little effective prescriptions for attachment and ownership to land, is not because of a malicious intent, but serves mainly two important objectives for this thesis. One is that it shows some of the types of challenges that the NGOs have encountered as national NGOs that are not attached to the specific area. Other sites I have visited where the NGOs have been working for several years, where they already know the people and the environment, they seemed to have trust among the villagers, and hence agency in promoting the project in the villages is amplified. I would say that it is perhaps not surprising that TFCG / MJUMITA would meet more challenges in initial stages of project implementation. An example of a challenge they have met, an outbreak of friction, is that they have been delayed because they had to start over again with a process of land use planning in the villages. This means that different areas that belong to the villages are mapped and divided into sectors of different utilization, for instance areas for harvesting firewood, farming, beekeeping and grazing. This was still going on in autumn 2011 because of miscommunication between NGO-staff and villagers, where the villagers thought that areas had been put off for full conservation, not for management. According to NGO staff, this was an incorrect perception.

The second objective was to create grounds for what I will discuss further in the next part of this chapter; the problems in these cases regarding the conceptualizations of the target communities for revenues from REDD+. Using the term "community" to address the target group for revenues and project management within REDD+ in Tanzania has been a given within the international and national discourse. In the next part, I want to look into how this is attached to the notion that cohesion; solidarity and common agency are strong enough in these "communities" to stand together in the introduction of an external project. Indeed, the TFCG Technical Advisor said in the excerpt from the interview cited in chapter 2, that a problem is often that these people are not organized well enough, so they are "trailing along the highway". Referring to the people living in the REDD+ target locality as a unit, such as "communities", in reports and otherwise, provides a harmonious impression that all people living in the area are included in this group, and hold the same perceptions, whether it be faith in the project revenues from REDD+, eagerness and availability to participation, needs satisfaction, and so on. TFCG / MJUMITA plan a positive

approach in relation to this issue, but there is also a negative catch to it. The positive is that they are planning a method by which payments from REDD+ goes to individuals. The negative is that, as a NGO, they have limited funds and time to work in the villages to make sure that the organizational system actually works.

Conceptualizing the Target Populations for REDD+ Revenues and Project Management in Tanzania

Who should be included in forest management and receive revenues from REDD+? I propose that the easy answer is: All people that are affected by the project. In this part I would like to suggest how to reflect on conceptualizations of the target populations for REDD+. To do this, it is necessary to go back in history, to the villagization process which took place in 1973-1976. It is explained by Albert K. Barume (2011) as the process of translocating people in Ujamaa villages[24] on cross of cultural backgrounds, lineages and clans, where they were expected to farm on communal farms which they had no cultural bonds to. Through this strategy, President Julius Nyerere had the intention to create economic independence for Tanzania after the colonial rule, but in the end he admitted that he had been wrong. Still the villages are there, and even though the ties to people and land within the village might in some way grow stronger, I believe that there were signs of limited trust and lack of common visions among people in the village that might have been related to the time when "artificial groupings" (Barume, 2011, p. 146) of Ujamaa villages were made.

It is also necessary to have a look at the internationally and nationally accepted ways to address people living in rural areas. In Tanzania the categorization of indigenous people is not very commonly used. Larson and Aminzade (2007) explain how the expression has been utilized differently in Tanzania as compared to the common international understanding of the term. There is no real definition of the expression that is internationally applicable, other than the right to claim indigenous self-definition, but the operating definition by international actors, e.g. UN staff, of "minorities who are threatened by the nation-state" determines what the authors call the "indigeneity". (Larson and Aminzade, 2007, p. 823) There are some small ethnic groups, like the Maasai and the Barabaig, that this definition applies to, but compared to indigenous groups in other REDD+ areas, like the Amazon and in Indonesia, they have not had very much impact on the national debate of indigenization, as it is considered an illegitimate threat to national unity. This

---

[24] Ujamaa Vijijini means "socialism within villages", and the process of implementing this policy is called villagization. (Barume, 2011, p. 140)

debate has mainly been concentrated on "the grievances and aspirations of the vast majority of the population, black Africans who have been economically marginalized and who see the economically dominant Asian minority or neocolonial foreign capital as the source of their continuing economic marginalization." (Larson and Aminzade, 2007, p. 822) Foreign investment and economic liberalization has imposed on the significance of indigenization in Tanzania. As Larson and Aminzade is also mentioning, I propose that another reason why the international understanding does not resonate as well among the Tanzanian population and their memory of the colonial history and racial domination strongly, is simply the fact that it is mainly developed in relation to the history of people living on other continents of the world. This memory combined with how the Tanzanian state has been mainly emphasizing national unity and strengthened the division between Tanzanian citizens and foreign investors has prevented people living in rural areas to come together and stand up for their specific rights. It has been difficult to come up with empowerment projects because it is intangible (Green, 2010). Projects of the like have been seen as unpredictable in terms of how the Government that claims to be on the people's side, not part of another racial or ethnical opposition group, could be pushed from a less powerful angle. Therefore, the introduction of Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) could either, if it succeeds, make some significant changes in villagers' way of thinking about their own rights, or if not, one should keep in mind that the project of REDD+ will in any case move on even though people do not fully understand the function of FPIC.

The term local communities can be substituted for the term indigenous people, but I will argue that neither of these terms should be taken for granted when considering villagers in groups or entities. The reason why I think it is important to reflect upon the content of these terms is that if we assume that they imply that the receivers of REDD+ funds are living harmoniously in groups or communities, we might forget about some important risks in relation to cooperation within the project, and benefit-sharing and empowerment as a result of the project. In one of my villages in particular, I would argue that local community can in some way be a problematic term in relation to cooperation and shared interests within the village boundaries. First, there were often people from other places living there over periods of time while they were renting land or clearing it for their own usage and those people would maybe also be affected by the project. Some came to do other kinds of work for a period of time, like selling beer, teaching, carpentry and healing through witchcraft, but those people would most likely not have that much to do with the project. Second, the category community partly tends to draw towards an understanding that it is one entity constituted of people with common interests and a good organizational system of leadership and governance. Nicholas K. Menzies (2007) discusses the term community, and writes that they are not

homogenous entities, but there is continuous change and diversity within them. A community is often defined in these CBFM projects due to the matter of place, such as the villages located nearby the forests, as in the case of the TFCG piloting of REDD+. Menzies writes that it is important to question and define who the community really is on a better basis than that of location or boundaries so that one can avoid the risk of disputes over who bears the costs and benefits of the project in the future and not undermine events of the project that should be locally attached, like for instance decision-making and the ability to monitor utilization of the resources (Menzies, 2007, p. 118). Instead of defining the expression "community" he would rather "… identify some characteristics that foster the kinds of trust, shared values, and expectations of reciprocity that build the capacity to take action in pursuit of a collective interest." (Menzies, 2007, p. 121) By the time I was in Ibingu – the village situated close to the road – I experienced several incidents of fights, both physical and verbal. 3 of them were about infidelity, 1 about money, and the other cases I do not know the cause of. I have no durable indicators on the status of shared values, but I know that regarding forest there are different views, some people thought it should be conserved whereas others have tried to clear forest for cultivation. Regarding trust I have already given an indicator through the stories of the elders about increased alcoholism, and they also said: "[Before villagization] we could leave the doors to our houses open as we went to the farm. Now we have to use a locker because of all the thefts. We don't trust people now." Reciprocity is nevertheless the most crucial element of the social environment. Due to all the insecurities that can follow unsteady rainfalls and destroyed crops, it is important to strengthen security through a person's social relations. The husband's family is among the relations that come first in reciprocal treatment, but there can also be similar relations to the wife's family and the neighbours.

I find that the most objective terms to be used in this setting are the terms "villagers" or "target population" (for REDD+ piloting). The Village Land Act 1999 defines the first term as "any person ordinarily resident in a village or who is recognised as such by the village council of the village concerned" (URT, 1999, Part 1 (2)) Most of the about 9000 villages in Tanzania were established once as part of the Ujamaa and villagization policy (Barume, 2011, p. 146) and due to information I got in the villages this was also the case for them. If the term "community" is applied to the people who are living in a village, there is a risk of undermining the divergence of interests and opportunities within the village, and the organizational challenges that need to be overcome to make the project work well. Questions that can be raised in relation to this issue are for instance; if the level of immigration and migration due to people coming from other villages to rent plots could be of relevance for the project; could there be unnecessary difficulties cooperating due to high alcohol consumption; what if the level of jealousy and elite capture were to become more recurrent; what if

there were conflicts of resources between the two villages that once used to share them? Those are questions that are important to address as the project proponent is "picking" sites for the projects.

Considering some Risks related to REDD+

There are several other risks to consider besides the two risks of access to land and natural resources, which was mentioned in the citation that initiated this chapter. One is that of reliability between actors both within and outside the "local community", and the potential for increased social differences, competition and jealousy within the society. In the case of "my" villages, there might be risks of competition between the two. People from Ibingu still have their farms up in Lunenzi from the days that they were one village. If the people of Lunenzi decide to conserve the forest in an area where an inhabitant of Ibingu has inherited the farming-plot from parents or grandparents, conflicts can arise. An option could have been to make the villages cooperate regarding the land use planning, since the people of Ibingu are relying on the soil in Lunenzi. I asked TFCG field-officers about this option, and they recognized that it could be a good one. From what I experienced during my fieldtrip in February, this option has not been considered.

As Menzies (2007) writes, local elites can easily exploit their position by dominating local institutions that are created as part of these kinds of projects, for instance the Village Natural Resource Committee that is created as part of REDD+. The RECOFTC principles are also proposing the risk of capture by elites of REDD+ benefits (Anderson, 2011, p. 10) Additionally, there might be a quite big risk of lacking revenues and unfulfilled promises and expectancies, depending on the degree to which REDD+ might actually work out or not. These two last risks can be connected to what the villagers risk in relation to time-consumption from the project-activities, that comes in addition to the ordinary daily work, of which the biggest share is considered women's work and is very time-consuming. Thus, for some women there are fewer opportunities to participate in meetings. Menzies writes that participation in community-based projects can become an inequitable burden for poorer people, where elites are the ones that benefit in the end (Menzies, 2007, p. 121). From my observations in the villages I perceive this as a high risk, as I already met villagers in February 2011, who complained that the project had not brought anything for *them*, but the members of the VNRC had received money for the work of marking the threes with red paint as part of the land use planning.

At "bibi's" (grandmother) home, a second home for her daughter, daughters in law and their children, and was a base during the day at the farm.

I am having a sip of " babu's" local beer – which is a valued gesture to offer your beer.

44

NGO's Role

Maia Green refers in her article on NGO work to Tanzanian indices on professional status through patronage and the power to command, and the material signifiers of global modernity. She writes that the power to command is also shared with an expatriate staff, and stakeholders within externally funded development projects are also adapted to the international expectations of modernity and wealth, where attached are proceedings of workshops in expensive hotels and the latest in vehicles and electronic office equipment (Green, 2003, p. 133).

Even though not everybody is involved directly in what happens in the field to the same degree as the field-officers, there are occasions that make the staff aware that there is another reality outside the offices and the five-star hotels where the project is envisioned. Learning lessons can be a tool for the future projects, and is the main purpose of piloting. If, on the contrary, the aim is to make the project work in the best way for the people in the specific sites, the "so-called policy dialogues in five-star hotels" in Dar es Salaam might not be as fruitful as it should have been. Issa Shivji's criticism of NGO's work in Tanzania is based on the way he has experienced it through his own participation in Tanzanian NGOs. What he describes can be interpreted as a notion of "anti-politics" (Ferguson, 1990). He writes that NGOs in Tanzania are not substituting themselves for the people, as they are neither elected by them nor representing them, and that they will never do so as long as they are not able to "expose and oppose imperial domination" (Shivji, 2007, p. 57) referring to the funding and neoliberal forces. He suggests that NGO's role should be to put pressure on the state and the democracy so that people themselves can be able to participate in policy-making. He utters that the strategies they perform are stifling public debates and the development of alternative methods by sticking to "stakeholder conferences" and "inputs into consultants' policy drafts" (Shivji, 2007, p. 58). This can be seen as a form of manipulation and replication of patterning within documents that has been emphasized by others, also Riles (2000, p. 79); "The objective was not so much to achieve transparent meaning as to satisfy the aesthetics of logics and language", and Green (2003, p. 129); "such documents have more in common with marketing texts than with social and economic analysis" in the competition for funding, depending on the current policy discourse within the area of development and funding.

