

Kutafuta Maisha: Seeking a Life

Political Disengagement as a Life-Improving Strategy – a Study of Youths in Politically Polarized Zanzibar

Kristin Birkeland Galteland



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Summary

Youths in Zanzibar live under tough socio-economic conditions. As they follow developments in rural mainland Tanzania, and in other countries, they develop notions of what “the ideal” life different from previous generations’. Youths tend to not consider farming and fishing as real jobs anymore, rather seeking jobs in offices and business. In Zanzibar, it is believed that supporters of the ruling party have greater economic opportunities. For decades, Pemba Island has been the stronghold of the political opposition. Young Pembans therefore find it hard to seek the privileges of ruling party supporters. As there is little room in their community for critique of the opposition party, they seek to become apolitical through political disengagement. This is a difficult project, since the opposition party over time has become a central part of the people’s shared identity.

This master thesis discusses everyday forms of resistance in Wete town on Pemba Island, where politics are strongly polarized. The thesis is also a discussion on collective memory, and *notions* of differences between ethnic and political groups.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Thesis Question

This master thesis is based on fieldwork conducted during the period of January until early July in 2009 in Wete on Pemba, the second largest island of the Zanzibar archipelago. In addition, the thesis also includes experience and data I gathered while working as an electoral observer on behalf of the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam, for five weeks in July and August the same year.

Previous to the fieldwork, I had stayed in Dar es Salaam in the fall of 2005. At that time, a presidential election took place in Tanzania, resulting in post-election riots in Zanzibar. Watching TV in Dar es Salaam, I saw youths clash with security forces. The youths were throwing rocks, and the security forces attacked them with tear gas and rubber bullets. I asked myself: On what grounds do youths engage in resistance movements?

When I set out for Zanzibar three years later, I headed for Pemba Island, the stronghold of the opposition Civic United Front (CUF) party. I expected to meet youths strongly passionate about the resistance movement. Sadly, I thought at first, there was not much “fire” in the youths’ eyes. When I asked youths about their relationship to politics, most of them showed little interest for the topic. They would say they did not like politics, and some would say that there is no such thing as politics in Zanzibar. It then occurred to me that through the media coverage back in 2005 I had witnessed only a fraction of the whole picture. My focus shifted

from trying to see the life situation fuelling political mobilization, to considering the youths' life situations as a *result* of party politics. Confrontation makes the headlines, while what are often overlooked are the strategies that are within reach of most people. These everyday forms of resistance are less risky than the more violent ones. Such a strategy is the main focus of this master thesis.

The two main parties in Zanzibar are Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and Civic United Front (CUF). I will show how and why party politics in Zanzibar are so strongly polarized. To be a Pemban on Pemba today also means to be a CUF sympathizer. How did these come to be and how is this link maintained? Party identity influences more or less every social arena in Wete. This thesis is a study of youths' lives in a society with strong socio-political boundaries that restricts people's actions. In this thesis I will discuss what government policies and party politics mean to people in Wete, and what role it plays in their lives. In Zanzibar, the political identity of one's family may determine an individual's options and possibilities in life. Due to disappointment of both political parties, there is an emerging tendency among youths to attempt to disengage from the political identity that they are born into. I view youths' disengagement as a form of resistance. Why do youths disengage? Why do they turn to this form of resistance?

I will argue that youths are oppositional, but not necessarily in the ways that resistance has been played out by generations before them.

Throughout the months in I stayed in Wete, I kept wondering who those youths in the clashes back in 2005 were. I was living in "CUF's capital", the hometown of their party leader and founder Seif Sharif Hamad. Zanzibaris most often call him Maalim Seif ("Maal'im" means "teacher" in Arabic), and I will use this name in further references to him. If there was any place for mobilization it would be there, I thought. Towards the end of my stay, things *suddenly* started to change. The registration process for the 2010 election was about to start and CUF began holding rallies on Pemba. The passion I had expected upon my arrival, started to light up youths' eyes. Statements from youths contradicted with previous opinions. Therefore, I will also discuss the role of the political rallies to grasp what triggered this sudden change. The passion I saw on television in 2005 did not come from nothing.

In order to understand the problems discussed in this master thesis, it is important to note the timeframe of my fieldwork. This thesis is based on data collected the spring of 2009. This was about three and a half years after the 2005 election, and a year and a half before the election of 2010. Had my fieldwork been conducted a year earlier, or only two months later, my data would probably have been different. Towards the end of my stay, I observed changes in attitude towards politics among many of my informants. Interesting events took place shortly after my departure and in the months following. As I have no empirical material from this period, more recent events will only be discussed in the conclusion. My analysis will therefore focus on the months of January until August 2009.

General Information on Zanzibar

Zanzibar is an archipelago in the United Republic of Tanzania. It is situated on the east coast, in the Indian Ocean. Zanzibar consists of two major islands, Unguja and Pemba. Zanzibar Town, situated on Unguja, is the capital and administrative centre. The population is approximately 900,000 people; whereof about 300,000 live on Pemba. 98% of the islanders are Muslim (Bakari 2001:1).

Geographically and environmentally Pemba is quite different from its sister island Unguja. Arab traders called Pemba “Al jazeera al khadra,” the green island. Pemba is a green and hilly island with very fertile land that makes agriculture highly productive. The shorelines are covered with white beaches and thick mangrove forests. Most Pembans are farmers or fishermen. The main crops are banana, mango, coconuts, red beans and cassava, but the most important is cloves, exported in large amounts to Unguja and the Tanzanian mainland. Approximately 70 % of all harvested cloves come from Pemba. Pemba is also covered with many rice fields, but it is only used for the islanders’ own consumption. The islands are referred to as the Spice Islands because of their cultivation of cloves, nutmeg, vanilla, pepper, cinnamon and other spices. Zanzibar was for long the world’s main clove exporter, and it served as the islands’ main income between the 1830s and early 1990s (Lofchie 1965: 4-6). Zanzibar is mostly known for its tourist industry, mostly situated on Unguja.

Wete is a town of about 10.000 people, located on the east coast in the middle of the island. The town is the capital of North Pemba region.

Previous Research on Zanzibar

Social scientists have covered many topics on Zanzibar. There exists much literature on the history of the Swahili people of the East African coast (e.g. Allen 1981; Middleton 1992; Mazrui and Shariff 1994).

On Zanzibar, focus has in particular been directed towards the *political* history and the 1964 Zanzibar Revolution (see e.g. Lofchie 1965; Freeman-Grenville 1988; Horton and Middleton 2000). In most academic literature written on Zanzibar, history plays a significant part. After the reintroduction of the multiparty system in 1992, much has been written about the political tensions between the two main political parties, and about the elections that have been held. Parallels between the Revolution and today are frequently drawn (e.g. Burgess 2002; Cameron 2004; Myers 2000).

As the revolutionary government restricted foreign access to Zanzibar after 1964, there has been little opportunity for field work. Therefore, Zanzibar studies have long been dominated by historical, archival research. Because of many shared societal traits, scholarship on the Tanzanian island of Mafia and Kenya's Swahili coast has been used in relation to Zanzibar as well. Caplan (1975, 2004) and Walley (2004) have conducted research on Mafia Island under topics of development and notions of modernity. From coastal Kenya, Beckerleg (1995) writes on the topic of changing moralities among youths. Since the 1980s, more various research topics have been covered. Larsen (e.g. 1990, 2008) has paid much attention to topics on spirits (*mashetani*) and witchcraft, mainly from Zanzibar Town. She has also written on gender and moralities (Larsen 1990), along with researchers such as Giles (e.g. 1999, 2009), Ntarangwi (2003) and McMahon (2006). On the topic of development and notions of modernity, the growing tourism industry and its impact on local communities has been thoroughly examined (e.g. Petterson-Löfquist 1995; Larsen 2000; Gössling 2003; Gössling and Schulz 2005; Beckerleg 2005; Saleh 2004).

As 98 % of Zanzibaris are Muslim, Islam on the archipelago has been studied (e.g. Purpura 2000; Topan 2000; Amidu 2009; Saleh 2009). Ethnic identities has also been a topic that has been given much attention (e.g. Cameron 2004; Larsen 2004; Topan 2009). Politics of Swahili literature, proverbs and music have been studied by e.g. Amidu (2004), who writes

about political literature from Lamu, Kenya. Musau (2004) have written on how changing socio-political realities are reflected in the *Taarab* songs (see also e.g. Declich 2009).

Most fieldwork on Zanzibar has been conducted on Unguja, largely neglecting Pemba.

Cameron has written on party politics, and politics of agriculture (ibid; 2004, 2009).

McMahon (2006) has written on Zanzibari morality, and Pemba has been brought up (e.g.

Young 2009, 2010) in literature on spirits (e.g. Kielman 1998) and medicine. As much has

been written on youths and modernity, and historical causes of the current political tension, I

find that little attention has been paid to how youths relate to politics, how it dominates their

community and their lives. I hope to contribute to this field. Also, it is necessary to study

youths in order to understand African community development, especially since youths make

up the majority in Africa. According to a CIA's World Fact Book, half of the Tanzanian

population is below 17.5 years of age¹.

Theoretic Outline

Youths

Many in Zanzibar do not know how old they are, in particular rural areas. In many contexts, it is considered irrelevant. Age in Zanzibar is about acquiring a place in society. "Vijana" means "youths" in Swahili (singular: "kijana"), but I found that Pembans have various definitions of the word, and what years of one's life it implies. A thirty-seven year old man told me that because he was unmarried, he was still "kijana". A *married* woman or man, of whatever age, is on the other hand not given this title. A youth is therefore considered someone who is no longer a child, but not yet married. But many young, married individuals still share the same views on and experiences of the socio-economic and political conditions. So my main informants are students, workers, unemployed, married or unmarried, all between the ages of fifteen and thirty. Ideally, I should use emic terms, and youths is considerably ethnocentric. Though being aware of this, I will use the terms "young people", "boys", "girls" and "youths" with reference to the same age group. When I use the terms girls and boys I refer to unmarried youths of about twenty years old or younger.

¹ In comparison, according to the same source, the median age in Norway is 37,7 years.

Identity and belonging

As I will argue, political identity is in Wete a unrepeatable part of the collective identity. In the context of this thesis I use the words *identity* and *belonging* when referring to political party identity of families and the community that the individual belongs to, as the two terms are closely intertwined in peoples' understandings about history and the present. I will operate with these terms as I discuss youths' relationship to their own and others' political identities, and also in discussions on notions of ethnic identities.

Resistance

Resistance has been romanticized through popular literature and academic writings (Abu-Lughod 1990). Less attention has been paid to the forms of resistance that are more frequent, the resistance occurring during the course of everyday life. As according to Scott (1985), everyday forms of resistance are less risky than the more violent that are often applauded. In Zanzibar, most people do not have the economic or social resources to participate in visible resistance.

In the course of this thesis, I will discuss two types of resistance: the violent resistance that has occurred around elections, and the everyday form of resistance by disengagement.

Disengagement

The most common form of resistance in Wete is disengagement. Many are tired of politics, but as loud criticism of the dominant can lead to social sanctions, resistance takes the form of disengagement.

Disengagement theory was first introduced by Hirschman (1970) under the terminology of "exit" and "voice". He argued that social organizations have a public *voice* of protest, while at the same time they have the option to *exit* – meaning to disengage. Hirschman argued that "voice" was a more attractive option for "basic social organisations such as the family, the church, and the state in which the exit outlet is less available". Hirschman's theory was further developed by other scholars, focusing on disengagement from the state in a broader sense, such as social, religious and economic withdrawal (Baker 2001: 2-3; see also Azarya

1994). Baker (2001) explores disengagement while simultaneously looking at current and historical politics in sub-Saharan Africa. He further develops Hirschman's theories by seeking a reversed alternative. Baker's theory of disengagement says that most people will opt to "exit" when *the state* denies them a "voice".

In Wete there is a general form of disengagement shared by most people, and a disengagement that is more strategic. Baker (2001) argues that those disengaging seek distance only, and do not seek to change the power structure they oppose (p. 2). I will argue that in the case of Wete, disengagement among youths includes significant motivations for change of the current socio-economic and socio-political conditions.

Hidden and public transcript

I will use James Scott's terms "hidden transcript" and "public transcript". The former characterizes what may take place when not in presence of dominants. The latter means what can be spoken or acted. This is similar to Hirschman's (1970) "exit" and "voice". As Baker (2001) argues, disengagement is a hidden transcript. While exploring disengagement as a hidden transcript, I will also discuss the hidden and public transcripts *within* the hidden transcript. In the political arena experienced by Wete youth, there are three main dominant/subordinate relationships, meaning three sets of hidden and public transcripts. The first power-relations is that between the government and the citizens. The second is between the government and the political opposition. The third power-relations lies within subordinate group of the second power-relations. Within the political opposition there is a dominant and a subordinate. The dominant is the opposition party's dominance in the community, and the subordinates are the individuals in the community that are *expected* to serve as supporters of the opposition.

Collective memory

"Collective memory" is a term coined by Maurice Halbwachs (1992). Collective memory expresses the continuing presence of the past. All arenas and groups in society maintain relations to the collective memory. Such memories are interpreted by individuals, and internalized as lived experiences. All self-expressions of historical consciousness are therefore expressions of the collective memory. It is the collective memory that makes historical

articulations possible. Pemban's role as politically oppositional, I shall argue, makes up a central part of the collective memory. I will discuss how the collective memory emerged, and how it is maintained.

Discourse

The collective memory serves as discourse, constituting the *framework* that determines what possible actions are available to people. To Foucault (1995), discourse is a "regime" that rules over the truth. Discourse is more than a paradigm, because it is perceived as neutral and apolitical. A discourse dominates both the dominated and the dominative powers: it is a truth accepted by everybody that it affects. Since I see Pemban youths' opportunities as largely socially constrained, I will use Foucault's discourse theory.

Agency

In exploring agency within the discourse, I will look at how agents *react* to the dominant structure. Anthony Giddens' theory of *structuration* reconstructs concepts of human beings, human actions and social reproduction and transformation. By redefining these concepts, he forms a new perspective on ontology, where structure does not determine the individual's actions. Neither is the structure the sum of an individual's actions. Giddens' theory of structuration is based on a balance of agency and structure. The theory considers society as a structuration process, where people's actions structure society and at the same time are *structured by* society. According to the structuration theory, this process must be understood in order to understand the production and reproduction of social life. Both the structure and the agent have productive and reproductive aspects to them (Kaspersen 1995: 42-52; Giddens 1982; Giddens 1984).

Studies of African youths are largely dominated by war, crisis and crime. This was initially my focus as well, as I was first looking for violent resistance. Instead of focusing on youths as easily manipulated, I want to focus on the youths as actors with agendas, individually and as a collective group, who try to reshape social relations and power formations. I will discuss individuals' awareness of the collective memory and the power structures in society. As this thesis focus on life strategies, I will discuss youths' active role in shaping their lives. I will focus on agency to emphasize the individuals' experiences of living on Pemba.

Setting the Scene: Arenas and Informants

Wete is a quiet town of about 10.000 people. Strolling around in the day time

Wete is not a fictional name, nor have I created aliases for the different parts of the city. The only ones created aliases for are my contacts. I will now present the different arenas where I spent my time:

Baraza

Many houses have a *baraza* outside. It is a concrete bench alongside parts of the outer walls. When neighbours visit, mostly women, they sit at the *baraza*. In my neighbourhood, the women gathered around 6pm and sat together until nightfall, sometimes longer. Several nights a week I sat with women of the neighbourhood, on the *baraza* of my neighbour's lovely blue house.

Men also gather at a *baraza*, but they are in most cases not benches outside homes, but more like club-houses consisting of benches under a simple roof. Many sit at a *baraza* in the late afternoons and drink local coffee. Women do not spend time in these places, but I was often invited, since the men knew I was interested in Zanzibari politics.

Maskani

Maskani, literally meaning "camp", is what male youths call the places they hang out. The members of a *maskani* are normally from the same neighbourhood, but some go to *maskani* in neighbourhoods other than their own. Who your friends are usually determines what *maskani* you belong to.

I conducted fieldwork in two *maskani*, one at Limbani neighbourhood and one at Jadida neighbourhood. The latter lay on the foundations of an unfinished house by the main road. There were almost always people there, from early morning until after sunset. The youths had constructed a simple roof and put up some benches. They often played a board game where they flipped chips into one of the four holes in the corners. The Jadida *maskani* came to be the one place I spent most time, and most of my contacts were from the neighbourhood.

The Limbani *maskani* is inside an unfinished house, also the local CCM office. In the front yard there is a flag pole with the CCM flag. Inside, posters of Tanzanian president Kikwete are displayed. As at Jadida, you can find youths here most of the day. It was a CCM supporter who first took me there.

Study groups

Every Tuesday night, a group of male and female secondary school students gather to study English over at the big flats (*majumba makubwa*). The number of attendants varies, but normally about ten students attend. Their classroom is an empty apartment with nothing but a blackboard on the wall. Khamis and Abdul are two senior students who take turns teaching English here. Many of these students, especially the girls, also have to help out at home, and are not always able to attend school every day. I often arranged English discussions here, though I sometimes also just observed.

The Youth Centre (*vijana center*) in Wete offers classes in English, computers and tailoring at a price much lower than what is common in town. A couple of times I was invited to hold discussions with the English class. The staff, two of whom were from the mainland, shared with me experiences of being mainlanders on Pemba.

Local NGOs and offices

I came in contact with many local NGOs. I was invited to help out with computer classes at PEWDO, a NGO that works with women. But due to the frequent power-cuts, the classes were often cancelled. UMATI is a NGO concerned with health care, mostly among women and youths. Also, the international organization CARE is located in Wete. Through these NGOs I mostly got information on general health and economic conditions on the island. In Chake-Chake town, the administrative centre on Wete, I got similar information from different government departments and the Zanzibar Legal Rights Centre.

At the offices of the political parties CCM and CUF I interviewed local politicians about party politics and general socio-economic conditions. I felt unwelcome at CCM's office, and therefore I visited CUF more often, as they were much more friendly and helpful.

Political space

All spaces in Wete are politicised, by which I mean affected by the historical and current political inter-party tensions. Some spaces give the impression of being more political than others. At the *baraza*, politics was often discussed openly, but in most areas where I met youths, politics were a topic of little or no interest. My data shows how youths' arenas are politicised through ways that are not verbally expressed.

Gendered spaces

Arenas in Wete are segregated. Women do not move as freely in the public sphere as men do (see Larsen 1990). I mostly met girls and women in my neighbourhood or in private homes, while I most often met men and boys at *maskani* or *baraza*. It is not considered respectable for a young woman in Wete to seek out male arenas like I did, but it was necessary for my fieldwork to do so, and people rarely commented on it – though my closest friends sometimes referred to the youths and men I knew as my “boyfriends”. Also, when men and boys invited me to meet their families, it would be considered rude of me to turn them down.

Working as an electoral observer

A few days before I was to return to Norway, I got a job as an electoral observer of the registration of voters. The five weeks that followed had a big impact on my understanding of the field. In the course of one day of work I often got to talk to citizens, politicians and officials, giving me a more complex understanding of the socio-political conditions in Wete and the rest of the island. I came to see many of the power-structures that people had told me about. For months, I had spent time at the grass roots level – now I was able to see the same issues from a macro-political level. Most of my contacts were random women or girls I met in the streets who invited me into their homes. As my host was the same age as me, she often brought me with her to her friends (of whom many were unmarried).

Method: Reflections on Fieldwork

Approaching Wete as field site

From my very first day in Wete, I felt I had people around me who cared. This is the personality of the people, but also a result of preparations from my side. I had been advised by Zanzibaris on Unguja who were familiar with Wete, to be aware of the importance of a good first impression. I was told that after two days, everybody would know who I was, and what kind of person I was. So I made sure to dress modestly (long skirt, long sleeves and a *hijab*), and took my time when greeting people. The longer the skirt or sleeves, or the tighter the headscarf, the prettier I was, people let me know. And after only a few days, it seemed like many knew who I was. Children first shouted “Albino, albino!” when they saw me, later “Mzungu, mzungu²!”, and finally “Kristina, Kristina!”

I lived with a local family, and took part in peoples’ everyday lives. My data is mainly based on participant observation. I realized that I could not focus on moving from one place to another, but that fieldwork rather happened *in between* point A and B. Often a person who greets reaches out for the other’s hand, and holds it as long as the conversation continues, and until farewells have been said. Greetings are in the form of questions and answers. How are you? How is everybody at home? Is your mother fine? How is everything at work? How is your health? There are sets of standard answers for each question. The answer is always that everything is fine, or thanks to God. When saying goodbye, “go in peace” or “I will see you soon”, are standard phrases. The standard replies are “and you also” or “if God wishes”. Greetings are shorter and looser around youths, and influenced by “cool” expressions from Tanzanian pop music (“bongo flava”).

Visiting

Many of the people I visited had limited relevance to my fieldwork; meeting them was mostly a part of social obligations. During my first weeks I took the main road through the town, as I easily got lost walking the alleys. The shopkeepers waved me over, and wanted to know who I was. This happened every time I walked that distance; I could not pass without greeting

² The term used about white foreigners.

(though I sometimes did if I was not spotted). Because of this, I was always late for appointments, and a short distance could take me the whole day to walk. When I got to know my way around the alleys, my days became more effective. Walking the alleys was also more comfortable, as there was no shade to find along the paved main road.

Had I not visited a friend in a while, she would state, in a judgemental and disappointed voice, that I have not been seen around lately (“Huonekani!”). To take time to visit neighbours and friends is important, and I took great pleasure in doing so. Over time I continuously got new invitations, and I could not turn them down. It was through these visits I got much of my data, but my visits were rarely as informative as the walks I had between them. Many of my young male friends walked with me as I made my way from one appointment to another. They wanted to practice their English, and I wanted to know about their lives. I found that when I came out from a home after a visit, the person who had walked me over there soon showed up again. I therefore gained more male informants than I had originally planned.

Reflections on participant observation

When I visited, I was always treated as a guest and served dates or juice. People often took a break from their activities, such as household maintenance, which sometimes made me miss out on understanding their daily lives.

My data is also shaped around the questions I asked them. It reflects what interested me, and not necessarily them. In some cases, they might have had ideas about what I wanted to hear, or what they wanted me to hear. People knew I was interested in politics, and therefore some might have expressed stronger political opinions than they normally would have done. This is particularly the case with men, who seemed to be interested in making sure I got the “right truth”.

My presence has to a large extent shaped conversations and interactions with people. In some cases it decreased over time as I became a part of their lives, but mostly it led to a longer process of getting a more thorough understanding of the topics I asked them about. Though people often said that “indeed, now you have become a Pemban”, I remained a guest in most scenarios. I felt that I was identified as a person with the privilege of coming from a

democratic society. I was resourceful; I had an education and could travel. Though everybody complained about Pemba's situation, some families portray themselves as wealthier than they are, through presents and food upon my visits.

