

# Can positions on single-issues explain voting behaviour in the Council of Ministers?

*An Empirical Analysis of Decision-making in the European  
Union*

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Vibeke Wøien Hansen

Oslo, 25<sup>th</sup> of November 2008.



**List of content:**

INTRODUCTION.....	7
Approach to the Problem and its Relevance for the Council Literature .....	9
Summary of the Findings .....	10
Plan of the Thesis .....	11
1 CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW .....	13
1.1 Introduction .....	13
1.2 Decision-making in the Council: Patterns of Conflict .....	14
1.3 Summary of the Council Literature.....	19
2 CHAPTER 2: THE RESEARCH DESIGN .....	21
2.1 The Research Design: Model, Method and Data .....	21
2.2 The Simple Spatial Model.....	21
2.3 Research Design .....	25
2.3.1 The Data .....	25
2.3.2 Methods and their Drawbacks.....	28
2.3.3 Data Preparation .....	30
3 CHAPTER 3: A REPLICATION OF ZIMMER ET AL. ....	33
3.1 The Political Space of the Council .....	33
3.2 Dimensions in the Council: Comparing the Results .....	33
3.3 Interpreting the Dimensions .....	37
3.4 Summary .....	39
4 CHAPTER 4: POSITIONS VERSUS ACTUAL VOTES.....	40
4.1 Introduction to a Comparative Analysis.....	40
4.2 The Results: All Positions versus all Votes .....	41
4.3 Explaining and Determining the Selection Problems .....	43
4.4 The Results: 44 positions versus 44 votes.....	47
4.5 Summarising the Findings.....	50
5 CHAPTER 5: TESTING THE SIMPLE SPATIAL MODEL .....	51
5.1 What defines Voting Behaviour? .....	51
5.2 Testing the Models .....	52
5.3 Testing the Models: Discussing the Results.....	55
5.3.1 Structuring the Discussion .....	55
5.3.2 The Aggregative Performance of the Simple Spatial Model .....	57
5.3.3 The largest Member States .....	60
5.3.4 Benelux and Austria .....	61
5.3.5 The Cohesion Bloc .....	63
5.3.6 The Nordic Bloc .....	65
6 CHAPTER 6: EVALUATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH.....	67
6.1 Under the Scope: The Model's Performance .....	67
6.2 Evaluations of the Model .....	67
6.3 Alternative Explanations .....	69
6.4 Possible Expansions of this Thesis.....	72
CONCLUSION .....	75
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	79
APPENDIX .....	84
Appendix A: Data Preparation: .....	84
Appendix B: Testing the Simple Spatial Model.....	95
Appendix C: R-codes .....	97

**List of figures:**

Figure 2-1 The Standard Version of Tsebelis and Garrett .....	22
Figure 2-2 A Simple Spatial Model .....	24
Figure 3-1 Replication study: (CA) .....	35
Figure 3-2 Original study CA .....	35
Figure 3-3 Replication study (PC) .....	36
Figure 3-4 Replication study (MDS) .....	36
Figure 3-5 Replication study: hierarchical clustering .....	37
Figure 4-1 (as in chapter 3): .....	42
Figure 4-2 .....	42
Figure 4-3 .....	42
Figure 4-4 .....	42
Figure 5-1 A Simple Spatial Model .....	52
Figure 5-2 The Tobacco Directive .....	53
Figure 5-3 Negative actual and predicted votes per. country group .....	58

**List of tables:**

Table 1-1 Voting in the Council 1994-1998: The preference for consensus .....	15
Table 1-2 Oppositions, abstentions and formal statements per year:.....	18
Table 1-3 The Political Space detected by the Council Literature.....	19
Table 3-1 Results: Replication of Zimmer et al. (FA, PC and CA) .....	33
Table 3-2 Possible interpretations of the Dimensions in DEU (Zimmer et al 2005:411) .....	34
Table 4-1 Results CA: Both Datasets .....	41
Table 4-2 T-test of mean values (all datasets).....	46
Table 4-3 Results 44 proposals correspondence analysis (CA) .....	47
Table 5-1 Aggregative model:.....	57
Table 5-2 Germany, France and UK .....	60
Table 5-3 Benelux and Austria.....	61
Table 5-4 The Cohesion Bloc.....	63
Table 5-5 The Nordic Countries.....	65
Table 6-1 A summary: What may have contributed to create the consensual bias in the Council? .....	71
Table 7-1 The Findings of this Thesis versus the Findings of the Council Literature .....	76

## INTRODUCTION

Theories of European integration often aim to explain the development of European regional integration or the institutional structure of the EU. There are especially two approaches that have been labelled the “grand theories” of European integration. The first one of these two is neofunctionalism (Haas 1958, Lindberg 1963). This theory stresses how integration in specific policy domains can spill over to others, and how these “spillover” processes constantly make the different domains appear more and more interconnected. Whereas neofunctionalists believe that the driving forces behind the “spillover” processes are non-state actors, Intergovernmentalism (Hoffman 1966), the other “grand theory”, argues that the European integration is driven by the actions and interests of the member states. This theory is derived from the “realist school” of international relations, and is hence advocating that the governments act out of geopolitical interests when they make decisions in the European Union.

But since the 1970s neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism have gradually been replaced by more “mid-level explanations of cross-systematic political processes” (Hix 2005:16-15). The new frameworks that have been advocated are liberal-intergovernmentalism, the rational choice institutionalist perspective and different variants of “supranationalism”. Liberal-intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1998) focus on how the big decisions, the treaties, can explain the integration process. This theory is derived from intergovernmentalism, but relaxes some of the assumptions of its predecessor. The member states are still the primary actors in the EU political system, but their preferences are not fixed and they may be driven from economic interests rather than geopolitical interests. The “supranational governance” perspective criticises liberal-intergovernmentalists for their reliance on the assumption that the member states always are in full control of the integration process. Because of the limited information about the long term implications of decision-making, the supranational institutions (the Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice) may influence the institutional and political outcomes much more than liberal-intergovernmentalists suggest that they do. Pierson (1996) advocates how

a variant of “supranationalism” called historical institutionalism (HI) may explain the integration process in a more nuanced way by showing how decisions may create path dependencies that limit the amount of member state control, and at the same time, increase the powers of the EU institutions. Rational choice institutionalists (like Tsebelis and Garrett (1996), Scully (1997), Moser (1996, Crombez (1996), Steunenberg (1994)) employ formal models of particular bargaining situations when trying to determine what kind of policy outcomes that will be the result under certain circumstances. This theoretical branch produces outcomes that may be similar to one of the other branches dependent on what kind of formal model it applies when theorising. All three perspectives may explain some part of the integration process in an adequately manner, but may lack the capabilities to explain every single aspect of the EU on their own. Another thing they have in common, is that all three, to some extent, underestimate the implications of the day-to-day decision-making.

The small decisions are also an important part of the integration process, even though their effects may be a lot harder to detect in the EU history. Even so, this thesis will give all its attention to the everyday decision-making of the EU. There are many possible approaches to this kind of problem, and this thesis will concentrate on one of the key legislative institutions of the EU (liberal-intergovernmentalists will say The legislative institution), namely the Council of Ministers (hereafter the Council).

The Council is a complex institution. It shares legislative powers with the European Parliament (the EP) and executive powers with the Commission. It is a permanent negotiating forum consisting of ministers from the member states. Even though it constantly interconnects with the EP and the Commission, the Council members are more directly accountable to their national electorates and parliaments than to their institutional colleagues (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006:2). Decision-making in the Council is hence not a clear-cut process. This thesis aims to explore a small, but important, part of this complex process by determining the extent of the Council members’ voting behaviour that may be explained by their positions on single issues.



Although a lot have been said about decision-making in the Council, there is little research regarding whether the Council members in fact make their preferences or expressed positions the main guideline for their actual voting behaviour. By combining voting results with preference positions that are estimated by policy experts, it is possible to explore whether the Council members are voting in line with their own positions on single-issues. Hence the research question of this thesis is:

**Can positions on single-issues explain voting behaviour of the Council of Ministers?**

### ***Approach to the Problem and its Relevance for the Council Literature***

This thesis reveals whether there is consistency between the Council members' positions and the votes that are actually taken by combining two different data sources. Quantitative interview data from the "Decision Making in the European Union" (DEU)-project (Thomson and Stokman 2003) is compared with data based on the Council Minutes. In the DEU data every country has been given a (position) value between 0 and 100 on each issue dimension that is attached to the 70 proposals considered. The countries' positions on each issue as well as reference points (status quo) and policy outcomes are estimated by policy experts during interviews. In contrast, the latter data is drawn from a larger data set collected by Sara Hagemann and is continuously updated. This data is based on information on all legislation adopted in the time period from 1999 to present time (Hagemann 2006, 2007). The time overlap between the two data sources is 1999-2002; hence this is also the time period of this thesis.

Combining the two data sets has not been done previously in the literature on the Council of Ministers. Matching the Council members' positions on single-issues with voting records, that reveal how they actually voted on each issue, may hence make a contribution to the existing Council literature. It may improve our understanding of decision-making in the Council in general, and more specifically: our understanding of the voting behaviour of each explicit Council member.

In order to link the findings related to the research question to the existing literature, this thesis also analyses the political space of the Council by using both data sets and compares the results of the analyses with each other. By doing this it is possible to say something about how the political space of the Council affects voting behaviour in general, and also how it may affect the research question of this thesis.

### ***Summary of the Findings***

The main argument of this thesis is that positions on single issues explain only a proportion of the actual voting behaviour in the Council of Ministers. By employing a simple spatial model the thesis tests whether the Council members vote in line with their positions on single-issues or not. The findings reveal that the model manage to predict (by using the positions as predictions) a large amount of the actual “yes” votes, but performs more poorly when predicting the extent of the actual opposition recorded on each proposal. Even so the model manages to detect some of the disagreement showed by the Council members at the final stage of decision-making.

The test of the simple spatial model also supports some of the findings from the correspondence analyses of the different data constellations and some of the main findings in the Council literature. The large member states record their opposition more frequently than their smaller counterparts. The model overestimates the extent of negative statements that actually are raised by the smaller member states, suggesting that there are some costs related to voting “no” for these countries in particular. This thesis also shows that the medium-sized countries oppose the actual decision-making more frequently than the largest countries (on the overlapping proposals of both data sets), and that the southern European member states are just as likely, or to some extent even more likely, to oppose decisions at the final stage of decision-making as their northern European counterparts .

## ***Plan of the Thesis***

In order to give an adequate picture of the voting behaviour in the Council, both in relation to the findings in the existing Council literature and the findings presented in this thesis, the thesis is structured as follows:

*Chapter 1* presents the recent literature on this field. The findings of previous studies will also be further elaborated on in the next chapters in order to place the findings of this thesis in a broader empirical setting. Chapter 1 is hence only a general overview of some of the main findings in the Council literature, a starting point for further elaboration and discussion.

*Chapter 2* presents how formal models have been applied in the Council literature. Further on, it outlines the simple spatial model that will be applied when determining whether the Council members vote according to their own preference or not. After this, the chapter examines the data sets and discusses the rest of the research design of the thesis in more detail. The main problems linked to the employment of the data sets and the choice of research design will also be discussed.

*Chapter 3* replicates the study of Zimmer et al (2005) in order to show how choice of method may play a role when defining the political space of the Council. This chapter is also the fundament for the further analyses of this thesis, as it outlines how the political space of the Council may be determined.

*Chapter 4* analyses the different data constellations in the same way as Zimmer et al. (2005) does. The findings of these analyses structure the test of the simple spatial model in Chapter 5, and give the results of this test a further empirical justification.

*Chapter 5* evaluates the performance of the simple spatial model, both its aggregative performance and how it performs in relation to each Council member's voting behaviour. The findings in this chapter are also compared to the findings from the existing Council literature.

*Chapter 6* evaluates the assumptions and the predictions that are attached to the simple spatial model. It also discusses alternatives to the simple spatial model, and outlines how the findings of this thesis could be further explored in the future.

*The Conclusion* summarises the findings and compares them with the findings from the Council literature in general.

## CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW

### **1.1 Introduction**

The Council is a complex institution. It shares executive functions with the Commission and legislative functions with the EP. The Council members are, first and foremost, national politicians appointed by their member states, but at the same time also ambassadors of the agreements and decisions taken by the EU in their home countries. They decide upon a variety of EU topics, some organised by sector other more multi-issue in nature. These decisions are taken by informal bargaining as well as formal decision-making, making the tension between confidentiality and openness evident for all to see (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006:4-6).

The Council meets in different configurations based on the subjects addressed, and usually there are the ministers with the relevant specialist responsibilities who meet in these configurations (i.e. the Minister of Agriculture meet in the Agriculture and Fisheries Council and so forth). Before these meetings there have been extensive preparatory phases where the proposals have been discussed at working group level and then passed on to COREPER, the committee of the permanent representatives from each member state. Most decisions (70%) are hence in practice made before reaching the Council level (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006). But the Council still has to adopt all legislative decisions. Even though many of the proposals go relatively smoothly through the system, it is important to detect the level of opposition attached to some of the not so clear-cut proposals. Studies in the Council literature hence focus on these main questions: how the Council vote, who votes with whom, which policy domains are the most contested ones and what kind of underlying dimensions may be important in the decision-making process. This chapter will now outline the main findings in these studies.

## **1.2 Decision-making in the Council: Patterns of Conflict<sup>1</sup>**

Before examining the studies in further detail, it could be useful to refer to some of the rules and norms that govern voting behaviour in the Council. First and foremost, the Council does not vote in a formal sense of stating positions or raising hands, voting is more implicit than explicit. Actual and explicit voting takes place only when some countries contest the proposals during the negotiations. Usually it is the chairperson that keeps track of the different member states' positions and voting is hence of a more informal character when countries are not opposing the proposal (Mattila 2004:30). When the chairperson knows that there is unanimity in the Council, a proposal can be adopted with a single sentence from the chairperson. But if there is any contestation, those member states that are opposing or abstaining can choose to record this officially. The contestation levels vary from policy area to policy area; agriculture and fisheries and issues related to the internal market are the most contested ones (Mattila and Lane 2001:39).

When the unanimity rule is applied, abstentions are not counted as "no" votes. Hence decisions can be made with only few countries actually voting for a proposal, if none of the countries openly contest it (Mattila and Lane 2001:39). But the opposite is true for qualified majority voting (QMV). In EU 15 (the EU primarily considered in this thesis) QMV means that 62 out of 87 votes are needed for the adoption of a proposal to be successful. The number of votes attached to each country is estimated on the basis of each country's population size and the threshold for majorities. The voting weights of EU 15 subscribed 10 votes to Germany, France, UK and Italy, 8 votes to Spain, 5 votes to Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece and Portugal, 4 votes to Sweden and Austria, 3 votes to Finland, Denmark and Ireland and 2 votes to Luxembourg (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006:264-265).

Then we may turn the attention to the existing Council literature on this topic. The data collected by Mattila and Lane shows that during the period from 1994-1998 the Council had a preference for finding a solution that is acceptable for all member states,

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<sup>1</sup> Some of the arguments in this section have previously been presented in Wøien Hansen (2008).

and that the expansion of memberships (from 12 to 15 states) did not affect voting patterns in any significant way. In general, the tendency is for one or two countries to oppose the majority and rarely three or four countries. Heisenberg (2005:68) explains this tendency as the result of a more than 40-year long history of negotiations among the same partners. The new members are immediately introduced to the norms governing this “culture of consensus”. Because of the high frequency of meetings and negotiations, she stresses that the trust among the partners is very high and that reputation matters a lot. Hence negotiations may be more personalised in the Council than in other multilateral settings (Heisenberg 2005:68). Table 1.1 illustrates how the “culture of consensus” was evident at the final stage of decision-making during the years 1994-1998:

**Table 1-1 Voting in the Council 1994-1998: The preference for consensus**

<b>Year</b>	<b>No. of legislative acts</b>	<b>% of “no” votes</b>	<b>Abstentions (%)<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>Unanimous decisions (%)</b>
<b>1994</b>	261	14	11	75
<b>1995</b>	344	18	4	78
<b>1996</b>	340	12	2	86
<b>1997</b>	218	17	6	78
<b>1998</b>	218	19	6	75

Source: General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union/ table taken from Mattila and Lane (2001:40)

Table 1.1 shows that, with the exception of 1996, the total level of opposition (“no” votes and abstentions) was relatively stable during this five year-period. Even though the data reveals a dominant preference for making decisions by consensus, different studies indicate that there are some clearly identifiable institutional and political factors behind governments’ decisions to agree or disagree with the majority of the Council. Those factors may or may not challenge the widely supported “consensual bias” in the future.