While elaborating ideas on where frictions can be found to different times in the creation of discursive elements of REDD+, I have in the previous chapters been looking at different levels of understanding, and at historical and present discursive contexts of development and environment in Tanzania. The rest of this thesis will have a closer look at the more specific context of the NGO's work on REDD+. There are different conditional factors that are set by the donors and the international driving forces behind the project. I will discuss three of them here, which one can say that are already part of an international discourse on development interventions. The first part of this chapter aims to show how these conditional factors, which would be accepted, appreciated or rejected by different stakeholders to be present during REDD+ implementation, might influence on another conditional factor, namely that of transparency. They are corruption, risks and safeguards. One might argue that there are several other factors that are also influential in terms of transparency, but in respect to the conciseness of this thesis I choose to focus on these three that I find have the most relevance for my further argument. The three of them are intertwining in the way that corruption itself can be put under the category of risks, and safeguards can be a way of preventing risks. Accepting the fact that there will be a quite high level of risks has also had an effect on the requirements for implementing safeguards and maybe also on how to follow-up on corruption.

Donors insist on transparent procedures within development interventions, and this is first and foremost perceived as assured through a range of documentations. Most important are the reports written by project proponents, reviews of the reports done by the donor, and evaluations done by independent agencies. This requires a heavy reliance in what is presented in these documents. Yet, how do we recognize transparency itself? Is it even possible? What if there are differences between what is reported and what is really done in the field, between "the Design" and the "Real"? This division is made by Annelise Riles (2000), and can further be seen in relation to elaborations done on discourses, in the way that we here talk about two different discourses, even though they are imposing on each other. I would like to approach these questions by mainly making a comparison between the theoretical work of Riles and what my own data gathered. I will also see it in relation to Michel Foucaults' work on discourses (Foucault, 1981). Following this, there will be an analytical part about how transparency and sharing of information is working within the project, through documents, which I have chosen to focus on here.

Foucault about Discourse

The work of Michel Foucault (ref. in Dove and Carpenter, 2008, pp. 48-49) on power and discourses underlies the whole debate on these same issues, that has taken form within environmental anthropology, and I will therefore also go into some of it here. The way he has used the term is as something that defines knowledge and ways of acting, and he separated it from "the paradigm" and "the model" in the way that the statements of the discourse, that also are controlled by the discourse, sounds neutral and apolitical, but they are laden with power exercised over the dominant as well as the dominated. In his statement from 1970, L'ordre du Discours (Foucault, 1981), he has elaborated on different procedures that are controlling the discourse. First, he talked about the systems of exclusion, which are the "forbidden speech" (not everything is allowed to be outspoken), the "division of madness" (the madman's discourse cannot have the same currency as others) and the "will to truth" (the way in which knowledge is valorised, distributed and attributed in a society). The last system tries to assimilate the two others. Second group of procedures are the internal ones, those that come from the discourse, and reaffirms it. Those are the "commentary" (the discourses that are said, remain said, and are to be said again), the "author" (as a principle of grouping of discourses), and the "disciplines" (anonymous systems at the disposal to anyone who wants to or is able to use them, and who therefore is "in the true"). There's also a third group of procedures, according to Foucault, which is controlling the discourses. That is the "rarefaction of the speaking subject", which means that not everybody got access to partaking in all discourses, depending on the level of restrictions to partake in it.

I suggest that every time that the project of REDD+ receives its consent to be implemented at any level – for instance by the Tanzanian Government, the District Government or by the villagers – the discourse of REDD+ are accepted as a dominating discourse. That is not to say that actors at these levels cannot contribute to the discourse, but as Foucault writes, there is a "forbidden speech", which means that already established discourses will be overrun by this one. Furthermore, some individuals' utterances will not be considered, and not everybody will have access to partaking – often as a result of lacking knowledge about it. If one accepts the project, one accepts the discourse. If there would be people in the villages that are not accepting the project, and they choose to openly disagree, they will become "authors" of a conflicting discourse, and they would create frictions, which means there would be bargaining between the discourses, and the project would maybe be declined or be adjusted. If these people are rather disagreeing in silence, they would use euphemization as a weapon (Scott, 1985), which at the same time means that they would avoid frictions, as representatives of the "forbidden speech", or they would not be able to access the discourse.

In the following I will talk about elements of a REDD+ discourse; three conditional factors to be considered under the implementation of REDD+. These are "commentaries", the tools that are reproducing the discourse, but they are also transferred from another discourse on development project assistance, where the "authors", I propose, have originally been the funders.

Elements of a REDD+ Discourse

Transparency

Transparency is an exalted pursuit within REDD+ and other development projects, and this is mainly because of funds going to countries with high scale of corruption and limited or underdeveloped systems of governance. It is often perceived as a contradiction to corruption, where the effort to increase the prevalence of one of them would lead to a decrease in the prevalence of the other. I suggest that there are more than two sides to this, which I will get back to later in this chapter.

It has become an important emphasis for several NGOs to promote transparency in their work towards different stakeholders as a way of assessing their credibility. This is closely linked to accountability as another quality-mark. There can be different perceptions as to whether they are two different sets of values to strive for, or whether transparency is a prerequisite for accountability. An example on the latter is Jo Marie Griesgraber's description of how the High-Level Panel on IMF Board Accountability included transparency as one of four essential characteristics in the evolving standards of accountability, whereas the other three were evaluation, participation and external complaint mechanism (Griesgraber, 2008, p. 164). In 2006 a group of international NGOs founded the "International Non-Governmental Organisations Accountability Charter" in response to pressure from the media, business and governments. The charter is intended to demonstrate NGO's commitment to accountability and transparency, which shows how the two are juxtaposed in this setting (INGO Accountability Charter, 2012). Furthermore, NGOs have also put pressure the other way, by requesting for transparency-mechanisms and good governance as underlying principles in the dialogue with multilateral bodies, like G8 (Martin, 2008).

It might be convenient to see transparency as part of accountability, considering that an assessment of an organization without transparency, whatever this black-box[25] might entail, would most likely not be considered accountable. Which begs the question; what can the term transparency mean in

---

[25] See chapter 1 about Latour's statements about "black-boxes" as social aggregates.

the context of organizational work? Elizabeth Ridell-Dixon describes "transparent" as a term that implies clearly visible operations that are easily seen through, and when procedures are open to public scrutiny. She specifically mentions corruption and abuses of power as a threat that need to be uncovered through transparency, and methods that can be used for promoting the latter are open meetings and making information freely available (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, p. 94). During my fieldwork and the internship at the Embassy I did not experience that it was common to operate with open meetings among the NGOs, but they did however arrange workshops for specially invited people.

In the UN-REDD Global Programme Framework 2011-2015 (FAO et al., 2011a) transparency is primarily emphasized as crucial aspect of funding, but also some in relation to forest monitoring. The framework demands transparency to be promoted by working towards a trusted national fiduciary system for performance-based payments, preventing risks of corruption, and implementing good governance, policies and measures. When funding is transferred within the project it should be transparently done every step of the way via documentation.

Transparency has to contain more substance than the formality of including it in documents as a diffuse goal with no guidelines. It can be rewarding to make an account of how feasible it is in practice. What I suggest, is that at the same time as international frameworks incorporate transparency as a goal, and the pursuit of transparency is to be found within decision-making processes in NGO work, it is often not considered the fact that other ideals to strive towards, that are included in the same frameworks and strategies – or legislation for that matter – can actually work against the rise of transparency.

Risks and Corruption

In April 2011 Norway's former Minister of the Environment and International Development, Erik Solheim, said it was necessary to take the risks of acting fast on REDD+, because to wait for Kongo to be like Switzerland would mean that all the forest would be gone by that time (Tømte, 2011). Did he forget to consider the risks of the people living in the affected areas of REDD+? There has been a common understanding that there will be risks under REDD+. These kinds of risks in international development projects can be counteracted by for instance laws on corruption and safeguards. In this part I suggest that the actual emphasis on these risks is relative according to the kinds of risks we are talking about, and that it strongly depends on who is talking – what in Foucault's terms would be the "authors" of the discourse.

The risks of "landgrabbing", forced migration and other violations of indigenous people's rights are REDD+-related topics that have been frequently illuminated in the media.[26] What has been most emphasized as potential risks in the draft National Strategy for REDD+ in Tanzania is whether payments to villages will be sufficient and competitive, but also how this money and other external impact under REDD+ can be damaging for the affected people and deprive them from their rights (URT, 2010a). The Global Programme Framework has considered risks more broadly, with a high emphasis on corruption, but also on other types of risks like the feasibility and sustainability of the project in economic and ecologically vulnerable areas, lack of trust in society and political system, and indigenous peoples' and local communities' unwillingness to participate (FAO et al., 2011a). This shows that rights related to people living in the affected areas are respected within the international discourse.

Relatively regardless of what these quite recently prepared documents say about risks, and what the discussion is about at international and national level, the contracts of funding are between the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the NGOs, and hence the administration of the allocations to the pilot projects is done by The Royal Norwegian Embassy, as the "actors" on behalf of The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What follows is that the manuals for administration of funds are those that are developed by Norad, which is the directorate of development assistance under the Ministry. Therefore, there are some risks that are particularly emphasized which follow the common regulations for disbursement of money, and which are reflected in the contracts.[27] Regardless of whether REDD+ contains principles of safeguards and payment for performance to be implemented, the Norwegian restrictions for receiving funds for piloting REDD+ did not demand safeguards to be implemented. This is not to say that the organizations did not recognize the need for safeguards, but it did remain a diffuse and suppressed theme for discussion at the national level for the first two years after a contract with the Tanzanian Government was signed. Thus, the situation is reflective of previously introduced adage of trying to "fly a plane while building it". At the same time, one can see how the existing discourse of development assistance is put directly onto the REDD+ discourse in the way of the Norwegian bureaucratic administration-system - the place where one is least likely to find events of frictions. This can be a reason to why the safeguards were forgotten in the initial process, as a need for debates on guidelines for the project at this level was not realized.

---

[26] REDD Monitor is the most important channel for informal discussions on REDD+ initiatives: http://www.redd-monitor.org/

[27] The Royal Norwegian Embassy gives access to the contracts on this webpage: http://www.norway.go.tz/News_and_events/agreements_and_contracts/

Norway operates with a principle of "zero-tolerance" for corruption related to financial support. The meaning that the Norwegian Government ascribes to this principle of "zero-tolerance" is that future disbursements will be halted, and there will be demands of repayment and compensation in cases where there is reasonable suspicion of corruption (Glenne et al., 2010). The tricky thing with it is that good guidelines are not fully developed. Inflexibility in practice, when it comes to reporting on corruption, can be a problem at several levels. Research has found that a strict corruption-policy like the one that is used by the Norwegian Department of Foreign Affairs (UD), leads to less dialogue between the parties, less reporting, and can work against the overall goal of the funded initiative (Trivunovic et al., 2011). In relation to the funding for REDD+ preparations in Tanzania, corruption has already been detected and funding for the project has been halted (Makoye, 2012).

