Track 2 Diplomacy and the ASEAN Peace

The role of experts in the development towards a security community – a case study on ASEAN-ISIS

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Map of Southeast Asia

Map 1. Southeast Asia (CIA, The World Factbook)

Preface

This research process has finally come to an end. It has been a long and giving process, but at times also discouraging. I began my work with this thesis during fall 2006, but my work was disrupted when I had the chance to serve as an intern at the UN. Unfortunately this delayed my research process with several months. When I returned to the university during fall 2007, I basically had to start from scratch. In this process I have benefited greatly from comments, suggestions and encouragement from my supervisor Prof. Helge Hveem. I would also like to extend my thanks to the Nordic Institute for Asian Studies (NIAS) in Copenhagen for providing me with a two-week scholarship and invaluable access to their resources. Thanks to Dr. Timo Kivimäki at NIAS for advice on literature on Track 2 diplomacy, for suggestions in the early stage of the writing, and for inviting me to an ASEM conference on "Lessons on Peace Processes". I would also express my appreciation for the hospitality I was given in Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia during my fieldwork. Last but not least, I would like to thank my friends and family who have supported me throughout this process.

The full responsibility for the end product rests with the author.

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Alan Christopher Jessen Aguilar

(34 912 words)

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Abbreviations

AMM	ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
APA	ASEAN People's Assembly
APR	Asia Pacific Roundtable
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Association
AICHOR	ASEAN-ISIS Colloquium on Human Rights
APA	Asia Pacific Assembly
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASC	ASESAN Security Community
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN-ISIS	ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies
ASEAN SOM	ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting
ASEM	Asia Europe Meeting
CAEC	Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific
CSIS	Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Indonesia)
IDSS	Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (Singapore)
ISEAS	Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore)
ISIS	Institute for Strategic and International Studies (Malaysia)
RSIS	Rajaratnam School for International Studies (Singapore)
SEA	Southeast Asia
SEANWFZ	Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone
SIIA	Singapore Institute for International Affairs
PECC	Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
PMC	Post-Ministerial Conference
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
VAP	Vientiane Action Programme
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

1.   Introduction

1.1 General overview of the study

At the 9th ASEAN Summit in 2003, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) decided to transform itself into an ASEAN Security Community (ASC). The concept of "security community" describes a group of states that have developed a habit of peaceful interaction and ruled out the use of force in settling disputes with other members of the group (Deutsch 1961). In 2007 ASEAN celebrated its 40th anniversary. During these 40 years there has been no war among two members of ASEAN (Amer 1998:41). This period of peace has been named the "Long Peace of ASEAN" (Kivimäki 2001). This track record is quite impressive considering the region′s mosaic of political, economic, religious, social and cultural diversity, the many potential conflicts in the region, and the lack of any strong multilateral security institution. Does this mean that the ten Southeast Asian countries (henceforth SEA) - Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam – belong to a peaceful community that has renounced the use of force as a means of resolving intra-regional conflicts?

Some scholars, based on constructivist thoughts that goes beyond Deutsch′ classical approach, believe that a security community could be developed through consultation, dialogue and socialization (Adler and Barnett 1998; Acharya 2001). In this way, ASEAN has cultivated a climate of socialization and trust. As the concept of security community sees international relations (IR) as a process of social learning and identity formation, driven by transactions, interactions and socialization, this thesis suggests one vehicle through which empirically address this question: by studying transnational expert networks operating in "Track 2" diplomacy, a process which seek to inform or influence policy by bringing officials in their personal capacity together with non-governmental experts to discuss regional problems. Even though Track 2 is a controversial idea, in terms of letting non-official people do

delicate and diplomatic work, ASEAN has experienced increased participation in security policymaking by non-officials since the 1990s. Dialogue and Research Monitor identified the volume of Track 2 dialogues in 2005 to slightly over 100, about half of them dedicated to the discussion of Asia-Pacific security.[1] Track 2 diplomacy is accordingly a characteristic feature in Southeast Asian diplomatic processes and the preferred method to build confidence and prevent conflicts with more than one Track 2 meeting per week (Phar 2001). The importance of a transnational network of experts in Southeast Asian security has been recognized (Kerr 1994:397; Rüland 2002:84), however the *how* question is yet to be explained adequately. The research question that will guide this study is:

"How and to what extent has Track 2 diplomacy influenced the ASEAN Peace?"