<sup>2</sup> The percentage of abstentions means the proportion of abstentions in which one or more countries abstained from voting but no “no” votes occurred (Mattila and Lane 2001:40).

Mattila (2004:46) advocates that leftist governments tend to vote less against the majority than the right-wing governments, and by this finds support for an evolving left-right dimension in Council voting. But, contrary, Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006:290) find no evidence of traditional left/right cleavages in the patterns of (explicit) voting. Related to this, Mattila (2004:46) advocates that if a government strongly favours increased integration, its position on the left-right dimension does not matter much. In fact, all other things being equal, pro-integration governments are the least likely to vote against the majority (hence favouring all possible outcomes of integration compared to no integration, status quo) (Mattila 2004:46). The left-right dimension is also supported by Hagemann and Høyland (2008). They advocate that coalition formation in the Council falls along some ideological left-right dimension, and that the Council members, to some extent, act as if party political lines affect their decisions. A further implication of this is that changes in government composition also mean a change in that country's behaviour at the EU level, exemplified by preferring other coalition partners than the ones favoured by their predecessor.

Another frequently supported finding in the literature is that the large countries are more likely to oppose decisions than their smaller counterparts. Heisenberg (2005) shows that the five large member states (EU 15) account for 46 % of the votes against and 54 % of the abstentions, and that the smaller member states hardly ever vote "no" or abstain from decisions. This suggests that "size matters" for the likelihood to oppose decision-making at the final stage. Mattila (2004) also finds data support for a "large versus small countries" dimension in addition to a left-right dimension and an independence-pro-integration dimension. He believes that the reasons behind this evident dimension are more related to issues of political culture and national pride than the idea that large countries are overrun by the small countries in the negotiations (Mattila 2004:43 and 46). Mattila and Lane (2001) also find support for this "large versus small"-countries dimension, but Hagemann (2007) shows that following the enlargement (EU 25) the country-group that is voicing their opposition the most frequently is in fact a group of medium-sized members rather than the largest countries of the EU.



But the patterns of voting and coalition-partners do not stop here. Mattila (2004) finds also some support for a redistributive dimension. Governments from member states that benefit financially from the EU are less likely to vote against proposals than member states that are net contributors to the EU budget. Zimmer et al (2005:403) advocate the same tendency, but their findings (data is here taken from the “Decision-Making in the European Union” project) differ to some extent from Mattila’s findings (data based on the Council Minutes). They do not find any major support for a left-right conflict or an ideological cleavage, their analysis rather shows that the redistributive dimension decisively shapes the interactions of the Council. The conflict between net-distributors and net-receivers manifest it self because poorer member states (from the south and the east) for the most part prefer extensive regulation of the market with low production costs whereas the northern member states tend to advocate greater competition (Zimmer et al 2005:417).

The so called redistributive dimension has several similarities with a north-south dimension, a dimension that is widely supported ( Mattila 2006, Mattila and Lane 2001, Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006). Mattila (2006) advocates, that the northern countries are more likely to share preferences of a more general kind with each other, than with the southern states (and vice versa). In relation to this Zimmer et al (2005:403) suggest that the north-south dimension rest upon various sub-divisions, the most important which being the redistributive dimension. The analysis conducted by Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006:290) support this latter notion. But even so the general north-south dimension is still advocated, and Mattila (2006) shows that the enlargement has not affected the conflict between the north and the south. The new members did in fact position themselves along this dimension in a similar way like the older members<sup>3</sup>.

Hagemann (2007:13) disagrees with Mattila (and to some extent Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace and Zimmer et al) and finds no signs that the frequency with which a country

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<sup>3</sup> The literature also considers how an “old versus new members” bloc may influence the political space of the Council. But since this thesis only analyses EU 15 and both Heisenberg (2005) and Hagemann (2007) show that such “blocs” are not likely to affect the decision-making, this dimension is not treated explicitly in this chapter.

opposes the majority is prescribed by its geographical location. In relation to this Heisenberg (2005:77) shows that even though large countries were more likely to vote “no” than their smaller counterparts during the years 1994-2002, it is not the case that rich or poor countries vote against or abstain more often than their counterparts, or that net-payers are more likely to dissent than net-receivers.

Hagemann also shows that the level of disagreement, which is recorded officially in voting, has not increased significantly since the enlargement (EU 25). But interestingly she finds that opposition is increasingly voiced in formal statements rather than via voting. “These statements are used to signal to home governments that the representative has stressed his or her position on a piece of legislation, but was reluctant to take a more drastic step and prevent consensus” (Hagemann 2007:1), and are included in the voting records in the minutes or posted at the Council website following the adoption of the proposal. Table 1.2 illustrates the increased tendency to voice opposition in formal statements:

**Table 1-2 Oppositions, Abstentions and Formal Statements per Year:**

Increasing level of formal statements

(\*The period “January to April 2004” had an increased amount of legislation passed in order to prepare for enlargement)

	Jan-Dec 1999	Jan-Dec 2000	Jan-Dec 2001	Jan-Dec 2002	Jan-Dec 2003	Jan-April 2004*	May-Dec 2004	Jan-Dec 2005	Jan-Dec 2006
All legislation	161	169	160	164	163	139	86	121	211
Disagreement voiced through voting	24,2%	20,1%	32,5%	17,7%	22,1%	7,9%	10,5%	10,7%	29,4%
Disagreement voiced either through voting or formal statements	<b>32,9%</b>	<b>34,9%</b>	<b>48,8%</b>	<b>32,3%</b>	<b>42,3%</b>	<b>33,1%</b>	<b>22,1%</b>	<b>43%</b>	<b>46%</b>

Source: Hagemann (2007:8).

Including formal statements, both in analyses of the political space of the Council and in analyses of the voting behaviour of the Council members, may hence give a more detailed picture regarding the actual levels of contestation.

### 1.3 Summary of the Council Literature

Table 1.3 summarises the main findings in the Council literature:

**Table 1-3 The Political Space detected by the Council Literature**

Author	Type of data	Main findings: conflict structure	Method
Mattila and Lane (2001)	Council Minutes 1381 pieces of legislation from 1994-1998	Large countries are significantly more inclined to vote “no” than their smaller counterparts. Finds support for the north-south dimension. Search for unanimity, consensus building.	Roll-call analysis Multidimensional scaling
Mattila (2004)	Council Minutes 180 observations from 1995-2000: voting records for 15 member states for 12 half years periods	Results support that the political space is defined by two dimensions: left-right and independence versus integration dimension. Pro-integration and left-wing governments as well as smaller countries vote “no” less frequently than their counterparts.	Roll-call analysis Bivariate and regression
Zimmer, Schneider, Dobbins (2005)	Expert interviews DEU data- Thomson et al.70 Commission proposals: 162 issues on decrees, directives and decisions under Consultation and Co-decision	Results support that a redistribution dimension shapes the political space. The north-south dimension is a sub-dimension of the redistribution-dimension as goes along the line of the conflict between the net-distributors (north) and the net-receivers (south and east).	Correspondence analysis
Heisenberg (2005)	Council Minutes Recorded legislation from 1994-2002	Size do matter, the five largest countries account for 46 % of the votes against. Finds no support for the redistributive dimension. Informal norm of consensus prevails.	Roll-call analysis
Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006)	Council Minutes Recorded legislation 1994-2004	No evidence of traditional left/right cleavages. The north-south dimension as a redistribution dimension.	Expert interview, document analysis
Mattila (2006)	Council Minutes 805 legislative acts from May 2004 to April 2006	Clear existence of a north-south dimension even after enlargement. This can be interpreted as free market based solutions versus regulatory solutions. Slightly increased consensus.	Roll-call analysis NOMINATE
Hagemann (2006 and 2007)	Council Minutes and 57 expert interviews January 1999 to December 2006 period. 872 pieces of legislation.	After the enlargement the medium-sized members are the ones that vote “no“ most frequently, rather than the largest members. Still some conflict structure of geographical location, but no distinct pattern. Governments act strategically rather than sincerely when deciding how to best pursue their policy preferences.	Roll-call analysis NOMINATE: (geometrical scaling method)
Hagemann and Høyland (2008)	Council Minutes January 1999 to December 2006 period. 872 pieces of legislation.	Ideological affiliations influence coalition formation in the Council. Coalition patterns change when governments are replaced.	Ideal point estimation technique

These findings will be compared with the findings presented throughout in this thesis. When summarising the findings, the conclusion will present the main findings of the thesis in the same table format as table 1.3 in order to link the findings directly to the

Council literature. But before presenting the findings in the literature and the findings of the thesis in more detail, it is necessary to examine the research design and to present the data sets that are applied throughout the remaining chapters. The next chapter will hence outline the research design and the methodological challenges that are attached to it.

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## CHAPTER 2: THE RESEARCH DESIGN

### ***2.1 The Research Design: Model, Method and Data***

In order to answer the research question, this thesis will employ a simple spatial model that illustrates how the Council members should vote if they vote in accordance to their positions revealed by the data set collected by the DEU-project. The combination of both position data and actual voting data makes a close to ideal environment for testing the predictions of a simple spatial model. A strict test of a model, such as the one presented in this chapter, will reveal whether the member states in fact vote sincerely or not. Are the member states voting in line with their preferences (which the DEU data set reveals)? This question will be analysed thoroughly in chapter 5 and 6, but before this it is necessary to present and explain the research design in more detail.

In order to embed the research question in a broader empirical setting and reach more nuanced conclusions in relation to the voting behaviour of the Council members, this thesis will also employ other quantitative techniques<sup>4</sup>. This chapter is hence structured as follows: The first section presents a very general overview of how formal models are applied in the Council literature and then ends by presenting the logic behind the spatial model that is employed in this thesis. The second section presents the two data sets, examines the other quantitative techniques that this thesis relies upon and explains how the two data sets have been treated before the analyses. It ends by outlining the main two methodological challenges attached to this thesis, and shows briefly what has been done in order to accommodate those problems.

### ***2.2 The Simple Spatial Model<sup>5</sup>***


The rational choice institutionalist perspective, which was mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, has been advocated by a lot of scholars in the Council literature. The different contributions based on game theory have usually tried to

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<sup>4</sup> The statistical program, R, is used for all analyses presented in chapter 3 and 4.

<sup>5</sup> Some of the arguments in this section have previously been presented in Wøien Hansen (2007).

establish the benefits of being agenda setters and veto players in relation to the different legislative procedures used in the EU, and also what would be the most likely decision outcome under the different procedures. Because of differences in modelling the scholars present different answers to these two main topics of discussion. Tsebelis and Garrett (2000) model the final stage of the decision-making process as a one-dimensional formal model where every actor has stable and Euclidean preferences<sup>6</sup> around a given, ideal point as well as complete information about each other. The Commission and the EP are modelled as unitary actors favouring more integration than the Council, whereas the Council is modelled as seven different players. The reason for this latter modelling is that QMV voting requires roughly 5/7 (62 out of 87) votes in order for a decision to be successful. By employing such a model Tsebelis and Garrett (2000:23) predict a different outcome under the co-decision I procedure than the one they predict would happen under the consultation procedure:



**Figure 2-1 The Standard Version of Tsebelis and Garrett**  
(As presented in Rittberger (2000))

The basic features of the model: The 15 Council members are modelled as seven actors in a one-dimensional space where SQ at the left of the dimension is the existing policy and the Commission and the EP are modelled as unitary actors at the right side of the less- or more integration dimension. The preference of actor 3 is the outcome

<sup>6</sup> Euclidean one-dimension preferences are separable and utility declines monotonically in distance from the ideal point (Milyo 2000). Euclidean preferences are also categorised as a particular type of cardinal single-peaked preferences (Bogomolnaia and Laslier 2007).

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
under the Co-decision I procedure, whereas the preference of actor 4 is the outcome under the Consultation procedure.

The main argument made by this model is that under the Consultation procedure the EP could in fact present the Council with a proposal that was easier for the Council to adopt than to reject, whereas under Co-decision I the Council could give the EP a take-it-or-leave-it proposal if the negotiations in the Conciliation committee collapsed. Hence the introduction of the Co-decision I-procedure (by the Maastricht Treaty) was, according to Tsebelis and Garrett, a loss for the EP (i.e. outcomes would be closer to status quo compared to outcomes under the Consultation procedure). This because the Co-decision I procedure introduced a third round of decision-making. If the Council and the EP could not agree in the second round, the two parties could meet in a conciliation committee in order to reach agreement. If no agreement could be reached, the Council could present the EP with any version of their common position that they would like to present, and since the EP favours more integration over no integration (status quo) their veto right is built upon an, in fact, empty threat than would not be used in practice (Tsebelis and Garrett 2000:22-23).

Other scholars (like Scully 1997, Moser 1996, Crombez 1996, Steunenberg 1994 and Rittberger 2000) criticise many aspects of this model by suggesting that it does not take into account some important factors and aspects of decision-making in the EU. Scully (1997:65-66) advocates that the outcomes that Tsebelis and Garrett predict under the different procedures are fundamentally wrong based on four main criteria: 1) they do not take into account how the previous rounds of decision-making influence the final round, 2) The conditional agenda setter rights of the EP under the consultation procedure may only come into effect if the EP gains the support of the Commission, 3) Unconditional veto rights (as granted by the Co-decision procedure(s)) make sure that the EP never can be worse of than status quo and 4) Proposals are just as (or even more) likely to be adopted in the previous rounds of decision-making. Hence modelling the decision process of the EU in an adequately way is not an easy task. But the strength of this thesis is that it already has the preferences and actual votes of the

Council members, making it possible to test whether they vote in line with the assumptions of a simple spatial model or not. The DEU data set also has estimates for the decision outcomes as well as estimates for the status quo in relation to each proposal. This makes it possible to test a spatial model that shares many of its assumptions with the standard version.

The logic behind the model employed in this thesis is very simple, and may be presented in a similar manner as the standard version of Tsebelis and Garrett:



**Figure 2-2 A Simple Spatial Model**

According to this model “country Y” would vote yes regarding this proposal since the decision outcome is closer to Y’s ideal position than status quo (the outcome if the Council cannot reach any agreement) is to Y’s ideal position. But if Y positions itself at point 2, Y will be indifferent between the status quo and the decision outcome, and hence also vote yes because of the underlying assumptions of game theory. When taking an indifferent position the Council members would prefer a deal over no deal at all, whereas if Y prefer point 1 it should absolutely oppose this proposal if it acts upon its own interests. The member states would hence vote against the proposal if status quo is closer to their ideal position than the decision outcome. This simple spatial model does not give any room for random utility; hence the testing of it will be strict in manner. By this it is meant that, when matching positions with votes nothing else than the exact recorded position is considered. Chapter 5 shows how the testing of the



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simple spatial model is done in practice, but for a complete understanding of the testing is it important to bear in mind the premises outlined in this section.

## **2.3 Research Design**

### **2.3.1 The Data**

The two data sets employed in this thesis differ from each other in many ways, so this section presents the main characteristics of both data sources.

The data set “Decision making in the European Union” (DEU) has a three year time frame, 1999-2002, and was developed by an international team of researchers. It consists of estimates of EU decision makers’ most favoured positions on controversial issues and also the levels of salience they attached to these issues. The DEU data set has information on 174 issues from 70 Commission proposals, and the proposals were chosen to obtain a number of issues from a range of policy areas (Thomson and Stokman 2003:6-10). The Commission proposals were subject to either the Consultation- or the Co-decision procedure and the proposals were introduced during or before December 2000, and were on the agenda in 1999 and/or 2000 (Thomson and Stokman 2003:14). Of the 70 proposals, 42 were subjected to the Consultation procedure, while 28 were governed by the Co-decision procedure<sup>7</sup> where the EP and the Council are (more) coequal legislators.

The data was conducted through interviews held with 125 experts, most of them who belonged to the national delegations of the Council in Brussels. The experts specified the issues at stake in relation to every proposal. The positions of the 15 member states, the Commission and the European Parliament were estimated along a standardised policy scale with values from 0 till 100 in which the distances between the actors reflect the political distance between them. The reference point (the state of current

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<sup>7</sup> 16 of 28 proposals subjected to the Co-decision procedure was treated after the reform of this decision procedure, meaning they were actually subjected to the Co-decision II procedure where the conciliation committee is the final round (Thomson et al. 2006:317)

affairs) and the decision outcome attached to each issue were also defined along this continuum (Thomson and Stokman 2003:21).

