

# The European Union and the Cyprus conflict

A study of the EU influence on different parts of the Cyprus conflict

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The map on page 3 is downloaded from the CIA world factbook:

<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cy.html>

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## List of abbreviations

- AKEL: Greek Cypriot communist party
- AKP: Islamist Justice and Development party of Turkey
- CS: Copenhagen School
- DESY: Democratic Rally Party, Greek Cypriot political party
- EC: European Community
- EEC: European Economic Community
- EMU: Economic Monetary Union
- EOKA: Ethnike Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters)
- EU: European Union
- LI: Liberal intergovernmentalism
- NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
- RF: Refah Partisi, Turkish political party
- RoC: Republic of Cyprus
- PASOK: Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement, Greek political party
- TAIEX: Technical Assistance and Information Exchange
- TRNC: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
- UN: United Nations
- UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force on Cyprus





# **1. Introduction**

## **Focus of the study**

This thesis focuses on the European Union and the Cyprus conflict. The EU was from the early start a peace project with the aim to secure the European continent from disasters like the two World Wars. Through trade and cooperation the major states in Europe would become interdependent and more developed. Over the years, several countries in Europe joined the Union in their quest for wealth and prosperity. The EU uses conditionality on its candidate countries to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and states in the periphery of Europe fight corruption and totalitarianism to meet EU standards. During the last decade the EU has grown and deepened. It has occurred an increasing institutionalization of relations between European states, where the states are bound together by legal agreements that constrain and condition policy choices. This is also happening across the traditional east- west line in Europe. The EU has successfully domesticated security within the union in the sense that it is extremely unlikely that member states would use military force to resolve conflicts with other member states.

The end of the Cold War marked a shift in security and foreign policy all over the world, something that led to a significant change in the understanding of what constitute threats to European security. After the Cold War there has been a shift from the almost exclusive focus on military threats from states and towards a focus on a number of highly diverse issues. These issues vary from economic and societal problems to terrorism, the spread of WMD, migration and ethnic conflicts.

One of the present EU members is Cyprus. It joined the EU on 1<sup>st</sup> of Mai 2004, together with nine other countries. The story behind this particular accession is somehow different, and perhaps more dramatic than the others. The island of Cyprus has been divided between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots since 1974, but troubles started much earlier. It got its independence from Great Britain in 1960 and the guarantors of the Constitution were Great Britain, Greece and Turkey. Along with the Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots, the UN and the EU these are the key players in this long lasting and deep rooted ethnic conflict.

This thesis will, however, deal with only a part of the overall conflict. The Republic of Cyprus (RoC, the southern part) applied for EU membership in 1990 and after that the EU became an important player in the conflict. Many researchers and politicians believed that the EU would work as a positive catalyst for peace, bringing with it enough incentive to make the parts involved agree. For a long time, settlement of the conflict was a pre-condition for accession of Cyprus. However, after the Luxembourg Summit in 1997, it became clear that after tremendous pressure from Greece this demand was no longer a fact. Even though only one part of Cyprus is present in the EU today it is interesting to look at the EU impact on several of the players in the conflict. Has the EU process led to any changes in northern Cyprus and in Turkey as well?

There have been many attempts to bring the two sides together and work towards a solution, which all have failed. The most prominent in this effort were led by the UN. After nerve-racking months with UN sponsored talks prior to the accession, the result became clear just days before the accession. On 24<sup>th</sup> of April 2004, both sides voted in referendums concerning a huge UN plan for settlement and reconciliation which also included EU membership for both sides. The people in north voted in favor of the plan, but the people in the south rejected it. The Republic of Cyprus, therefore, joined the EU on behalf of the whole island, with EU- laws and rules suspended in the north.

Northern Cyprus has a special place in this study. It is a side of the conflict that is rarely heard and which is marginalized in much of the world. It has for years been a “rogue state”, which has from the western point of view, including the EU, been the sole reason for the stalemate. Northern Cyprus unilaterally declared its own state in November 1984, a state that is only recognized by Turkey. Turkey has been criticized for recognizing it and has for years considered it as a domestic part of Turkey. However, the situation has changed in both Turkey and Northern Cyprus in the last years and created a new type of conflict. Many studies have been made about how the nation state alters in relationship with the EU and how the EU has great influence when it comes to identity, politics and economy. Northern Cyprus is, however, not an internationally recognized nation state, but strives for membership and closer contact with Europe. This thesis will also look at this difficult relationship and how the EU has influenced the Turkish Cypriot position and view on settlement.

Turkey is a key actor in today's security picture both regarding the Cyprus conflict but also in a more general way in the Middle East. Turkey has been of vital importance for the US in the search for terrorists and the war against Iraq. The country is heavily interlinked with Iran, Iraq and Syria concerning the Kurds in the area. What happens now with the Kurds in Iraq will be of great importance for the Kurds in Turkey. It will also be of great importance for the EU. A Turkey with a developing democracy, good record with human rights and rule of law is very important to maintain and develop further in the troublesome region. However, Turkey is also important in the Cyprus conflict. Turkey is the only country that legitimizes the TRNC and has for many years treated it as a Turkish region. In the recent years the prospect for a Turkish EU membership has been optimistic which again has loosened the deadlock that has prevailed for the last 30 years. The political change in Turkey has also contributed to this. The present Prime Minister in Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has worked hard to convince the reluctant nationalist elite and the military about the importance of meeting the EU accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria). The Cyprus conflict is therefore vital to the future of Turkey. And the future of Turkey is vital to the future of EU. The EU is now in the border zone between east and west and the case of Turkey makes this even clearer.

### **The research questions**

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the EU impact on the Cyprus conflict. Has it contributed to peace and stability or has it on the contrary had little impact on the peace process? This can be specified in the following two questions:

- 1. How has the EU influenced the different parts of the Cyprus conflict?*
- 2. How can this influence be explained?*

There are many parts involved in this conflict, and this thesis will only look at some of them. The main parts, which will be analyzed, are the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, as well as their motherlands, Turkey and Greece. However, there will be a special focus on the Turkish Cypriot and the Turkish side. As mentioned, Northern

Cyprus has been internationally isolated for many years, and the last settlement effort could have been a new start in a new world for them. Therefore it is especially interesting to look at EU impact in the north. How do people in the north view the EU? Another element which will be dealt with here is the role of the UN and how the EU framework was utilized in the last UN plan, the so-called “Annan Plan”.

One special feature about conflicts in general, which also suits the Cyprus conflict, is the question of security. Both sides are obsessed with it in their own way, and this thesis will also look at how the EU changes the perception of security within their framework. Theories from the constructivist Copenhagen School will be used to better understand difficult security issues after the Cold War.

The weakness of picking some actors is that others will be ruled out, and in this case there are several actors that I hardly mention. Both the U.S and the UK are also important players as well as the UN, which are probably the most important mediator and actor beside the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots themselves.

### **Structure of the thesis**

This thesis consists of six main chapters. In chapter two I will account for the methodology and methods used during the work with this thesis. It will reveal some features about qualitative method and case study method, but also important features about the fieldwork. The following theory chapter will frame my analysis with theories and concepts from integration theory, Europeanization theory and Security theory. Chapter four is a background chapter, which gives us important snapshots from the history. I find it important to have knowledge about the history of Cyprus, but also about Turkey and Greece. Their way of doing politics, for instance, has influenced the two communities on the island heavily. The next chapter will then be the main analysis chapter, and deal with the EU perspective on the Cyprus conflict as well as the overall impact from the EU on different parts of the conflict. Finally, I will sum up my findings in the Conclusion chapter.

## **2. Methods**

### **Introduction**

This chapter will reveal some of the most important elements of a master thesis. It will show how the work has been conducted and prove that the researcher have thought through positive and negative sides with his or her work. Every move needs an explanation and this chapter will reveal mine. I also want the reader to understand how my data has been collected and used. The reader can then more easily assess the thesis concerning reliability, validity and generalization and the researcher himself can reflect over his own work. Even though these concepts are mostly used in quantitative research, they are also important for qualitative work. Reliability tells us something about how reliable the results of the research are; while validity is about how well the data and the research design fits the main research questions. Generalization is about how this knowledge can be transferred to other situations (Thagaard 1998). This thesis is built upon qualitative methods only, and the nature of qualitative methods and case study will be dealt with in the first part. The next parts take a close look on the materials, which form the basis for this thesis. It will analyze the process of fieldwork and interviewing, document analysis and observation.

### **Case study as a qualitative method**

According to Thagaard (1998) it is important that ones choice about method is in accordance with the theme and main research questions. This thesis will assess the impact the EU has had, and still have on the Cyprus conflict, and the tool I find most proper to use is qualitative methods. Qualitative methodologies explore the feelings, understandings and knowledge's of others through interviews, discussions or participant observation (Limb and Dwyer 2001). This way of conducting research is increasingly used by human geographers to explore the complexity of the processes that shapes our social world. The extensive use of this methodology came as a protest to the "quantitative revolution" in the 1960s which used various quantitative methods to understand people's sense of place (Limb and Dwyer 2001). By using qualitative methods, we do not start with the assumption that there is a pre-existing world that can be measured, but that the

social world is something dynamic and always changing. Qualitative methods are therefore characterized by an in-depth, intensive approach rather than an extensive or numerical approach (Limb and Dwyer 2001).

The case study method used here is one way of conducting qualitative research. According to Gomm et al. (2000) all research is case study, because there is always some unit that is analyzed. But they also manage to narrow down the term and make it suitable for this study about the Cyprus conflict. They argue that a case study method investigates a relatively small number of cases and that information is gathered and analyzed about a large number of features of each case. Yin (1989) states that case study method is a preferred method when the main research questions are “how” and “why”, when the phenomenon in the study is a contemporary one and when the researcher has little control over the events. These questions contribute to the exploring feature of the case study, where new and interesting research questions arise on the way. This exploring feature makes it easier to seize the complexity of meanings and events, which form the basis for a social phenomenon. Another feature about the case study design is the method triangulation. When working with a case, it is normal to use several methods to gather data, for example interviewing, observation and document analysis.

The case study approach has been criticized for not being able to generalize in the classic way. The classic form of generalization is to claim that what is the case in one place or time will be so elsewhere or in another time. In experimental or survey research, generalization claims are explicit and constitute the basis of scientific reasoning. However, in qualitative research, generalization claims are less explicit. Some social scientists even minimize the relevance of generalization or deny any intention toward generalization in qualitative research (Payne and Williams 2005). A case study does not tell us anything about the expansion of a social phenomenon within a limited universe of phenomenon. In fact, the purpose of a case study is to not generalize, but rather to “*generalize to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes*” (Yin 1989, 21) However, Yin argues that there are another type of generalization that is more feasible on case study research which is called analytical generalization. This type of generalization is rather conclusions that are drawn from the case to develop new theories

and concepts. The conclusions made are therefore on a higher level of abstractions than in a classic generalization.

## **Fieldwork**

Much of the basis for this thesis is from my experiences in Cyprus. The fieldwork lasted for one month, during the whole of November 2004. I stayed in the city of Gazi Magusa (Famagusta in Greek), which is situated in the north east of the island. The main reason why I chose this city is that The Eastern Mediterranean University is located there, with approximately 14 000 students. The University has students from all over the Middle East and Eastern Europe as well as Turkish Cypriots. During my stay, I conducted several interviews, read local newspapers, observed both people and important places and had many informal conversations.

Prior to the trip I contacted the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) for advice and help regarding informants in Cyprus. PRIO has local staff in Nicosia, which I contacted before leaving Norway. These were my key persons during my stay in Cyprus, and besides them I only had one interview organized prior to the trip. This interview was organized through a friend who lives in Cyprus. After my first interview with PRIO-employees, many doors were opened, and I got in touch with the people I wanted to meet. During my stay I conducted in total 10 interviews and attended one seminar (appendix). The people I talked to were mainly high-ranking politicians or advisers, and political researchers.

When looking back on this experience, I find especially one weakness about the fieldwork. The theory used in this thesis was collected and read through after the fieldwork. In the aftermath, this should have been done prior to the trip. The theory is important and gives the researcher more knowledge and understanding and makes the important questions easier to find. I believe this decreased the validity of the data, since many of the questions asked were not answering my research questions well enough. This weakness can be related to both lack of experience as a researcher and lack of preparedness before the fieldwork. The same weakness can also be a result of the very

nature of the case study. Because of the exploring feature of the case study, the level of knowledge is low in the starting phase and will increase during the work.

### **The interview situation**

Interviewing is a qualitative method, which brings with it great advantages, as well as challenges. Interviews are generally unstructured or semi-structured and work more as a dialogue than an interrogation (Valentine 1997). The aim of an interview is to understand how individual people experience their own life. The research interview is not only a new method that gives us qualitative data instead of quantitative ones, but it also reflects an alternative view on themes in social sciences. It reflects our thoughts about meaning, reality and the truths in social science (Kvale 2002). However, there are a lot of things to remember when conducting interviews and also ethical guidelines to follow. My own experience with these issues will be dealt with here.

Before leaving Norway, I made a semi structural interview guide to use in the field. The reason for making the guide semi-structural was to make the interviews as flexible as possible in my situation. A semi-structured interview lets the interviewees respond more freely and it allows conversation. It also made it easier for me to cross-reference and verify my interpretation and understanding of the replies. It contained several topics and some specific questions. This guide was meant as a helping tool to get the open conversation started. Already at the first interview I noticed that several questions were outdated and not relevant enough. The questions that had meaning to me in front of my computer at home did not have the same meaning to other people. Prior to the remaining interviews I therefore made new guides directly aimed at the persons I was meeting. As time went by, the guides were not used actively, but rather as a check list to ensure all the topics were covered. This is also the reason why this guide is not part of this thesis' appendix.

I used a tape recorder during almost all of the interviews, something which was both positive and negative. In my opinion, this strengthened the reliability of the data by ensuring more reliable and trustworthy information. The main reason for me to use it was for me to pay more attention to what the informant was actually saying and try to follow up with good questions. My lack of experience with the interview-situation made it difficult to focus on the conversation and at the same time writes down the most



important points. Two of my interviews, however, showed me the more negative aspect of using tape recorder. Half way through the first interview I realized that the pause button was still on, so I only recorded the second half of the interview. Thinking it was recording, I did not pay enough attention and taking notes. After the interview I tried to sum up the most important points of the first half, but it was difficult and many important elements may have disappeared. During the next interviews I was very cautious about taping it the right way. Towards the end of the stay I had a similar experience with the tape recorder during an interview. I realized that the tape was empty a day later when I was going to transcribe it. This resulted in a very fragmented resume from what I recollected from the interview. Many important elements from the interview may also here have been lost. Further, I found it important to transcribe the interviews as accurate as possible, something which also further ensure the validity of the data. It is also important to remember that there are also no true, objective transformation from an oral to a written mode of communication since transcripts are decontextualised conversations (Kvale 2002).

Before I started the interviews I asked for permission to use the tape recorder, something everyone but one confirmed. My last informant gave me a negative answer to this request and I conducted the interview without the recorder. This put me in a different position from the other interviews, and I had to focus on both the conversation and my questions. Luckily, this interview was the last one, and I was then familiar both to professional and technical issues, so that interview actually became one of the best.

Prior to the trip I had thought about how to deal with an interview situation were I was a young blonde female student and in charge of a situation with mostly male Muslim powerful men. This was certainly the situation many times, but it never became a hindrance or a negative element. Rather, the informants were glad to talk to foreigners who take interest in their case and care about learning more. The overall feeling of the informants, especially the politicians, was frustration about little international attention for the conflict and about the Turkish Cypriot side. The Turkish Cypriot community is more secular than the Turkish mainland community and that gave me more confidence being in charge of the interview situation. I felt also uncertain how to behave towards high-politic persons, like the Prime Minister, but this interview was in the end of the

fieldwork, so my questions and insight in the topics were far more thought through than in the beginning. Talking to politicians in general was no problem, since they are used to talk much, and during some interviews I barely got to ask a few questions. This situation also put me in a position where I could conduct research on a more neutral and objective basis than an insider.

While doing the research, the ethical considerations might be just as important as the technical ones, especially concerning interviewing. The ethical principles do not only concern the informant, but also the research itself, that it is scientific and independent (Kvale 2002). Prior to the trip, I had made “confidentiality agreements” for each informant about the absolute confidentiality of the conversation and question about quoting in the thesis. At each interview I felt very uneasy about bringing out the paper and thus making the situation more formal. This does not mean that the interviews were informal, but I felt that our oral promise about the matter was enough. The informants answered very clear on these questions and all but one was positive for later use of their words. Another ethical consideration is the possible consequences for the informants because of their attendance to the project. Prior to the trip I felt insecure about the negative effects it could cause to the people involved because of the sensitive topic. Northern Cyprus is, even though it is softening, still a military state with more than 30 000 troops on the ground. The military are still controlling many areas, something which was easy to observe. It was therefore a surprise when the openness and positivism about the topic was a fact with almost all the informants. This openness can be a sign of the emerging democracy and longing for international attention. They maybe considered the consequences to be more positive than negative, something in which I agree on. The Turkish Cypriot community need and should get more international attention. Even though the positive feed back, I have chosen to keep the informants anonymous during the whole thesis.

One can ask why there are no “ordinary people” in this survey, and why I only talked to well educated people. It was important to me to talk to persons who are activists in the conflict and who have knowledge about the present situation with the EU. All my informants could give me analyses and thoughts of why the situation is like it is today and why the EU did not work as the positive catalyst many thought it could be. However,

that does not mean that I did not talk to “ordinary people” about the conflict and the situation they are in.

Another problem with reliability in the interview situation is that the informants talk about experiences and happenings, which go long back in time. These memories will change with time, since we forget details or interpret the actions in new light than earlier. This is also a fact I must remember when analyzing the transcribed interviews. All my informants talked much about history and particularly events that occurred several years ago. The context in political Cyprus has shifted dramatically the last years and interpretations of prior events can easily change with them.