1.2 The Research Question – What is there to explain?

The dependent variable in this study is the ASEAN Peace. This catchphrase refers to the fact that there has been no war between two members of ASEAN. This is extraordinary keeping in mind how war-prone the region was before the establishment of ASEAN, and the challenges facing the region today. There have been a few intra-state disputes, but none with known casualties (Kivimäki 2005:104). It is thus plausible to discuss an ASEAN Peace if we use a narrow peace concept, meaning simply the absence of war. I will use the terms "peace", "security" and "stability" interchangeably as they are the ASEAN signatories' terms in the Declaration. The ASEAN Peace concept can be contested. While it is true that there has been no war between two members of ASEAN, which has its origin in 1967, half of its members have only been part of the organization since the 1990s. This poses a serious question whether the ASEAN Peace will be sustainable over time including

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[1]DRM is run by the Japan Center for International Exchange and tracks policy-relevant dialogue and research projects on security and regional community-building in East Asia. According to Dr. Brendan Taylor, DRM is the best source to get an overview on Track 2 meetings. (Personal correspondence: September 11, 2007). Online at: http://www.jcie.or.jp/drm/ (last reading date: March 27, 2008).

the new members. Because of the difficulties in presenting cause-and-effect explanations for non-events (the absence of war) (Kivimäki 2001:8), I will look at the relationship between ASEAN states in terms of multilateral security cooperation. This thesis suggests that Track 2 diplomacy which developed after the end of the Cold War has to some extent contributed to peace by providing ASEAN with cooperative mechanisms and ideas that foster a climate of trust and community-building.

This leads us to our independent variable. ASEAN may be assumed to have formed a distinct culture characterized by informal consultation and dialogue (the ASEAN Way). Hence, we assume that Track 2 diplomacy equip ASEAN states to better manage or resolve conflicts *within* the group peacefully through a process of socialization, communication, policy innovation and institution building (see 2.5 and 4.2.3). The study suggests that intergovernmental relationships in SEA are influenced by the advice given by a set of *transnational experts* operating through Track 2 diplomacy. Transnational activities refer to the "*movement of tangible or intangible items across state boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a government or an inter-governmental organization*" (Keohane & Nye 1972:xii). In different issue-areas, former studies show that the formation of a transnational community of experts can be of significant importance in bringing states together in cooperative arrangements (Haas 1989; Næss 1999; Sending 2004). Figure 1 indicates the meaning of transnational interactions, and illustrates the relationship between governments, intergovernmental organizations and Track 2 actors. The logic is that frequent transnational networking, socialization and community-building across state boundaries will lead to a sense of community and absence of war. I will emphasize that what is taking place is a process of action and interaction, in other words social learning.

Figure 1. *Transnational interactions and interstate politics (based on Keohane & Nye 1972:xiv).*

As Track 2 networks are grappled with the inter-linkage between official and unofficial channels of diplomacy, it can be fruitful to analyze Track 2 within the framework of the epistemic community approach: "*a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain*" (Haas 1992:3). This implies an analysis of the relationship between Track 2 actors and decision-makers and to which extent this relationship have contributed to enhancing a security community by providing decision-makers with ideas and approaches on how to maintain peace.

Peter Haas dismissed ideas and knowledge as independent variables in his epistemic community approach. Ideas, in Haas′ opinion, are sterile without carriers. The epistemic community approach is actor-oriented and invites us to study the groups of people who initiate cooperation. This leads us to ask; "who are these agents" and "which channels are used to bring their ideas to the decision-making arena"? My suggestion is that experts operating within the network of ASEAN-Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) act as such agents and use Track 2 as a channel to bring their ideas to the decision-making arena. This suggestion assumes that Track 2 diplomacy is an arena where scientific knowledge is transformed into premises for policy choice. The independent variable in this study is therefore an epistemic community of security experts operating in Track 2 diplomacy.