The drawbacks of interview data are well known, and Thomson and Stokman (2003:15) stress that they are well aware of the limitations of expert judgements. Even so, they advocate that their research design minimises these problems:

”First of all, we focus on specific issues raised during the discussions on legislative proposals, rather than more abstract policy dimensions, such as a socio-economic Left-Right dimension. The meaning of these specific issues is clear, while more abstract policy dimensions may mean different things to different people. Second, we held in depth interviews with a relatively small number of experts, rather than a survey of a large number of individuals. Consequently, we were able to monitor the effort devoted to answering the questions, and the expertise on which the experts drew when providing their estimations”  
(Thomson and Stokman 2003:15).

But they also point out that the experts usually had first hand knowledge of the decision situations and were participants (i.e. members from the permanent representations of the member states or civil servants representing their state in Council discussions) in the decision-making processes. Thomson and Stokman (2003:15) justify this by emphasising the need for detailed information, even though this means that the policy experts interviewed could not be considered to be truly neutral and impartial experts.

The other data set, hereafter called the voting data set, is collected by Sara Hagemann, and consists of all legislative acts from January 1999 until today, but this thesis only uses data from the time period 1999-2002, which is the overlapping time period between the two data sets. During this time period 654 legislative acts were decided upon. The data is collected from the minutes of the Council meetings as documented by the Council website, the inter-institutional database PreLex and the Council’s Access Service. The Council minutes include each country’s decision to abstain, oppose, support and/or if they have made a formal statement.

The latter phenomenon may also be posted separately at the Council website, and not explicitly in the Council minutes. Information about procedure, date of introduction and adoption, A and B points<sup>8</sup>, policy area, title of proposal, policy contents, which stage of the legislative process the vote was taken and which stage the proposal was adopted, inter-institutional reference number, sectoral council and the name of the member holding the presidency are also included (Hagemann 2006:81).

As mentioned in chapter 1, the formal statements following the adoption of a proposal may reveal another level of contestation in the Council. Such statements may be recorded to show disagreement with the decision taken, often even regarding decisions where disagreement may not have been expressed through formal voting (Hagemann 2006:37). The voting data set includes all negative statements; negative votes, abstentions and the disagreement voiced through formal statements. The simple spatial model will be tested against a wider interpretation of the actual voting behaviour of the Council including all contestation that is possible to detect at the final stage of decision-making. In this way it is possible to give a more detailed picture of the voting behaviour shown by the Council members, and reveal more levels of contestation than just the levels accounted for by the negative votes and/or abstentions made.

Hagemann (2006:82) mentions two main limitations to her data. First, only those decisions which result in successful adoption are recorded. Hence there are no data on the decisions that the Council cannot reach agreement on, or the contestation levels attached to these “flawed” decisions. Second, decision-making in the Council could be subjected to vote trading, especially between legislation bundles that are on the agenda for the same meeting. Vote trading means that deals could be struck between the Council members that affects their voting behaviour on individual proposals. In return for agreement on one proposal, a Council member may choose to vote for a decision

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<sup>8</sup> B-point labelled proposals are supposed to be more controversial than A-points, but Hagemann (2006) shows that this not always hold when we look at the level of recorded disagreement attached to these decisions. Hence this division will not receive any explicit attention in this thesis. See Appendix A for information on which proposals that were labelled A-points and which (five proposals) that were labelled B-points.

whose content this member was initially against. These limitations would be further elaborated on in chapter 6.

### **2.3.2 Methods and their Drawbacks**

In addition to the simple spatial model this thesis also employs other quantitative techniques. The motivation for this is to define the political space of the Council, and let these findings structure the test of the simple spatial model as well as complementing the test findings by providing a useful background. To show how the political space may be revealed, this thesis will replicate the study of Zimmer et al. (2005) and then do the same type of analysis with the other data constellations presented here. Since the analysis of Zimmer et al. also is based on the DEU data set it is natural to compare the findings of this thesis with their findings, and it is also interesting to extend their research design by applying it at the voting data as well.

In order to determine the political space of the Council, we first have to determine how many dimensions that are likely to affect the decision-making in general.

A factor analysis or principal component analysis can reveal if the issues related to the different proposals, in fact, are versions of some more general issue dimensions. If the conflict structure is two-dimensional or three-dimensional it would certainly be easier to determine the negotiating positions of the Council members.

Factor analyses are frequently employed in order to reveal the latent conflict structure of multiple variables. According to Kim and Mueller (as cited in Zimmer et al 2005:409), factor analysis (FA) serves to reduce multiple variables to a few hypothetical constructs or factors. But Zimmer et al (2003:409) advocate that FA has several disadvantages when applied on the DEU data set. For instance, the sample size of the DEU data set is a bit too small for a FA, and the data is not measured sufficiently in order to meet the requirements of this analytical tool. Since FA is based on correlation matrixes and weighted variable sums the data should be measured on an interval scale level. The DEU data set could be said to be measured on an interval scale level regarding some of the issues considered, but since the different issues have

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values in accordance to their policy content the interval scale level does not apply to all of them. For example if issue X are divided into two position values: 0 (status quo) and 100 (new policy) it is not possible to measure the exact distance between these two positions.

Other tools for detecting the spatial orderings of the Council are multidimensional scaling (MDS) and hierarchical clustering (HC). HC is a form of cluster analysis, and may in this thesis detect different clusters of Council members. This clustering process yields a hierarchy where subsets of clusters are aggregated to form the clusters at the next aggregated level and so forth. Hence it is possible to detect likely coalition partners and then make a division between likely partners and *more* likely partners for each original cluster. In the end the different stages in the process are presented as a tree diagram where the branches indicate when clusters come together or/and are separated (Bartholomew et al. 2002:17-18) MDS, on the other hand, aims to reveal the structure of a data set by plotting points in one or two dimensions. The result of a MDS analysis is a picture that can be interpreted as a map (Mattila and Lane 2001:44). Hence distance is the prime concept in MDS, meaning that this technique may determine the (political) distance between one Council member and another making the ones close to each other likely coalition partners (Bartholomew et al. 2002:53-54). Both techniques could easily define the dimensional space of the Council, but it would be difficult to trace the positions back to the influence of the issues that are contested (Zimmer et al 2005:409). But the problems of MDS, HC and FA could be avoided by employing alternative techniques; principal component analysis (PC) or correspondence analysis (CA).

The differences between these two techniques are quite small. PC is a descriptive method that is concerned with summarising a data matrix in a manner which expresses its structure in a small number of dimensions (Bartholomew et al 2002: 143). The aim of CA is the same: to represent the raw data in a low-dimensional space so that it is easier to identify the key features of the data (Bartholomew et al 2002:81). The main difference between the two analytical techniques lies in the criteria each of them

employ in order to explain whether the model fits or not. In CA the dimensions are derived in order of importance in the meaning that the first dimension explains the largest proportion of Pearson's chi-squared statistic (or inertia), while in PC the components are also determined in order of importance but also in terms of the proportion of variance explained (Bartholomew et al 2002:116). Both CA and MDS convert a small table of numbers into a plot of points in a smaller number of dimensions – most usually two dimensions, whereas PC replaces the actual number of metrical correlated variables by a smaller number of uncorrelated variables. These new uncorrelated variables contain most of the information from the original set of variables (Bartholomew et. al 2002:81 and 115).

In short all techniques reveal the latent structures of the data but visualises them in different ways. Even so, regarding the data sets employed in this thesis PC and CA may be the most suitable techniques. This because both trace the latent structure of nominally or ordinally scaled data, hence the data does not need to be measured on an interval level (as in FA). The two techniques are also especially suitable when the research design involves a small number of cases, like the DEU data employed in this thesis.

### **2.3.3 Data Preparation**

This thesis has treated missing values of the DEU data set in the same way that Zimmer et al (2005:409) has treated them. Issues where the preference positions are unknown for more than four member states were discarded from the analysis. The reason for this is simple. If more than 30 % of the member states' positions are unknown it would be difficult to determine the political space of the Council accurately. Hence it is better to remove those issues from the analysis. Other missing scores were given the mean score of the reference point (status quo of that particular policy) and the position of the Commission. In this way the member states that could not be given a preference score during the expert interviews were attributed a neutral position.

15 issues had more than four missing scores, and were hence discarded from the analysis. The new number of issues is a total of 159 issues, but the number of proposals is still 70, the same as the original dataset<sup>9</sup>. This is because neither of the issues removed influenced the number of proposals. See appendix A for a complete list of the issues that were removed from the analysis. When the reference point was unknown (i.e because the Commission was introducing a new policy) this thesis chose to give the member states that lacked a preference score the value 0. Zimmer et al. do not mention what they have done in this particular situation, but since this just affect three of the 159 issues and just three member states (one missing on each issue dimension), it is not likely that this choice will affect the overall reliability and validity of the analyses.

The voting data originally links each country's votes to which government each country has on any given time. This means that if one country had three governments during the time period of the data set, three variables would measure its actual voting behaviour. Since the DEU data does not explicitly measures such shifts in government, it has been constructed one voting behaviour variable for each Council member. Except from this the voting data has been used in its original form.

In order to test the simple spatial model, each proposal presented in the DEU data has been given the mean value of all the issues attached to it. Thus, if one proposal X consisted of three issues and country Y had the values 80, 100 and 80 on these issues, its position on proposal X is estimated as 87. The justification for this arrangement is that even though a proposal may consist of more than one issue; the data shows that each member state often have the same tendency on all three issues. And if this is not the case, the reference points (the status quo) and the decision outcomes linked to every single issue may equalise this problem. This because the reference point and the decision outcome on each proposal also are estimated as means based on the number

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<sup>9</sup> Zimmer et a (2005) do not mention how many issues they discarded from the analysis, but 15 is the number of issues this thesis removed from the analysis after following the information given in the original study.

of issues (and hence number of outcomes and number of reference points) attached to each proposal.

There are two main challenges in relation to the research design of this thesis. First, comparing the controversial proposals in the DEU data set with all the proposals in the same time period may be problematic, and then go on by using the proposals identified in both data sets as a basis for saying something about voting behaviour in the Council may propose difficulties. The extent of these problems will be determined by employing a t-test in chapter 4.

Second there are a variety of problems attached to the simple spatial model, and the employment of it. Chapter 5 will address these problems in practice by modelling the tobacco directive explicitly, and chapter 6 will evaluate the model in detail and compare its performance with the performance of an alternative model.



## CHAPTER 3: A REPLICATION OF ZIMMER ET AL.

### **3.1 *The Political Space of the Council***

This chapter will compare the analysis of Zimmer et al. (2005), which reveals a three-dimensional conflict structure, with a replicated study with the same research design, as outlined in the previous chapter.

But instead of just relying on one explicit technique (correspondence analysis) this chapter will employ other different techniques (factor analysis, principal component analysis, multidimensional scaling and hierarchical clustering) as well. This will enable the thesis to discuss the findings of both their study and the replicated study in a broader methodological setting. The last sections of this chapter will then go on by comparing these findings with the main findings in the Council literature.

### **3.2 *Dimensions in the Council: Comparing the Results***

The results of the different analyses of the replicated study (see tables 3.1) show that method plays a considerable role when defining the political space of the Council. If we are to rely upon a decision rule advocating that each dimension must explain more than 10 % of the total variance to be considered important, only the results of the factor analysis justifies to be labelled a three dimensional model.

**Table 3-1 Results: Replication of Zimmer et al. (FA, PC and CA)**

Different models	1 dimensional model	2 dimensional model	3 dimensional model
FA: Explained variation in %	25,5%	47,5 %	57,8%
PC: Explained variation in %	39,1%	59,2%	65,9%
CA: Explained variation in %	42,5%	52,1%	60,1%

The PC analysis and the CA analysis reveal, instead, a two dimensional structure of the Council. The 10 % decision rule could of course be discussed, but if we decrease this threshold another problem will occur since the difference between the third and

the fourth dimension of the analyses is so small. If we include three dimensions, why not include the fourth too? Hence a 10 % rule could be justified in this context.


When looking at the results of the analytical techniques that are most suitable for this kind of data set, PC and CA, the two dimensional model explains 59,2 % and 52,1 % of the total variance respectively. The main difference between these two techniques were outlined in chapter 2, and it is interesting to see that the first dimension in the CA has a more important role (when explaining the total variance) than the role of the first dimension in the PC. Regarding the PC, the second and third dimension explains a lot more of the variance than their counterparts in the CA.

The three dimensional model derived from the correspondence analysis of Zimmer et al (2005) explains, in contrast, 53,7 % of the total variance, so the results of this replication study and the results of the original study differs to some extent when we compare the total variance explained in each study. This shows that replicating quantitative analyses are not an easy task, and these differences in numbers could support the argument that researchers need to improve their documentation regarding how they have conducted their analysis. But if we employ the 10 % decision rule on the original study from 2005 the results of this study will, as the replication study, advocate a two dimensional structure of the Council that explains 44,8% of the total variance:


**Table 3-2 Possible interpretations of the Dimensions in DEU (Zimmer et al 2005:411)**

	D1	D2	Explained variation, 2D-model	D3	Explained variation, 3D-model
DEU	Market regulation, subsidies	Consumer protection, subsidies	<b>44,8%</b>	Subsidies, economic interests protectionism	<b>53,7%</b>

When we have a closer look on how the member states position themselves in this two dimensional space, the CA plot of the replication study (figure 3.1) and the CA plot of the original study (figure 3.2) show almost identical structures.




**Figure 3-1 Replication study: (CA)**




**Figure 3-2 Original study CA**  
Zimmer et al (2005:410)

Both plots show a grouping of France, Spain (España), Greece, Italy and to some extent Portugal. The Nordic countries are also grouped together in both plots (Sweden and Denmark have almost identical points) and the Netherlands and the UK (GB) are also placed close to each other. Ireland has the same place in both plots, but Luxembourg is closer to Ireland in the original study. Belgium is also placed somewhat different in this study, and Austria and Germany are more outliers here than in the replication study. But the differences between the two structures can be accounted for by the difference in dimensions considered. Zimmer et al. consider three dimensions in their analysis, whereas this analysis employs two dimensions. When plotting the CA of the replication study in three dimensions it is likely that the already small differences between the two analyses will get even smaller. The similarities in dimensional structure shows that the results of the replication study and the results of the original study do not differ in a significant manner.

Also the plots of principal component analysis (PC), hierarchical clustering (HC) and multidimensional scaling (MDS) reveal quite similar dimensional structures when it comes to the distances between- and the groupings of the member states (see figure 3.3, figure 3.4 and figure 3.5).




**Figure 3-3 Replication study (PC)**



**Figure 3-4 Replication study (MDS)**

The PC also shows a loose bloc of southern European countries like Greece, Spain, France, Portugal and Italy. But the Nordic bloc is not that evident in this plot. UK and the Netherlands are again quite close each other and the same are to be said for Luxembourg and Ireland, the two smallest countries of the EU. As in figure 3.1 Germany and Austria are close to each other also in this plot.

The MDS plot also shows a clear Nordic bloc, a southern bloc and pairings of Germany and Austria and the Netherlands and the UK. Once again Belgium is closer to southern-European countries than its more northern neighbours. Mattila and Lane (2001:44-45) also employ MDS as a visual displaying technique, and their plot also shows a southern bloc of Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal. Hence the MDS plot (Figure 3.4) to some extent overlaps with the analysis of Mattila and Lane which indicates that a north-south division is the main cleavage in the Council.



**Figure 3-5 Replication study: hierarchical clustering**

The HC plot shows two main clusters: One with Greece, Portugal, France, Spain, Belgium and Italy and one with Germany, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, UK, Ireland, Austria and Luxembourg. This division could to some extent be detected in the other four presented plots as well. Further on the Nordic countries form a separate cluster, as well as the Netherlands and the UK. Both these findings are consistent with the two CA plots and the MDS plot. Overall this shows that the patterns are quite consistent independently of what technique that has been employed.

### **3.3 Interpreting the Dimensions**

Before trying to interpret the results of the replication study, some reservations have to be made. The Council decides over a variety of complicated and very detailed topics. And since the content of the dimensions revealed through this kind of analysis is highly dependent on the issues at hand, it is difficult to draw explicit conclusions on the general conflict structure within the Council. Also, in correspondence analysis the interpretation of the policy content of the dimensions is based upon the columns (issues) with extreme component loadings (Zimmer et al 2005:410), making it difficult

to subscribe substantial content to the different dimensions revealed through the analysis.

It is not possible to say something about absolute positions. The positions of the member states that are revealed through the different analyses can hence only be interpreted relatively to each other. And it is not certain that the scales applied to the different plots are the same, even though we cannot say that the scales, in fact, are different from each other. So we have to be aware of all these problems when interpreting the dimensions.