A widely acknowledged definition of corruption is "abuse of public trust for private gain" (Uwazi, 2008, p. 1). To explain how little the "public trust" is perceived as something worth investing in for most civilians, I refer to the section in chapter 3 about conceptualizing the "communities" for REDD+ revenues to get an idea of how fragile the public trust can be. Results from the survey Fordia Corruption Perception Index for Tanzania from 2008 showed that on a household-level there is a wide understanding that the source of corruption is greed and selfishness, and the problem of this is acknowledged as a socially bad phenomenon, first because it denies people their rights to social services, second because it erodes public trust in the judicial system. The survey also shows that 43% of ordinary Tanzanians confess to having, at least once, paid a bribe as means to access services in the Local Government Authorities (LGA). 95.4 % of those who do so, do it forcefully in their own perception (Uwazi, 2008). What the survey shows is that there is a market for corruption when people are pressured.

Corruption is widespread in Tanzania, at every level, as the poverty level creates a high demand for bribery. One example within the tax administration, when the 1996 reform which introduced Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) seemed for a period to be improving the situation of corruption within the section, until it increased again. A CMI report suggests that it is partly because compared to bribes, the pay rates offered of tax officers are not likely to be high enough (Fjeldstad, 2002). A reason why corruption is so embedded in Tanzanian society can be related to emergency at lower level – the level of poverty in relation to highly challenging market-forces. The food-prizes in Tanzania had been estimated to having increased more than 30 % since the beginning of year 2011 up to February 2012 (Mbashiru, 2012). At that point the Annual Inflation Rate for food consumed at home and away from home was 25.5%, which has decreased to 24.7 % in April 2012, but is still high (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012). Low wages compared to these prizes may have been of the contributing causes to what I have experienced as a somewhat openness in relation to

transactions that can be termed corruption. It does not mean that everyone is fine with it; it is a known problem, especially in the work of building trust among people. In one REDD+ village that I briefly visited in Zanzibar, there were questions about how to solve problems with the people patrolling the forest, which often received bribes from people who had abused laws that had been agreed upon regarding the utilization of resources in the forest area. Members of the village that we talked to perceived it as a problem for the society, but at the same time there were understandings as to why this happened, as one explanation that they gave was that many people were related and it would be difficult to deny relatives access to what they needed in the forest. Another example is the NGO that officially follows a policy of not paying people in the villages for participating in meetings because of restrictions towards funders. In practice I experienced that the field-team had decided to pay them, both out of moral reasons, considering little spare-time left from the farm and the domestic work, and because of own interests of gathering as many people as possible. Looking at it this way one can maybe start a discussion on what is more moral between zero-tolerance of corruption as what we associate with the word corruption itself, and corruption as bending the strict policy of a NGO, which is again created to satisfy donors, to support the people in poor areas with an option to participate in the meetings, or accepting briberies to satisfy their basic needs. My effort by giving these examples of corruption is to create an understanding of how much corruption has become infiltrated at different levels in Tanzania and why it is problematic to expect zero-tolerance in relation to corruption.

My purpose with this section is also to shed light on the fact that even though there has been a common understanding that there are risks related to REDD+, the risks related to the people living in the villages that have been included in the project are clearly coming in the second line, whereas the risks related to the funders – the part that concerns what will happen to Norwegian tax-payers' money – is much more pre-oriented in the means that the pre-condition of no corruption is already specifically included in the contract. Not only are those risks related to the donor country more frequently considered in contractual terms, but risks related to those living in the REDD+ villages are also less outspoken and communicated to them, something I will return to in the next chapter.

If the risks for the environment including its inhabitants in the relevant areas are to get more significance than merely attention in international discussions, should they not be considered at the same political level as the risks of corruption? To me this shows the agency of controlling transparency, when certain risks are taken seriously and others not. It is nevertheless evident that some of the agency here rests with the contract document, which is something that can confirm Latour's arguments about the agency of objects (Latour, 2005, pp. 63-86).

Safeguards

> REDD has the potential to save forests and benefit the local communities around them, but it also could do enormous harm in terms of forcing people off their traditional lands, destroying natural ecosystems for the sake of maximising carbon, and creating new wealth which is hogged by the few. That's why we have these things called "safeguards". What we could have got out of Durban was some minimum standards for reporting, a format, a review mechanism, and perhaps even a grievance procedure. What we got instead was a tame declaration that all safeguards should be reported on, as transparently as possible, according to a timetable that will be discussed next year. And there will be another meeting next year to discuss whether any more guidance than that is needed.[28]

Prior to the COP17 conference in Durban different stakeholders were gathered in a workshop in Dar es Salaam to discuss which topics Tanzania should showcase in the conference. Safeguards were among the topics, but since there was no national strategy for them at the moment, the decision that the NGOs themselves should present their own safeguards was made. What was evident from the workshop, was that the ones that had the most comprehensive guidelines for safeguarding activities was a private plantation company, which was not doing any REDD+ initiatives at that time.

The matter of safeguards is a wide theme. The term has been frequently used within the REDD+ discourse, especially during the last year. In this setting it can roughly be divided into social- and environmental safeguards. The intention in relation to the REDD+ initiatives has been that they should follow a political strategy at national level, and therefore the issue of safeguards has also been considered as national responsibility. There are different international standards that can be followed, but the NGOs themselves have not been obliged to follow these, as they have signed contracts with Norway directly, and these contracts did not include safeguards, but a separate paragraph 8 on corruption and annual audits of financial statements are included. This is also due to the fact that safeguards for UN-REDD first became a main request in the Cancun Agreements that came out from the COP 16 conference in December 2010 (UNFCCC, 2011, Annex 1, §2), and hence there is a big black hole related to accountability on the issue. An options assessment report prepared by the Meridian Institute for The Norwegian Government in 2009 did mention safeguards in relation to the strategy of Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC). This was however not mentioned as something that should be part of the REDD agreements, but more like an "international norm" that "…can play a role in enhancing procedural rights…" (Angelsen et al., 2009, pp. 27-28). Norway did recognize the need for safeguards on biodiversity and procedures of

---

[28] Excerpt from the blog titled "Progress on REDD at CoP17" written by CARE's Technical Advisor Raja Jarrah in TZ-REDD Newsletter issue no. 6, January 2012. Accessible from: http://www.tnrf.org/reddnewsletter6#highlights4

free, prior and informed consultations for those affected by REDD+ under a submission to the AWG LCA[29] (2009). Nevertheless, a real-time evaluation done on Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI)[30] came with a report in 2011, which was negative on the point where it found the initiative too vague on Norway's expectations and demands towards the pilot countries on biological and human protection within REDD+ (Tipper et al., 2011, p. 57).

In Tanzania it has been very hard to develop discussions and understanding surrounding safeguards at national level, and that can be due to the fact that it has also been a blurry debate at international level, and hence little guidance on how to move forward on this vague phenomenon of safeguards. The quotation in the beginning of this section expresses that there is a lot of frustration regarding the blurriness on what should be NGOs' obligations to safeguards. In the UN REDD Global Programme Framework 2011-2015 it is said that:

> Thanks to its experience and activities on … iii)FPIC; iv) social and environmental risk identification and mitigation approaches … the UN-REDD Programme is well placed to provide guidance and support to establish such systems.[31]
>
> (FAO et al., 2011a, p. 35)

What the UN organizations presented in September 2011 on Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria under UN-REDD, was that this risk identification and mitigation tool, as is mentioned in the citation above, were to be piloted trough out 2012, whilst the principles and criteria themselves, which are supposed to support countries in building a national approach to the safeguards agreed upon in Cancun, were to be approved in 2012 (FAO et al., 2011b). It shows the relatively slow motion at UN level. My effort here is to make clear that for those that see safeguards as included within REDD+ due to how the international REDD+ discourse has embraced them, it should be pointed out that they are not included in the Tanzanian initiatives that are running today. Therefore, one can question whether safeguards really are mechanisms without any substance for legitimizing REDD+, and hence working against the pursuit of transparency. I hope this figure can illustrate my point:

---

[29] The AWG LCA is a working group to facilitate discussions on how to implement the UNFCCC.

[30] NICFI is equivalent to the Norwegian initiatives on REDD+.

[31] The systems in question refers to Article 71(d) of the Cancun Agreements which calls for REDD+ countries to develop systems for providing information on how the safeguards that are described in the annex 1 of the agreements are being addressed and respected.

	Promoted as part of *agreement*/ present in *contract documents*	Exists with high probability during *implementation*	Promoted through Tanzania's national draft strategy	Promoted in REDD+ mechanisms and international framework	Transparency promoted through inclusion or exclusion of principles
Risks	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Negative
Korruption	Negative	Positive	Negative	Negative	Negative
Safeguards	Negative	Negative	Positive	Positive	Negative

Fig. 1: Three conditional factors for REDD+ consideration and how they promote transparency.

Explaining the model: I argue that the common understanding that there will be several risks in REDD+ can both minimize the seriousness that it deserves, and also that it can put attention towards certain obvious risks and then forget about those that were less foreseen at an early stage. The risk of corruption gets special treatment. If risks of corruption appear in a report, this issue is so sensitive that the consequences compared to those if one reported lack of social or environmental safeguards, which are not captured in any legal document, would be perceived as much more serious, and it should be thoroughly reasoned why the word corruption has been mentioned in the report, and why the project is then still receiving funds. In the end the result is therefore that the pressure to implement specific safeguards like FPIC can easily become lower from the donor side compared to the pressure to prove the absence of, or I would rather say not mention the risk of, corruption. Safeguards have been more talk than action up till now, and is therefore used as an element of the discourse that is legitimizing itself by what Foucault calls the "authors" of the discourse at the international level. Transparency is therefore not promoted through safeguards at the present stage.

The Aesthetics of Information-Sharing and Decision-Making as Commentaries to the REDD+ Discourse

As I have already described earlier in this chapter, "commentaries" are what Foucault sees as what is said and done to reaffirm the discourse. "Authors" are needed to make those "commentaries". This part aims to see how aesthetics is tied to the process of making those "commentaries", and I

suggest that they are supplying to information, form and facts within the REDD+ discourse, while also drawing on existing discourses. First and foremost, I want to describe how this works towards sharing of information through the well-known designs of documents that are what Latour calls "artifacts" distributed within the "network" of similar institutions as the NGO. The document in question is the TFCG Project Proposal. The document was initially the most concise and concrete presentation of information on the TFCG / MJUMITA pilot project. It contained the "logframe" with the different activities that the project would be doing in relation to their schedule. Nevertheless, it did not contain FPIC, neither did it say anything about an agricultural expert. It did say something about considering so-called "cross cutting issues", that are requested by the donor countries to be included, like "… ensuring that AIDS-related messages are inserted into exiting training and capacity building processes at the community level". (TFCG, 2009, p. 37) These "cross-cutting issues", the other two being promoting gender-equality and addressing poverty, are issues that already were decided to be included from before, as part of the existing discourse on development and conservation in Tanzania, and illustrate how they can be transferred from one Project Proposal to the other, regardless of the project. Riles calls it "patterning".

Some of the reason for why I became interested in the way information about the REDD+ project was distributed at different levels, was because there seemed to be so many speculations surrounding what the project was really about – was it really something new to Tanzania, or was it just funding for continuing what the NGOs already did? Would it really mean revenues for people living nearby the forest, and in any case – would the amount be considerable? Was Tanzania really the right country for piloting REDD+? With all these uncertainties among the NGO-staff as well as at national and international level, I of course wondered like everybody else how they would be able to explain this to the people living in the villages. In other words, the big question was if "authors" for the REDD+ discourse were really available, and what would be the consequences if not. As I have described earlier, the discourse merged into what was already present in the world of funding for development and conservation in Tanzania, and by drawing on this old discourse, and making less frictions, the problem seemed to be solved. It seemed at least to be the case within the designs of the project.

