

Becoming 'the Only Game in Town'

A Quantitative Analysis of Democratic Transitions in 1970-2007

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1 Introduction

Since the mid-1970s a growing number of countries have adopted democracy as their form of government. The movement away from various forms of dictatorial rule began in Southern Europe, resulting in the now consolidated democracies of Spain, Portugal and Greece. It continued in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s in Latin America, and after 1989 the transitions in Central and Eastern Europe were enabled by the fall of Soviet Union. Samuel Huntington (1991) describes this period as the “third wave of democracy”.

Prevailing opinion and theory holds that functioning democratic institutions are preferable for improving the living conditions of citizens, by among other factors, avoiding involvement in wars. However, installation of a democratic government does not necessarily lead to durability of the new democratic structure, or to progress toward creating a consolidated democratic regime. Huntington (1991:208) finds that in both the first and second reverse waves’ twenty countries with democratic political systems changed to authoritarian forms of government. So far democracy has endured in most of the third wave countries. According to the Polity IV data set (Marshall and Jaggers 2008), a majority of the third wave democracies had a democracy score¹ of 8, 9 or 10 by the end of 2007. Nigeria, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nepal were placed between 4 and 7, while Pakistan and Sudan had reversed to autocracy. While the situation looks promising in Latin America and Europe, many countries, especially in the African continent, struggle to maintain, stabilize and develop newly established democratic institutions.

¹The score [0, 10] is a summation of points from five authority dimensions, competitiveness and regulation of political participation, competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on chief executive (Jaggers and Gurr 1995:472).

Mauritanian President Maaouiya Ould Taya was overthrown in a bloodless military palace coup in August 3rd, 2005. The new Military Council for Justice and Democracy said it would rule the country for a transitional period of two years, after which it would organise fresh elections. The military junta carried through its promises, and free and fair presidential elections were held in 2007, appearing to herald a new era of democracy in Mauritania. However, on August 6th, 2008 troops overthrew the freely-elected President Abdallahi, and formed a state council to rule the country (BBC 2008). This is one of many examples of countries failing to maintain newly established democratic institutions, and returning to authoritarianism after a short period of experimenting with democratic procedures and institutions.

The purpose of this thesis is to shed light on how different types of democratic transitions influence the probability of further democratic consolidation. My thesis is based on two basic assumptions. The first assumption is that the process of democratization can be conceptualized as two transitions (O'Donnell 1992:18). “The first is the transition from the previous authoritarian regime to the installation of a democratic government. The second transition is from this government to the consolidation of democracy or, in other words, to the effective functioning of a *democratic regime* (ibid.)”. Valenzuela (1992:73) asserts that “[t]he manner in which any new regime, whether authoritarian or democratic, is inaugurated has a significant effect over the regime's subsequent evolution”. Also Huntington (1991:276) defines the transition process itself as a possible condition affecting consolidation. Therefore, the second assumption is that the first phase of transition affects the second phase.

For the first phase of transition, the installation of a democratic government, I have chosen to apply a typology developed by Scott Mainwaring (1992:323), based on his study of transitions in Latin America and Southern Europe². He categorizes three transition paths defined by the interactions between the authoritarian regime and the opposition:

1. Transition through transaction: The authoritarian regime chooses to continue opening the political system.
2. Transition through extrication: The authoritarian regime is weakened, but remains strong enough to dictate important terms of the transition.
3. Transition through regime defeat: The authoritarian regime collapses or is overthrown.

The typology above provides the background for the research question of this thesis:

Which of the three democratic transitions, transaction, extrication or defeat, is connected to the highest probability of further democratic consolidation?

Since Mainwaring actually applies and writes about his threefold typology to a limited degree, the definition and the categorization of the three modes of transition in this thesis is mainly based on Samuel Huntington's (1991) *The Third Wave*, which is an extensive study of the three different transition processes. Huntington (1991:276) is however uncertain about the effect of mode to consolidation noticing that "[p]lausible arguments can be made for and against the helpfulness of each of these processes as far as consolidation is concerned". Therefore, for the second phase of transition, from the installed democratic government to the consolidation of democracy, I create hypotheses based on how the mode of the first phase of transition can be related to two necessary conditions for consolidation suggested by O'Donnell

²See Mainwaring and Viola 1985, Mainwaring and Share 1986

(1992:19); the importance of on the one hand avoiding authoritarian regression, while on the other pushing the democratization process further, toward consolidation.

The independent variable in my study is a transition through transaction, extrication, or defeat leading to the installation of a first democratically elected government or chief executive after authoritarian rule in the time period of 1970-2000. The probability further of consolidation is operationalized as five dependent variables, all measuring different aspects of the continued transition process after the installation of first democratic government. The first dependent variable is the probability of authoritarian regression. The second dependent variable 'polity_next' measures the level of democracy after the next regime change following the installation democratic government. The third dependent variable 'polity_change' measures the direction and magnitude of the next regime change. The fourth dependent variable 'polity_future' is constructed by studying the long-term development pattern of the regime, in some cases measuring the obtained level of democracy in 2007. And the fifth dependent variable 'consolidation' is a dummy transformation of the 'polity_future', with a cut-off point of polity score of 7.

It should be kept in mind that my research design is not appropriate for measuring whether a country is a consolidated democracy. Consolidation is an abstract, constructed concept which implies that there is no 'final destination' of a consolidated democracy. The possibilities of both improvement and of having been 'the only game in town' only for a limited time can not be wiped out. In accordance, the concept of consolidation concerns both the institutional structure of democratic regime, and people's beliefs and norms on whether political change and resolving political conflict should emerge within these structures (Linz and Stepan 1996:5). My dependent variables only measure changes in the institutional structure of regimes, such as level of constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executive, disregarding changes in the attitudinal aspects of consolidation, such as public opinion of whether democracy is the preferred form of government. Consolidation is

also dependent on how long the democracy has endured, and the short time frame between the explanatory and the dependent variables in some of my units creates limitation for defining the level of consolidation³. Therefore, the dependent variables must be interpreted as *indications of further consolidation*, rather than clear measurements of consolidation.

By using both linear and logistic regression analyses of cross-sectional country data with 78 units, the continued transition process after the installation of the first democratic government is examined. I find that transitions through extrications, where both the authoritarian regime and the opposition influence the transition process, are related to the lowest probability of authoritarian regression and to the highest probability of further democratic change and consolidation of democracy. In extrications, which usually are non-violent and characterized by negotiations and consensus, the balanced power between the groups restrains a possible authoritarian regression, while the presence of the old elites encourages the opposition to develop, to strengthen, and to promote further democratic change.

The results of the analyses also show that the effects of both defeats and transactions are contingent on the level of democracy obtained after the installation of the first democratic government. Defeats leading to the initial level of coherent democracy are related to a significantly higher probability of consolidation than defeats leading to semi-democracy. I argue that when a defeat of an authoritarian regime takes place through a military coup leading to the initial level of semi-democracy, the number of democratic actors in the country is still low and the number of authoritarian, or at least neutral actors, is high. Subsequently, the balance of power does not necessarily favour opposition to authoritarianism, which complicates the further democratization process.

The results also indicate that transactions leading to the initial level of semi-democracy are more supportive of consolidation than transactions leading to coherent

³ The latest transitions in my study occurred in 2000, while the last year in my dependent variables is 2007.

democracy. It is possible that when a transition leads first to semi-democracy, the democratic transition is more gradual and cautious, which enables the parts of the old elites, and parts of the population to adjust to, and to accept the new democratic system, while the opposition groups have better possibilities to develop, and to influence the further democratization process.

My thesis is divided into five chapters. In chapter 2 I review existing literature on democratic transitions, conduct a theoretically based discussion how the different democratic transitions are related to probability of further consolidation, and develop hypotheses for the subsequent analysis. In chapter 3 I present the empirical approach for my inquiry, the operationalization of independent, dependent and control variables, and discuss methodological problems related to my research design. In chapter 4 the results of the regression analyses are reported and discussed, and the robustness of the models is examined. In chapter 5 I sum up the findings and propose improvements in the research design for further studies.

2 Literature Review

The backbone of the studies of democratic transitions has been the modernization theory, which emphasizes that political transformations are determined by change in objective conditions (Przeworski 1986:47), such as change in class structure (Moore 1965), or increased economic welfare (Lipset 1960, Doorenspleet 2005). However, when the new democratization wave swept through Latin America in the mid-1970, the modernization approach appeared to offer a less valid explanation of the events. A number of scholars, such as O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), found the theory offering an excessively deterministic picture of reality, and maintained that democratization was also an outcome of actions, not just of conditions (Przeworski 1991). Instead of studying the impact of macro variables, the scholars concentrated on how the strategic behaviour of political actors (Higley and Burton 1989, Karl and Schmitter 1991, Przeworski 1991, Mainwaring 1992), and the type and characteristics of the previous regime (Linz and Stepan 1996) affected the transition process and the further consolidation of democracy. One of the most extensive works in this field is Samuel Huntington's *The Third Wave* (1991), which studies the impact of both macro variables, the type of previous regime, and political actors' choices and actions on democratic transitions.

In order not to end up with an excessively deterministic or voluntaristic picture of reality, I have chosen a research design that recognizes both changes in objective conditions and strategic behaviour of political actors as determinants for political transformations. For example Przeworski and Limongi's (1997) find that democracies are not solely by-products of economic development; it is the actions of political actors that determine whether democracies are established or not, but high level of economic development increases their chances of survival. Or, as Bratton and van de Walle (1997:45) put it "people can make their own history, even if not under conditions of their own choosing". The independent variable in my study implies that actions and choices of political actors influence both the establishment of

democracies and the further probability of democratic consolidation. At the same time, the chosen statistical method allows me to control the effect of their choices for the effect of structural factors, such as the level of economic development, or level of democracy in the neighbouring countries. I have chosen not to analyze how the type of the previous regime affects the transition process. This is because Huntington's (1991:115) categorization of the transition does not indicate any clear one-to-one relation. One-party regimes, personal dictatorships, and military regimes have changed to democratic systems through all the three modes of transition.

In the following section 2.1 I present the typology of democratic transitions, which is applied to explain and systematize the first phase of transition, the installation of democratic government. In section 2.2 I give a brief theoretical definition of the concept of democratic consolidation, and present two necessary conditions and three guidelines for democratic actors, suggested by O'Donnell (1992:19), for a transition to a consolidated democracy. Finally, I will generate hypotheses that will serve as the starting point for the empirical analysis on how the three modes of transition are related to the probability of further consolidation.

2.1 The First Transition: Installation of Democratic Government

Various typologies of democratic transitions have been developed. For example Alfred Stepan (1986:64ff) finds eight to ten different paths towards redemocratization, and Donald Share (1987) develops a two-by-two matrix based on 'democratization led by or against authoritarian regime' and 'the duration of the transition'. Mainwaring (1992:320-21) finds Stepan's typology too extensive asserting that Stepan is not categorizing paths, but rather which forces lead the different transitions. In contrast, Mainwaring perceives Shares's matrix too parsimonious, where several transitions in Latin America do not fit any of the four categories in the matrix.

Mainwaring (1992: 322) himself suggests a threefold typology of transaction, extrication, and defeat to capture the reality of transitions in Latin America. Mainwaring builds on J. Linz's (1978) work by adding the third intermediary category of extrication to Linz's transitions through reform (similar to transaction) and rupture (similar to defeat). The threefold typology, presented in the introduction, “indicates differential positions of power in the negotiations and interaction between regime and opposition, underscoring decisive differences in how much authoritarian regimes influence the transition process” (ibid.). Mainwaring's typology is identical with Samuel Huntington's (1991:121ff) typology of transformation, transplacement and replacement. While Mainwaring actually applies and writes about the typology to a limited degree, Huntington gives extensive explanations on how 'third wave' countries democratized, categorizes 33 democratic transitions after their mode of transition in the time period of 1974-90, and develops normative 'Guidelines for Democratizers' on the basis of the mode of transition.

2.1.1 The Typology

According to Huntington (1991:121) “the crucial participants in the [democratization] processes were stand patters, liberal reformers, and democratic reformers in the governing coalition, and democratic reformers and revolutionary extremists in the opposition”.

Table 2.1 Political Groups Involved in Democratization

	Attitudes toward Democracy	
	Against	For
Government	Stand patters	Democratic reformers/Liberals
Opposition	Radical Extremists	Democratic Moderates

Source: Huntington (1991:121)

Stand patters are members of the governing group opposing democratization. In non-communist authoritarian systems the stand patters were normally right-wing, fascist, and nationalist. In communist regimes these were normally Stalinist or Brezhnevite

(ibid.). Huntington does not provide a clear definition of opposition⁴, but it is natural to assess that in authoritarian regimes this is hardly political opposition to the governing coalition, but rather different groups, such as trade unions or political parties, organized *outside* the government, or the mass of the populace. Graeme Gill (2000:210), writing about the post-Soviet transition, asserts that "[o]pposition élites are the leaders of independent organizations which emerged to challenge the ruling élite, civil society forces usually having their roots in society at large, reflected in mass support". It should be kept in mind that opposition in Mainwaring's and Huntington's typologies refers to opposition to authoritarianism and not to democracy, i.e. when referring to opposition I refer to democratic reformers outside the government.