Language

I had basic language skills in Kiswahili from before, and I found that they improved rapidly. I had therefore little need for an interpreter. At first, I avoided seeking out people with good English skills, but those who knew English often sought me out. Language became an access key in many situations, as youths wanted to practise their English. I quickly adopted Pemban expressions, which amused people and made many want to teach me more *kipemba* (the Pemban dialect). What could be problematic when I relied on my Kiswahili was that I often needed people to simplify their sentences. My language skills were not good enough to be able to pick up proverbs, sayings and the use of animal images from folktales. Also, I found it hard to follow other people's conversations and understand the radio. I used participant observation, but due to the limits of my Kiswahili, many conversations were adapted to include me. An anthropologist's presence always influences the field site, but language skills might be the most crucial factor when it comes to being included in social settings.

Groups out of place: studying youths

Studying a group "out of context" can be problematic, since people act differently in the various contexts they move in. The time I spent with many youths - in particular boys - happened outside of their homes, mostly without grownups present. So much of their identity was unavailable to me, in some cases probably even hidden from me. Youths' domestic lives are not part of my analysis, because few of them introduced me to their families. I have not focused on verifying what my informants told me, I have rather accepted it as a subjective truth, though there are probably cases where the "truth" is not fact, but dream. As I as a Westerner had what most youths wanted - education and financial resources - this shaped our conversations. Many sought to impress me. As I did not know many of the youths' families, they could easily portray themselves to be more successful than they were, as having accomplished "more" in terms of school results and sources of income. When they spoke of the future, it was often about opportunities awaiting them outside the island, through friends and family on Unguja, in Dar es Salaam or in Oman.

Ethical Concerns: Reflections on my Presence in the Field

My social and academic background has supplied with of ways of interpreting are affected by my theoretical predispositions. This thesis is an attempt to portray Pembans' experiences, but doing also unavoidably reflects my experiences and point of views. The thesis is coloured by how I locate anthropological theories and approaches in my fieldwork. When I talk about the discourse, it does not mean I necessarily see something most people in Wete do not. I do not have the embodied experiences of living in Wete, and have not felt the political powers or the social sanctions they encounter every day. What I have are theoretical terms to label the power-relations in society.

Reflections on being bias

CCM politicians and some of their supporter, accused me of being bias; for siding with CUF. As I will argue, politics on Pemba is so polarized that many find it hard to imagine somebody having a neutral status. This is part of the reason for the accusations. But also, it is easy to side with the weaker part. Zanzibaris have experienced violent power abuses from the government around elections. From CUF politicians I did not find this as they have received support of their accusations of the government from human right reports and reports from electoral committees. People in Wete were interested in knowing who I sided with.

Organization of the thesis

In chapter two ("Pemba's Emergence as Oppositional"), I discuss historic events that has shaped the collective memory and made the opposition party a central part of the Pemban identity. In chapter three ("*Hali ya Pemba* – The Condition of Pemba"), I discuss the socio-economic conditions of life in Wete. I aim to thoroughly describe youths' lives by focusing on work, education, migration, and understandings of poverty, modernity and development. This chapter looks at the background for political resistance, and people's dissatisfaction with politicians. Chapter four (Politics: a Matter of Belonging), discusses Pemba's political identity. The chapter describes how politics shapes everyday life and individuals. I will also look at how political history as oppositional has over time become a part of peoples' collective memory. In light of this, I will look at everyday forms of resistance, with particular

focus on political disengagement among youths as an economic strategy. In the final chapter, I will add concluding comments on this master thesis, and also reflect on the political developments that have happened after ended fieldwork.

Political rallies that I attended marked great shift in my understanding of youths' relationship to politics. By how this thesis is organized I aim to emphasize the sudden shift of atmosphere that happened close to the end of my fieldwork. The order of the chapter is organized in such ways that the three main power-relations that will be discussed are gradually introduced.

Chapter 2

Pemba's Emergence as Oppositional

In order to understand contemporary Pemba, it is necessary to understand its history, in particular its *political* history. In recent years there has been a great deal of political unrest in Zanzibar, in particular around election times. Much of the reasons can be found by looking at the islands' history, from independence in 1963 up until today. I will mainly focus on the politicized identities that emerged during colonial rule and the intensified notion of similar identities in the multi-party era. How have they emerged, and been maintained. The aim of this chapter is to show how Pemba came to be the centre of political oppositional movement.

The Cosmopolite Zanzibar

“...the women were notable for their finery, and the men dressed in very fine silks and cottons, bought in Mombasa [in Kenya] from Cambay³ merchants.”
(Freeman-Grenville 1988: IV 150)

During my first week working as an electoral observer, I travelled with colleague Hajj M. by motorcycle between registration centres in Pemba's northern region Micheweni. Since Hajj had participated in many archaeological surveys, he decided it would be good for me as an anthropologist to learn about archaeology as well. He stopped the motorcycle by the side of

³ Cambay, today Kambhat, was a former important trading centre in India.

the road and announced his decision. We had only taken two steps into the cassava field to our left when Hajj started picking up pieces of pottery and placing them in my hand. Children soon joined in, and five minutes later my hands were filled with pottery-pieces of various patterns and shapes. Some had bright blue and green colours and originated from the Middle East. We were standing in the midst of what was once a great kingdom. “Pemba used to be much more developed than what it is today,” Hajj said.

The Swahili people of the East African coast are a mix of many peoples of various origins. There are different theories about where the first immigrants came from, and when they started arriving. Most agree that African Bantu from Western and central Africa were among the first settlers on the East African coast, early in the first millennium. They established monarchies and chieftainships. In the 7th century, wars in Persia caused some of the Shirazi people to migrate and permanently settle on the east African coast. The Shirazi brought Islam with them. Over time, multi-racial communities were established on the coast of Kenya and Tanzania. The population became *the Swahili*, with mainly Bantu and Shirazi background. They shared the Islamic religion, and developed the Swahili language. Later on, immigrants from Oman settled in Zanzibar. Today, there are also some Swahilis who originate from what today is Pakistan and India (see Prince 1961; Lofchie 1965, Caplan 2004; Bakari 2001; Freeman-Grenville 1988).

For centuries, Zanzibar was a powerful commercial centre. Among of the commodities traded were spices, gold, ivory, rhino horns, leopard skins, tortoise shells, and slaves. Zanzibaris traded mostly with Persia and Arabia, but also with India, China and civilizations further east. The islands has therefore been shaped by many cultures throughout the centuries. This is visible in Zanzibari cuisine, music, boats (*dhow*⁴) and decorations, such as the famous Zanzibar doors⁵ that decorate the entrance to many homes. Although Zanzibar later on would experience Portuguese, Omani and British power, this would have little impact on the culture. The Swahili have for centuries constituted a single African civilization (Lofchie 1965: 26-27, see also Prince 1961; Freeman-Grenville 1988; Middleton 1992; Mazrui and Shariff 1994; Horton and Middleton 2000; Myers 2000).

4 For more on dhow culture, see Gilbert 2004.

5 For more on the Zanzibar doors, see Burton 2002.

In the 16th century, the Portuguese took control over Zanzibar. This disrupted the local powers and trade. The Portuguese controlled the East African coast for nearly a century before the Omani Arabs helped local sultans and kings to regain power. Zanzibar later became the capital of Oman, as the Omani sultan settled on Unguja because of the increasing interest for cloves, slaves and ivory. The slave trade elevated Zanzibar as an economic centre of the Indian Ocean. During the first quarter of the nineteenth century, three-fourths of Zanzibar's population was slaves (Lofchie 1965: 49; Bakari 2001: 47). Unguja's large-scale clove cultivation was based on slave labour. After a hurricane in 1873, the cloves were replanted on Pemba, where the land was more fertile (Bakari 2001: 49). The plantations were mostly owned by people of Arab origin. This is why an Arab identity got a stronger foothold on Pemba than on Unguja (Lofchie 1965: 28; Glassman 1995).

The Emergence of Political Ethnic Identities in Colonial Times

Before the arrival of the Omani, there were little hierarchic ethnic relations between the populations of Arab and African descent. Intermarriages were common, and Arabs had become a part of the local Swahili population. But as ties to Oman were strengthened when Zanzibar became a part of the sultanate, Africans became the underprivileged class, since they made up most of the manual and agricultural labourers, while the Arab communities stayed powerful through the employer-employee, master-servant and landowner-labourer relations. Ethnic categories coincided with economic class (Lofchie 1965: 9, 14-15, 40; see also Bakari 2001). The Omani contact with Pemba was different than with Unguja. Pembans did not experience much hardship. On Pemba, the Arabs' incursion into Pemba happened after the local African rulers had consented to it. It was therefore unnecessary for Arabs to employ repressive strategies to ensure social control. The African communities retained possession of cultivable areas. Land relations between Arab colonists and the local population on Pemba, created a basis for inter-ethnic solidarity. On Unguja, the Arab immigrants imposed their authority and created an autocratic colonial regime. The colonists wished to operate through a form of indirect rule, but the local political institutions collapsed as a result of the abrupt changes (Lofchie 1965: 16-17, 48).

In 1890, Zanzibar became a British protectorate. The Sultan remained the symbolic head of state, while the British took control over defence, foreign affairs, and most political and

administrative matters. African interests were largely ignored, since Britain viewed Zanzibar as an Arab state. As was the case in many colonies in Africa, racial categories such as “African”, “Arab” and “Indian” were largely constructed by the British. This labelling served to divide people into two main groups: the elite on the one hand, and slaves, peasants and workers on the other. Africans were largely excluded from higher education and the administrative sectors. Arabs and Indians also got larger food rations. This is how the British created ethnic divisions that remain after they were gone (Bakari 2001: 47, 54; Lofchie 1965: 18).

The Zanzibar Revolution

Arab political leaders formed the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) in 1954, and it became the main force in the anti-British movement. The majority of the members were Zanzibaris of non-Asian descent. Later in the 1950s, the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) was formed. This party was an attempt to unite the African immigrants from mainland and the indigenous Zanzibari community. ASP established themselves as anti-Arab, motivated by resentment of the Arabic oligarchy. Due to inter-party conflicts, a third political party, the Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party (ZPPP), was established in 1959. The ZPPP distanced itself from ASP’s racism, but remained an African party looking out for African interests. After the 1961 election, the ZNP and ZPPP formed a coalition government. The opposition immediately accused it of preserving Arab supremacy. A new election was held in July 1963. It was to prepare Zanzibar for independence. The ASP won the popular vote, but gained only 13 out of 31 seats in the National Assembly, as ASP’s support was concentrated in fewer constituencies. The Pemban Africans were less willing to end the Arab community’s hegemony. About half of ZNP’s seats in the National Assembly came from Pemba. The ZNP and ZPPP therefore remained in power (Lofchie 1965: 9-16, 48, 170-172).

In January of 1964, only one month after Zanzibar gained its independence, the government and the sultan was overthrown by the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP). It was the result of years of growing tensions along ethnic and partisan lines. The Revolution was mainly a reaction towards British maintenance of Arab dominance (Lofchie 1965: 257; Burgess 2000: 1). Overnight, neighbours became enemies. Thousands of Arabs and Asians fled the country. 611 homes belonging to “destroyers of national development” were confiscated, primary Arab and

Asian (Myers 2000: 434-439; see also Burgess 2000:1; Lofchie 1965: 257). Cameron reports that approximately ten thousand people were killed in only a few days. At that time, the population of Zanzibar was less than 300.000 (Cameron 2004: 105). About one-third of all Arabs on Unguja were killed or forced into exile (Burgess 2000: 1). The revolution ended 150 years of Arab and South Asian economic and cultural hegemony in Zanzibar. It was a rejection of Zanzibar's cosmopolitan heritage. The revolution has been portrayed by the Revolutionary Government as "the glorious overthrow of a slave-holding feudal regime by an oppressed African majority" (Cameron 2004: 105).

Scholars view post-1990s Zanzibar mainly in the light of the Revolution. They have, to a degree, legitimized the colonially created categories imposed Swahili identity (Caplan 2004: 9; Mazrui and Shariff 1994: 4- 5). Fairhead and Leach (2008) report from West Africa: "it appears [...] that social science analysis [...] have been providing explanations for forest loss that has not actually taken place". The social sciences have been shaped by colonial assumptions, and have over time gained credibility and a central part in the national narrative (pp.102-107). It has become impossible to talk of "Swahili identity" without being partisan. "Ethnicity" can be seen as a highly problematic term. Larsen prefers the Swahili word *makabila*, literally meaning "tribe", arguing that using "ethnicity" easily leads to an essential differentiation between groups of people (Larsen 2004: 122). A man living in Zanzibar may describe himself as belonging to a place, by profession or age-group, by gender or by religion (Cameron 2004: 112). A person embodies many identities, and there are no clear boundaries between them. People more often define somebody's "Zanzibariness" according to moral standards, such as hospitality, generosity and modesty (see Larsen 2004: 123-124).

The Revolutionary Era

In April 1964, barely three months after the Revolution, Zanzibar and Tanganyika entered into a political union and created the United Republic of Tanzania. Nyerere became president of both Tanganyika and the Tanzanian Union, and Karume became the president of Zanzibar. The Zanzibar government remained independent in domestic and international affairs. It retained separate legislative and administrative institutions (Lofchie 1965: 280-281).

The number of Zanzibaris claiming “Arab” status has varied over time. During British rule, being an “Arab” was an advantage. Being classified as non-native meant more advantages. After the Revolution, though, the number of people claiming Arab identity decreased (Caplan 2004: 8). The revolution did not reduce tension in Zanzibar. During the Karume era, many disappeared. Pembans were perceived as anti-revolutionary, and many were publically humiliated by having their beards and hair shaved off. The Arab population of Zanzibar had been around 50.000 before the Revolution. At the end of 1964 the number had fallen to 12-15.000 people. (op.cit: 105). During the African nationalist and socialist regime, the formerly privileged minorities were transformed into second-class citizens (Burgess 2000: 1) The Forced Marriage Act was introduced in 1969. Men of African origin could marry women of Asian decent without needing consent of either the women or their families. It aimed to create a Zanzibar where ethnicity would be irrelevant (Larsen 2004: 126).

Karume was assassinated in 1972. This event led to an erosion of Zanzibar’s autonomy. Five years later, the ASP united with Tanganyika’s ruling party, Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), and formed Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the Revolutionary Party. Tanzania is today still under CCM leadership. Although Zanzibar has its own presidency, cabinet and parliament, the archipelago depends on the mainland for security, finances and electricity. The Zanzibari presidents are nominated and kept in power by the Tanzanian ruling party, and army personnel on Zanzibar consists mainly of mainlanders (Burgess 2000: 1; Kaiser 2001: 94). The economic and political isolation of Pemba has continued since the Revolution. On Unguja, in particular Zanzibar Town, locals have been secured employment in the growing modern public sectors, especially during the socialist era after the Revolution. Pemba, on the other hand, experienced few social changes and remained predominantly a rural and agrarian society (Lofchie 1965).

Multiparty system in Zanzibar

The multi-party system was reintroduced in 1992. There was no strong domestic pressure in Tanzania in favour of a multi-party system, but due to the economic crisis and dependence on foreign aid, the Tanzanian government gave in to international pressure, and adopted a structural adjustment plan (Bakari 2001: 155-158). The first multi-party election was held in

October 1995. The multi-party system reinvigorated tensions between regions and ethnic groups, manifested in the conflict between the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), and the main opposition party Civic United Front (CUF). CCM has their main support in the previous ASP regions, and CUF in northern Unguja and Pemba, which used to be ZNP's stronghold (Myers 2000: 435). There was a drop in the popular vote for the Revolutionary Government from 1964 until 1995. In 1963, ASP won 44% of the Pemban votes, while in 2000, and the by-elections in Pemba in 2003, the ruling party CCM only got 15% of the Pemban vote. In Zanzibar in general, CCM has won all the multi-party elections by a few percent. The elections can be seen as verdicts on the legitimacy of the Revolution. Although most of the voters had not experienced the Revolution personally, their families and their communities had. There had always been those who had disapproved of the Revolution and the Union, mainly people who had lost family and friends or property in 1964 (Burgess 2000: 1).

None of the elections have been declared free or fair by most international observers⁶. There were several weaknesses and irregularities in the voting process that raised local and international concerns that the election was rigged. Donors suspended aid to the Zanzibari government. After the 1995 election, CUF boycotted the House of Representatives until 1998 (see Tronvoll 2004; Killian 2008). In the years after the first multi-party election, several CUF supporters were fired from government jobs. After the election in 2000, many people, among them opposition supporters, said that they wished they had kept the single party system (Cameron 2004: 109). Ruling-party politicians justify rigging elections, viewing such measures as necessary to preserve the Revolution, and to ensure that the islands remain part of Tanzania (Burgess 2000: 1-2). Politicians from the ruling party that I talked to in Wete openly expressed the same views. They said that the current Revolutionary Zanzibari Government has to be kept intact to prevent Zanzibar from falling back into "Arab hands".

After the Revolution those considered Arab, and Pembans in particular, were seen as less legitimately Zanzibari. Therefore, much of Pemba's political oppositional activity can be seen as a process of reclaiming Zanzibari identity. One reason why Zanzibaris of Arab origin seem

6 See NDI's report from 2005 (http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/1927_zb_statement_110105.pdf), The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, (http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/903C0A27-DA0B-4AF1-8361-0F512980FB0A_COGElectionsZanzibar2005.pdf)

to prefer CUF, is because the ruling party ASP, and later CCM, adopted racist policies against citizens of Arab origin. They do not support CUF, because they consider themselves to be Arabs, or consider CUF an Arab party. Zanzibaris of Arab origin support CUF because they feel victimised by the ruling party. They see CUF as an instrument to rid themselves of second class citizen status, and reclaim a position in Zanzibar (Bakari 2001: 175).

The 2001 violence

The government has become more repressive after the multi-party system was established. Elections have been marred by violence (see Bakari 2001; Tronvoll 2004). CCM has a strong presence on Pemba, to counter the island's staunch grass roots opposition. Several irregularities during the 2000 election raised suspicions of rigging. In one incident, ballot boxes were confiscated for a week by security forces from the district electoral commission offices. Electoral ballots were delayed in sixteen constituencies on Unguja, and were therefore annulled. CUF called for the whole election to be annulled, and boycotted reruns in these sixteen constituencies. After the electoral results, where CCM claimed victory, CUF again refused to recognize the results, and announced a boycott of both sessions in the House of Representatives and in the Union Parliament. In the months following the election, CUF rallies were banned, and several CUF supporters were arrested and harassed (Tronvoll 2004: 16-18).

On 27 January 2001, peaceful protests were held throughout the country. In Wete, demonstrators planned to march on the city centre, to attend a CUF rally at the football field behind the courthouse. Security forces met the peaceful protesters with violence. In Wete alone, Human Rights Watch reports that at least thirteen people were killed by security forces, about 213 wounded, and over 400 detained. One police officer was killed.

“We met a group of police and FFU [riot police]. They fired into the air. We thought they were scaring us, because we didn't have any weapons, and we were clapping. As we walked towards them, they started firing live ammunition at us. We were ten feet away from them. They fired into the people. I was in the third line behind my nephew who was in the front row. He was shot between the eyes. Eight people were injured there. I took his body with others and put it

into a car to take it to the village.” (From Human Rights Report “The Bullets were Raining” p. 15).

The violence was not limited to those actively participating in the demonstration. Throughout the day, random beatings and shootings took place without warning. In all of Zanzibar, between 23 and 75 people were killed⁷ and hundreds wounded when police opened fire. Approximately two thousand political refugees fled to Kenya, most of them were Pembans. Almost all have returned after receiving amnesty from the government (Human Rights’ Watch 2002; see also Kaiser 2001; Tronvoll 2004; Rawlence 2005). On the outer wall of some houses there are still visible marks from bullets. In one case a family showed me a hole from a bullet in a living room wall.

Ethnicity today

In October 2001, CCM and CUF signed the *Muafaka* agreement. It was supposed to reform the Zanzibar Electoral Commission, introduce a permanent voters’ register, review the constitution and electoral laws, guarantee fair and equal coverage of both parties in national media, compensate those affected by the January 2001 violence, and grant CUF a greater share in government institutions. In addition, reruns were to be held in the 16 constituencies where CUF MPs had been expelled because of the Zanzibar House of Representatives boycott. There have been three reconciliation agreements since 1999, the *Muafaka* being the second. None of them have been particularly successful (Cameron 2004: 116; see also Rawlence 2005; Tronvoll 2004).

Since most of the cloves were grown on Pemba, this was naturally also where the Arab plantation owners lived. Zanzibaris of Arab origin play a central role in Zanzibar’s history, especially Pemba’s history. This has fuelled the notion of most Pembans being Arabs, which is not actually the case. Origin-oriented identity stem from projects of social distinctions and political alliances, mainly by political parties (Larsen 2004: 124). The government has also stigmatised the opposition and “Arabs” through school curriculum novels (see Myers 2000).

⁷ The government claims that 23 died (including one police officer), and CUF estimates the number exceeded 75 (Heilman and Kaiser 2001). The Human Rights’ Watch estimated in their report “The Bullets Were Raining” that at least thirty-five people were killed and over 600 injured

I use the term “Arabs” since Pembans use it themselves (*waarabu*). It is today, as it was then, used mostly to indicate a person’s socio-economic position and political alliance. Many families in Wete have strong Omani roots, and there are some families who consider themselves Arabs. They are assumed wealthier because of their connections to relatives in the Middle East. Such connections, their fairer skin and other “Arab” features, such as beards and Muslim dress, establish them as “pure” Arabs in many Zanzibaris’ eyes. This is a misnomer, since most “Arabs” have never been in Oman, nor do they speak any Arabic beyond what they’ve been taught in Quran classes (*madarasa*). One might be a fifth generation Zanzibari and still be seen as an “Arab”. On Pemba, most of them work in their own shops, or shops belonging to family members. Arabs own many of the bigger shops in Wete and Chake-Chake, and in some shops they even keep a framed picture of the current Omani sultan. Many Pembans are of the impression that the Arabs see themselves as better than everyone else. And in conversations with people who consider themselves Arabs, I experienced that many indeed do, though this is much less common among the younger generation.

A young African man from Wete once asked an Arab for his fair skinned daughter’s hand in marriage. The father said he would only provide him with a wife “when the dog gives birth” (meaning he would only be willing to give him a dog as a wife). Now, this story is apocryphal, but many Arab families told me that they would not allow their daughters to marry an African. The youths in Wete would tell me that you need a lot of money to marry an Arab girl. Farouk had recently proposed to an Arab girl. Farouk is a farmer, and also owns a shop. Because he worked some years in England, and visited Mecca at an early age, he is a well known man in Wete. But the family had preferred an expatriate who lived in Oman.