I will continue to find basis for my arguments in Riles (2000) work on the aesthetics of information. I have been talking about a discourse on REDD+, which has grown much more rich since the initial stages. It has been interesting and engaging to follow this process, the initiatives around the world have been triggering creative thoughts and engaging debates, and several times we are reminded of how big this is – that we are actually part of the first meetings of these kinds. These kinds of aesthetic emphasis got much attention during conferences and workshops on REDD+. The

engagement that is felt when we are reminded about the scope of the information-sharing and decision-making in the project of which we are partaking or even only observing from the sideline, is a similar case to what I think Riles is writing about when referring to the aesthetics of information within the "NGO-network". She has mixed definitions made by Bateson and Strathern on information and aesthetics to come up with a perception based on the persuasiveness of form and elicitation of appropriateness with the need for a pattern to connect through information sharing.

Riles also writes about design as a "networked craft of visual manipulations of the aesthetics of communication," (Riles, 2000, p. 20) and say that their purpose is not to describe fully but to channel attention. What is crucial about the design is that it should be possible to remake it or pieces of it in different settings. Let me illustrate what such a visual manipulation might look like:

Fig. 2: The organizational structure of TFCG as presented in their Project Proposal

Fig. 3: MJUMITA organizational structure, as presented in their Project Proposal

These are the organizational structures of the two organizations. The arrows are representing the information-flow. What I want to illuminate, is that they both have the technical advisors illustrated as imposing on the staff from the sideline, where no information is going back to them. It might be true that they had limited knowledge about the project areas, since they were mainly working in the office, but that is also why there had to be a lot of information going back to them. The way I experienced these positions and their significance and relevance during the time I was there was that those positions of the technical advisors were the most central ones to the accumulation of and influence on discursive knowledge, and the TFCG Technical Advisor was what Riles terms the "Focal Point" in the organization, in relation to exchange of information within the project and maybe, in Riles' conceptualizations, with an "aesthetic attraction, the desire to captivate that it evidences." (Riles, 2000, p. 130) In addition to being the one to follow up on international processes on REDD+, she is also the one that receives information from the field-officers. The TFCG Technical Advisor was in some way the control-organ of the project, and in the figure it would have been more right to put her in the middle of the model with several arrows going both ways in different directions. The technical advisors were not only advisors as such. They were in addition to the executive directors the only ones who knew, if any, what REDD+ was really about. The TFCG Technical Advisor and Executive Director were also the ones that knew what was the organization's expectations and role within REDD+ in Tanzania, whereas MJUMITA is more of a supporter to

58

their founder organization and their decisions about REDD+. When asking the field-officers about this issue, I was told to go asking the senior staff – the people occupying these two already mentioned positions. The reason for this might be that all the other people working on the project were temporarily employed, while Technical Advisor and Executive Director were not.

Riles writes that information has the ability to create a "gap" in the way it is relative in its paucity of meaning and content. This further gives ground to her references to Strathern's arguments on how information can be seen differently from different points of views, as she argues all phenomena are infinitely complex. This depends on "… an aesthetic that places a central emphasis on the quality of information …" (Riles, 2000, p. 18) For instance, the Project Proposal contains several conceptualized terms from both the international discourse on REDD+ and the national discourse on forest conservation and NGO work, and the language is quite technical in relation to this. Some of the "new" terms that came with REDD+ have been heavily emphasized, and those that are related to what is "new" with REDD+, like the mechanisms that will measure the basis for REDD+ revenues, and how these revenues should be handled, have been even more exalted than those of the mechanisms for securing people's rights.

Having a look into different project proposals one soon realizes the system of writing them, where the most crucial component is the so-called logical framework, showing output-activities related to the timeline and preferably costs inside a matrix. The practical purpose of the design is that it is cross-culturally recognizable and transferable in its meaning and utilization, that it should be possible to cut out parts and paste it into a similar design, like what I have done above, so that processes can move quicker, for instance in bureaucratic processes on cross of boarders.

Having these procedures saves time, as project proponents know the discourse and codes designing a project, and it can cause less friction if the project proponents know how to write them well. It would lead to less discussion with the donors on what should be included, and how much money should be used on a certain activity etc. If there nevertheless would be lack of for instance attention paid to gender equality or HIV/aids issues within the documents, the donor can easily refer to the regulations of the donor-country, and how this should be addressed within the designed project. There should also not be too much friction, as donors and proponents should be two collaborating parties where trust is perceived as important for good collaboration, and frictions in the Tanzanian donor/recipient relationship can be seen as something negative and something that foster distrust.

Riles writes that on Suva (Fiji), the design often seemed to replace the project itself, so that whereas the design of the project is "the project", what is happening in the villages is something else. What

can it be? She is making a distinction between the Design and the Real, and the Real is perceived as something that is outside the "network" of institutions and knowledge practices and the artifacts of these that are continually reflecting upon themselves as a "network", and hence constituting its existence, which is superseding reality. The "networks" are also conduits for the flow of information and enlightenment (Riles, 2000, p. 173). What she aims at is the creation of a discourse within the "network", which is based on this kind of information, and that this again is the base for the creation of designs, which "make no appeal to a reality outside and beyond themselves" (Riles, 2000, p. 143), although there is an awareness of a different "world out there". At the same time as the Real among the people participating in the "networks" that she describes was seen as outside the design and the "network", there was also a powerful appeal towards it, and an awareness of the lack, which would occasionally stimulate the urge for "Action" and effort to approach the Real. Those attempts to enact the Real through discussions about language and meaning, activism and negotiations of funding would frequently declare the lacks regarding the Real within the function of the "network", which as mentioned would only exist through reflections upon itself.

In relation to my analysis, what is crucial is how she sees information as relative depending on the aesthetical condition – here I am focused on the aesthetics of bureaucratic system – and how the aesthetics of relevant information highly impacts on forms of design, which are artifacts within the "network". As Riles writes; "… aesthetic of system has implications for the character of the information it systematizes – for what we might call the aesthetics of fact (Riles, 2000, p. 138).

In the next part I have described how this explains the NGO's emphasis on upward accountability compared to the downward accountability – why the NGO's are so susceptible to the bureaucratic system, which runs more easily without frictions. It is of course because of the necessity to adapt to the donor demands, but it does also have a strong aesthetical side to it, which is attached to the aesthetics of how information is presented in form and facts within what Riles terms the "network", but what I term "stakeholders" in the context of this thesis.

NGO – Nothing Going On?

It had already started to get dark when I arrived at the TFCG / MJUMITA office that Saturday. The TFCG Technical Advisor and a representative from a cooperating NGO were working there. I was hoping to get some information about where we were going the next day. "We" were the same representative, whom I from now on will call Anna, Makaa, and me. Makaa was the manager of the project. I was surprised to see them working there in the dark on a Saturday, although I had

60

understood that it was not uncommon for the Technical Advisor to have long working hours. They seemed slightly stressed, and I found it rather convenient to leave the place after some advices to bring snacks and sensible shoes, and the message from Technical Advisor that we would go "wherever we decide tonight". I was surprised by the small and seemingly arbitrary, or spontaneous forum where this decision was made.

"So which villages are we going to?" I asked Makaa the next day. I had put on my converse-branded shoes, which was the closest I got to sensible, and was ready for my very first trip to "somewhere-rural-areas" outside Dar es Salaam. Makaa was morning-tired and restless to leave after waiting nearly half an hour in the car for Anna, who were discussing with the receptionist at the hotel about the price of her room, as he answered; "actually, Heidi, we are not going to the villages this time, we will only be going to the districts to talk to different people, forest officers and natural resource officers and maybe some other staff" I was disappointed as I heard that all the information for making the site-selection, like the drivers of deforestation and poverty level, was to be gathered at district level, and that no consultation was to be done among the villagers themselves. If the districts were chosen before the villages, it meant that at least a certain number of villages in the area were bound to be included, without the villagers being aware of it, and without the organizations knowing the people and the area. The TFCG Technical Advisor and Anna had made a selection of four districts that we went to, whereof two were chosen during a workshop later in Dar es Salaam, where the information gathered was presented.

From the very start of the trip the conversation between the two officers was set with the theme "REDD". They were very eager in discussing, most of the time it was about "what are we really doing?" Makaa seemed to try to hunt out a way to legitimize it all, while Anna was the one giving him "answers" – though not very optimistically; "REDD is really nothing new besides the money, it is business. We have the carbon market already, and we have the techniques through PFM. If REDD doesn't bring us anything else, why should we bother to test it out?" The conversation came to an arousal at the moment Anna gave Makaa a number of dollars that she assumed to be the sum of what the local people would receive from the REDD project – 10 US dollars each a year. Further, that would be 0.03 dollars a day. Makaa obviously went into a mild form of desperation when he heard this, and he seemed very unsatisfied with the position he just found himself in. Out of frustration he said he wanted to call his bosses, to make them explain to him what sort of mission they were actually sending him on. "Do they want me to tell the villagers that we will give them 10 dollars a year to stop farming?" This was something he said to express his frustrations at the moment, and he never called them. "What would you do in my position, Heidi? Would you have the balls to tell them that?" he asked me. I had to compose myself in finding a good answer, having

been nausea from the bumpy road we were driving in for the last two hours, and trying to make some unreadable notes at the same time. I did not really manage it, and answered: "no". The two of them seemed to have quite big doubts regarding their jobs, and whether this kind of work was even worth their allowance. Anna was focused on this, and justified it through the fact that somebody were going to do this anyway, they could just as well govern the process, and anyway, they had to pay their bills.

I heard one reason to why Makaa was not working for the organization some weeks later. Maybe the event I described above could be another one. At least he told m that if he did not have other opportunities, he would still be working for the organization. I had several conversations with him later, and he said he was happy to contribute to my knowledge about NGO work and forest conservation in Tanzania. He said I did him a favor to explain his version of it: How the site-selection had been a rubber-stamping process where the organization had already decided their two districts before the workshop took place; how the organization had just left all activities in one area during an earlier project as it did not work out well with the authorities in the area; how there was seldom any revenues for the villagers in these projects; now this REDD that he had thought would be the solution to all the problems with lacking revenues seemed to be no solution at all. "Forest conservation is killing people slowly, cut down the damn forest and put something useful there – plantations, or farms – something that the people can make use of! These NGOs, they are just in there for the money, they don't care. N-G-O – Nothing Going On! Put that down! Damn!" he said, while he pointed hard towards my notebook. I had obviously put some fire on his mind about things he had wanted to utter for a long time.

The incident of friction described above represents two persons' view on the project in its early stages, and does not necessarily represent all stakeholders' views on the project and NGO work. I find the case important in illuminating agency and accountability among NGO staff, and how information has been shared, or not shared, within the NGO. In analytical terms, this friction did not lead to anything new other than new information for Makaa, which made him change his opinion about the project. He nevertheless continued in his position, and therefore Anna's information seemed like an intermediary at the moment. However, it was a mediator, in the way that it strongly affected his opinion, and hence his position as a Project Manager, and can have been affecting him to quit his position.

I was surprised by the impact that Anna's information had on Makaa. It showed that the occupation as a REDD Project Manager did not necessarily imply that one would know too much about the project itself. It could also be a sign that he did not really believe in the project, considering his

62

views upon NGO work itself. Should not sufficient information from the senior-staff have been given for him to be comfortable in what he was about to do? His occupation entails acting professional and to have the responsibility to lead the project coordination team, to communicate between project staff, external organizations, Government and media among others, and thus it would be important for him to have a lot of information about REDD+.

However, both Makaa and Anna seemed to disclaim their accountability as actors within the REDD+ discourse. Despite the friction, Makaa did still not call his bosses to claim better "work-conditions" in form of less responsibility in what he had been set to do. What Anna meant with "govern the process" I do not know, but there might be little intended actions underlying. What was evident was that their intentions with what they were doing were good, but they perceived the situation as being out of their hands. Makaa told me: "They have to realize that forest conservation is expensive. You have to address the whole issue of poverty, and that is not cheap." This runs contrary to what was the original idea of REDD+, which was seen as a cheap way of improving climate change conditions.