I think this whole experience has given me good training in how to handle the researcher situation, especially since this has been my own project from the start. Working with an organization or a larger group, I could not have acted so freely and independently as I have done. On the other hand, working alone also imply that I myself have to take all the choices and all the critique. The personal experience of being alone in a foreign country is also a great one, where barriers were stretched each day.

### **Other sources of data**

During a case study, the researcher will improve the validity of the work by using multiple types of information sources, also called data triangulation (Yin 1989). In addition to the semi structured interviews, I also made use of secondary data, observation and informal conversations. Secondary data means information which has already been collected by someone else and is available for others to inspect (Clark 1997). The secondary data sources can be government surveys, censuses, administrative records, newspaper articles and diaries; in other words all material which are publicly available.

The aim of the analysis is to gather many documents about a certain subject and then compare them. When using many sources, one gets a broader picture of the phenomenon of interest (Clark 1997). Analyzing secondary data is challenging when studying conflicts, like the Cyprus conflict. There are many sides of all the stories and strong opinions and feelings are attached to it. It was therefore important from the beginning to use a wide variety of data sources, both primary and secondary ones. The secondary data sources are most important in this thesis, and include newspaper articles,

research papers and official documents mainly from the EU. With all these sources there is one important issue which Clark (1997) describes as “representativeness”. Each newspaper has their own way of interpreting or seeing things, which is important for all readers to think about. When using such material in a master thesis it is extremely important to interpret the data well and do thoroughly background check on both the author and the newspaper itself. Double-checking the facts is also important. This will improve the reliability of the work. The newspapers I have used most often here are Turkish Daily News and The Guardian. The first one I found most difficult to use, because of my lack of knowledge about Turkey, at least prior to the fieldwork. Nevertheless, I found this source very important, both for use in the thesis, but also for filling my knowledge gaps about the topic seen from the Turkish side. The importance of interpretation became clear when using this source. Many of these articles were not suitable for joining my document analysis, but nevertheless gave a good overview about the citizen’s opinions.

One other important secondary data source used in the thesis is various research working papers. The working papers and research reports are from various peace research institutes like PRIO, SIPRI and COPRI (Peace Research Institutes in Oslo, Stockholm and Copenhagen), political journals like JEMIE (Journal on Ethno politics and Minority Issues in Europe) and reports from various Universities. Even though no data is objective, I found good help in these articles, which I regard as trustworthy and reliable. Another source is official documents from the EU homepage, which I used mainly to get hard facts about the EU accession process and strategies both towards Cyprus and Turkey.

### **Observation and informal conversations**

To understand such a complex conflict better, it was vital for me to stay in Cyprus a month and learn not only through formal interviews, but also through visiting people in their homes and at work. The older men in Northern Cyprus spoke quite well English, since they lived during the colony era when everyone learned English. They were glad to talk to foreigners again and loved to talk about the troublesome history. The young people and the students did not speak that well English so it was hard to get into contact with them, but I had many conversations with other foreigners who stayed in Famagusta.

They gave me an outsider's point of view on the situation and about the Turkish Cypriots, which was interesting. One learns much about a different culture just by observing and being curious. It was also important to see with my own eyes the border and the checkpoints, the military and all the "propaganda". The two communities speak of each other in a way that I would refer to as propaganda, a word they probably would not use themselves. Northern Cyprus has been isolated since 1974 and it was also important for me to see the consequences of this. It has not only affected the economy and politics but also the mentality of the people. To better understand the conflict and how it has changed since the EU became a factor it was important to study all these aspects. A weakness of the observation method is the fact that events might happen differently due to the presence of the researcher (Yin 1989).

## **Summary**

The method used in this work is qualitative method based on what Yin labels case study method. The reason for this choice depends on what design will fit the main research question best. In this case qualitative methods based on fieldwork and document analysis fits the research question the best. The fieldwork was conducted during November 2004 where various activists in the conflict were interviewed (appendix). This raw material was transformed to text, which again was analyzed. Other secondary data sources were also analyzed and used either as background information or inside the text. When conducting fieldwork, but also during other stages in the research process, it is important to examine strength and weaknesses about the work to increase the validity and reliability of the work. In this chapter several such weaknesses and strength have been dealt with such as the low level of knowledge at the starting point in a case study research, but also challenges during the interview process. Being an "outsider" in a Muslim society is also discussed. There are also many important ethical aspects to think through, especially during fieldwork, such as confidentiality. This is a special important element since the case in focus is a rather tense identity conflict, and critical voices could imply sanctions for the persons involved. This was not a problem in this case, but the choice was nevertheless made to keep the informants anonymous.



## 3. Theory

### Introduction

This chapter will introduce concepts and theories to frame this analysis. It will reveal ideas from integration theory, Europeanization theory and from security theory.

### Integration theory

Theories about European integration are important to know to better understand how the EU has affected the Cyprus conflict, but also to gain better understanding of the EU's formal institutions. The European integration force has contributed much to the development of peace and prosperity in Europe after the Second World War, and the integration force also alters the political landscape and changes the nation states in its integration path. The theories dealt with here will try to explain some of these changes.

Integration theory is also important because “pure” empirical knowledge of how institutions work is impossible and thus not very meaningful. It is impossible because the representation of empirical facts is always based on assumptions and concerns which are often not reflected upon. Integration theory helps to highlight and problematize these assumptions and concerns (Wiener and Diez 2004).

European integration made a huge leap forward on 1<sup>st</sup> of May 2004 when ten new countries joined the EU, including the Republic of Cyprus (RoC). The northern part of the island, however, was excluded from the *aquis communautaire*<sup>1</sup> and is therefore not affected by the EU in the same way as the southern part. The north is viewed by many as a “quasi-state” since it has no recognition by any other states than Turkey. Either way, the two states are part of the same island; join much history and also a Constitution from 1960. The way the EU could and can play a role in this conflict is therefore quite complex. How is the integrating force of the EU affecting this conflict? To help answer this question we have to look at various integration theories and their stance on enlargement, cooperation, conflict and security. European integration can be analyzed

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<sup>1</sup> *Acquis communautaire* is all the principles, laws, practices, duties and goals within the EU. These are formulated in all the previous treaties, which all applicant country has to accept and implement before accession to the EU.

through various perspectives, whereas some theories embrace and clarify certain elements, and thereby make it harder to spot others. The theories I have chosen to use here are neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and constructivism. The two first theories can be labeled as rationalism which also better can be compared to constructivism, which is a meta theory (Rieker 2004). The debate between these two approaches has been going on for many years, and has recently reached the study of integration. What they all share, however, is that they are not primarily concerned with the development of particular policies, but with the abstract reflection on European integration.

### *Neo-functionalism*

Ernst Haas developed the theory of neo-functionalism in his book “The uniting of Europe”, and according to his definition, European integration is a...

*“... process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.” (Haas 1958, 16)*

This implies that the ultimate goal for Haas is the supranational organization which becomes the new centre of political and economic activities. The integration towards this goal would happen almost automatically through a cumulative process.

According to Haas the key to European integration is the “logic of sectoral integration”. This means that integration would spread from sector to sector, a so-called “spillover” effect. Technology and the expanding size of economic activity would lead to integration in one sector, which again would spill over into other sectors, like the political sector. Even though the focus of integration has been on “low politics” (economic politics), neo-functionalism presumes that the integration process will proceed from cooperation in “low” politics to “high” politics (foreign and defense policies), because “low” politics is less contentious than “high” politics (Eriksen and Fossum 1999).



Haas believed that the modern industrial technology would make even the largest European countries too small to produce effectively. Larger units, across borders, would be more effective. The nation state was *passé* (Førland and Claes 1998). Political and economic cooperation could only happen if there was an overarching and supranational institution. The goal was therefore, to Haas and the neo-functionalists, to attain a federal union of states (Hatay 2001). The neo-functional theories is based on the elite level, because they saw political and economic interest groups as the driving forces of integration. Domestic politics and the national governments are not the central players in European integration. The main players are the private market leaders and the employees of the Commission (Førland and Claes 1998).

The neo-functional theories made huge predictions on the future of Europe. The only drawback was that many of these predictions did not happen. When the integration process nearly stopped during the 60s, the neo-functionalists got problems explaining what happened. Historians wrote essays about how it was actually the state leaders who had pushed the EEC onwards and not the enterprise leaders or the Eurocrats. Real life and the theories of neo-functionalism did not work well together, and theorists then developed more moderate neo-functional theories about integration. What makes this theory worth noting today are, according to Førland and Claes (1998), three things: The theory highlights that the production technology is the basis for the political institutions. When trade expands across borders, the pressure for supranational institutions grows. Secondly, the neo-functionalists urge us not only to narrow our analysis to the formal decision makers, because other players may also have much power, for instance interest groups and organizations. Third, no integration analysis should forget the driving force of the common institutions, because they are the ones who work all the time to strengthen the integration process and make the basis for the decision makers.

The integration process in Europe has bound the member countries together in a security community. The use of violence between them is almost unthinkable today. However, this does not mean that the threat to security is extinct, especially concerning ethnic conflicts. The success of the neo-functional interdependence model of European integration process in ending the German French rivalry is often held up as a model to be followed (Jakobsson Hatay 2001).

Neo-functionalism has problems with explaining enlargement. They regard expansion into additional functional tasks as a positive thing, but not extension into additional territorial units. If their predictions had proven right, Switzerland would long time ago been a member and Greece would not have. This is because Switzerland is more “European” than Greece. Enlargement is, according to this approach, delaying the spillover effect, unless the spill over is built into the access negotiations process as a means of compensating existing members or accommodating new ones. The neo-functionalists will also pay much attention to whether the full *aquis* have been imposed upon new members and how enlargement treat the *aquis* (Schmitter 2004).

### *Liberal intergovernmentalism*

Liberal intergovernmentalism aims at explaining why interstate cooperation in general and European integration in particular occurs. The clearest protest to the neo-functional approach is liberal intergovernmentalism (LI), and the greatest contributor to this approach is Andrew Moravcsik. His theories are inspired of the neo- realist theories. Neo- realists suggest that it is not just uneven development or distribution of power among states that leads to conflicts. They believe that the struggle for power is the result of the structure of the international system at whole, rather than the nature of man. The main problem, according to the neo-realists, is the anarchic international system, which means that there is no world government that can provide law and order among the nation states. This lack of authority is the key to understand the international system and international relations theory. The self-help situation leads to a security dilemma, which leads to lack of trust among states living in the anarchic system. States arm themselves in order to pursue the rational goal of self- preservation (Genest 1996).

Moravcsik wanted the EU to be considered just as an interstate organization, where the nation states played the key role. As in neo-realism, Moravcsik emphasized the states and the rational behavior of these. Cost and benefit of international interdependence is seen as determinants of national preferences. The point where Moravcsik parts from neo-realism is that he emphasizes domestic politics more, and the power struggle between states less than neo-realists would (Førland and Claes 1998). Moravcsik himself stresses the distinctions between neo- functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism in his

article “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist approach”:

*“Where neo-functionalism emphasizes domestic technocratic consensus, liberal intergovernmentalism looks to domestic coalitional struggles. Where neo-functionalism emphasizes opportunities to upgrade the common interest, liberal intergovernmentalism stresses the role of relative power. Where neo-functionalism emphasizes the active role of supranational officials in shaping bargaining outcomes, liberal intergovernmentalism stresses instead passive institutions and the autonomy of national leaders. Ironically, the EC's 'democratic deficit' may be a fundamental source of its success”(Moravcsik 1993, 518).*

LI sees the domestic politics in the EU countries as important and is thus a first step in a LI- analysis of European integration. The domestic politics is dominated by a power struggle between various political parties and private corporates. They fight for government control and thereby the interests of the country. This is where the liberal element appears. This relationship between state and society makes the system dynamic, since domestic power shifts is a response to bottom-up pressure. Moravcsik seeks to refute the neo-functional notion that integration weakens the state through diffusion of power and argues that integration strengthens the state (Eriksen and Fossum 1999).

The central claim in LI analysis is that integration after 1955 reflects three factors which made governments willing to delegate or pool their power: The first factor is the economic interest. Secondly, it is the interstate bargaining. The bargaining stage seeks to explain the efficiency and distributional outcomes. Here two possible explanations of agreements on substance are contrasted: asymmetrical interdependence or supranational entrepreneurship. Moravcsik arrives at the answer that asymmetrical interdependence has most explanatory power. Increased interdependence between the states in Western Europe can make states with competing trade areas liable to cooperate on economic fields, like the customs-union and the inner market (Førland and Claes 1998). States bargain through a “give and take” game where the result is a regime or a treaty. The EU has grown so complex because the premium of cooperating is so high that they could

agree on special treatment of the smaller countries. The third factor is the commitment of the states to transfer sovereignty (Rieker 2004).

A central element in this analysis is enlargement. How does the LI explain EU enlargement? It is indeed a hard task to explain EU enlargement from a LI perspective. Demetriou (1998) argues that the last enlargement round should not even be on the agenda given that it implies a realignment of the structural funding regime in favor of the Eastern European States and against the so called cohesion states of the EU. A further problem lies at the concept of bargaining. The focus on the great “bargains” (the EU pacts and treaties) collides in the enlargement process, where much of the work is done bi-laterally, multilaterally and with a very active Commission. However, LI provides an explanation of the member states enlargement preferences.

But what does LI theory say about security? As a contrast to neo-realisms desire for military power and military security, LI theories do not focus much on this. In fact they are not very concerned about security at all (Rieker 2004). Their main focus is on economic interests and not much on security concerns. However, this does not mean that LI theories ignore the security and peace aspect of the EU. The rationalist that belonged more to the liberal wing than the realist one broadened the security scope and included more to the concept than the traditional military security aspect. This included environmental and social threats. The rationalist perspective (especially neo-realists and LI) will argue that the EU does not have any security policy. The first argument to this is that it is the member states that govern the EU and that it has not enough autonomy. Single member states will block common plan when it is in their interest. States will much likely not pool sovereignty on issues like security, defense or foreign policy. Some LI will argue that this will not always happen, though. When the most powerful states cooperate on high politics issues which are in their own interests, this can happen. But in the moment these interests diverge, the cooperation will fail. Secondly, prior attempts on building military forces and tighten the security aspect has not been successful. Thirdly the rationalist highlight the point that a common EU security policy will not likely happen in the future unless the military power grows or the decision-making system develops further.

This theory captures many different aspects of integration, both on national and the international level, a quality that Følrand and Claes (1998) emphasizes highly. The major drawback of this theory is its lack of prediction.

### *Social Constructivism*

Social constructivism has reached the study of European integration recently, and was much an effect of a misgiving among scholars about the narrow focus of the debates between neo- functionalists and LI. However, there is quite a lot of confusion in the field of European studies on what constitutes social constructivism and what distinguishes it from other integration theory approaches (Risse 2004).

Social constructivism saw strength in sociological theories and turned to them, but without rejecting all the neo-realist structures. Alexander Went, John Ruggie and Emanuel Adler are great contributors to this approach, and they all have a vision to bridge the theoretical gaps in IR theory. The two main assumptions in social constructivist theory are the reasons for its growing acknowledgement. Firstly, the structures for human interaction are based on a common understanding of reality where ideas play a more important role than material relations. Further, an actor's identity and interests are constructed by these common ideas.

The constructivist approach to European integration is quite different from the rationalist theories. It is not a single theory, but a meta- theory, containing many different theories which all have some common features. Whereas the rationalist theories try to explain features of the EU, the constructivists try to understand it. Constructivists reject the demarcation between the natural world and the human or social world. It also rejects the methodological individualism that is present in all the previous mentioned theories. This means that it rejects the idea that the elementary unit of social life is the individual human action. The constructivists on the other hand are methodological collectivists, and thus draw conclusions *from* the character of the social phenomenon *to* characters of the individuals and their actions. The line of explanation is the opposite (Gilje and Grimen 1993).

Social constructivism has an ontology that is open for both hard (material) and soft (social facts) evidence. Its epistemology does not reject the possibility of testing

theories against evidence, but also puts emphasis on the more qualitative and interpretive methods of inquiry. It pay less attention to causal explanations, and more attention in interpreting and examining how structures and agents interact and are mutually constitutive (Rieker 2004). Our social environment constitutes who we are and our identities as social beings. At the same time, human agency creates, reproduces and change culture through our daily practices (Risse 2004).

Considered EU integration and enlargement, especially the 2004 enlargement, constructivist theories are more able to explain elements than rationalist theories do. The rationalist theories can not explain anomalies that are unexpected given the general theory. Constructivist approaches emphasize norm guided behavior and the impacts of norms, ideas and identity, in contrast to the narrow material- based rationalism (Jileva 2004). From a rationalist view the eastern and southern enlargement is a “puzzle”, because the cost of the new membership countries will exceed the benefits. Jileva (2004) highlights several elements which are of importance for constructivist theory concerning enlargement: peace, democracy, rule of law, liberty, respect for human rights, solidarity, anti- discrimination and respect for sustainable development. She further emphasize the role of solidarity: *“Solidarity as a variable in integration could be an important factor in relations between actors with clashing interests and crucial for bringing together actors with asymmetrical powers as is the case with this round of enlargement”* (Jileva 2004, 2). Risse (2004) argues that the growing European identity is an explanation to European integration generally, and especially concerning the Eastern enlargement. The states share a collective identity and adhere to its constitutive norms and values and therefore are entitled to join the community. The Western states had also committed themselves during the Cold War to welcome a free and democratic Eastern Europe into the Western Community. The enlargement rounds in both NATO and the EU shows how normative commitments acquire their own dynamics as social rather than material capabilities (Risse 2004). But do norms affect all human behavior? The constructivist puzzle tells us that it might not. It can explain the decision to start the enlargement round, but not the bickering of the member states during the negotiations.

Constructivists also have a different view on multilateral cooperation and integration. They regard social interaction and collective identity formation as vital for

cooperation and not bargaining, like the LI. Constructivists share this fact with the neo-functionalists. As already mentioned, the neo-functionalists believe that international interaction and cooperation can trigger processes of spillover, which can promote further integration. They do not accept the idea that the interests of states are fixed and independent of social structures (Rieker 2004).