Focusing on only one independent variable does not imply that epistemic communities are the only, or most important, factor that can explain variations in the dependent variable. It is rather supplementary. Alternative explanatory approaches will be briefly discussed in Chapter 2. The focus on the operations of a specific group of non-state actors as an independent variable is based on a view that these transnational actors carry and advance "ideas", "norms", and "consensual knowledge" which can influence decision-makers. Their influence is based on their "authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge", but is explored through a focus on the group′s agency and ability to influence policy-makers (Sending 2004:34). My focus is not on how their knowledge is formed but to what extent their policy advice is adopted and "used" by government or impeded by political interests. Central to this study is therefore a discussion on Track 2's autonomy dilemma; that is the fine balance between the autonomy and integrity of experts and their prospect to produce independent research and policy recommendations, versus their need to be relevant to decision-makers and make their recommendations applicable.

1.3 Purpose of the study

The purpose of the study is to *describe* the organisation and function of one particular case of Track 2 diplomacy, the ASEAN-ISIS network, to *explore* the relationship and interaction between Track 2 actors and decision-makers, and contribute to *explain* the outcome of this process, namely an international community in SEA that might develop a pacific disposition. I will analyze the community's significance by looking at the case of ASEAN-ISIS' role in establishing a multilateral security cooperation, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Despite the observation that there has not been a violent conflict between two members of ASEAN, this study does not assume *a priori*, that ASEAN has already become a security community. The purpose of this study is not to define whether or to what extent ASEAN is a security community. That is an open-ended question among scholars of security and

SEA studies.[2] Rather, this study sees ASEAN's development towards a security community as a process of interaction and socialization that is conducive to peace and focuses on the actors that carry the norms and ideas that underpin this process. The dissemination of a body of ideational factors that function as a confidence-building mechanism appears to be central in the construction of the Southeast Asian security system. Against that backdrop, this thesis reflects upon some Track 2 activities in SEA, the contributions these have made, and some of the challenges facing second track processes in this part of the world. The thesis will also try to deal with some contextual matters concerning the relationship between experts and decision-makers, by examining whether this relationship varies between different regime types and between the founding members of ASEAN and the newer members. Such observations suggest that there is a scope for further analysis into the significance of contrasting national approaches towards second track diplomacy. Research along such lines would go beyond the issue of *whether* second track processes work, to ask the question of *how* they function.

1.3.1 Contribution of the study

The first contribution will be aimed to the theoretical development of the study on regional peace and security cooperation. ASEAN is not yet a full-fledged security community, so applying this concept is not sufficient to explain the ASEAN Peace. But the concept is important to understand how member states develop a common understanding of security through the mechanism of regional cooperation to maintain peace and stability. It is therefore essential to look at this process and the actors within. In this case, the analysis will be framed under the concept of epistemic communities, thus one contribution of the thesis will be to combine some insights from the security community and epistemic community approaches. The purpose is to use the epistemic community approach as a framework within which to examine the relationship between a group of experts in ASEAN-ISIS and SEA governments.

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[2] See Adler and Barnett (1998); Acharya (2001); Emmerson (2005); Collins (2007).

Perhaps the epistemic community can play a security community-building role by helping states specify norms of behaviour and provide a framework for socialization that could regulate state behaviour and lead to the development of a sense of community that has renounced the use of force.

The theoretical framework for the analysis will be developed in Chapter 2, but hopefully this study will contribute to fill a theoretical gap in a field dominated by empirical observation, as there are few theoretical studies on Track 2 diplomacy (Simon 2002:168). The study is intended to help fill the gap between the need to recognize the significance of the Track 2 activities in contemporary Southeast Asian politics and the lack of knowledge of such activities.

The second contribution is by giving an empirical analysis on ASEAN-ISIS as an empirical case on how Track 2 diplomacy can contribute as an explanatory factor to the ASEAN Peace through the development of regional security cooperation. The main argument in this thesis is that Track 2 plays an important independent role in influencing intergovernmental deliberations and behaviour. If Track 2 groups have the potential to influence government officials in security issues, their role can be significant in keeping the regional peace and stability. The questions to study are *how* and *when* this influence is taking place. I do not assert that this approach is a substitute to other explanations, but rather complementary.