The temporality of history

“We are slaves of history,” an old Arab shopkeeper in Wete told me. When he was young in the 1970s, he got a scholarship to study in Sierra Leone. But when he travelled to Unguja for the necessary travel documents, they would not provide him with any. He said he and his family had a tough time until the late 1980s. Though his conditions have improved, he claimed that the political situation will never change. Many Zanzibaris still explain their life situation by referring to the Revolution. Scholars have argued that history is important if one

wants to understand contemporary Zanzibar. At the same time, one has to be aware of how the present shapes the past (Caplan 2004: 4). History is not only what actually happened in the past, but is rather a response to the requirements of the present. The past and the present shape and interpret each other in the present — they are both temporalities (Crane 1997: 1372, 1377, 1381; Eriksen 1993: 72; see also Giddens 1984: xxvii).

When explaining people's *perceptions* of history, it should be explained in terms of the times and the conditions people *currently* live in, where historical consciousness is expressed (Bloch 1977: 278). History "besieges memory, deforming and transforming it, penetrating and petrifying it" (Nora 1989: 12). *Collective memory* preserves what would otherwise be lost, and expresses the continuing presence of the past. In Wete stories from the 2001 violence is often brought up. All arenas and groups in society maintain relations to the collective memory. Collective memories are interpreted by individuals, and internalized as lived experiences. "Each self-expression of historical consciousness is an expression of collective memory, because [the] collective makes its articulation possible, because historical consciousness has itself become an element of collective memory". The collective memory is the *framework* where historical remembrances occurs (Crane 1997: 1373, 1376, 1383).

One evening, I was invited to join some old men at their *baraza* in the afternoon. They would teach me about politics, they said. This was the only such place where I had seen a woman; Fatma served coffee and sweets there every afternoon. Dozens of bees swirled around the juice stand, but it did not seem to bother anyone. I was treated to a cup of local black coffee and a *kisheti*, a sweet bite - in this case made of peanuts and sugar. We talked about the youths. I was told that most youths today are ignorant about history. "Since they show no interest in talking with us, they do not know anything about our past. (...) When we were young, we did not have televisions so we sat together at night and listen to our elders," one of them told me. Compared to today's youths, the previous generations got much more of their information from their parents. As times have changed, sources of knowledge have shifted, and youths today get a lot of their information at school, both from teachers and fellow students, and through the media. Their grandparents, and even parents, did not necessarily go to school. History comes to mean something different over time. I believe that the youths I spent time with in Wete are very much aware of Pemba's history, if not in detail, then at least they are aware of the part history plays in their everyday life, as I will argue. According to the

2002 census, more than half of the voters were born after 1964, and 45% were under thirty years old (Rawlence 2005: 515).

Keeping in mind that less than half of eligible voters had actually experienced the Revolution, election results have showed how successful the maintenance of Zanzibari collective history has been. The collective memories that people share make out their *collective identity* as people of Wete, Pembans and Zanzibaris.

Recapitulation of Main Points

Ethnic essentialism has been channelled into party belonging before the 1964 revolution and after the re-emergence of multi-party system. Today as then, a polarizing process has led to political conflict and violence. Stories of the Revolution have lived on and become part of people's collective history. The men who invited me to their *baraza* were afraid that today's youths are taking history for granted. If a memory is no longer a lived experience, it becomes *historical* memory - a *lost* past. History is then only recollected, and does not exist as collective memory anymore (Crane 1997: 1377). In the coming chapters, I will look at how youths experience the presence of history in their lives, and how they deal with it. I will also further discuss collective memory's effect on the collective political identity that people in Wete share.

Chapter 3

Hali ya Pemba – The Condition of Pemba

*We want reliable tap water and electricity
to attract investors to Pemba
Did you buy weapons with the money from our cloves?
Yes, we have seen the weapons!*

(from “Hali ya Pemba” by Al Hajj Goya⁸)

Al Hajj Goya is a famous young rapper in Tanzania. He grew up in Chake-Chake, the administrative centre on Pemba. “Hali ya Pemba” means, literally, “the condition of Pemba”. In this song he expresses a view of Pemban life common among young people, addressing issues such as unemployment, poor development and politicians’ empty promises. Throughout this chapter I will use parts of Al Hajj’s song to emphasize the emotions that Pembans attach to these issues.

In the introductory chapter, I described life in Wete by presenting my main informants and arenas where I conducted my fieldwork. In chapter two, I presented Pemba and Wete through political history that, I argue, has shaped a distinct Pemban identity. Political events in the

⁸ Translated by Lingston Adam for Freemuse.com. See <http://freemuse.org/sw24251.asp>

past have laid the grounds for the course of everyday life on the island today. Almost every day I was told, by young and old, that life on Pemba is tough - “Maisha ni magumu.” What did they mean by this? What does poverty and development mean to youths in Wete? I will also look at what they dream of for their futures, and discuss the chances they have of realizing their ambitions. By focusing on how youths experience the socio-economic conditions in which they live, I will discuss how they deal with them. In Zanzibar there are important differences in living conditions between rural and urban areas, and most people on Unguja, in particular rural areas, face more or less the same economic hardships as Pembans. I will here focus mainly on Wete and Pemba, though much of what I will discuss will most likely be relevant for other places on Zanzibar as well. As mentioned in chapter two, Pemba has since the 1964 revolution suffered from political and economic isolation from the union with mainland Tanzania, and from its sister island Unguja. Therefore, national politics are blamed for the socio-economic conditions of Pemba, and I will discuss how youths deal with the difficulties arising from them. How do the difficulties youths face today affect their relationship to politics? Towards the end of the chapter, I will discuss whether or not economic hardship evokes political resistance. Has the economic isolation of Pemba helped CUF maintain its political hegemony? The aim of this chapter is to illustrate some socio-economic aspects influencing a tendency towards political disengagement as an economic strategy.

In order to understand a contemporary social movement, which I consider disengagement to be, it is central to look at the local, micro-level tactics of creating realities through everyday practices (see Escobar 1992).

Maisha ni magumu - Life is Tough.

During my stay in Unguja, before travelling north to Pemba for the first time, many people on Unguja were surprised to learn that I wanted to travel there. “You will be so bored! There is nothing to do there. People go to sleep early because there is often no electricity. You will not manage such a life,” a friend told me. She was herself born in Wete.

Pemba is considered by many living on Unguja as peripheral and underdeveloped. The political isolation of Pemba has led to slower infrastructural development than seen on

Unguja the last decades. A shopkeeper in Zanzibar Town told me that Pemba is how Unguja was fifty years back in time. This might be an exaggeration, but there are certainly elements of truth to it. In Zanzibar Town, a Western style education system was introduced, as well as technical and economic institutions. Zanzibar Town has been the administrative centre for centuries.

On Pemba, the only source of electricity is two old generators, while Unguja receives electricity through a submarine cable from the mainland⁹. Although people pay for their electricity in advance, it is still unreliable. During my stay, electricity was generally available every second or third day, sometimes only for a few hours, but occasionally over several days. The longest period without electricity I experienced in Wete was five days, but there are power cuts on Pemba that last longer. The longest period with continuous electricity was about three weeks. As electricity has been unreliable for years, Pemba has been a risky place to invest. Therefore the island has barely any industry, and few businesses. In Wete people often say, “Nimeshindwa,” which means “I am defeated” or “I have failed” (see Caplan 2004b).

Everyday life in Wete

Life in Wete is calm. As unemployment is high, for many days pass slowly without much activity. The rhythm of the day is largely shaped by the set times of prayer. The five prayers take place at noon (“zuhr”), afternoon (“asr”), evening (“maghrib”) late evening (“isha”) and dawn (“fajr”). In Wete there are several mosques, but only one of them has a special room for women. Therefore most women pray at home, while men tend to pray in the mosque. The calmness is something Pembans themselves often brag about, especially after return from visiting relatives in Unguja or Dar es Salaam. But Pembans say the calmness is not peace-giving. Life is boring, youths tell me. They have little to do. “All we do is sit at the *baraza* and gossip,” one young woman told me. In the afternoon, women often gather at their own or their neighbour’s *baraza* and relax in the shade until the sun sets, while men gather at the more public *baraza* and drink coffee and play *bao*, and male youths often gather at their *maskani*. Many boys spend most hours of their days with friends in these hangouts playing

⁹ In February 2010 Pemba received reliable electricity through a cable from mainland. Electricity was until then more reliable on Unguja than on Pemba, but power cuts occur on Unguja as well. In December 2009 Unguja experienced a power cut that lasted three months.

board games. Few of them, if any, are satisfied with spending so much time there. Nor do most girls want to spend as much time at home as they do, nor marry early. Some boys play for a local football-team. It is not considered proper for women to play sports, but I was told there is a girl's basketball team in one part of town. When there is a football game in town, or in another ward, many youths gather to root for their local team.

44,2 % of the population of Zanzibar is under the age of fifteen¹⁰. Most youths in Sub-Saharan Africa grow up in conditions of unemployment, health problems such as AIDS and cholera, and poor education systems. This is clearly the case in Zanzibar as well. Pemba suffers from the above-mentioned challenges, mostly due to the economic isolation Pemba has suffered from since the Revolution. Such difficulties have an affect on youths' lives in terms of difficulties in pursuing education or establishing businesses or other sources of income. Abbink and van Kessel (2005) argues that many young people in Africa today no longer grow up in the well-integrated societies documented by earlier anthropologists¹¹. Because of this, youths do not have a well-defined place in society, making them a vulnerable group.

In Wete, the definition of youth ("kijana") is not attached to a certain age, but rather defined by the person's acquired position in society. A man who does not have a source of income is not in a position to marry, and therefore still considered a youth. A girl becomes an adult ("mtu mzima") woman through marriage. A girl told me that she would like to get married, but she does not want a man who cannot provide three meals a day. Few young men in Wete have steady sources of income, but this does not delay youths' entry to adulthood, as Abbink and van Kessel (2005) argue is the case in Africa in general. In Wete, it rather leads to alterations of the demands traditionally laid on the groom. The sum of valuables given to the bride's family is negotiable. In Wete they say life often gets tougher after one marries, both for the man and woman (see also Caplan 1975).

Youths are expected to contribute to the household. This household is most often the nuclear family, but it might also be the house of other relatives. Both boys and girls contribute by taking care of the children, farm the household's plot, do laundry or other duties related to the household. Although there are many local NGOs located in Wete, few unemployed men are

¹⁰ Tanzanian government statistics

¹¹ See Evans-Pritchard's (1940) fieldwork among the Nuer people and Fortes (1949) work among the Tallensi people.

interested in volunteer work to keep busy, preferring to help out at home. In the poorest families on Pemba children often have more responsibilities, for example taking care of younger siblings. In rural Pemba child labour is prevalent. By the main roads, children sit and wait for passing cars and busses to sell their passengers seasonal fruits. The prime market is newly-arrived ferry passengers travelling north. There are also jobs much more gruelling than this. In Micheweni there is a small business where children can be found among the labourers hatching stones into pebbles.

If a young man in Wete is not in school, he should find a source of income, and contribute financially. Many youths find these expectations frustrating. When they talked about the future, many emphasized a need to fulfil their obligations to their families. In every country where Afrobarometer has conducted surveys over the last years, adults believe that their children will have a better life than they did. Afrobarometer statistics show that parents expect their children to find a way out of poverty (Bratton 2008: 37). Many in Wete have stated that parents on Pemba invest more in their children's education than before, particularly in Chake-Chake and Wete. This has led to parents expecting young men to establish reliable sources of income, which are scarce today.

Youths stay in school longer than their parents did. They have difficulties finding wage work on Pemba. There are few jobs, and most households rely on different income sources to make ends meet. Old people and women, who are traditionally supposed to be provided for, must themselves provide (Larsen 2000). In Wete, most people make their living from informal economic activities and cultivation. Such activities constitute a substantial part of the Tanzanian economy (Helgesson 2006). Few young men and women have a steady income, and rely on odd jobs such as seasonal farming and construction work. Since employment is hard to come by, youths have to get creative and search for other ways to earn money, even if only a few shillings a day. Youths are good at finding forms of self-employment. By the main road in Wete there are stands where men and boys sell sugarcane juice and peeled oranges.

Alima is twenty-three years old and has four children. Her husband is temporarily living and working in Tanga on the mainland, just across from Wete. She expects him home in about three months. Her house indicates that they are of the less fortunate. It is made in traditional Swahili style: of wood and mud. It is not yet finished. Inside it is very dark, as they have not

built in any windows yet. In front of the house they have a little stall attached to the house. Here Alima sells candy and selected vegetables and fruits. Small sweet bananas hang from the roof while different fruits and vegetables lie in 200-shilling bunches.

Women often make bake and sell pastry, either to stores or by themselves. Early in the morning and after nightfall some foods are sold by the main road, such as breads, pastries, fried fish, fresh milk and porridge. Products sold in the stores are mostly sold by men. By the side of the road, women sit in rows and sell mostly the same products for the same price. Groceries have the same prices in almost all stores in Wete, as poor money circulation has pushed the prices to an absolute minimum. Commodities are often more expensive on Pemba than on mainland, as they are bought in Dar es Salaam or Tanga and brought to the island. Since there is little work to find, many dream of moving to Dar es Salaam and beyond. I will elaborate on migration from Pemba later in this chapter.

According to Mr. Rashid at a local NGO engaged with women's health and family planning, members of older generations found it as difficult to find work as youths do today. Others claim the opposite. I take it that there is a greater variety of labour available today, especially as ways of transport to Unguja and the even more developed mainland Tanzania have increased. The favouring of jobs through business and in offices has weakened farming's status as a "real" job. Before privatization through the structural adjustment plans implemented in the 1990s, there were far more jobs in the public sector than there is today. This might be why there is an idea that the government should provide employment. Many young male informants whom I met at *maskani* said that they were waiting to be given jobs. They consider that not providing jobs was the government's main failure, and also CUF's. Though this is outside the parameters of this thesis, it is interesting that most Pembans strongly resent the government, yet still expect it to assist them.

Local Understandings of Poverty

Tanzanian authorities do not have a clear definition of poverty, but state that “the cost of minimum nutritional requirements is the most important component of the basic needs approach to the measurement of poverty.”¹² I will focus on what poverty is on Pemba through looking at how people in Wete talk about their own and other Pembans’ economic hardships. On Pemba poverty (“umaskini”) generally means that available resources do not cover the needs of a family. Poor people are mainly those who often lack food. Since such a situation is quite common, many Pembans add lack of clothing, health care and schooling to this definition of poverty. On the island, poverty does not bring with it social exclusion, as economic difficulties are more or less a part of everybody’s lives. In general, people agree that life is tough, *maisha ni magumu*.

People appear poorer in the rural areas of Pemba than in the urban settlements of Wete, Mkoani or Chake-Chake. When I spoke with people in Wete about poverty, they referred mostly to rural life, the Kiuyu region in particular. Kiuyu is situated north-east, and is, according to locals, the poorest area in the whole of Zanzibar. Employees at the local CARE office confirmed this. CARE also informed me that Kiuyu is also one of the poorest parts of Tanzania. I was told that Kiuyu is poorer, as the region’s soil is not very fertile, in contrast to the rest of the island. People of Kiuyu often have to travel far, by foot or bicycle, to get food and basic resources, such as firewood. According to the CARE office in Wete, Kiuyu is also one of the places with the highest birth rates in the country. It is not unusual for a woman there to give birth to ten children, it is said. When people in Wete talk about the region, it is often mentioned that children eat raw cassava. Another thing my informants often emphasized is that the people walk barefoot and wear dirty clothes. During my stay on Pemba, this region had a cholera outbreak. Zanzibar radio reported that about one hundred people fell ill, and three people died¹³. Though the outbreak actually started in Wete, the town was not as affected as other areas. Cholera outbreaks occur almost yearly on Pemba.

In Wete, people would often describe a poor person as someone who rarely can afford to buy food that “builds the body”, only food that “only fills the stomach”. In Wete, the poorest eat

12 Tanzania National Website. <http://www.tanzania.go.tz/poverty.html>

13 See also Daily News: <http://www.dailynews.co.tz/home/?n=4042>

only one meal a day, maybe two. A regular lunch consists of basics such as rice, plantain bananas or cassava served with fish, chicken, meat, beans or a simple sauce. Chicken and meat is particularly expensive, so most people do not eat this every day. Those who can afford it also eat vegetables, fruit and homemade juice from the season's fruits. Cassava, plantain banana and *ugali* (cassava porridge) are cheaper meals, and is often referred to as *shamba* (countryside) food. The last years, food prices have increased significantly. An old woman told me that some years ago her family rarely had to resort to cassava, but today she cannot afford cooking rice as often as before.

Overall the standard of living is better in Wete, but there are great differences within the town as well. *Nyumba ya maskini haishui kujengwa*: a poor person's house is always under construction, a Swahili proverb says (Zawawi 2005: 117). The part of town where I lived is called Kifumbikai, but also goes by the name "njonge hajengi," which means "the poor do not build". When I was reminded of the name, I would sometimes respond: "*Lakini njonge anakaa*," meaning "but the poor live [there]". This is a newer part of town. The people who build houses here are mainly newlyweds, or Pembans who have recently returned from living abroad. The neighbourhood has a variety of different houses, but in general they are built in a more modern style than houses in other neighbourhoods. They are made of concrete, the roofs are higher and the windows are bigger. Several of these houses have walls around them. Many of the half-finished houses are rented out to families. All over town, cassava and other vegetables are grown in the foundations of unfinished houses.

It is expensive to build; therefore many build little by little, some spending years to finish their homes. One day my friend Saide and I took a walk through the town's side roads. Saide is the daughter of the man I usually bought bread from. When we walked by a nice painted house with a traditional Swahili door, I asked her whether one can tell by a house if the people who live there are well off. No, she said, to my surprise. I came to think of one of my neighbours in Kifombikai. Their house is big, but inside they have no furniture except for in the master bedroom. Saide told me that having steady income is rare in Wete. I also thought about one of the boys in my neighbourhood, and how his parents spend almost all their money to put him through private secondary school.

Dealing with poverty

*The banks have nothing to do,
No one has money to deposit; only for their daily spending,
Banks workers have sharp cracks in their heels from farming
Civil servants are also farmers,
They farms exceedingly.*

(from "Hali ya Pemba" by Al Hajj Goya)

Many students aim for positions in public offices, which are by youths considered "real" jobs. Workers in the public sectors have more rights, and women also get maternity leave, which is rare in other workplaces. To better their chances of getting these jobs, many take lessons in English or basic computer skills at the Youth Centre downtown. The problem is, according to Mr. Rashid, that the education system of today prepares students for types of work that do not exist on the island. On Pemba the public sector is quite small, as Unguja is the administrative centre. When students finish their month long courses at the Youth Centre their skills often wither, as there are few opportunities to maintain them. Computers are largely unavailable (mainly due to cost), and there are few people to practice English with. Also those who take tailoring classes face the same problems, as sewing-machines are few. Due to lack of electricity, and therefore also viable businesses, there is little need for computer skills.

After failing a national exam, few students start more expensive private schools to take the test again the next year. Abdul did, and is about to graduate from secondary school. Every night he works in a drugstore that belongs to his uncle. Since there are few customers, he embroiders linen during his work-hours. He says: "I am not a dreamer. There is neither room nor time for dreams on Pemba. I will take the options I have, as chances are I will never get away from this island." He is aiming to have multiple qualifications in order to meet various

opportunities. He earns 20.000 Tanzanian Shillings (Tsh)¹⁴ a month. He is saving money for computer classes at the Wete Youth Centre. The amount of money Abdul earns per month amounts to a good salary for a student. The biggest local car-repair shop has about six boys, all around twenty years old, working there. Some days they earn no money, other days 1.000Tsh or maybe even 5.000 Tsh each. Many have to rely on their neighbours. According to Larsen (2004), some Zanzibaris claim people today no longer value neighbourliness (“ujirani”) (pp. 132-133). In the household where I lived, food was often put aside and brought over to a neighbouring woman.

Farming

Most Pembans are farmers or fishermen. Most farmland is owned by the government. Such farmlands are called *mashamba ya serekali*, which means “the fields of the government”. People have to apply to the regional commissioner’s office for a piece of land to farm. Small-scale farmers mostly sell their crops to the local markets and stores in villages or towns. Those with larger crops sell to middlemen who travel to the main markets in Wete, Chake-Chake or Mkoani, or even the big Darajani market in Zanzibar Town. Most of the fruits sold on the markets in Zanzibar Town are from Pemba. Many people on Unguja and Pemba pointed this out to me.

One morning, shortly after dawn, Subira and her husband Baruk took me to their field. In the mornings the grass is covered with dew, and the air is still cool from the night. Subira returns home around noon to cook lunch. Baruk most often returns in the afternoon, but many return back to town in the midday as the sun is very strong during these hours. On the way to the plot we passed fields of rice and cassava, and occasionally a cow tied to a pole. Most of the farmers were women, some of them quite old. According to Aco (1995), Zanzibari women’s agricultural activities are considered a part of household maintenance. These women are therefore not seen as having left domestic domain (Ako 1995).

There were hardly any youths around this particular morning. I asked some women if they had children who helped them. One woman said that her son did not like to come here because he did not want to be a farmer. But during the weekend where there is no school,

¹⁴ 20.000 Tsh is about 20 dollars.

some youths come to work. Baruk says that youths today are not interested in farming and would rather want to work in an office. “They are lazy, these youths today. Sometimes young people come and ask for work, but they rarely return. (...) They will not see the development they want, unless they work.” He said youths today prefer to do nothing but to smoke marihuana.

In interviews I did, local CCM politicians maintained that there is no problem of unemployment on the island, saying that Pemba is a fertile land - there are a lot of government-owned fields ripe for cultivation. There is enough work for everybody, claimed the leader of the youth league in Wete constituency. Many youths say they do not care much for farming as there is not much money to be made. Many people barely grow enough to cover the family’s needs, and rarely have spare crops to sell. As farming of fruits, vegetables and rice is vital to Pemba’s economy, farmers need modern technology and fertilizers to better their crops and make the work more efficient. The main food crop today is therefore the easily grown cassava. Baruk owns three acres. He walked me from one end to the other. All the fields surrounding his plot are vacant. There is another man who cultivates cassava on this property, but apart from that he rarely sees people there. Since there has been no improvement in agricultural technology, many young people seek other sources of income through informal markets, such as selling peeled oranges or sugar-cane juice at the market, or by the main road. This lack of farmers is largely due to the lack of fertilizers. Many fields are nearly barren due to many years of single-crop cultivation.

The cultivation of cloves

Cloves have been favoured over rice and other crops ever since Zanzibar first became an Omani sultanate. The cultivation intensified during British colonial rule and Zanzibar became the world’s main exporter of cloves. Other crops were cleared to make room for clove trees, and roads were built to facilitate access to the fields (Cameron 2004). Today, clove farming is regulated by the Zanzibar State Trading Corporation. There is a long history to the clove monopoly. In 1978 the prices offered to clove growers was 7 per cent of the world price (Cameron 2002: 320). The price per kilo is about 3000 Tsh, approximately 3 dollars. Because of this low rate, smuggling to Kenya is very common. In Kenya they get 5000 Tsh per kilo. Government pricing policies contributed to a staggering drop in clove production. Pembans

wish for free market in clove exportation. This demand has been ignored through all three multi-party elections. Clove trees are occasionally burned and replaced by cassava plants. Cameron (2004) reports that different CCM branches use local muscle to force farmers to harvest their clove trees. Clove smugglers I have talked to say it is a big risk, but their boats are faster than the coast guard's. If they are caught, the guards often let them go in exchange for bribes. Rumours have it that president Karume also personally profits from smuggling. Cloves are Zanzibar's main source of income, but the money only makes its way to the elite.