Another contrast to the rationalist approach is on the security issue. Constructivists maintain a wider concept of security than for instance neo-realists or liberal intergovernmentalists (Rieker 2004). One example of this way of thinking is the Copenhagen School (CS), which developed a new framework for security. They accept the realist argument that security is about survival, but disagree about the military use to handle the security problem. Threats are not fixed objectives, but results of social constructs (Buzan et al. 1998). This approach is more flexible and more able to capture changes in threat perception and security instruments (Rieker 2004). The Copenhagen School and their view on security is dealt with later on in this chapter.

### **Europeanization theory**

All the mentioned integration theories have a bottom-up perspective, where the dynamics and outcome of the European institution building are the main dependent variable. However, in Europeanization theory the perspective is top-down, focusing more on the impact of the integration on the domestic level (Börzel and Risse 2000).

The concept of Europeanization is a contested one and scholars have used it in two ways which have caused confusion (Börzel and Risse 2000). The first way is by using Europeanization to describe

*“... the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with political problem-solving that formalizes interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative rules. “ (Börzel and Risse 2000, 3)*

Europeanization is according to this point of view the independent variable which impacts upon domestic processes, policies and institutions. On the other hand,

Europeanization describes “*an incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EU political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy making.*” (Börzel and Risse 2000, 3). This refers to the processes and mechanisms by which European institution building can cause change at the domestic level.

In this chapter I will use the first definition, since I want to explore both the processes by which European integration affects domestic change and the outcome of this change. The focus will be on Europeanization as a force in conflict settlement or conflict resolution in the context of secessionist crises. The next chapters will deal with the role the EU have in this process of change, whether it be as a framework or as an active player. This part will also put particular stress on Europeanization through conditionality and through social learning, but before that it is important to know the theoretical conceptualizations of Europeanization: rational-choice institutionalism and constructivist institutionalism.

*“New institutionalism”: Rational- choice institutionalism and constructivist institutionalism*

How do the EU rules, norms and policies affecting domestic politics and policy? To answer this, scholars of Europeanization have gone to the theories of “new institutionalism” (Börzel and Risse 2003). Institutions are classically understood as the formal rules, standard operating procedures and organizations of government. However, in the “new” understanding, an institution also encompasses informal norms, routines and conventions. The seemingly banal claim that institutions matter and influence relevant political behavior must be understood primarily as a reaction to post-war behavioralism and rational choice that approach politics from a rather atomized conception of the individual. Börzel and Risse (2003) refers to two types of institutionalism, namely rational choice institutionalism and sociological / constructivist institutionalism. Both theories agree that institutions matter, but they differ fundamentally in their arguments about how the institutions matter. Simplifying it slightly, the rationalists define institutions as rules of the game, both formal and informal, that provide incentives for rational actors to pursue their strategies. This contrasts the constructivist scholars who



believe that institutions include informal norms and intersubjective understandings as well as formal rules.

The rational choice institutionalists see the misfit between European and domestic policies, processes and institutions as making opportunities and constraints to pursue their interests. If these political opportunity structures are to be used, it requires actors who exploit these opportunities and avoid the constraints. This approach sees Europeanization as leading to domestic change through differential empowerment of actors resulting from a redistribution of resources at the domestic level. Rational institutionalism embodies a “logic of consequentialism” which treats actors as rational and goal oriented. The actors engage in the interaction, weighing the costs and benefits of different strategies.

The liberal intergovernmentalists (LI) think that the European opportunities and constraints strengthen the action capacities of national executives and enhancing their autonomy vis a vis other domestic actors. Neo-functionalists think in a different way, and believe that Europeanization provides societal and sub-national actors with new resources since the EU enables them to bypass the national executives.

On the other hand, the sociological / constructivist institutionalism define institutions as having a more important and fundamental role, since the institutions constitute and shape not only their incentives, but their preferences and identities as well (Pollack 2000). In their view, the rationalists can capture parts of the effects of institutions, but they lack the ability of grasping and theorizing about the more important effects of institutions. The sociologist / constructivists approach emphasize processes of persuasion. The advocates of this approach suggest that Europeanization leads to domestic change through socialization, which again result in norm internalization and the development of new identities. The approach draws on the “logic of appropriateness”, which means that the actions of the actors cannot simply be reduced to utility-maximization and rational calculations, but are necessarily context-bound.

But what degree of domestic change are we talking about? Three important changes can be mentioned here: Absorption, accommodation and transformation (Börzel and Risse 2000). Absorption is when member states are able to adjust the existing policies and incorporate the EU policies without having to change the essential features of the state. When member states accommodate EU policies the degree of domestic

change is higher than during absorption. The country adapts existing policies and institutions without changing too much. Transformation is on the other hand known as a process with fundamental changes, where the member states replace their own policies and institutions with new ones.

### **The EU as a framework and as a third party**

The EU can act in two ways, regarding conflict transformation and conflict resolution. It can provide a framework for resolving the Constitutional problems related to secessionist crisis or / and it can act directly as a mediator or indirectly by supporting mediation (Noutcheva et al. 2004). The EU's role as a mediator can be linked to the role it will have as a framework in a post-conflict situation. The EU's role as a mediator is intended to have a short term effect to the conflict, and the function of a framework has mainly long term effects. The role as a third party actor in conflicts is an important role of the EU, which can contribute much to conflict- solution or management.

The “framework-function” adds new Constitutional and policy options to the solution of the conflict. In a conflict where the positions are very different concerning sovereignty and citizenship, the EU's multi-level framework for governance might be a good solution for both parties. The EU framework can also develop multiple identities, because EU membership offers an additional layer of identification, which can ease the tensions in ethnic conflicts. These two dimensions are not unrelated and must be seen in context with the conflict.

Noutcheva et al. (2004) makes a distinction between the candidate states and the non-candidate or non-member states. The interaction between the EU and the candidate states are much more dynamic and two ways than the interaction between the EU and other peripheral states. Based on this, Noutcheva et al. (2004) makes a clearer definition of Europeanization and secessionist conflicts:

*“Europeanization in the field of secessionist conflict settlement and resolution should be understood as a process which is activated and encouraged by European institutions, primarily the EU, by linking the final outcome of the conflict to a certain degree of integration of the parties involved in it into European structures.”*  
(Noutcheva et al. 2004, 7).

The Europeanization of divided states is usually a highly asymmetrical process. There is asymmetry not only between the EU and individual states generally, but also in the interaction pattern between the EU and the two conflicting parties. One characteristic of the Europeanization of divided states is that there are no institutional channels for interaction between the EU and non-recognized authorities. EU integration and policies are often also perceived differently by the different actors in the conflict.

Europeanization here is then changes in external territorial boundaries. Politics, economy and life in general are very prone to changes in this area. Cyprus is a place in the middle. It is both inside the EU, but also outside. How does Europeanization alter the conflict? How does EU alter the conflict? Europeanization can be seen as working through three mechanisms which all interact with each other (Emerson and Noutcheva 2004): Firstly; legal obligations in political and economic domains flowing from the requirements for accession to the EU, and / or from Council of Europe membership and accession to its “Convention on Human Rights and fundamental Freedoms”. Secondly, objective changes in economic structures and the interest of individuals as a result of integration with Europe. Third and finally it is subjective changes in the beliefs, expectations and identity of the individual, feeding political will to adopt European norms of politics, civil society and business.

These mechanisms can be seen as combining rational institutionalism through policies of conditionality and sociological institutionalism through norm diffusion and social learning (Emerson and Noutcheva 2004).

#### *Europeanization through conditionality*

To become an EU member, a state has to fulfill certain demands set by the EU. These demands are called the Copenhagen criteria, named after the Copenhagen summit in 2002 where the accession criteria were agreed upon. The applicant state must have a stable democracy, a competitive market economy, good record with minority treatment and a workable judicial system to start accession negotiation (Grabbe 2002). Previous studies of Europeanization have concentrated on the member states, but the EU exerts the same pressure on applicant states as well. The *acquis communautaire* has to be adopted by the

candidate states, and the negotiations are primarily concerned with determining how much of it that has to be implemented prior to accession (Grabbe 2003).

The EU has much power in the area of conflict settlement. It can involve direct as a mediator or it can carry a policy of “carrots and sticks”, where the ultimate carrot for the actors involved in the conflict can be membership. Progressive inclusion in EU policies without formal membership can also act as a strong carrot. The EU can in return demand certain changes to the issues involved in the conflict. The most frequent disagreements on the conflict agenda concern specific issues as trade, monetary policy, taxation, refugee policy, citizenship and border issues. By attaching rewards to the solutions that the EU wants it can intervene in the conflict and help finding a compromise that satisfies both sides. However, it can also widen the gap between them by exacerbating their differences (Noutchevaet al. 2004).

The next question then is, how do these conditionality policies change domestic practices? The different theoretical approaches which are mentioned above have different answers to this question. Rational choice institutionalism argues that the actors are goal oriented and purposeful and will act with the cost benefit thought in mind. EU conditionality generates “simple learning”, which means that rationally calculating actors are met by Constitutional constraints and are then more prone to change their strategies and tactics but it still does not mean that their identities will change (Noutchevaet al. 2004). The conditionality policies can have a direct effect by favoring one solution over another one, but it can also change the opportunity structures which are more an indirect effect. The latter is an important effect, since the EU cannot use its formal rules and laws outside the member area. Instead it can change the actor’s possibility for action, by favoring or legitimizing some and put constraints on others. The possibility for change is dependent of the compatibility between the EU conditions and demands and the domestic politics. The greater the incompatibility, the lesser chance for change through conditionality

The changes made domestically can be merely superficial. Research indicates that conditionality often fails to promote compliance, especially in transition states where political or institutional changes are to be made. Dialogue and persuasion alone is often

not enough to produce compliance and that pressure and material incentives still are important elements (Checkel 2000).

The most important factors to get positive results from conditionality use are the value that different domestic actors have concerning the EU benefits, but also how committed these actors are towards the EU project (Noutcheva et al. 2004).

### *Europeanization through social learning*

Noutcheva et al. (2004) emphasizes that Europeanization through social learning has a more long term effect than Europeanization through conditionality. This is because through social learning the actors can change their strategies and also their actions. The constructivist approach argues that actors change their identities and thereby also their behavior and goals when interacting in a common institution. It is a process based on interaction, and Noutcheva, Tocci et al (2004) argue that the EU environment is a good arena for change because of its tight cooperation. The possibility for change through social learning is also possible for states or actors outside the EU, but it is then dependent on the relationship it has to the EU. As already mentioned above this approach draws on the “logic of appropriateness” which means that “actors are guided by collective shared understandings of what constitutes socially accepted behavior in a given rule structure” (Börzel and Risse 2000).

The degree of success from this effect in a secessionist conflict is dependent on how the EU manages to mediate in the conflict situation and how the offered solution are compatible to, or fit the domestic political visions. This will again affect the opportunities and possibilities for dialogue with the conflicting parts.

It is not the intention to give an impression that only one of these two processes is more important or that they don't work together. There is a close link between them. However, the time aspect is an important one. The early changes in domestic policy and processes is perhaps better understood with a rational-choice approach where conditionality is important. But in the longer run it may be the internal forces which are the most important ones. The process of conditionality can be a hindrance to socialization and thus be a negative force, especially if some actors of the conflict regard the EU to support the other side of the conflict.

Börzel and Risse (2000) argue that there are two factors which can contribute to a transition of norms, values and identities. The first one is a so called “norm entrepreneur”, which mobilize domestically. The “norm entrepreneur” mobilizes policy makers to make policy changes by increasing the cost of certain strategies, but they also try to redefine the interests and identities of the involved actors. Secondly there can be consensus-oriented institutions that entail collective understandings of appropriate behavior. In that way they can influence domestic actors and the way they behave towards the EU.

### **Security theory and the Copenhagen School**

The debate about security theory has developed quite different in Europe and in the US. While the debate in Europe is vibrant and dynamic with lots of new “schools” and thoughts, the American theoretical framework for security is based mainly on the traditional realist point of view. One of these new “schools” in Europe is the Copenhagen School (CS), which developed as a result of the debates about security during the 1970s and 1980s and as a critique to the narrow concept of security. The approach finds it important to discriminate and separate issues from non-security to be able to have a clear sense of what security really is. Identifying security issues is easy for traditionalists who equate security with military issues and the use of force (Buzan et al. 1998). However, it is more difficult when security is moved out of the military sector. This school argues for a constructivist approach that extends the analysis of international security to culture, economics and the environment, but at the same time incorporates the traditional realist position. They seek to find coherence by exploring the logic of security to find out what differentiates security and the process of securitization from the political process.

The CS is built around three main ideas: 1) securitization, 2) sectors and 3) regional security complexes, but in this chapter I will focus mainly on the securitization idea and on regional security complexes. The reason for this is that these two elements features this school the best, but they are also elements that can explain processes in the Cyprus conflict and the EU relationship.

### *Securitization and desecuritization*

According to (Buzan et al. 1998) security is the move that takes politics beyond the rules of the game and frames the issues as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization, which is dealt with differently by all actors. States can for instance politicize religion (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Burma) while others will securitize culture (former USSR and Iran). This link between politicization and securitization does not imply that securitization always goes through the state. The securitization process is in opposition to the politicization process, because the former will try to make issues appear more open and as a matter of choice. The latter is about making an issue urgent and existential that only can be dealt with by top leaders.

But what is security? The CS theory states that one has to capture the power and functionality in the word. To do this one then has to analyze the linguistic practices in the discourse. The process of securitization is a speech act, and it is the utterance itself that is the act. By labeling something a security issue, it will become one. The definition of securitization is thus the “inter-subjective establishment of an existential threat which will have substantial political effects” (Buzan et al. 1998). Securitization can be studied directly through discourse and political constellations: When does an argument with this particular rhetoric structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed? A discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat is making a securitization move, but it is only securitized if and when the audience accepts it as such (Buzan et al. 1998). Securitization is fulfilled only in the cases when there is an existential threat that legitimizes the breaking of rules. Security is thus about survival. However, it is difficult to sort the degree of importance of the threat, but the definition also makes it possible and easier to address whether or not something has become a real security threat.

As already mentioned, the securitization process can be studied through security discourse. In this analysis we can make a distinction among three types of units: referent objects, securitizing actors and functional actors (Buzan et al. 1998). The referent object is the object that is threatened and has a legitimate claim to survival. Often, this object has been the state or the nation. Size and scale are two important elements that determine

what constitute a successful referent object. Small groups of people or individuals can seldom make a large audience listen and thus establish security legitimacy. In the other end of the scale there are also problems with constructing a security object. There have been attempts to unite all mankind, as a security object for instance towards weapon of mass destruction or environmental threats, but the outcome has not been successful. However, the middle scale (states, nations and civilizations) has proven successful at this aim. The reason for this can be the states or nations quest for rivalries with other limited collectives and thereby strengthen the “we”-feeling.

The securitizing actor is the one who performs the security speech act. It might be a person (political leaders) or a group (bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists or pressure groups). It is difficult to label something as “actor” since it is problematic to say who or what acts, and finding the actor is more difficult than finding the referent object. The challenge is to not disaggregate it down to individuals, because much of social life is understandable when collectivities are seen as more than the sum of their members (methodological collectivism) (Buzan et al. 1998).

A functional actor is an actor who is affecting the dynamics of a sector. They have much influence and impact on decisions in the security agenda since they are neither the referent object nor the securitizing actor. Another important group in this matter is the audience, which have to be convinced in order for the securitizing move to be successful. This group is often the citizens but it can vary according to the political system and the issue itself.

The main object is to desecuritize the securitized issues. It implies a search for an alternative way to order the political inside (Roe 2004). Security should be seen as something negative and as a failure to dealing with issues in the normal political way. In the traditional view of security, security and insecurity is seen as opposite poles. However, in the CS approach a triad replaces these two poles. The new element is a-security, which is a situation that has been desecuritized or never securitized. Insecurity is on the other hand a situation with a threat and no security against it. In a conflict resolution view, desecuritizing is preferred instead of producing more security.

Wævers position outline three options on how to desecuritize a situation. The first option is to avoid talking about issues related to security in the first place and also



prevent issues from being framed in terms of security. If that is not possible, the second option is to keep the responses in forms that do not generate security dilemmas. The third and final option is to move security issues back into the sphere of normal politics. The first option is perhaps difficult to achieve, since desecuritization is about moving something from security in the first place. The issues, which are already securitized, can either be transformed or managed. In the latter situation the issue will not be entirely normalized but it will be a better climate.

### *Regional security complex theory*

Another important element in this approach is the regional security complex theories. The definition of a security complex is “a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan et al. 1998). The theory assumes that the complexes are a result of the international anarchic structure. A complex is a mini anarchy in the world anarchy with structures their own structures.

International security has changed its pattern after the end of the Cold War. From being dominated by two superpowers, it is now dominated by regionalism. This theory looks mainly at the states in this regional pattern, and at the military and political sectors. Political and military threats travel more easily over short distances, and insecurity is therefore often associated with proximity. Many states fear their neighbors more than they fear states far away. Security within such a complex is more common than security outside one.

A central element in this theory is the insulator position. An insulator is an actor which is located in the border zone between several security complexes and its main task is to separate the different complexes from each other. Kazan (2002) argues that Turkey occupies an insulator position between three regional security complexes: The post Soviet complex, the European complex and the Middle East complex. Being in such an insulator position is not easy because they have to absorb the different security dynamics that surrounds it. The insulator can risk a collapse which can mean an end of its political entity. This can again trigger an active policy to encounter security risks and avoid isolation.

The Turkish case shows us this difficulty. Turkey's strategic position as an insulator can have several consequences. Either Turkey can isolate itself from the European cooperation, or it can leave its position as an insulator. This last option can cause danger because the border structure will change. The more likely scenario is, however, neither of these, because of the present Turkish desire for EU membership and cooperation (Kazan 2002)

## **Summary**

To frame this thesis about the EU and the Cyprus conflict, I have chosen theories concerning integration, Europeanization and security. There are many sub-theories in all the theories, but it is important to choose the theories that can explain the process or case in the best way. Different approaches can explain different sides about integration; Europeanization or security and they are not supposed to explain all aspects.