In 'transition through transaction' the authoritarian government initiates the process of liberalization and remains a decisive actor throughout the transition (Huntington 1991:124, Mainwaring 1992:322). The authoritarian regime chooses to continue opening the political system because the costs of staying in power increase or the costs of liberalizing decrease, or because the initial idea was to intervene in a crisis situation and restore democracy after a short interlude (Mainwaring 1992:323). The democratic reformers are in power *within* the authoritarian regime (Huntington 1991:129), but this does not imply that the opposition plays an insignificant role. According to Huntington (1991:139) the processes involved normally consultations with leaders of opposition, the political parties, and major social groups and institutions. In some instances formal negotiations and explicit agreements or pacts, while in other cases the consultations were more informal. However, the government is stronger than the opposition, and in the end it is the authoritarian regime that decides the speed and the progress of the transition. The prototypical cases of transaction were Spain, Brazil, and, among communist regimes, Hungary (Huntington 1991:125).

⁴Huntington (1991:121) for example mentions that "in non-communist authoritarian systems the opponents of democratization in the opposition were normally left-wing, revolutionary, and Marxist-Leninist".

In 'transition through extrication' the authoritarian regime is weakened, but remains strong enough to dictate important terms of transition. The balance between the ancient regime and the opposition is quite equal, such that they both influence the speed and the progress of transition (Mainwaring 1992:323). Within the opposition the democratic moderates are strong enough to prevail over antidemocratic radicals, but they are not strong enough to overthrow the government. Within the government the balance between stand patters and reformers is such that the government is unwilling to initiate, but willing to negotiate a change of regime. It has to be pushed into formal or informal negotiations with the opposition (Huntington 1991:151). The most prototypical cases of extrication were Poland's and Uruguay's transition in the 1980's.

A 'transition through defeat' takes place when a major defeat of the authoritarian regime leads to the collapse of authoritarianism and the inauguration of a democratic government, such as transitions in Argentina in 1982-83, Portugal, Greece, Philippines, and Romania (Huntington 1991:113, Mainwaring 1992:322). Reformers *within* the regime are weak or nonexistent, and the stand patters dominate the regime. Democratization results from the opposition outside the regime gaining strength and the government losing strength until the government collapses or is overthrown (Huntington 1991:142).

2.2 The Second Transition: Consolidation of Democracy

The second transition phase is “from the installed democratic government to the consolidation of democracy or, in other words, to the effective functioning of a *democratic regime*” (O'Donnell 1992:18). Linz and Stephan (1996:5-6) find that consolidated democracy is a political situation where democracy has become “the only game in town”.

-Behaviourally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or turning to violence or foreign invasion to secede from the state.

-Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a society such as theirs and when the support for antisystem alternatives is quite small or more or less isolated from the pro-democratic forces.

-Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and nongovernmental forces alike, throughout the territory of the state, become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process (ibid.).

The above indicates that, in order to be regarded as a consolidated democracy, an overwhelming majority of people in a territory must embrace the *norms and beliefs* that political change and resolving political conflict must take place within the *existing democratic procedures and institutions*. And the possible minor fractions supporting antisystem alternatives *must not attempt to overthrow* the democratic government.

O'Donnell (1992:19) asserts that there are two necessary conditions for a transition from a democratic government to a democratic regime. The first necessary condition is obvious, there can be no authoritarian regression. According to O'Donnell (ibid.) authoritarian regression can occur through a "sudden death", via a classic military coup, or it can occur through a "slow death", in which there is "a progressive diminution of existing spaces for the exercise of civilian power and the effectiveness of the classic guarantees of liberal constitutionalism". The second necessary condition is that the democratic actors must be able to push the process in such way that it moves forward to the consolidation of democracy (ibid.). These two conditions are in

accordance with Valenzuela's (1992:59) claim that both durability and quality of a democratic regime are attributes of consolidation.

O'Donnell (1992:21) suggests that in order to avoid authoritarian regression and to advance toward consolidation, democratic actors must at least: (a) neutralize those actors who are unconditionally authoritarian, either by isolating them politically or by turning them into fragmented sects which cannot threaten the survival of the regime, (b) in regard of those actors with more neutral attitudes toward democracy, promote preferences or at least practices which are compatible with the functioning of democracy, and (c) increase the number and intensity of democratic actors, and make the electoral sphere the critical locus of decision making in the important issues facing the nation.

I regard O'Donnell's guidelines for democratic actors for avoiding authoritarian regression and for advancing toward consolidation being in accordance with, or covering, the three aspects of consolidated democracies defined by Linz and Stepan (1996:6). The minor factions supporting authoritarian regime must become isolated in a matter that they do not attempt to overthrow the democratic government. There has to be change in the beliefs and norms of the majority of people, such that they rely on political change or resolving political conflict through the existing democratic channel. And democratic procedures and institutions must be maintained and progressed further. I will now develop hypotheses based on O'Donnell's suggested necessary conditions for consolidation of a democratic regime.

2.2.1 Hypothesis Generation

The first condition for the path to consolidation of a democratic regime is that there can be no authoritarian regression. Transitions through transaction, such as the processes in Brazil and Spain, are often regarded as resulting in favourable conditions for consolidation of democracy (Hagopian 1992:244, O'Donnell 1992:31, O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). O'Donnell (1992:31-37), however, finds that transactions, which often are preceded by a relatively high level of economic welfare and low

degree of repression, are complicated due to what he refers to as a “paradox of success”. The memory of the authoritarian regime is usually less negative, parts of the population (mostly bourgeoisie and the middle class) benefited from the authoritarian regime and therefore have more neutral attitudes toward democracy, there are continuities in the political personnel from the authoritarian regime to the new democratic one, and the civilian authorities may remain subordinate to the military power. Thus, there exists a possibility of authoritarian regression through a “slow death”, through a gradual diminution of the democratic system.

On the other hand, O’Donnell (1992:31-33) also asserts that neither are transitions through defeat necessarily conducive to the consolidation of democracy. Defeats are often preceded by ruined economy and high degree of repression and violence. In addition, defeats can lead to a situation where the armed forces are politically defeated and thus likely hostile to the new democracy. This can provoke authoritarian regression through a “sudden death”, a classic military coup.

H₁: After transaction an authoritarian regression is more likely to occur through a “slow death”.

H₂: After defeat an authoritarian regression is more likely to occur through a “sudden death”.

H₃: There is no systematic difference between defeats and transactions and probability of authoritarian regression.

The second necessary condition for consolidation is that the democratic actors must be able to push the process forward. To achieve consolidation, the democratic actors must neutralize authoritarian actors, promote democratic practices and preferences among the neutral actors, and increase in number. In cases of transaction, in addition to the fact that the balance of power favours the authoritarian regime, the “paradox of success” indicates that the number of authoritarian and neutral actors may be relatively high, and the number of strictly democratic actors low. Thus, the promotion

of further democratic change may become problematic. In contrast, in defeats the opposition becomes stronger than the authoritarian regime which eventually collapses with no emphasis on continuity in procedures, institutions, ideas or individuals (Huntington 1991:146-47). This indicates that the democratic actors are numerous, and that they have great possibilities to promote further democratic change.

H₄: Defeats are related to higher probability of further democratic change after the installation of democratic government than transactions.

On the other hand, consolidation after defeats may be problematic due to the very fact that the old elites are swept away. Huntington (1991:142) finds that when the former opposition groups come to power following a defeat, the conflict enters a new phase as groups in the new government compete and struggle among themselves over the nature of the regime they should institute. This implies that the democratic actors may lose sight of their need to retain a strategic alliance against authoritarian forces (O'Donnell 1992:33). Thus, their possibilities to achieve consolidation are weakened. Huntington (1991:276) also hypothesizes that defeats are less supportive of consolidation due to their conflict-prone and violent nature.

The above indicates that extrications, where the balance between the old authoritarian elites and the new democratic elites is more equal, are most supportive of consolidation. Extrications are usually non-violent, the presence of the old elites creates stability, and helps the democratic actors to retain and strengthen their strategic alliance against the authoritarian forces, and the presence of the relatively strong opposition is conducive to maintaining and strengthening the newly established democratic institutions. Subsequently, the threat of authoritarian regression seems less imminent, and the new democratic elites can promote democratic preferences and practices among the neutral actors, and gradually increase in number and neutralize the old elites. In accordance, Huntington (1991:276) hypothesizes that extrications, characterized by negotiations and consensus, may be most supportive of consolidation. Also Munck (1994:364) finds that "the prospects of

democratic consolidation appear to be enhanced in those cases where the more or less balanced power between the authoritarian leaders and emerging opposition groups makes compromise on both sides an essential ingredient of the transition".

H₅: *Extractions are related to the lowest probability of authoritarian regression.*

H₆: *Extractions are related to the highest probability of further democratic change after the installation of democratic government.*

H₇: *Extractions are related to the highest probability of further democratic consolidation.*

3 The Empirical Approach and Methodology

In this chapter I present and discuss the empirical assessment of the theoretical basis of the thesis. In the paragraphs below the applied data set is presented. In section 3.1 I briefly present the chosen analysis method, and in section 3.2 I explain the selection of the units for my analysis. In section 3.3 I present the operationalization of the independent variable; the empirical and theoretical basis for the coding of the three modes of transition. In sections 3.4 and 3.5 the operationalization of the chosen dependent and control variables is presented. Finally, in section 3.6, I discuss some methodological problems related to my research design.

I have chosen to analyze statistically how the mode of transition is related to the further democratization process. For my inquiry I extend the MIRPS/SIP⁵ data set developed by Gates et al. (2006), based on the Polity IV project by Marshall and Jaggers (2008) and Vanhanen (2000). To the MIRPS/SIP data set I have added my covariate for mode of transition, transformed to a pair of dummy variables with defeat as reference category. I have also added the control variable for prior democratic experience, 'prior_dem', for initial level of democracy, 'democracy', and for level of democracy in the neighbourhood, 'sipneighbour' and 'sipneighb_next'. And finally, I have added the dependent variables measuring the probability of authoritarian 'regression', the level of democracy after the next regime change, 'polity_next', the direction and magnitude of the next regime change, 'polity_change', the future level of democracy, 'polity_future', and the probability of 'consolidation', which is a dummy transformation of the 'polity_future'.

To construct the control variables and the dependent variable 'regression', I have applied the 'sip2' variable from the Gates et al. (2006) replication. The 'sip2' varies between 0 and 1, measuring the regulation, competitiveness, and openness of executive recruitment, the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-

⁵ Available at <http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Governance/>

making powers of chief executives, and the number of citizens with voting rights (Codebook for MIRPS 2008). To construct the other dependent variables I have applied the 'polity' variable from the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers 2008), which also takes into account changes that have occurred in the time period of 2000 to 2007. The 'polity' variable varies between -10 (strongly autocratic), and 10 (strongly democratic). It is a summation of autocracy (-) and democracy (+) points from competitiveness and regulation of political participation, competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on chief executive (Jaggers and Gurr 1995:472). The coding procedures are explained in greater detail in sections 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5.

3.1 Analysis Method

The MIRPS/SIP data set by Gates et al. (2006) is adequate for analysing how the institutional characters of regimes affect the expected durability of regimes. They find that institutionally inconsistent regimes (those exhibiting a mix of institutional characteristics of both democracy and autocracy) are significantly less stable, i.e. shorter-lived, than institutionally consistent regimes (ibid: 893). Survival analysis is however not the most suitable method for my inquiry, since it only allows for measuring how long a regime exists before the institutional structure of that regime changes. The aim of my inquiry is to find out what happens with the regimes when they change; do they change toward a greater degree of democracy or autocracy. Given the prevailing opinion and theory on democracy as the preferred form of governance, short durability of inconsistent regimes can be regarded preferable if the regime ends due to further democratization, and vice versa.