It is possible to interpret the dimensions obtained from the CA (and the PC) by examining the position of row/column categories along each dimension and thinking about what row/column categories, that appears to make natural groupings, have in common (Bartholomew et al. 2002:95). The plots provide a visual display of such groupings of row/column categories.

When looking at figure 3.1 it is evidently that these analyses supports the north-south dimension advocated by Mattila (2006) and Mattila and Lane (2001). The northern countries (like for instance Austria, Denmark, Sweden, UK, Germany and Finland) seem to make one grouping, and Spain, France, Portugal, Italy and Greece another (southern) grouping. The north-south dimension has been criticised for lacking theoretical justification, but Zimmer et al (2005) advocates that the north-south dimension may be incorporated in the theoretically supported redistributive dimension. Hence the conflict between the north and the south, can rather be seen as a conflict between the net-contributors (the north) and the net-receivers (the south). The northern countries who only make small net-contributions (like Finland) can be still be a part of the northern block because of so-called cultural connectedness, aka “you do as your neighbour does” (Zimmer et al 2005:411). Hence this replication study clearly can be taken as supporting the redistributive dimension of Zimmer et al (2005), where the two dimensions are subdivisions of the general redistributive dimension and may touch

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upon different economical conflicts of the EU (i.e. market regulation and consumer protection).

Another possible interpretation of the plots is that the two dimensional political space is governed by the frequently advocated left-right dimension and the more or less integration-dimension. The first dimension of the CA (figure 3.1) could be the left-right dimension and the second dimension could be the more or less integration-dimension leaving the UK at a traditionally defensive position as one of the most free market and least integrationist member states (Hix 2005, Zimmer et al. 2005).

This chapter does not find any particular support for the large vs. small countries-dimension advocated by Mattila (2004). The CA plots do not reveal explicit groupings of small countries and other groupings of big countries, except for the coalition of the Nordic countries which could also be explained by cultural connectedness (Elgström et al. 2001) or similarities in political and economical structures (Hix 2005:87).

### **3.4 Summary**

This chapter has replicated the study of Zimmer et al (2005). The results show that method does matter to some extent when determining the political space of the Council of Ministers, although the pattern of conflict seems to be stable no matter what method we choose to employ. The analysis has revealed a two dimensional space, and the two dimensions can be said to support both the notion of a redistributive dimension and the more general notion that ideology and integration speed determines the positions of the EU member states. Hence this thesis supports the main findings of Zimmer et al (2005), but also some of the main findings of Mattila (2004 and 2006). The notions discussed in this chapter will be elaborated upon in more detail in the next chapter that compares the results from the correspondence analysis of the DEU data with a similar analysis of the voting data.

## CHAPTER 4: POSITIONS VERSUS ACTUAL VOTES

### ***4.1 Introduction to a Comparative Analysis***

It is essential to compare positions with actual votes in order to determine whether the Council members vote sincere or whether their voting behaviour may be governed by strategic considerations. But before determining this it could be useful to define the differences between the two data sets by employing correspondence analysis as the analytical tool of choice.

The structure is as follows: The first section of this chapter compares the DEU data with voting data stretching from the period from January 1999 – December 2002 (654 acts) because this is the overlapping time period between the two datasets. Of the 70 proposals in the Thomson data, unfortunately only 44 of them can be identified in the Council Minutes. There can be a variety of reasons for this, and the problems the lack of coherence represent for this thesis will be adequately addressed in this chapter. Hence the second section compares the different data constellations employed in this thesis by focusing on the mean values in order to reveal if there are any significant differences to detect. This is an important comparison since the DEU project only explores the most controversial proposals of the overlapping time period. Hence the critical questions are whether the 44 proposals, that are included in the DEU data, are significantly different from the rest of the proposal universe, and whether the selection of 44 proposals is significantly different from the 70 proposals originally considered by the DEU project.

The third section will compare the overlapping proposals of the two datasets in the same way as the first section, by employing correspondence analysis. The member states' positions on the 44 proposals of the Thomson data set are calculated by giving each member state a position which equals the mean value of the issues attached to



each proposal<sup>10</sup>. The fourth section summarises the findings and places them in a broader empirical setting.

#### **4.2 The Results: All Positions versus all Votes**

When comparing the results of the previous DEU correspondence analysis with the results of the correspondence analysis (hereafter the CA) of the actual voting data, it is evident that only the actual voting data can defend a three dimensional model when we use the previously explained 10% decision rule. The two dimensional DEU model explains 52,1% of the total variance while the three dimensional voting data model explains 40,8% of the total variance:

**Table 4-1 Results CA: Both Datasets**


Different models	1 dimensional model	2 dimensional model	3 dimensional model
DEU: Explained variation in %	42,5%	52,1%	60,1%
Voting data: Explained variation in %	15,6%	29,5%	40,8%

This gap in explained variance can be anticipated since the possible distributions of row categories over the column categories and vice versa differ in the two data sets (Bartholomew et al. 2002: 80). The voting data has only two values: 1 (yes) and 0 (no), and since the proportion of negative votes is very low it is little variation to detect in this data. The extent to which row/column distributions vary across the column/row categories is hence much smaller in the voting data than in the data based on positions. The latter has values from 0-100, and has much more room for possible variation. Because of this it is more useful for this thesis to compare the plots of the two CAs than the different levels of explained variation, even though also the CA plots should be treated with caution since the two data sets are so different in terms of distributions.


The plots vary to some degree when it comes to determining the political space in the Council. The DEU plot (figure 4.1) finds (as previously discussed) support for a north-

<sup>10</sup> See chapter 2 for justification for this.


south dimension, a left-right dimension and a more-or less integration dimension, and render it possible to incorporate the north-south dimension as a sub-dimension in the more theoretically founded redistributive dimension. But the comparison of this CA plot with the voting data CA plot (figure 4.3), shows that these dimensions cannot be supported to such a high extent by an analysis based on actual voting data:




**Figure 4-1 (as in chapter 3):  
DEU: All positions**



**Figure 4-2  
DEU: 44 positions**



**Figure 4-3  
Voting data: All votes**



**Figure 4-4  
Voting data: 44 votes**

The voting data plot rather shows a grouping of small countries like Luxembourg, Ireland, Austria and Denmark, while the two largest countries, Germany and France, are considerably closer to each other here than in the DEU plot. This makes “the large versus small countries dimension”, that is supported by Mattila (2004:45), much more evident in the voting data than in the position data. It is interesting to note that also this is a dimension that to some degree can be incorporated in the redistributive dimension advocated by Zimmer et al. (2005), many of the large countries are the net-contributors (Germany contributes the most) to the EU budget whereas many of the smaller countries, like for instance Ireland, are among the net-beneficiaries.

In the voting data plot the UK is once again at a counterpoint, but this time it is closer to a cluster of smaller countries as well as Spain. The constellation of southern countries and the Nordic cluster that can be detected in the position data plot is not supported by the voting data plot, leaving an impression of little coherence between the two correspondence analyses. But once again this could be explained by the low proportion of negative votes in the voting data. It is important to have in mind that it is only the successfully adopted proposals that are a part of this data set, and this leaves naturally little room for variation among the countries.

### ***4.3 Explaining and Determining the Selection Problems***

Of the 70 proposals in the DEU data set only 44 of them could be found in the Council Minutes, and hence in the voting data that are based on the Council Minutes and the statements posted at the Council website. There could be a variety of explanations for this.

It could be, that the Council chose not to publish the minutes linked to some of the missing proposals that were on the agenda already prior to 1999. This because the Council increased their level of transparency, as issued by the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), by publishing the Council minutes at the website for the first time in February 1999 leaving their decisions prior to this unavailable for the

public (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006: 125 and the Council website). 12 of the 26 missing proposals have been on the agenda before 1999 (see appendix A for details on these proposals). Moreover, one of these 12 proposals (CNS/1996/160: “Council Regulation (EC) No 850/98 of 30 March 1998 for the conservation of fishery resources through technical measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms”) was decided upon before 1999 (Thomson et al 2006:318), and is hence not a part of the actual voting data. Another proposal<sup>11</sup> (COD/1995/341: Proposal for a 13<sup>th</sup> European Parliament and Council Directive on company law concerning takeover bids) was rejected by the European Parliament, and thus not exists in the actual voting data. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006:125) also stresses that the online register of council documents does not necessarily include all legal acts. Some Council Minutes may be classified as *limité*, and are not directly- or completely available. This may also contribute to explain why 26 proposals cannot be identified in the voting data.

Further on, of the proposals that have been reconsidered and changed quite a few times over the years, it is likely that only the latter versions of this directive or decision are included in the Council Minutes. A thoroughly reading of the Council Minutes<sup>12</sup>, and a subsequent examination of the actual voting data supports this notion.

Another explanation for the gap between the DEU data and the Council Minutes could be that the proposal in the DEU data may have been included as separate decisions in the Council minutes (Hagemann 2007:126), hence making it difficult to match the proposals with each other. But this is not very likely to affect the data of this thesis since Thomson et al. have included the decision outcome in the DEU data set. Any how, it could be possible that they have only found the decision outcome related to one of, for instance a total of, three issues, making it likely to link the initial proposal to a, in fact, separate decision.

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<sup>11</sup> This proposal is not included in the group of the 12 proposals that were on the agenda prior to 1999, because the DEU data does not mention (explicitly) the date it was voted upon.

<sup>12</sup> The author of this thesis have read all the Council Minutes in the time period under scrutiny in order to make sure that the analysis should be as accurate as possible.

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It is also to be said that the Official Journal of the European Union , accounts for some information on the proposals that cannot be detected in the Council Minutes (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006:125). So it could be that the Council some times only chose to document parts of their decisions through this channel, leaving data based on the Council Minutes to some extent not updated on every single Council decision. Finally it may be that some member states refuse to make their positions on a proposal public. The member states are still allowed to this, although it has occurred only nine times since 1999 (Hagemann 2007:27). It has not been possible to obtain information on which proposals that are affected by this rare phenomenon, but it could be likely that some of the missing proposals would be accounted for in this way.

As discussed in chapter 2, the missing proposals represent some problems for this thesis. The main drawback is that the missing proposals make a complete comparison of both data sets impossible. This leaves us with the question: Would the results of the correspondence analyses and the results of the simple spatial model test be very different if this thesis could compare all 70 proposals instead of the overlapping 44? And does the controversial selection criteria, that is applied in the DEU project, restrain the possibility to generalise the results of this thesis's analysis to the rest of the proposal universe? These questions could be answered by comparing the mean values of the four different data constellations, employing a t-test that compares the mean values of two separate selections. By comparing the mean values of the DEU data set and the DEU 44 data set, and using the difference between the two values as the fundament for a test observator, it is possible to test if "m1= m2" or if "m1" actually is significantly different from "m2" (Skog 2007:180-183). The test is done accordingly to the formulas presented in Skog (2007), and is also employed at the voting data set and at the voting 44 data set.

The results of the two tests are as follows:

**Table 4-2 T-test of mean values (all datasets)**

Country	Mean DEU 70	Mean DEU 44	T-value pairwise DEU	Mean Voting Data 1999-2002 (654)	Mean Voting Data 44	T-value pairwise Voting Data
Germany	48,43	43,51	-0,6900	0,9679	0,9545	-0,4132
France	56,15	59,88	0,5121	0,9587	0,9545	-0,1288
UK	46,74	45,54	-0,1761	0,9725	0,9318	-1,0653
Italy	56,38	58,51	0,3008	0,945	0,9318	-0,3407
Spain	54,45	59,00	0,6799	0,9664	0,9091	-1,2940
Netherlands	46,13	47,39	0,1857	0,9495	0,9091	-0,9067
Greece	51,52	51,99	0,0694	0,9694	0,9318	-0,9825
Belgium	52,79	56,49	0,5310	0,9801	0,9318	-1,2682
Portugal	53,38	54,67	0,1927	0,9633	0,8864	-1,5755
Sweden	51,09	52,44	0,2029	0,9602	0,9773	0,71466
Austria	48,97	47,90	-0,1671	0,9862	0,9545	-0,9904
Denmark	51,75	48,93	-0,4360	0,9755	0,9545	-0,6522
Finland	53,61	51,79	-0,2706	0,974	0,9773	0,14064
Ireland	48,99	50,44	0,2182	0,9847	1	3,2606*
Luxembourg	48,11	50,37	0,3310	0,9908	0,9545	-1,1380

\*p =< .05

Since the degrees of freedom are the sum of the proposals in both groups minus 2, the degrees of freedom are 112 in the DEU pairs and 696 in the voting data pairs. This means that the critical T-value is plus/minus 1,98 in both tests if we employ a 5% level of significance (Skog 2007:182). The results of the DEU test show that neither of the mean value-pairings is significantly different from each other. The same holds for the voting data test, with one exception: Ireland. This is because during the 44 overlapping proposals Ireland did not oppose the decisions at all, and hence the related T-value is much higher than the other countries' T-values.

From these two T-tests it is possible to draw two conclusions that are of high importance to this thesis when moving on with the analyses:

1) The results of the correspondence analyses and the results of the simple spatial model test, both based on the 44 overlapping proposals, would not differ significantly

from the results that could have been detected with a complete universe of overlapping proposals.

2) The controversial proposals in the DEU data set do not differ from the proposal universe of the same time period, when it comes to the actual voting behaviour of the Council members.

But this does not mean that the proposal universe (1999-2002) is similar to the 70 proposals of the DEU data set in terms of the amount of time and debate attached to each proposal before the last step of decision-making<sup>13</sup>. The T-test does not rule out that the proposals of the DEU data set are more controversial than others when it comes to preparatory stages and various negotiations, both in the Council and between the EU institutions.

#### **4.4 The Results: 44 positions versus 44 votes**

The results of the two correspondence analyses justify that both data constellations can be modelled in three dimensions, even if we employ the 10% decision rule (see table 4.3). Although this makes plotting the data in two dimensions a bit inadequate, it can be argued that such a plot still illustrates the data in a sufficient manner. A two-dimensional “DEU 44 model” explains 51% of the total variance, while a two-dimensional “voting data 44 model” explains 39,9% of the total variance.

**Table 4-3 Results 44 proposals correspondence analysis (CA)**

Different models	1 dimensional model	2 dimensional model	3 dimensional model
DEU: Explained variation in %	36,5%	51%	63,1%
Voting data: Explained variation in %	21,8%	39,9%	54,2%

The two-dimensional “DEU 44 model” explains roughly as much as the two-dimensional “DEU all positions” model, but the two-dimensional “voting data 44 model” explains roughly as much as the three-dimensional “voting data all votes” model. The differences between the two voting data models can of course be explained

<sup>13</sup> See chapter 6 for more elaboration on the time frames attached to the decision-making processes.

by the differences in size between the two selections, that are much bigger than the differences between the two DEU selections.

When looking at the plots of the “44 proposals” two-dimensional models (see figure 4.2 and figure 4.4) it is clear that the “DEU 44” plot is in general quite similar to the “DEU all positions” plot (figure 4.1). The northern countries form one group and the southern countries another, making it possible to argue for the existence of a redistributive dimension as previously discussed. This finding may also support the notion that coalitions are likely to form between governments with similar policy goals, interests and political- and economical structures (Hix 2005:87).

This applies especially to the grouping of Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, the cluster of Germany and the Netherlands and the southern grouping of France, Italy and Greece which to some degree also includes Spain and Portugal. The groups of northern and southern countries may thus be explained by the groups’ differences in regulation modes. In political economy the groups are attributed distinctive varieties of capitalism that are categorised by specific organisational structures (Hall 1999:143). The policy paths that the member states can pursue successfully may hence often be affected by the existing structure of the states’ political economy (Hall 1999:161). The Rhine model (close relationship between banks and industries) and the different variants of organised capitalism or coordinated market economies may illustrate the northern group, whereas high government regulation and intervention as well as social oligopolies may be common features of the Southern-European states (Hall 1999 and Boyer 1997). Elaborating further on these arguments it is possible to explain the more isolated position of the UK (in figure 4.1 and to some degree 4.3) with the country’s liberal market economy, that differs from the coordinated market economies in for instance its focus on short –term profitability and its lack of representative organisations and central coordination of the employers’ interests (Hall 1999:143-144). The economic- and social structures of the member states may hence play a role in explaining the voting behaviour of the Council. This notion may also incorporate to some extent the “cultural connectedness”-argument, where countries with similarities



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in cultural traditions and language are supposed to vote together (Elgström et al. 2001).

In relation to this it is interesting to note that the Nordic grouping are much less evident in the “DEU 44” plot than in the “DEU all positions” plot. This finding may suggest that Sweden, Finland and Denmark voted more “together” on the missing 26 proposals than the 44 proposals there are overlapping data on.