An Attempt to Locate Agency and Accountability

As I received the Project Proposal from the technical advisor in TFCG I was told; "don't circulate it, "cause it's not an official document". So the proposal was not supposed to be shown to everybody. I found this inconvenient, since the pursuit of transparency seemed to be talked about and emphasized to a high degree. I will argue that the Project Proposal has a lot of agency depending on how it is used and by whom. It describes the project itself in the most concrete manner, but it is not equivalent to the project. Although depending on international decisions, the project at local level is being formed by different people's perceptions to it, and some of these opinions are influenced by the content of the Project Proposal depending on how meticulous the field-staff has been reading it, and how the content has been presented to others. When I asked one of the field-officers about how they had gone through the proposal in the start-up phase of the project, he told me that there had been no careful review of it in the plenary to make sure that the staff had understood the content of it, but they had received a copy and went through it roughly, so they had only ascertained the general idea of REDD+. I argue that the Project Proposal has got the agency to produce different thinking about the project. This again imposes on and is part of the net of processes that later constitutes the project in action. These are also frictions, as events that in

some way can be imposing on the steering of global processes in a sometimes different direction than what was intended. Also through the documents is the REDD+ discourse dynamic and constantly evolving, as they present agendas that are being imposed on it in different ways at different times and in different places. I propose that they are working as "authors" and "mediators" at the same time, in the way that they are giving information about the projects, which is changing according to the perception of the person who is reading it. I also propose that besides these documents, there was a lack of "authors", which would lead to frustration and lack of information among the staff as well as the villagers.

Accountability in the development context implies the responsibility to outcomes of interventions, and is therefore important to be localized within development work in the way that somebody should be responsible for the consequences of actions, and not only the way they are implemented (Trivunovic, 2011, p. 11). What I have tried to demonstrate at several points throughout this thesis, is that the agency and accountability of TFCG / MJUMITA as REDD+ pilot organizations at international level is crucial in the present form of the REDD+, and that the NGOs are also the ones that probably have the largest urge to push for decisions and obligations in international forum, which would be in their favour. At the same time, partly because of the aesthetics of knowledge, facts, system, form and results, partly because of the necessity of satisfying donor requirements, the upward accountability is often stronger than the downward- and internal accountability (Ebrahim, 2003). As Kontinen (2004) is emphasizing, one should also be reminded that the NGOs themselves are in some way depending on good cooperation with the villagers, so that they can get good results from the projects and further funding. This is where it is necessary to advocate an understanding of the local needs and situation in international forum, so as to impose on the decisions made for the future projects. If, however, the local needs are not expressed, as a result of having too little knowledge about the project, or because of villagers "social weapon" of euphemization, localizing accountability can be difficult.

Riles wants to give attention to how seamless knowledge-practices of intergovernmental and UN character fade into one's own, and she describes how the Pacific NGOs that she was working with increasingly adapted to these practices to be able to participate in the debate that concerned them. She mentions that the NGOs are also gaining legitimacy together with the UN institutions from these conferences, and the NGO community claims them to validate their own significance and promote their causes nationally and internationally. This shows how strongly dependent the NGOs are, of the conferences, of other institutions, and of the documents produced as results of these conferences, where "the only way to counter a text is with a better text" (Riles, 2000, p. 13) An effort she makes by promoting all these issues is to show the adaptation to an information-system of
64

documents and conferences that moves towards the initial hope of UN to produce international practices and norms.

What can be positive for the organizations is if they are able to be active in the work of promoting the making of a national strategy that is in accordance with an international framework when possible. This would show the accountability of some organizations in the facilitations for REDD+ at national level, at the same time as it also shows their desire to find the "unsolved solutions" within the REDD+ programme to get an idea of how to move forward, and to see how the pilots can fit into the future frames of REDD+, they have some pressure to follow these international standards for the sustainability of these projects. In a review made by TFCG they have compared four different internationally recognized safeguard standards (UN-FCCC, FCPF, UN-REDD and REDD-SES) towards the national REDD+ strategy to evaluate where gaps and weaknesses are within the national REDD+ strategy and other national policy frameworks. TFCG expressed the urgency to get this Strategy in place.

Whether firm ideas about safeguards are stipulated in political decisions or not seems to make all the difference in the work of development agencies, because without the decisions the accountability and hence the transparency can to a quite high degree escape the project. An example is to for instance draw this in relation to what I have pointed out earlier, that there were no obligations for the NGOs to do FPIC, and TFCG is the only organization that claim to do this, and none of the organizations have got any obligations due to their contracts to include specific safeguards – even though the discussions on safeguards for securing the rights of indigenous people and protect biodiversity have been going on at international level for a long time. This does not mean that what is decided at international level will automatically be applied at lower level, it is also a matter to interpret and adapt the decisions to the relevant project and context for implementation. At the implementation level, as a result of less obligations towards safeguards because they were still unclear, the discussions were put to the side to make way for new things that had to be sorted out in relation to REDD+ - namely mechanisms related to the money; like the monitoring and verification of the REDD+ forest areas, carbon-markets and benefit-sharing. Although social rights to some extent are at stake in the NGO project proposals, there have been no obligations to safeguarding them, and it has been more to a voluntary degree from the organizations themselves, and not through the contractual obligations that set the standard for reporting. Hence, my proposal is that the contracts, that are supposed to make clear the responsibility-standards between the parties, should promote more accountability on safeguard-issues and affected people's rights. It is important that there should be a pre-condition for starting implementing REDD+ initiatives that equals the risks of the poor in the form of safeguards like FPIC with the risks of the

donor in the form of corruption[32]. The latter has already got a lot of attention, and been carefully reviewed upon, but the former has basically only been talked about.

Part of the aim of this chapter has been to see how the lack of adapted accountability among international proponents of the REDD+ regime and funders of initiatives are affecting the process of implementation, and the inefficiency of talking about safeguards and zero tolerance of corruption when guidelines are absent. However, at lower level there are also evidences of too little accountability.

Under the Oslo REDD Exchange conference in June 2011 a representative from the Rainforest Foundation Norway requested that the UN organizations and the World Bank should be clearer on their obligations to implement the rights of indigenous people into their policies of REDD. Another way of saying this could be to say that obligations to safeguards like FPIC should be clearer within the Programme. A lot has happened on the development of principles within UN-REDD since that time, and a lot has also happened at local implementation level since that time. I suggest that these obligations should also have been more prevalent in the Norwegian piloting initiatives.

---

[32] I am aware that corruption is not only a risk for the donor, but it is also a risk for the function of the societies where the money goes. Nevertheless I choose to put the two principles of zero-tolerance for corruption and safeguards up against each other in this text to illustrate the difference in prioritizing, as the contracts do not say anything about addressing these types of lower level corruption, and it would therefore be little use in talking about these kinds of risks in relation to them.

Village Meeting and FPIC

Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) has slowly been formed into a strategy that is opposing the saying frequently heard in the 1950's and 60's world of development work; "You can't make an omelet without breaking eggs" (Goodland, 2004, p. 66).

In this chapter I intend touch on how risks are being communicated by TFCG / MJUMITA, and to what has been termed the target-communities for REDD+ piloting at the very initial stage of project implementation. I will discuss how this is done in relation to the principles of Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), which is obliged under the guidance of UN-REDD.[33] Whilst informing about REDD+ the project proponents should make sure that a "Balanced treatment of potential positive and negative impacts takes place, as identified by both parties, including direct and opportunity costs" (Anderson, 2011, p. 21). Despite a heavy emphasis at international level on the importance of including these FPIC guidelines together with REDD+, they are still per May 2012 in draft version in the UN (UN-REDD, 2011).

Even though TFCG / MJUMITA are now implementing FPIC as part of the project, the emphasis of this did not occur until late in the introductory-phase of the piloting, and there were no signs of using them while I did my fieldwork. Therefore I question the way FPIC is done, as it is not introduced to the villagers "Prior" to REDD+ implementation. It can be put it in relation to what I have earlier written on obligations to safeguards, to see if they really promote transparency, or if they rather serve another purpose, namely the aesthetics of information and facts through developing "lessons learnt". I want to show here, that the mechanism can be important for project implementation, at the same time as the way it is done is similarly crucial. This not only has to do with the "P" for "Prior", the "I" is also a concern because there is still insufficient information about REDD, and for the consent to be really "informed", the information on this should also be communicated to the affected villagers due to FPIC. I refer to some conversations with villagers about their expectations, and also disappointments to REDD+ that might give some insights as to why FPIC would be a necessary way of introducing the projects, and maybe why the organization also decided to utilize the methodology after some time.

---

[33] This has not been part of the commitments under the bilateral funding for REDD+ initiatives in Tanzania, and TFCG is the only organization in Tanzania which has included FPIC as part of the process of REDD+ implementation. FPIC has been highly prioritized at international level in relation to REDD+, and I have therefore choosen to also put particular emphasis on this, as TFCG's pilot can be crucial in the elaboration of this mechanism in Tanzania.

As I came back to the villages in February 2011 I did three main observations. First was that some people were quite confused and worried, because they had received a red cross on a tree nearby their farm, which meant that they were supposed to stop farming there. The cross, had been painted by representatives in the Village Natural Resource Committee (VNRC), which had been established as part of the project initiative, by TFCG and MJUMITA.

The second observation was that some people complained they had been excluded from meetings on REDD+ in the village. This was, as far as I understood, meetings conducted by the VNRC, and hence they were not arranged for everybody, but they had still wanted to participate.

The third observation was the clear sign that still not very many people knew much about the project. What was most frequently mentioned when we asked what the villagers knew was that the project would give them a village office and a telecommunication mast. They also mentioned other things, like roads, wells, dispensary and a school, things that the project would clearly not manage to provide – but maybe as a result of the rather questionable revenues from REDD+. These observations was a sign that FPIC mechanisms had not been utilized in project implementation, and that there would have been a need for it.

There were differences between the two villages regarding the general perceptions to the project at the time I returned. In Lunenzi – the village situated far away from the road - they had little knowledge and relations to the project still. They were one step further in Ibingu, and the work with the land use planning was in progress. One of the farmers that was upset because of the boarder-making by VNRC told me:

> Some of us are not satisfied with MKUHUMI because they have put the cross on our farm. I will do what they tell me, but I don't know where to move because they didn't tell us where to move. [In Ibingu] we have been talking about moving the farms to the other side of the village, because we think the soil can be good there. They [the VNRC] said that we can't farm there neither so we don't know where.[34]

Robert Goodland gives an outline of the significance of FPIC, and of particular interest is what he writes about the "fully-informed" consent. He claims there are two ways of being fully informed. First the people in question have to be informed about their rights, for instance they should have clear ideas about their rights to the resources that are under management of the project. The consent

---

[34] MKUHUMI is the Swahili term for REDD+.

should be sought by neutral agents without interests in the project. Second, he says worst-case scenarios should be presented, and that it is impossible to obtain consent if the people in question have never seen an example of the project before. In the end there has to be an understanding that the possible benefits from the project will be larger than the possible worst-case scenarios, and that prudent mechanisms are in place to guarantee the benefits for the "communities". Regarding the "P" for Prior, he says that the consent should be sought well before a funding agency has started to consider the request to finance the project. He also writes that the FPIC process can be manipulated (Goodland, 2004). In the following, my effort is to show that none of these considerations that Goodland suggests are part of TFCG / MJUMITAs process, except from maybe the last one.