I have chosen to apply both linear and logistic regression analysis of cross-sectional country data, in which I observe all my units (countries with first democratic elections) at one moment of time having different qualities defined by the chosen independent variables. The aim is to find (co)variations between the units in regard of

these qualities, or in other words, to find correlations between the independent and the dependent variables (Skog 2005:71). In linear regression the dependent variable is metric, and usually continuous. The regression coefficients are estimated with the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. They measure how much and to what direction the dependent variable changes when the corresponding independent variable increases with one unit, holding all the other independent variables constant. A multivariate linear regression model can be written as:

$$Y_i = b_0 + b_1 \cdot X_1 + b_2 \cdot X_2 + \dots + b_k \cdot X_k + e_i,$$

where b_0 is the intercept, b_1, \dots, b_k are the regression coefficients estimated by the independent variables, and e_i is the stochastic error term (Skog 2005:215, 222).

In logistic regression the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable with only two values, usually 0 and 1. The aim is to study how the share having a particular value on the dependent variable changes for different values of the independent variable. But since shares per definition can only vary between 0 and 1, these are transformed to *log odds* of having the particular value on the dependent variable. The logarithmic transformation of the odds is carried out to extend the range of the latent dependent variable from $-\infty$ to $+\infty$. A multivariate logistic model can be written as:

$$\text{Logit}(Z) = \ln\left(\frac{p}{1-p}\right) = b_0 + b_1 \cdot X_1 + b_2 \cdot X_2 + \dots + b_k \cdot X_k + e_i,$$

Due to the logarithmic transformation, interpreting regression coefficients is more complicated than in regular OLS regression. The coefficients measure how much the log-odds of having the value of 1 change when the corresponding independent variable increases with one unit, holding all the other independent variables constant. To make the interpretation of correlations between variables more precise and intuitive, it is better to apply odds ratios than log odds. The odds ratio measures the relative change in the odds of having the value 1 in the dependent variable resulting from a one unit increase in an explanatory variable, controlled for all other variables. Odds ratios are antilogarithms of the log odds (the regression coefficients), marked

with Exp (B) in the results (Skog 2005:352-66). The results can also be interpreted by calculating the proportions having the value of 1 in the dependent variable. When the coefficients are estimated, the logit Z can be calculated for different values on the explanatory variables. Subsequently, the proportions having the value of 1 are calculated from the equation $p = \frac{\exp(Z)}{1 + \exp(Z)}$. Proportions can be interpreted as the probability of having the value of 1 in the dependent variable (Skog 2005:358-59).

3.2 The Units

The units in my analysis are states that have experienced the first phase of transition, the installation of a democratic government in the time period of 1970-2000. I have chosen to operationalize this as installation of first *democratically elected* government after authoritarian rule. O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986:57) define the concept of 'founding election' as "when, for the first time after an authoritarian regime, elected positions of national significance are disputed under reasonably competitive conditions". I have operationalized 'elected positions' as elected government or chief executive, and 'reasonably competitive conditions' by excluding cases where the level of democracy measured in 'sip2' remains below 0.3 after the elections.

My study is based on Gates et al. (2006) data set, and to find my units I tracked democratic transition where at least one of following indicators change: 1) movement from one category to another in the Executive Recruitment dimension⁶, 2) change of at least two units in the Executive Constraints dimension⁷, 3) 100% increase in

⁶The executive recruitment dimension is constructed out of three Polity IV indicators: Regulation of Executive Recruitment (XRREG), Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP) and Openness of Executive Recruitment (XROPEN) (Codebook for MIRPS 2008).

⁷Executive constraints dimension refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives. The variable measures the level of 'checks and balances' in decision-making process with a seven-category scale stretching from (1) Unlimited Authority to (7) Executive Parity or Subordination (Codebook for Polity II 2008).

number of citizens with voting rights (Gates et al. 2006:898). In most of my units at least two of the indicators change simultaneously. After tracking the democratic transitions in the data set, I studied whether these transitions were suitable as units for my inquiry, and collected data for further coding process. The list of my units can be found in appendix 1.

The creators of the MIRPS/SIP data set have not been consistent in their selection of which events lead to changes in the coding of variables measuring the level of democracy/autocracy. Therefore, the start date of my units may be the date when political parties became legal, the date of a new constitution⁸, the date of elections, or the date new president takes office. In addition, in the later transitions, such as those in Eastern Europe, the data set takes into account the stepwise transition process toward democracy, defining several of the events mentioned above as start dates of a new regime. In the earlier transitions, such as those in Latin America and Southern Europe, there is only one event defining the start date. When there were several start dates to choose between, I chose the date of first elections, or the date closest to first elections as the start date⁹.

3.3 Coding Criteria

I will now present and explain how the coding of the three modes of transition is carried through. My categorization of transitions is based on the requirements of the necessary criteria, while supporting criteria are mainly used as assurance for my coding. The coding of the units can be found in appendix 1.

Necessary Criteria

The difference between extrication and transaction is diffuse, especially since both transaction and extrication include negotiations between the old regime and the

⁸For these units I have marked the date of elections in appendix 1.

⁹In cases of Russia and Poland I chose the last start date in the stepwise transition process.

opposition. And as Huntington (1991:124) notices: "The line between transformations and transplacements [transactions and extrications] is fuzzy, and some cases might be legitimately classified in either category". The criterion of which political group decides the speed and progress of the transition process has been decisive for my categorization (Table 2.1). In cases of transaction the interactions between the reformers and the stand patters *within* the authoritarian government that decides the speed and course of the transition. In contrast, in cases of extrication both ancient regime and the opposition influence the speed and course of transition. The central interaction is between democratic reformers inside the government and opposition elites (moderates) outside the government, with each being able to dominate the antidemocratic groups on its side of the line (Huntington 1991:124). I have for example defined the following incidences as indications of transition through extrication: if the opposition manages to influence which date is settled as the date of elections, or if national conferences, held in many countries in Africa, declared themselves as sovereign.

After studying cases classified as defeat by Huntington, I found that these transitions followed quite similar pattern. Since stand patters dominate the regime, the opposition outside the regime must become strong enough to wear down the regime. The erosion of support for the regime often occurred covertly given the repressive character of the regime, and then manifested itself when some triggering event exposed the weakness of the regime. Greece and Argentina, for example, suffered the humiliation of military defeat, and the Portuguese and Philippine regimes were unable to win counterinsurgency wars (Huntington 1991:143-46). Subsequently, the authoritarian regime or the head of state is either overthrown, or obliged to resign. The process continues with an establishment of a transitional government, where usually the army continues to rule until the civilian rule is restored. Finally, a new constitution comes to effect, and the country holds free elections. This transition process can better be described as a regime collapse than a regime change, it happens relatively quickly (*ibid.*).

It is important to notice that not only defeats, but also transactions may be preceded by a coup. There are two possible occasions. First, a coup may occur in transactions if the military section intervenes in a crisis situation with the aim of restoring the democracy after a period with authoritarian rule (Mainwaring 1992:323). In these cases the regime usually stays authoritarian several years before they start to liberalize. In contrast, in transitions through defeat the new ruling (military) regime initiates a *transitional* government and starts the democratization process immediately after the coup. Transactions may also be preceded by a coup since democratic reformers have to be in power *within* the authoritarian regime for democratization to take place. And when the old leaders did not die (Spain and Taiwan), or were regularly changed (Brazil), the democratic reformers had to oust the ruler and install prodemocratic leadership. In military governments this meant the replacement by coup d'état of one military leader by another (Peru, Ecuador, Nigeria, and Guatemala) (Huntington 1992:129-31). For example Oscar Humberto Mejia replaced Rios Montt in a coup in Guatemala in 1983. This can however not be categorized as a defeat of the military regime, but only as change of head figures. President Montt had initiated the liberalization process by advancing the timetable for the return to elected rule. After the elections the current head of state, Mejia, assured that the military had no intention of continuing to exercise political influence. However, the outgoing military rulers managed to posit exit guarantees in form of a decree ruling out the possibility of officers being brought to trial by the new civilian government.

A weakness in Huntington's study is that he has no clear definition of opposition. Huntington (1991:145) asserts that in transitions through defeat “the opposition outside the regime gains strength and the government loses strength until the government collapses or is overthrown”. Huntington (1991:146) also recognizes that a mass mobilization of citizens to overthrow a regime is a rare event. In the third wave defeats, “people power” played a decisive role only in East Germany, Romania and Philippines. It is more common that authoritarian regimes are overthrown by

military factions in a coup, such as in Greece and Portugal. The question is whether *all kinds of* coups by military factions should be regarded as defeats by 'opposition', or whether some degree of popular support is also needed to fulfil the theoretical requirement of the opposition becoming stronger than the government. In other words, when a small military faction manages to overthrow the government, has there really been a change in the balance of power between the opposition and the authoritarian regime, or should this be regarded as some kind of struggle inside the authoritarian regime, a change of head figures. I have chosen to categorize transitions through a military coup, such as Ethiopia in 1994, Cambodia in 1998, and Thailand in 1975, 1978, and 1992, as defeats of the authoritarian regime. I have marked the seven defeats through 'people power' in appendix 1.

Supporting Criteria

The events of supporting criteria do not take place under every transition, and these criteria *alone* are not sufficient indicators for coding. The exceptions from the rule are actual foreign invasions, Haiti, Panama, and Uganda, which I have chosen to define as defeats of the authoritarian regime. 'Exit guarantees' are relevant only in some cases of transitions from military regimes to democratic ones. Huntington (1991:116) finds that military leaders often posit two conditions or "exit guarantees" for their withdrawal from power. First, there is to be no prosecution, punishment, or other retaliation against military officers for acts they may have committed when they were in power. Second, the institutional role and autonomy of the military establishment must be respected, including its overall responsibility for national security. In transaction the military leaders are able to assure their demands for exit guarantees, while in cases of extrication negotiations with civilian leaders lead to modification of these demands. In cases of defeat the military leaders may ask for assurances, but their requests are rejected by civilian leaders.

The role of external pressure and threat of foreign invasion is used to differentiate extrications from transactions. In extrications the pressure from opposition to

democratize may include an influence from a foreign power, and in the negotiations a foreign state or an organization may act as a surrogate for democratic moderates (ibid: 151-152). For example in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras, all classified as extrications by Huntington (1991:113), the US aid or withdrawal from invasion was conditional on political and economic reforms. However, cases with external pressure to democratize without any noticeable influence from opposition inside the country do not qualify as extrications, but are coded as transactions. The speed of transition has been a less important criterion for my coding. I expected it could help to differentiate transactions from defeats; however, many transitions in Africa, following the patterns of both transaction and extrication, have taken place within the time frame of two years.

The following tables are based on the theoretical framework described in this section and in section 2.1.1, my study of 78 democratic transitions, and comparison of my empirical findings with categorization of transition processes by Huntington (1991:113) and Mainwaring (1992:321).

Table 3.1 Necessary Criteria

	Transaction (3)	Extrication (2)	Defeat (1)
Political Group Influencing the Speed and Progress of the Process	Democratizers and stand patters inside the authoritarian regime	Both opposition and authoritarian regime	Opposition/Transitional government
Negotiations Between Ancient Regime and Opposition	Yes (1)	Yes (1)	No (0), eventually between transitional government and opposition
Head of State/Ancient Regime	Resigns or participates new elections voluntarily	Resigns or participates new elections due to pressure from opposition	Obligated to resign/ Removed in a coup or revolution
Triggering Factor for Democratization	Ancient regime initiates voluntarily	Ancient regime initiates due to pressure from opposition	Opposition mobilization or some triggering event, such as military defeat.

Table 3.2 Supporting Criteria

	Transaction	Extrication	Defeat
Exit Guarantees	Yes	Yes, but modified	No
The Speed of Transition¹⁰	Slow (1)	Slow (1)	Fast (0)
External Pressure	Irrelevant	Yes	Leads to invasion
Foreign Invasion	Irrelevant	As a threat	Yes

3.4 Probability of Democratic Consolidation

In this section, I explain the operationalization of the dependent variables chosen to characterize the further transition process after the installation of first democratic government. Valenzuela (1992:58) finds that there is a “complex relationship of continuity and discontinuity between the first and the second transitions”. The transition toward consolidation includes the strengthening of the institutions and procedures created during the first phase of transition. However, building a consolidated democracy often requires abandoning or altering some of the arrangements, agreements, and institutions that may have facilitated the first transition, but that are inimical to the second transition. Therefore, the process is seldom purely ascending, but often precedes one step forward, two steps back (*ibid.*). In order to obtain as valid and adequate prediction of the probability of further consolidation as possible, I have constructed five dependent variables, all measuring different aspects of how the transition process continues further after the installation of democratically elected government, or chief executive.