Education

For youths in Zanzibar, education is seen as a key to unlocking opportunities. Many students have told me that it is a matter of "now or never". Failing an exam means that a door leading out of poverty closes (see also Caplan 2004b). As Helgesson (2006) emphasizes in her book on youths' economic strategies in Mozambique and Tanzania, there are other reasons for pursuing education. The motivation is not only financial, but also to gain knowledge and status. This is also true for Wete, but it is first of all a financial strategy that brings status if one secures a job. Youths consider education a key to escaping Pemba and its limited opportunities, the youths of Wete tell me. A scholarship to study in Unguja or on the mainland is one of the ways youths hope to get away from Pemba.

Khamis (19), who came to be one of my key informants, is a dedicated student. He spends close to all waking hours studying and teaching. Together with three of his friends, he has arranged a deal with a man who is building a house. They get a quiet place to study, in return they watch over his building materials. The boys spend most of their waking (and sleeping) hours here, apart from the time they spend in school and eating lunch at their parents' house.

It is common for youths to have study groups. They often meet at night when the air is cooler. It is common for those with education, completed or ongoing, to share their knowledge by teaching their children, siblings or neighbours. Many of the students I came to know, in particular boys, teach children on a regular basis, sometimes for a small sum of money. Every Tuesday night, a group of male and female secondary school students gather for tuition over at the big flats. The number of attendants varies, but normally about ten students show up. Their classroom is an empty apartment with nothing but a blackboard on the wall. Khamis

and Abdul are two senior students who take turns teaching English here. Many of these students, especially the girls, also have to help out at home, and are not always able to attend school every day.

Although many work hard on their studies, there are also some who have little interest in education, arguing that they are being realistic. Elementary school is taught in Swahili, but secondary school is taught in English. When students start secondary school they are rarely prepared for English. An even bigger problem is that most teachers simply do not know the language. This is, according to students, one of the main reasons why many students fail national exams. There is a lack of teachers on Pemba, and in some courses in secondary school, students simply have to study without a teacher, relying solely on their textbooks. On Kojani Island, for example, the people are famous for their fishing skills. Children work on the small boats that bring people to and from the island, and by the shore children pick shrimps. The small island has about thirty thousand inhabitants, but only one school. The school had 1026¹⁵ pupils at the time I visited (June 2009), twenty-four classes from primary through secondary school, and only sixteen teachers. Most of the teachers live on the Pemban mainland, and in the rainy season many teachers do not show up due to the bad weather. I asked one man why he did not put his children through school. He replied with a strong determined voice, which the people of Kojani are known for: “You put your children through primary school, and they do not get a job! Through form two and they do not get a job! Through college, and they do not get a job! They may very well start fishing at an early age and know their profession.”

Though it is still very hard to find work for a person who has graduated secondary school, or with higher levels of education, schooling is still seen as a good investment by the majority of people in Wete. This is because they are surrounded by a wider variety of businesses and offices than rural areas such as Kojani, that barely has any. Students I talked to, believe that when electricity becomes more reliable, it is in the towns job opportunities will increase.

The majority of parents in Wete want their children to go to school, but it is expensive. Many students want to continue their studies, and although school fees are relatively low (approximately 3 dollars a year in primary school), that is still too expensive for a family with

¹⁵ Out of these 1026 students, 601 one were boys, and 425 girls.

seven children. The children also need uniforms and books. Many cannot afford their children to attend school every month, and many have to drop out. It is therefore common that children of the same age are in different levels in school. Also, the higher level of education a student reaches, the more expensive the school fees get. A student at the top of his class might very well end up selling biscuits from the front porch of her home. Saleh got the best grades in his class in secondary school. A religious leader in his neighbourhood told me about him. Saleh was offered a spot at Castro Secondary School, a lucrative private school, but his family had no way of paying the 30.000 Tsh monthly fee¹⁶. When I met him, two years had passed since he finished school. He was selling vegetables from a stall in front of his family's house. In Wete there is no library, and newspapers are hard to get by. He said he felt stupid, that he felt his brain was shrinking as he saw no ways to increase his knowledge. This is what many students fear will happen to them.

Pemban Connotations on Development

*What valuables do we have?
For years, Pemba has not been built,
The airport is located in the bush,
A town is a town only because it has a bus stand
And the roads have huge pits like wells*

(“Hali ya Pemba” by Al Hajj Goya)

The Swahili word for “development” is “maendeleo”. Tanzania entered an economic crisis by the end of the 1970s. Tanzania found it increasingly difficult to meet its debt obligations. In light of these difficulties, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank urged the Tanzanian government to abandon its socialist policies and adopt a structural adjustment programme. President Nyerere refused, but eventually stepped down in 1985 and the programme was adopted four years later (Ahluwalia and Zegeye 2001). Pat Caplan (2004b)

¹⁶ 30.000 Tanzanian Shillings is about three dollars.

argues that the majority of the population on Mafia Island ¹⁷ has not experienced any improvement in their standard of living from the policy adjustments implemented by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the 1990s, but rather the opposite. People on Mafia Island and Zanzibar share much of the same socioeconomic conditions.

Anthropologist Christine Wally's (2004) experience is that when people on Mafia talk about the lack of development that their community suffers from, they also talk about a sense of isolation. As I have mentioned earlier, Zanzibar has a history of being cosmopolitan. "If you play the flute in Zanzibar, all Africa as far as the Lakes dances," goes an old Swahili saying (Ingrams 1942: 10). As power gradually shifted to Dar es Salaam after independence, many people in Wete saw development reverse and their Zanzibari heritage disempowered. Many old people say things were better when they were younger, before the multiparty system and a liberalised economy.

When young people in Wete speak of a lack of development, they mostly refer to poor infrastructure such as the dilapidated buildings or the island's damaged roads. In 2005, a paved road stretching from the south to the north of Pemba was built by finances provided by the World Bank, but most roads on Pemba are still in poor shape. A few years ago somebody supposedly planted a banana tree in one of the holes on the main road running through Wete, to demonstrate how poor the infrastructure is. I was constantly reminded of the poor infrastructure through references to this incident: "Look at the roads! You could plant a banana tree here!" It has become a common expression in Wete. In addition to the roads being sub-standard, the transport and communication system is poor. Farmers have to bike great distances to reach bigger markets such as in Wete or Chake-Chake where they can sell their goods, or they can load their goods on the small local buses.

Tourism: expectations and realities

The Zanzibari government has focused on tourism in the national economy. Since the Tourism Development Act was established in 1986, Unguja's tourism industry has flourished (Gössel and Schulz 2005: 56). Unguja receives the majority of tourists¹⁸. Young people in Wete were always excited by the prospect of tourism on Pemba. They expect tourism to bring

¹⁷ Mafia Island is located south of Zanzibar. The island is a part of Tanganyika.

¹⁸ Unguja received approximately 97.000 tourists in year 2000 (Gössling and Schulz 2005:46), and according to the online newspaper *People Daily*, officials' numbers reached 125.443 in 2005.

economic opportunities such as employment in the hotel business and construction, and a larger market for selling seafood. Caplan (2004b) reports similar expectations from Mafia Island. One may question whether Unguja's massive tourism has done the population much good (see Caplan 2004b; Gössling and Schulz 2005, Larsen 2002). Because of tourism, Unguja has a more developed infrastructure than Pemba, but the tourist industry has put a strain on Unguja's resources. Today there are fewer plots to farm, and in Nungwi, in the north, the hotels' water consumption has led to a shortage of fresh water for the locals (McIntyre and Shand 2006). There are also complaints among people, and organizations such as the Islamic organization UAMSHO¹⁹, that tourism pollutes the Zanzibari culture. The organization regards music and dance, even the traditional *taraab*²⁰, as sinful. It also holds that drugs, alcohol and prostitutes have become more available on Unguja due to tourism. There are not many hotels on Pemba compared to Unguja, but more are being built. A growing tourist industry will most certainly lead to same consequences on Pemba. There are significant differences between urban Unguja and urban Pemba. Though private parties take place, there are no restaurants or bars in Wete where people meet to listen to popular music and dance. Apart from a small bar at the military camp by the harbour where soldiers from the mainland live, there is no place to buy alcohol. In this sense, Wete can be considered more conservative than urban Unguja. Tourists' lifestyles, dominated by pleasure and consumption, contradict traditional local lifestyles that are oriented towards work, religion and kinship. Youths adopt many aspects of this lifestyle. In some villages on Unguja, the response towards the tourism industry's influence on local communities has been aggressive. Local economic strategies are changing, along with the use and control of resources brought on by the increased request for seafood. Migrants are blamed for taking jobs from the locals. They also take the blame for occurrences of robbery, theft and rape (Gössel and Schulz 2005; see also Beckerleg 1995; Petterson-Löfquist 1995; Vatne 1999; Gössling 2002, Gössling 2003; Larsen 2000). On Pemba, I also met this attitude towards the mainlanders who permanently or temporarily settle on Pemba to work in agriculture²¹.

19 Islamic Revival and Propagation Organization (Jumuia ya Uamsho na Mihadhara) is an Islamic fundamental organization. They monitor Islamic values in Zanzibar society and remind Zanzibaris of their duties as Muslims (personal interview with UAMSHO).

20 Taarab is a music genre that emerged in coastal East Africa in the nineteenth century. Taarab was mainly inspired by music from Arabia, but has since then been influenced by aspects of African, Indian and European music (see Holmen 2006)

21 See chapter five for more on Pemban attitudes towards mainlanders.

Neither has tourism in reality brought many job opportunities. In 2005, 78 % of workers in the hotel and restaurant business were migrants from the mainland, while the majority of those involved in informal economic activities, such as massages, henna painting, or souvenir sales are Zanzibaris. A European hotel manager and a European hotel owner both told me that they prefer to employ mainlanders, as they generally speak better English than Zanzibaris (see also Gössling and Schulz 2005). One of them also told me that mainlanders object less to serving alcohol, in particular compared to Zanzibari women²². According to Gössling and Schulz's study (2005), Zanzibari workers earn less than migrant workers. There are laws meant to regulate the share of employees from the mainland and make sure that migrants are only to be employed when no Zanzibari applicants are qualified, but according to workers I spoke to, these regulations are rarely exercised.

“Kwenda na wakati”- to move with [the] times. Expressions of being modern.

The Swahili word *maendeleo* can mean both development and modernity. They are two sides of the same thing: the Zanzibari idea of moving forward. According to Long (2001), modernity is a sense of now and then; living in the present with an awareness of the past, that people compare their realities to.

Many women in Wete emphasized that they are not like the women from the countryside. For many in Wete, the countryside represents what is undeveloped. One of the things many urban women consider “old fashioned” is the tendency to have many children. Young women in Wete do not want as many children as their parents' generation had. Having many children has traditionally been a way of securing future sources of income for the parents as they grow old. It is also believed that those with many children will be rewarded by God in the afterlife.

Though Pembans say that the economic situation on the island has not improved the last decades, the birth rate has decreased²³. Mr. Rashid believes the decrease in birth rates is

22,84 % of migrant workers are men, while 70 % of Zanzibari workers are women. These women are often included in henna paintings, massages, and in some cases sexual services, niches unavailable to men. Also, the activities carried out by women are generally less capital intensive and demand little or no education. Great deals of local social control prevent local women from applying for jobs in restaurants and hotels, as well as religious believe (Gössling and Schulz 2005).

23 Since 2003 the life expectancy at birth has increased from 44,56 years to 52,01 years. (Based on Tanzanian statistics by CIA's World Fact Book)

largely because of better health information for women. He advises women to wait three years before getting pregnant again. Family planning is a hot topic among the young women in Wete, though many are sceptical about using birth-control pills, as it is said it might increase the risk of getting cancer.

Biubwa (25) has a three-year-old daughter. Last year, her husband took a second wife. He says he did so because Biubwa had only given birth to one child during five years of marriage. What he does not know, is that Biubwa is counting the days of her menstrual cycle to avoid pregnancy. She has not told him, because she knows he would disapprove. She says she carried on with prevention because she was convinced her husband would find a new wife regardless. I once overheard Biubwa telling him that she is “not a cat”, i.e. a baby machine. She is determined to finish her teacher college exams and get a job, so she can take care of her mother. The younger generation in Wete is more in favour of family planning. “If you do not have a good plan, you can make life more miserable if you bear a child you can not provide for,” one female student told me.

The decreasing birth rates may also be a result of the increased acknowledgement of the value of schooling. Education does not only imply opportunities for the children; it also serves as an investment and security for parents as they grow older. It has become a strategy to improve their standard of living for both parents and the children (Helgesson 2006). Though this is a growing tendency, the most common strategy on Pemba to secure future economic finances is still to have many children. But particularly in urban areas, having less children has become a part of being modern; a part of “getting with the time” (“kwenda na wakati”), as they say, despite the fact that economic difficulties have not eased with time.

“Showing off” wealth

Showing that you are “getting with the times” is especially demonstrated through material means. Women in Wete do not wear a *kanga*²⁴ outside of their neighbourhood anymore, many not even outside of their homes. It is not considered modest. Also older women have

24 The kanga is a two-pieced cotton fabric with a Swahili proverb printed on it. One piece is wrapped around the waist, while the other piece around the upper body or head. For more on the kanga see Zawawi (2005), David (2008).

abandoned the *kanga*, apart from wearing it as a *hijab* together with the *buibui*, a black robe. The colours and quality of the fabric often indicate the woman's economic status.

The *ninja* is becoming more popular among young women. It is a thin veil covering the face from the eyes down, worn in addition to the *buibui*. It is most often black, though once at a wedding breakfast I spotted a girl wearing a red *ninja*. Since few women in Wete wear it, the veil gives an individual touch. It is associated with Arabian culture. Women wearing it are seen as having connections abroad. Tailors might also get inspired by foreign trends, and have new designs to offer their costumers. There is little inspiration from other African countries (Beckerleg 2004). The *ninja* is more a fashion statement than it is a religious statement. An imam in Wete criticised this veil and argued that it is against the Koran. On Unguja, on the other hand, several young women wear it on Fridays when they go to the mosque. It is mainly worn for reasons of anonymity. The women I knew who occasionally wore the *ninja*, said it was a relief to be able to run errands in town without being recognized. This anonymity leads to a sense of more freedom of movement.

Teenage boys are particularly inspired by hip-hop fashion, such as baggy jeans and caps. Women see it as important to have a new outfit for wedding occasions and for the Islamic Eid celebration that marks the end of Ramadan. At weddings, women show off their outfits as they dance to the ceremonial drumming. The men's wealth is portrayed through their women. Saving money in the bank is considered risky and insecure; therefore money is often invested in gold. It is quite common even for toddlers to wear gold earrings. It is not only wealthy women who wear gold, poor people do as well. At weddings, men are not particularly dressed up, except for the groom, many of whom wear Omani style outfits at the ceremony: turban, robe and sometimes a knife tucked in the belt.

Changing moralities

Almost everybody has access to a cell phone. They might own one themselves, or use their relatives'. When youths hang out, they often play and exchange digital music between their phones. There are mixed feelings about these means of communication. One of the male youths in the English class that I visited said that "one of the things that pollute society is the

cell phone. [...] Instead of using it accordingly [for making calls] they use it for evil actions, like planning theft or flirting with girls”.

Today, parents say they find it harder to make their children preserve traditional culture and morals. One day I had a conversation with the English class at the Youth Centre about changes in society and their relationship to their parents. Some of the students were annoyed by their parents’ traditional values. Young girls resent the fact that they have little freedom to travel alone. Other youths find it comforting, because “globalization plays a large part in the destruction of African culture and traditions, because most young people try to imitate Western culture,” one student said. Such views are often expressed by saying “*dunia mbaya*”, that means “the world is bad,” or “difficult”. People used to look after the neighbours’ children, and punish them if they misbehaved. This is unheard of today. There is a weaker sense of community today, and a stronger sense of individuality. People think more about what is right for themselves (see Burgess 2002).

People told me that drugs have started to make an appearance in some *maskanis* in Wete. Most drug users are those who do not go to school. Girls sometimes get themselves well-off boyfriends, “sugar-daddies”, to pay their way, but this is rare compared to Unguja and especially compared to mainland²⁵.

Migration

*Pembans’ jobs on Pemba are risky,
(S)he has to leave Pemba to look for a better life,
It is depressing, we are living dead,
If a Pemban on Pemba is changing a ten-thousand bill it means (s)he got from
somebody outside Pemba.
One may fail to run a shop when giving people loans
without getting paid back,
All people are exhausted; no one even earns a shilling*
(from “Hali ya Pemba” by Al Hajj Goya.)

²⁵ For literature on drugs in East Africa, see Beckerleg, Telfer and Hundt 2005; Beckerleg 1995

I will now focus on the issue of migration. So far in this chapter I have described the socioeconomic factors that make Pembans want to move. Now I will describe the economic aspects of migration. Many households rely on income from relatives outside of Pemba. Many families have relatives on Unguja and in Dar es Salaam, and some have relatives in the Middle East, Europe and North America as well, who send them money, and maybe even products they can sell. Such extra income from relatives is very noticeable in many areas, in the form of modern housing and satellite dishes (Caplan 2004b).

Between 1975 and 2002, the urban population in sub-Saharan Africa increased from 21 % to 35 % (Helgesson 2006: 6). Wete, Chake-Chake and Mkoani are relatively urban areas on Pemba. Many move to these towns to seek more prosperous lives. They are aware of the difficulties of finding work in the towns, but there are, generally speaking, more job opportunities here. Many youths migrate in order to continue their studies, or girls get married to a man who lives in a town. In my experience, people from the countryside are as eager to migrate off the island as the people in Wete are. One young man told me he wants to travel to America “because they live good lives there”. I asked him what a good life was, and he said work. “They do not sit in *maskanis* all day and play games. I really want to work.” Very many migrate to Dar es Salaam. It is said that Pembans have more stores in Dar es Salaam than in all of Zanzibar (Rawlence 2005: 517).

Migration is a life-making project. Migrant workers from outside of Zanzibar move to the islands to earn money. Most intend to move back home when they have enough (Gössling and Schulz 2005). It is also quite common for Pembans who leave for other countries to return after a few years. The money they earn abroad is worth more in Tanzania. When they return, they have enough to start a business and get married. Many men who have returned to Pemba after years in Europe or North America say they are happier at home. One man even told me that in England he felt like a prisoner, as the money he made bought almost nothing there, whereas in Zanzibar it had great value.

Zanzibaris, as other African migrants, often go through great risks to reach other continents. I have heard stories of long journeys. One man told me he hid on a ship and jumped into the sea as he saw land, and swam for hours before reaching land in Saudi Arabia. I have asked

returned migrants why they took the risk, and many said they did so because they found it intolerable to continue living on Pemba. Although many do not succeed abroad, their failures do not affect others wishes to migrate, since there is always a higher chance of getting a job abroad than on Pemba. Those with families in the Middle East, in particular Oman and Yemen, use these links as gateways to get job opportunities. Few girls I met talked about migration. From Malindi on the Kenyan coast, Beckerleg (2004) reports that women seldom migrate for work reasons, but rather for studies or marriage. Men living abroad make very attractive spouses, and it may bring good fortune if your daughter marries an expatriate. My host married her husband while he was in England. Her family and she hoped he would bring her to Europe, but he did not get a work permit and had to return to Pemba.

Though many dream of life outside of Pemba, or outside of Africa, many lack the resources to emigrate. Money is the biggest obstacle. Mundir is in his early thirties. He has two wives and five children. He is part owner in a car business in Dar es Salaam, and runs a shop in Wete that employs his older brother. Mundir has close ties with his relatives in Oman. His uncle in Oman has arranged a job for him as a truck driver there. He is planning to be gone for about five years. While he is away, his wives will be living with their parents in Unguja. Mundir has opportunities through his family network, and the resources necessary to make the most of them.

There are also those who want to remain in Wete, but say they have no option but to leave, as there is nothing for them here. As Khamis said: “We [youth in Wete] would like to stay close to our parents, but life does not allow us to stay here.” It is not that those who stay in Wete do so involuntarily; some say they could never leave their families. He would rather stay close to them and help them out here, rather than send money home.

Poverty and Politics

*The truth is you cannot tell a town's road from a road in the forest,
The cars can easily slip on the muddy roads,
They [the government] fill bumps with clay soil used to make potteries,*

*But when leaders come over [to Pemba],
You will see trucks carrying sand and pebbles,
They think we are small children
(...)
Even the vice president [of Tanzania] is Pemban,
How come the situation does not change?*

(from “Hali ya Pemba” by Al Hajj Goya.)

There are many poor roads on the island, full of pot holes, but the road from Wete to Gando is one of the worst. Few vehicles are able to drive there, as the road consists of rocky mountainsides and dunes of fine sand. The bus that drives the distance between Wete and Gando has enormous tires and drives very slowly. For years this road has been a battleground for politicians. The story in Wete is that the Member of Parliament from Gando, together with other local CUF politicians, raised money to fix the road. Since they intended to start building before the 2000 election, the plans were stopped by officials.

According to the opposition party’s office in Wete, this was done on purpose, as the ruling party feared it would give a bad impression of them in the run-up for the election. They also told me that during the shootings in Wete in January 2001, the barrels of materials for the road were destroyed. In an interview with CCM politicians in Wete, they told me that CUF told nothing but lies; the governing party had indeed planned to fix the road from Wete town to Gando for a long time, but the plans had been scuppered by a CUF sympathizer in the department, so that CCM would lose their opportunity to prove that they were developing the island’s infrastructure. I have not once, ever, heard or read about an official from either party admitting a mistake. On the other hand, they are never shy about laying all the blame at the door of the other party. As Pembans for years have blamed the ruling party for their difficult lives – often referring to the 2001 violence – many now also see the bickering between the CCM and CUF as another reason why political and economic progress has passed them by.

Pembans tell stories of how the government prevents investments. Several Pembans enjoy considerable success in Dar es Salaam. Along with expatriates, they find it difficult to invest

in Pemba. Kaabi, a man in his fifties, lives on the outskirts of Wete town. “This is war, a cold war,” he told me. He thought the inter-party strife was limiting people’s opportunities and making it difficult for them to succeed in life. On the wall of his small living room there hangs a picture of the Tanzanian president Kikwete. It was not there the first time I visited; when I asked him about it he sighed. “It has come to such measures,” he said. For over ten years he has written letters to national and international organizations seeking support for his project, without any results. He wants to build a rurally based factory that produces essential oils without using electricity. Years ago he bought the land for it, and the land now flourishes with flowers and spices. He shares this experience with many other Pembans, as a result of economic and political sanctions of Pemba. Now Kaabi is tired and tells me that he has lost hope. As a sympathizer of the opposition party, he has for years been harassed by security forces around election times. Now he wants peace, he says, therefore he has put up a picture of the president.