During my fieldwork I heard almost nothing about FPIC during meetings or in other conversation with the staff, and the impression I got of the importance of it as a mechanism within REDD+ through the international discourse did not correlate with how I experienced the launching of this pilot project. In an interview with the first Project Manager, he confirmed that FPIC was not of any concern for the organizations at the time he had been the manager, which was about the first 2.5 months of my fieldwork. He said that of main concern in this period had, first, been to ensure that preferred forest by TFCG was to be included in the project, second, to find a way to justify this and make it look like it was through a participatory way through stakeholders involvement and consultation. Make it look like is also referring to how the guidelines for site selection and the report from it was developed. Third was to choose the villages, and fourth to start implementing activities. This description can match some of Green's arguments about manipulation and consciousness about the processes that are perhaps not only working through a "machine" (Ferguson, 1990), but through agents conscious actions that I emphasized in the previous section. The organization has a priority agenda, which is forest- and biodiversity conservation, but as a demand from donors, justifications of each step should be made. Therefore, to justify their methods of selecting certain forests of interests to funders and other stakeholders, they utilized formal processes of a site-selection workshop that was open to specially invited stakeholders and some district representatives following a fieldtrip to these four districts that had been unofficially selected in advance. My argument here is that TFCG does have agency and can act consciously in relation to processes related to funding and international development aid. They can steer part of the process in the direction that will benefit their agenda, but are also constrained from the demands that are attached to funding.

That FPIC received very little emphasis during the initial stages of the project, is something also reflected in the TFCG-report on FPIC:

> TFCG has much experience of the kind of social interaction required through FPIC, and has understood the importance of engaging with the community for many years, in contrast with many companies who have never worked with communities. TFCG was able to start with building relationships with communities, and carried out mapping and boundary demarcation later. The concept of consent has not been an issue at this early stage

(Kibuga et al., 2011, p. 9)

This excerpt shows that work on the project has started in the villages before consent had been given. Therefore, one can question whether this is really a valid process of FPIC. The report shows that the FPIC process by TFCG / MJUMITA is mainly about exchange of questions and answers about the REDD+ project at sub-village level. Principles and Approaches for Policy and Project Development says "… the first stages of respecting the right to FPIC is agreement with the relevant community on the process itself." (Anderson, 2011, p. 11) The report does not say anything about whether information on this has been shared. The same principle-framework also says that the indigenous people and local communities have the right to determine the process of consultation and decision making themselves, and that the information about this should be "… widely disseminated at the local level and understood." (Anderson, 2011, p. 21) Establishing a Village Natural Resource Committee is procedure as part of CBFM, and not a process determined by the villagers. It seems like there was some exclusiveness related to the committee, where those that were part of the committee could have benefits in decision-making.

TFCG strategy on FPIC seems to be about sharing information about REDD+, and not to create any awareness about the rights of the people living in the villages or about FPIC itself. Regarding worst-case scenarios - some people had made up their own minds about them – like that they would have to migrate – but it did not seem like the project proponent themselves had informed about any scenarios, like that of unclear rights to resources and the risk of conflicts with the neighboring village. Due to my descriptions of the social relations within the village, one can understand that a lot of work can and should be done on empowerment and consciousness about the agency of people living in the villages selected for REDD+ to make sure that implementation will be efficient. The fact that TFCG did not know anything about the villages and their environment and people presented complications for the initial process of implementation in form of the need for comprehensive mapping in addition to the miscommunication between villagers and TFCG staff that made them bound to do a new process of land use planning.

Lunenzi Oye! Ibingu Juu! Meeting the villages

The exclamations in the title was what the field-officers usually shouted before they started to speak, following responding shouts from the village audience. The gesture promoted a lively and informal atmosphere. The first meetings that TFCG / MJUMITA had in the villages, were with representatives from the sub-villages and the village authorities. A governmental representative at district level was also present to show the legitimacy of the NGO's visit, and she was included in the "teaching-programme" that was going to take place. System and formalities surrounding authorities were consistent during the meetings with how the common governmental systems in the villages are working; the chairman and the VEO were the first to be greeted as the hosts of the village. They were seated in the front of the blackboard, where they introduced themselves, the purpose of the meeting, and wishing everybody welcome. The representatives from the village were sitting two by two at the benches in the classroom. Like submissive schoolchildren, some were sitting bent over their desks looking down in the table, some with the head in the hands.

Eventually, the NGO-staff took over the podium and encouraged the different participants to present themselves by name and commission as they switched places with the village authorities. A common teacher-students session took place – where the NGO-staff were the "teachers", as TFCG / MJUMITA field-staff were not only coming with information about REDD+, but also to teach in on elementary level[35] the threats about climate change, topics such as the functions of the ozone layer and global warming and how it can affect their livelihood through unsteady rainfalls, floods, droughts and underproduction. To frame the setting of the project and making people relate to it, references was made to the floods in Kilosa few months earlier. The REDD+ project was presented as a solution to these problems, and, unlike in most cases of regular PFM projects[36], the opportunity for revenues was also being mentioned. From the talk I heard around in the villages more than half a year later, it seemed that people had little faith in these money arriving, as they did not mention it as a benefit from the project when I asked about it. What they told me about was the importance of forest conservation – they had heard the president himself talk about it on the radio. There were different levels of knowledge about environmental issues, and whereas it appeared that some

---

[35] The teaching included lots of drawings on the blackboard and questions to make the village counsel, or the pupils, contribute. An example on teacher's method while talking about global warming was when the teacher was drawing a sun on the blackboard and stated; "this is a sun." Next he asked the pupils: "What is this?" Whereas several answered in a choir: "Sun". He followed up with the next question: "And what does it do?" The answer was right, but not quite formulated in the way he wanted, so he formulated it himself; "sends beams down to the earth, yes".

[36] According to one TFCG-officer, the organization do usually not inform about the opportunities of revenues from PFM projects as they introduce them to the villagers. The reason for this, he said, is that "they are not worthwhile", which means that the revenues are generally low from these projects.

villagers had some knowledge on issues related to the greenhouse effect, others told me that this information had been new to them.[37] A group of women told me after the meeting that they appreciated the opportunity to learn what the NGO-staff had taught them.

The NGO-officers were encouraging the villagers to ask questions, which is an important part of the process of FPIC. However, the answers that they gave to these questions often contained little substance. For instance, one question they were asked was the common worry among the villagers of how to handle the eruption of bushfires. This is a very difficult issue to address anywhere, but since the field-officers were new in the area, they also had little understanding of the causes and extend of this problem. Information which I received in February 2011, was that they had started teaching the villagers how to "clear the line", which is a technique to prevent the spread of bushfires. At the time they launched the project for the Village Assembly, they had not yet had any solutions to this problem. Here I will give an example of how insufficient information about project progress was handled in the case of the question about the bushfires:

TFCG-officer: What are the reasons for bushfires here in Ibingu?

(Different people answered; hunters, people harvesting honey and external people making charcoal)

Woman of Village Assembly: Bushfires are common in August, September. For these months we should have meetings in Ibingu. It could help if the people that are responsible for these bushfires were caught and go to prison for seven years.

Vise-VEO: We have to punish them by cleaning the office.

Man 1 of VA: We do not know where the fires originate, so how can we catch them?

Chairman: The farmers are the source of bushfires, as they cannot cultivate without clearing by fire. If someone is going to cultivate it means that he or she is the source of fire, and should be punished.

Man 2 of VA: If fire erupts on somebody's property, this person is the one responsible, even if the person was not the source of fire.

Man 3 of VA: We have to gather people in the village for seminars on bushfires.

TFCG-officer: Thank you very much. Are there any decisions on how to prevent this?

Man 3 of VA: We cannot avoid bushfires, but they can be reduced.

---

[37] During my stay in Ibingu one of the primary school teachers told me that he had taken the children for a walk up in the forest to teach them about environmental issues and to visit the spiritual bamboo forest-area, Mianzini. This shows how the national and international ideas on climate change and forest conservation are mixing with traditional perceptions of the environment in one single class excursion.

Man 4 of VA: If fire erupts we will bring water to take it out. I insist that we should make some rules.

Vise-VEO: We should have meetings frequently with the people from the village during July and August.

Man 4 of VA: If you get 6 months in prison it will teach you a lesson.

Man 5 of VA: I insist on prison!

Man 3 of VA: We have to stop these punishments of cleaning the office. People say, "let me do it, I want to clean the office!"

TFCG-officer: It is possible to conserve the forest and to overcome those bushfires. You should conserve the forest, but the process should be elaborated.

The officer's conclusion gives little guidance and instead of saying whether or not this project can offer a solution rather he tries to avoid the situation by making the villagers answer their own question. The common way to handle questions in some situations was to say that these questions would be addressed to a later stage in the process, and that this was not of the present concern. In that way, they could leave the question instead of giving relevance to the unknowns. I propose that frictions do not frequently happen when the source of information and knowledge about the issue in question – which in this case is the REDD+ discourse – is low, or considerably lower among one part than the other. This is the "rarefaction of the speaking subject", which Foucault spoke about, and which means that access to participation in the discourse is limited. I believe part of the problem here was that the officers themselves did not have sufficient knowledge about the village-context and the project, so when people asked them how they could overcome problems like bushfires and charcoal-making, they had no idea of the extent and the sources of these problems, and how much the project in itself was going to cover, they had therefore little basis for giving answers to the questions.

For the same reasons there was also little basis to promote discussions or critical thoughts on feasible risks that came up during the meeting, but rather fluctuating answers to the questions that the villagers might be able to ask due to the preconditions to get some kind of perspective on the project. Since REDD+ revenues were not emphasized, most of them were probably relating the project to environmental threats and what they knew about similar conservation projects from other people or the radio. There was no opportunity for discussing "backstage"[38] or to have some days to

---

[38] I use the expression here in the same sense as Ervin Goffman (1959) in his elaborations on consepts for different settings of human actions, depending on whether these are taking place in a person's relative comfort-sone or "frontstage", which is a setting where people are to an extended degree wearing different "masks", which means that a sort of acting is taking place.

think about the final decision about whether the Village Assembly would like to have the project or not.

At the end of the meeting, there was one short sentence that came from a TFCG-officer, and everybody in the classroom raised their hands. Snap! Another officer took a photo of us. The assembly had been giving the first consent to introduce the project in Ibingu by the show of hands.

No Machine, but Frictions and Euphemization

The general willingness to go through with the project among the village representatives was evidently there. My assumption is that the opportunity to learn about how to handle environmental threats would not be the main reasons. Having projects can be an attractive way of getting extra income for certain villagers, who might be able to help in tracing borders, patrolling the forest, and it was also clear from the focus group meeting which I arranged that they wished for infrastructural improvements in the form of roads, wells, and school in addition to preserving the forest. In the beginning of the meeting one of the TFCG-officers had the same "seller-role" as the UN-staff during the workshop I described in chapter 2. He was naming the places where they intended to start the project, and this village could choose to be "in" or "out". This gave a strong feeling of "take it or leave it". In the end of the meeting one man said that, "We are already accepting the project, since we are already conserving the forest". I propose that there was an evident lack of information sharing just there, since the way that REDD+ is working, there is a need for a quite high rate of deforestation to create revenues through re-growth. This was at least one of the presumptions that TFCG had and operated with at this stage. Another sign of insufficient information, was as I mentioned in chapter 3, that the people living in the villages had understood the land use planning as a system that made restrictions so they would not be able to use or manage the land in certain areas at all. This indicates either insufficient information or poor follow-up among the field staff.

TFCG had high ambitions about what they were going to do during the five years that they are piloting REDD+. Even though it seemed like TFCG, being national and not a local NGO, would like to exploit the opportunity of piloting REDD+ in new areas in Tanzania, I suggest that more knowledge of the people and the area they live in is needed – and the "rush" of REDD+ with unfinished frameworks and blurry guidelines has also led to confusion, unnecessary setbacks and delays. In the case of re-planning land use, one can see it as agency performed against the

"antipolitics machine" (Ferguson, 1990) at two levels. TFCG used its agency as project proponents to go against the "rush" of the international initiative and chose to move a step backward with the land use planning and try again. This was an investment for later cooperation in the villages. I suggest that if these "quick-start initiatives" allow for more time for pre-work and especially set as a standard that broad knowledge of the area and people should be a pre-condition for funding, these inconvenient cases could more easily be prevented. Considering the dissatisfaction among some villagers in February 2011, this agency might however have come from the villagers, and this is the second level, as they were not satisfied with the way that the land use planning had led to areas being put aside for conservation only, whereas TFCG / MJUMITA was advocating the need for more time and money, as they had to accept the fact that if this project was going to work out, it demanded a better process of land use planning in cooperation with villagers. This shows how the NGOs are also dependant of the villagers in relation to the outcome of projects, which is some of the point that Kontinen (Kontinen, 2004, p. 87) also makes by referring to Hudock (1999).