The operationalization of the dependent variables is conditional on how the 'polity' and 'sip2' variables (applied in the 'regression' variable) measure the level of democracy or autocracy. Both variables measure changes in the institutional structure

¹⁰More than two years from the announcement of democratization to the start date of a new regime is coded as slow.

of regimes; the competitiveness and regulation of political participation, competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on chief executive. The operationalization does not cover any attitudinal aspects of democracy, such as public opinion of whether democracy is the preferred form of government. Changes in the institutional structure can naturally be interpreted as reflections of changes in people's norms and beliefs. The operationalization of the dependent variables is also conditional on the impossibility of predicting the future. The dependent variables are restricted to the last year in the Polity data set, 2007, and since the latest democratic transitions have occurred in 2000, the time frame for a possible authoritarian regression or democratic consolidation for some of the units is relatively short, only seven years. Therefore, my dependent variables must be interpreted as *indications of further consolidation*, rather than clear measurements of consolidation. Table 3.3 presents six example units' polity scores in the Polity IV data set. Table 3.4 presents how the dependent variables are constructed for these six units.

Table 3.3 Polity Scores

41 Haiti	1993	1994	1999			
	-7	7	-88			
91 Honduras	1981	1982	1985	1989	1999-2007	
	-88	6	5	6	7	
93 Nicaragua	1983	1984	1990	1995	2007	
	-5	-1	6	8	9	
135 Peru	1979	1980	1990	1992	1993	2000
	-88	7	8	-3	1	-88
452 Ghana	1991	1992	1996	2001	2004-2007	
	-88	-1	2	6	8	
790 Nepal	1989	1990	1999	2002		
	-2	5	6	-6		

Table 3.4 Construction of the Dependent Variables

	<i>regression</i>	<i>polity</i>	<i>polity_next</i>	<i>polity_change</i>	<i>polity_future</i>	<i>consolidation</i>
41 Haiti	1	7	-10	-17	-10	0
91 Honduras	0	6	5	-1	7	1
93 Nicaragua	0	-1	6	7	9	1
135 Peru	1	7	8	1	-10	0
452 Ghana	0	-1	2	3	8	1
790 Nepal	1	5	6	1	-6	0

3.4.1 Authoritarian Regression

As noticed in section 2.2, a necessary condition for democratic consolidation is to avoid authoritarian regression. The first dependent variable simply measures whether the country has reversed to authoritarianism after the installation of democratic government. The variable 'regression' is coded as 1(yes), if a country's 'sip2' value changes to lower than 0.3 before 2000¹¹, or if a country's polity-score in the Polity IV data set changes to equal to or lower than -5 after 2000¹². If a country experiences civil war (-77)¹³, the consolidation is regarded as failed, and this is coded as a regression. I have made this choice since there are only six transitions followed by civil war, Guinea Bissau, Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Lesotho, and Comoros. Also, if a country experiences a new transitional period (-88)¹⁴ in the time period of 2000-2007, the consolidation is regarded as failed, and this is coded as a

¹¹ I have chosen the value of 0.3 since my units, defined as democratic transitions, have sip2 values between 0.311 and 0.980.

¹² I apply Jagers and Gurr's (1995:479) suggested cut-off point, -5. They distinguish between «coherent democracies», «coherent autocracies», and «anocracies».

¹³ -77 indicates a period of interregnum, during which there is a complete collapse of central political authority, most likely a period of internal war (Codebook for Polity II)

¹⁴ -88 indicates a period of transition where new institutions are planned, legally constituted, and put into effect. Democratic and quasi-democratic polities are particularly likely to be established (Codebook for Polity II)

regression (for example Haiti and Peru in Table 4.3.1). I have made this choice since these cases would probably qualify as new units for my analysis, if my selection of units was not restricted to the year 2000. Otherwise 'regression' is coded as 0 (no).

3.4.2 The 'Next' Level of Democracy

In addition to avoiding regression, democratic actors have to push the democratization process further, toward consolidation (O'Donnell 1992:19). In some cases the level of democracy is high already right after the installation of the first democratic government. For example Peru and Haiti have the polity value of 7, while Nicaragua and Ghana have the polity value of -1 (Table 3.3). The obtained level of democracy after the next regime change and the magnitude and direction of the next regime change often indicates whether the country is moving toward consolidation. The installation of new democratic government may be followed by a full-scale authoritarian regression, minor adjustment of the political system toward either a slightly more democratic or more authoritarian system (Honduras, Peru, Ghana and Nepal in Table 3.3), or a clear increase in the level of democracy, through for example second democratic elections leading to victory for the opposition candidates (Nicaragua in Table 3.3).

The second dependent variable 'polity_next' measures the obtained *level of democracy* in a country after the next regime change, or in other words, the next change following the installation of democratic government. If a country experiences civil war or a new transitional period after 2000, the consolidation is regarded as failed, and the 'polity_next' is coded as -10. If there are no further changes in the data set the 'polity_next' has the same value as 'polity', which measures the level of democracy right after the installation of democratic government¹⁵.

The 'polity_next' variable measures the level of democracy after the next change of regime, but it does not reveal whether the next change is toward a more democratic or

¹⁵In case of Czechoslovakia I applied the next polity value of Czech Republic.

more authoritarian system. Therefore, I have constructed a third dependent variable, 'polity_change'. This variable measures the *direction and magnitude* of the next regime change following the installation of democratically elected government, or chief executive. Table 3.4 shows that Honduras experiences a minor negative change toward a more authoritarian system, Peru, Ghana, and Nepal experience minor positive changes becoming slightly more democratic, while Haiti and Nicaragua go through more extensive positive and negative changes.

3.4.3 The Future Level of Democracy

The previous two dependent variables measured the stepwise development of regimes, both forwards and backwards. However, in many cases minor adjustments of the regime toward a slightly more authoritarian or more democratic system are followed by bigger steps toward democracy, or vice versa. For example Peru moves gradually toward a new transitional period, which I have chosen to interpret as a failed consolidation, while Ghana is steadily moving toward higher level of democracy, as shown in Table 3.3. The fourth dependent variable 'polity_future' is constructed by studying the long-term development pattern of regimes. It measures the obtained level of democracy in the Polity IV data set by 2007, with the following exceptions: If the installation of democratic government, or chief executive, is followed by civil war or a new transitional period after 2000, consolidation is regarded as failed, and the polity_future is coded as -10 (Haiti and Peru in Table 3.4). If the first phase of transition is followed by authoritarian regression, the 'polity_future' is the corresponding value of equal to or lower than -5 (Nepal in Table 3.4). Otherwise the 'polity_future' is the country's polity value in 2007.

The final dependent variable 'consolidation' is a dummy transformation of the 'polity_future' variable; hence it is a more precise and excluding measurement of consolidation than the previous three dependent variables. To be categorized as a 'consolidated democracy' a country has to have the 'polity_future' value equal to or

higher than 7 in 2007¹⁶. Table 3.3 presents the stepwise democratization processes in Honduras, Nicaragua and Ghana until the last year in my study, 2007. They all have obtained level of democracy equal to or above the polity score of 7, and coded as 'consolidated democracies', as shown in the Table 3.4.

3.5 Control Variables

GDP

According to Lipset (1960) economic development is a key precondition for democratic rule. Also Huntington (1991:272) asserts that presence of an industrialized, modern economy with educated population is correlated with the existence of democratic regimes, and that high level of economic development is conducive to the consolidation of democratic regimes. The variable is measured as the average logarithm of GDP per capita in constant 1995 dollars for the five years preceding the end date of each annual time segment. The variable is adopted from Gates et al. (2006). They use World Bank data for the period 1960 to 1998.

Initial Level of Democracy

A number of empirical studies imply that the combination of autocratic and democratic institutions in a regime plays a significant role in determining its stability. Studies by Gurr (1974), Sanhueza (1999), Hegre et al. (2001), and Gates et al. (2006) demonstrate that consistent democracies and consistent autocracies are the most stable political systems¹⁷. This indicates that if the level of democracy in a country is high already after the installation of democratic government, the probability of authoritarian regression is lower, and the probability of consolidation of the democratic regime is higher.

¹⁶I apply Jagers and Gurr's (1995:479) suggested cut-off point, 7. They distinguish between «coherent democracies», «coherent autocracies», and «anocracies».

¹⁷Referring to duration of different regimes, i.e. how long they last.

I have transformed the 'sip2' variable from Gates et al. (2006) replication into a categorical variable 'democracy', which measures the level of democracy in a country after the installation of democratic government. The units in the data set have 'sip2' values between 0.311 and 0.980. I have coded values equal to or higher than 0.70 as consistent democracies, and values below 0.70 as semi-democracies. I will refer to this variable as the 'initial level of democracy' further in the thesis.

Level of Democracy in the Neighbouring Countries

Gleditsch and Ward (2006:911) find that “the scope and extent of connections with other democratic countries in the region can strengthen support for democratic reform and help sustain institutions in transitional democracies”. Also Huntington (1991:273) suggests that an external environment supportive of democracy is conducive to consolidation. The variable 'sipneighbour' measures the average level of democracy in neighbouring countries¹⁸. I have computed this variable by adding the country's 'sip2' value to the country's 'sip2avgnabo' value. The 'sip2avgnabo' measures the difference between the institutional structure of a country in question and all its neighbouring countries, ranging from -0.965 to 0.935. For some reason the three isolated states, Madagascar, Comoros, and Fiji, obtained a 'sipneighbour' value greater than 1 when I added up their 'sip2' and 'sip2avgnabo' values¹⁹. Therefore, I computed the averages of their neighbour's 'sip2' values manually. In case of Madagascar, I applied the values of Comoros, Mauritius, and Mozambique. For Comoros I applied the values of Tanzania, Mozambique, and Madagascar. And for Fiji I applied the values of New Zealand, Australia, and Papua New Guinea.

For the analyses of the future level of democracy, I have adjusted the operationalization of the 'sipneighbour' variable. The variable 'sipneighb_next' measures the average level of democracy in the neighbouring countries the year the

¹⁸ “A political neighbourhood consists of all contiguous countries with either a common border or less than 150 nautical miles of water between them (Gates et al 2006:899)”.

¹⁹This must be somehow related to either missing values, or to the fact that Gates et al. (2006:899) measure the average political distance from isolated islands to *all* countries in the world.

unit in question experiences the next regime change, or in other words, the next change following the installation of democratic government. If there are no further changes in the data set I have applied the value of the last year in the data set, 2000. There are two reasons for this adjustment. First, the last two dependent variables measure the future level of democracy, in many of the units concerning the year 2007, which makes the time frame between the 'sipneighbour' and the dependent variables for some of the units quite long. And second, a number of the units defined as consolidated democracies (the level of democracy ≥ 7) in 2007 have been 'the first ones out' to democratize. And naturally, the units democratizing first have extremely low 'sipneighbour' scores, while the ones following their example have higher scores. I regard the adjustment of the operationalization increasing the validity of data; in addition to reducing the time frame between the variables, the 'sipneighb_next' takes better into account the development in the average level of democracy in the neighbouring countries.

Prior Democratic Experience

According to Huntington (1991:270), prior democratic experience is a condition favouring democratic consolidation, since few countries create stable democratic systems on their first try. Huntington also hypothesizes that a longer and more recent experience with democracy is more conducive to consolidation than is a shorter and more distant one. If the country has had a 'sip2' value greater than 0.3 after 1950, the variable 'prior_dem' is coded as 1 (yes), otherwise 0 (no). I have chosen the value of 0.3 by finding the 'sip2' values of countries Huntington (1991:272) mentions having prior democratic experience. It is also natural to choose the level of 0.3 since my units, defined as democratic transitions, have 'sip2' values down to 0.311.

Table 3.5 presents the distribution of the units in the two categorical control variables and in the two categorical dependent variables applies in the analysis.

Table 3.5 Number of Units in Categorical Variables

		Defeat	Extrication	Transaction	Total
Prior Democratic Experience	No	7	9	16	32
	Yes	14	14	18	46
Initial Level of Democracy	Semi-democracy	10	5	15	30
	Democracy	11	18	19	48
Regression	No	11	20	21	52
	Yes	10	3	13	26
Consolidation	No	13	9	22	44
	Yes	8	14	12	34
Total		21	23	34	78

3.6 Methodological discussion

I will first discuss the validity and reliability of the data; whether the units and variables in my study are suitable to illuminate my research question. Further, I will review and discuss some (dis)advantages related to the chosen statistical method.

3.6.1 Validity and Reliability of Data

Data's validity concerns conformity between my theoretical and operational definitions; whether I have measured the qualities relevant for my research question. Data's reliability depends on whether I have measured these qualities correctly; it is about the exactness and precision of measuring data (Hellevik 2002:52-53, 471).