This study engages in a general debate on the security architecture in SEA, and grew out of an interest in Southeast Asian security and why this region has proved relatively stable in terms of international relations, despite the region's heterogeneity, lack of strong institutions and war-prone history. In my opinion, traditional explanations on security fail to explain certain aspects of Southeast Asian security in a satisfactory and accurately way. For example, with its state-centric focus, realism ignores "transnational actors" in their analysis on international affairs. This will be discussed in Chapter 2, but one reason can be, as David Kang (2003) argues, that most IR theory is inductively derived from European experiences and is "getting Asia wrong". Also John Ruggie has observed that East Asia has long been viewed by his

colleagues in the field of IR as "unworthy" of theoretical reflection (1993:4).[3] Asia has a different political economy, history, culture and demography. Hence efforts to explain Asian issues using Eurocentric IR theories can be problematic, but at the same time, focusing exclusively on differences may result in "orientalist" analysis that most scholars avoid.[4] Consequently, cultural or constructivist approaches seek support in Southeast Asian practices and values. Track 2 diplomacy is a science-policy process that has been characterized as distinctly "Asian" (Ball et al. 2006a; Phar 2001), but the theoretical framework in this study will also appropriate "Western" theory within Asian IR, but the point is not to criticize European-derived theories just because they are based on Western experience. The point is to be aware that I have to pay careful attention to their application.

1.4 ASEAN's security objectives

The idea of transforming ASEAN into a security community is not new. It can even be argued that the creation of ASEAN in 1967 was inspired by a desire to create a security community in the region. Even though not a security organization per se, the *reason d'être* of ASEAN was preventative. In substance, security has been at the core of ASEAN′s existence. The emergence of ASEAN was the result of many factors, but few were more important than creating a forum for the discussion and resolution of intra-regional disputes. Thus, the ASEAN framework has been considered successful in reconciling former conflicting states. The founding states of Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia were determined to prevent disputes between them from erupting into conflict and to settle any disputes by peaceful means. This was needed because ASEAN was established during a period of grim outlook for regional security and stability, with the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore *Konfrontasi* and territorial disputes like the Malaysia-Philippines

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[3] See also Tim Huxley (1996).

[4] See Edward Said (1978).

dispute of sovereignty over Sabah, and later the Vietnam War and the Cambodian conflict, as the defining features of the regional security environment (Kivimäki 2005; Narine 1998:196). Previous attempts at regional organization, in the form of Maphilindo and the Association of Southeast Asia, had failed. Against this backdrop, ASEAN′s task was to defuse the sources of tension among the member states. Decolonization had left SEA new and tender states and the founding members hoped that ASEAN would enhance their sovereignty by promoting intramural security. Thus, without being named as such until Indonesia proposed it in 2003, a security community has been ASEAN′s central purpose from the beginning. The legacy of colonialism in SEA continues to influence the complex relations between states and results in a highly state-centric approach. Most of these states remain engaged in the process of nation-building among the many ethnic, religious and political groups within the state, and are reluctant to compromise their sovereignty to any outside actors (Narine 2004:426).

1.4.1 The ASEAN Way

In sharp contrast to the tensions that marked the relations between the SEA countries, is the *modus operandi* of multilateral diplomacy that has characterized the region and regulated state interaction. The Southeast Asian culture of *mushawara dan mufakat* (consultation and consensus) puts a set of norms in the centre of attention in security cooperation and defines ASEAN′s approach to inter-state relations. These mechanisms of conflict and security management are the norms, principles, and practices that are commonly referred to as the "ASEAN Way" of diplomacy.[5] The ASEAN Way is characterized by a preference for informality and loose arrangements over legal instruments and binding agreements, a greater reliance on personal relations than on institutions, an emphasis on sovereign equality of members and non-interference in internal affairs, and the renunciation of threat and use of force. These

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[5] For a critical discussion of the ASEAN Way, see Alan Dupont (1996) and Shaun Narine (1997).

original ideas of ASEAN are enumerated in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) Article 2. The "ASEAN Way" encourages decision-making through consultation and consensus building, but it also encourages its members to cooperate around contentious issues. If ASEAN cannot reach consensus on a difficult issue, then no stand is taken. Instead, the members agree to disagree and enable the organization to remain unified. This has been important in a region with a history of political and ethnic division, and still in the process of nation building.