Politics of the belly

“Our so called leaders have run away. They get elected and then travel to Dar es Salaam and build big houses (...) they send their children to private schools. They do not do anything for us. Only close to the elections do they return (...) and give their promises...they only eat (wanakula tu)”
(from an interview with a woman man in Wete).

In Cameroon, they speak of *la politique du ventre*, the “politics of the belly”. Isichei (2002) applies this term to describe the practice where individuals use their positions of power to achieve personal fortune, in particular with reference to corrupt governments. It also refers to the shortage of food that is a part of many Africans’ lives. But most often “the politics of the belly” refers to the social mobility that comes with food security (Bayart 1993: xviii, 233-234). Having enough to eat is a constant worry for a large part of the population on Pemba. Pembans’ desired forms of social mobility are having enough capital to open a business, and being able to put their children through schools, and hopefully even higher education.

According to Bayart (1993), “politics of the belly” also refers to nepotism. Most people in Wete rely on friends, relatives or other contacts for jobs. Power often means the ability to distribute status, power and wealth. The scarcity of resources feeds corruption. Networks are founded upon inequality between the people who are providing resources, those who receive them, and those who do not. The politics of redistribution of wealth have therefore become normalized. This also reproduces inequality. Nepotism maintains a system where your possibilities are determined by who you know. Though “the politics of the belly” has become normal and expected of politicians, it is still not publicly accepted or legal. If a man is caught without a helmet while driving a motorcycle, he will most likely bribe the police officer at the spot, if he can. It might cost him 5.000 shillings, but a court appearance might put him back as much as 30.000 shillings. In chapter four I will elaborate on the course of nepotism in Wete, and how what political party a person belongs to plays a central part in their opportunities.

The phrase also refers to largeness of a body (Bayart 1993)²⁶. In Swahili, corruption is “kularuswa”²⁷, which means “to eat bribe”. When my informants were telling me about local politicians and leaders, many illustrate by gesturing a big belly. They often referred to the regional commissioner of northern Pemba. He is a very big man from Kiuyu, and Pembans often point out the irony that such a fat man is from Pemba’s poorest region.

Corruption is a part of all aspects of life on Pemba. In school, it is common to pay teachers for higher grades, and within political parties, corruption is frequently used to gain more influence, young party members have told me. To get a job, especially in an office, a bribe is expected. I was told that girls often have to sleep with their prospective boss to get a job. It is estimated that a stunningly low *seven percent* of civil servants in Zanzibar are actually qualified for their positions (Tronvoll 2006: 4)²⁸. Corruption is an instrument used by everyone who can. In Bayart’s (1993) experience, personal fortune is considered a political virtue rather than an object of disapproval. I would say that this is not the case on Pemba. On

26 According to Bayart, it may also refer to control of spiritual forces that is essential for conquest and exercise of power (Bayart 1993). For further readings on politics, spirits and magic, see Kjersti Larsen 2008 and 2009.

27 In other areas of East Africa corruption is “chei”, which means tea, or breakfast. For more on African interpretations of power and eating see Isichei 2002 chapter 17.

28 “ ‘Over half of Isles civil servants not qualified – govt’, The Guardian, 6 July 2006. The study revealed that at least 68 per cent of the civil servants totally lacked education/qualification for the positions held, while 30 percent are “semi-skilled and therefore do not deserve rendering services at the various capacities” (Tronvoll 2006: footnote 1).

Pemba, people are very much judged by their morals, such as generosity (see McMahon 2006; Kjersti 1990). If you have a car on Pemba, you are expected to offer people lifts, but politicians with their nice cars do not do so, according to my contacts.

The multi-party system results in a zero-sum game where gains happen at the expense of others. Politics started to affect families' survival strategies. It led to the current system, where political affiliation determines a family's opportunities (Cameron 2004). Corruption is arguably a part of being modern in Zanzibar today, and challenges the value of traditional morality. The famous proverb "Si hoja kitu, bora utu" means that "one's dignity and integrity are worth more than material objects" (Saleh 2004). I heard this quoted many times. Such understandings are being contested by the notion of being modern.

I rarely met Khamis at scheduled times, as he was very busy, but I would often run into him during the week as he was on his way from one study group to another. One afternoon I found him sitting in the shadow outside his friend Omar's shop, writing in a notebook. I asked what he was writing. Reading students' homework for English class always amused me, as I often found the language unnecessary proper and old fashion. But he was not doing homework. "Did I not tell you I am writing a novel? Come over to the house tomorrow after lunch, and I will tell you the story."

I went to visit as agreed, and he told me the story of Amina, an Arab girl who falls in love with Mussa, a boy who sweeps the streets and carries luggage at the bus station for a living. Also, Mussa has a good friend, Mohammad, who gives him a job in his store. And later, when this friend enters politics, he asks Mussa to run his shop. Amina is the daughter of a powerful politician. The relationship is kept secret until the girl one day becomes pregnant. In fear of what her father might do to Mussa, they decide to have an abortion. When the father finds out, he hires men to kill Mussa. He is therefore forced to escape and leave his life behind. After Mohammad entered politics, he became a difficult man to reach. When Mussa is forced to flee, he is unable to contact Mohammad for help. Mussa travels from village to village in search of a place to hide. At one point, he gets beaten and robbed. Finally, a man invites him to stay, and after some time, Mussa marries the man's daughter. A few years later, Amina's sister passes through and she and Mussa meet by chance. Mussa learns that Amina has

become ill and refuses to marry anyone else. Her father has given in and it is now safe for Mussa to return. In the end Mussa, leaves his wife and children and reunites with Amina. The love story is the main plot of Khamis' novel, but there is also a parallel story about a friendship poisoned by corruption.

When Khamis told me the story, from beginning to end, he touched upon many issues. He talked about the social status of Arabs, about power-relations in society and about poverty. But most importantly, in my perspective, he talked about corruption. The novel does not identify its locations, but Khamis tells me that he has Wete in mind when he is writing. When I listened to the story of Mussa and Amina, I heard what Khamis thought about "the big men" of Zanzibar. In many ways, it is also a story about his reality. It paints a picture of how youths in Wete, and on Pemba and Zanzibar in general, relate to their political leaders. "Wanakosa imani," they say – "they [politicians and leaders] have lost trust". Since the 2005 elections, people have lost faith in their politicians, both elected and appointed, maybe more than ever before. Youths say that their leaders do not care about their people, only about their own self-interests. The 2005 elections was the third election CUF lost and people are increasingly losing hope and saying that voting is a waste of time, "kazi bure".

Poverty and resistance

After working the family field in the morning, Nassur (18) goes to and stays at the CCM *maskani* at Limbani. His family did not have enough money for him to start secondary school. He does not have a job. Like most youths, he is dissatisfied with the "condition of Pemba", and wants improved infrastructure to attract investors. He believes that CCM is the only party that can create this change, and that it has shown so by building roads, clinics and schools. Nassur says that because of CUF's lack of experience, the time is not right for a change in power. Salim is twenty years old, and half way through secondary school. As so many other young people, he says he does not want to vote at the next election, because he believes it will not make a difference. "Both parties give promises they will not keep. It does not matter who wins, things will not change," a young woman said.

As the island has been largely been left out of development of infrastructure and investment, Pemba's role as politically oppositional has for years maintained strong. The hardship of

Pembans has been a rhetorical instrument for CUF, especially during election run-ups. I will elaborate on political rallies in chapter five. Life has not improved the last two decades, and Pembans have no prospect of real change in the near future. The opposition is therefore gradually losing credibility and trust, especially among young people. Therefore, poverty is not a factor that causes resistance to emerge on Pemba, but rather weakens it. For resistance to be possible, one needs social resources, and the social room for such mobility. As this is not available for most people, collective resistance is fragmented.

Recapitulation of Main Points

In this chapter I have shown how people, particularly youths, deal with economic constraints in a society with little room for economic manoeuvre. The ultimate goal for many young Pembans is to get away from the island, to developed Dar es Salaam, Unguja and beyond. This has also led to a change in the notion of what constitutes “real” work, different from previous generations’.

People feel that neither the government, nor the ruling party, nor the opposition have provided any change, therefore people disengage from politics. In the following chapters, I intend to explore how political identities on Pemba shape people’s everyday lives, and the possibilities and constraints the political identities entail. I will also discuss factors that *do* strengthen, or re-manifest, the opposition on Pemban.



1. A wedding ceremony. The groom is wearing an arabic style outfit. The bride's head is covered by a *kanga*.



2. An old lady farming.

Chapter 4

Politics: a Matter of Belonging

Historical processes have established Pemba as the main seat of the political opposition since the late 1950s. As described in the previous chapter, this has led to socioeconomic discrepancies between Unguja and Pemba. Youths in Wete view their life situation as the result of Pemba's economic isolation, and the elites' prioritising development and tourism on Unguja. I will now pick up where I left off in chapter two, and elaborate on how the historical political affiliations which emerged in the late 1950s are played out in everyday life *today*, with particular focus on youths in Wete. I will argue that Pemba's oppositional role for a long time has dominated Zanzibar, and left little room for political manoeuvring among youths today.

In this chapter I will discuss how youths express their political opinions. At the start of my research, I got the impression that youths were ignorant about politics. I saw none of the passionate activism I expected from a place known as the capital of the opposition. During my stay, there were hardly any political activities, such as rallies or public party meetings, to invigorate the common man in Wete. Over time, I came to understand that there was more to this attitude; it was a form of everyday political resistance, and these forms of resistance are harder to spot. To only look at dramatic events such as the 2001 riots is, as James Scott (1990) puts it: "it is to focus on the visible coastline of politics and miss the continent that lies beyond" (p.198). Scott (1985) argues that in order to understand everyday forms of resistance, we need to understand what people do *between* revolts to defend their interests. As I elaborate on the power of political identity, I will also discuss the everyday forms of resistance that take

place in Wete. As a result of socioeconomic issues, such as those discussed in chapter three, there is an increasing dissatisfaction with politics among people in Wete. People say that they are tired, and that *this* time they are not going to vote. Baker (2001) uses the term “disengagement” as a common denominator for strategic political withdrawal, such as migration, counter-cultural movements and non-participation. As in all societies, there are people who oppose the political power system, and who try to withdraw from it or change it. Disengagement is the most common form of resistance (Scott 1985).

A new form of political disengagement has emerged among youths. I shall argue that the ignorance and apathy I observed is in fact an expression of resistance, which again differs from the general dissatisfaction in Wete. Why do some youths choose a different form of resistance? What are they hoping to achieve? Most of Pembans are from families that support CUF, and this was true of my informants as well. This chapter therefore focuses on youths from oppositional families. Giddens’ (1984) “structuration theory” reconsiders the dichotomy of structure and agency. With his theory in mind, I will examine youths’ attitudes towards the dominant political powers in their society, which the youths express verbally and through actions. He argues that the agents are not victims of social structures, but that the two are interdependent. Is the strategy of disengagement an adjustment to the political reality, or is it an attempt to change it? With the concept of structuration Giddens (1982) to give full due to the “knowledgeability” of lay actors without entailing any form of subjectivism (p.109). Agents have knowledge about the social structures, and adapt to the social conditions. The dynamic between agency and structure makes generative action possible, Giddens argues. Considering Giddens’ emphasis on knowledge, I will discuss what knowledge Wete youths need know, in order to change the power structures that affect their lives. And in addition to knowledge, what conditions are needed for the continuation of the disengagement strategy?

There are disagreements in Wete on how to react to the socio-economic situation. The traditional resistance is still popular, especially around election time – which I will explore in chapter five – but is in daily life being contested by disengagement. The traditional form of resistance is, roughly speaking, the formation of a united movement, manifested in the CUF party, against the government and the CCM party. Social life is never so unitary as to be built upon one single type of discourse. However restricted their choices are, actors always have some alternative ways of expressing their views (Long 2001: 18).

Echoes of History: Political Identity on Pemba Today

After the multi-party system was reintroduced in 1992, the political dualism of the 1950s and 60s has re-emerged. Back then, the dualism consisted of different parties than today, but then as now, the political parties created a polarized political arena. Roughly speaking, the two parts were in the political rhetoric separated ethnically, between those of Arab descent and African descent, and regionally, between Pemba and Unguja. The two parts were not as homogenous as many today claim they were. The Revolution, the ensuing government, and current political conflicts have shaped and strengthened stereotypes of the Revolution through rhetoric (see chapter five), and created a notion of their being real. The violent Zanzibar Revolution was the high point of the political tension. Though the following revolutionary government intended to weaken ethnic identities, the Revolution left deep wounds among a large part of the population. Today the political arena is dominated by the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), and the main opposition party Civic United Front (CUF). Pemba's shared identity as CUF sympathizers has over time become deeply entrenched and shaped a collective identity. As a result of this, Zanzibaris divide themselves into two political categories. The majority on Pemba considers others either as supporting CCM or as supporting CUF. Since the early 1990s, there has not been any other political category of significance. CUF sympathizers paint all political parties with the CCM brush, seeing them as enemies. All governmental institutions are also understood as being CCM. Members of other parties are largely excluded from working in public offices and government administrations. Official politics is always also party politics. This is more or less the reality in all of Zanzibar, but my main focus remains Wete.

“But how do you know who is CCM and who is CUF!?”

“We just know. Everybody knows who belongs to the one party or the other.”

Party affiliation is visualized through arenas people move in. There is, for example, a mosque in Chake-Chake that people say is only attended by CCM. Sometimes it is also expressed through clothing. In all regions of Zanzibar, and in most towns or villages, there are one or several houses painted in bright green and yellow: the colours of the CCM party. These houses are their local headquarters. Most houses in Wete are not painted; therefore CCM's buildings are very visible. The CCM building in Wete is situated by Four-Ways, the main junction where roads from the Wete city centre, Gando, Konde and Chake-Chake meet. In the

afternoon, men who support the ruling party sit on the *baraza* in front of the building and drink coffee. Most men in Wete gather like this before nightfall and politics is often a topic discussed. Some men gather in their neighbourhood, while other seeks out many of the larger and more political *baraza*, of which there are several of. Political belonging is currently among Zanzibaris considered a significant aspect of a person, and of a family's identity. A person has been considered CCM or a CUF according to his or her parents' party identity. There seem to be an understanding that families' political identities shape youths' lives, especially when in fields of education and employment. Everyone, CCM or CUF, largely experience the same hardships. Privileges are limited to small elite, mainly politicians of the central government. Many youths in Wete believe that those affiliated with the CCM have a much higher chance of tapping into the resources of the political power-networks. CUF politician Maalim Seif was himself chief minister of the ruling government in the 1980s, before he left the party and formed CUF in 1992. Many have found success through CCM.

In the previous chapter, I discussed how economic hardship restricts people's opportunities. In addition, many youths believe that opportunities also rely on one's party affiliation. Political categories are today more or less a part of all social arenas, and every aspect of social life. It can have an underlying role, or a more dominant role. Still, there are obviously arenas and situations where the political aspect becomes more or less relevant. Gender, for example, often determines what line of work is pursued. In many contexts, corruption dominates more than party affiliations. Within contexts where political identity is set, and not being contested, it rarely plays a significant role, such as within a household. This is the reality that youths have to relate to. My point is that children in Wete are born into pre-set political identities which they cannot easily rid themselves of.

The relationship between CUF and CCM supporters in everyday life

During the voter registration, which started in July 2009 (see chapter five), I witnessed and heard of many cases where Pembans were not allowed to register, whereas CCM sympathizers faced no such problems. It was even said that underage voters got to register, and I later witnessed one such incident myself. I also met a man who had been turned away at registration centre by the *sheha* (local leader), despite the men being brothers-in-law. The *sheha* claimed to not know the man.

The traditional, normative form of resistance is “the silent partner of a loud form of public resistance” (Scott 1990: 199). Few engage in violent confrontations with security forces. Most people avoid it. During previous elections, many CCM sympathizers would not shop in stores owned by CUF sympathizers, and vice versa. Political rivals also frequently refused to attend each other’s funerals (Burgess 2000: 2). These are silent forms of resistance. Party affiliation determines who people socialize with and who they marry. After the first multi-party election, it became much rarer for people belonging to different parties to marry each other. If an imam supported CCM, many did not attend his prayers. People say this occurs in the wake of elections, though not so much during the previous election, in 2005. Inter-communal divisions have not been as strong as the divisions between the local community and the state, and the tension between the main political parties nationally. Neighbours may resent each other politically around election times, but most of the time they are neighbours-as-usual (Cameron 2004: 112). In Wete, people often say “CCM, CUF — we are all Zanzibaris”, or “CCM and CUF are all brothers and sisters”. Wete is a relatively small society and the family ties are strong, though many are bitter after the violence towards the peaceful demonstration in 2001. In daily life there is also an underlying scepticism. One night I had a discussion with my host Ahmed about marriages across political affiliations. Within his family they are only CUF, except for his cousin who married a woman from a CCM family. The extended family did not think highly of this though. Ahmed said that after that, he has had little contact with his cousin.

People who come from CCM families, are believed by younger to have greater economic opportunities. If one is a sympathizer of the ruling party, he or she may have a higher chance of working in the governmental sector (*kazi ya serekali*), for example within the police, military or other security forces, in public sector offices and schools. People are quite open about the correct political affiliation can mean the difference between a job and unemployment. I never found that youths who did so would rarely denied that they sympathized with CCM because of the benefits. To be a vocal CCM supporter is believed to increase opportunities such as access to better fields, jobs and scholarships. “One of my former classmates had barely started secondary school when he got a job at the hospital,” Khamis told me. I heard many such stories. Young people see that their classmates get jobs

they are unqualified for. They also see that those from wealthier families are sent to private schools on Pemba, Unguja, in Dar es Salaam or abroad.

Juma is one of the boys I often found at *Jadida maskani* in the afternoons. He is in secondary school, and both his parents work in public offices. Juma does not care much for politics, he says, but tells me he would be denounced by his father if he were to vote for CUF. Another boy, Abdullah, lives with his mother and two other siblings in a big house. He has finished his schooling and is at the moment keeping the house as his mother works. Their kitchen is placed in their back yard, and when I was in the neighbourhood, I heard him chat with his friends as he prepared lunch. Sometimes I would drop by as I made my way home. As in the case with Juma's parents, both Abdullah's parents work in the public sector and are CCM sympathizers. He says he will vote for CCM at the next election since his parents work in the public sector, and hopes their connections will soon lead to his getting an office job as well.

Neither Juma nor Abdullah gave me any ideological reasons as to why they sympathize with the ruling party, whereas this was often the case with CCM voters. Achieving a better life situation seems to be a primarily be the main motivator, though probably also coloured a sense of familiar loyalty. Considering the high unemployment, job opportunities are few. Most of the few public offices on Pemba lies in Chake-Chake. On the mainland, and on Unguja, Pembans are thought oppositional. This put restrictions on most Pembans, whether CCM or CUF. Pemban student find it particularly hard to get scholarships. A woman in my neighbourhood had a few years back applied for a scholarship to study in Dar es Salaam, but she says it went to the daughter of a politician on Unguja. It is said that candidates from the "right" families— meaning CCM—, or from Unguja, are preferred. People in Wete express this as a big problem, and politicians have addressed it, including at political rallies I attended (see chapter five).

In Wete there is, in the terms of James Scott (1990), a *public* and a *hidden transcript* in relation to the local power that CUF holds, and also to the power of the government. There are topics which are not spoken of in the presence of the dominant power, it being the government or key members of CUF. The public transcript shape Pembans over time. People have to fit into the Pemba, or the CUF, role for not to be socially excluded. There is social pressure to become how a Pemban is supposed to be — to fit into the collective identity. The

identity is also largely shaped by how Pembans are viewed from outside: from people on Unguja, the mainland or others. According to Scott (1990), the frontier between a public and a hidden transcript is not a solid boundary. It is rather where the continuous struggle between the dominant and subordinate takes place. Scott views this as the most vital arena for everyday conflicts. The political power structure has for long been strongly polarized, and the limitations of political manoeuvrings have set strict boundaries between the public and the hidden transcripts.

Emergence of a New Form of Resistance

Youths are often reminded of their families' negative experiences with elections, such as threats from security forces, that they might have experienced themselves as well. I have been told that there have been curfews in the days following elections, where people risked being beaten if they left their houses. Such collective experiences lead to, naturally, that most youths relate to politics the way their parents do. But recently a new form of resistance has emerged and gained support among many youths. This form of disengagement differs from the regular form of disengagement in Wete. Not only is it a silent protest against the ruling government, the CCM party, or politics in general, but against the power CUF wields on Pemba. There is a difference between the general political fatigue and this new form of disengagement. They are both a reaction to politicians' empty promises. As the traditional resistance is a protest against CCM, the disengagement strategy is a protest against *both* the political parties. The apathy among youths is an effort to create a counter-culture, an oppositional consciousness towards a politicized society created by both CCM and CUF. They try to rid their lives of the presence of history. They feel that they have no future on Pemba today, and try therefore to shape a new, and more tolerant one. And also, youths disengage themselves because there is no other language of resistance available to them. I found that youths did not want to relate to the dualism. Many youths using the disengagement strategy were not interested to talk to me about the struggling political identities. Some rejected my use of CCM and CUF as oppositions, and would say "we are all Zanzibaris". They did not wish to categorize people politically. It is a protest against the predetermination. It is an attempt to gain status as individuals outside of political categories in social situations where party affiliations often dominate, such as in application procedures for scholarships.

The socio-economic situation discussed in chapter three is the main reason why youths choose to disengage from politics. The boys at the CCM *maskani* at Limbani are just as dissatisfied with Pemba's condition as the youths who are CUF sympathizers, or as the ones who claim to be apolitical. They all refer to the same problems, such as the quality of the education system, the lack of employment, or the poor roads. The political leaders of the different parties rarely share their followers' world-views. "They do not see how our lives are", or "they live so different lives from ours", youths said. CUF has now "lost" three elections. People in Wete feel they have not been rewarded for their resistance, but rather the opposite. There has always been doubt in CUF, but according to people in Wete and local politicians, the dissatisfaction with the CUF leadership has increased. As Brown (1996) describe from the Ashaninkas Indians in the Amazon: "there is always somebody who doubts". There is also internal opposition in Wete. This newer resistance strategy shown through disengagement is a form of internal opposition to the leadership of CUF. What is it that youths hope to change by the disengagement strategy? I will now discuss the two main things that disengaging youths aim to change: history and the resources attached to a political identity.