The integration theories I have chosen to use here are neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and constructivism. The two first theories are under the theory umbrella of rationalism. This contrasts to the constructive approach. I find it important to examine several approaches here because all the theories and approaches are focusing on different sides and processes of the EU and its integration. By only using one theory, one will end up with a narrow frame that is not able to explain various sides and effects.

Theories about integration is important because it helps us to explain processes and outcomes of integration, which again can lead to better understanding of the current set of institutions, but it can also help us understand what will happen in the future. It is also argued previously that "pure" empirical knowledge is of little use in social science. This is because all empirical representations are filled with particular feelings, qualities or ideas, and that this "facts" will only provide us with a superficial understanding of a phenomenon or a process.

I also find it important to examine theories of Europeanization. Contrasting to the integration theories, these theories have a top-down view and looks at the effects of the integration. In my case, it will be useful to see how the EU has played a role in the conflict and what effect it might have had. In conflict zones, the EU can play a role both

through conditionality, but also through social learning. The EU can also play the role as a third party who mediates in a conflict. This last element will be important in the present analysis.

Security is a red line through this chapter, because security is a major issue in the Cyprus conflict. The traditional realist perspective of security is not enough to explain the case of Cyprus, which is the reason for focusing on the Copenhagen School and their mixture of realist and constructivist thoughts. Both securitization and regional security complexes are important elements to better understand the conflict itself, but also the Turkish position.



## **4. History and background**

### **Introduction**

The history of Cyprus is not easy to tell. Nevertheless, it is an exciting and engaging history. To understand the case as it rests today, it is important to know the history well, both that of Cyprus, but also that of Turkey and Greece. It is a history with many different voices and views, and one will get different stories if asking a Turkish Cypriot, a Greek Cypriot, a Greek or a Turkish person. However, this chapter will try to reveal the most important moments, events and processes so we can better understand the situation today.

This chapter will start with the Ottoman Empire era and end when the EU membership application was a fact in 1990. Chapter 5 will continue the history from 1990 and onwards.

### **From the Ottoman Empire to the Colony era**

Cyprus is located with an important geostrategic position in the Mediterranean Sea close to both the Middle East, Europe and Africa. Cyprus has in the past been part of both the Roman empire and the Byzants before it in 1573 became a part of the Ottoman Empire. This explains why Cyprus today consists of both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. However, during history, the majority of the population on Cyprus was of Greek origin (Stivachtis 2000). In the eyes of Greeks and Greek Cypriots, Cyprus has been a Greek island from 1500 BC and has since then remained the centre of Greek culture, however with some special characteristics (Diez 2000).

The island came under British administration in 1878 as a strategic choice from The Ottoman Empire after its loss in the war against Russia in 1877-78. If Russia were to attack Europe through the Dardanells they would also attack directly on British interests. When World War One started, the Ottomans joined the Central powers and Britain annexed Cyprus, something which the Ottoman government did not recognize. Britain offered the island to Greece, but Greece had already then decided to be neutral in the war. Atatürk became the leader of the new Turkish republic after the war, and accepted the

annexation of Cyprus to Britain. The island became a British crown colony in 1925 (Volkan and Itzkowitz 1994).

The British rulers played a rather hard game of “split and rule”, and the opposition grew increasingly during the 1940s and the 1950s. In 1955 the Greek Cypriot Guerrilla started several attacks against the colonists, which marked the beginning of the end of the British rule. The guerrilla, named EOKA<sup>2</sup>, wanted independence from Britain, and union (*enosis* in Greek) with Greece (Demetriou 2004a, Stivachtis 2000, Tocci and Kovziridze 2004). The Turkish Cypriots also formed their own underground political organization, called Volkan, which cooperated with the Turkish Resistance Organization (Volkan and Itzkowitz 1994). This events made the hostility and mistrust between the two communities even bigger, and Britain did not succeed in keeping Cyprus under its sovereignty.

### **The Constitution, the Cold War context and difficult political environment**

The constant failures of all parties involved to end the conflict led to the Conferencens in London and Zurich where the Constitution agreement was signed. The Constitution made in 1959 and 1960 was a unique Constitution in the sense that it tried to make a balance between the Greek wish for *enosis* (union with Greece and Cyprus) and the Turkish wish for *taksim* (division of the island). To preserve the Constitution and prevent it from *enosis* and *taksim*, Britain, Greece and Turkey got garantour power, which made them able to intervene and they got “...the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affaris established by the Treaty.” (article 4) (Tocci and Kovziridze 2004, 4) The Turkish Cypriot side got more power in the new state than the demographic proportion would say (30% instead of 18%). Neither of the two communities were allowed to make contact with their motherland which could lead to secession. The new government consisted of a Greek Cypriot president, but the vice president should always be a Turkish Cypriot, both with veto power. The two communities therefore always had to agree on any issue. The Parliament consisted of 50 seats, where Greek Cypriots had 35 and Turkish Cypriots had 15. This meant that the Turkish side needed 12 votes to veto even though

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<sup>2</sup> Ethniki Organosis Kyrion Agoniston: The national Organization of Cypriot Fighters

the remaining 42 votes were in majority. Demetriou (2004a) argues that the Constitution made the ethnic identity as major determinants of civic and political practice, and that the conflicts to come was spin offs of this identity conflict. The new state was a compromise which resulted in a new territorial state, but not a nation in the sense that one was still either a Greek or a Turk (Volkan and Itzkowitz 1994). It was a political compromise based on *realpolitik* or realist thinking. This resulted in a treaty which ratified the existing distribution of power rather than solutions that would change that distribution in the direction of greater justice. The treaty was, according to (Volkan and Itzkowitz 1994) not an idealist seeking to rectify injustices.

This close cooperation proved to be a hard task, and the years from 1960 to 1963 were years with conflict and mistrust, not only because of the internal politics, but also because of patronage from the motherlands. The Greek Cypriots were from the early start angry with the Turkish Cypriots for using the office power to pave way for more Turkish influence. However, the main issue was the power sharing. The Greek Cypriots wanted a strong central government, while the opposite side wanted more power to the local municipalities. This mistrust led to a Constitutional crisis in 1963, when Archbishop Makarios decided to revise the Constitution by introducing Constitutional amendments. He justified his decision by the fact that it was impossible to run the country in the present situation, where both sides actively used their veto against the other (Stivachtis 2000). Other factors which also played a part were the lack of experience in self-government, conflicting ethno-political goals, mistrust and a shared sense of insecurity (Joseph 2001). There were several judicial problems with Makarios' action. This was a decision made by Makarios alone, without consulting the interested parties or the Turkish Cypriot Vice President. Stivachtis (2000) argues that Makarios should have consulted the guarantor powers, at least then it would not have been a unilateral decision. However, it has been indications that Makarios' wish was *enosis*. This can be explained with his words: "*Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus was Greek from the dawn of history and will remain Greek. Greek and undivided we have taken it over. Greek and undivided we shall preserve it. Greek and undivided we shall deliver it to Greece*" (Stivachtis 2000, 5). The Turkish Cypriot MPs found this unacceptable and redrew from their seats in Parliament. This further ignited the conflict, which became violent in December 1963 (Demetriou

2004a). The amendments of 1963 introduced a majority- minority divide between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. It is from this “new” Constitution, Greek Cypriots have tried to solve the Cyprus conflict.

This period in history is dominated by Cold War politics and the power struggle between USA and the Soviet Union. The US and NATO were sceptic about Makarios tight relationship with the Soviet Union and Nassers Egypt which again was related it to Cuba. When violations and crisis escalated in 1963, USA therefore wanted NATO forces to intervene in Cyprus to defend the West against the Communist East. It was important for President Makarios to keep Cyprus outside this conflict and he refused to let NATO forces into the island.

### **UN intervention**

The UN intervened in 1964 because of the violence, and this action marks an important point in the history of Cyprus (interview, Turkish Cypriot political researcher, 2004). At this point the government had collapsed and the Turkish Cypriots were already moving into enclaves for reason of self defence. The UN felt at that time that the Greek Cypriots were the remaining rulers of the government and therefore asked them for permission to send troops to the island, even though the government at that time was not the *de jure* government. This *de facto* acceptance of the purely Greek Cypriot government as the representative of the Cyprus government has carried on until today. This is also the point where troubles started seriously for the Turkish Cypriots (personal interview, november 2004). The Greek Cypriots continued to run the Government as before without the Turkish Cypriots and the administration of Turkish Cypriots affairs were now dealt with by the representatives in the enclaves. The UN Security Council Resolution 186 provided for the stationing of a UN Peace keeping Force (UNFICYP) and UN lead mediation efforts (Zahedi 2001). However, this force was too small to make peace and order on the island. Greece also decided to send troops to the island, in fear of an Turkish invasion. UNFICYP consisted of 7000 soldiers and policemen and the mandate was originally for three months. This mandate was extended every sixth month and is still present on the island today. It remains the longest lasting peace keeping operation in the UN history.



## **Political situation in Greece**

The political situation prior to 1967 was unstable and there were many demonstrations, strikes and riots during those years. The civilian government seemed incapable to control the situation, and the military made a coup on 21<sup>st</sup> of April 1967. They were called the *Colonels* and they justified their coup with a growing fear of communist take-over. There was, however, no strong-hold in these claims, as the *Colonels* themselves admitted later. The real motive for the coup was the fear of a new “Centre Union”- government in the May election. If they were to win, many of the high ranking and right wing officers could expect retirement (Clogg 1979). The leader of the coup was a greek intelligence officer, named George Papadopoulos. The regime was a totalitarian regime, where Papadopoulos appointed himself as Prime Minister, removed the parliament and refused to have free elections. However, the regime met little opposition at the time of the coup, and most Greeks were not affected much negatively. The economy grew quickly and decisions were taken efficiently without a huge bureaucracy and parliament.

The ruling junta wanted to solve the Cyprus conflict by incorporate Cyprus into Greece, with assistance from the US. They were displeased with the way Makarios ruled the country and tried several times to remove him from his position. They infiltrated the national guard in Cyprus, and on the 15<sup>th</sup> of July in 1974 the Greek terrorist organization, EOKA-B, gave green light to remove Makarios through a coup. Makarios himself, condemned this action and stated that the Colonel regime was seeking to destroy the state of Cyprus. He escaped from the island, and a former EOKA gunman, Nikos Samson, was replaced as president (Clogg 1979).

Greece was expelled from The Council of Europe and blocked from joining the EEC, therefore they had to rely on means and support from the US (Clogg 1979, Hitchens 2001). The Pentagon was anxious to maintain good relationship with Greece to maintain their strategic important bases, especially concerning the Arab- Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 and the increasing naval presence of Soviet in the Mediterranean (Clogg 1979).

The *Colonel* regime showed itself incapable to deal with the growing problems which confronted Greece. The oil crises which followed the Yom Kippur war in 1973 was severely affecting Greece, since they had little indigenous sources of energy. The

inflation continued unchecked and they punished dissidents even harder than before (Clogg 1979). The lack of political expertise and refusal to restore democracy led to the *Colonels* downfall in 1974. Papadopoulos was replaced with the new Prime Minister, Konstantinos Karamanlis, who had been in French exile in eleven years (Clogg 1992).

### **The Turkish invasion**

The Turkish military had much power in Turkey and also supporting gangster organization in Cyprus. The Turkish and Turkish Cypriot Governments were frightened of what could happen if the Greek junta got too much power, and feared the same destiny as Crete some years earlier (*enosis* with Greece). As guarantor power they had the right to intervene if they thought the Turkish Cypriot rights were, or were to become, violated. When the coup against Makarios occurred the Turkish Cypriots and Ankara feared for civilian lives and five days after the Greek coup they intervened in Cyprus. The Turkish army took control over a narrow, ten mile strip around the city of Kyrenia, but attacked a second time after failed negotiations. This time they took control over 37% of the island (Tocci and Kovziridze 2004). The line which separated the two communities has become known as the “green line”. According to Hitchens (1997) an important reason for Turkey's invasion is the influence of the great powers and their interest in Cyprus. He especially highlights US Secretary of State Kissinger as having great influence by signaling to Ankara that he did not disapprove of Turkey's actions.

The north and south have quite different memories and thoughts about the 1974 invasions, a fact that the official statements from the respective Foreign Affairs departments show us. The Turkish Cypriots asked all the guarantor powers for help, but Turkey was the only one who responded. Turkey sent troops in order to save the lives of the Turkish Cypriots and mention it as a peace operation<sup>3</sup>. They also view the failed negotiations in the time between the two interventions as a Greek Cypriot fault, and thus had to intervene the second time to end the sufferings of the Turkish Cypriot people. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriots viewed this invasion as a long time yearned action from Turkey. They had feared an invasion for over a decade and refused the legality in

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<sup>3</sup> Homepage of the TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs:  
<http://www.trncpio.org/ingilizce/DOSYALAR/HISTORICAL%20BACKGROUND.htm>

the action from Turkey. They saw the invasion as a violation on all rules of international legality, including the UN charter<sup>4</sup>.

Despite all the reasons for the attack, the Turkish side had *de facto* control over a huge area of the island. It comprised 75% of the coastline, 70% of the economic area with 50% of its industrial enterprises, 60% of natural resources, 65% of the total cultivated land and 73% of the tourist infrastructure (Tocci and Kovziridze 2004). As a natural consequence of this, many people of both origins were displaced. The figures are quite roughly, but are approximately 140 -160 000 Greek Cypriots from the north and 60 000 Turkish Cypriots from the south. Both areas were almost entirely ethnically cleansed (Tocci and Kovziridze 2004).

Between the first and second Turkish attacks, the Greek *Colonel-* junta collapsed and the Greek Cypriot government was restored. Archbishop Makarios came back from exile and ruled the country until he died in 1977. From this point, both Greece and the Greek Cypriot side began to thrive economically. The success in the southern part of Cyprus was due to the international recognition of their state, Republic of Cyprus (RoC). The economy was based on trade and investments, especially light manufacturing goods, tourism and offshore financial services (Tocci and Kovziridze 2004). On the other hand, the economy of the north was stagnating. All countries except Turkey condemned the invasion and boycotted any form of trade or cooperation with the north. The result was a low economic development with mainly subsistence farming. The north did (and does) have a huge potential for tourism, but the lack of air links from other places than Turkey makes tourism difficult.

It is important that one is careful with making general judgements in this case. It was not all Greek Cypriots who believed that the extermination of Turkish Cypriots and enosis with Greece was a good thing. Actually, quite few had such extreme thoughts (Stivachtis 2000). It is also important to bear in mind that the coup in 1974 did not aim only against the Turkish Cypriots, but also against the democratic republic of the south (RoC). One can also discuss whether the Turkish invasion was actually in accordance to the two Constitutional Treaties.

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<sup>4</sup> Homepage of the Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs:  
<http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa.nsf/CQHistoricalReview?OpenForm>

## **The political situation in Turkey**

To better understand the Turkish position in this event, it is important to include some characteristics about the Turkish domestic and foreign politics during the 1970s and 1980s. One reason for this is the tight relationship between north-Cyprus and Turkey, but also the resemblance between politics in northern Cyprus and Turkey. Two elements are important here: Kemalism and the power of the military. Kemalism is the key principle in Turkish as well as in north-Cyprus politics. It evolves around six principles made by Mustafa Kemal (later called Atatürk which means “the father of the Turks”) (Lange 1998). He was the state leader of the new Turkish state after the Ottoman Empire fall after the first World War, to his death in 1938. The importance of the different principles has changed over time, but they are all part of the Turkish Constitution. The first one (and perhaps the most significant today) is the principle of *laiklik*, which means separation of state and religion. The state is to be in control over the religion, in other words the superior part. The second principle is nationalism (*milliyetçilik*), which for the Turks means absolute sovereignty and independence. The third one is that of republicanism (*cumhuriyetçilik*). The state must always remain republican, and never again attend to monarchy. The fourth principle is closely linked to republicanism, and is called populism (*halkçılık*). The revolution and the change towards the west could only be done by support of the great majority of the people. *Inkilapçılık* is the fifth principle and can best be translated with revolutionism, but not in the most known way. It means unconditional faithfulness to Kemalism and the modernisation process. The last one, etatism (or *devletçilik*), describes the importance of state controlled economy, at least for the most important bricks in the economy (Lange 1998, Volkan and Itzkowitz 1994). Lange (1998) states that it might be added a seventh principle to this list, that is the one of the military and their power.

The Turkish military sees itself as the preserver of the secular state and of Atatürk's principles. Since the birth of the new state, the military has intervened into government policy and successfully organized coups three times, in 1960, 1971 and 1980. There has also been several other coup attempts and -plans. The national security council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK) is dominated by generals, and the council's mandate is to decide national security politics and also to execute them. Ironically, this institution and

its lack of democracy undermine the democratisation and preservation of civil rights that the military want to promote<sup>5</sup>. A reduction of the councils power would mean a fundamental breach with the Kemalist way of thinking. A description of the political situation in Turkey is made by the left wing politician Ali Bayramoglu: “ *The military has the power to act, but no responsibility. The civil government has no power, but has all responsibility*” (Lange 1998, 25). The military has a belief that they have the right to act against the government to preserve the citizens rights and well being. They also in a great extent feel superior to the “ordinary dying people”, a thought which is difficult for outsiders to comprehend. Despite all this; the military is both popular and accepted in Turkey. People trust the military more than they trust other political and judicial institutions (Lange 1998).

Another reason why the military is so popular is the situation of the political parties. As already mentioned the political parties have little trust amongs the majority of the people and much of the reason for this is the lack of results. Working with party politics in Turkey is quite another way of doing politics than in Western Europe. Lange (1998) see this lack of action as a result of two processes. The party leaders has two major challenges, whereas the first one is the expectation that the parties produce political programmes and plans that they can use both in position and opposition. Secondly, the parties and party leaders are met by a demand of clientilism which is in greater extent than in other European parties (Lange 1998). This results in a situation where people who support a person or a party want a “treat back” for their support (for instance a job). The politicians has to spend much time dealing with these “clients” and their expectations, which leads to lack of time for other actions. Many people feel that the parties are unable to solve the serious problems, which again leads to a lack of legitimation of the politicians. In addition, the parties themselves lack democracy. The people in Turkey are more prone to devote itself to a powerful leader than in western Europe (Lange 1998).