The “voting data 44” plot (figure 4.4) is a lot harder to interpret; basically this can again be explained by the huge difference in selection size. It is although interesting to see that there is possible to detect three groups of countries. Sweden, France, Ireland and Finland form one group, Italy, Belgium, Spain, UK and Netherlands another and lastly it can be seen a less tight cluster of Luxembourg, Austria, Denmark, Greece and Germany. Once again (as in the three other plots) it seems like Luxembourg and Austria are voting in a similar manner, whereas Portugal again takes a more isolated position.

Apart from the mentioned findings the plot represents a bit of an exception from the norm of groupings of large and small countries and/or northern and southern countries that the other plots have revealed. Even so the group of Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Spain and UK are all among the 8 largest member states of the EU 15 (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006:264-265), suggesting that the dimension of large versus small countries also may apply to this plot as it did to the “voting data all votes” plot (figure 4.3). This particular group of countries can also be linked to the analyses of Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006:282-283). Their analyses show that the Netherlands, Italy and the UK are among the five most frequent “no”-voters (together with Germany and Denmark).

#### **4.5 Summarising the Findings**

This chapter has explored the similarities and differences of the correspondence analyses of four different data constellations, as well as determining the implications of the “selection problems”. The chapter has done four main findings:

- Both the actual voting data and the position data reveal support for a redistributive dimension, as advocated by Zimmer et al (2005). Either in terms of northern versus southern member states or in form of big member states versus the smaller member states.
- All four data constellations suggest to some degree that the Council members often vote the same way as their geographical neighbours. This finding supports the notion that member states with similarities in interests, political goals and economy vote together (Hix 2005:87 and Hall 1999). The related political economy argument may also be a more theoretical fundament for the north versus south dimension as well as a more familiar and recognised explanation related to the conflict structure of the Council in general.
- Overall the two-dimensional model of the political space of the Council is a better fit than a three-dimensional model. This is to be said; if we employ a ten percent decision rule, and take into account the percents of variance that each dimension of the models explains. This suggests that the bargaining is more likely to centre around one- or two main-dimensions, rather than three dimensions.
- The differences between the data selections, which exist mainly because of the difficulties attached to finding the overlapping proposals of the position data and the voting data, are not significant. In practice (when voting) the controversial proposals of the DEU data set do not differ significantly when compared to all the proposals from the same time period. This means that “the selection problems” do no restrain the findings of this thesis in any significant way.

But to put the results of the CAs in perspective, these results have to be linked more specifically to a theory of decision-making. Hence this thesis will now use the results from this chapter when structuring the test of a simple spatial model of voting behaviour in order to determine its explanatory force.

## CHAPTER 5: TESTING THE SIMPLE SPATIAL MODEL


### ***5.1 What defines Voting Behaviour?***

The research question of this thesis “Can positions on single-issues explain voting behaviour in the Council of Ministers” can be tested (as previously mentioned) by employing a simple spatial model. If the Council members actually vote accordingly to their preferences the answer to the research question will be yes. If the opposite is true, we have to look for alternative explanations. This chapter will now test the model by comparing the overlapping proposals of the two data sets. By doing this it is possible to draw explicit conclusions on each member state’s performance in relation to the model. The main contribution of this thesis is hence that the two data sets combined facilitate the opportunity to reveal the consistency between positions and actual votes/statements. So by merging the two data sets it is possible to make a contribution to the existing literature on this field.

The structure of this chapter is as follows: The first section presents how it is possible to test the performance of the simple spatial model, and illustrates this by employing the Tobacco Directive as an example. The second section evaluates the performance of the simple spatial model, both its aggregative performance and how it performs in relation to each Council member’s voting behaviour. Throughout this section the findings presented are also compared to the findings from the existing Council literature on this topic.

## 5.2 Testing the Models

The logic behind the simple spatial model was outlined in chapter 2, by employing this figure:



**Figure 5-1 A Simple Spatial Model**

Since this thesis has access to both the member states' ideal positions and the decision outcomes (both can be found in the DEU data), this data can be matched with the voting data revealing how the Council members actually did vote on the 44 proposals that the data sets have in common. The ideal positions (the predicted positions), the decision outcomes, the reference points and the actual votes are all the information that this thesis needs in order to do an adequate test of the validity and reliability of the simple spatial model. The test can hence determine whether the simple spatial model is a useful tool for explaining the voting behaviour of the Council, or if the model has to be complemented by other explanations. Unfortunately the DEU data lacks the position of the decision outcome in a total of seven proposals, making 37 the actual total of proposals that can be employed in the testing of the simple spatial model (see Appendix B for information on which proposals that does not include the position of the decision outcome).

In order to show the logic behind the test of this model and some problems attached to it, this thesis will use an explicit proposal (one of the proposals included in the testing)

as an illustration. Consider the Tobacco Directive: “Directive 2001/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2001 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products”. This directive outlines regulations for the supervision of all forms of tobacco products. In more detail, it prohibits the use of terms like “light” and “mild” and brand-names that advertise with “less harmful” tobacco. Moreover, it means that warning texts on tobacco products will be increased in size, and that maximum permitted yield levels (of nicotine, tar and carbon monoxide) should also apply for products manufactured in the EU, but intended for export to third countries (EurActiv). Thomson et al (2006:331) describe this decision outcome as a victory for the health lobby, but is this decision outcome also a victory for the performance of the simple spatial model? A closer look on the predicted positions- and the actual votes/statements of the Council Members in relation to this explicit example may give us an answer to this question. Hence based on the DEU data and the voting records data the Tobacco Directive can be modelled in this way:




Figure 5-2 The Tobacco Directive

Figure 5.2 shows that the model performs quite well when trying to predict how the actors would vote on this directive. It manages to predict right three out of five negative statements. Luxembourg, Austria and Greece were negative towards the directive both in the DEU data and the actual voting data. But if the model was to perform perfectly, it had to position Portugal and Germany at the left side of the indifferent point (39) too. Since both Germany and Portugal were among the six least positive members on this proposal, the model at least seems to predict the general (ordered) preference distribution of the Council accurately. The model states that Luxembourg, Austria and Greece will prefer status quo over the decision outcome (X), whereas the other Council members prefer X over status quo. The Council Minutes reveal that Austria, Luxembourg and Germany abstained from voting (and in practice voted “no”), and this means that Greece and Portugal issued their negative opinions through formal statements<sup>14</sup>. It is to be said that all five of the actual negative council members could not have expressed their negative preference through voting in order to make the voting records (5/7 must vote “yes” in order to reach a decision or more explicit 62 out of 87 votes).

This may suggest that Portugal perhaps was not that evidently negative since it did not abstain from voting/voted “no” and was not positioned as negative towards the directive. Or it may suggest that Portugal, for instance, gained some bargains in its favour in the last rounds of negotiations and hence did not propose an actual threat against successful decision-making. Any how, the Tobacco Directive is the only one of the 37 proposals, which are included in the testing, that has more than four actual negative statements. This means, that the negative statements of the voting data may correspond to a high degree with the abstentions/negative votes that are cited in the Council minutes. This again, means that the performance of the simple spatial model may be tested in an adequate way.

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<sup>14</sup> Formal statements can be included in the Council minutes or posted afterwards on the Council’s website (Hagemann 2006:81). In this case they were not included in the minutes.

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In order to determine the reliability and the validity of the simple spatial model the test will make use of recall and precision for measuring the model's goodness of fit when it comes to voting behaviour in the Council of Ministers. Whereas recall is a measure of completeness, precision measures the exactness of the model. Generally, researchers are interested in obtaining high levels of precision in conjunction with high (or reasonable) levels of recall (Cardie and Wilkerson 2008:3). High levels of both precision and recall are hence the criteria for good performance of the simple spatial model.

More explicitly, the precision test determines how many predicted positive votes which are actually positive and how many predicted negative votes which are actually negative. In other words precision asks: What percentage of the annotations (votes) proposed by the model is correct when compared to the gold standard (how they actually voted)? The recall test identifies how many of the actual positive votes that are also predicted positive, and how many of the actual negative votes that are predicted negative as well. The recall test answers the question: What percentage of the annotations (votes) in the gold standard is identified correctly by the model? (Cardie and Wilkerson 2008:3). Together the two measures may give a nuanced picture of the performance of the spatial model.

### ***5.3 Testing the Models: Discussing the Results***

#### **5.3.1 Structuring the Discussion**

When testing the model the thesis will divide the council members into groups based on the previous results of this thesis and the redistributive dimension supported by the Council literature. The natural 4 groupings in relation to these criteria are:

- Germany, France and UK: This group consists of the three largest countries of the EU, and Germany and UK are also the two largest net contributors to the EU budget. (Zimmer et al. 2005:411). Germany and France<sup>15</sup> vote in a similar manner

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<sup>15</sup> Even though France receive relatively high sums of agricultural and structural funds (Zimmer et al. 2005), this thesis will still argue that a constellation of the three largest countries may be justified for this discussion.

according to “the voting data all votes” plot, and have historically been labelled the Paris-Bonn axis (Hix 2005:87).

- Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Austria: These four countries vote in a similar manner according to at least one of the previously examined CA plots. Luxembourg and Austria were close to each other in all four CA plots, and the Benelux-countries are more economically and politically integrated than any other grouping in the EU (Hix 2005:87).
- Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Ireland: Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy voted together as a southern grouping in the two DEU CA plots as well as in the HC plot, MDS plot and the PC plot. The inclusion of Ireland in this grouping is supported by the notion of a cohesion bloc of the less prosperous member states that receive funding from the EU structural funds. The cohesion bloc includes, according to Hix (2005:87), Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland, but Zimmer et al. (2005:411) argues that Italy also has received high sums of agricultural and structural funds since the mid-1990s. These five countries may also be interconnected because of their economical structures and interests.
- Sweden, Denmark and Finland: The Nordic member states were a tight cluster in the “DEU all positions” CA plot and in the HC- and MDS plots. The Nordic countries have close political, economical and cultural ties- and structures making coalitions and compliance convergence between these three countries very likely (Hix 2005:87 and Sverdrup 2004).

The thesis will first discuss the simple spatial model’s aggregative performance, and then examine the model performance in relation to these four groups of member states more closely.



### 5.3.2 The Aggregative Performance of the Simple Spatial Model


Table 5-1 Aggregative model<sup>16</sup>:

Actual:	Yes	No	Precision
Predicted:			
Yes	392	20	$392/412=$ 95%
No	131	12	$12/143=$ 8,5%
Recall	$392/523=$ 75%	$12/32=$ 37,5%	

The aggregative performance of the simple spatial model shows that the model manages to predict the extent - (the completeness) and the accuracy (the exactness) of the positive votes quite well.

But the main flaw related to the reliability of the simple spatial model is that it over-determines the extent of the “no” votes, making the exactness measurement of the data’s negative votes (statements) perform poorly as well. The latter relates to when some countries does not oppose any of the decisions, although the model predicts that they will vote “no” on several occasions. Another problem related to the exactness of the model is that the model only manage to get 12 of the 32 actual “no” votes (37,5%) right. This means that many of the countries actually vote “no”, when they are supposed to vote “yes”. Hence the member states do not necessary follow their preferences on single-issues when they vote in the Council. This suggests that the model may have to be complemented by other explanations in order to give a nuanced picture of the voting behaviour of the Council, since the model does not capture the essence of voting behaviour in the Council in a valid manner. But it is also valuable to have a closer look on the predicted versus actual shares of opposition when we group the members into three groups based on their size:

<sup>16</sup> Recall and precision percents adjusted up/down to nearby half value. This applies to all recall/precision tables.



**Figure 5-3 Negative actual and predicted votes per. country group**

The five largest countries (Germany, France, UK, Italy and Spain) account for 37,5% of the actual “no” votes (negative statements) and 33% of the predicted no votes. So it seems like the model manage to predict the actual share of opposition linked to the largest countries in a sufficient manner, even though it does not always manage to predict which votes that will turn out to be negative. In relation to this, the analysis conducted by Heisenberg (2005:77) shows that this group of countries account for 46 % of the votes against and 54% of the abstentions, 8,5% and 16,5% more than the small sample of this analysis detects. Hence the large countries express less disagreement in the 37 proposals of this analysis than in the proposals in general from the time period 1994-2002.

In comparison, the five middle-sized countries (the Netherlands, Greece, Belgium, Portugal and Sweden) account for 47% of the actual “no” votes and 29,5% of the predicted no votes. The model thus underestimate the actual share of opposition attached to this group of countries with 17,5%. But the fact that the medium-sized countries account for 47% of the actual opposition supports the findings of Hagemann (2007:12). Her analysis reveal that after the enlargement (EU 25) the largest member states are not longer the ones that record their disagreements most frequently. The role that was previously attributed to the largest member states has gradually shifted to the

group of medium-sized members. The members of this group (the first of two “medium” groups in her analysis) are Netherlands, Greece, Portugal, Belgium, Hungary and the Czech Republic, and besides from the latter two member states, the group members are also represented in the medium-sized group of this analysis. This may suggest that on some policy issues the “negative” role could have shifted from large- to medium-sized member states even prior to the enlargement.

It is also interesting to note that the five smallest countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Luxembourg) account for only 15,5 % of the actual no votes and 37,5% of the predicted “no” votes. This means that the small members vote/act upon their preferences in a much lesser degree than the bigger countries, and this may suggest that there are some costs relating to voting “no” for these countries. Mattila (2004:46) argues that the smaller member states are practical in their orientation and that they understand that they cannot win every situation. Hence they will concentrate their efforts and record their disagreement only on those decisions that are highly important to them. In relation to this, Hagemann (2006) advocates that the Council members consider their possibilities for influencing new legislation as defined by their voting power (number of votes), and that voting behaviour is the result of strategic estimations rather than sincere preferences.

### 5.3.3 The largest Member States

**Table 5-2 Germany, France and UK**

Germany:

Actual:	Yes	No	Precision
Predicted:			
Yes	22	1	22/23= 95,5%
No	13	1	1/14= 7%
Recall	22/35= 63%	1/2= 50%	

France:

Actual:	Yes	No	Precision
Predicted:			
Yes	28	1	28/29= 96,5%
No	7	1	1/8= 12,5%
Recall	28/35= 80%	1/2= 50%	

UK:

Actual:	Yes	No	Precision
Predicted:			
Yes	24	1	24/25= 96%
No	10	2	2/12= 16,5%
Recall	24/34= 70,5%	2/3= 66,5%	

Generally the precision values, that examine how many of the predicted positive votes that are actually positive, are quite consistent within this group. The precision percent varies only between 95,5-96,5%. According to the predicted negative votes, Germany should be the most negative, UK would take a middle position and France should take the least negative position of the three. But as the precision percent of the negative predicted and actual votes reveal, Germany is in fact the least negative (in terms of acting upon its predicted disagreement), France takes a middle position and UK is the most negative. These precision percents also reveal that the model does a poor job when trying to predict the extent of the negative votes that these three member states actually have taken. The actual negative votes accounts for only 7-16,5 % of the negative votes predicted by the model.

When looking at the recall percents the test reveal that the simple spatial model manage to predict between 60-80% of the actual positive votes and between 50-66,5 %

of the actual negative votes. Once again the model has the poorest performance when looking at the largest country of the EU and the biggest contributor to the EU budget, Germany. This is an interesting finding, since the previous analyses of this thesis and the Council literature in general advocate that the large, northern and richest member states are most likely to vote no (Mattila 2006, Zimmer et al. 2005, Hagemann 2007 and Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006 ). But quite the contrary, Germany does not seem to vote upon its preferences in the same way as the literature suggests it would do.

### 5.3.4 Benelux and Austria

**Table 5-3 Benelux and Austria**

Netherlands:

Actual:	Yes	No	Precision
Predicted:			
Yes	24	3	24/27= 89%
No	9	1	1/10= 10%
Recall	24/33= 72,5%	1/4= 25%	

Belgium:

Actual:	Yes	No	Precision
Predicted:			
Yes	27	2	27/29= 93%
No	7	1	1/8= 12,5%
Recall	27/34= 79,5%	1/3= 33,5%	

Austria:

Actual:	Yes	No	Precision
Predicted:			
Yes	25	0	25/25= 100%
No	11	1	1/12= 8,5%
Recall	25/36= 69,5%	1/1= 100%	

Luxembourg:

Actual:	Yes	No	Precision
Predicted:			
Yes	26	1	26/27= 96,5%
No	9	1	1/10= 10%
Recall	26/35= 74%	1/2= 50% %	

The Benelux countries and Austria have many similarities when it comes to recall and precision values. All four countries have between 24 and 27 predicted positive votes that are also actual positive votes, giving a precision value between 89 % and 100% when we take into account the predicted positive votes that actually turned out to be negative votes. The precision percent for how many predicted positive votes that actually are positive is 100 % for Austria, and this member state also has the best model performance of the four member states. With precision percents of 100 % (positive) and 8,5% (negative) and recall percents of 69,5% (positive) and 100% (negative) the simple spatial model does explain some extents of the voting behaviour of Austria. But the negative precision percent is also here very low, and this reveals that the model has some problems when trying to predict the extent of actual negative votes. The same problems can also be attached to the other three countries in this group.