The two cases of agency performed, when Fergusson's "machine" is not running, can also be termed as frictions. At village-level they seemed to erupt very seldom in relation to the project. People in the villages were rarely openly in disagreement with anything presented to them in relation to the project. One example of how I experienced this was when one of the elders in the village came and asked my translator and me whether there was a chance that they would have to migrate because of the project. This was a question to us after the village launching of the project, but was never raised to the NGO officers themselves that were holding the meeting. This can be a sign that the elder was afraid that a discussion would erupt into disagreements. After all, he was eager to welcome a project, if it could mean to improve prosperity for the village. Therefore, both the NGO-staff and the villagers did in some way adopt what James C. Scott terms a "reciprocal manipulation of the symbols of euphemization" (Scott, 1985, p. 309), where both parties are appealing to each other's self-interested descriptions of their own acts. The NGO-staff's description is helping those people who are in need of help, whereas the villagers' description is being the helpless so that the help will not bypass them. But these descriptions can change if the villagers find that the project is not advantageous. Then, the helpless will actually be the ones that are helping the NGO-staff to get good outcomes from the project, like what has been the case with PFM, but this situation is hardly sustainable. Here I suggest that the REDD+ discourse can have agency in relation to the NGO's work. The way it is today, there will be no measurable results in the form of carbon sequestration or improved forest cover that can show that the project has succeeded, if the projects are not sustainable. Therefore, if the officers have realized that the villagers have misunderstood the

land use planning, there might have been good reasons for them to start all over again to prevent those villagers from continuing business as usual in the future.

Why did the organizations choose to include FPIC in REDD+ piloting after their Project Proposal had been approved for funding and the project was already running? One reason can be that as the only organization that has included the mechanism, they will be able to contribute with valuable "lessons learnt" and further contribute to the REDD+ discourse. TFCG could potentially have a very important role in introducing FPIC within REDD+ from a stakeholder's point of view, as the only piloting organization in Tanzania that has included it in their Project Proposal. In their report they state: "TFCG is advocating the benefits for FPIC in Tanzania." (Kibuga et al., 2011, p. 9) This makes their role central in relation to testing the mechanism and contributing "lessons learnt" in Tanzania. Another reason can be their experiences with villagers that had misunderstood the purpose of the land use planning. A third reason can be that it would strengthen their justification in being a national NGO without particular ties to the areas in question.

Concluding Remarks

This thesis has aimed to show different aspects of the REDD+ discourse that is in the making on several levels from different angles. As one is talking about REDD+ as a forest regime, it can be advantageous to get some impressions of where agency is located, which is what I have tried to do here. In conclusion my findings say that there is not an absolute "global regime" or "international force" or "machine" that are controlling all the REDD+ processes. The projects are adapted to both national and NGO agendas, and fall into already established discourses on development and environment. I have tried to illustrate this by giving an impression of how FPIC is adapted, although is seemingly perceived differently than the international guidelines for it, and it has been adjusted to the regular way that TFCG and MJUMITA are normally implementing other projects. NGOs have designed the proposals in a way that fits the overall goal of REDD+ with their own agendas and specializations in biodiversity and PFM. They do however need clear obligations so that they know where the project will move next, at the same time as accountability should be clear. There has been an immense rush to get REDD+ started, and even though the NGO's have had own agendas, this has led to a perception that REDD+ is nothing new, as the debate about it has been blurry, and the carbon-market uncertain. The dynamics in the international REDD+ discourse is having effects at the lower level. Therefore, it is also important for the NGOs to have a certain influence in the formation and decision-making at the international level, where frictions are found. As I have argued, the project documents can also have agency, as they are bringing the discourse of REDD+ forward. In the villages, there can unfortunately be little agency located in relation to the project, and I have argued that the reason for this can be those of sometimes fragile "communities". Therefore the selection of sites for REDD+ has to be a thorough one on the basis of not only the biophysical conditions, but also the human population.

References

ABDALLAH, J. M. & MONELA, G. G. 2007. Overview of Miombo Woodlands in Tanzania. MITMIOMBO Project Workshop. Morogoro, Tanzania: Finnish Forest Research Institute.

AGRAWAL, A. 2002. Environmentality: Technologies of government and the making of subjects, New Haven, Yale University.

ANDERSON, P. 2011. Free, Prior, and Informed Consent in REDD+: Principles and Approaches for Policy and Project Development. Bangkok/Eschborn: RECOFTC - The Center for People and Forests/ GIZ - Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit.

ANGELSEN, A., BROWN, S., LOISEL, C., PESKETT, L., STRECK, C. & ZARIN, D. 2009. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD): An Options Assessment Report. Meridian Institute.

BARDALEN, I. 2011. No queremos vender oxígeno: the implementation of a REDD pilot project in the Bolivian Amazon. Master, University of Oslo.

BARUME, A. K. 2011. The Lands of Indigenous Peoples: Importance and Justification. Land Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Africa. Copenhagen: IWGIA Document Series.

BLOMLEY, T. & RAMADHANI, H. 2005. Lessons learned : Participatory Forest Management in Tanzania (PFM). SLSA newsletter.

BOND, I., CHAMBWERA, M., JONES, B., CHUNDAMA, M. & NHANTUMBO, I. 2010. REDD+ in dryland forests: issues and prospects for pro-poor REDD in the miombo woodlands of southern Africa, London, International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).

BROSIUS, J. P. 1999. Green dots, pink hearts: Displacing politics from the Malaysian rain forest. In: DOVE, M. R. & CARPENTER, C. (eds.) Environmental Anthropology: a historical reader. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing.

BROSIUS, J. P., TSING, A. L. & ZERNER, C. 2005. Communities and conservation: histories and politics of community-based natural resource management, Walnut Creek, Calif., AltaMira Press.

BUTLER, R. A. 1999-2012. Tanzania Forest Information and Data [Online]. San Francisco, CA. Available: http://rainforests.mongabay.com/deforestation/2000/Tanzania.htm [Accessed 16.04. 2012].

CARBONPOSITIVE. 2010. Carbon News and Info> Carbon economy explained> Glossary of carbon & climate [Online]. Available: http://www.carbonpositive.net/viewarticle.aspx?articleID=44 - VERs [Accessed 17.03 2011].

COSSLETT, C. 2010. UN-REDD National Programmes: Where to begin? UN-REDD Programme newsletter [Online]. Available: http://www.un-redd.org/Newsletter7_Indonesia_Workshop_Review/tabid/3927/language/en-US/Default.aspx [Accessed 29.03.2011].

DOOLEY, K., GRIFFITHS, T., MARTONE, F. & OZINGA, S. 2011. Smoke and mirrors: A critical assessment of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility. Moreton in Marsh: FERN and Forest Peoples Programme.

DOVE, M. R. & CARPENTER, C. 2008. Introduction: Major Historical Currents in Environmental Anthropology. In: DOVE, M. R. & CARPENTER, C. (eds.) Environmental Anthropology: A historical reader. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

EBRAHIM, A. 2003. Accountability In Practice: Mechanisms for NGOs. World Development. United Kingdom: Elsevier.

ESCOBAR, A. 1995. Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

FAO, UNDP & UNEP 2011a. Support to National REDD+ Action: Global Programme Framework 2011-2015 (UN-REDD Programme). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Environment Programme.

FAO, UNDP & UNEP. 2011b. UN-REDD Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria [Online]. Cape Town: African Regional Consultation and Capacity-building workshop on REDD+, including on relevant Biodiversity Safeguards. Available: http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/for/wscbredd-afr-01/other/wscbredd-afr-01-unredd-en.pdf [Accessed 15.04. 2012].

FERGUSON, J. 1990. The anti-politics machine: "development," depoliticization, and bureaucratic power in Lesotho, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
80

FJELDSTAD, O.-H. 2002. Fighting fiscal corruption: The case of the Tanzania Revenue Authority. CMI Working Papers. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute.

FOUCAULT, M. 1981. The Order of the Discourse. In: YOUNG, R. (ed.) Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader. Boston: Routledge.

GLENNE, LUND, LYNGROTH & TUNOLD. 2010. Notat til Utenriksråden: Nulltoleranse for korrupsjon. Utdypning av innholdet i politikken [Online]. Oslo: Sentral Kontrollenhet. Available: http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/nulltoleranse_misligheter.pdf [Accessed 19.04. 2012].

GOFFMAN, E. 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, New York, Doubleday.

GOODLAND, R. 2004. Free, Prior and Informed Consent and the World Bank Group. Sustainable Development Law & Policy, 4, 66-74.

GOVERNOR BYATT, H. A. 1923. LAND ORDINANCE. Tanganyika Territory.

GREEN, M. 2003. Globalizing development in Tanzania: policy franchising through participatory project management. Critique of anthropology, 23, 123-43.

GREEN, M. 2010. After Ujamaa? : cultures of governance and the representation of power in Tanzania. Social analysis, 54, 15-34.

GRIESGRABER, J. M. 2008. Influencing the IMF. In: WALKER, J. W. S. G. & THOMPSON, A. S. (eds.) Critical Mass: The Emergence of Global Civil Society. 5 ed. Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

HUDOCK, A. 1999. NGOs and Civil Society: Democracy by Proxy?, Cornwall, Polity Press.

INGO ACCOUNTABILITY CHARTER. 2012. INGO Accountabilitycharter>About the Charter [Online]. Available: http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org/about-the-charter/ [Accessed 07.04. 2012].

KIBUGA, K. F., NGUYA, N., CHIKIRA, H., LUWUGE, B. & DOGGART, N. 2011. Integrating the principles of free, prior and informed consent in the establishment of a REDD project: a case study from Tanzania Making REDD work for communities and forest conservation in Tanzania: TFCG Technical Report 27. Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Forest Conservation Group.

KONTINEN, T. 2004. Intervention Negotiated? - Production of shared object and power relations in the planning of a development co-operation project. In: KONTINEN, T. (ed.) Development Intervention: Actor and activitiy perspectives. Helsinki: University of Helsinki.

LARSON, E. & AMINZADE, R. 2007. Nation-states confront the global: Discourses of indigenous rights in Fiji and Tanzania. The Sociological Quarterly, 48, 801-831.

LATOUR, B. 2005. Reassembling the social: an introduction to actor-network-theory, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

LOISKE, V.-M. 1995. The village that vanished : The roots of erosion in a Tanzanian village. Doctor Doctoral Dissertation, Stockholms Universitet.

LONG, N. 2001. Development sociology: actor perspectives, London, Routledge.

MAKOYE, K. 2012. Corruption allegations hit WWF programmes in Tanzania [Online]. Dar es Salaam: AlertNet. Available: http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/corruption-allegations-hit-wwf-programmes-in-tanzania [Accessed 23.05. 2012].

MALIMBWI, R. E. & ZAHABU, E. 2008. Reducing Carbon Emissions Through Participatory Forest Management. Proceedings of the 15th Annual Scientific and 22nd General meeting of Tanzania Association of Foresters (TAF). Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Association of Foresters.

MARCUS, G. E. & FAUBION, J. D. 2009. Fieldwork is not what it used to be / learning anthropology's method in a time of transition, Itacha, N.Y., Cornell University Press.