When it comes to the selection of units, my theoretical definition refers to installation of a democratic government. I chose not to restrict my selection of units to any particular theoretical definition of a democratic government, but to operationalize this as countries with founding election. I have excluded elections leading to a 'sip2' value below 0.3, since I regarded the validity of these units insufficient. These are

usually transitions in Africa where first multi party elections are held, but the opposition parties boycott the elections, or the elections are neither free nor fair, and therefore the installed government can not be characterized as democratically elected. The cut-off point of 0.3 has created some reliability problems due to sip2 values incoherence with the polity scores. For example, Mauritania's 'sip2' value is above 0.3 after its first multi party elections, but its polity score remains -5, which actually is the cut-off point of authoritarian regression. However, I chose to include Mauritania in the analyses since I have relatively few units, and since my main interest is the further development of the democracy. Due to the incoherence between the polity and sip2 variables, when measuring the variable 'regression', I relied on sip2 values until 2000, and polity values only between 2000 and 2007.

I have operationalized my independent variable as a transition leading to installation of a democratically elected government, categorized after Mainwaring's and Huntington's typology on democratic transition. The question is whether it is misleading to apply the typology to only the first phase of transition. It is quite evident that they have based their classification of transitions on longer periods of time than only until the first democratic elections after the authoritarian rule (for example in the case of Nicaragua). The choice of applying the typology only for the first phase of transition may decrease the validity of my research design. However, my empirical study of transitions has shown that if I also had included cases with second democratic elections, there had been an overwhelming majority of transactions. This is because after the first democratic government is installed, the possible further democratization is often initiated by the existing government, with less influence from the opposition outside. Restricting my empirical study of transition to the first democratic elections was also necessary since I needed enough units for a statistical model, but at the same time I had to be able to read extensive empirical material for each unit, within the time available. However, this may have reduced the reliability of my coding, since it is more challenging to get a comprehensive impression of the transition, and for example to take into account that

transitions sometimes can start as one type, and change to another type later (Huntington 1991:114).

I have not questioned the categorizing made by Huntington, but throughout followed Huntington's coding. The only exception is Sudan, which Huntington (1991:113) defines as transaction, but where I found clear evidence of defeat. This allowed me to concentrate on the transitions that were not categorized by Huntington, and to study empirically a number of transitions in each category to develop the coding criteria. The availability of empirical material for some of my units, especially countries in Africa, has created measuring problems. If I did not regard the information in the Keesings's News Archive as sufficient, I also studied other relevant literature on transitions. Also my own expectations, or unconscious wishes, on the mode of transition may have influenced the reliability of my coding. However, following strictly and conscientiously the coding criteria has reduced this problem.

The theoretical definition of my dependent variable is 'transition from the installed democratic government to the consolidation of democracy'. In order to obtain as valid explanation of the further transition process as possible, I have operationalized five different dependent variables. I argue that the final two dependent variables, 'polity_future' and 'consolidation', are the most valid indicators of further consolidation. 'Polity_future' covers the dependent variable of authoritarian regression, and measures the latest level of democracy in the stepwise democratization process. The 'consolidation' in addition differs between those having the latest level of democracy below and above the cut-off point of 7. The validity of these two variables is reduced since they do not take into account time. There is a difference between having the polity value of 7 for one year and having it for ten years. Only one year can always be a small step forward before a huge step back. It is clear that further studies are needed in this area. By expanding the time frame, and the number of units, the duration of a democratic regime could also be taken into account.

The concept of democratic consolidation naturally carries an implicit definition of what democracy is. Robert Dahl (1971:3) defines eight institutional requirements for democracy: freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, right to vote, eligibility for public office, right of political leaders to compete for support and votes, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, and institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference. One can argue that the polity score, only measuring competitiveness and regulation of political participation, competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on chief executive, is not a sufficient measurement of democracy. It does not take into account political rights and civil liberties at individual level, such as Dahl's requirements for democracy. The cut-off point of 7 in the last dependent variable gives an impression of a quite strong democracy, especially since the polity score ranges from -10 to 10. However, the Freedom in the World survey (Freedom House 2008) gives a more pessimistic picture of the level of democracy (or freedom) in some of my units. Freedom House categorizes countries as 'free', 'partly free', or 'not free', dependent on their level of political rights and civil liberties at individuals' level. The only countries having the polity score of 7, and defined as 'free' by the Freedom House in 2007 were Benin and El Salvador, while others with the polity score of 7 were defined as only 'partly free'.

I also found some incoherence between my units' polity scores in 2007 and whether these countries were defined as 'not free', 'partly free' or 'free'. Countries classified as 'free' had the polity scores between 5 and 10, countries classified as 'not free' had the polity scores between -10 and 5, while 'partly free' countries varied between -6 and 9. For example, a country with a polity score of 9 is defined as less free than a country with polity score of 5. In accordance, Table 3.6 shows that the standard deviations of the polity scores in the categories for 'not free' and 'partly free' are quite large. In the category for 'free' the average polity is 8.5 with a standard deviation of 1.4. This indicates that the last dependent variable of consolidation, with the cut-off point of 7, measures the level of democracy, covering both the institutional

structure, and political rights and civil liberties of individuals, in a sufficient matter. In addition, since the dependent variables are indications rather than clear measurements of democratic consolidation, I regard the validity of my data sufficient.

Table 3.6 Mean Polity Scores in the Freedom House Categories in 2007

Freedom	Mean	N	St. Dev.
Not Free	-1.11	9	4.51
Partly Free	4.00	32	4.50
Free	8.48	29	1.38
Total	5.20	70	4.76

3.6.2 Advantages and Pitfalls of Statistical Modelling

There are a number of reasons to apply statistical methods to study the subject of democratization, rather than for example a comparative case-study method. First, too little has been done to test quantitatively widely recognized theoretical assertions regarding democratic transitions. Second, I wish to offer a plausible argument for a common effect of the transition path on further democratic consolidation, and the statistical method's greatest advantage is its potential for generalization. Third, statistical method allows me to assess, compare, and exclude rivaling explanations. The method opens for controlling the effect of the variables of main interest for confounding variables, gives systematic information of the relative effects of variables included, and reduces the problem of causal over determination (Skog 2005:259, Frenreis 1983:259). In my study, statistical method opens for controlling the effect of choices and decision made by the key actors in regard of the transition process for confounding macro variables, such as the level of economic development.

Despite the statistical method's advantages in regard of my inquiry's purpose, there are some pitfalls to be aware of. A common criticism of the statistical method is that the ability to control for alternative explanations is affected by the researcher's theoretical starting point, *a priori* knowledge, the availability of data, and the fact that all possible relevant effects can not be incorporated into a statistical analysis. Some

effects of importance for the phenomena of interest may be excluded from the analysis (Grønmo 1996:83, 93, Skog 2005:74). Therefore, statistical method does not necessarily provide a deep insight of the studied phenomena, but only a limited overview. This problem is reduced by founding the applications of the control variables on extensive earlier research on democratic transitions. However, caution in generalization of the results is necessary.

Another challenge facing researchers committed to statistical analysis is the confusion of correlation with causation. Statistical modelling reveals correlations, but it does not eliminate the uncertainty about causal inferences. This is related to David Hume's asymmetry and contiguity criteria of causal relations (Skog 2005:23-28). A cross-sectional study detecting a correlation between the variables X and Y does not necessarily reveal which one of the effects comes first, i.e. whether the effect of X actually appears before Y. This problem is however reduced in my study by assigning the values of the explanatory variables before the values of the dependent variable, i.e. the dependent variables are always measured at some future date following the installation of democratic government. In addition, the value of the GDP per capita is lagged with 5 years.

It is rather the lack of temporal closeness between X and Y, especially in regard of the last two dependent variables, that reduces the likelihood of causality in my study. It is possible that the probability of consolidation is affected by other factors of greater importance than the mode of transition, when the time frame between the installation of democratic government and the future level of democracy becomes long²⁰. However, since no democracy becomes consolidated over night, I argue that it is precisely the long-term effect of the mode of transition that is of interest. Neither is it unreasonable to assume that the possible further democratization follows the same mode of transition after the first elections. And as noticed in the previous section, the definition of the mode of transition in the units categorized by Huntington is probably

²⁰ See for example Peru, Honduras, and Nicaragua in Table 3.4.1.

based on longer periods of time than until the installation of first democratic government. In addition, to shorten the time frame between the variables, I have adjusted the operationalization of the 'sipneighbour' variable when analyzing the future level of democracy. This is explained in greater detail in section 3.5.

4 The Findings

In this chapter I present the results of the empirical analyses, and examine whether the hypotheses introduced in section 2.2.1 are supported by the findings. In section 4.1 I study the relation between the mode of transition and the probability of authoritarian regression; whether hypotheses 1 to 3 and 5 are supported by the results. In section 4.2, I examine hypotheses 4 and 6; the relation between the mode of transition and the probability of further democratic change. In section 4.3, I examine hypotheses 7 on whether extrications are related to the highest probability of consolidation. Finally, I discuss the results of the analysis and test the robustness of the models.

4.1 Authoritarian Regression

Hypotheses 1 and 2 are based on O'Donnell's (1992:19) claim that in cases of defeat authoritarian regression is more likely to occur through a "sudden death", via a classic military coup, while after transitions the regression is more likely to occur through a "slow death", through a gradual diminution of the democratic system. In my study there are 26 cases of transitions followed by authoritarian regression (see Table 3.5). Table 4.1, based on a data set on coup d'états by Marshall and Marshall (2008), locates these 26 instances in the subsets of mode of transition and mode of regression. Table 4.1 shows that countries have returned to authoritarian system through a coup d'état in 17 out of 26 cases of regression. In addition, there has been three attempted coups and one alleged coup plot resulting in civil war, and one attempted coup resulting to a transitional period. This indicates that coup d'état has been the most common way of regression in the time period of 1970-2007. The table also shows that coups d'état have occurred eight times after transitions, five times after defeats, and in all the three cases of extrication leading to regression. When it comes to the so called "slow death", it appears to have occurred in Peru and in Haiti

(after the US invasion). The countries' 'sip2' and 'polity' values reduced gradually until the subversion by the ruling executive in Haiti in 1999, and until the new transitional period in Peru in 2000 (Table 3.3). It is possible that also the regression in Bangladesh in 2007 should be categorized as a slow death, although the country's polity score does not reduce gradually. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are not supported by these empirical findings; the mode of transition does not have any noticeable effect on how the authoritarian regression takes place.

Table 4.1 Authoritarian Regressions and Coup d' État

	Transaction	Defeat	Extrication
Coup d'état	Argentina, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, Ghana (*2), Nigeria, Pakistan (*2)	Haiti, Thailand (*3), Uganda (also civil war), Sudan	Niger, Congo, Nepal
Other	Lesotho (civil war) Guinea Bissau (attempted coup/civil war) Fiji (attempted coup / transitional period) Guinea (elections postponed due to a worsened security situation) Peru (president Fujimori announced his resignation/ transitional period)	Comoros (attempted coup/civil war) Cote d'Ivoire (alleged coup plot/civil war) Haiti (subversion by the ruling executive) Bangladesh (elections cancelled)	

Source: Marshall and Marshall (2008), Keesing's Record of World Events (2008).

Hypotheses 3 and 5 relate to how the mode of transition affects the probability of authoritarian regression. Table 4.2 presents the results of multivariate logistic regression analyses with authoritarian regression as the dependent variable. To get an impression of how the control variables affect the dependent variable, without the variables of interest for the hypotheses, the first model only includes these covariates, and thus serves as a control model.

Table 4.2 Logistic Regression Analysis with Authoritarian Regression as Dependent Variable

	Model 1-1		Model 1-2		Model 1-3	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Extrication			-2.471*** (.888)	.085	-2.022** (.894)	.132
Transaction			-.239 (.655)	.787	-2.287** (1.098)	.102
Initial level of democracy	.403 (.567)	1.496	1.060 (.666)	2.887	-.607 (.900)	.545
Earlier democratic experience	.652 (.567)	1.919	.736 (.624)	2.088	1.059 (.687)	2.884
GDP per capita	-.536** (.248)	.585	-.720** (.284)	.487	-.788** (.318)	.455
Sipneighbour	-2.008* (1.083)	.134	-2.324** (1.166)	.098	-2.152* (1.233)	.116
Dem * Trans					3.568** (1.379)	35.454
Constant	2.998* (1.547)	20.052	4.587** (1.878)	98.225	5.612*** (2.111)	273.663
Observations	78		78		78	
-2 Log likelihood	85.249		73.939		66.352	
Cox & Snell R ²	.165		.278		.345	

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two tailed tests).

Model 1-1 shows that the results of the control variables measuring the GDP per capita and the level of democracy in the neighbouring countries are in accordance with the previous findings, as presented in section 3.5. Increase in both GDP per capita and the level of democracy in the neighbourhood reduces the probability of authoritarian regression, although the effect of the ‘sipneighbour’ is significant only at the 10 percent level. However, the effects of the initial level of democracy, and prior democratic experience, do not support the results from earlier studies. Neither of the effects is significantly different from their base line categories. In addition, the coefficients indicate that higher initial level of democracy and earlier democratic experience increase the probability of authoritarian regression.