Many of these elements can be transferred to northern Cyprus. Both Kemalism and the military are central elements in northern- Cyprus political life, even though Turkish influence and military power has been limited during the last years.

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<sup>5</sup> Europaprogrammets homepage for ”Fokus Europa”. ”Tyrkia utenfor EU”. Nr 3 1998.  
<http://www.europaprogrammet.no/index.php?struct=100&join=340>

## **The Aegian conflict**

The relationship between Greece and Turkey has for many years been a tense relationship. The border between Greece and Turkey is a source for many conflicts since the conquest of the Ottoman Empire, but also after its fall. The old borders of the Ottoman empire were drastically changed after World War One, and Turkey has because of this a rather tense relationship 360 degree around its country. The Aegian conflicts have several elements<sup>6</sup>, where the first one is the Greek demand for the Aegian islands own territorial water, which will result in the whole area as domestic Greek water. Turkey has threatened Greece with war if they increase the territorial zone from six to twelve nautical miles. Greece also demands air- space of ten nautical miles above their islands. Turkey does not accept this demand and has often sent air planes into the zones. There are also conflicting views about military posts on some islands in the east Aegean sea, which the Turks see as a breach of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. Greece wants to solve these problems through the international court of justice in Haag, but Turkey on the other hand wants to solve it bilaterally. In addition to these Aegian problems, there are issues dealing with Turkish minorities in West Trakia in Eastern Greece<sup>7</sup>. The deep rooted sceptical Greek approach towards Turkey is much due to the long Ottoman conquest of Greece which lasted for four hundred years. There are powerful forces in both Greece and Turkey who resist reconseliation and peace between the two countries.

## **Cyprus- EEC/EC relations before 1990**

The relationship between the Republic of Cyprus and the EU dates back to the early 1970s. The Association Agreement between Cyprus and the EEC from 1972 provided for the gradual elimination of trade obstacles for industrial and agricultural products between Cyprus and the EEC. The early signs of interest were a result of the British application for EEC membership. Cyprus was dependent on exports to Britain and the prospect of loosing the Commonwealth tariff rate made the RoC government to seek arrangements

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<sup>6</sup> Europaprogrammets hjemmeside for "Fokus Europa". "Tilnærming mellom erkefiendene". Nr 4 2000. <http://www.europaprogrammet.no/index.php?struct=91&join=236>

<sup>7</sup> Europaprogrammets hjemmeside for "Fokus Europa". "Tilnærming mellom erkefiendene". Nr 4 2000. <http://www.europaprogrammet.no/index.php?struct=91&join=236>

with the EEC. The agreement with EEC provided for the gradual removal of trade obstacles for industrial and agricultural products between Cyprus and EEC. The plan was to enter a customs union after going through two phases. The first phase would be completed in 1977 and the second phase in 1982. Because of the Turkish invasion this plan was delayed and the second phase ended in 1987, with the plan for the establishment of the customs union by the year 2002 (Joseph 2003). Ever since this point, the EC/EU-Cyprus negotiations have been conducted by the Greek Cypriot Government as the sole actor. After the Turkish invasion in 1974, the EC played only a side-role in the Cyprus question. There were, however, three important developments in this time period: Greece entered the EC in 1981, Turkey applied for EC membership in 1987 and Northern Cyprus proclaimed its own state in 1983.

The Turkish Cypriot unilateral proclamation of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC) in 1983 marked a change in EC relations with the parties in the conflict. Prior to this point, the EC had stressed that the relationship with Cyprus was to benefit both communities. The EC accepted, for instance, exports of fruits and agricultural products from the north as long as they had been certificated by the Chamber of Commerce in the north. This was perhaps one of the reasons why neither Turkey nor Northern Cyprus criticised the tight RoC- EC relationship. Turkey had also signed an association agreement with the EC. The EC also established a policy that they were to avoid involvement in the political and Constitutional problems on the island. They wanted to isolate the integration process from the political development in relation to the Cyprus problem (Hatay 2001). However, after 1983 the EC joined in the international condemnation and boycott of TRNC. All goods which were to leave the island were now bound to go through the RoC for legal documentation and exported through legal ports in the south. As a result of the international condemnation, the EC-TRNC relationship became difficult and almost non-existing. Turkey was, and still is, the only country which legitimizes TRNC. This fact made TRNC heavily dependent on Turkey for export and import. The unilateral declaration of independence made also the relationship with UN difficult

## **Peace attempts after 1974**

Since the UN intervened in 1964, they have been the chief peace negotiator in Cyprus. It is a history of little success and many failures. In 1975, shortly after the invasion, the UN Security Council launched a plan for a solution based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation (resolution 367). This resolution was the basis for the 1977 and 1979 high level agreements between Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktash and Archbishop Makarios and the later Greek Cypriot President Spyros Kyprianou. The first high level agreement of 1977 stated four main principles (Tocci and Kovziridze 2004). First the federation would be independent and bi-communal, secondly the territorial readjustments would take into account the economic viability of the entities involved and communal land ownership. The third principle was that provisions on movement, settlement and property (the so called “three freedoms”) were to be included in the agreement. At last, the federal government would ensure the unity of the country. The 1979 high level agreement included ten more points. The result of this compromise was not successful.

UN has later tried to mediate and make a framework for new negotiations. The UN Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar, formed the “Draft Framework Agreement” in 1984. The framework addressed the most important issues, such as federalism, independence, bicomunality and bizonality which would both unite and separate the two communities with the right balance. The Turkish Cypriot leader, Denktash, accepted the framework, but the Greek Cypriot President, Kyprianou, did not. This was because he did not believe the document addressed the “three freedoms” (movement, settlement and property) in the best way (Zahedi 2001). The refusal of the framework was followed by years of stagnation.

The *Ghali set of ideas* was the next attempt to solve the conflict. It stated that the republic was to become bi-communal concerning the Constitutional aspects and bi-zonal regarding the territorial aspects (Brewin 2000). It was important that both communities contributed in all organs and decisions, and the two states would have equal power and functions. The Turkish side, however, was asked to reduce their territory to 26% of the island and giving the cities of Famagusta and Morphou to the Greek side. The two leaders on the island had different views about the relationship with EEC. The Greek Cypriot President, Vassiliou, wanted to have separate elections about EEC membership but was



open to whether or not the elections was to be held parallel with the framework elections. President Denktash, on the other hand, was reluctant to join the EEC until Turkey was a member too. The chances to agree was even more limited with the presidential election in RoC in 1993. Mr Clerides won the election and stated that “The UN Set of Ideas would block Cyprus course towards Europe.” (Brewin 2000). The stagnation in the negotiations lasted until 1997 when UN secretary general Kofi Annan launched his “Annan Plan”. The recent UN led peace negotiations and the “Annan Plan” will be examined more in chapter 5.

## **Summary**

This chapter contains some snapshots from history. However, telling history also mean that important events or facts can be left out, something which is always the weakness of telling history. When looking at a conflict as it rests today, it is nevertheless important to look back at the reasons for these events. This chapter starts with the era long time ago when both Ottomans and Venetians ruled the island, which has resulted in the two communities today. The two communities were brought together after British rule in 1960 and given a Constitution which soon proved worthless. They were again separated after failed cooperation efforts and the Greek Cypriots kept control of the *de jure* government. This government also allowed the UN to intervene in 1964. The coup in Greece in 1967 resulted in Turkish protection for the Turkish Cypriot minority, which again resulted in the 1974- invasion. The two communities have been separated by the Green Line since then and the Republic of Cyprus has all along been the sole legitimate government in the eyes of the whole world except Turkey. Several peace efforts, mainly driven by the UN, have not led to success and the northern side remains isolated and condemned by the international community for its unilateral declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

These events are crucial to know and understand when reading the next chapter, which deals with continuity of many of the mentioned events and processes.



## **5. EU influence on the Cyprus conflict**

### **Introduction**

The European Union has contributed much to the peaceful environment we find in Europe today. It has frequently used its capabilities as a framework and as a third party actor in conflicts both within, but also at the borders in Europe. There are, however, also examples where the EU has not been the active player many wanted it to be, where its use of conditionality has not been enough and conflicts have not been solved. Cyprus is such a case. In this chapter I will try to reveal how the EU has influenced different actors in the conflict and also find reasons and explanations for this influence.

The EU had little impact on the conflict before 1972, when RoC became an associate member. However, the promising positive catalytic effect was brought to the fore after the EU application in 1990. The EU framework was also actively used in the UN mediation efforts in the late 1990s, and I will later show how the UN used this framework in its search for peace on the island. The most important actors in this conflict are by no doubt the Cypriots themselves and further on the chapter will show the EU impact on these players as well as their homelands, Greece and Turkey.

### **International context**

#### **The UN perspective on the Cyprus conflict**

##### *The Annan Plan*

Until the 1990s, the UN mediation efforts had led to failure and all the plans proposed in the previous years did not lead to success. It almost looked like the UN was “a part of the problem” instead of a problem-solver. However, with the new Secretary General, Kofi Annan (since 1997), hope was made for solution and peace. The Turkish Cypriot leadership rejected any direct negotiations until November 2002, when Mr. Annan proposed a new plan that the parties were to discuss upon, the so called “Annan Plan”. This new plan was inviting the whole island to join the EU, and the plan was to reach an agreement by or at the Copenhagen Council in December 2002 (Tocci 2003).

The new plan was more adequate and complex than any other previous plan, and consisted of 10 000 pages. It was to fulfill the basic needs of both communities and the three guarantor powers. The plan thoroughly tackled difficult issues such as property, political- and economic harmonization, territory adjustments and power sharing of the new government (Alexiouet al. 2003). It proposed a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus conflict, based on a bizonal and a bicomunal federation. The new United Cyprus Republic would be an independent state with a federal government and two equal states with their own parliaments. It resembled both the Belgian and the Swiss federal state model (Tocci 2003). The federal level were to take care of foreign policy and the relationship with the EU, the central bank, fiscal policy, aviation, communication, citizenship and the natural resources like water. Moreover, tourism, environment policy, health policy, agriculture, fisheries and industry were among the tasks that the two states would take care of more separately. The two states should, however, consult each other on most matters. There would also be territorial adjustments, which would reduce the TRNC zone to 28.5 percent. About 90 000 Greek Cypriot refugees would return to their old properties, and the rest would be quota restricted (Tocci 2003). The Annan plan had a huge impact for property issues for the Turkish Cypriots. Some benefited on the plan and others would be in limbo and suffer both economically, psychologically and socially. 55 percent of all refugees were going to come back to their property, and the others would get almost all their property back (interview, Turkish Cypriot researcher 2004). Further, the troops on both sides would be reduced to 6000 over a certain time period and reduced to zero after the Turkish accession to the EU (Alexiouet al. 2003). The plan includes mechanisms to prevent the Greek Cypriots from buying too much land in the north, but also preventing the Anatolian Turks from settling on the island as today, and thereby changing the demography.

The plan was perceived differently by different actors and the negative elements in the plan were voiced, especially by the Greek Cypriots toward the referendums. The reasons for this will be clarified later on in the chapter.

#### *EU framework within the Annan Plan*

The Annan Plan tried to make a settlement within the EU more appealing to the skeptical Turkish Cypriots by utilizing the so called Belgian model. The Belgian model is based on

the consensus principle were each entity can use its right to veto and thus block a coordination process (Tocci 2003). The plan states that

*“Cyprus shall be represented in the EU by the common state government in its areas of competence or where a matter concerns an area of its competence. Where a matter falls predominantly or exclusively into an area of competence of the constituent states, Cyprus may be represented either by a common state or a constituent state representative, provided the latter is able to commit Cyprus”<sup>8</sup>.*

This added considerable substance to the definition of political equality, which has been the basic need for the Turkish Cypriots. It further promised that the implementation of the *acquis* would not be an obstacle to find a solution. There were, however, some exemptions in the plan to allay the Turkish Cypriots. The three freedoms (movement, settlement and property acquisition) were to be implemented, but there would be restrictions on the two latter ones during a certain time period. In addition to this the Turkish Cypriot state would adopt temporary economic “safeguard measures”, if the EU internal market laws threatened the economic development there (Tocci 2003).

The EU played a rather passive role in the bi-communal negotiations. It had seen itself, during the whole period, as having neither the duty nor the personnel to impose a settlement. The EU regarded the conflict as a matter to be settled between the two parties with help from the UN (Brewin 2000). However, the EU contributed much to the plan by utilizing the EU framework as a win-win proposal. Within this framework, the Greek Cypriot security concern would also be addressed.

There has also been argued that the process of the EU and that of the UN were two processes which were going in different directions and also in contradiction to each other. *“One was trying to put the problem right and the other was pretending there was no problem”* (interview, Turkish Cypriot political researcher, 2004). After the Helsinki Summit in 1999, when Turkey was given candidate status, these two processes were finally converging, but *“it did not work out because one side was already there without any preconditions”* (Interview, Turkish Cypriot political researcher, 2004). Another criticism against the EU membership clause in the Annan Plan was linked to the Greek

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<sup>8</sup> The Annan plan, fifth version: <http://www.cyprus-un-plan.org>

Cypriot opinion. They were not opening their arms to the Annan plan, in fact, they were quite resistant to it, according to a 2002 poll where 64 percent were against the plan (Tocci 2004). The reasons for this skepticism which further led to the massive “no” vote in the 2004- referendums will be dealt with later on.

### *Negotiations and referendums*

While the access negotiations between the EU and RoC went on with rapid progress, the conflict settlement efforts moved slowly. Because much of the substance in the Annan Plan was based on the accession of a united Cyprus into the EU, it was important that the settlement would be clear before the signing of the Accession Treaty. UN revised the plan several times and there were total 5 different versions of the plan. The latest one was finished in 2002 and also the one that the Cypriot on both sides voted on in the referendums in 2004.

Much of the reason for this slow progress was the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot rejection to join the negotiations from 1997 until 2002. The Turkish Cypriots protested to the EU decision to start access negotiations to only the southern part, and almost instantly made an agreement with Turkey about further integration. The UN hoped to restart negotiations in 1998, but was again stopped by the EU accession negotiation. TRNC with president Denktash wanted international recognition and insisted on bilateral talks with the UN and not talks based on intercommunality. TRNC president Denktash joined negotiations in 2002 together with RoC president Clerides, after pressure from Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit. The plan required referendums in April 2003, something which never happened. During The Hague meeting in March 2003, the Secretary General acknowledged that there was no successful negotiation and that the referendums had to be postponed.

The final version of the plan, the fifth version, was a result of negotiation in Burgenstock in Switzerland in March 2004 between the Cypriot President Papadopoulos, TRNC Prime Minister Talat, the Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan. The UN Secretary General, US Secretary of State, Powell, and Verheugen who was the enlargement Commissioner, all followed the negotiations closely. The Secretary General was to fill inn the gaps at the end if there

were points that the two sides could not agree upon. In his speech before the referendums he stated: *“This plan is inevitably a compromise. It does not satisfy everyone’s demands. But I believe it meets the core interests, and addresses the key concerns, of people on both sides.”*<sup>9</sup> These negotiations did not become a complete failure as many previous attempts, but the attending parties were not absolutely satisfied with the result. The reactions of the Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot delegation were quite positive and described it as a “victory”, while the Greek Cypriot side and especially Prime Minister Papadopoulos meant that the last plan was not a fair compromise. They would, with the plan, lose their exclusive rights over the Republic of Cyprus and not represent the island by themselves (Tsoundarou 2004).

The time frame was extremely short for the two sides to digest the plan. From Burgstock to the RoC accession date was only three weeks. The referendums were to be held on 24<sup>th</sup> of April 2004 on both sides, and both sides had to vote “yes” for the plan to become active before the EU accession. If both sides voted positively, there would be an accession of a united Cyprus into the EU. As we know today, the Turkish side voted “yes” (64%), while the Greek Cypriots voted “no” (76%). On the 1<sup>st</sup> of May 2004, only the Greek side joined the EU, while the north is still isolated. This rejection was an enormous defeat to the international community and their hope to finally remove this long-standing problem from the agenda. For the first time since the Turkish invasion in 1974, the Turkish Cypriots were promised that the international isolation would end even though their state would still not be recognized.

## **The EU perspective on Cyprus**

### *Early relations: settlement through conditionality*

As the previous chapter showed, EU-Cyprus relations go back to the early 1970s when the Customs Union was signed. The application for membership was, however, not a fact until 1990, when RoC applied on behalf of the whole island. The wish for applying for membership was voiced from RoC and Greece long before 1990. During the Greek presidency in EC in 1988, Prime Minister Papandreu found it hard to get support for the

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<sup>9</sup> UN homepage: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sgsm9239.doc.htm>

Greek anti-Turkish policies in the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council, and he became thus a strong supporter of Greek Cypriot EU membership application. The political environment in the south was, however, not supporting such a move. The government, with Prime Minister Vassiliou, was dependent on support from the communist AKEL party, which was anti-European. They wanted the government to act within the UN framework and secure inter-communal agreements (Brewin 2000). This caused the two year delay until Mr. Vassiliou sent the application on 4<sup>th</sup> of July 1990. The Commission used three years to make an opinion on the matter, which in this respect is a long time. During the same years, the Commission made their opinion on respectively Sweden, Finland, Austria and Norway. There can be various reasons for this. First of all the member states were reluctant about interfering in the tense relationship between Greece and Turkey, and also with domestic issues in Cyprus. Secondly, many member states felt that the integration of a partly Muslim country would lead to a “clash of civilizations” (Brewin 2000). The member states also had to decide whether or not to accept the unilateral application on behalf of the whole island. However, the opinion of the Commission was positive to the geographic, cultural, economic and political situation in Cyprus, but negative to racial factors. They viewed that a political settlement would only strengthen the vocation that Cyprus belonged to the Community. A settlement would also open the way to restoration of human rights and pluralist democracy. The Opinion stated also that the result of accession to the Community would be “...*increased security and prosperity and that it would help bring the two communities on the island closer together.*” (Commission Opinion on the application by the Republic of Cyprus for membership 1993, 2). The Opinion concluded also that the application was on behalf of the whole island.