1.4.2 The ASEAN 10

The ASEAN Way has been extended over a larger geographical area, in an attempt to promote regional cooperation and enhance a sense of mutual trust among Southeast Asian countries. Brunei joined in 1984 after its independence, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Burma were admitted in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. This was in keeping with the statement of the 1967 ASEAN Declaration that the "*Association is open for participation to all States in the South-East Asian Region subscribing to (its) aims, principles and purposes*". The ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in 1994 was the first time Foreign Ministers of all SEA countries were present. At this meeting it was stated that they hoped to include the four other Southeast Asian states in a"*Southeast Asian community through common membership in ASEAN*" (ASEAN 1994, paragraph 3). At the same meeting, the Philippines′ Secretary of Foreign Affairs declared, "*We look forward to the day when Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, too, become members of ASEAN. On that day, ASEAN will finally encompass all of Southeast Asia, as ASEAN′s founding fathers envisioned it in 1967*" (Severino 2006:42). When Cambodia was given admission to ASEAN, the Joint Communiqué of the 1999 AMM declared, "*All Southeast Asians are now part of a single community*" (ASEAN 1999, paragraph 2).

1.4.3 The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

The ASEAN Regional Forum, created at the 27th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting

in 1994 is probably the most important regional institutional instrument for security cooperation in the region. The Bali Concord II reaffirms the ARF as "*the main forum for regional security dialogue*" and "*the primary forum in enhancing political and security cooperation in the Asia Pacific region, as well as the pivot in building peace and stability in the region*". As a forum, the ARF functions as a multilateral dialogue that seeks to foster mutual confidence and clarify positions on security issues through consultations and dialogue at the ministerial and senior-officials levels.[6] The ARF is premised on the idea that a process of dialogue can produce qualitative improvements in inter-state relationships, but its significance has been highly debated.[7] It provides a setting where members can discuss current regional security issues and develop measures to enhance peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN′s diplomatic style has been adopted in the ARF process as a code of conduct governing the relations between its participants. The 1995 ARF Concept Paper (paragraph 20) states that the "*rules of procedure of ARF meetings shall be based on prevailing ASEAN practices. Decisions should be made by consensus after careful and extensive consultations*".

1.5 What is Track 2?

The meaning of Track 2 in the Asia-Pacific region is not necessarily synonymous with usage in other regions because of its variation in size, structure, significance, and policy ambit.[8] In this region Track 2 diplomacy is mostly considered "elitist" with little or no participation from civil society organizations. In a Western context Track 2 processes is considered as only one among many tracks in a multi-track diplomacy which, much stronger than the Asian format, relies on the

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[6] Today it comprises the 10 ASEAN member states (Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), the 10 ASEAN dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Japan, New Zealand, ROK, Russia and the US), one ASEAN observer (Papua New Guinea), as well as the DPRK, Mongolia and Pakistan. East Timor was admitted to the ARF in 2005.

[7] See for example Hiro Katsumata (2006).

[8] See Desmond Ball et al. (2006a). See also Pervaiz Cheema (2006) on Track 2 diplomacy in India-Pakistan relations.

mediatory roles of civil society (Rüland 2002:86).[9] Brian Job observes that the term "Track 2" has two connotations in the Asia-Pacific context. The first refers to "*the entire complex of informal networking activities, unofficial channels of communication, and people-to-people diplomacy, across national and regional levels, including official and non-governmental diplomacy*". The second describes "*a particular form of dialogue activity associated…with the promotion of cooperative and multilateral security regionalism*" (2002:246-247). This kind of dialogue involves academics, think tank researchers, former officials, and current officials operating in their private capacities who are acknowledged to have expertise in the area or issue under discussion (Kraft 2000b:3; Simon 2002:168).[10] In my view, both definitions can be traced to the practices of the ASEAN Way. Paralleling the formal dialogues that are held in the region, Track 2 diplomacy is a process designed to assist officials with complex issues through informal dialogue forums, workshops, conferences, seminars, and the like. Then recommendations are submitted to the official level. An illuminating example which will be analyzed in this thesis is the relationship between ASEAN-ISIS and the ASEAN governments. A defining characteristic of these second track processes is the existence of some linkage to Track 1, either through the participation of officials and/or reporting arrangements.

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[9] Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy identifies a total number of nine tracks of diplomatic activities. MTDI is online at http://imtd.org/cgi-bin/imtd.cgi. (Last access date is March 27, 2008). Some authors have extended the number of tracks in Asia-Pacific diplomacy to include Track 1.5 and Track 3. See Xavier Furtado (1999) and Herman Kraft (2000a,b) respectively.