Disengagement as an attempt to rewrite history

Social movements must be seen as struggles over meaning as much as they are struggles over socio-economic conditions (Escobar 1992: 412). Youths try to separate themselves from a reality that has shaped their parents' and grandparents' lives. Their parents experienced the change to multiparty elections²⁹, and their grandparents experienced the brutal 1964 revolution, and the alienation of Pemba that followed. My first impression was that elders seem to have much stronger opinions and attachment to politics than younger generations. This was a common opinion of youths. But that youths are less interested in politics is not the case. I consider their disengagement a language of resistance that is in many ways very similar to their grandparents' more confrontational approach; it just takes a different form. As their grandparents more often verbally express their resistance in certain arenas, many youths today are rather silent about politics. The main similarity between the traditional form of resistance, which includes support of CUF, and the new disengaging resistance, are that they

²⁹ The change to multi-party system was not a political struggle but the result of implementations of structural adjustment programs suggested by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

are both protesting the government's abuse of power. Both forms of disengagement are reactions towards the alienations of Pembans on Pemba since the 1964 revolution. And both of them are also considered, by their engagers, as instruments to reclaim a place in Zanzibar, and not being considered as peripheral as they are today.

Disengagement as an economic strategy

There is little people's power on Pemba. Therefore, distancing themselves is people's way of taking control of their own lives and destinies. There are multiple motives within a resistant group, but as Gledhill (2000) argues, the motive is most often personal gain (p. 86).

Disengagement is an attractive strategy for those who do not have access to networks of resources (Baker 2001: 4). Many youths have told me they want a neutral status to increase their chances of employment, and distance from aspects of life that signal political belonging. A neutral status has not been an alternative before. Youths in Wete want to secure their economic interests, which are mainly schooling and job opportunities. CUF are therefore losing supporters when these turn to formal agencies.

Changing party is a rare occurrence. When it happens, it often meets with social sanctions, as most of Pembans support the opposition party. In extreme cases, youths would feign CCM sympathy to get secure greater opportunities for themselves. They expressed so verbally, or through wearing the colours of CUF, or its emblem to express loyalty to the ruling party. Also, youths tell me that if one "converts", it rarely increases the chances of getting a job, as the employee most often would look at the applicant's parents party affiliation. Civil servants often claim support to the ruling party, but it does not necessarily mean that they will vote for CCM. People have told me this is often the case. According to Rawlence (2005), workers in the public sectors support CCM to avoid problems (p.517). I once asked two women, whom I knew worked in the district office, which party they supported. They said they could not answer me as they, as civil servants, were supposed to be politically neutral. But also, civil servants are obligated to attend political meetings held by CCM.

Disengagement and agency

Party identity has shown itself to be a strong structure of life in Wete, but as Giddens (1991) emphasizes: social structures cannot be properly understood without taking human agency into consideration. Structures are not only made up of rules that operate solely constraining, they are tools available to agents. Since structures are man-made, they also enable opportunities (p.110). Giddens (1985) argues that individuals have to be considered knowledgeable and capable actors, and not victims of powerful structures, as it is the structural environment that makes individuals' actions possible (pp. xxvii-xxiii; see also Kaspersen 1995: 50,53-54). Youths in Wete say that they are aware of the power structures in society, and I believe that they largely are. They feel them every day. Through relations to other individuals and institutions, they actively participate within the discourse. When they talk about politics they discuss aspects of the political discourse. Following Long's (2001) discussions on political movements, I see that youths process information and strategies as they participate in society, and talk about issues such as their life situations, political leaders, or political violence (p.13). Baker (2001) argues that disengagement occurs as an individual response, or as an organised collective movement. In Wete, disengaging actions emerged as a reaction to the socio-economic limitations in youths' lives, which they blamed on politics (p.15). But is this disengagement an individual decision, or a decision made by a group?

At *Jadida maskani*, youths frequently discussed their dissatisfaction with politicians. I heard that the youths there agreed among themselves that their relationship to party politics would be expressed by not showing interest. Sometimes the more talkative boys would express an opinion about politics on the behalf of the group, and the rest would nod their heads, or ad agreeing comments. The fact that they talk about their disinterest shows that this is an intentional act. Together they develop a political statement. When I met some of these boys together with other youths in study groups, I found that their relationship to politics did not change. Among youths I found that there was always room for disengagement. As I did not witness the emergence of the disengagement strategy at *Jadida maskani*, I do not know if it was introduced by an individual or by the whole group. None of the youths at *maskani* could

give me an accurate answer as to when it occurred, or who came to think it was a good idea. They said it came about as people grew tired, and did not care about politics anymore. I believe it most likely emerged out of jealousy of those who had the right contacts and therefore got employed. Long (2001) argues that a disengagement strategy rely on maintenance of acceptance through a united network of actors. Disengagement is therefore a group action. Also for the strategy to be successful, it needs to grow. It depends upon the emergence of a network of actors who become partially enrolled in others' projects (pp.13, 17). It is not a difficult task for the disengaging youths to mobilize other youths, as most youths relate to this project. When youths say they are not interested in politics, it is a political statement, considering the mobilization which lies behind it.

A Discussion on Change

What do youths believe has to be done to achieve the ideological and economic goals they wish for? Many youths talked about what they want to change, but few youths reflected on *how* to achieve change. Those who did, found that if they were to achieve change through disengagement, they rely on their form of resistance to gain wider acceptance in society, and for the political arena to be defragmented.

Gaining acceptance

Many youths in Wete see disengagement mainly as a strategy to improve their livelihood. For many it is also an attempt to weaken the role history plays in society. As noted, for the disengagement project to be successful, it needs to gain supporters. Disengagement has started to gain some support among other people in Wete. Since so many are tired of politics, some adults see the value of the youths' disengagement strategy. I will now discuss two different reactions of two mothers whose children have chosen to side with the ruling party.

When I visited Salma, a twenty-one year old student at the Teacher's Training College in town, she spoke loudly and passionately about politics. Especially she liked to talk about Maalim Seif, the leader and founder of CUF. He is from Wete, something people in Wete are very proud of. Her mother Rehema, though, constantly complained when we she heard us discussing politics. "I tell her she is wasting her time sympathizing with CUF. She is a fool

for not thinking about finding a job when she finishes her studies.” Rehema has no strong political views, but says she has always voted for CUF. She fears that Salma will have trouble getting a job as a teacher. Rehema considers political engagement a waste of time, “it has not led to anything good”, she said. She wishes for Salma to take advantage of the opportunities available to her. In her view, associating with CUF leads to less socio-economic resources.

The other mother is Bi Bahati. I would normally pass her house on my way home in the afternoons, and often sat with her the *baraza* where she sold small packages of peanuts and *ubuyu*³⁰. One afternoon her eighteen year old son Omar, who runs the little shop attached to their house, called me over. He invited me in and offered me his chair. He pulled over a water tank for himself to sit on. Apart from the new Valentine’s Day cards his sister had brought from Dar es Salaam the week before, the shop looked exactly like any other shop in town, selling the exact same products, such as soap, rice, flour, butter and beans. He asked me why I had not asked him which party he preferred, as I had asked others. When I met Omar with his friends at *Jadida maskani*, he was not the most talkative guy, but I had gotten the impression that he shared the views of the others, who showed very little interest in politics. “There is no doubt that I will vote for CCM”, he said. In his view, there has not been any progress, because of the hostility towards the government. If Pembans were more welcoming of the government, they would see changes, he said. I was surprised. Through many long conversations with his mother, I had learned that the family was CUF. Bi Bahati loves her party, but tells me that Omar may vote for whatever party he wants to. “After all, we live in a democracy” she said. She believes that if people accept the right to individually choose their party, the political atmosphere will eventually change.

Both Rehema and Bi Bahati are interested in making sure that their children will have greater opportunities in education and employment. By attempting to change the course of political belonging, parents may get involved by accommodating such resistance within their homes, an arena which most often has had a stronger sense of party affiliation. Children are the parents’ economic security. If political identity were not as pre-set, and flow across the boarder between CCM and CUF becomes acceptable, it will also ease the tension that has affected neighbourhoods, Bi Bahati told me. It was not so that CCM families did not want such change. I spoke to mothers who supported CCM, and some expressed that the children

30 Candy made from seeds from fruits of the baobab tree, together with sugar and spices.

should be able to choose for themselves. With fathers, on the other hand, I rarely found this. It might be so that women are, in general, more open minded when it comes to politics than men? Probably not. I had more contact with mothers, but I believe the conversations I had with men were more influenced by that they knew of my interest for Zanzibar politics, while with women I shared a more variety of topics. In many settings I believe my interest in political issues triggered peoples' collective memory, and therefore many felt a need to make it clear which truth was the real truth.

When I had conversations about party politics with both youths and adults, they often referred to the violent events people in Wete have experienced, especially the 2001 violence. Bi Bahati's son Omar talked about events the same way that many CUF sympathizers would. Other CCM supporters often justified such events, and some denied they even happened. I noticed that, in general, youths from CCM families defended acts made by the party, whereas, of course, CUF families condemned them. Omar is an interesting case since he is from a family that sympathizes with the opposition party, but still he says he will vote for the ruling party, *and in addition* he condemns the violent events in the wake of the 2000 and 2005 elections. He saw no contradiction in this. The election violence has had a strengthening effect on CUF, and created hatred against the government. When people in Wete told me about their own experiences, and the experiences of their families, I never experienced distinctions between the government and the party CCM. His views on the connection between the party CCM and its the government, seem to differ from the normal perception of the power structure. Since he will not condemn the violence, he finds it useful to distance the party from the government in order to further legitimize his choice. It might also be that he did not consider the violence as acts from the Zanzibari government, but more from the Union government. Either way, he represents another aspect of the disengagement strategy that I did not have the chance to fully explore. I will further discuss the government and CCMs power in chapter five.

Defragmentation of political arena

I experienced that young and old in Wete found it hard to imagine a political landscape on Pemba that would be fragmented differently. For this reason, it is difficult for other political parties to establish themselves on Pemba. If a third political party managed to gain significant

support on Pemba, I believe it would be the best possibility of change in the political arena. But young and old viewed a defragmentation as impossible, and that it would not be the situation in Zanzibar for a very long time. When I asked my friend Saide, the daughter of the man I usually bought bread from, if she supported CCM or CUF, she remarked that there are other parties as well. It was very rare that I ever met supporters of other parties; it was as if they barely existed. I never heard a party's actual policies given as a reason for a particular political affiliation. It is, as noted, a matter of political belongingness. Party politicians have themselves told me that their platform is mostly a matter of ideology. CCM's and CUF's promises are very similar: they mostly speak about improved infrastructure and of increased job opportunities. It is therefore less likely that Saide, or any other person, would choose to support a party because of its program, especially since no third party holds any power in Wete, or in Zanzibar at all. But what ideology has a third political party, such as Chadema³¹, has to offer? A third party offers something outside of the existing political arena, and outside the current struggle of ideology, identity and of history. I did not meet many people who found the popularization of a third party to be a solution. People say that would be impossible. Youths who suggested defragmentation as a solution, were high school students, or people with higher education.

Disengagement and Change

Do youths even aim to change the system – do they see it as a possibility? Or is this disengagement strategy rather a way of adjusting to the existing power relations? Baker (2001) argues that those who seek to disengage do not wish to change or destroy the system. He argues they seek ways to ignore and avoid it (p.2). Disengagement in Wete is a way of ignoring and avoiding politics, just as Baker argues, but through disengage youths in Wete express dissatisfaction with socio-economic and socio-political conditions. I therefore believe that change is always a motive for disengagement. They aim to change the power CUF wields over their local community, and open up the strict boundaries between the parties, so that one stands freer to choose one's party.

31 Chadema is the largest party on mainland Tanzania, and has some support in urban Zanzibar, but not of significance.

Long (2000) argues that change comes from interactions, negotiations and social struggles between different kinds of actors. Agency gives individuals the opportunities to break away from normative actions, and, depending on the sum of social factors at work, they may instigate shifts in the social structure (p.13). Youths have a great deal of knowledge about the power CUF and the government holds, and a great deal of experience of how the dominations affect the community and their own lives. Youths know the limits of political manoeuvrings. They know how to operate within the given framework for acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. Giddens (1984) argue that agents are knowledgeable; that they are aware of the power structures that affect their lives. But in my experience, few youths had knowledge that exceeded awareness. Few expressed ideas reflecting an ability to imagine politics differently. Most youths wished the dichotomy to be weakened, but not for it to completely dissolve.

But the things that many youths want to change, are the same things that make change seem impossible. As for now, political identity is such a strong discourse. This is where the main challenge lies. If people cannot imagine change, can they contribute to change? Because of this, disengagement does not easily gain support among most people in Wete. Although youths discuss the possibilities and limitations of politics, and make an effort to distance themselves from it, they cannot fully make an object out of CUF through disengagement. CUF is not only a party, but so much more. The CUF identity is still so strongly rooted in society, in arenas, and in themselves. It is hard to choose to try to rid oneself of the collective identity. It may also lead to sanctions from families and the community. Omar has made a decision that differs from his family's ideas, and that of most of his friends, by supporting CCM. Not only did he distance himself from the political identity of his city, and of his family's political identity, he expresses support of a party that has in times been considered an enemy. His action has little acceptance among most people, nor among many disengaging youths. Most people view it as unacceptable to support the ruling party. People who change party affiliation often risk being socially excluded. One may be viewed as a traitor.

But the snowball has started rolling. The social sanctions are not as strong as they used to be. Some parents, as noted, are supportive of youths' disengagement. If CUF were to lose a significant number of human resources, this could, over time, weaken the opposition, as the party would slowly lose its central role in the collective identity.

Recapitulation of Main Points

Pembans were for a long time after the Revolution regarded as traitors. Ever since the return of the multi party system, CUF has had a strong position on the island. Through CUF, Pembans have fought to regain a position in Zanzibar, and to not remain peripheral. The opposition party has become a central part of the Pemban identity. CUF has been their voice. When I conducted my fieldwork, three elections had been held, and people said they had still not seen any results of the promises CUF had made since the 1990s. Many people have grown tired of politics. The socioeconomic situation has made CUF lose credibility among many youths. Therefore, a new form of disengagement has emerged. Some youths do not only disapprove of the government, but also of CUF. There is a strong notion that there are clear-cut identities, such as the idea of “pure” Arabs, or that of political identity. CCM sympathizers are believed to have greater economic opportunities than the rest, but this is rarely the case. Many youths therefore view CUF as an obstacle for them to have the same opportunities as youths who come from CCM families. But as CUF has become strongly rooted in the Pemban identity, few find it possible to imagine the political arena differently fragmented. The collective identity is largely based on the Pemban collective memory of suffering because of their political identity and is the foundation for the polarization of the socio- and party-political arena. For youths to achieve the opportunities CCM is believed to have, significant alterations in the collective memory has to be made.

Chapter 5

Producing and Reproducing Political Identity

*“On Pemba the towns are falling apart,
Neither Wete, Chake or Mkoani are as they used to be,
(...)That’s why Pembans don’t trust the government,
For them we are trouble makers, like Osama and Al-Qaida for Bush,
Or Palestinians with Hamas for Israel,
This is my reality
(...)
Everyday I fight huge old clove trees,
Even if I shower, I smell of sweat.”*

(From “Hali ya Pemba” by Al Hajj Goya).

I have argued that the new form of disengagement among youths is a conscious strategy, and is motivated by a wish for change. Disengagement strategies show that many youths believe that the tension between the parties has to be weakened for change to happen. In this chapter I will elaborate further on the possibilities youths have of changing the structure of the political arena, and the impact political belonging has on society in light of the boundaries of the discourse. In the previous chapter I discussed disengagement among youths in Wete, and the possibilities of change in the light of party association. To further understand the possibilities

of youths' disengagement, I will discuss disengagement in the light of collective memory as part of larger power structures in society.

I will now elaborate on their disengagement, and focus on why these youths have resorted to this passive resistance, as opposed to a more active, violent form. The reason lies, as Gledhill (2000) argues, in the power-relations that are opposed (pp.90-91). When authorities lose social control, a more violent form of resistance is likely to emerge. In the presence of a strong authority, on the other hand, the suppressed often have limited resources, and therefore resort to defensive disengagement (Baker 2001: 3; Gledhill 2000: 77). "Everyday I fight huge old clove trees," Goya sings. Pembans do not feel that the clove cultivation benefits them economically, but many clove farmers are pressured to continue to grow them. The trees in Goya's lyric symbolize the government. Ever since the Revolution, CCM has had a strong presence on Pemba. Do the ways the government mark their presence influence what form of resistance people choose?

Like most Tanzanians, Pembans have no economic security. For many, the near future is uncertain. So why would a poor man support CUF, when it is widely believed that CCM supporters have greater economic opportunities? How have alliances shaped over fifty years ago, remaining such a powerful part of Zanzibari identity? People often told me, or reminded each other: "But wait until elections ..." What happen then? I will examine the political rallies held by CUF in July 2009 (CCM did not hold any rallies at that time). Rallies play a central part in maintaining the boundaries for political movement. In this chapter I will show how CUF has manifested its position on Pemba through political rallies. I will look at the measures CUF takes to maintain their role, and prevent youths from abandoning the party.

I will in this chapter examine the larger political power structures present in Wete, and presumably in all of Zanzibar. This chapter is mostly based on data collected when I worked in Wete as an electoral observer. The job, through the Norwegian Embassy, gave me the opportunity to see the larger power structures that are a part of Zanzibaris' lives.

Agency and discourse: theoretic framework for this chapter

In the previous chapter, I focused on people's abilities to act. Giddens (1984) emphasizes that the structural environment does not explicitly constrain individuals' actions. In his view, the structural environment is what makes individual actions possible, as individuals adapt to their social conditions. Structures are made up of resources, as well as rules and constraints. Giddens argues that agents are portrayed in structural sociology as less knowledgeable than they really are, and aims to treat structure and agency equally (pp. xxvii- xxiii; see also Kaspersen 1995: 50). But although Giddens recognizes the significance of social constraints, he does not consider it as powerful as Foucault does. When looking at the socio-political power structures, I will again apply Giddens' structuration approach, and discuss it in relation to Foucault's theory of discourse. In doing so, I wish to emphasize the dominance the political discourses holds over the individual. For Foucault (1995), a discourse dominates both the dominated and the dominative powers: it is a truth accepted by everybody that it affects. Now, I must note that I am probably not much more able than my informants to point out the discourse they live in. I do not have the embodied experiences of life as a Pamban. What I have are theoretical frameworks to apply. Having said so, I am of the opinion that a voluntary-focused approach to decision, such as that of Giddens, pays insufficient attention to how choices are shaped by larger structural frames. I will use Foucault's discourse theory to show how strong CUF's role is in Wete, and the legitimacy CUF has established over time. The form of the dominant power shapes the conditions for where and when there is room, and where there is *not* room, for public expression of one's political views. Discourse says what is possible for people to think, and lays the grounds for what are possible actions.

Weber (2000) defines power as the ability of an actor to realize his or her will through social actions, even against the will of other actors (p.53). For Foucault (1995), power is a complex strategic situation in society, embedded in all conditions and processes. It is never exercised without purpose. Power is the game of struggles that strengthen the power relations. Where there is power there is resistance, and where there is resistance there is power (pp.103-107). The power I am about to discuss, is the power that is driven by the contradictions that distinguish the rivaling parties, CCM and CUF, from each other. The elements that strengthen a party are found within the rivaling party.

The Presence of Government Power

The Registration process of 2009

In July 2009, the registration of voters for the 2010 general elections started on Pemba. Usually registrations have started in southern Unguja and worked its way north, ending up on Pemba. This was initially the plan for this registration as well. There were speculations among CUF politicians that this was a government – meaning CCM – strategy to eliminate a significant amount of oppositional votes at a time when the international community paid little attention. It was an “open secret” that the obstacles were not mistakes, but purposely implemented. This way, there would be little need for further rigging during the actual elections, it was said. I will now turn to some of the many obstacles that were put into play by the government.

President Karume announced in 2005 that the new Zanzibar Identity Card (ZanID) would not be used in any political or electoral matters³², but 30 June 2009 it was announced that the ZanID would be necessary in order to register for the 2010 national election. This was less than a week before the registration started. It was very difficult for people to get this identity card, and other forms of identification, such as birth certificate, passport or drivers license, were not valid for this registration. In Mgogoni, a village not far from Wete town, I visited Bi Time. As we sat at her *baraza*, her grandson returned from the school where the registration was taking place. He looked confused, and told his grandmother he had been rejected because he did not have a ZanID. She became furious, took her walking stick and her grandson and went to the registration centre. When the guard stopped them by the door, she started arguing her case. She had brought with her an old passport, her new passport, all of her voting cards dating a long time back, and an old “party book” with a picture of the late president Karume in it. She laid them all out on the ground in front of the door. “I am my grandson’s identity card! I was born here, my daughter – his mother – was born here. My grandson was born here. I am his identity card!” She was brought inside and the registration staff tried to assure her that her grandson would get a chance to register during the second round of registration which was to take place from January 2010, if he got a ZanID.

32 “Karume issued with ID card” in The Guardian. 18.07.2005.

Most Zanzibaris have to go through long procedures to get this identity card. The necessary application form is bought from their *sheha*, a local leader appointed by the district commissioner. He or she is most often selected out of long lasting loyalty to the CCM party. Though being a simple form of paper, the forms are not available other places than through the *sheha*, and the *sheha* could only get it from the district office. Also, to get the application form from *sheha*, one had to show a birth certificate. This registration is the first time in many peoples' lives that birth certificates have been necessary to own Most Pembans, especially those in rural areas, do not own birth certificates. If a child is born in a hospital, a birth certificate will be issued automatically, but if a child is born at home, the parents have to register the birth themselves. These days, most parents *do* get their children the proper documents, but many people who today are of voting age, simply do not own birth certificates. Making it the only valid form of identification to qualify for a ZanID therefore, effectively, disenfranchises an enormous amount of voters. According to the district office, the birth certificate rule only applies for people under 50 years of age. But in Wingwi, a 74 year old man was denied an application form because he did not have a birth certificate, even though the *sheha* had known him all of his life.

The registration started off dramatically. During this first week, 1.584 Pembans were rejected at the registration centers. During the first week of registration, only 6.536 people got registered, whereas the sum of registered from the same areas for the 2005 election were 9.011 people³³. In conversations with CARE in Wete, I learned that the yearly population growth is approximately 3 %, making the gap between the 2005 and 2009 results even bigger.

In conversations with *shehas*, locals and CUF, it became clear to me that local leaders were under great pressure from the district offices. A *sheha* is under a lot of restrictions from the district office and the party. He is prevented from providing the form. He was not allowed to photocopy the form, but had to travel to the district office and *buy* them. Because of the *shehas* affiliations with CCM, it was said that they were purposely not handing out the

33 Results from the 2009 registration, and that of the previous registration are available at the Zanzibar Electoral Commission's website, www.zec.gov.tz. The number of rejected were provided by CUF representatives at the registration centres.

application forms. Being the most visible actor of the registration process, the *sheha* got blamed for the injustice people experienced. He was the one not providing the form, making them pay for it, or asking for a birth certificate when he knew that most people did not have it. For many, the *sheha* was a traitor. He is a leader in a community where he grew up, and in most cases knows who his people are. A *sheha* rarely has the money to buy a stock of forms in advance, nor to travel frequently to the district office. Living in a community that often is a CUF stronghold, he risked social stigmas for himself and his family. But despite this, I never found that any of the *sheha* I spoke to expressed regret, guilt or fear. Despite their low salary, they do not seem to fail to support CCM's cause.