During these years, the EU took a rather neutral third party position. It actively supported UN sponsored help for settlement, but were distancing itself from settlement efforts. It saw the possible settlement of the conflict as having positive effects for the enlargement process of the EU.

Two years later, in March 1995, the General Affairs Council concluded that Cyprus was suitable for membership and that access negotiations would start six months



after the end of the Intergovernmental Conference in Amsterdam in October 1997 (Brewin 2000). This event has later been called the “1995 compromise”.

*“1995 compromise”*

The compromise agreed upon during the French presidency in 1995 consisted of two elements. The first one was related to the Greek veto of the Turkish finalization of the Customs Union in 1994. The Union wanted Greece to lift this veto, but was then forced by Greece to set a starting date for accession of RoC *without* a prior settlement (Brewin 2000). This meant that the conditionality on Cyprus was removed. Secondly, Greece also threatened to veto the whole 2004 enlargement, unless Cyprus was part of it. Greece stated that waiting for a settlement would mean a veto right for TRNC leader Rauf Denktash, and the relationship between Turkey and Greece did not get any better because of this compromise. Turkey was still convinced that RoC had no right to negotiate membership accession on behalf of the whole island, while Greece viewed Turkey with suspicion since it had occupied Greek land and did not want to improve the relationship. The French presidency and many other EU states saw the importance of having a good and stable relationship with Turkey, however not as a member in the club. It was important for them that Greece was on their side in achieving this goal, and they also believed that reconciling with Turkey would mean that Turkey could use pressure upon the TRNC leadership and thereby paving the way for settlement (Brewin 2000). However, this hope for reconciliation between the archenemies proved wrong. It was just a compromise were Turkey got the Customs Union and Greece got green light for enlargement for Cyprus. That was all. (Brewin 2000) The General Affairs Council met in February 1995 and discussed the compromise and eventually agreed upon the Greek demand.

After this, the stance of the EU became clearer. At the same time as the EU wanted to keep a safe distance to the conflict itself, it chose to have a close relationship with the RoC. This also meant that the neutral third party position was left for a more active and interested second party position behind the Greek Cypriot administration.

The integration of Cyprus into the EU shows that rational integration theories can be suitable as an explanatory vehicle. Liberal intergovernmentalism theory argue that

states and state leaders are important elements in enlargement and integration and that rational choices made by state leaders push integration forward. Greece took their rational choice (in threatening to veto the enlargement) because they saw it as necessary for their individual national interest and domestic pressure. However, the theory states that this is the main driving force and by saying this marginalizes the integrating power of the Commission, something which is not entirely applicable in this case. The neo-functional integration theory suggests that economy is the driving force of economic and cooperation, and thus perhaps making this theory less applicable in this case. Ethnic conflicts are rather resistant to economic incentives for conflict resolution. “Low politics” like economic politics loses its meaning and the onset of an integration process can be prevented.

#### *The Luxembourg Summit and start of access negotiations*

During the Luxembourg Summit in December 1997, the Council made two decisions. Firstly, they decided to start the access negotiations with RoC, and secondly they decided to stop the Turkish EU membership process.

The access negotiations started on 30<sup>th</sup> of March 1998, the same day as Cyprus joined its first meeting in Brussels. During access negotiations there are two main actors involved. On the one hand there is the Presidency of the Councils of Ministers, which rotates among the member states every six months. They present the negotiating positions which are agreed by the Council and also chair negotiating sessions at the level of ministers of their deputies<sup>10</sup>. The EU *acquis* consist of 31 chapters and each applicant country makes a position on each of the chapters. The applicant state appoints a chief negotiator with a supporting expert team. It is the Commission, or the Directorate General for Enlargement, who proposes the draft negotiating positions. The Parliament is informed all the way about the negotiations and gives its approval to the resulting accession treaties. All member states must ratify the treaties of accession in their own Parliaments or through referendums. The two parties then negotiate about the conditions under which each applicant country will join the EU. The rules and laws of the EU, the *acquis*, which originate from the major treaties (mainly from Rome, Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice), must be accepted by the applicant state. The negotiations are

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<sup>10</sup> European Union homepage: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/index.htm>

mainly about how these rules are adopted and the possible transitional arrangements. The final positions are approved unanimously by the Council and the results are integrated in an accession treaty which again is to be approved by the EP<sup>11</sup>.

The preparations for negotiations were successful and Cyprus was, according to the Commission, the country which posed fewest legal and economic problems to the EU of all the candidate countries. The fact that it was a small and prosperous island actually gave them an advantage. Negotiations focused on the thirty chapters of the *acquis*, and the Commission spent one day on each chapter with each applicant. The area which caused most problems were the issues of institutions, telecommunications and free movement of persons (Brewin 2000). Even though the technical negotiation went well, there was still uncertainty about the whole enlargement process and the Cyprus issue in particular. The member countries argued about whether or not it was lawful and right to exclude the Turkish Cypriots from the negotiation. The absence of the Turkish Cypriots made the whole accession process easier and quicker, and they did not have to consider the ability of the Turkish Cypriots in implementing the *acquis*. Fractions in the Union, mainly driven by France and Germany, wanted to include the Turkish Cypriots to the negotiations. Greece, on the other hand, supported RoC in their wish to exclude TRNC until after the accession had been completed. However, the TRNC did not want to join the access negotiations with the EU because the negotiation team was formed by the RoC.

After the Luxembourg Summit in 1997, the EU appeared more conscious towards the Cyprus conflict. It had prior to this acted on behalf of the enlargement project with little understanding of the effects of their policies. It was not until after this that the EU understood that it could have a major leverage through the catalytic effect on the parties involved in the conflict. However, the EU has refrained to take any direct action in the conflict and rather supported the UN talks.

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<sup>11</sup> European Union homepage: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/index.htm>

### *Helsinki Summit and green light for Turkey*

The Cyprus accession was emerging as a serious headache for the EU, but at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, a glimmer of hope emerged. The EU removed conflict settlement as a condition for the RoC's EU membership, although such a solution prior to accession was highly desirable. This was meant to serve several purposes, but mainly to ensure that the whole enlargement round would happen. With the removal of this clause, it became clear that the EU had no intentions of being a conflict solver in the Cyprus conflict. It has been debated whether this was a mistake or not, but it is sure that the EU could not use strict conditionality on the RoC. During this Summit, Turkey was also recognized as a candidate for membership, with Greece's blessing. This was to ensure the Western orientation, and to improve the reforms in Turkey. Making Turkey less skeptic about Europe would maybe soften its tone over the Cyprus issue. It was also important to eliminate much of the negative thoughts that had spread in Turkey about Europe after the Luxembourg Summit in 1997.

It is difficult to only use rationalist integration theories when explaining why the EU decided to offer full membership to Turkey, because the costs of such a membership would, at least in the short run, exceed the benefits. Neo-functionalism for instance proposes almost the opposite of what has been reality of the integration of Turkey. Neo-functionalism argues that the development of a political community or of political integration between states is a result of economic integration. Economic integration becomes more profound and political spillover occurs almost automatically. However, the relationship with Turkey and the EU did not work this way. From the 1950s to 1989, Europe lived under the threat of communism and Turkey's relationship to Europe became closer in spite of its economic backwardness. Turkey's economic situation improved during the 1980s, but the threat from east disappeared almost at the same time and as a result, Turkey was pushed further into the periphery. As the threat from east disappeared Europe had no longer use of Turkey, and as a result the economic integration became stronger but the political integration became weaker. The social constructivist approach can better explain this enlargement as it did with the Eastern European enlargement in April 2004. Cultural and environmental factors, identity and solidarity are among important issues in a constructivist approach as well as the methodological collectivist

way of thinking. Taking into account the Kemalist “Western” state ideology of Turkey as well as the growing notion of a European identity it would be natural from this point of view to integrate Turkey into the Union.

The negotiations with Cyprus closed successfully in 2002 and at the Copenhagen summit they were promised membership in May 2004, after ratification of the accession treaties in all member countries and in the European Parliament (Zervaktis 2004).

### *The EU as a catalyst for peace*

When the application from RoC was accepted in 1993, many actors within politics and academia thought that the EU would play the role as a positive catalyst for peace and settlement (Diez 2000, Nugent 2003). The Commission report from 2002 stated that “*It is the preference of the European Union that a settlement under UN auspices be reached before Cyprus’s accession, although, in line with the Helsinki European Council conclusions, this is not a pre-condition for Cyprus’s accession*” (Commission 2002, 3).

Diez (2000) argues that there are three different types of catalytic effects which are not mutually exclusive. The first one can be called *carrot catalyst*, and was mostly articulated by the Greeks, the RoC government and EU officials. Here, the Turkish Cypriots would join the EU membership negotiations because they should see the huge benefits, which were mostly economic, that the EU membership would give them. They would benefit from the EU’s structural development programs, the social cohesion funds and the extensive regional assistance network already in place (Antoniou 1999). If TRNC would join the EU together with RoC, they would be able to export their goods to the union without high taxes and also open up a potentially huge tourism industry.

*“EU membership, in the framework of a settlement, will provide the most effective means for the northern part of the island to catch up in terms of economic modernization, growth and development. The economic reforms associated with EU accession will reduce disparities in incomes and in living standards on the island”* (Commission 2002, 4).

There is also a second type of catalyst, called the *stick catalyst* which was mainly used by Greek Cypriots towards Turkey, but also by the EU. They would try to get Turkey work

for a solution on the island and further democratization. If they failed at this task, their wish to integrate with Europe would prove difficult.

*“The Commission recalls that efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem form part of the enhanced political dialogue between the European Union and Turkey. As repeatedly stressed by the European Council, Turkey, together with all parties concerned, has a decisive interest in providing determined support for efforts towards a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. The Commission considers that there are favorable conditions for the two communities to reach a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem before Cyprus’ accession to the EU on 1 May 2004. The absence of a settlement could become a serious obstacle to Turkey’s EU aspirations.” (Commission 2003, 7).*

A third type of catalyst is the *subversion catalyst*. This idea of catalyst is different from the others, because the pressure here was to be put on the Greek Cypriot government. This was to be done by using technical issues of membership negotiations about the implementation of the *acquis* to soften the government vis a vis Turkey and TRNC. These ideas could not be presented as giving in to the TRNCs position. Seeing this from a neo-functionalist perspective, the technical issues such as the four freedoms (movement of goods, persons, services and capital) could be used to demand changes which would make settlement easier. It could encourage the RoC government to move closer to the TRNC government, either to cooperate more or to force TRNC to respond in some ways. It is called subversive, because it is supposed to have more a subversive character than aiming at open pressure (Diez 2002).

#### *The failure of the EU catalyst*

Even though we can say today that the EU failed to use its catalytic effect to make a settlement, it is important to note that the EU-process has brought with it positive effects as well. The Turkish Cypriots has, even though it did not participate in the negotiations, debated the issue in the civil society. After many years of deadlock, the issue of moving closer to the south again was raised. However, to blame the present situation entirely on the Turkish side or the Turkish Cypriot side is a wrong assumption. We also have to look at the catalyst itself, and see if the catalyst rest on wrong assumptions. Diez (2000, Diez 2002) argues that the EU as a catalyst failed due to several reasons. I will mention three

of them here. The first one has to do with the first type of catalyst mentioned here, the *carrot catalyst*. That view was that the economic security would outweigh the societal security, a fact that has proven wrong. This conflict is a conflict where identity matters much and where economic rationality does not have detrimental impact. The Turkish Cypriots view themselves poor, but not even close to other countries in the Middle East which, in their eyes, are poorer. The life is hard, but acceptable thanks to help from Turkey. The Turkish Cypriots feel that the economic security in the EU (through regional and structural funds) is not enough to guarantee the future. EU promised the Turkish Cypriots 260 millions Euro over a three-year period. However, the Turkish government transfers 260 millions to TRNC every year (interview, Turkish Cypriot political adviser). They are afraid of the Greek Cypriots and that they would be the one who benefits from an open north. Because of the trade embargo, the Turkish Cypriots would be unable to compete with their rich neighbors. They are afraid that economic wealth is going to fuel the conflict rather than repair it, since the starting point is unequal. Both the *carrot catalyst* and the *subversion catalyst* are based on a universal economic rationality of the individual, while the dominant feature of the TRNC community is that economic security does not dominate societal or political security. This mismatch makes desecuritization unlikely (Diez 2000). The use of conditionality and the economic carrot can be explained with the rational choice institutionalism theory. The actors will, according to this theory, act rationally and goal oriented and weighing costs and benefits. However, this action did not work in this case, and it would therefore be appropriate to also make use of the constructivist institutionalist approach which focuses more on the role of identity when explaining state actions.

The second problematic assumption with the catalyst is that of fixed identities. All these three catalysts treat the actors involved as given since policy making processes require clearly identifiable actors. This can be problematic especially when the democratic legitimacy is in question (such as most liberation movements). “Who is representing who” can be asked about TRNC during the rule of Denktash. One can ask about the legitimacy of the representatives when the political system has for such a long time been dominated by one person. Was Denktash speaking for the Turkish Cypriots, Turkish settlers or Turks? While representing certain identities, one will marginalize or

exclude others. The border between the identities is contested in the same way as the identity itself, and they are constructed continually. It is through securitization that these borders are manifesting. It is by presenting a group as threatened that the identity of the group is created. The border between the identities will maintain as long as one continues to securitize it.

The third problem with the catalyst approach is its inadequate integration of the international context. The *carrot- and subversion catalyst* ignore the connection of the Cyprus conflict with the security framework of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Greek-Turkish conflict in special. The island of Cyprus is of core interest of Turkey because of its geographic location, and those favoring the *carrot- and subversion catalyst* are ignoring this fact, while the ones supporting the *stick catalyst* are making a too simple picture of the one sided Turkish influence. For those arguing of the stick catalyst, TRNC is a puppet state under Turkey and thus the conflict will only be solved through Turkey. It is also important to bear in mind the relationship between Greece and the Greek Cypriots and also the Greek-Turkish relationship. The securitization on the island is heavily interlinked with the securitization in the wider Mediterranean area, which again of course will only make the desecuritization even harder.

## **The national context**

### **EU influence on the Greek Cypriot and Greek position**

The relationship between the Greek Cypriots and the Greeks has always been close. It has ranged from total dependence and attempted union (enosis) to the present close relationship with the EU as a bridge. There is, however, not unity in these close ties with motherland Greece in RoC. The right wing parties, which have been in position almost always since 1960, celebrate the national holidays of Greece. The left wing in RoC, is on the other hand not so in favor of this close relationship with Greece. They identify more with Pan-Cypriotism and celebrate the October Revolution and 1<sup>st</sup> of May together with their compatriots in the north (Brewin 2000).



### *EU influence on the Greek Cypriot position*

Most Greek Cypriots aim for a settlement in the conflict, but there are great differences in the perception of how this settlement is supposed to be. The Greek Cypriots are in majority on the island, and have therefore considered the Turkish Cypriots as minority and not equal partners to share the power with. They feel that the 1960 Constitution gave the Turkish Cypriots far more power than they were entitled to have. The desire for enosis, however, has diminished through the years. Even though there still are some advocates of enosis left on the island, the official line in recent years has been legitimacy for the sovereign RoC. They nevertheless stress Hellenic culture and history. It is not the Turkish Cypriots who are the great enemy for the Greek Cypriot, but Turkey. There are as already mentioned a great number of Turkish settlers in the north, and they represent fear for the Greek Cypriots (Zahedi 2001). The main incentive for joining the EU was therefore political. Their membership has increased their bargaining position towards TRNC and Turkey and further legitimized their own state and sovereignty.

The governments from 1990 to 2003 have all been positive to the UN mediation efforts, with the Clerides government as perhaps one of the greatest supporters of the Annan Plan. The road towards EU membership has been supported by a wide spectrum of the Greek Cypriots. President Clerides, who represented the “Democratic Rally Party, DESY, got support from both the centre parties as well as the left wing AKEL. However, AKEL and the unions were in the beginning of the 1990s not in favor of the European orientation. They feared the disappearance of their own industries and also remembered the reluctant EU action during the crisis in 1974 (Zervaktis 2004). All the governments from 1990 were in great favor of the European direction. This has mainly been a tool for the Greek Cypriot to strengthen their bargaining position. With an EU membership they would strengthen their position as the only legitimate government on the island and thus further discredit the TRNC (Tocci and Kovziridze 2004). An EU membership could also increase their leverage towards Turkey, which has throughout history been perceived as the greatest enemy. As we see the major incentive for the Greek Cypriot EU application was not economical but rather political. Likewise, the major impact of the EU has also been political. Within the Union, the Greek Cypriots feel secure, both from TRNC and Turkey. This stress on security (regarding both Greek- and Turkish Cypriots) favors the

use of a constructivist institutionalist theory and the constructivist integration theories. The constructivist approach uses a wider concept of security, where the threats that both sides feel are not fixed objectives, but results of social constructs, formed after decades of isolation. The security issues are constantly voiced and the words themselves become a part of the conflict as securitized elements. The rationalist theories and especially the liberal intergovernmentalist theory are not useful in the same way when studying security issues. Liberal intergovernmentalism theory is not concerned with security but focuses more on economic interests.