[10] The term "Track 2" was first coined as a concept by William Davidson and Joseph Montville in their 1981 *Foreign Affairs* article *"Foreign Policy According to Freud"*, characterizing unofficial initiatives aimed at fixing a conflict situation. Montville later redefined it as "*an unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict*" (Montville 1991:162). However, scholars still differ on Track 2′s exact definition and boundaries of operations.

The participation of government officials in their private capacities differentiates Track 2 groups from the nearby concept of "think tanks". Think tanks are defined as independent, non-commercial, permanent, research-and expert institutions that are seeking influence on political debate and policy-making (Skodvin 2006:369-370). Track 2 diplomacy is not think tanks, but think tanks can be a part of Track 2 diplomacy.

1.6 Organization of the thesis

The thesis is divided into seven chapters. After the introductory chapter I will proceed with developing a theoretical framework applied in this thesis, from which I will derive hypotheses connecting theory to empery. In Chapter 3 I will explain how I will go about and answer these propositions by presenting the research strategy and design with regard to methodological considerations concerning this study. I will proceed in Chapter 4 with an empirical description of the organisation and function of one particular case of Track 2 diplomacy, the ASEAN-ISIS network. In the following two chapters, the hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework are tested out and analyzed in view of the empirical findings. Chapter 5 examines the relationship and interaction between Track 2 and Track 1 by analyzing to what extent there exist a security epistemic community in SEA. Chapter 6 continues the exploration of the relationship between analysts and policy-makers and seeks to explain the significance of this Track 2 process to regional security cooperation. Finally, in Chapter 7 I summarize the findings from the above chapters and make some concluding remarks on the prospects of ASEAN forming a peaceful community that might develop a pacific disposition and the role of experts in this process, before I present some suggestions for further research.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Southeast Asian regional security in a theoretical context

This chapter is intended to map a theoretical framework that will be applied in this study. I will briefly discuss traditional explanations on Asian security relations before I present the two theoretical concepts that frame this study: security community and epistemic community. In the end I will derive some propositions that will be tested on empirical findings.

The concept of security community attempts to explain how a process of communication and transaction will lead to a peaceful condition within a community, where the use of force among the members is unthinkable. Applying the concept of security community in this study is important to understand how ASEAN states develop a common understanding of security through the mechanism of regional cooperation to maintain peace and stability. The concept of epistemic community attempts to explain how a group of people, with recognized expertise and competence on a specific issue-area, influence political decision-makers. Applying the concept of epistemic community in this study is important to understand the relationship between a group of security analysts and SEA governments and the development of a sense of community.

When combining the two concepts, I hope to construct a theoretical framework which can explain to what extent this group of experts have influenced regional security cooperation within the venue of Track 2 processes. It may improve the understanding on how ASEAN states move towards a security community and self-consciously abandon war as a means of policy towards other members of ASEAN.

2.2 Explanatory approaches to the ASEAN Peace: realism and neoliberalism

In the introductory chapter I noted that Asian IR has been subject to lack of theorizing given the poor fit between "Asian data" and "Western theory" and expectations. However, recently we have witnessed a range of works which sought to apply various theoretical perspectives to the study of Asian IR.[11] Nevertheless, a region "unworthy" of theoretical reflection readily adopted realist assumptions. Its systematic explanations on state power and interests as determinants of state behaviour under the anarchical nature of the international system seem to fit the case of SEA.[12] The continuing existence of intra-regional disputes, competitive military modernization programs, and relatively weak international institutions, reinforce the relevance of realism to the study of SEA as "ripe for rivalry" (Friedberg 1993/94; Simon 1995:9-11).[13] For realists, Southeast Asian security have been dependent on a wider regional balance of power system, based on an intricate web of defence links with each other and with outside powers. The US-led balance of power is particularly fundamental to SEA security.[14] Balancing against a common communist threat has even been argued as a main factor for the origin of ASEAN. The problem with this argument is that the nature of these relationships has changed. They have turned into confidence-building measures and lack mechanisms of deterrence, essential in a balancing game. Contrary to the expectations of realism, the pessimistic predictions after the end of the Cold War have largely failed to materialize. SEA has not experienced an increased arms racing and power politics, the countries do not fear for their survival, and Southeast Asian states do not appear to be balancing against rising powers such as China. Rather they seem to engage China in cooperative security

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[11] See for example Busse 1999; Kivimäki 2001; Peou 2002; Acharya and Stubbs 2006; Tan 2001/2006.