If a person managed to get the application form and the six signatures needed from several witnesses, the form was brought to the district office, where the applicant was photographed, had his fingerprints scanned and personal information computerized. This information was then sent to Unguja, where the ZanIDs are produced. The applicant got a receipt, which they brought with them when they returned later to pick up their identity card. I met people who had still not received their ZanID, even though they had receipts dating back to 2003. Upon a visit to a district office, I saw boxes with hundreds of cards, while most of the tens of people lined up outside did not get their cards. The cards were purposely withheld from people. I rarely saw a ZanID issued after the previous election in 2005. According to article 14 of the Registration of Zanzibaris Resident Act of 2005³⁴, carrying this hard-to-get ZanID is *compulsory*. One can only speculate if this law is designed to criminalize CUF politicians or supporters in case of post-election unrest.

Fear and Control

When the registration reached its fifth week, a peaceful boycott took place in Ole. By the next day, it had spread to the other wards that were registering that week. In Zanzibar, as in many parts of Africa, animals play central part in folktales.³⁵ A member of parliament for CUF, Mr. Azzan, told me about the *nguchiro* a bushy-tailed mongoose. If it is corned by dogs, he said,

³⁴ "14. (1) Any person who: (a) fails to apply to be registered (...) shall be guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be liable to a fine of not less than One Hundred Shillings or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or to both such fine and imprisonment." The Registration of Zanzibaris Resident Act of 2005, article 14.

³⁵ For more on Zanzibar tales, see Bateman 1901.

its only option to avoid death is to quickly attack one of the dogs when they are distracted in hopes of getting out alive. CCM was, in Mr. Azzan's view, pushing CUF into a corner. And CUF's boycott of the registration was their way of avoiding death. Security forces quickly reacted, and two young men were severely beaten, ending up at Wete hospital. Shortly after they arrived at the hospital, the police came and took them to prison, where they received no medical treatment. Security forces from the police and different military branches had been present since the registration started, many of them were armed. They were at the registration premises, and also scattered in groups further away. A military truck drove daily by the registration centres. The vehicle had a red combat flag in the front. They were more heavily armed than other security forces, and one of the men always wore a gasmask. All this served to frighten the people registering.

In March I was told that the registration of voters for the by-election in Mgogoni on Unguja had started, and some people had been beaten by a government sponsored (and army trained) youth militia. People call them "Janjaweed," the same name as the militia in Darfur, and they are used to harass and spread fear. They have been accused of beatings, arson and rape (Rawlence 2005: 520). But power is not only exercised during and immediately after elections. In everyday life, the government shows its face in different ways, whereof many have been discussed above. CCM sympathizers are often favoured with scholarships, employment and land distribution. Those associated with the opposition are excluded from such networks. Government power is present through the many roadblocks across Zanzibar. Vehicles have to slow down, or stop, whenever they pass roadblocks or a police station, and wait for permission to continue (though I never saw that happen in Wete town). In the clove seasons there are more roadblocks, to prevent smugglings. Also, the only independent newspaper, *Dira*, was banned³⁶ in 2003.

"Fifteen minutes of no electricity is enough for CCM to do what they want," a student at the University of Dar es Salaam told me back in 2005, as we were waiting for the Zanzibar election results to be published. The students said that all the elections on Zanzibar had been rigged, and that this one would not be any different. In previous elections and registration times, people have been brought from the mainland to Zanzibar to vote. Many of the army camps is said to receive extra men, who register or vote. It also happens that people,

36 Committee to Protect Journalists: <http://cpj.org/2004/11/court-ruling-keeps-zanzibar-independent-paper-clos.php>,

especially of the security forces, vote several times. A person might hold several identity cards, or register in different areas (Rawlence 2005).

When the government is centralized, people in the periphery experience power as unreachable, and people are marginalized as they have few economic resources (Bratton 2008: 56) With the exception of demonstrations which have taken place after elections, dramatic forms of resistance are rare in everyday life, since it is considered dangerous (Gledhill 2000: 77; see Scott 1985). Close by one of the registration centres, I visited a family with four young children. I asked the mother if her children were frightened by the armed guards. She told me that the youngest were, but that the oldest were used to it like the rest of Pembans. It is a part of life here, she said.

One afternoon I walked home after having had conversations with CCM politicians at their regional headquarters. One of the topics we discussed was the rumours that robberies had taken place during the 2001 violence in Wete, something they denied. I ran into one of the youths from the *maskani* at Jadida. "I don't understand how anyone can vote CCM," I told him. He gave me a dirty look, shushed me, and told me that it was unwise of me to say things like that in public. At first, I was confused. The majority of Pembans are CUF sympathizers. At the *maskani* where this boy usually hung out, political discussions sometimes took place, and it was the same at many of the men's *baraza*. As Scott (1990) argues, there are always background discourses where critique of the dominant power takes place, but it does not happen in the presence of the dominant power (p.xii). On Pemba, the dominant power is the ruling party, despite its unpopularity. The ways the government mark their presence, influence what forms of resistance people use. When an insult is suffered systematically by a specific group, the fantasies of revenge and confrontation becomes a *collective cultural product*. Under such conditions, hidden transcripts are formed. Scott (1990) argues that both hidden and public transcripts are essential in all dynamic power relations. The practice of domination is what creates the hidden transcript. The hidden transcript is disclosed from the dominant power. According to Scott, only by examining *both* the hidden and the public transcript can one begin to understand domination's impact on public discourse. It is what is between the dominant and the subordinate that measurements are being taken to affect the two. It is not the case that all of the subordinates' hidden transcripts exist outside of the dominant's knowledge. They each restrict each other's public discourse (pp.14, 27). The

dominants also have hidden transcripts, but it is the hidden transcripts of the subordinates I will discuss. CCM leaders are aware of how they are spoken of behind closed doors, but they use the party's power to make sure their opponents do not act on their ideas. CUF is also aware that many Zanzibaris wish to claim an apolitical status. I will now discuss the measurements CUF takes to prevent people from disengaging themselves.

The Political Rallies in Wete and Majenzani

Power, politics and control are not necessarily conterminous with the state. The more threatening the dominant is considered, or the greater the distance between the dominant and the subordinate, more effort is made to keep up an image pleasing to the dominant. Over time, the individual internalizes this image (p. 12). In this context, the dominant is the government (either the Zanzibari government or the Union government). But also, the dominant is the collective identity, and its members are subordinates. The frontier between CUF and CCM politicians becomes clearer when elections approach. This affects the local communities, and collective identity. When Pembans put on their "masks" in the presence of the dominant power (the government), their collective identity simultaneously puts pressure on all its members to act accordingly. Zanzibaris are well aware of how the relationship between supporters of the two main parties becomes more tense come election time. Informants would often say: "Just wait and see."

I will now further discuss CUF's power by looking at two of their political rallies held on Pemba in July 2009. When the details on the registration were revealed one week before the registration was to start, CUF and its leader Maalim Seif started a seven day tour of Pemba.

On my way to a rally in Mjenzani I saw hundreds of people walking by the road, heading for the rally. Many came from far away, many of them dressed in the CUF colours – red, yellow, white and blue – and women had wrapped the CUF *kanga* around their waists. When I reached the football ground where the rally was to be held, people came flooding in from all directions. Some groups came singing and drumming. CUF's rallies are events where thousands of people meet to socialize, and where they receive information. People meet up with friends and relatives. It is also a place where girls and boys can interact. I estimate that about two thousand people were present. Vendors were selling peanuts wrapped in cones

made from old newspapers, bags of popcorn, popsicles, fruit and juice. Around the podium, women were dancing to the music that was playing through the speakers. Behind the podium, there was a big tent where seats were reserved for key CUF members. The crowd was waiting for Maalim Seif to arrive. Right on time, a caravan of cars drove up to the tent. Maalim Seif's car had two CUF flags attached to each side at the front of the car. The crowd got loud and chanted CUF lines and songs about the party and the politicians in attendance. The speakers called out (**bold**), and the crowd answered (*italics*):

Haki! (“Rights!”)

Sawa! (“Equal!”)

Haki sawa kwa nani? (“Equal rights for who?”)

Kwa Wote! (“For everybody!”)

Na asiye taka haki? (“And the one who do not want rights?”)

Aende! (“He/she should go!”)

After the opening speech, CUF introduced the party's gifts to the local community. A small bus (*dala-dala*) came driving up, overloaded with sewing machines and footballs. The gifts were unloaded and placed in front of the podium. It was also announced that 100.000 Tsh would be given for electricity to the twenty local mosques. Acrobats from Unguja entertained the crowd between speeches. As time went on, people started to leave in order to get home before nightfall, and by the time Maalim Seif held his speech, the crowd had lessened. The same speeches were held at the rally in Wete a few days later. There was only half the amount of people present, although it was held in the middle of the town, and few people had to travel far to get there. I could see how the Wete rally changed the town's atmosphere. Many shops were closed, and the main market on the other end of town was practically empty. There were fewer people in the alleys, though the children were running around as usual. The rally was structured the same way as the rally in Mjenzani, apart from the presentation of gifts. To my surprise, Suleiman (28) showed up. I had visited him and his wife several times. Upon my first visit, he told me that he had been dedicated to CUF for a long time, but recently had felt that his time and energy had been wasted on the party. At the rally, he told me he would give Maalim Seif ten minutes, and if he was not convinced by then, he would leave. As time went on, Suleiman was still there, although he told me he heard nothing new. When I commented on his decision to stay, he told me that yes, he had heard the exact same words before, “but he

[Maalim Seif] is still one of us”. The disinterest in politics that had surrounded me for months was not visible at these rallies. There was an atmosphere of pride.

Political rhetoric

Through these rallies CUF managed to educate and prepare a significant amount of people for registration. In conversations with people around the island, many told me that they had gotten the practical information about the ZanID Card at rallies. The speakers mainly informed people about the procedures of the registration, which had not yet reached them, but there were also harsh words against the government and CCM. “Begging is employment,” (“*Kuomba ni ajiri*”) CUF politician Juma Duni said. He accused CCM of taking advantage of people’s poverty, “Hunger has no party ... I have never heard of a hungry policeman,” Duni continued. At rallies, CUF often say that the revolutionary government has destroyed the islands. When opposition leaders have referred to how Zanzibar was before the 1964 revolution, they talk about the quality of the social services and education systems. The negative conditions, such as the oppression along racial and class lines, are ignored. Many CCM supporters see CUF’s complaints as disparaging towards the achievements of the Revolution (Cameron 2004: 108). Both parties brand the other as deceitful to the nation. Pemban has been perceived by CCM and the government as anti-revolutionary, and CUF has been referred to as predominately Pemban (Rawlence 2005: 517).

Pemba and its inhabitants are linked to CUF through government speeches, party propaganda and newspaper stories (most newspapers are government owned) (Arnold 1996: 2; see also Glassman 2000). CUF, for its part, has made good use of conspiracy theories stigmatising CCM, in 2009 rallies furthering one they called “the trinity of demons”, or the “unholy alliance” between the Revolutionary Government, Zanzibar Electoral Commission and Zanzibar department for Identity Cards. Politicians said that CCM was slowly killing CUF, and that they feared they would succeed. The audience got quite emotional at times. A man next to me responded to Maalim Seif’s statement by shouting: “Better to die!” Maalim Seif also said he had warned the government that the registration was a huge problem, and if they did not act, any blood shed would be on their hands. Maalim Seif said the party did not want to take the registration rights violations to court. That would take years, he said, and details of any suit and the actual allegations therein would be kept off the public record. “This is a

political problem and should be dealt with politically,” he said.³⁷ They said they would “dance to the music that is played,” in other words respond with violence if the government used violence, or going, as Cameron (2002) writes, “jino kwa jino” – tooth for tooth (p.319). Politicians and people believed this was the only way they would get international attention. CCM have often accused CUF for being nothing but “vurugu” (disrupting), or “people of violence” (Rawlence 2005: 516).

When CCM have held rallies in areas where CUF is favoured, people have often been bussed in from other villages or towns. When I asked youths in Wete if they attended CCM rallies as well, they often did if they were offered money and food.

Civic United Front and the Pemban Identity

Cementing enemy images

“[y]our identity becomes the sole ground of politics, and the sole determinant of political good and evil. Those who disagree with my ‘politics’, then, are the enemies of my identity” (Elshtain 1995: 53).

I will now discuss the *othering* of the rivalling political party, and of ethnic groups in relation to the collective identity on Pemba.³⁸ Identity is constantly negotiated in the relationship between the self and the others. Both CCM and CUF make images of the other that exclude them from the idea of who is a true Zanzibari, and play off ethnic identities to achieve this. CUF tries to appear as a non-racial and secular party. The CUF leadership and members cut across all ethnic lines. None of the key politicians could be considered Arab (Bakari 2001: 175). Despite this, CUF has portrayed CCM as anti-Muslim. CCM, on the other hand, often portrays CUF members as Arab outsiders seeking to re-establish the sultanate. In conversations with local CCM politicians in Wete, I asked about the notion people had that

37 In personal conversation with Maalim Seif Sharif Hamad on Pemba 29 July 2009. This was also said at the rallies.

38 Much attention has also been given to religious division, as the majority of Zanzibaris (98%) are Muslim, and approximately one third of the mainlanders are Christians (Kaiser 2001: 94-96; see also Tronvoll 2006).

despite the government's building many clinics on Pemba, it was still hard to get medicine. The politicians told me that it was because the "Arabs" stole medicines from the hospitals and clinics. On a rally in Wete in 2000, the president's wife, Mama Mkapa, said the following:

Before the 1964 Revolution the people of the Isles were slaves in their own country. I call upon you to be more analytical before you support parties with hidden agendas aiming at humiliating your dignity as independent people (Cameron 2002: 316).

Both islands' inhabitants have almost exactly the same range of skin colours, and same proportions of those considered Arabs. Despite of intermarriages, both between Arabs and Africans and between Pembans and Ungujans, a notion of strong connection between Pemban identity and Arab identity has strengthened on Pemba itself, and outside (Myers 2000: 435, 439). After the ethnic cleansing of Arabs during the Revolution, the government attempted to build the nation on the idea of African identity. During and following the three multi party elections held since 1995, different identities have been reconstructed.

In Larsen's (2004) experience, the Revolution is not something people like talking about. But in situations of fear and anger, the memories from the Revolution are often evoked (p.124).

"It is because he (the boy) was a Mngazija (Comorian) that the police from the mainland shot him. Do not think that anything has changed. It is just like during the Revolution. People from the mainland (bara) do not like people of Comorian or Arabian origin. We all know that this is the reason why the man was shot" (Larsen 2004: 125).

Larsen (2004) reports that the woman of Comorian decent, who told her this, was too young to have experienced the Revolution. Though the revolution happened a long time ago, it is still a collective memory, as new generations have been told the stories of what happened (pp.125-126). As Pembans feel pressured around election time, they seek to reinvent themselves by emphasizing their collective memory. After the establishment of multi-party system, CUF has brought history into the present. In this way, they claim the authenticity of being "pure" Zanzibaris (Caplan 2004: 10). As political parties struggle over control of the

state around election times, the tension between the parties escalate. It becomes a struggle over the identity of the state, as the CCM and CUF both politicize racial identities through political propaganda (Killian 2008: 100; Kaiser 2001: 89-90). In this process people are included and excluded from the Zanzibari identity. Bakari (2001) asked a CCM supporter on Unguja if she really believed “the Arabs” would rule Zanzibar if CUF were to win the election. He quotes her: “In fact I don’t believe it, but that is what we are told by our leaders” (p.175).

“Turn the car, we cannot stop here. It may be dangerous. There are many ‘Waswahili’ [people of mainland origin] here. We never know what these people might do when there are many of them together. They will see that we are ‘Wahindi’ (of Indian origin).” (Larsen 2004: 125).

One night in Wete there was no electricity, nor a moon to light up the road, so the son of the family I had visited walked me home. The family said that I had to look out for mainlanders. Mainlanders are often blamed for theft and suspected of ruining crops and killing cows at night. Kheri (20), lives on Unguja, but grew up on Pemba. He told me he had witnessed people being shot and killed by the police back in 2001. He told me that back then a pregnant woman was shot in her belly. Soldiers also forced men to have sex with their mothers. Numerous stories like this circulate the islands. Whether they are all true or not, they are still real for the people who tell these stories. There exists an understanding that origin determines people’s character and thus what kind of relationships they may engage in (Larsen 2004: 126).

In 1995, Zanzibar suffered a big collective panic. Shape-shifting spirits, referred to as *Popobawa*³⁹, were supposedly assaulting people, also sexually. This lasted for several months, and led to incidents of collective violence where people suspected of possession were attacked, in some cases killed. As *Popobawa* moved from place to place, and as time went on, people started to believe that the spirits were sent to Pemba (where the panic first erupted) by CCM. According to Martin Walsh (2009), there was a rumour that that the Tanzanian president at that time, Benjamin Mkapa, fled the island in the midst of campaigning after being visited by spirits one night. At rallies during the run-up to the 2000 election, CUF

39 For more on Popobawa see Jansen 1996, Larsen 2008, Parkin 2004 and Walsh 2009.

distributed photocopies of a newspaper cartoon showing a half naked CCM member fleeing from *Popobawa*. As Laren (2004) points out, essentialist categories of origin are strengthened in times of conflict, and used to explain changing conditions (p.138).

The union issue

Pemba is without doubt the place in Tanzania where CCM and governmental power are most present. Zanzibar is the most turbulent part of Tanzania today (see Burgess 2000). The government has a strong grip on Pemba. One may wonder why, in a country of over 40 million people, the government would be so concerned about Zanzibar, which does not even have a million inhabitants. Tanzania is known to be the foremost stable nation in the East Africa region, with long-lasting national unity among people of different ethnic, religious and racial groups (the Swahili language has been a binding thread). But many Zanzibaris do not associate with this national Tanzanian unity (Killian 2008: 99). Yearly, the Uhuru (“freedom”) Torch race is held in Tanzania, starting from different locations every year. Youths in Wete told me how ridiculous they thought it was, and that it was a waste of money. If the government was to turn the power over to the opposition, then regions on mainland would see that a regime change is possible. This could weaken CCM, and strengthen other political parties. CUF is the largest opposition party in all of Tanzania, not just on Zanzibar, but CUF is much more popular on the islands than on the mainland – and a bigger threat to the ruling party. The government’s grip on Zanzibar, and in particular Pemba, is tight, because a shift in power on Zanzibar would threaten the Union.

The union between Zanzibar and the mainland has been intensely debated in the Tanzanian parliament. Both CCM and CUF express dissatisfaction with the Union agreement (Rawlence 2005: 516- 517). A speaker at the rallies I attended, stated that “Zanzibar is under military occupation”. CUF accuses the Union of economic mismanagement, discriminations of those of Arab and Pemban ethnicity, abuses of human rights, unfair customs duties⁴⁰ and of polarizing security forces and civil servants (Rawlence 2005: 516). CUF fear that if the Union agreement does not return to the form stated in the original Union agreement, Zanzibar will become just another region of Tanzania. A representative of the government, who was

40 The Union introduced VAT on port duties in the late 1990s (Cameron 2002: 319).

visiting Wete, told me that he considered Zanzibar to be a region of Tanzania. He said that Zanzibar was like a small child that needs taking care of (see also Cameron 2002: 319).

Many Zanzibaris distrust those who have strong mainland connections. They may be considered as anti-Zanzibari, also by CCM supporters. In the aftermath of the 2000 election, and in discourses on Union matters, two distinctions have emerged: *wazanzibari* and *wazanzibara*. These terms refer to a person's loyalty to the Union. The first term means a Zanzibari, while *wazanzibara* refers to a person from the mainland (*bara*), generally considered more loyal to the Union than to Zanzibar (Cameron 2004: 114). On Pemba *waunguja*, referring to people from Unguja, may also encompass some of the characteristics of a *wazanzibara*. Many Pembans view Ungujans as more loyal to Dar es Salaam than to their neighbour island Pemba. It is a popular discourse on Pemba that Ungujans are not "real Zanzibaris". It is in the Pembans countryside that the purest form of Swahili is spoken, Pembans argue. This is because this is where the Arabs first arrived, an old man at a coffee stall in Wete claimed. Those of Arab descent are the pure Zanzibaris, he went on to say. Swahili on Unguja has been increasingly influenced by the mainland Swahili than the Pembans dialect (Saleh 2004: 151; Larsen 2004: 124). I have sometimes heard people in Wete referring to Ungujans using the term *wazanzibara*, claiming that there are no real Zanzibaris on Unguja, but that they are *wageni* (guests). Pembans are sceptical of mainlanders who come to the island. Many have told me that topics of conversations often change when a mainlander, or a Christian, joins the group. There are small Christian communities on the island. In Wete there are two churches, and the Youth Centre, where I spent much time, is run by mainlanders, and financed by an international Christian network. Sam at the Youth Centre is from the mainland. He has lived in Wete for seven years with his family, but notices that he is often not welcome at certain occasions, such as funerals. Sam says he knows that many avoid telling him somebody has passed away, because they do not want him to attend the funeral. "You can laugh and talk with them, but in their hearts they may hate you," he said. Sam said they get their hatred towards mainlanders and Christians from the Arabs. This shows that the notion of Pembans as Arabs is established among mainlanders as well. Pembans think they are better than the rest, and see everybody else as enemies, he said. Sam closes the Youth Centre around election time, and travels to the mainland, at the advice of locals. He is told that if he stays he will get hurt. Sam said elections make Zanzibaris hateful. He believes many worry that he will vote for CCM on Pemba, therefore he always returns home to mainland and

casts his vote there. Sam finds it hard to achieve an apolitical profile for the Youth Centre and of himself.

In recent years, there has been a disagreement between the Tanzanian mainland and Zanzibar over offshore oil exploration. The Union government has stressed that oil exploration was a Union matter and has gone ahead to consider applications for exploration off the Indian Ocean waters surrounding Pemba and Unguja. Several foreign companies have signed contracts with the Union government to explore for oil, but none has been found so far. Zanzibar's House of Representatives has been demanding that both the jurisdiction to give licences for oil exploration and the actual benefits from oil drilling should belong to Zanzibar. President Kikwete has announced that oil has not yet been discovered, and therefore there is no urgent need to find a solution to the question of oil. Many Pembans believe Kikwete is hiding oil from Zanzibar; CUF has claimed this for years (see Cameron 2002: 319). Many have the idea that there is so much oil in the ocean off the island that Zanzibar could become a second Saudi Arabia. People in Wete talk about the oil as their property, and think that the mainland is trying to steal it. Little do people in Wete, nor does CUF, focus on the benefits of the Union, such as electricity.