Another problem is the negative recall percents of Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium. The model only manages to predict 25-50% of the actual negative votes of these member states accurately. Hence the results indicate that the consistency between the model and the reality is of limited degree, at least when it comes to predicting the negative votes. Both the extent of these votes (how often disagreement actually will be expressed) and the accuracy (which votes that actually will turn out to be negative in practice) of these votes are not sufficiently determined by the model. And because of this the precision percent and the recall percent, that illustrates the fit of the positive votes, never manage to reach 100%.

It is though interesting to note that both Belgium and the Netherlands expressed their disagreement more frequently than the two largest member states, France and Germany, expressed theirs. The Netherlands is in fact the most negative member state (together with Portugal: see table 5.4), and this finding is equivalent to the analysis of Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006:282). They emphasize, that the Netherlands are among the top 5 countries that are most likely to abstain or to vote “no”, both before and after the enlargement.

### 5.3.5 The Cohesion Bloc

**Table 5-4 The Cohesion Bloc**

Italy:

Actual:	Yes	No	Precision
Predicted:			
Yes	28	2	28/30= 93,5%
No	6	1	1/7= 14,5%
Recall	28/34= 82,5%	1/3= 33,5%	

Spain:

Actual:	Yes	No	Precision
Predicted:			
Yes	29	2	29/31= 93,5%
No	6	0	0/6= ---
Recall	29/35= 93,5%	0/2= ---	

Greece:

Actual:	Yes	No	Precision
Predicted:			
Yes	29	2	29/31= 93,5%
No	5	1	1/6= 16,5%
Recall	29/34= 85,5%	1/3 33,5%	

Portugal:

Actual:	Yes	No	Precision
Predicted:			
Yes	27	3	27/30= 90%
No	6	1	1/7= 14,5%
Recall	27/33= 80%	1/4 25%	

Ireland:

Actual:	Yes	No	Precision
Predicted:			
Yes	28	0	28/28= 100%
No	9	0	0/9= ---
Recall	28/37= 75,5%	0/0= ---	

According to Zimmer et al. (2005) the member states that benefit the most from the EU budget should be among the least negative member states since the less prosperous Council members benefit from more integration (both more regulation and more redistribution) between the member states. But as the results show this assumption is not supported adequately by the data employed in this thesis. Only Ireland behaves as

predicted by this theory, voting yes on all the 37 proposals. The other four countries voted “no” 1-4 times, and Italy (3 negative statements), Greece (3 negative statements) and Portugal (4 negative statements) voted “no” more frequently than the average EU member state. This finding is also consistent with the findings of Hagemann (2007), and Heidenberg (2005) and may suggest that the net-receivers in fact not necessarily can be recognised by their explicit voting behaviour in such a way that some of the existing Council literature claims. But it has to be said that the disagreement expressed by this group not necessarily can be linked to any preferences “of less redistribution and regulation”, it may just as likely be a protest against reforms of the agricultural sector or some issues relating to other complex conflicts of the EU. Any how a detailed discussion of the context of each “no” vote is beyond the scope of this thesis.

The low degree of opposition showed by Spain (2 negative) and France (table 5.2) supports the analysis of Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006:282-285). They find that Spain and France voice their opposition rather less frequently than one should expect the largest countries to do, and explain this by that: either these governments success repeatedly in getting their interests accommodated or their political cultures make them prefer to appear at the winning side after the final stage of decision-making.

More generally, the results show that the simple spatial model (again) meets problems when trying to predict the extent- and the accuracy of the negative votes. But except for Ireland and Spain, the recall percent of the negative votes are between 25 and 33,5%. This means that for Greece, Portugal and Italy the model manage to predict some of the actual “no” votes right. Otherwise, the findings of the previous two groups (regarding the flaws of the model) also apply to the cohesion block.



### 5.3.6 The Nordic Bloc

**Table 5-5 The Nordic Countries**

Sweden:

Actual:	Yes	No	Precision
Predicted:			
Yes	25	1	25/26= 96%
No	11	0	0/11= ---
Recall	25/36= 69,5%	0/1= ---	

Denmark:

Actual:	Yes	No	Precision
Predicted:			
Yes	24	1	24/25= 96%
No	11	1	1/12= 8,5%
Recall	24/35= 68,5%	1/2= 50%	

Finland:

Actual:	Yes	No	Precision
Predicted:			
Yes	26	0	26/26= 100%
No	11	0	0/11= ---
Recall	26/37= 72%	0/0= ---	

The Nordic group does not seem to oppose the decisions in a frequent manner.

Denmark voted/stated “no” two times, Sweden did this one time and Finland did not record any opposition on any of the 37 proposals examined. For all the three countries the model predicted a number of 11 “no” votes. This shows that the Nordic group is far more positive of the decisions that are made than their positions suggest they are. It is interesting to note though, that the model predicts similar results for all the three member states. This can again be interpreted as support for the notion of that similar voting behaviour may be the result of similarities in economical and political structures as discussed in chapter 4. The geographical location of the countries as well as similarities in language and long traditions of cooperation may perhaps also contribute to explain the similarities in position-taking and actual voting behaviour (Elgström et al. 2001). Another related explanation for the countries low level of opposition may be their political strategy. Both Finland and Denmark try to maintain a

position as the Council member that the Council has to please in order to make a decision successful (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006:287).

The results may also support the notion of socialisation processes within the Council and COREPER (Comité des représentants permanents). According to Lewis<sup>17</sup> (1998a, 2002, 2003) these processes play an important role in shaping both attitudes and behaviour, and this argument can also be illustrated through the voting behaviour of Sweden. During its first year of membership, 1995, Sweden voted negatively more than 30 times. Because of this Sweden tops the list of negative voting pr. country in the time period 1995-1998 (Mattila and Lane 2001:43-44). But after its first year Sweden moderated its voting behaviour considerably, and this may suggest that the new member states need some time to get to know the EU system. While the results confirm that Sweden is no longer among the most negative member states, it could be interesting to expand this analysis to the new EU 27, and see whether some of the new member states also voice their opposition more frequently during their first year of membership. In relation to the case of Sweden it is also to be said that Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006:282) stresses that a large proportion of the countries' negative votes in 1995 can be attributed to the misfit between the Swedish agricultural policy and the EU agricultural policy.

Overall, the model has the best fit with the actual voting behaviour of Denmark. Unfortunately the model performs quite poorly when it tries to predict the negative votes of the two other countries. The model does in fact neither manage to capture the extent or the accuracy of the negative votes linked to Sweden and Finland (0 negative statements), in any possible way.

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<sup>17</sup> As cited in Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006:318).

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## CHAPTER 6: EVALUATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

### **6.1 Under the Scope: The Model's Performance**

The performance of the simple spatial model is determined from its assumptions and predictions. This chapter will now evaluate the simple spatial model based on the criteria of Morton (1999). She advocates that the empirical evaluation of formal models may be organised as follows:

(1) evaluation of assumptions, (2) evaluation of predictions and (3) evaluation of alternative models. This chapter will first evaluate the assumptions and the predictions of the model, and then evaluate an alternative to the model outlined here. The last section will present some thoughts regarding possible future expansions of the analyses of this thesis.

### **6.2 Evaluations of the Model**

The simple spatial model rests upon some fundamental assumptions that were outlined in chapter 2. The actors have (1) exogenous and stable preferences, (2) they have complete information regarding each other and (3) the decision-making process is modelled in a one-dimensional space. Hence there is not room for any uncertainty. These three assumptions may all need to be evaluated against the actual reality of decision-making in the Council.

First, it is, as the performance of the model shows, not the case that the Council members always have stable and exogenous preferences. In fact the results of this thesis rather reveals that the Council members often do not vote upon their estimated negative preferences. Rittberger (2000) and McCarty (2000) stress that some actors may be more impatient than the others and that this may mean that these actors “give in” more in negotiations in order to struck a deal on an explicit policy domain, even though this means that they do not act upon their initial preference. Further on, the time frame attached to the different decision-making processes may facilitate changes in the preferences of the actors. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006) exemplifies this by examining the Takeover Directive. This directive was a result of 15 years of labour,

and during such a long time period it is naturally that shifts in preferences (as well as governments) may occur. Even so the DEU data applied in this thesis rests upon position estimates that are identified by policy experts after the actual decision outcome, or just shortly before the proposals were decided upon. This may suggest that the preferences should be estimated at least fairly correct for each member state, but they could still vary to some extent because of the actors' differences in patience as well as being affected by party discipline at both the national and European level. The preferences may also be subjected to vote trading, even though the existence of this in the Council has yet to be proved. Mattila and Lane (2001:46) point out that an incentive for vote trading may arise when the intensities of preferences (the salience) may vary between the actors. One actor could vote insincerely on one proposal in return for support from other actors on another proposal. Mattila and Lane conclude by showing how vote trading may be more likely in the Council than in other multilateral settings.

Second, the complete information assumption may also raise some questions. But this assumption is perhaps more valid than the preference assumption, since the 15 Council members of the EU analysed in this thesis engage in multiple formal and informal negotiations in addition to an exhaustive preparatory stage before the proposals reach the top of the hierarchy. Mattila and Lane (2001:47) stress that the limited number of players and the extensive use of preparatory bodies ensure that member states are well aware of both each other's policy preferences and the saliency that each member attach to particular decisions. Even so the complete info assumption may not hold that well for the EU 27.

Third, modelling the process in a one-dimensional space oversimplifies the reality of decision-making in the Council. This thesis shows that if we employ a 10 % decision rule, the political space attached to the proposals examined here may justify a two-dimensional space. Rittberger (2000:557-558) advocates that the Council negotiates along three different dimensions (integration, ideology and institutional), but that only one or two of them will affect the bargaining at the same time. Hagemann (2006)

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emphasis that negotiations that introduce more than one policy issue may in fact take place within one single dimension, but may just as likely fall within the larger left-right dimension rather than the supranational scenario (more-less integration) that are advocated by the standard version. Therefore it may be useful to distinguish between multi-issue and multi-dimensional bargaining. So for a more thoroughly test, than the one done in this thesis it could be useful to model the political space in more than one dimension. Hence it is also important to note that the simple spatial model shuts out all “noise” that may be attached to the processes; it does not consider other players than the 15 Council members. The EP, the Commission, lobbyists, the media and the situation in the home countries are not accounted for by the assumptions of the model.

Regarding the predictions it is likely that these may be flawed because of the problems outlined when evaluating the model’s assumptions. More generally mistakes can be done in the data and the data treatment that are the fundament for accurate predictions. The judgements of the experts in the DEU data may include some misjudgements or biases, the interviewers may have biased the data to some extent and the analyses presented in this thesis rests upon some discussable judgements. Also the predictions do not allow for any uncertainty, and may hence not manage to capture all the aspects of the complex reality. By allowing the Council members to make deviations in their behaviour from the logic of the spatial model, as advocated by Hagemann and Høyland (2008:13), the predictions of the model may get more accurate (and hence closer to the reality). But even so a simple spatial model, like the one employed here, may gain valuable knowledge of an isolated phenomenon, in this setting the voting behaviour of the Council.

### **6.3 *Alternative Explanations***

According to Rebecca Morton (1999:101) an empirical evaluation is not complete without an evaluation of alternative models. Such evaluations are also advocated by Cardie and Wilkerson (2008:3). They stress that the model’s performance should always be compared to one or more baseline systems, and suggest that this may be a system that always guesses the most frequent category. In the case of the formal model

of this thesis, this will be the “yes” vote category. How does the simple spatial model perform in comparison to a “yes”-model? If we have a look at the simple spatial model’s aggregative performance (table 5.1) it is clear that a competing model that only predicts positive votes will predict the wrong outcome 32 of 555 times (just 5,8%). This may suggest that the alternative model will perform better than the model tested in this thesis, and hence explain the voting behaviour in the Council in a more valid manner. But this is not a clear cut-picture. The recall- and precision percents (of the alternative model) that illustrate the exactness/completeness of the negative votes will both be undetected (--), and a “yes”-model will hence perform even more poorly than the preference-based model of this thesis. When exploring the voting behaviour of the Council the negative votes and negative statements are just as important, if not even more important, than the positive outcomes. This because opposition in general is quite rare, making it interesting to explore the reasons and mechanisms behind the negative statements, and in order to do so opposition has to be detected by the formal model.

Arguments that support the explanatory force of the “yes” model have often been raised in the Council literature, and the Council is often attributed a so-called “Culture of Consensus” suggesting that decisions are rarely contested at the final stage of decision-making. Heisenberg (2005:81) points out that consensus facilitates bargaining, keeps the typically “nationalistic” issues out of the public mind (at least in many circumstances), encourages compliance, compensates losers and avoids the tyranny of the large states as well as the overweighting of small countries’ interests. The history of accommodating special problems of the member states, as illustrated by the “Luxembourg compromise”, may be a part of a rather functional working method that facilitates consensus as the prevailing method of decision-making. But focus on such a norm may camouflage the actual level of conflicts and contestation in the Council. There are a variety of reasons for the seemingly consensual voting outcomes of the Council. Among one of them is the role of the Commission. The Commission exercises some sort of self-censorship by not sending proposals to the Council that are likely not to be accepted at all or that are highly controversial (Heisenberg 2005:71).

Table 5.6. summarises some of the factors that may explain the low level of contestation at the final stage of decision-making:

**Table 6-1 A summary: What may have contributed to create the consensual bias in the Council?**<sup>18</sup>

Explanations	How?/some examples
The history	The Luxembourg compromise, the Ionannina compromise, emergency brakes.
Time frame attached to negotiations	The Takeover Directive: 15 years of labour before reaching the voting records. (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006).
Incomplete voting records	A downward bias: disagreement voiced at the preparatory stages + lack of data on failed proposals. Governments show opposition only in cases that are of high salience to them (Mattila 2004).
Accommodations of special needs	Achieved to declarations in the Council Minutes and often attached to decisions that are taken by consensus. Examples: Exceptions, differentiated rules, longer or shorter time delays or transitions (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006).
Vote trading	May be likely in the EU because the possibility of multiple games facilitating trust and issue-linkages (Mattila and Lane 2001).
Formal statements	A form of voicing opposition without impeding the traditional consensus, show some sort of “national pride”. This thesis includes formal statements in the analyses.
Voting rules	The rules do matter, the consensus affected by the rules applied. 5/7 of the Council has to agree on a proposal (under QMV) in order for it to reach the voting records, even so extended use of QMV may “shake” the consensual mode of decision-making.
Decision-making procedures	The more reliance on Co-decision (II), the more united the Council has to be in order to “win” over the EP (Hix 2005).
Organisational structure within the Council	Prestige to settle agreements before the ministerial level, COREPER and the working parties oiling the machinery and facilitate consensus (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006)

If we evaluate the simple spatial model against the consensus norm (that can be illustrated as a “yes”-model) and interpret the consensus norm as an alternative hypothesis from nonformal theorizing (as advocated by Morton (1999:275), it seems like the consensus norm ignores effects that, when incorporated, can lead to different predictions. The summary of some of the factors that may contribute to uphold the consensual bias in the Council may in fact disguise the real level of contestation in the

<sup>18</sup> This table is partly taken from Wøien Hansen (2008).

Council. Hence a model, that only explains the positive votes, lacks the ability to give a nuanced picture of the voting behaviour of each Council member and the decision-making processes of the Council in general. But it is also to be said that the consensual bias of the Council may justify some of the difficulties the simple spatial model experiences when it tries to predict the extent- and accuracy of the negative statements. Thomson and Stokman (2003:20) emphasize that there is a clear distinction between actors' most favoured policy alternatives and the policy alternatives that they were willing to accept or eventually accepted in the form of the decision outcome. The results of this thesis may suggest that the compromise mentality, in many cases, may be stronger than the individual preferences of each Council member.