Model 1-2 includes the core independent variables. The significant coefficient for extrication, -2.471, indicates that when moving from defeats to extrications, the odds

of authoritarian regression decreases. Model 1-2 also shows that there is no significant difference between transactions and defeats. As for the control variables, the GDP per capita and democratic neighbourhood have roughly the same effects as in the control model. In addition, the neighbourhood variable is now significant at the 5 percent level. According to Model 1-2, Hypothesis 3 can not be rejected; there is no systematic difference between defeats and transactions and probability of authoritarian regression. The results also support Hypothesis 5; extrications are related to the lowest probability of authoritarian regression.

In Model 1-2 the initial level of democracy and prior democratic experience are still non-significant. The fact that earlier democratic experience does not have a significant effect on the probability of regression does not surprise me, since I did not notice any particular pattern when constructing this variable. However, considering the large number of empirical studies demonstrating that consistent democracies are more stable political systems than semi-democracies, it is confusing that in my analysis the odds of authoritarian regression increases by a factor of 2.89, when moving from semi-democracy to coherent democracy, although the correlation is slightly non-significant ($p=0.111$). When collecting the empirical evidence for the coding of transitions, I observed that there were particular types of defeats and transactions that were not supportive of further consolidation, and which I also suspected resulting to a certain level of democracy after the first phase of transition. Therefore, I have chosen to test whether there is a statistical interaction between the mode of transition and the initial level of democracy. Since the inclusion of the interaction variables is caused by the knowledge and information I achieved throughout the coding process, I have not generated hypotheses on theoretical background for the effects of these variables²¹. I will discuss possible reasons for the effects of the interactions in section 4.5. The discussion will rest on the theoretical definitions of the three modes of transition by Huntington and Mainwaring, and on

²¹ I also tested whether there is an interaction between earlier democratic experience and the mode of transition, but did not find any significant correlations.

the guide lines suggested by O'Donnell (1992:21) in order to advance toward consolidation.

In Model 1-3 the interaction variable between transactions and the initial level of democracy is included in the analysis²². A decreasing -2LL and an increasing R^2 indicate an improvement of the model when the interaction variable is included. To illustrate the effects, I have calculated the predicted probability of regression for the three modes of transition in their respective categories of semi-democracy and coherent democracy. To calculate the proportions, I applied the approximate average values of GDP per capita (6) and 'sipneighbour' (0.4). For the earlier democratic experience and the initial level of democracy I applied the baseline values of 0. The results are presented in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Predicted Probability of Authoritarian Regression

²² I excluded the interaction variable between extrication and the initial level of democracy from this first analysis since only three cases of extrication are followed by authoritarian regression (see Table 3.5). Therefore, when the variable was included, the standard errors for the coefficients became extremely large (16142.9).

Figure 1, which is based on Model 1-3, illustrates that extrications are related to lower probability of regression than defeats. However, compared to Model 1-2, the inclusion of the interaction variable slightly reduces the effect of extrication. A significant interaction variable changes the interpretation of the coefficients for the variables included in the interaction variable (Skog 2005:415). The coefficient for transaction (-2.287) now describes the effect of transactions leading to semi-democracy (i.e. when the democracy variable has the value of 0), compared to defeats leading to semi-democracy. Transaction leading to coherent democracy increases the probability of regression with 1.3 (-2.287+3.568), compared to defeats leading to coherent democracy. Or in other words, the odds of regression increases with 3.6 (0.102×35.454) when moving from transactions leading to coherent democracy to defeats leading to coherent democracy. In accordance, Figure 1 demonstrates that authoritarian regression is most common after transactions leading to coherent democracy and after defeats leading to semi-democracy, while regression seldom occurs after extrications and after transactions leading to semi-democracy.

The results from Model 1-3 indicate that Hypothesis 3 must be rejected. There is a systematic difference between defeats and transactions and the probability of authoritarian regression, when controlling for whether the transition leads to semi-democracy or to coherent democracy. However, Model 1-3 does not provide a clear answer to whether it is transactions leading to semi-democracy or extrications that are related to the lowest probability of authoritarian regression. However, if one disregards the effect of the interaction variable, extrications are clearly related to the lowest probability of authoritarian regression, i.e. Hypothesis 5 is supported.

4.2 The 'Next' Level of Democracy

Hypotheses 4 and 6 relate to how the mode of transition affects the further transition process after the installation of first democratic government. Table 4.3 presents the results of linear multivariate regression analyses with the 'polity_next' as the

dependent variable. 'Polity_next' measures *the level of democracy* in a country after the next regime change following the installation of democratic government.

Table 4.3 Regression Analysis with Polity_next as Dependent Variable

	Model 2-1	Model 2-2	Model 2-3
Extrication		3.515** (1.679)	4.573 (2.945)
Transaction		-.325 (1.523)	2.915 (2.210)
Initial level of democracy	2.708* (1.373)	1.856 (1.367)	5.437** (2.429)
Earlier democratic experience	.118 (1.335)	.215 (1.299)	-.110 (1.300)
GDP per capita	2.089*** (.555)	2.215*** (.538)	2.118*** (.534)
Sipneighbour	7.722*** (2.488)	7.736*** (2.418)	7.281*** (2.403)
Dem*Extr			-2.538 (3.591)
Dem*Trans			-6.010* (3.012)
Constant	-17.382*** (3.643)	-18.667*** (3.664)	-19.504*** (3.654)
Observations	78	78	78
Adjusted R ²	.335	.380	.398

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two tailed tests)

The control model 2-1 shows that increase in both GDP per capita, the level of democracy in the neighbourhood, and in the initial level of democracy has a significant, positive effect on the obtained level of democracy after the next regime change. Model 2-3 includes the interaction variables between the mode of transition and the initial level of democracy. However, the interaction variables are nearly non-significant, and there is only a minor increase in the adjusted R² when these are included in the analysis. I tested whether the inclusion of the variables improved the model, and found that there was no significant²³ change in the predicted variance, i.e.

²³ p= 0.136

change in R square. This indicates that Model 2-2 gives a more precise estimate of the correlations between variables than Model 2-3.

Figure 2, which is based on the variables in Model 2-2 and on the same approximate average values for GDP and 'sipneighbour' as Figure 1, illustrates how the three modes of transition are related to the obtained level of democracy after the next regime change following the installation of democratic government.




Figure 2. Predicted Values of 'Polity_next'

According to Model 2-2, extrications are related to 3.5 points higher level of democracy after the regime change than defeats, while there is no significant difference between transactions and defeats with respect to their effect on the obtained level of democracy after the next regime change. The effect of the initial level of coherent democracy is reduced and becomes non-significant when the variables for the mode of transition are included. Figure 2 illustrates the results from Model 2-2; extrications are related to the highest probability of further democratic change, i.e. Hypothesis 6 is supported by the results. On the other hand, Hypothesis 4 is not supported by the results; defeats are not related to higher probability of further democratic change after the installation of democratic government than transactions.

Table 4.4 presents the results of linear multivariate regression analyses with the dependent variable 'polity_change'. 'Polity_change' measures *the direction and magnitude* of the next regime change following the installation of democratic government.

Table 4.4 Regression Analysis with Polity_change as Dependent Variable

	Model 3-1	Model 3-2	Model 3-3
Extrication		5.949*** (1.799)	10.511*** (3.047)
Transaction		1.805 (1.632)	6.810*** (2.286)
Initial level of democracy	-2.737* (1.514)	-3.953*** (1.465)	2.455 (2.513)
Earlier democratic experience	-.388 (1.472)	-.041 (1.392)	-.308 (1.345)
GDP per capita	1.655*** (.612)	1.818*** (.576)	1.617*** (.553)
Sipneighbour	5.743** (2.743)	5.357** (2.592)	4.965* (2.486)
Dem*Extr			-7.952** (3.716)
Dem*Trans			-9.313*** (3.117)
Constant	-14.702*** (4.016)	-17.637*** (3.928)	-19.315*** (3.780)
Observations	78	78	78
Adjusted R ²	.163	.262	.332

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two tailed tests).

The results from the control model 3-1 show that both GDP per capita and level of democracy in the neighbourhood have a significant, positive effect on the direction and magnitude of the next regime change following the installation of democratic government. The effect of the initial level of coherent democracy is negative, but significant only at the 10 percent level. According to Model 3-2, extrications have a positive effect on the direction of the next regime change, compared to defeats. The magnitude of the effect is an increase of 5.95 in predicted change. There is no significant difference between the effects of transactions and defeats. The initial level of democracy is now significant at 1 percent level, indicating that the initial level of

coherent democracy has a negative effect on the direction of the next regime change of 3.95 points.

In Table 4.4 the effects of extrications and transactions are always compared to the effect of defeats. Therefore, the results do not provide an intuitive explanation on whether the effects actually lead to positive or negative regime changes. Figure 3, which is based on the variables in Model 3-3 and on the same approximate average values for GDP and 'sipneighbour' as the previous figures, illustrates how the three modes of transition are related to the direction and magnitude of the next regime change.




Figure 3. Predicted Values of 'Polity_change'

In Model 3-3 both interaction variables are significant. The results show that extrications leading to semi-democracy have a positive effect of 10.5 points on the direction of the next regime change, compared with defeats leading to semi-democracy. In accordance, Figure 3 shows that while defeats leading to semi-democracy are related to large negative changes, the effect of extrications leading to semi-democracy is positive. Model 3-3 also shows that extrications leading to coherent democracy have a positive effect of 2.56 points (10.511-7.952) on the next regime change, compared with defeats leading to coherent democracy. This effect is however positive only when compared to the effect of defeats, as shown in Figure 3.

Model 3-3 also shows that transactions leading to semi-democracy have a positive effect on the direction of the next regime change of 6.8 points, compared with defeats leading to semi-democracy, while transactions leading to coherent democracy have a negative effect of -2.5 (6.81-9.313) points on the next regime change, compared to defeats leading to coherent democracy. Figure 3 shows that effect of transactions leading semi-democracy is however positive only when compared to the effect of defeats.

Figure 3 demonstrates that only extrications leading to semi-democracy are related to further democratic change at the next regime change following the installation of democratic government. The significant coefficients in Model 3-3 confirm that Hypothesis 6 is supported by the results; extrications are related to the highest probability of further democratic change after the installation of democratic government. According to Figure 3, transaction leading to semi-democracy is the second best alternative with regard to further democratic change, while transactions leading to coherent democracy and defeats leading to both semi-democracy and coherent democracy are least supportive of further democratic change. Model 3-3 confirms that Hypothesis 4 is not supported by the results. Defeats are not related to higher probability of further democratic change after the installation of democratic government than transactions.

4.3 The Future Level of Democracy

According to Hypothesis 7, extrications are related to the highest probability of democratic consolidation. Table 4.5 presents the results of multivariate regression analyses with the 'polity_future' as dependent variable, measuring the obtained level of democracy in the Polity IV data set for 2007²⁴.

²⁴With the exceptions of a new transitional period, civil war, and authoritarian regression. See section 3.4.3.

Since the control variable for prior democratic experience has not been significant in any of the previous models, I have chosen to leave it out from the subsequent analyses. In addition, I have adjusted the variable measuring the average level of democracy in the neighbouring countries. Instead of measuring the average level of democracy in the neighbouring countries the year the unit in question experiences the installation of democratic government, the ‘sipneighb_next’ measures the level of democracy the year the unit in question experiences the next regime change, or in other words, the next change following the installation of democratic government (explained in section 3.5).

Table 4.5 Regression Analysis with Polity_future as Dependent Variable

	Model 4-1	Model 4-2	Model 4-3
Extrication		4.436** (1.842)	7.915** (3.060)
Transaction		.079 (1.652)	5.944** (2.298)
Initial level of democracy	-.453 (1.472)	-1.388 (1.452)	5.454** (2.508)
GDP per capita	1.813*** (.637)	2.057*** (.619)	1.937*** (.587)
Sipneighb_next	10.003*** (2.897)	8.831*** (2.815)	7.566*** (2.721)
Dem*Extr			-6.594* (3.767)
Dem*Trans			-10.907*** (3.158)
Constant	-15.560*** (3.948)	-17.354*** (3.931)	-19.475*** (3.738)
Observations	78	78	78
Adjusted R ²	.288	.343	.422

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two tailed tests).

The results from the control model 4-1 show that an increase in both GDP per capita and level of democracy in the neighbourhood has a significant, positive effect on the future level of democracy. The effect of the initial level of coherent democracy is negative, but non-significant. The results from Model 4-2 show that extrications are related to 4.4 points higher future level of democracy than defeats, while there is no significant difference between the effect of transactions and defeats.