The disturbances that have occurred on Pemba around election times are Pemba's attempts to reclaim its rightful place in Zanzibar (Cameron 2004: 112). In 2008, ten elder Pembans went to the United Nations' office in Dar es Salaam to declare they wanted Pemba to become an independent nation, arguing that Pemba does not benefit from the Union in the way Unguja does. Though these men were old, the idea is shared by many youths as well.

A Change of Atmosphere

A visit to Khamis

I did not realize the impact of the Wete rally until a few days after. I met Khamis, hurrying down the main road as always. He told me that the night before, he and his friends had discussed politics for hours on end. Two weeks later, I had the chance to visit them to discuss their views on the registration process. Upon my arrival, I could hear they were talking about

Maalim Seif. The four of them sat around the small wooden table. Their statements on this night contradicted the views they had expressed in the conversations I had previously had with them. “I have realized we have to fight for our freedom!” announced one of the boys. They talked passionately about the opposition movement, and angrily about the ruling party. They told me stories of CCM’s harmful actions towards Zanzibaris. The boys also talked about their experiences of the 2001 violence. One of the boys’ family hid wounded people in their house. The son of one the neighbours they were sheltering was shot right outside the window. For fear of revealing their location, the father had to stay still while his dying son was kicked and taunted by a soldier.

This was one of the youths I met who had always been involved in the opposition movement. Khamis had not, but this night he said: “Don’t be surprised if you see me in the very front of the mob, throwing rocks.” He had become inspired by the changing atmosphere in Wete, as the collective memory was more openly discussed.

When the registration process started on Wete, the atmosphere changed. People were whispering about what they were going to do. After all, they lived in the CUF capital. Local CUF members were encouraging youths to show up to register, even if they had not gotten the ZanID in time. One youth said that if they did not get the form, they would burn down the *sheha*’s house. This has happened around earlier elections. During this registration, one *sheha* accused someone of burning down her shack, but it appeared she had done it herself, hoping the police would make arrests.

Producing CUF sympathizers – reproducing CUF-identity

Bratton (2008) argues that poor people are less likely than the wealthy to engage in political discussions during the course of daily life. On the other hand, the poor are significantly predisposed to attend community meetings, such as rallies. Poor people’s participation does not reflect strong individual attachments to personal values. On the contrary, their participation is more *mobilized*, or a product of a process of groupthink⁴¹ that is mass-produced in collective settings and under certain conditions (p.55). During the registration,

41 “Groupthink is a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action” (Janis 1972: 9). For more on groupthink see Amidon (2005); McCauley (1989).

the collective memory is played out. The “off-stage” discourse becomes visible at the rallies. People move within both the public and the hidden transcripts. Both transcripts have sanctioning powers. People within the “off-stage” hidden transcript often monitor the others’ public performances through a form of peer pressure (Scott 1990: 191-192).

Confrontational resistance is more likely to bring CUF to power than the everyday forms of resistance are. CUF therefore relies on popular support. They need people who are willing to take greater risks. I have spoken to central politicians within CUF, and they have expressed that they are concerned about youths’ lack of interest in politics. One politician told me that he considered this the party’s main threat. These rallies are the main scene where they remanifest their role in the construction of Pemban identity. They claim that all the three multiparty elections since 1995 have been rigged. Therefore, it is not only important for CUF to prove they can win again. Their most important task is to keep up hope and make sure that Pemba remains a CUF stronghold. For CUF to maintain their position, they have to constantly reconstitute their place in Pemban identity. A rally is a lot more than a political meeting ground. It is a social meeting ground for thousands of people. It is a place to meet friends and relatives, as well as to catch up with the latest news. The rallies remind people what unites them. Their identity is recollected, and the feeling of belonging is strengthened.

Dissatisfaction with CUF is expressed through disengagement because there is still little room for direct critiques of the party. Expressing silent dissatisfaction with CUF, on the other hand, has most often no social sanctions, as long as it does not lead to favouring the ruling party. There is more tolerance for critique today than before 2005, but it still leads to social stigmas, such as gossip. It penetrates so many arenas, such as the coffee stalls, schools and neighbourhoods. Suffering and triumphs through politics is a historical – as well as a living – shared experience. Critiques of CUF are easily understood as critiques of the Pemban identity, as dishonouring history. Pemba’s role as the opposition’s nest plays a strong part in the island’s history. When Maalim Seif said that the government aims “to kill the party,” Pembans see it as a threat against them as well. Killing CUF means, for people on Pemba, killing Pembans as well. The crowd’s response to Maalim Seif’s claim must be understood through the character of the physical space. According to Giddens (1984), regionalization is an important part of institutional reproduction. Disclosure of others in activities and ideas has strong psychological and social resonance (pp.xxv-xxvi). The week after the rally in Wete

was held, I came to meet a government representative from Dar es Salaam. I was sitting at a restaurant downtown with my colleagues. The man rambled on and on about his negative impressions about Pembans, that they only spend their time in the shade, and have time to say ten greetings when they meet a person. After he had left, Issa, the waiter, said: “We will kill people like him when we win!” Such rhetoric triggers the fear that Larsen (2004) discusses, and triggers also thoughts of revenge.

Actions are embedded within structures, and are also constitutive elements of institutions that stretch far beyond the individual in both time and space. It does not mean that the individual does not have choices – he or she could have acted otherwise – but rather that the individuals’ actions follow a pre-given script: the discourse (Giddens 1987: 11; see also Long 2001: 14-18). Giddens (1990) identifies three types of structures in social systems: signification, legitimating, and domination. The first produces meaning through organized webs of language, such as discursive practices. This meaning is legitimized through naturalization in societal norms and values. The naturalized meaning – the discourse – coordinates forms of domination. Through domination, the discourse gains further force. The subordinate group “acts a mask” when in presence of the dominant, and eventually they have shaped themselves to fit this role. In this way, subordination finds its own legitimacy (Scott 1990: 10). It is this legitimisation that assists the reproduction of the Pembani identity. The role becomes the dominant discourse.

Can disengagement lead to change?

Government monitoring of CUF is limited, and so is CUF’s monitoring of communities. In times that are not affected by rallying and other election oriented political activity, CUF’s control over the internal hidden transcript, the disengagement, is limited. As Ortner (1995) remarks, People construct projects that transform who they are through social action, and thus gain a voice and in some ways change history.

The disengaging economic strategy that has emerged is a wish for change of the political power structure. But since this strategy operates within the rules of the game – the boundaries of the political discourse – it is unlikely that disengagement will contribute to the change they seek. The form of disengagement that has so far been discussed in this thesis is a way of

gaining economic opportunities. But in most cases, disengagement is a wish for a weaker polarization, and less strict boundaries between them. The polarization is more likely to be weakened by the establishment of a third party. I found that very few of the disengaging youths turn to a specific third party, or express a wish for a legitimate third way. As long as other political parties are not firmly established on Pemba, politics will remain polarized. As I have argued in chapter four, most people in Wete find it hard to imagine a third party category.

Wherever there is power, there is resistance. Therefore, resistance always exists in relation to the dominant, and acts in the language of the dominant. Power relations can only exist within power relations' strategic field: the discourse (Foucault 1995: 106-107). Both what has been considered the traditional way of resistance in Wete, and this newly emerged resistance through disengagement among youths operate largely within the already existing discourse. Rationalities are drawn from available discourses that form part of the cultural milieu of social practice (Long 2001: 14-15). Where there is power, there is resistance, and also where there is resistance there is power. Resistance is dependent on the power it resists (Foucault 1995: 197). Power relations penetrate all institutions and arenas, without necessarily locating itself in them. Power is therefore also a part of the spreading of oppositions, and as long as disengagement operates within the discourse, it does not challenge it.

When in the presence of government power, CUF supporters' the collective become the hidden transcript. Within this hidden transcript, when people are in the presence of the collective power, the disengagement becomes the hidden transcript – as seen at the rallies. As an election approaches, peer pressure is activated. Activities that differ from what has been normative oppositional activity in Wete are sanctioned. There is less room for youths to disengage, and many are therefore easily mobilized. The hidden transcript, the CUF party and its supporters, contain strong forces that enforce a preferred form of resistance against CCM and the government. This internal control is vital for the CUF resistance – which I have referred to as the *traditional* resistance – as they consider it important to stand as a united group in order to achieve the changes they want, which is, in CUF's case, a place in government. The dominant powers, on the other hand, rarely fully monitor the subordinates. Only in times of escalating tension, if at all, does the government not distinguish between the disengaging youths and other forms of resistance. The reason why many of these youths

therefore join in on the popular form of resistance is because they are under pressure, as much as the rest of Pembans. “They want to kill the party,” Maalim Seif announced. Most Pembans then see their identity as threatened, and the framework for movement and actions are tightened. The rallies marked a time where the disengagement strategy became weakened. CUF promise to be the voice of Pemba, and many youths realize that the party is the only voice available to them. The aspects of the structure that some of the disengaging youths hope to change, are vital parts of the discourse. Though youths can identify the political power structures, it is not possible for them rid themselves of the political discourse, as it is internalized in individuals. As of today, they are not succeeding in gradually changing the discourse. It is the political discourse that strikes back and limits or paralyzes the attempts at change.

The rallies mark the start of a new period with a stronger polarized political arena. People have told me that times between elections are far less tense than usual. But still, elections occur regularly (every five years). This time, the rallies started 15 months before the election and the tension escalated. Towards the end of my fieldwork, about five months after the first rally, there was no doubt that the tension would be there until after the 2010 election, and probably some time after that. The notions of others as less Zanzibari are therefore always present. They do not come from nothing.

Giddens (1984) argues that if agents can reproduce structure through action, they can also transform it. People find meaning in positive and stable emotions and by avoiding chaos. People therefore avoid things that threaten or might destabilize their lives. Therefore, when the dominant is strong, changes are less likely to occur (Giddens 1984: xxx). In the case of Zanzibar, the government and its party CCM limit the people’s power, and the power of CUF. Also, CUF’s presence in the collective identity limits people’s political movements. The discourse wins. Youths are a part of a different, larger context. The fact that CUF identity is a part of Pemban identity is played out in many arenas. CUF maintains and reproduces its place in Pemban identity. Even if youths hope to gain greater possibilities by disengaging themselves, resistant groups must adopt the dominant’s language in order to be heard. The dominant structures constrain the ways the oppressed can resist their conditions (Gledhill 2000: 87).

Recapitulation of Main Points

There are three main power relations that affect youths' ability to succeed with their disengagement strategy: the relationship between the dominant government and the citizen, between the government and the subjected political opposition, and the dominating collective identity and its members. The power-relation between the government and the citizens is maintained through exercise, while the domination of CUF is manifested in the collective memory. When in the presence of government power, CUF supporters' collective identity becomes the hidden transcript. And when people are reminded of their collective memory, disengagement becomes the hidden transcript. The youths disengage from the power of the government and the power CUF holds in their community. Disengagement is the only alternative form for resistance, as there is no room for public criticism of CUF. The collective memory is the main obstacle for all forms of disengagement to succeed. People cannot fully distance themselves from the collective memory as it is a discourse, in Foucault's words (1995), perceived as neutral and apolitical (p.103). When the political atmosphere becomes tense during rallies and voter registration, the room for disengagement shrinks. Society enters a phase where younger generations are *socialized* into the collective identity as they are again reminded of, and taught, their collective memory. You are what your parents are, and what your grandparents are – a product of the collective memory.

Chapter 6

Concluding Remarks

For months I followed how youths dealt with poverty. I rarely found youths who were particularly excited over politics. It seemed, as youths told me themselves, that the community had grown tired of politics. Their disengagement was indeed a reaction to politicians' empty promises, and to the political history. Youths did not find themselves connected to the political history of the archipelago. They did not see CUF affiliation as profitable. In general, most people gave the impression that there was no tension in neighbourhoods or families over party affiliation.

After the registration had started, the collective memory became more visible. It occurred to me that the collective memory had been present all along, but took a more subtle form. The tension that emerged when the registration process started did not come out of nothing. Their collective memory is fuelled by ideas of differences within society. When youths seek the privileges of CCM through disengagement, they act on the *perceptions* of origin that have lived on since before the revolution. Most Zanzibaris are poor, and economic privileges are held by central elite, which is often in connection to the government. But it is still believed that CCM sympathizers have opportunities that most CUF supporters do not have. With this, it is believed that the rise of one is the fall of the other. Within this, lies the battle between CUF and CCM over defining "Zanzibariness". The parties view the other as traitors of Zanzibar. The collective memory is also reproduced through such notions. Essential categories of identity have been created through political rhetoric. The ideas of such

categories have survived through collective memory, and have been re-manifested regularly through political rhetoric and through recollections of history in everyday life.

Disengagement is also chosen as it is the only optional form of resistance available, as there is no room for direct criticism of CUF in the public transcript. The discourse, the collective memories and shared identity, penetrates the movement as it is internalized by its individuals. This makes it difficult for disengagement to succeed in changing the power structures. Despite youths' dissatisfaction, change cannot be made by detaching themselves from their family's identity. It is not possible to stand without a political identity. Though some can imagine a person to be without a political identity, or a political affiliation with a party besides CCM or CUF, it is not — as of today — room for it in the overall society.

After I left Zanzibar in August 2009, the tension kept escalating. But what caught many locals by surprise, was that CUF leader, Seif Sharif Hamad, and president of Zanzibar, Abeid Karume, agreed on working towards shaping a coalition government before the 2010 elections. The issue of oil might seem to have been the only thing that unites the party. Politicians from both parties find that terrorism is a threat. They fear that people will turn to religious extremist as they lose faith in politics, as the tendency has been on the horn of Africa. Hamad acknowledged, on behalf of CUF, Karume as president. Over the phone, my contacts expressed mixed feelings about this. If the agreement proves successful, will this lead Zanzibar in to a more peaceful future? Maybe, but the notions and the stereotypes about the other are bound to remain for some time.

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Music

Goya, Al Hajj *Hali ya Pemba*

Appendix 1

“Hali ya Pemba” by Al Hajj Goya.

Swahili version

Course:

Hali ya hasira na Pemba Wallahi nasikisha,
Na hapana jua lini hali yaweza mabadilika,
Jukumu ya Serekali yenye maelezo,
Na nyinyi matajiri maende maongeze (repeat X2)

Hali ya Pemba miji ishafifia jamani,
Si Wete, Chake wala Mkoani, miji haipo kama zamani,
Nkanini? Hili nlenu? jiulizeni,
Na ndio maana huko nyuma wapemba hatwekuwa na imani na serekali iliopo madarakani
Tukionekana wabishi kama Osama na Alqaida kwa Bush
Au wapalestina wa Hamas kwa Israel,
Huu wangu ndio ukweli.

Ha sie tuna nini cha thamani jamani?
Miaka yote Pemba haijengwi
Huo uwanja wa ndege nao kwa nje una pori,
Hakuna kilichoZanIDi ila stendi ya gari,
Hizo barabara nazo zina shimo pima, wazani nkisima,

Ukweli barabara hwezijua mjini wala porini,
Barabara ya gari waweza kugwa kwa tope,
Hawantia dongo jekundu la kujengea vyungu,
Ila siku wakubwa wakitaka kuja uku,
Watakuhasi kwa wasi wasi,
Utaona migari inbeba kifusi na kokoto,
Washatuona sie tuwatoto,

Kazi za Wapemba Pemba nkubahatisha,
Nlazima ahamevye Pemba kwenda zinga maisha,
Hii yasikitisha, Kimaisha tunauwawa,
Mpemba alieko Pemba akichenji noti ya elfu 10 ujuwe kanletewa nduguye alioko nje ya Pemba,
Duka la Mpemba Pemba laweza nshinda kwa mkopo aliokopesha watu madeni,
Watu wote taabani, hakuna amilikie taa mbuni.

Benki nazo kwa sasa hazina kazi,
Hakuna apatae pesa ya kuweka, zaidi ni za matumizi,
Mfanyakazi wa Benki ana kea kaa kisu kwa kulima,
Mfanyakazi ndio zaidi mkulima tena bila ya ujima, alima kiama.

Alhaji nashikwa nhuruma toka kimya sasa nasema,
Kosa lipi la Mpemba?, mwamuona vipi Mpemba?, afanye nini Mpemba?,
Nimkorofi Mpemba? Kanzubaa Mpemba?
Makamu wa raisi ni Mpemba mbona haigeuki hali ya Pemba?

(Course...)

Nataka eleza kwa uwazi zaidi juu ya hili,
Hata kama taambiwa, eweyeweye wee, ila wafikiri au wazinga utesi na serekali?
Sikwanza nsikizani kwani mie nahubiri?
Sometime Pemba hali si shwari,

Hayo maisha yachosha.

Kazi zetu kwa kwetu ni uvuvi na ukulima,
Usijesikia ukulima ukadhani ndio ukulima,
Huwo uwo ukulima, sehemu zenyewe hatuna,
Sie si kama wenzetu wa Zimbabwe wanavyolima,
Sie twalima chini nkwakula, zao la biashara li juu,
Na zao kubwa twategemea karafuu,
Wee nenda kachume kuna siku utakugwa toka juu ya mrafafuu,
Uvunjike mkono, mbavu au mguu.

Serekali haikujali weye, watakacho wao ni mazao tu,
Hicho nsemacho Alhaji ni ukweli tu,
Wasema hizi ni zama za ukweli, ila kwa huo wautaja tu,
Kama nyie muwawazi npani basi bei halali ya karafuu,
Kila siku mie nawana na paragwe na mikarafuu,
Taa hioga bado tu nanuka kupuu.

Saidi Kombo ree Masta J, ngoja niwape skendo,
Karafuu nzangu mwenyewe hizisafirisha huambiwa mmagendo,
Mie ndie mwenye mali, serekali ndio wanunuzi,
Bei wee wenyewe wajipangia wala hili zao halijanadiwa,
Nlani hili zao name litanisaidia?
Niachiani mwenyewe nende hauze,
Ngalau mwaka mmoja namie nsafike,
Hikaa kwengine namie nsifike, kuwa hili hamliwezi,
Basi hizi pesa muuzazo mafanikioe tuyaone,

Niwekeyeni umeme na maji wenye uhakika,
Nasie tuwekezewe uwekezaji wenye uhakika,
Tupate kazi kule kwetu sio twanuma-numa mijimingwa kina tukitaabika,
Haa pesa nyengine munzinunulia silaha?,
Maana hizo tulizona, awamu iliyopita Zanzibar kwa Wapemba yekuwa mashaka,

Eeh jamani nyi kubalini Wapemba wetaabika,

Huu ni ukweli usiofichika, ila haya Mungu muwezi,
Bila yeye sie wenyewe hatuwezi,
Na mabalaa mengi yee mwenyewe anatubarizi,
Si mweona kipindupindu,
cheingia kwa kasi Ungaja Dar-salama, ila Pemba salama,
Sie ajali kubwa nkugwa nkarufuu, risasi na kasa,
Ama hizi zetutisha na kututikisa, ila hatwekishwa,
Kwani uzazi wa Mpemba asiye na kizazi ni watoto tisa.

(Course...)

Appendix 2

“Hali ya Pemba” by Al Hajj Goya. English translation⁴²

I swear the situation in Pemba is frustrating
And is uncertain when it will change,
It is up to wealthy people to bring improvement (x2).

On Pemba the towns are degrading,
Neither Wete, Chake or Mkoani, are as they used to be,
Why? This is yours, ask yourself,
That’s why in the past Pembans we didn’t trust the ruling Government,
We were seen as trouble makers like Osama and Al-Qaida for Bush,
Or Palestinian with Hamas for Israel,
This is my thruth.

What valuables do we have?
For years Pemba has not been built,
The airport is located in the bush,
There is nothing that make up towns beside a car stand.
The roads has huge pits like wells,

⁴² Translation by Hajj M. Hajj (2009)

The truth is you cannot tell a town's road from a road in the forest,
The cars can easily slip on the muddy main road,
They(government) fill bumps with clay soil used to make potteries,
But when (government) leaders want to come over (to Pemba),
They irritate us,
You will see trucks carrying sand and pebbles,
They think we are small children,

Pembans job in Pemba is a risk,
(S)he has to leave Pemba to look for a better life,
This is sad, we are living dead,
If a Pemban on Pemba is changing a ten-thousand bill it means (s)he got from her/his sibling
who lives outside Pemba.
You can fail to run a shop when giving people loans without getting paid back,
All people are exhausted, no one earn even a shilling

The banks have nothing to do,
No one has money to deposit; they just have for their daily spending,
Banks workers have sharp cracks on their heels, like knives, from farming
An employee (in an office) is also a farmer,
(S)he farms extremely,

Alhaji (the singer) is sad. I was quiet but now am speaking,
What is Pembans' fault? How you see Pembans?, What should (s)he do?
Is (s)he honourable? Is (s)he dumbfounded?
(Even) the Vice President (of Tanzania) is Pemban, how comes the situation doesn't change?

On this, I want to explain more openly,
Even if I will be warned; "eeh you, are you looking for trouble with the Government?"
Listen to me first, I am not a professional speaker,
Sometimes the situation on Pemba is not calm,
The life there is exhausting.

Our main work is fishing and farming,
But the farming is not really farming,
We don't have (enough) farming grounds,
We are not farming like our colleagues in Zimbabwe,
We farm just for food; the trade good is on top,
We mainly rely on cloves,
You go to pick (cloves) but one day you will fall from the tree,
And break your hand, ribs or feet.
The government does not care, what they need is only the product (cloves),
Alhaji is only speaking the truth,
They say these are moment of the truth, but so they just say,
If you are honest then tell me an actual price of cloves (in world market)
I everyday fight on huge old clove trees,
Even if I shower I will smell bad sweat (from climbing cloves trees).

Saidi Kombo ree Masta J, (his colleagues) let me tell you the scandal,
The cloves are mine, but when I take them away they say its smuggling
I am the owner; the government is the buyer,
You make your own price without an auction,
When will I benefit?
Let me sell by myself,
At least I can be known/ valued/ cleaned one year,
So I can be praised when I am somewhere, but if you cannot manage this,
But the money from selling (the cloves) we need to see the success/ outcomes,

Bring me a proper electricity and water,
And bring proper investment,
So we can a job there at home instead of roving in other peoples towns,
Ah did you spend the money to buy weapons?,
Because we saw them, the last period Zanzibar there was trouble in Pemban,
Pembas were in huge troubles,

This is the unhidden truth, but God is great/ able,

Without him we ourselves we cannot manage
On many plagues he blesses us,
You witnessed the cholera,
It spread so fast on Unguja and Dar es Salam, but Pemba was spared
The main accident (in Pemba) is to fall from the clove tree, bullets and sea turtle,
Oh these scared and shackled us, but we did not destroyed completely (from those),
Because (we are so many) a family with smallest member are 9 children.