MARTIN, N. T. 2008. The FIM G8 Project, 2002–2006: A Case Analysis of a Project to Initiate Civil Society Engagement with the G8. In: WALKER, J. W. S. G. & THOMPSON, A. S. (eds.) Critical Mass: The Emergence of Global Civil Society. 5 ed. Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

MBASHIRU, K. 2012. Food prices soar despite drop in inflation [Online]. Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Standard Newspapers Ltd. Available: http://dailynews.co.tz/index.php/local-news/2184-food-prices-soar-despite-drop-in-inflation [Accessed 09.05. 2012].

MENZIES, N. K. 2007. Our Forest, Your Ecosystem, Their Timber: Communities, conservation, and the state in community-based forest management, New York, Columbia University Press.

MWAKALOBO, A. B. S., C., K. G., S., S. D., E., N., E., Z., S., M. & N., K. D. 2011. REDD and Sustainable Development: perspective from Tanzania. London: International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS. 2012. National Consumer Price Index (NCPI) for April, 2012 [Online]. Dar es Salaam: National Bureau of Statistics. Available: http://www.nbs.go.tz/takwimu/cpi/CPI_April2012_Eng.pdf [Accessed 09.05. 2012].

NEUMANN, R. P. 1998. Imposing wilderness: struggles over livelihood and nature preservation in Africa, Berkeley, University of California Press.

NEUMANN, R. P. 2005. Model, Panacea, or Exception? Contextualizing CAMPFIRE and Related Programs in Africa. In: BROSIUS, J. P., TSING, A. L. & ZERNER, C. (eds.) Communities and Conservation: Histories and Politics of Community-Based Natural Resource Management. Plymouth: Altamira Press.

RIDDELL-DIXON, E. 2008. Facilitating NGO Participation: An Assessment of Canadian Government-Sponsored Mechanisms for the Copenhagen Summit for Social Development and the Beijing Conference on Women. In: WALKER, J. W. S. G. & THOMPSON, A. S. (eds.) Critical Mass: The Emergence of Global Civil Society. 5 ed. Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

RILES, A. 2000. The Network Inside Out, Ann Arbor, Mich., University of Michigan Press.

SCOTT, J. C. 1985. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, New Haven and London, Yale University Press.

SHIVJI, I. G. 2007. Silences in NGO discourse: the role and future of NGOs in Africa, Nairobi, Fahamu - Networks for Social Justice.

SKUTSCH, M. & MCCALL, M. K. 2011. Why Community Forest Monitoring? In: SKUTSCH, M. (ed.) Community forest monitoring for the carbon market: opportunities under REDD. London: Earthscan.

SNYDER, K. A. 2005. The Iraqw of Tanzania: Negotiating Rural Development, Boulder, Westview Press.

SOUTHERNVOICES. 2011. Benefit-sharing is the key issue [Online]. Souhern Voices News no 1. Available: http://climatecapacity.org/news/newsletter/55 [Accessed 03.06 2011].

SUNSERI, T. 2005. 'Something else to burn': forest squatters, conservationists, and the state in modern Tanzania. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 43, 609-640.

TALLE, A. 1995. Bar workers at the boarder. In: KLEPP, K. I., BISWALO, P. M. & TALLE, A. (eds.) Young People at Risk: Fighting AIDS in Northern Tanzania. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.

TFCG, T. F. C. G. 2009. Making REDD and the Carbon Market work for Communities and Forest Conservation in Tanzania: a project proposal presented to the Royal Norwegian Embassy, Dar es Salaam. Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Forest Conservation Group.

THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON LONG-TERM COOPERATIVE ACTION UNDER THE CONVENTION 2009. Paper no. 28D, Norway: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD). Ideas and proposals on the elements contained in paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan: Submissions from Parties (Part II). Bonn: UNFCCC.

TIPPER, R., BERRY, N., CAMARGO, M., DAVENPORT, D., DUTSCHKE, M., HELLAND, J., LINCOLN, P., LOW, R., MAKUNDI, W., PEDRONI, L. & STRØNEN, I. Å. 2011. Real-time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative: Contributions to a Global REDD+ Regime 2007-2010. Oslo: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD).

TNRF. Tanzania Natural Resource Forum>About Us [Online]. Available: http://www.tnrf.org/about [Accessed 13.04 2012].

TOWNSEND, P. K. 2009. Environmental anthropology: from pigs to policies, Long Grove, Ill., Waveland Press.

TRIVUNOVIC, M. 2011. Countering NGO corruption: Rethinking the conventional approaches. U4 Issue. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute.

TRIVUNOVIC, M., JOHNSØN, J. & MATHISEN, H. 2011. Developing an NGO corruption risk management system: Considerations for donors. U4 Issue. Bergen: Christian Michelsen's Institute.

TSING, A. L. 2005. Friction: an ethnography of global connection, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.

TØMTE, E. 2011. Ståkarakter for skogsatsing [Online]. Oslo: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD). Available:

http://www.bistandsaktuelt.no/Nyheter+og+reportasjer/Arkiv+nyheter+og+reportasjer/St%C3%A5 karakter+for+skogsatsing.333497.cms [Accessed 02.05 2011].

UN-REDD. 2011. UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent [Online]. UN. Available: http://www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=6369&Itemid= 53.

UNFCCC. Decision 1/CP. 16. The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention Conference of the Parties - Sixteenth Session (COP 16), 2010 Cancún, Mexico. UNFCCC.

UNFCCC 2011. Decision 1/CP.16: The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010. Bonn: UNFCCC.

URT. 1999. Tanzania Village Land Act 1 (2) [Online]. Dar es Salaam: United Republic of Tanzania. Available: http://www.dlist-asclme.org/sites/default/files/doclib/view6.pdf [Accessed 12.06. 2012].

URT. 2001. National Forest Programme in Tanzania: 2001 - 2010 [Online]. Dar es Salaam: United Republic of Tanzania. Available: http://www.fao.org/forestry/15158-08384729a01df4a904de10082b3ae53a3.pdf [Accessed 12.06. 2012].

URT 2002. The Forest Act. In: MUSSA, K. M. (ed.). Dar es Salaam: United Republic of Tanzania.

URT. 2010a. Draft National Strategy for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) [Online]. Dar es Salaam: United Republic of Tanzania. Available: http://www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=4297&Itemid= 53 [Accessed 03.04 2011].

URT, U. R. O. T. 2010b. National Strategy for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+). In: FORCE], N. R. T. (ed.). [Dar es Salaam]: United Republic of Tanzania (URT).

URT-MEM. 2012. Energy Sector Overview [Online]. Dar es Salaam: The United Republic of Tanzania – Ministry of Energy and Minerals. Available: http://www.mem.go.tz/overview-energy-sector [Accessed 17.04. 2012].

UWAZI 2008. Citizens' Awareness and their Perception of Corruption: Who is not corrupt in Tanzania? Corruption Perception Surveys. Dar es Salaam: Uwazi.

WILLIS, J. 2006. Drinking Crisis? Change and Continuity in Cultures of Drinking in Sub-Saharan Africa. African Journal of Drug & Alcohol Studies. Baltimore: CRISA Publications.

ZAHABU, E. & MALIMBWI, R. E. 2011. The Potential of Community Forest Management under REDD+ for Achieving MDG Goals in Tanzania In: SKUTSCH, M. (ed.) Community Forest Monitoring for the Carbon Market: opportunities under REDD. London: Earthscan.

Appendix 1

Villages are situated nearby the arrow

Appendix 2

Tanzania Forest Conservation Group
Shirika la Kuhifadhi Misitu ya Asili Tanzania

MAKING REDD WORK FOR COMMUNITIES AND FOREST CONSERVATION IN TANZANIA

FIVE STEPS TO GET REDD RIGHT(S)

The vision of Tanzania's National Strategy for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation is that:

'Tanzania implements a National REDD+ Strategy that ensures conservation and/or enhancements of its unique biodiversity values and forest ecosystems and the corresponding benefits, goods and services are equitably shared by all stakeholders for adaptation, mitigation and adoption of a low carbon development pathway under all processes as required by the UNFCCC.'

These are goals that almost everyone can agree on. The question is how best to achieve these goals. Here we present five measures that would help to make REDD in Tanzania more effective and more equitable.

Step 1: Recognise community rights to forest on village land.

In keeping with the interpretation of land law adopted by the Ministry of Lands, the National REDD Task Force should recognise that forests that lie outside of village forest reserves but within village boundaries are on Village Land and not General Land and are thus under the authority of the Village Assembly. Consistent misrepresentation of unreserved forests within village boundaries as being General Land leaves them open to land grabbing and exploitation without the consent of the village thereby increasing the risk of deforestation.

For more information on this please see our policy brief on REDD and Village Land at www.tfcg.org/MakingREDDWork.html

Step 2: Recognize that communities have the right to all REDD revenues pertaining to forests on their land.

Forests on village land fall under the authority of the Village Assembly who are entitled to decide on the distribution of revenues that accrue from them. As trees and carbon are inseparable, the right to REDD revenues should follow this principle. The National REDD strategy and related policy and legal documents should be clear that communities are entitled to REDD revenues accrued from reduced deforestation on their land. This is both more equitable and will be more effective by channelling the incentive directly to the communities.

You can't separate the carbon from the trees....

Performance-based payments will be more effective and more equitable than effort-based or forest area-based payments.

Step 3: REDD revenues should be paid to those who reduce deforestation

At an international level, REDD funds will only flow to countries that are successful at reducing deforestation. This principle of performance-based payments should also apply at the local level if REDD is to be effective. For REDD to result in rapid reductions of deforestation in Tanzania, communities must receive significant financial benefits for reducing emissions. These need to exceed the opportunity costs of not clearing forest. Performance based cash payments to community members create the most direct incentive for communities to reduce deforestation. Cash payments to individuals in participating rural communities are most likely to succeed at merging the dual goals of reducing deforestation and promoting rural development. Individual payments supports the diverse needs and interests in a community, ensuring the greatest number of community members realize economic benefits from REDD+.

Step 4: Implement benefit sharing for jointly managed forests and explicitly include revenues generated from REDD.

Tanzanian policy and law support the rights of communities to access revenues from jointly managed forests. Rewarding communities who succeed in reducing deforestation and forest degradation in government forest reserves is more equitable and more effective. Guidelines on the proportion of revenues that communities are entitled to from forests under joint management have been eagerly awaited since the National Forest Policy was passed in 1998. But communities and other stakeholders have so far waited in vain. Benefit sharing has remained an unfulfilled policy promise to the frustration of communities and other stakeholders; and to the detriment of both the forests and the communities. With the launch of the Tanzania Forest Service (TFS) and the Tanzania Forest Fund (TFF) in 2011 and with revenues from REDD now a real possibility, it is

time that TFS act boldly to make benefit sharing a reality with explicit provisions for the sharing of REDD revenues.

Step 5: Commit to developing, monitoring and enforcing social and environmental standards for REDD, with the full participation of stakeholders.

In order for REDD to be implemented in a way that is equitable, effective and environmentally sustainable, there is a need for stakeholders to reach consensus on the principles and standards that should underpin REDD in Tanzania. This should include a commitment to comply with the strongest international standards to reduce negative impacts from REDD and seeking the greatest possible positive social and environmental benefits. Consensus also needs to be reached as to how the standards can be monitored and enforced. The design of the standard should be done with the full and informed participation of stakeholders including communities.

What are the social and environmental principles and standards that should guide REDD in Tanzania?

Making REDD work for Communities and Forest Conservation in Tanzania

This leaflet was published as part of the project 'Making REDD work for communities and forest Conservation in Tanzania', a 5 year partnership project between the Tanzania Forest Conservation Group and the Community Forest Conservation Network of Tanzania (MJUMITA). The project aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in Tanzania in ways that provide direct and equitable incentives to communities to conserve and manage forests sustainably. The project will achieve this by supporting the development of a Community Carbon Enterprise hosted within the existing Network of Tanzanian communities engaged in participatory forest management. The project is sponsored by the Norwegian government and was launched in September 2009.

www.tfcg.org/makingReddWork.html
e-mail: tfcg@tfcg.or.tz