To illustrate the effects in Model 4-3, I applied the approximate average values of GDP per capita (6) and 'sipneighb_next' (0.5). For the initial level of democracy I applied the baseline values of 0. The results are presented in Figure 4.




Figure 4. Predicted Values of 'Polity_future'

In Model 4-3 both interaction variables are significant. The results show that extrications leading to the initial level of semi-democracy are related to 7.9 points higher future level of democracy than defeats leading to semi-democracy. In the case of the initial level of coherent democracy, extrication increases the future level of democracy with 1.3 points (7.915-6.594), compared to defeats leading to coherent democracy. Figure 4 illustrates that extrications, no matter the initial level of democracy, are related to the highest future level of democracy. The results from Model 4-3 support Hypothesis 7; extrications are related to the highest probability of further democratic consolidation

According to Model 4-3, transactions leading to semi-democracy are related to 5.9 points higher future level of democracy than defeats leading to semi-democracy. On the other hand, transactions leading to coherent democracy are related to -4.96 points (5.944-10.907) lower future level of democracy than defeats leading coherent democracy. In accordance with this, Figure 4 demonstrates that transactions leading

to coherent democracy and defeats leading to semi-democracy are related to the lowest future levels of democracy, which also are negative, while transactions leading to semi-democracy and defeats leading to coherent democracy are related to positive future levels of democracy. In Model 4-3 also the effect of the initial level of democracy is significant at the 5 percent level. And as Figure 4 demonstrates, defeats leading to coherent democracy are related to 5.5 points higher future level of democracy than defeats leading to semi-democracy.

Table 4.6 presents the results of logistic regression analyses with consolidation as the dependent variable. Consolidation is a dummy transformation of the 'polity_future' variable, with a cut-off point of 7.

Table 4.6 Logistic Regression Analysis with Consolidation as Dependent Variable

	Model 5-1		Model 5-2		Model 5-3	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Extrication			1.842** (.925)	6.311	3.698** (1.754)	40.351
Transaction			-.609 (.818)	.544	1.777 (1.466)	5.910
Initial level of democracy	-.393 (.656)	.675	-1.121 (.775)	.326	1.717 (1.621)	5.568
GDP per capita	1.000*** (.300)	2.718	1.289*** (.360)	3.629	1.316*** (.390)	3.727
Sipneighb_next	4.277*** (1.330)	71.997	5.201*** (1.675)	181.483	5.494*** (1.891)	243.196
Dem*Extr					-3.119 (2.126)	.044
Dem*Trans					-4.425** (1.984)	.012
Constant	-9.282***	.000	-11.765*** (2.752)	.000	-13.741*** (3.198)	.000
Observations	78		78		78	
-2 Log likelihood	67.275		58.684		52.541	
Cox & Snell R ²	.398		.461		.502	

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two tailed tests)

Both Model 5-1 and 5-2 are in accordance with the previous findings. Higher GDP per capita, higher level of democracy in the neighbourhood, and a transition through

extrication increase the probability of further democratic consolidation. Model 5-2 shows that the odds of consolidation increases by a factor of 6.3 when moving from defeats to extrications, while there is no significant difference between transactions and defeats in their effect on consolidation.

To illustrate the effects, I have calculated the predicted probability of consolidation for the three modes of transition in their respective categories of semi-democracy and coherent democracy. To calculate the proportions I applied the same approximate average values as for Figure 4.




Figure 5. Predicted Probability of Consolidation

Figure 5 demonstrates that democratic consolidation is most common after extrications leading to semi-democracy. However, in Model 5-3 the interaction variable between extrications and the initial level of democracy is non-significant, while the effect of extrication is significant at the 5 percent level. This implies that the estimated odds of consolidation increases by a factor of 40, when moving from defeats to extrications. Figure 5 also illustrates that defeats leading to coherent democracy and transactions leading to semi-democracy are more supportive of consolidation than defeats leading to semi-democracy and transactions leading to

coherent democracy. However, Model 5-3 shows that the effect of transaction is non-significant, thus there is no significant difference between transactions and defeats leading to semi-democracy in their effect on consolidation, while transactions leading to coherent democracy have a significantly lower probability of consolidation than defeats leading to coherent democracy.

In short, extrications are related to higher probability of consolidation than defeats, there is no significant difference between transactions and defeats leading to semi-democracy, and in cases of coherent democracy, transactions are related to lower probability of consolidation than defeats. Thus, the results from Model 5-3 support Hypothesis 7; extrications are related to the highest probability of further democratic consolidation.

4.4 Discussion of the Findings

The results from all the previous analyses support the hypotheses by Huntington (1991:276) and Munck (1994:364); the prospects of democratic consolidation are enhanced in extrications. In extrications both the authoritarian regime and the opposition influence the democratization process relatively equally. It seems that the presence of the old elites creates stability, and helps the democratic actors to retain and strengthen their strategic alliance against authoritarian forces, while the presence of the relatively strong opposition conduces to maintaining and strengthening the newly established democratic institutions. Subsequently, the threat of authoritarian regression is less imminent, the opposition, which has had a great opportunity to develop, and to increase in number and intensity throughout the transition process, can accomplish the tasks O'Donnell (1992:21) suggested for democratic actors; to neutralize authoritarian actors, and to promote democratic preferences and practices among the neutral actors. In addition, extrications are usually non-violent and characterized by negotiations and compromise on both sides.

The question that arises from the findings deals with the puzzle of the different effects of defeats and transitions on the two initial levels of democracy. Why is the positive effect of defeats on consolidation conditional on the initial level of coherent democracy, as demonstrated in Model 4-3? My empirical study of transitions through defeat has shown that coups by small military factions, leading to the initial level of semi-democracy, such as those in Cote d'Ivoire, Thailand in 1975 and 1978, Ethiopia, Comoros, and Cambodia, have not been followed by further democratization, but new military coups, or even civil war. Neither have the foreign invasions in Uganda and Haiti leading to the initial level of semi-democracy resulted to further democratization. In my study the only case of defeat leading to semi-democracy, and showing signs of democratic consolidation, is the revolution in Romania.

What is the difference between the defeat in Romania and the defeats in the other countries mentioned? This may be related to the discussion conducted in section 3.3 regarding whether all kinds of coups should be defined as defeats by 'opposition'. The initial level of semi-democracy after a coup may be related to the fact that the balance of power does not yet favour opposition to authoritarianism. When a small military faction manages to overthrow the government, with relatively weak popular support, the number of strictly democratic actors in a country is low, and the number of authoritarian or at least neutral actors is high. As a consequence, it may become impossible for the few democratic actors to accomplish the tasks suggested by O'Donnell (1992:21) to advance toward consolidation; to neutralize authoritarian actors, to promote democratic preferences and practices among the neutral actors, and thus to increase in number and intensity.

On the other hand, a defeat leading to the initial level of coherent democracy may indicate that the balance of power between the old and the new elites has clearly changed, and the opposition to authoritarianism has become the strongest group. For example, the defeat in Portugal in 1974 resulted in a 'sip2' level of 0.905, which is defined as a coherent democracy in my study. The efficient coup was carried out by a

group of young officers leading the *Movimento das Forças Armadas*. The coup attained huge popular support with crowds flooding the streets, cheering the soldiers, and placing carnations in the barrels of the rifles. This indicates that the number of democratic actors was high, while the number of neutral and authoritarian actors was low already in time of the coup. Subsequently, the tasks of democratic actors are easier to carry through, or are actually already partly accomplished. Examples of other transitions located in this category, and showing positive results with regard to consolidation, are Argentina, Mali, Philippines, Indonesia, and the US invasion in Panama.

The results of the regression analyses confirmed that transactions leading to the initial level of semi-democracy are related to higher probability of consolidation than defeats leading to semi-democracy, while transactions leading to coherent democracy are related to lower probability of consolidation than defeats leading coherent democracy, i.e. the significant correlations are contingent on a *comparison* of the effects of defeats and transactions. However, to simplify the following discussion, I assume that in cases of transactions, the initial level of semi-democracy is related to higher probability of further democratization than the initial level of coherent democracy, as illustrated in the figures 4 and 5.

As noticed in section 2.2.1, in transactions there are continuities in procedures, institutions, and individuals connected with the previous regime, and the memory of the authoritarian regime may be less negative among parts of the population. It is possible that a transition though transaction leading to the initial level of coherent democracy is too sudden and extensive both for the old elites, and for parts of the population to adjust to, and to accept. Another closely related problem concerns the role of opposition in transactions. The impression I attained from my empirical study of the transactions leading to coherent democracy, such as Guinea Bissau, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, Central African Republic, and Lesotho, was that the role of opposition in the transition process was minor, or even non-existing. However, the

influence from the opposition is of importance also in transactions, although it is the ancient regime that decides the speed and the progress of the transition (Huntington 1991:139). It is possible that if the old regime suddenly carries through an extensive democratization, where the influence of the opposition is minor, the number of strictly democratic actors remains low, while the number of authoritarian and neutral actors is high. Subsequently, the democratic actors' possibilities to neutralize authoritarian actors, to promote democratic preferences and practices among the numerous neutral actors, and to increase in number are restricted.

On the other hand, when transactions lead to the initial level of semi-democracy, the democratization is more cautious and gradual, and the old authoritarian elites and the neutral parts of the population have more time for adjusting to and accepting the new system. In addition, the opposition to the authoritarian system has better chance to develop, to increase in number and intensity, to neutralize authoritarian actors, and to promote further democratic change. For example, Ghana has experienced three transitions all following the pattern of transaction in the time period of 1970-1992. The first two transitions resulted to the initial level of coherent democracy, but both were after a relatively short time period followed by authoritarian regression through a military coup. In contrast, the last transition resulted to the initial level of semi-democracy, and the country is finally showing signs of not returning to authoritarianism, since the level of democracy has gradually become stronger (see Table 3.3). Another examples of transactions located in this category, and showing positive results with regard to consolidation, are Mexico, Guatemala, Brazil, Paraguay, Albania, and Taiwan.

4.5 The Robustness of the Models

The log-likelihood values in logistic regression analysis describe whether the models are improved when new explanatory variables included in the analysis. The results from the analyses with the dependent variables 'regression' (Model 1-1 to 1-3) and

‘consolidation’ (Model 5-1 to 5-3) show that the -2LL values decrease, which implies that the models are improved when the new explanatory variables are included. The Cox & Snell R square measures the same aspect by showing how much the log-likelihood values are reduced when the new explanatory variables are included. In both analyses the R^2 increases, which indicates that the models are improved (Christophersen 2006:208).

Omnibus tests of the model coefficients show whether the inclusion of the new explanatory variables lead to a significant improvement of the model (Christophersen 2006:206). The results showed that the models where the dummy variables for the mode of transition were included were significantly better to predict respectively ‘regression’ and ‘consolidation’ than the models with only the control variables. Also the models where the interaction variable(s) were included were significantly better to predict the dependent variables than the model without the interaction variable(s). The p-values were always below the 5 percent level. Hosmer and Lemeshow tests of the models where the interaction variables were included generated p-values above the 10 percent level. This indicates that since the discrepancy between the predicted and observed frequencies is non-significant, the models with the interaction variables can not be rejected.

To interpret results from a linear regression analysis, the dependent variables must be measured at least at the interval level (Christophersen 2006:175). The dependent variables *polity_next*, and *polity_future* are categorized on a scale ranging from -10 to 10, while *polity_change* varies between -18 and 7 (see appendix 3). The variables are constructed as additive indexes where the unit’s value is a summation of autocracy (-) and democracy (+) points from five indicators measuring different institutional aspects of regimes. These variables can not be characterized as continuous, but they are relatively fine-graded, and it is possible to measure the distance between the categories. Therefore, I regard the measurement level of the

variables sufficient for them to qualify as dependent variables in the linear regression analyses.

I tested whether the changes in the predicted variance, i.e. changes in the R square, were significant when the dummy variables for the mode of transition and the interaction variables were included in the analyses. The results showed that the inclusion of the variables significantly improved the models, with the exception of the analysis of the dependent variable 'polity_next'. The inclusion of the interaction variables resulted to a non-significant change in the predicted variance, as noticed in section 4.2. Beyond that, the changes in the predicted variance were always significant at last at the 5 percent level.

Linear regression analysis requires that the distribution of the residuals is symmetric along a horizontal line and follows the curve of the standard normal distribution (Skog 2005:236). I have tested whether these conditions are fulfilled, and found some discrepancy from the normal distribution curve, while the scatter plots indicated a relatively symmetric distribution of the residuals. Linear regression analysis also requires that the explanatory variables are not correlated. In my study multicollinearity, which means that one explanatory variable is a linear combination of two or several of the other explanatory variables (Christophersen 2006:180), reduces the robustness of the models where the interaction variables are included. The tolerance values approach 0.2 and the VIF values approach 5, indicating multicollinearity. However, I have chosen to interpret the results from the models with the interaction variables, since the multicollinearity is caused by the fact that I have relatively few units, and when measuring interaction, the variables are multiplied with each other.