The preference for consensus and the fact that the Council goes to great lengths to accommodate each member state in the decision outcomes may together with the simple spatial model illustrate the voting behaviour of the Council in a more comprehensive and valid way. By combining the model and the consensus norm as well as its underlying effects for decision-making, it is possible both to explain and predict the negative votes/statements and to explain the low level of opposition within the Council. In relation to this, Schneider et al. (2006:304) emphasize that the so called bargaining perspective is more successful in predicting outcomes than other models considered in Thomson et al. (2006). They advocate that the reason for this is that unanimity is a strong norm in EU legislation, even when the legislation processes are subjected to QMV voting. Bargaining theory suggests that positions should be taken as strategic choices rather than raw preferences, and thus manages to incorporate the consensual mode of decision-making into its modelling. Such models may hence explain voting behaviour in the Council better than the model presented in this thesis.

#### **6.4 Possible Expansions of this Thesis**

In order to evaluate the performance of the simple spatial model as adequately as possible the next step may be to control for the salience attached to the different issues of each proposal of the DEU data set. The DEU project asked the policy experts to estimate the level of salience or importance each of the actors attached to each of the



issues on a scale from 0 to 100 where 100 indicates that an issue is of the highest importance to an actor (Thomson and Stokman 2003:22-23). It may be the case that on some of the proposals included in the DEU data set the mean of the issues of each proposal may not be the Council members' accurate position. This because the means do not incorporate the level of salience attached to each issue. It could be that one actor was very positive towards 2 out of 3 issues, but the third issue was decisive for its voting behaviour because this issue was the most important to the actor. Hence it could be useful to include the salience variable in further studies on this topic. But as Thomson and Stokman (2003:23) emphasise it is intuitively plausible that actors who take more extreme positions on an issue also attach higher salience to them. They also stress that there is a modest positive correlation between the extremity of the Council members' positions and the levels of importance they attach to the issues. Because of this, it is possible (or likely) that the inclusion of a salience variable would not alter the results of this thesis significantly.

Further research may also include differentiation between negative votes and formal statements in order to see how many of each kind the simple spatial model manage to detect. But as advocated in chapter 2, the inclusion of formal statements give a more nuanced picture of the actual level of contestation at the final stage of decision-making. It could also be interesting to explore whether a change of parties in the member states' governments may explain some of the cases where the Council members were supposed to vote "no" but in fact voted "yes" and vice versa. Hagemann and Høyland (2008) show, that when a government is replaced, the new government tends to find other coalition partners than the ones favoured by their predecessor. This means that a shift in preference may be a result of a shift in government. Regarding the 37 proposals that make up the fundament for the testing of the simple spatial model only three shifts in government occurred: Italy, Austria and Denmark underwent a change in parties in government.<sup>19</sup> Hence such shifts do not influence this thesis that much, but if it was possible to detect the voting data on the missing 26 proposals as well it could be very useful to control for change in parties in

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<sup>19</sup> This finding was revealed when making the actual voting data set ready for the analyses of this thesis.

government. When that is said it could be that the simple spatial model could perform somewhat better in relation to Italy, Austria and Denmark if this analysis takes into account the shift in government in these three countries.

Another possible extension of this thesis could be, as previously mentioned, to relax some of the assumptions of the simple spatial model. Either by employing a multi-dimensional model, allow the Council members to deviate more in their behaviour, relax the accuracy of the indifferent point (IP in figure 5.2), take into account the differences in voting power or incorporate the lessons learnt from the bargaining perspective. Another idea would be to estimate the costs of voting "no". The results in chapter 5 suggest that these costs are higher for the smaller countries than for the larger countries, and based on these results it could be possible to estimate the costs for each group of countries. If the cost of voting "no" is higher than the cost of voting "yes" the countries would rather chose not to have their opposition recorded than to vote sincerely at the final stage of the decision-making process<sup>20</sup>.

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<sup>20</sup> This could again be illustrated by employing "position minus indifferent point" as a measure for the cost of voting "no".

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## CONCLUSION

The thesis has argued that positions on single-issues explain only a proportion of the actual voting behaviour in the Council of Ministers. The test of the simple spatial model revealed that the model managed to predict a large amount of the actual “yes”-votes right, but it did not manage to predict the extent and the accuracy of the negative statements that well. Even so, some percent of the negative positions recorded by the DEU-project did translate into negative statements in the voting data. The model managed thus to detect some of the disagreement shown by each Council member (except from Ireland, Sweden, Finland and Spain) at the final stage of decision-making. This means that the simple spatial model employed in the thesis may perform better than a “yes” model, as discussed in chapter 6, if the criteria are to detect *both* positive- and negative votes (statements).

The test of the simple spatial model also supported some of the findings from the analyses of the different data constellations and some of the main findings in the literature. The two voting data CA plots in chapter 4 did show a weak tendency of a big versus small countries cleavage, a finding advocated by Heisenberg (2005), Mattila and Lane (2001) and Mattila (2004). The test of the model revealed that the large member states did record their opposition more frequently than their smaller counterparts, and also that the proportion of the negative positions attached to the five largest members was quite similar to the group’s proportion of negative statements. Even so, the test of the model showed that the medium-sized group of member states voiced their opposition more frequently than the other two groups in question. This finding is consistent with the findings advocated by Hagemann (2007). But, as advocated by Heisenberg and Mattila and Lane the smaller countries show their disagreement much less often than the medium-sized- and the largest countries. In fact, the model overestimates the opposition level attached to the smallest Council members, and this may suggest that there are costs related to voting “no” for this particular country group and/or that these countries do not think their votes matter for the final outcome of these decisions.

The plots (CA, PC, MDS and HC) in chapter 3 and the “DEU ” CA plots in chapter 4 drew a clear southern European bloc, suggesting that support for the north-south dimension could be detected. The north-south dimension has received a lot of attention in the literature, and Zimmer et al (2005) advocate that this dimension may be incorporated in a more general redistributive dimension. The interpretation of this dimension is that the voting behaviour of the net-contributors to the EU budget differs from the voting behaviour of the net-receivers. Such a dimension may also rest upon the mentioned arguments from political economy. The redistributive dimension may reveal itself by the southern European member states’ reluctance to show their opposition towards the EU decisions because of the benefits they receive from the EU budget. But the test of the model showed that member states like Italy, Greece and Portugal in the Cohesion bloc, in fact was among the most negative members of the Council along with the Netherlands and the UK. So the south European member states may represent a bloc, but this bloc is, according to this thesis, not characterised by the countries reluctance to voice their opposition openly. Hence, based on the small sample of overlapping proposals, the net-payers are not more likely to dissent than the net-receivers. Table 7.1 summarises the findings of this thesis and relates the findings directly to the studies discussed throughout the thesis:

**Table 7-1 The Findings of this Thesis versus the Findings of the Council Literature**

<b>Author</b>	<b>Type of data</b>	<b>Main findings: conflict structure</b>	<b>Method</b>	<b>This thesis</b>
Mattila and Lane (2001)	Council Minutes 1381 pieces of legislation from 1994-1998	Large countries are significantly more inclined to vote “no” than their smaller counterparts. Finds support for the north-south dimension. Search for unanimity, consensus building.	Roll-call analysis Multidimensional scaling	Some of the large countries do vote together according to the voting data CAs, but the test of model reveals that the middle-sized countries actually vote “no” more frequently.
Mattila (2004)	Council Minutes 180 observations from 1995-2000: voting records for 15 member states for 12 half years periods	Results support that the political space is defined by two dimensions: left-right and independence versus integration dimension. Pro-integration and left-wing governments as well as smaller countries vote “no” less frequently than their counterparts.	Roll-call analysis Bivariate and regression	The “all positions” CA plot supports the existence of these two dimensions, the other three CA plots does not fit that well with Mattila’s results. But the thesis does not take into account shifts in governments. If it had done that in all the analyses presented the findings in relation to these dimensions could be easier to interpret.

Zimmer, Schneider, Dobbins (2005)	Expert interviews (DEU data-Thomson et al. 70 Commission proposals: 162 issues on decrees, directives and decisions under Consultation and Co-decision	Results support that a redistribution dimension shapes the political space. The north-south dimension is a sub-dimension of the redistribution-dimension as goes along the line of the conflict between the net-distributors (north) and the net-receivers (south and east).	Correspondence analysis	The four position data plots (CA, MDS, HC and PC) and to some extent the DEU 44 positions CA plot support the north-south dimension, which again supports the redistribution-dimension. But the cohesion bloc are not more inclined to vote yes than others, in fact Greece, Italy and Portugal are among the most negative.
Heisenberg (2005)	Council Minutes Recorded legislation from 1994-2002	Size do matter, the five largest countries account for 46 % of the votes against. Finds no support for the redistributive dimension. Informal norm of consensus prevails.	Roll-call analysis	In this thesis's small sample the five biggest countries account for 37,5% of the negative statements, suggesting that size do not necessarily matter that much.
Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006)	Council Minutes Recorded legislation 1994-2004	No evidence of traditional left/right cleavages. The north-south dimension as a redistribution dimension.	Expert interview, document analysis	The "all positions" plots (CA, PC, HC and MDS) support the north-south dimension. Little evidence of left/right cleavages, but the thesis do not control for shifts in governments.
Mattila (2006)	Council Minutes 805 legislative acts from May 2004 to April 2006	Clear existence of a north-south dimension even after enlargement. This can be interpreted as free market based solutions versus regulatory solutions. Slightly increased consensus	Roll-call analysis NOMINATE	This thesis has not analysed data from this time period, but it supports Mattila's main argument
Hagemann (2007, 2006)	Council Minutes and 57 expert interviews January 1999 to December 2006 period. 872 pieces of legislation.	After the enlargement the medium-sized members are the ones that vote "no" most frequently, rather than the largest members. Still some conflict structure of geographical location, but no distinct pattern. Governments act strategically rather than sincerely when deciding how to best pursue their policy preferences.	Roll-call analysis NOMINATE: (geometrical scaling method)	Even before the enlargement it is some suggestions that the medium-sized member states vote "no" the most frequently. Also this thesis' results show to some extent that the Council members may vote more strategically than sincerely.
Hagemann and Høyland (2008)	Council Minutes Jan. 1999 to Dec. 2006 period. 872 pieces of legislation.	Ideological affiliations influence coalition formation in the Council. Coalition patterns change when governments are replaced.	Ideal point estimation technique	This argument may explain some of the wrong predictions of the simple spatial model

But as chapter 6 advocated, the performance of the simple spatial model may be a lot better if we for instance relax some of the assumptions of the model or incorporate lessons learnt from the bargaining perspective. Since positions on single-issues only explain a proportion of the voting behaviour in the Council of Ministers it could be suggested that the Council members vote more strategically than sincerely. A possible expansion of the thesis is hence to control for shifts in the member states' governments, each member states' voting power and the saliency they attach to each

issue and then employ a similar research design with a preferably larger sample of overlapping proposals (positions and votes). However, since the matching of positions and voting data, as done by this thesis, has not been presented in this way before, further research is needed in order to give the arguments presented here a more general “stamp of approval”. It would be interesting to further explore these findings in the future.

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## APPENDIX

### **Appendix A: Data Preparation:**

1) Issues that have been removed from the analysis of the DEU data set:

1. d00062i1 had 6 missing
  2. d00062i2 had 10 missing
  3. d95341i3 had 8 missing
  4. n00358i3 had 8 missing
  5. n00358i5 had 8 missing
  6. d98325i2 had 6 missing
  7. n96115i2 had 10 missing
  8. n98087i1 had 11 missing
  9. n98189i2 had 14 missing
  10. n99092i2 had 9 missing
  11. n99116i1 had 6 missing
  12. n99225i2 had 9 missing
  13. n99236i2 had 9 missing
  14. n99255i2 had 13 missing
  15. n98193i3 had 9 missing
- Before 174 issues. Now 159 issues.

2) Finding convergence between the references of the Commission proposals in DEU data and the references of the Commission proposals in voting data (Hagemann) by using a third information dataset of raw data with both dates and proposal texts (conducted by Hagemann)

Criteria and assumptions:

- Overlapping proposal texts and/or dates of Council Meeting
- Usually the proposals of the same Council meeting/Council minutes in the voting data have the same order and rankings as the Council minutes in general:

I.e.: CNS/1998/347, COM(1998)728: “Council Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 of 17 December 1999 laying down the detailed rules and arrangements regarding Community structural assistance in the fisheries sector” is item 3 and ranking no. 5 in the 14172/99 Council Minutes. Hence it also has ranking no. 5 of the 14172/99 proposals in the voting data set. This has been double-checked and the exceptions have been accommodated.

- All the Council Minutes of 1999-2002 have been examined in order to double-check that rankings and info are correct and to source for any additional information. I could not find any thing that was not included in the information data set.
- The number in brackets related to the policy area, is the number the proposal is given in the figure (see Appendix B) that summarises both data sets.

**Table 2A: Identifying the Proposals**

Policy area	Ref DEU data*	Ref Voting data (Inter- institutional reference number)

1. Fisheries/eco/fin	CNS/1996/160 COM(1996)296	-
2. Fisheries (4)	CNS/1998/347 COM(1998)728 n98347 2 issues	14172/99 ranking: 5 (item 3)
3. Fisheries (5)	CNS/1999/047 COM(1999)055 n99047 3 issues	14172/99 Ranking: 4. (item 2 )
4. Fisheries (environment) (6)	CNS/1999/050 COM(1999)070 n99050 1 issue	9433/99 Ranking:1 (item 1)
5. Fisheries (7)	CNS/1999/138 COM(1999)345 n99138 2 issues	14172/99 <b>B Item!</b> Ranking: 22 (Item 5)
6. Fisheries (8)	CNS/1999/163 COM(1999)382 n99163 2 issues	7374/00 Ranking: 4 (Item 17)
7. Fisheries (9)	CNS/1999/255 COM(1999)636 n99255 1 issue	9234/00 Ranking:1 (item 2)
8. Ecofin/General affairs (10)	CNS/1998/189 COM(1998)320 n98189 1 issue	10197/99 Ranking: 1. (item 5)
9. Ecofin/fisheries (11)	COD/1998/252 COM(1998)461 n98252 2 issues	9407/00 Ranking: 2 (item 12)
10. Ecofin (12)	CNS/1998/331 COM(1998)693 n98331 2 issues	8589/99 Ranking 1. item 1
11. Ecofin (13)	CNS/1999/056 COM(1999)062 n99056 1 issue	12142/99 Ranking: 1 (item 17)
12. Ecofin (14)	CNS/1999/151 COM(1999)364 n99151 1 issue	11656/00 Ranking: 1 (item 18)
13. Ecofin (15)	CNS/2000/223 COM(2000)537 n00223 2 issues	5537/01 Ranking: 1 (item 2)
14. JHA	CNS/1999/116 COM(1999)260	-
15. JHA	CNS/1999/154 COM(1999)348	-
16. JHA (16)	CNS/1999/274 COM(1999)686 n99274 3 issues	11657/00 Ranking: 2 (item 10)

17. JHA (17)	CNS/2000/030 COM(2000)027 n00030 6 issues	7181/01 Ranking: 1 (item 1)
18. JHA social (18)	CNS/2000/127 COM(2000)303 n00127 3 issues	11181/01 Ranking: 1 (item 7)
19. GA	CNS/1998/299 COM(1998)600/1	-
20. GA	COD/1998/300 COM(1998)600/2	-
21. GA Civil protection (19)	CNS/1998/354 COM(1998)768 n98354 2 issues	13859/99 Ranking: 1 (item 4)
22. GA	CNS/1999/132 COM(1999)312	
23. GA	CNS/1999/214 COM(1999)494	
24. GA (20)	COD/2000/032 COM(2000)030 d00032 4 issues	9204/01 Ranking: 2 (item 6)
25. Culture/fisheries (21)	CNS/1999/066 COM(1999)111 n99066 1 issue	13168/99 Ranking: 1 (item 7)
26. Culture Agriculture/fisheries education	COD/1999/275 COM(1999)658/1	
27. Culture/labour/social (22)	CNS 1999/276 COM(1999)658/2 n99276 5 issues	14774/00 Ranking: 2 (item 3)
28. Development	COD/2000/062 COM(2000)111/1	-
29. Development/agriculture (23)	CNS/2000/062B COM(2000)111/2 n0062B 1 issue	11182/01 Ranking: 6 (item 14)
30. Employment (24)	CNS/1999/192 COM(1999)440 n99192 2 issues	5593/00 Nr. 4 (item 8)
31. Employment (25)	CNS/1999/225 COM(1999)565 n99225 1 issue	13875/00 Ranking: 2 (item 2)
32. Energy	COD/1999/127 COM(1999)296	-
33. Health Industry/energy diff dates (26)	COD/1999/244 COM(1999)594 d99244 5 issues	8763/01 Ranking: 3 (item 6)
34. Industry	CNS/1998/288 COM(1998)546	-
35. Social Affairs	COD/1998/195 COM(1998)329	-