The political situation changed with the presidential election in February 2003. President Clerides, who was then 83 years old, chose to run for presidency only weeks before the election. He wanted to finish the Annan Plan and make sure that the settlement plans were put to life. The man who won the election was Tassos Papadopoulos, a well known nationalist and hard rival for the Greek Cypriot state (Barkey 2003, Tocci 2003). He accepted, though unwillingly, the Annan Plan in March 2003, but was the driving force of the “no”-campaign during 2004. The EU membership was then secure, and he believed that he could use his membership to make an even better agreement. He believed that the plan was not a fair compromise, that it even encouraged partition and did nothing to promote unity (Tsoungarou 2004). As mentioned earlier, the Greek Cypriots would gain much from a settlement; however, these gains would not be of economic character. Any agreement would mean power-sharing, were the Turkish Cypriots would be a part of the *de jure* and the *de facto* Cypriot government. The most obvious gain would be in terms of territory, since the Annan Plan stated that the southern territory would increase and that many refugees were to return to their old properties. The Greek Cypriots were already skeptical about the settlement plan and could now legitimize their “no” even more because of the President point of view. One can label the President (and his collaborators) as a securitizing actor, because of his constant utterance and search for security.

The EU accession process has also helped to improve democracy in the RoC. It has contributed with a framework where both the use of conditionality and social learning has been and still is important. However, there are critical voices in RoC that claims that their country still is not deeply democratized yet. “*Ethnic conflicts prevent societies from*

*actually becoming fully democratized.*” (Interview from seminar with a Greek Cypriot political research organization, 2004). The media is, for instance, not accommodating real discussions about the conflict, and the children is indoctrinated with nationalistic literature in the education system. The long term effect of Europeanization through social learning can have a positive effect on the democracy in RoC, and promoting greater transparency and openness. It can be criticized that the EU perhaps did not spend enough time and resources on informing and transforming the Greek Cypriot opinion and government. For a long time the EU officials believed that they had to mainly influence and inform the northern side, because of the past, but realized too late the intransigence of the RoC government (Interview, Turkish Cypriot politician, 2004).

As will be shown later, the new rapprochement between Greece and Turkey after 1999, contributed also to a new path for the political elite in RoC. The security threat from east was no longer strong, and the politicians could focus on the other elements concerning the settlement. This security gain is another clear direct impact of their EU membership. It would be small chances of being attacked by Turkey, whom themselves wanted membership.

Since RoC has been the only legitimate actor throughout the EU process, it is evident that the EU has had much more direct impact on the Greek Cypriot side than the Turkish Cypriot side, especially concerning policy and institutional issues. The RoC government has been able to participate in the negotiations and talks and thus formed the direction in their own desired way. The present situation with RoC within the Union makes this fact even clearer, where RoC has much leverage and power inside the EU and is able to veto undesired solutions. The Europeanization process in RoC has also been influenced much by the Europeanization process in Greece which will be dealt with next.

#### *EU influence on the Greek position*

The Greek and the Greek Cypriot relationship and positions are and have always been close. Cyprus has been perceived as a part of the Hellenic world, and thus almost part of Greece. For a long period of time, Greece supported the idea of *enosis* or unification of all Hellenic territory. However, this policy is not followed today. The early Greek line towards Cyprus' EU membership was to reject all form of Turkish Cypriot involvement in the negotiations. If not, it would veto the whole upcoming enlargement round. It would

do the same thing if the application itself was rejected (Demetriou 2004b). As mentioned earlier, the result was a quick, three year period time, before the Commission made its opinion in 1993. Greece was also acting hard in 1995, during the Luxembourg Summit, when it threatened to veto the conclusion of the customs union with Turkey unless Cyprus was given a start date. It would be easier to veto this, than the whole enlargement, since Germany was in favor of the eastern enlargement (Dodd 2002).

Central in the Greek perception of the Cyprus conflict is the long lasting conflict between Greece and Turkey. The Greek position changed dramatically when the Simitis government came into office in 1996. His party, Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), won the election and started the path for even greater integration into the EU. After the EU Helsinki Summit in 1999 a new paradigm of cooperative politics emerged in Greece (Rumelili 2004). There was a realization that unless Greece cooperated and coordinated its politics with the other EU countries, it would never enjoy the political advantages of being a member. Greece would also benefit from Europeanization inside of Turkey, were European values were going to be strengthened. Turkey's geographical location is also an element here. Its location makes it an attractive ally of most of Greece's allies. Greece opened up for a more inclusive policy towards Turkey and opened the door for future Turkish access negotiations. The Greek foreign minister, George Papandreu was one of the leading men for this new rapprochement policy (Tocci 2003). Both Simitis and Papandreu were pragmatic persons who knew that better relations with Turkey were in Greek interests.

After years of crisis, stagnation, macroeconomic imbalance and populist politics, Greece is now emerging as a new state. In the past, Greece had no policy towards Turkey and they rejected all dialogue. This strategy was safe and did not expose them for much danger (Keridis 2001). There is a deep dislike in the Greek mind towards Turkey and Turks, since the Ottoman empire destroyed the Byzantine Empire, which was the repository of Greek civilization (Dodd 2002). Political discourse in Greece has traditionally emphasized Greek rights, rather than their interests. If one are to emphasize ones interests, one have to use arguments and intelligent diplomacy. The relationship with Turkey, therefore, has been based on the references to rights rather than interests,

and thus makes bilateral diplomacy with Turkey almost impossible (Keridis 2001). This new state is also based on a stronger democracy with a more active civil society.

Greece was a strong supporter of the Annan Plan and settlement prior to the referendums (Tocci 2003, Tocci and Kovziridze 2004). Such a solution would be of great help for Turkey in their road toward EU membership. This shift towards cooperative politics in Greece especially favors the reconciliatory forces in RoC.

Stivachtis (2002) argue that Cyprus has a psychological and a symbolic value for Greece. Cyprus is also of strategic importance for Greece since it is located near the sensitive region of the Middle East and the Suez Canal. A country that exercises influence over such an island possesses significant geostrategic value that would allow it to increase its prestige and bargaining power within the international community (Stivachtis 2002). The island is also located near to the Turkish coast, and is therefore a “soft spot” for Turkey if Greece were to install large range weapons on the island.

Rumelili (2004) argue that the process of Europeanization has had a dualistic effect on Greece, where the traditional and the modern sections coexists. In the 1990s, Greece was criticized by the other member states both for the traditional way of doing politics and for a slow growing economy. This slowly Europeanization process has been explained with their culture. According to Rumelili, Greece is suffering from the “underdog culture”, an idea that the West is despising Greece because of its glorious past, which again restrains Greece from aligning its foreign policy with the EU foreign policy. They are therefore in constant search of protection. This lack of speed in the Europeanization process led to a crisis in the late 1990s when it became clear that Greece did not fulfill the conditions to join the monetary union (EMU). The joining in this cooperation became the national goal in Greece and led to large economic reforms, which also included abandoning the costly arms race with Turkey.

### EU influence on the Turkish Cypriot and the Turkish position

There is a significant overlap between the TRNC official and Turkish national positions, as well as a long enduring tradition of mutual understanding and support among them. During the last decades, the national position on Cyprus has been institutionalized in

Turkey as “state policy”, and the majority of the Turkish people have supported former President Denktash and his struggle to defend the national identity of his people.

### *EU influence on the Turkish Cypriot position*

*“The EU is an environment of peace, cooperation and compromise, so in the context of the EU the Cyprus problem could not survive within the EU if Turkey and Cyprus is going to be a member of the EU. Solution is a must.” (Interview, Turkish Cypriot politician, 2004)*

*“The EU is not solving the problem; it is becoming a part of the problem.” (Interview, Turkish Cypriot political researcher, 2004)*

The Turkish Cypriot positions differ much from the Greek Cypriot and Greek position, even though the willingness to reach compromise has increased during the last years. As mentioned earlier, northern Cyprus has lived in isolation for over 40 years and as a result grown close ties to Turkey. The main stance towards RoC during these years has been the demand for equality with the Greek Cypriots and the presence of Turkish troops to preserve this (Brewin 2000). Traditionally, it has been the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey which have been blamed on after failed mediations.

The main Turkish Cypriot position of the application for EU membership in 1990 was negative. The accession process had its strongest negative effects between 1993 and 2001 (Tocci and Kovziridze 2004). Tocci and Kovziridze (2004) argue that this was due to misinformation about EU and was therefore not valued enough. The information that did come was offer for manipulation by those who opposed to a solution. The Greek Cypriots on their side was sure that an EU membership would mean increased security, but it was harder to convince the north about this. Demilitarization would mean that the Greek Cypriot military dominance would be restored. Even though the EU had pointed out several opportunities for minority protection within the EU, the historical experience is difficult to overcome for the Turkish Cypriots. The tendency of the EU to avoid involvement in intra-state conflicts creates the perception of a security threat rather than a guarantee (Christou 2002). Further, it is claimed that both the Commission and the

Council showed little interest in their attitude towards the Turkish Cypriot side (Brewin 2000). As mentioned earlier, the main incentive offered by the Commission was economic ones. However, the carrot had not the intended effect. The incentive was manipulated and labeled as bribe by Turkish Cypriot and Turkish officials (interview, Turkish Cypriot politician, 2004). The decisions in 1995 to start the access negotiations made the relationship between TRNC and Turkey even stronger. The will to act open minded in settlement talks were absent, and the elections in 1998 showed a renewed support for Denktash and his line towards settlement (Dodd 2002). The south was then already doing harmonization work with the EU, something which only further alienated the north (Brewin 2000). The Turkish Cypriots were therefore losing little when they announced that they would breach all contact with the EU in 1997. This was on the official level. On the unofficial level, there were meetings where the Turkish Cypriots tried to encourage the EU to be more balanced in their approach:

*“...we were telling them: listen, if you don’t approach this issue in a more balanced manner, the Greek Cypriots may surprise you. Although you think that the obstacle is the Turkish Cypriot regime, we believe that there is a greater problem within the Greek Cypriot community. I think the EU got this message very late. Of course the process of accession of the south could not been stopped at that point.”* (Interview, Turkish Cypriot politician, 2004).

The reaction from the EU was not what the Turkish Cypriots wanted:

*“They were saying that: “no, your government, your President and Turkey will never change, and your side will always block a settlement”. And we were telling them “listen, we are acting within people and we are seeing that pretty soon there will be a dramatic change within the Turkish Cypriot community”. But they could never believe that.”* (interview, Turkish Cypriot politician, 2004).

One important element in this negative approach was Rauf Denktash, who was President of TRNC from 1974 until April 2005. He was originally part of the coalition government from 1960 to 1963, when the Turkish Cypriots resigned from Parliament. Mr. Denktash insisted that if they were to join the negotiations, they would have to do it under the 1960- Constitution, something that both the EU and RoC rejected. His official political

line was to have two separate states and that TRNC would move closer to Turkey in the same way as the south moved closer to the EU. TRNC signed several agreements with Turkey, mostly concerning economic cooperation, which again lead to further dependence on Turkey. TRNC are by some viewed as a “puppet state”, were more than 50% of the budget is directly transferred from Turkey (interview, Turkish Cypriot professor, 2004). Economic decline in Turkey, as the one in 2000, had therefore huge impacts on TRNC economy. This again led to dissatisfaction with the local and the Turkish regime. The EU became then an important incentive to get out of this difficult situation. Because of tremendous pressure from Ankara, Denktash was sidelined and he withdrew from the UN negotiation process. He is seen by many as the player that did not play his cards right and thus lost the opportunity to get an agreement in time. Turkish Cypriots who had supported Denktash no longer shared his vision and organized large demonstrations in favor of settlement. These demonstrations sometimes gathered as many as 70 000 demonstrators and provided a new dynamic to the process (Barkey 2003). This mobilization of civil society can also be seen as an impact from the EU. The prospects of joining the Union were slowly changing their identity in opposition to their own government. Seen from a different angle, Denktash had perhaps little choice in his actions. Northern Cyprus was unable to sell its agricultural products to Europe due to the embargo from 1994 and could only sustain its economic development through a parallel agreement with Turkey. Mr Denktash can, as well as Mr Papadopolous, be labeled as a securitizing actor (according to the theories of the Copenhagen School) because of his nationalistic rhetoric.

The Turkish Cypriot government hoped that the new settlement negotiations would delay the EU accession (Tocci 2003). However, in 1998 they were asked by the EU and the Greek Cypriots to appoint representatives for the negotiations, if they agreed on the 1990 membership application. The Turkish Cypriots as mentioned earlier rejected this invitation. There were also disagreements about what the Turkish Cypriots were to negotiate about if they were to join. Should they join to negotiate the accession of RoC? Therefore, all the 30 chapters regarding for instance economics, culture, tourism and infrastructure were based on the south and their economy progress and development and



not applicable to the north at all. The fact that they rejected to join the negotiations is still seen as a mistake (interview, Turkish Cypriot political researcher, 2004).

After the Helsinki Summit in 1999, rapprochement policy between Greece and Turkey was a fact and new settlement negotiations on both sides started. These negotiations lasted until February 2003 and did not succeed, and the Turkish Cypriot leadership was blamed for this. By the autumn of 2002, both TRNC and Turkey realized that the accession of Cyprus into the EU was inevitable, and this further led to a policy shift (Tocci 2003). The Turkish Cypriots understood that their hard line in criticizing RoC for their unilaterally accession was neither helping them nor the Turkish application.

A public opinion survey, made by the Commission in 2002 found that a high percentage of the people in northern Cyprus were supporting EU membership (Commission 2002a). Nine in ten (88%) adults and teenagers thought that an EU membership would be a good thing for them, and 19% thought the opposite. The survey further showed that many of the inhabitants (77%) felt that they had a strong European identity, a share that is even larger than the EU members themselves (62%). *“The Turkish Cypriots tend to see themselves as virtual Europeans even though they have very little contact with Europe directly. They see themselves as worthy Europeans.”* (Interview, Turkish Cypriot Professor in Political Science, 2004). Of course, not having contact with the EU mythologizes the EU in the mind of the Turkish Cypriots. They think that they are European and that there should be no reason for them to be excluded and that their values are not in contradiction to the European values. However, not all Turkish Cypriots feel this way, because there is a strong ethnic identity as well, which in many times will override these cosmopolitan identities. This multi-layered identity of the Turkish Cypriots (and also the Greek Cypriots) can be explained with the use of constructivist institutionalist Europeanization theory. The domestic change happens through socialization which further develops new identities.

When analyzing EU involvement in the conflict, we see that the EU was mainly involved on the Greek Cypriots side (Demetriou 2004b). The situation has, however, changed to the more positive for the Turkish Cypriots. With the new leadership and the partial opening of the Green Line, the interest about an EU membership has grown. The change in leadership is also a consequence of the political change in Turkey which again

was heavily linked to the prospect of EU membership. However, the change in leadership came too late to impose any real impact on the settlement.

The increased pressure on Denktash in 2002 and 2003 from the EU had much impact on the Turkish Cypriot people in general. The parliamentary election in December 2003 led to a victory for the opposition. Two opposing wings got the same amount of seats in the parliament, one of them opposing the Annan Plan and the other supporting it. The opposing side was the Democrat Party, led by Rauf Denktash' son, Serdar Denktash, and the National Unity Party led by former Prime Minister Ergulu. The side who supported the settlement plan and EU membership was the Republican Party, led by Mehmet Ali Talat, and Peace and Democracy Movement led by Mustafa Akinci. The Republican Party and Democrat Party formed a coalition government and Talat became Prime Minister. The shift to a pro peace and pro EU government was a shock to the EU, according to the Turkish Cypriots (Interview, Turkish Cypriot politician, 2004).

The involvement of the Turkish Cypriots in Brussels altered after the referendums. After April 2004 a delegation from the government has visited Brussels frequently where they participate in the committee meetings as observers to watch over three legislations. One of them is direct trade; the other is direct funding the third is the Green Line regulations. This last regulation deals with the intra island trade. It is supposed to make it easier to produce things in the north, transport it to the south for documentation and then export it. However, with the RoC already inside the EU, they have been able to delay and block decisions concerning these three legislations, and none of them are therefore operational. The promises that the EU gave just before the accession in 2004 is no longer valid, since RoC and Greece now has got power to block and veto within the Council. The big debate is happening around the direct trade regulation, since this is the regulation that would help the TRNC economy the most, but also on the other hand indirectly legitimize the state. If this regulation is approved, the ports and airport in the north would be legitimized in the eyes of the EU. The Turkish Cypriots would then be able to send goods to the EU without the heavy taxation and thereby compete with other EU members. This would again lead to a spillover effect and attract foreign investment and further economic growth in the north (interview, Turkish Cypriot politician, 2004)

This development also fuels the negative feelings to the EU- antagonists, like the Democracy Party. They feel frustrated that the EU did not listen when they voiced their concern prior to the referendums.

*“EU had turned the blind eye and shut their eyes to our protest that “the way you are progressing you are going to have a divided island, you are going to have just the GC as your member and you will import a problem into the EU”. They would not listen. They thought, “ we will put so much pressure on the TC and we get them to say yes to the solution of the Cyprus problem and the whole Cyprus will become member of the EU”. What they didn’t take into account was that the GC could say no. So I can not say we are very pleased with the EU.”* (Interview, Turkish Cypriot political adviser, 2004).

The negative view of the EU prior to the referendums did not change in these eyes after the referendums. With RoC inside the Union, they found the EU as *“very heavy moving, slow moving, determined, has got powers but very reluctant to utilize them frequently”* (interview, Turkish Cypriot political adviser, 2004). The general view of the EU after this is that it has been ineffectual and created a new situation that can help Denktash and his collaborators in his political vision which is by many viewed as ethnocentric and isolationist.

The EU demands more democracy in Northern Cyprus, but is at the same time undermining the institutions that is to promote the democracy (Interview, Turkish Cypriot political researcher, 2004). In their view, these institutions do not exist. In the financial aid proposal from the EU there are no local authorities, just local bodies like the Chamber of Commerce, which is elected by business men. *“Will NGOs run the country? This is contradictions and dangers to developing democracy in the north”*. (Interview, Turkish Cypriot political researcher, 2004).

EU impact on TRNC, seen from the EU official line, has and still is huge. However, this is in the long run and the only chance for the Turkish Cypriots to fully benefit from the EU is reunification. The EU rules and regulation try to make trade and economic issues as easy as possible, by lifting many of the barriers (interview, EU official, 2004). The main challenge for the Turkish Cypriots is to learn to use a tool which is not yet there, and to help them with this, the EU helps with technical assistance and information exchange through the so called TAIEX (Technical Assistance and

Information Exchange unit of Directorate-General Enlargement of the European Commission). Since the three regulations (direct trade, green line regulations and aid) are currently being delayed within the EU, the TAIEX is the only element which is active.