5 Conclusion

This thesis has explored the question of how does the mode of democratic transition affect the probability of further democratic consolidation. The main explanatory variable is a democratic transition resulting to the installation of the first democratically elected government or chief executive in the time period of 1970-2000, categorized as transaction, extrication, or defeat. The continued transition process after this first phase of transition is studied by using both linear and logistic regression analysis of cross-sectional country data with 78 units. In order to obtain a valid and adequate prediction of the probability of further consolidation, I construct five dependent variables, all measuring different aspects of how the transition process continues further after the installation of democratic government.

When testing the hypotheses concerning how the mode of transition is related to the probability of authoritarian regression, I find that Coup d'état has been the most common way of regression in the time period of 1970-2007. The results indicate that the mode of transition does not have any noticeable effect on how the authoritarian regression takes place. The logistic regression analyses with authoritarian regression as the dependent variable showed that extrications are related to lower probability of regression than defeats. I also tested whether there was an interaction between the mode of transition and the level of democracy obtained right after the installation of the first democratic government, which I refer to as the initial level of democracy. I find that authoritarian regression is most common after transactions leading to coherent democracy and after defeats leading to semi-democracy, while regression seldom occurs after extrications and after transactions leading to semi-democracy. The analysis with the interaction variable did not provide a clear answer to whether it is transactions leading to semi-democracy or extrications that are related to the lowest probability of authoritarian regression. However, if one disregards the effect of the

interaction, extrications are clearly related to the lowest probability of authoritarian regression.

When testing the hypotheses concerning the probability of further democratic change, I find that extrications are related to significantly higher level of democracy after the next regime change following the installation of first democratic government than defeats, while there is no significant difference between transactions and defeats with respect to their effect on the 'next' level of democracy. I also found that only extrications leading to semi-democracy are related to further *positive* democratic change following the installation of democratic government. Transaction leading to semi-democracy is the second best alternative with regard to further democratic change, while transactions leading to coherent democracy and defeats leading to both semi-democracy and coherent democracy are least supportive of further democratic change. In short, extrications are related to the highest probability of further democratic change.

When testing the hypotheses concerning the future level of democracy, which I refer to as the probability of consolidation, I find that extrications, no matter the initial level of democracy, are related to the highest future level of democracy. Transactions leading to coherent democracy and defeats leading to semi-democracy are related to the lowest future levels of democracy, which also are negative, while transactions leading to semi-democracy and defeats leading to coherent democracy are the second best alternatives after extrications. I also found that defeats leading to coherent democracy are related to significantly higher future level of democracy than defeats leading to semi-democracy. The logistic regression analyses with 'consolidation' as the dependent variable showed that extrications are related to higher probability of consolidation than defeats, there is no significant difference between transactions and defeats leading to semi-democracy, and transactions leading to coherent democracy are related to lower probability of consolidation than defeats leading to coherent democracy.

The results from all the five analyses supported the hypotheses by Huntington (1991:276) and Munck (1994:364); extrications are related to the highest probability of democratic consolidation. All the analyses also indicate that transactions leading to semi-democracy and defeats leading to coherent democracy are more supportive of consolidation than transactions leading to coherent democracy and defeats leading to semi-democracy. The effects of the control variables supported the results from earlier studies; higher GDP per capita and higher level of democracy in the neighbouring countries increases the probability of democratic consolidation.

When discussing the findings, I argue that in extrications the balanced power between the old regime and the opposition restrains a possible authoritarian regression; the presence of the opposition is conducive to maintaining and strengthening the newly established democratic institutions, while the presence of the old elites encourages the opposition to develop, to strengthen, and to promote further democratic change. I also argue that when a defeat of an authoritarian regime takes place through a military coup leading to the initial level of semi-democracy, the number of democratic actors in the country is still low and the number of authoritarian or at least neutral actors is high. Subsequently, the balance of power does not necessarily favour opposition to authoritarianism, which complicates the further democratization process.

On the other hand, when a transaction leads to coherent democracy, the change may be too sudden and extensive both for parts of the old elites, and parts of the population to adjust to, and to accept. A related problem concerns the role of the opposition in the transition process. If the authoritarian regime carries through an extensive democratization, where the influence of the opposition is minor, the number of strictly democratic actors remains low, while the number of authoritarian and neutral actors is high. This reduces the democratic actors' possibilities to neutralize the authoritarian actors and to promote further democratic change. When the transition is more gradual and cautious leading first to semi-democracy, the

opposition groups have better possibilities to develop, and to influence the democratization process.

I am tempted to return to the example of democratization in Mauritania presented in the introduction. If the selection of my units was not restricted to the year 2000, the transition would qualify as a unit in my inquiry. The events would clearly be categorized as a defeat of the authoritarian regime through a military coup in 2005, with the following transitional period until 2007. The obtained polity-score in the Polity IV data set is 4, which would be defined as the initial level of semi-democracy in my study. The results from study show that defeats leading to semi-democracy are related to a predicted probability of authoritarian regression of 0.5, and a predicted probability of democratic consolidation of 0.04 (see figures 1 and 5). Unfortunately, the continued transition process in Mauritania, with new military coup in August 2008, followed the predicted pattern in my study.

In the course of this study it has become clear to me that further (quantitative) studies are needed in order to answer two important questions. Why do democratic transitions take place? And why some democratic transitions are successful, while others are followed by return to authoritarianism? I have three proposals for improvements in the research design for further studies of the probability of consolidation. First, concerning both the theoretical background and the actual operationalization, it should be more clearly specified which democratic transition qualify as units in the analysis, and thus can be categorized after the mode of transition. Second, the coding criteria should be precised and developed further. And third, the dependent variable should also take into account the duration of the democratic structures. These measurements would increase the validity of the research design and be conducive to possible generalizations of the results.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: List of Units

	Ssno	Country	Polity Start Date	Event	Mode of Transition
1	41	Haiti	01.01.91	Presidential elections	Defeat (people power)
2	41	Haiti	16.10.94	Aristide returned from exile	Defeat
3	42	Dominican Republic	17.08.78	President takes office	Extrication
4	70	Mexico	01.07.82	Presidential elections	Transaction
5	90	Guatemala	15.01.86	President takes office	Transaction
6	91	Honduras	28.01.82	President takes office	Extrication
7	92	El Salvador	02.06.84	President takes office	Extrication
8	93	Nicaragua	01.07.84	Presidential and legislative elections in November 1984	Extrication
9	95	Panama	20.12.89	President installed	Defeat
10	110	Guyana	06.10.92	Presidential and legislative elections	Extrication
11	130	Ecuador	30.04.79	Presidential and congressional elections	Transaction
12	135	Peru	29.07.80	President takes office	Transaction
13	140	Brazil	16.01.85	Presidential elections	Transaction
14	145	Bolivia	11.10.82	President and cabinet takes office	Extrication
15	150	Paraguay	02.05.89	Presidential and congressional elections	Transaction
16	155	Chile	16.12.89	Presidential elections	Transaction
17	160	Argentina	12.03.73	Presidential and legislative elections	Transaction
18	160	Argentina	31.10.83	Presidential and legislative elections	Defeat
19	165	Uruguay	02.03.85	Government takes office	Extrication
20	230	Spain	30.12.78	New constitution (Legislative elections in June 1977)	Transaction
21	235	Portugal	26.04.76	New constitution (Legislative elections in April 1975)	Defeat
22	290	Poland	01.07.91	New electoral draft law	Extrication
23	310	Hungary	01.07.90	Legislative elections in March 1990	Transaction
24	315	Czechoslovakia	09.06.90	Legislative elections	Extrication
25	339	Albania	14.04.91	Legislative elections	Transaction
26	345	Yugoslavia	24.11.00	Legislative elections in December 2000	Defeat (people power)

27	350	Greece	08.06.75	New constitution (Legislative elections in Nov. 1974)	Defeat
28	355	Bulgaria	21.06.90	Legislative elections	Transaction
29	360	Romania	21.06.90	Presidential and legislative elections	Defeat (people power)
30	365	Russia	23.08.91	Decree of Aug. 23 transferred all union enterprises and natural resources on RSFSR territory to RSFSR jurisdiction	Transaction
31	404	Guinea Bissau	04.07.94	Presidential and legislative elections	Transaction
32	420	Gambia	01.07.97	Presidential elections in Sept. 1996, legislative elections in Jan. 97	Transaction
33	432	Mali	09.06.92	President takes office	Defeat (people power)
34	434	Benin	25.03.91	Presidential elections	Extrication
35	435	Mauritania	01.07.92	Presidential elections in Jan. 1992, legislative elections in March 1992	Transaction
36	436	Niger	27.12.92	New constitution (Presidential and legislative elections in Feb. 1993)	Extrication
37	437	Cote d'Ivoire	26.10.00	President takes office	Defeat
38	438	Guinea	01.07.95	Legislative elections in June 1995	Transaction
39	439	Burkina Faso	30.05.78	Presidential Elections	Transaction
40	451	Sierra Leone	27.02.96	Legislative elections	Transaction
41	452	Ghana	01.09.70	Legislative elections	Transaction
42	452	Ghana	01.01.79	Day political parties became legal. (Legislative and presidential elections in June 1979)	Transaction
43	452	Ghana	04.11.92	Presidential elections	Transaction
44	475	Nigeria	02.10.79	President takes office	Transaction
45	475	Nigeria	29.04.99	President takes office	Transaction
46	481	Gabon	01.07.93	Legislative elections in Oct. 1990, presidential elections in Dec. 1993	Extrication
47	482	Central African Republic	23.08.93	Legislative and presidential elections	Transaction
48	484	Congo	16.03.92	New constitution (Legislative elections in June 1992, presidential elections in August 1992)	Extrication
49	500	Uganda	16.12.80	President takes office	Defeat
50	500	Uganda	09.05.96	Presidential elections	Transaction
51	501	Kenya	01.07.92	Legislative elections in December 1992	Extrication
52	510	Tanzania	01.07.95	Legislative elections in October 1995	Transaction
53	530	Ethiopia	09.12.94	New constitution (Legislative elections in May 1995)	Defeat
54	541	Mozambique	28.10.94	Presidential and legislative elections	Extrication

55	551	Zambia	01.11.91	Presidential and legislative elections	Extrication
56	553	Malawi	18.05.94	Presidential and legislative elections	Extrication
57	560	South Africa	27.04.94	Legislative elections	Extrication
58	570	Lesotho	28.03.93	Legislative elections	Transaction
59	580	Madagascar	26.11.92	Presidential elections	Extrication
60	581	Comoros	21.03.90	President takes office	Defeat
61	583	Chad	01.07.96	Presidential elections in July 1996	Extrication
62	615	Algeria	01.07.95	Presidential elections in November 1995	Transaction
63	625	Sudan	02.04.86	Legislative elections	Defeat
64	640	Turkey	07.11.83	Legislative elections	Transaction
65	712	Mongolia	30.07.90	Legislative election	Extrication
66	713	Taiwan	20.12.92	Legislative elections	Transaction
67	732	Korea	26.02.88	President takes office	Extrication
68	770	Pakistan	01.01.73	New constitution	Transaction
69	770	Pakistan	17.11.88	Legislative elections	Transaction
70	771	Bangladesh	26.09.91	New constitution (Legislative elections in Feb. 1991)	Defeat (people power)
71	790	Nepal	01.07.91	Legislative elections in May 1991	Extrication
72	800	Thailand	01.07.75	Legislative elections in January 1975	Defeat
73	800	Thailand	19.12.78	New constitution (Legislative elections in April 1979)	Defeat
74	800	Thailand	14.09.92	Legislative elections	Defeat
75	811	Cambodia	05.08.98	Legislative elections	Defeat
76	840	Philippines	03.02.87	New constitution	Defeat (people power)
77	850	Indonesia	21.10.99	President takes office	Defeat (people power)
78	950	Fiji	01.07.92	New constitution (Legislative elections in May 1992)	Transaction

Appendix 2: Sources for Coding

Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives)

-URL: http://www.keesings.com/keesings_record_of_world_events

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91	Honduras	Volume 24, June 1978, Page 29036. Volume 26, September 1980, Page 30483. Volume 26, November 1980, Page 30570. Volume 28, April 1982, Page 31407. Huntington (1991:113)
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Appendix 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Regression	78	0	1	.33	.474
polity_next	78	-10	10	1.85	6.861
polity_change	78	-18	7	-2.92	6.740
polity_future	78	-10	10	1.78	7.328
Consolidation	78	0	1	.44	.499