36. Transport	COD/1999/083 COM(1999)158	-
37. Transport	COD/1999/252 COM(1999)617	-
38. Transport	COD/2000/060 COM(2000)137	-
39. Transport	COD/2000/067 COM(2000)142	-
40. Internal market	COD/1995/341 COM(1995)655	-
41. Internal market	COD/1996/085 COM(1996)097	-
42. Internal market (27)	COD/1996/112 COM(1995)722/1 d96112 4 issues	8991/00 Ranking: 1 (item 3)
43. Internal market (28)	CNS/1996/114 COM(1995)722/3 n96114 3 issues	15451/01 Ranking: 3 (item 1)
44. Internal market (29)	CNS/1996/115 COM(1995)722/4 n96115 1 issue	15451/01 Ranking: 5 (item 3)
45. Internal market Consumers (3)	COD/1996/161 COM(1995)520 d96161 2 issues	8319/99 Ranking: 12 (item 8)
46. Internal market Transport/telecom (30)	COD/1997/264 COM(1997)510 d97264 1 issue	8113/00 Ranking: 4 (item 10)
47. Internal market Gen aff/culture (31)	COD/1997/359 COM(1997)628 d97359 3 issues	7906/01 Ranking: 1 (item 23)
48. Internal market	COD/1998/134 COM(1998)226	-
49. Internal market	COD/1998/191 COM(1998)297	-
50. Internal market	COD/1998/240 COM(1998)450	-
51. Internal market	COD/1998/325 COM(1998)586	-
52. Internal market (32)	COD/1999/158 COM(1999)329 d99158 1 issue	5537/01 Ranking: 3 (item 26)
53. Agriculture (33)	CNS/1998/092 COM(1998)135 n98092 6 issues	10196/99 Ranking: 12 (item 3)
54. Agriculture (1)	CNS/1998/109 COM(1998)158/3 n98109 2 issues	8319/99 Ranking: 4 (Item 1 d)
55. Agriculture (2)	CNS/1998/110 COM(1998)158/4 n98110	8319/99 Ranking: 5 (Item 1 e)

	2 issues	
56. Agriculture	COD/1998/323 COM(1998)623	-
57. Agriculture (41)	CNS/1999/072 COM(1999)130 n99072 3 issues	9221/99 Ranking:2 (item 8) <b>B item!</b>
58. Agriculture	CNS/1999/202 COM(1999)188	-
59. Agriculture* (34)	CNS/1999/202 COM(1999)492 n99202 2 issues	9066/01 Ranking:3 (item 3)
60. Agriculture (35)	COD/1999/204 COM(1999)487 d99204 4 issues	10454/00 Ranking:6 (item 7) <b>B-item!</b>
61. Agriculture (36)	COD/1999/217 COM(1999)456 d99217 1 issue	7949/00 Ranking: 1 (Item 1)
62. Agriculture (37)	CNS/1999/235 COM(1999)582 n99235 2 issues	5702/01 Ranking: 1 (item 1)
63. Agriculture	CNS/1999/236 COM(1999)576	-
64. Agriculture/Budget (38)	CNS/1999/246 COM(1999)608 n99246 2 issues	10455/00 Ranking: 3 (item 35)
65. Agriculture (39)	CNS/2000/250 COM(2000)604 n00250 3 issues	10182/01 Ranking:1 (item 1)
66. Agriculture (40)	CNS/2000/358 COM(2000)855 n00358 3 issues	11182/01 Ranking:2 (item 2)
67. Internal market	COD/1999/238 COM(1999)577	-
68. ECOFIN (42)	CNS/1998/087 COM(1998)067 n98087 1 issue	10173/03 Ranking:3 (item 8b) <b>B-item</b>
69. ECOFIN (43)	CNS/1998/193 COM(1998)295 n98193 2 issues	10173/03 Ranking:2 (item 8a) <b>B-item</b>
70. Telecom (44)	COD/2000/184 COM(2000)393 d00184 3 issues	6264/02 Ranking:2 (item 6a)

26 missing  
44 proposals ok

5 B-items



**\*Ref Thomson:**

n= consultation procedure

d= Co-decision procedure

number of issues= number of issues AFTER ruled out the issues with more than four missing values

3)

**Table 3A: Proposal titles, references and numbers of initial issues (source: Thomson and Stokman 2003)****Agriculture (14 Commission proposals, 40 issues)**

Reference	Name	No. Issues
CNS/1998/092 COM(1998)135	Council Directive 1999/74/EC of 19 July 1999 laying down minimum standards for the protection of laying hens	6
CNS/1998/109 COM(1998)158/3	Council Regulation (EC) No 1254/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in beef and veal	2
CNS/1998/110 COM(1998)158/4	Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products	2
COD/1998/323 COM(1998)623	Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 laying down rules for the prevention, control and eradication of certain transmissible spongiform encephalopathies	3
CNS/1999/072 COM(1999)130	Council Regulation (EC) No 1308/1999 of 15 June 1999 amending Regulation (EC) No 2377/90 laying down a Community procedure for the establishment of maximum residue limits of veterinary medicinal products in foodstuffs of animal origin	3
CNS/1999/202 COM(1999)188	Council Directive 1999/105/EC of 22 December 1999 on the marketing of forest reproductive material	3
CNS/1999/202 COM(1999)492	Council Regulation (EC) No 1051/2001 of 22 May 2001 on production aid for cotton	2
COD/1999/204 COM(1999)487	Regulation (EC) No 1760/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 July 2000 establishing a system for the identification and registration of bovine animals and regarding the labelling of beef and beef products and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 820/97	4
COD/1999/217 COM(1999)456	Directive amending Directive 64/432/EEC: health problems affecting intra-Community trade in bovine animals and swine	1
CNS/1999/235 COM(1999)582	Council Regulation (EC) No 216/2001 of 29 January 2001 amending Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 on the common organisation of the market in bananas	2
CNS/1999/236 COM(1999)576	Council Regulation (EC) No 1672/2000 of 27 July 2000 amending Regulation (EC) No 1251/1999 establishing a support system for producers of certain arable crops, to	2

CNS/1999/246 COM(1999)608	include flax and hemp grown for fibre Council Regulation (EC) No 1670/2000 of 20 July 2000 amending Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 on the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products	2
CNS/2000/250 COM(2000)604	Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector	3
CNS/2000/358 COM(2000)855	Council Regulation (EC) No 1513/2001 of 23 July 2001 amending Regulations No 136/66/EEC and (EC) No 1638/98 as regards the extension of the period of validity of the aid scheme and the quality strategy for olive oil	5

### Internal Market (13 Commission proposals, 34 issues)

Reference	Name	No. issues
COD/1995/341 COM(1995)655	Proposal for a 13 <sup>th</sup> European Parliament and Council Directive on company law concerning takeover bids	3*
COD/1996/085 COM(1996)097	Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work of art	4
COD/1996/112 COM(1995)722/1	Directive 2000/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 June 2000 relating to cocoa and chocolate products intended for human consumption	4
CNS/1996/114 COM(1995)722/3	Council Directive 2001/110/EC of 20 December 2001 relating to honey	3
CNS/1996/115 COM(1995)722/4	Council Directive 2001/112/EC of 20 December 2001 relating to fruit juices and certain similar products intended for human consumption	2
COD/1996/161 COM(1995)520	Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees	2
COD/1997/264 COM(1997)510	Directive 2000/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 May 2000 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC (Fourth motor insurance Directive)	1
COD/1997/359 COM(1997)628	Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society	3
COD/1998/134 COM(1998)226	Regulation (EC) No 2700/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2000 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code	4
COD/1998/191 COM(1998)297	Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures	3
COD/1998/240 COM(1998)450	Regulation (EC) No 141/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1999 on orphan medicinal products	1

COD/1998/325 COM(1998)586	Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market ("Directive on electronic commerce")	3
COD/1999/158 COM(1999)329	Directive 2001/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2001 amending Directive 95/2/EC on food additives other than colours and sweeteners	1

\* This proposal was rejected by the European Parliament. The decision outcomes on these three issues therefore correspond with the reference point. There was also a fourth issue described by the experts. It was, however, not possible to define a reference point on this fourth issue due to the presence of fundamentally different legislative regimes in the different member states. Therefore, this issue cannot be included in the testing of the accuracy of the models' forecasts.

### **Fisheries (7 Commission proposals, 13 issues)**

Reference	Name	No. issues
CNS/1996/160 COM(1996)296	Council Regulation (EC) No 850/98 of 30 March 1998 for the conservation of fishery resources through technical measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms	1
CNS/1998/347 COM(1998)728	Council Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 of 17 December 1999 laying down the detailed rules and arrangements regarding Community structural assistance in the fisheries sector	2
CNS/1999/047 COM(1999)055	Council Regulation (EC) No 104/2000 of 17 December 1999 on the common organisation of the markets in fishery and aquaculture products	3
CNS/1999/050 COM(1999)070	Council Regulation (EC) No 1447/1999 of 24 June 1999 establishing a list of types of behaviour which seriously infringe the rules of the common fisheries policy	1
CNS/1999/138 COM(1999)345	Council Regulation (EC) No 2791/1999 of 16 December 1999 laying down certain control measures applicable in the area covered by the Convention on future multilateral cooperation in the north-east Atlantic fisheries	2
CNS/1999/163 COM(1999)382	Council Regulation (EC) No 657/2000 of 27 March 2000 on closer dialogue with the fishing sector and groups affected by the common fisheries policy	2
CNS/1999/255 COM(1999)636	Council Regulation (EC) No 1298/2000 of 8 June 2000 amending for the fifth time Regulation (EC) No 850/98 for the conservation of fishery resources through technical measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms	2

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**Table 4A: The proposals that are missing from the Council Minutes 1999-2002 (2003) sorted by year**

1998 (1 proposal)

Fish CNS/1996/160 COM(1996)296	Council Regulation (EC) No 850/98 of 30 March 1998 for the conservation of fishery resources through technical measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms
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1999 (3 proposals)

Agri CNS/1999/202 COM(1999)188	Council Directive 1999/105/EC of 22 December 1999 on the marketing of forest reproductive material
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Int COD/1998/191 COM(1998)297	Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures
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GA CNS/1999/132 COM(1999)312	Council Regulation (EC) No 2454/1999 of 15 November 1999 amending Regulation (EC) No 1628/96 relating to aid for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in particular by the setting up of a European Agency for Reconstruction
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2000 (10 proposals)

Agri CNS/1999/236 COM(1999)576	Council Regulation (EC) No 1672/2000 of 27 July 2000 amending Regulation (EC) No 1251/1999 establishing a support system for producers of certain arable crops, to include flax and hemp grown for fibre
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Int COD/1998/134 COM(1998)226	Regulation (EC) No 2700/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2000 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code
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Int COD/1998/325 COM(1998)586	Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market ("Directive on electronic commerce")
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Int COD/1998/240 COM(1998)450	Regulation (EC) No 141/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1999 on orphan medicinal products
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GA CNS/1998/299 COM(1998)600/1	Council Regulation (EC) No 764/2000 of 10 April 2000 regarding the implementation of measures to intensify the EC-Turkey customs union
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GA	Council Regulation (EC) No 2698/2000 of 27 November
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CNS/1999/214 COM(1999)494	2000 amending Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 on financial and technical measures to accompany (MEDA) the reform of economic and social structures in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership
Energy COD/1999/127 COM(1999)296	Directive 2000/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 on energy efficiency requirements for ballasts for fluorescent lighting
Soc COD/1998/195 COM(1998)329	Decision No 253/2000/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 January 2000 establishing the second phase of the Community action programme in the field of education Socrates
Trans COD/1999/083 COM(1999)158	Directive 2000/61/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 October 2000 amending Council Directive 94/55/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States with regard to the transport of dangerous goods by road
JHA CNS/1999/116 COM(1999)260	Council Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 concerning the establishment of "Eurodac" for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention
2001 (7 proposals)	
Agri COD/1998/323 COM(1998)623	Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 laying down rules for the prevention, control and eradication of certain transmissible spongiform encephalopathies
Int COD/1996/085 COM(1996)097	Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work of art
JHA CNS/1999/154 COM(1999)348	Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters
GA COD/1998/300 COM(1998)600/2	Regulation (EC) No 257/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 January 2001 regarding the implementation of measures to promote economic and social development in Turkey
Cult COD/1999/275 COM(1999)658/1	Decision No 163/2001/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 January 2001 on the implementation of a training programme for professionals in the European audiovisual programme industry (MEDIA-Training) (2001-2005)
Dev COD/2000/062 COM(2000)111/1	Regulation (EC) No 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries
Trans COD/1999/252	Directive 2001/16/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2001 on the interoperability of the

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COM(1999)617 trans-European conventional rail system

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2002 (2 proposals)

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Trans COD/2000/060 COM(2000)137	Directive 2002/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 February 2002 amending Council Directive 96/53/EC laying down for certain road vehicles circulating within the Community the maximum authorised dimensions in national and international traffic and the maximum authorised weights in international traffic
Trans COD/2000/067 COM(2000)142	Regulation (EC) No 417/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 February 2002 on the accelerated phasing-in of double hull or equivalent design requirements for single hull oil tankers and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 2978/94

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Time not specified: (3 proposals)

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CNS/1998/288 COM(1998)546	Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) amending Regulation nr 17: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty
Int COD/1995/341 COM(1995)655	Proposal for a 13th European Parliament and Council Directive on company law concerning takeover bids

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Internal Market

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COD/1999/238 COM(1999)577	Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council amending for the 22nd time Directive 76/769/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to restrictions on the marketing and use of certain dangerous substances and preparations (phthalates) and amending Council Directive 88/378/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States concerning the safety of toys
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
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26 proposals in total, 12 of them were on the agenda already prior to 1999.



X=decision outcome  
 IP=Indifferent point

Figure 1B: Visual Illustration of Both Data Sets





## Appendix C: R-codes<sup>21</sup>

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#####
# Replication R-code #
# Council:Position and#
# voting data:PC,CA, #
# MDS and HC analyses #
#####
rm(list=ls())
library(car)
setwd('Steinmetz/datasets')
library(foreign)
Data <- read.spss('format2slettetm.sav',
  use.value.labels=TRUE, max.value.labels=Inf, to.data.frame=TRUE)
dim(Data)
summary(Data)
attach(Data)
Countries <- data.frame(PAUS,PBEL,PDK,PFIN,PFRANCE,PGER,
  PGRCE,PIRE,PITY,PLUX,PNL,PPORT,PSPAIN,PSWED,PUK)
detach(Data)
names(Countries) <-c('Austria','Belgium','Denmark','Finland','France',
  'Germany','Greece','Ireland','Italy','Luxembourg','Netherlands','Portugal',
  'Spain','Sweden','UK')
summary(Countries)

#Principal component (PC)
pr.council <- prcomp(Countries)
summary(pr.council)# Loadings
probs <- round((pr.council$sdev^2/sum(pr.council$sdev^2)),3)
barplot(probs, col=as.numeric(probs > .075),
  xlab = "principal components",
  ylab = "proportion of variance explained",
  main = "Dimensionality of conflict in the Council")
abline(h=.075)
pos.countries <- data.frame(pr.council$rotation[,1:2] )
attach(pos.countries)
plot(PC1,PC2,
  main="Council in the Council",
  ylab="2nd dimension",
  xlab="1st dimension",
  pch=16
)
identify(PC1,PC2,row.names(pos.countries))
detach(pos.countries)

# Hierarchical clustering (HC)
hc.council <- hclust(dist(t(Countries)))
summary(hc.council)
plot(hc.council,main="Coalitions in the Council")

#Correspondence analysis (CA)
library(languager)
#bruk install.packages("languager")
dist.council <- as.matrix(dist(t(Countries)))
co.council <- corres.fnc(dist.council)
summary(co.council,returnList=TRUE,head=FALSE)
plot(co.council,addcol=FALSE,main="Coalitions in the Council
Correspondence analysis")

# Multidimensional scaling (MDS)
ms.council <- cmdscale(dist.council,k=2)
cor.test(ms.council[,1],ms.council[,2],method="sp")
plot(ms.council[,1],ms.council[,2], main="Coalition in the Council
```

<sup>21</sup> Thanks to Bjørn Høyland for valuable help regarding these R-codes.

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multidimensional scaling",xlab="Factor 1",ylab="Factor 2")
identify(ms.council[,1],ms.council[,2],row.names(ms.council))

# The correspondence analysis code is applied to the datasets
#"AllVotesGovernments1999-2002.csv", "Thomson.csv" (44 positions) and
#CouncilVotes.csv" (44 votes) as well.
```