#### *EU influence on the Turkish position*

Turkey is holding one of the keys to this conflict, and the impact from the EU is clear to see, especially after 1999. The EU has led an active “carrot and stick” approach towards Turkey and their leadership, and views their application in direct connection with Turkey’s attitude towards the Cyprus conflict.

Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952 and an associate member of the EU since 1963. 99% of its 71 million inhabitants are Muslims, but the country has been a different Muslim state than other states in the Middle- and Far East (Bundt 2004). As noted earlier, Kemalism as state ideology has as primary goal to integrate Turkey with Europe and the EU, and as a result of that, almost all governments from 1960 to present has urged for close cooperation with Europe and the EU in particular. However, during mid 1990s there was a shift in this traditional way of thinking. The left wing side in Turkey’s domestic politics, as well as the conservatives had a major drawback in the mid 1990s. This political vacuum, mostly contributed by the military, favored the Muslim wing, and especially the Islamic party, Refah Partisi, RP. A growing part of the Turkish population was marginalized and poor because of the economic modernization and the RP party became soon the party for this segment of the population. They got 21, 5 % of the votes in 1995<sup>12</sup> and thereby the largest party in Turkey (Lange 1998). This was a historic moment in Turkey. RP formed a government in July 1996 with Mr. Erbakan as Prime Minister. He was skeptic about the modernization and relationship with the EU and preferred to turn to the Muslim world (Brewin 2000) Erbakan and his government became soon a threat to the military and their Kemalist way of thinking. Even though RP was not pushing any reforms or serious changes, the military forced them out of office in 1997. The opposition party (ANAP) formed a government with Mr. Yilmaz as Prime Minister, and launched a massive pro-EU campaign in 1997.

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<sup>12</sup> 7% in 1987 (Lange 1998).

This Muslim shift in Turkish politics had effects in the rest of Europe. Even though the European view of Turkey had always been skeptic, it got even worse after the Islamist victory in both regional and national elections. As mentioned earlier, Turkey was denied candidate status during the Luxembourg Council meeting in 1997, and Prime Minister Yilmaz cut immediately all contact with EU. Ankara also threatened to annex TRNC if accession talks with the Republic of Cyprus went ahead. In understanding the Turkish reaction it is important to note that when Greece applied to join EU its economic and political fundamentals were also considered essentially unsuitable by EU member states. However, the Council decided that overriding political considerations required that Greece should accede.

After the Helsinki summit in December 1999, the intentions of the EU were to conduct a “carrot and stick policy” towards Turkey, which they considered the other part of the conflict, so they would resume the settlement talks with the RoC. This was much due to US pressure on the EU countries and Greece especially. Turkey is of vital geo-strategic importance to the US, both regarded energy and foreign policy (Güney 2004). Prime Minister Ecevit then announced that his country only needed a few years to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, but the EU, on the other hand, remained skeptical towards Turkey and suggests that it will take at least 10-15 years before the process of negotiations will even start. There are three main challenges for Turkey considering their EU application. The first one deals with the military and their strong power within politics, something that is not in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria. This scenario, would however, breach with the main principle in Kemalism. Second, the human rights situation in Turkey is questionable. The standards are not compatible with the EU standards, especially concerning the Kurds. According to the Lusanne Treaty from 1923, Jews, Armenians and Greeks are considered minorities, but the Kurds are not. The economic aspect is also a challenge for Turkey. They have a low GNP and high inflation, and there are great differences between different parts of Turkey considered the economy. The western part of the country has a relatively good economy with lots of industry, but the eastern and southern parts are almost at developing country level. It is the political and economical factors, which are of importance here, and not cultural or religious factors.

After the 2002- election, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) formed a new government with Mr. Erdogan as the Prime Minister. The AKP refuses to define itself as a religious party, but rather a party that favor greater religious freedom. They started a reform process in Turkey, a so-called “silent revolution” (Bundt 2004). These reforms are not easy to put to life, because of the intricate military-AKP relationship. The military, which is skeptical and negative to the AKP government, provide the government with as little maneuvering space as possible. Even though the reforms lack important elements, the EU commissioner for enlargement, Mr. Verhaugen, opens up for negotiation start during 2005. This process, however, are expected to last for many years both due to the situation in Turkey, but also because of the huge skepticism in Europe (especially in France, Germany and RoC). The military also lobbied actively against the governments wish for settlement in Cyprus and shielded Denktash from any type of pressure (Barkey 2003).

The Europeanization has also created larger maneuvering space for the civil society in Turkey. Traditionally, the state has distrusted civil society and put restrictions on it, for instance through funding, organizations and the freedom of speech. This has further severely constrained the range of alternative identities and ideas. After the late 1990s, however, the civil society gradually began to play an independent role in Turkey. This process was also further encouraged through the Civil Society Development Program, which was started by the Representation of the European Commission to Turkey. The program promotes and helps civil initiatives and increases the capacity of Turkish NGOs though technical support. Rumelili (2004) argues that even though this process was not initiated by the EU, it can help consolidate the efforts already made.

The theory of security complexes (Buzan et al. 1998) is suitable for explaining the difficulty of turning the Turkish society towards Europe. Central in this theory is the “insulator”, a border status that among others, Turkey holds. The fact that Turkey is such an insulator makes the whole environment around Turkey unstable. Researchers such as Diez (2004b) argue that there could be a danger in the fact that the peaceful European security complex is drawn into the conflicts of the Middle East, especially if Turkey becomes a member of the EU without changing their foreign policy. Turkey on its side is not strong enough to bring these two complexes together. Even though the theory is a

good device for explaining the key position of Turkey in the Cyprus conflict, there are some elements that make the theory less applicable here. Turkey is an unusual insulator in several ways: Turkey has for instance an unusual active foreign policy as an insulator. They have been active in several foreign policy actions in its neighborhood that can be labeled as desecuritization, much based on their Kemalist thinking of “peace at home, peace abroad” (Diez 2000b). For instance, they have been active in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Council and tried to build links between the Turkic countries of Central Asia and Caucasus. However, these activities can also be seen as mere traditional foreign policy with pure national interests as goal. According to theory, an insulator is supposed to provide stability by preventing the security complexes to collide too much. In the case of Turkey, it would provide more stability inside the European security complex than outside as an insulator. Most important is that Turkey can no longer be seen as staying outside the European security complex.

The EU has great leverage to force states to resolve disputes by offering membership or threaten with sanctions to this status. As mentioned above, the greatest impact from the EU was after the Helsinki Summit in 1999. From the history, we can see that states, for instance Greece and Turkey, has acted cautiously when the EU membership was pending and rather improved the bilateral relations rather than escalate the crisis. This “carrot and stick” approach failed before this for two reasons (Rumelili 2004): One of the reasons given in the literature is that Turkey's application for membership came in a time period where the EU was conservative about its potential role in conflict resolution and rather ignored internal disputes. It especially kept out of the Greek- Turkish conflict and paid more attention at keeping both sides anchored in the West. Instead, the EU left the mediation and conflict resolution efforts to other actors as the UN, US or NATO. A second explanation is that the EU lost its ability to put any pressure on Greece, since Greece became a member in 1981. After this, Greece has had a dominant role within the Union and thus made the EU part of the problem. Turkey has viewed EU as just another forum in which Greece pursues its agenda towards Turkey.

Also present in Turkey is the so called “Sevres syndrome” a notion that the remaining world (especially the West) is constantly conspiring to weaken Turkey. This has again created sensitivity in Turkey with respect to equal treatment and recognition as

a Western country. The lack of democracy in Turkey and the difficult relationship between liberal democratic principles and the Kemalist ideology are also explanations to why the EU impact has not had full leverage in the past.

Turkey's EU aspirations are contingent not only on Turkey doing the right thing by EU standard but also on US support. European doubts about Turkey's place in the EU, its large size, its different cultural roots, its economic backwardness, and troubled democratic tradition are sufficiently significant that the Europeans are likely to delay Turkey's final accession.

### **Summary**

In this chapter I have discussed the relationship between EU and the island of Cyprus. I have discussed several areas where the EU has imposed influence on the conflicting parties and how this influence can be explained. The EU supported the "Annan Plan" of the UN, but did not actively engage in the settlement efforts. However, it has influenced the various parts in different degree in different areas. The economic influence from the EU is perhaps greater on the RoC than it is for Northern Cyprus, but the political influence is easy to spot also in TRNC and also in Turkey. The EU uses "carrots and sticks" to transform economy and politics in candidate countries to make it more compatible to EU standards. This approach has worked and is still working in the case of TRNC and Turkey, even though the road to full membership can seem long and difficult.



## 6. Conclusion

This case study has been focusing on the European Union and its relationship with the Cyprus conflict. Concerning this I have first examined the impact from the European Union on different actors in the conflict. These actors have been the Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots, Greece and Turkey. Second, I have examined the reasons behind this influence.

### **How has the EU influenced different parts of the Cyprus conflict?**

This analysis has shown that the EU impact on various actors in the Cyprus conflict has been complex. The involvement in the conflict came at a time where the EU had not yet consolidated itself as a political actor. The Cold War was barely over and the new political world was complex and difficult to maneuver within. It is therefore important to remember the context when analyzing the impact. The influence from the European Union on the conflict was both of positive and negative character; although *I will conclude that the overall impact from the EU has not been positive*. The EU actively supported the peace process but did not engage actively, and was actually reluctant all along to deal with the problem. Compared to the UN, the UK and even the US, the EU played a minor role. *The most positive impact on the overall conflict is that the new mediation talks probably would not have happened if it were not for the accession of RoC*. This opportunity gave all parts involved a new framework and platform on which they again could meet face to face.

*The most positive impact is of natural reasons most obvious for the Greek and Greek Cypriot side*. Greece strived for many years to include RoC into the EU and RoC itself has had both political and economical benefits from the access negotiation process and the membership, although the political impact has been the most prominent. The accession process boosted their leverage towards Turkey and also further ensured their own state as the only legitimate government on the island. It has also been political in the sense that the Greek Cypriots now feel secure under the EU security framework and that Turkey no longer is a threat.

EU pressure on Greece led eventually to a more positive shift in government and in policies towards Turkey. I think this is one of the *most important positive impacts* from

the EU, because the long lasting rivalry between Greece and Turkey has been one of the main reasons for the stalemate in the Cyprus conflict and a solution would imply a better relationship between these two countries. *The capabilities of the EU to impose pressure and conditionality clearly worked in the case of Greece.*

Due to this rapprochement policy, the EU could again offer a starting date on access negotiations for Turkey. Turkish accession process after 1999 has offered a more progressive attitude among the Turkish elite in order to improve their relations with the EU. They have improved their human right issues and democracy deficit, but EU officials claim that the road ahead for complete membership is long. Another impact is political and deals with government change, which happened in both Turkey and TRNC. The present Prime Minister Erdogan is, albeit his Muslim background, a propel for the Western direction in Turkey's politics. *The western direction in (some parts of) the Turkish society has also contributed to greater openness and transparency in civil society.*

The pressure on Turkey's government further led to pressure to remove the old President and Euro-skeptics Rauf Denktaş and make room for pro-peace and pro-EU parties in TRNC. The present President Mehmet Ali Talat is a close colleague of Erdogan and shares his vision of Turkey inside the EU. This shift was also due to a massive pressure within the TRNC public which did not agree on Denktaş's policies. The climate between the old governments in both TRNC and Turkey and EU has therefore not been positive in the past. *I find it very important to maintain this positive climate in order to find a solution to the conflict in the future.* The impact from the EU on the Turkish Cypriot community has, because of the isolation and the embargo, been of little economic degree, but quite substantial concerning civil society and the government. Even though the direct influence from EU and Europe in general has been limited, the Turkish Cypriots nevertheless feel European and want to take part of the European project. The mass mobilization and demonstrations in protest to the government, shows that novel opening of the civil society which has been rare in TRNC in the past.

I will, however, stress one more positive impact of the EU on the different parts of the conflict. The more slow process of Europeanization through social learning is perhaps not obvious today, but can have much impact in the long run. It can help promote

a more pluralistic, democratic and tolerant society in the two communities on the island, in Turkey and continue the process already started in Greece.

### **How can this influence be explained?**

The reasons for this diverse influence are various, and I will start with the context on the island itself, because I believe that the European Union (and the UN) did not take this enough into consideration. The two communities on the island have been *de facto* separated since the early 1960s and have not cooperated on political or economic issues since then. They have evolved in totally separate directions and their separation has led to growing fear and myths about one another. Their expectation about a solution has also varied from total separation to close federation, and to expect that they could cooperate in such a tight time frame is not likely. *I also believe that the EU took the TRNC leadership and their intransigence as granted and did not pay enough attention to what was going on in the southern part.* During the early 1990s it was the elites in both TRNC and Turkey that was regarded as the main hindrance to settlement. *They did not spend enough time informing about the positive win-win situation of a settlement neither in the north nor in the south.*

*The EU strategies did also not reflect enough the Turkish Cypriot or the Turkish perceptions of the conflict, and therefore the EU could not gain leverage on the Cyprus issue.* Neither Turkey nor TC perceived that the incentives offered by the EU outweighed their policy and interest on Cyprus. The economic carrot that was mainly used towards TRNC did not bear in mind their strong security concern, which outweighed the economic benefits of an EU- membership. Even if the carrot catalyst was not working as it was planned during the access negotiation phase, the Turkish Cypriots voiced a clear “yes” to reunification and EU-membership in the April 2004 referendum. It was therefore a positive catalyst in the sense that it promoted a new platform for debates and meetings.

*After Greece became a member in 1981, the EU has not been viewed as a neutral or impartial arena for Turkey and TRNC.* Before 1999, when Turkey got its candidate status, it was rather viewed as just another platform for their rivalry. With Greece safe inside the Union, the voice from the EU could not be perceived as impartial. After the Helsinki Summit when settlement was removed as a precondition for accession, the

impression of this has even increased. Today, both Greece and RoC are EU-members and makes the credibility of EU decisions even lower for the Turks and the Turkish Cypriots.

*The European Union (and RoC) also failed to see the broader geo-strategic picture when posing the catalyzing effect on Turkey and TRNC.* Turkey holds a special position as an “insulator”, and this forces it to have an active security and foreign policy in order to keep the different security complexes away from each other, but also in order to avoid isolation. However, it is argued here that Turkey is somehow an unusual insulator since it operates with a much more active foreign policy than the insulator position would imply. Cyprus is of important geo-strategic value to Turkey, since it is located only 65 km from the southern coast of Turkey. The military presence in TRNC is not only there to protect the Turkish Cypriots, but also to protect Turkey's own coastline and only secure supply line. It is therefore impossible for Turkey to legitimize RoC and allow it to become under “Greek control”.

I have also argued that both rational integration theories and social constructivism can be used to explain the enlargement of Cyprus. Liberal intergovernmentalism is suitable to explain certain issues such as government- or state leader power. Neo-functionalism can explain the ongoing integration with RoC, but it can not explain the integration of the whole island. This is because neo-functionalism stress the economic element in integration and that economic cooperation would eventually lead to political spillover as well. However, in ethnic conflicts, the argument of economic rationality does not have the intended effect. The “carrot catalyst” did not have the intended effect on the Turkish Cypriots as their view on other security issues was greater. I have also shown that social constructivism is a useful tool when explaining the integration of Turkey. The rational integration theories come short when explaining factors such as culture and identity.

### **Looking into the future of Cyprus**

The future of Cyprus is heavily dependent on the future of Turkey. Certainly, a Turkey within Europe, with European values is the biggest guarantee of the Turkish Cypriots as well as meeting the Greek Cypriots security concerns. RoC is today in a position were

they can actively block decisions concerning Turkey and their future accession. If they do veto the Turkish accession start it would be bad for their own security concerns, but also for the entire European security concerns. I find the recent events in Europe, concerning the referendums on the European Constitution and the growing skepticism towards Turkey, as concerning. It can trigger a more Euro-skeptic attitude in Turkey which again can delay the possible settlement of the Cyprus conflict. Denying them access to the EU can make them turn towards east and further promote anti-Western ideology. *If there is a uniformed opinion that Turkey ought to become a member of the EU, the pressure on the Greek Cypriot government would increase accordingly. It all depends on that.* The key position that RoC holds can also become dangerous to the Turkish Cypriot population, if it comes to a point were Turkey and RoC bilaterally negotiate about the future. RoC can force Turkey into making concessions which for the Turkish Cypriot community can turn out as a semi-optimal solution. Turkey can for instance be forced to make concessions about the political equality and rights of the Turkish Cypriots, which since 1960 has been the rock bottom for the Turkish Cypriots.

For the integration of TRNC into the EU to become reality, it is also important that the TRNC community intensify their debates aimed at progressive political, social and economic change. They should also encourage open minded dialogue and friendship with the south to prevent further isolation. The Greek Cypriots on their side should do the same and initiate new talks and peace efforts.

The EU is, as stated previously not a uniform community but consist of many different voices. One can also hope that some of these voices can put pressure on the Greek Cypriot government to resume talks. The challenge will then be to transform the southern no-vote into a yes-vote while preserving the yes-vote in the north. It is therefore important that the EU increases its credibility and deliver what they have promised the Turkish Cypriot community.

To continue status quo is difficult for all sides in this conflict, and it is important that initiative is taken soon, not only to improve life for the Turkish Cypriots but also to make life easier to the Greek Cypriots. It is time to forget about the past and move on!



## **Appendix**

### *Interviews*

These are the persons I interviewed during the fieldwork in Cyprus in November 2004:

- Political adviser for government party
- Employee at the EU Commission representation office in Nicosia
- Chair member of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce.
- Two Turkish Cypriot political researchers
- One Greek Cypriot political researcher
- Turkish Cypriot professor in political science at Eastern Mediterranean University
- Two high ranking politicians for government party
- Former Norwegian politician and researcher, now living in Cyprus
- Seminar with a Greek Cypriot research organization.





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