[12] See the works of Michael Leifer. For a review of Leifer's work, see Jürgen Haacke (2005).

[13] David Kang (2003) challenges Friedman's pessimistic thesis about "Europe's past" becoming "Asia's future". But his alternative approach to Asian peace, by a return to a hierarchical order and "bandwagoning" China can be questioned. See Acharya (2003/04).

[14] For a discussion on the balance of power, see Kenneth Waltz (1979). For a discussion on the balance of threat, see Stephen Walt (1987).

dialogue and community formation, for example through the ARF (Acharya and Tan 2006; Ba 2006). Furthermore, according to a realist view, foreign policy belongs within the domain of the state, not civil society. As such, realism fails to explain the significance of Track 2 in the region; at best it argues that Track 2 processes are state-sponsored and not autonomous processes. This observation is not incorrect, but as we will see in this study, too simplistic.

An alternative approach to explain contemporary dynamics in SEA is liberal-oriented analyses which share realisms positivist, state-centred epistemology. According to Peou (2002:120), neoliberalism once sought to challenge realism, but it lacks the empirical content necessary of proper recognition. The Kantian "liberal peace" theory has never been influential because SEA does not fit the model. Only three of the region′s ten states have become liberal democracies: Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. And even they are struggling as democracies. The region consists of a mix regime types (Case 2002), and should according to the "liberal peace" theory be more war-prone. ASEAN also does not fit the liberal economic interdependence model if we compare the "peace period" with the war-prone period before. If the economic welfare of Singapore is positively dependent on that of Indonesia, neither country wants a war. In ASEAN the countries never reached the levels of objective interdependence as before 1967 (Kivimäki 2001:11-12). Neoliberal institutionalism has shown more relevance in the study of Southeast Asian security, with the institutionalization of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) lending some support to this theory, but fails to offer a compelling answer to why there is no security institution in Asia (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002). According to neoliberal institutionalism, the main obstacle to cooperation among states is the fear of cheating in a "prisoners' dilemma" situation. That is, "mixed-motive" situations where states have incentives to cooperate as well as defect. The role of institutions is to overcome this problem by creating rules which (de)legitimates different types of action (Keohane 1984:244-247). If defection is detected, institutions can create the basis for enforcement founded on the principle of reciprocity. Regarding ASEAN, the neo-liberal belief that institutions constrain state preferences through provision of

sanction mechanisms to prevent cheating is not applicable. ASEAN lacks rigid rules and enforcement power and are based on the ASEAN Way discussed in 1.4.1.

2.2.1 Constructivism

Instead constructivism has established itself, together with realism, as the key intellectual competitor in contemporary Southeast Asian security studies. Constructivism reflects an ontology which is not only open to study changes in states' and organizations' interests, but is also interested in identities and norms. I will not provide a detailed elaboration of the assumptions and arguments of constructivism.[15] Suffice it to say that the constructivist injection into security community offers a range of new insights by placing ideas, norms, and identity at the centre of the explanation. The constructivist approach has important implications for an understanding of the ASEAN Peace in suggesting that we look for norms, practices, and collective identity as factors holding the peace together. Constructivists are less transfixed on the state than realists, and have demonstrated greater sensitivity toward regional cooperation and community. IR scholars have been generally uncomfortable with the language of community - "*the idea that actors can share values, norms, and symbols that provide a social identity, and engage in various interactions in myriad spheres that reflect long-term interests, diffuse reciprocity and trust, strikes fear and incredulity in their hearts*" (Adler and Barnett 1998:3). Thus, constructivism allows us to identify Track 2 actors as "agents" who bring with them "ideas" and "knowledge" that are critical factors in shaping state policies.

If we accept a constructivist interpretation that security and interstate relations are regulated by ideational factors, then expert groups may be able to enhance regional security by providing decision-makers with new ideas, policy recommendations and approaches on how to best manage conflicts and advance regional security. I do not assert that this approach represent a full explanation on

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[15] On constructivism and its research agenda, see Wendt (1992); Adler (1997); Ruggie (1998); Tan (2006).

ASEAN Peace, or is a substitute to other explanations, but rather supplementing. For example, the realist notion on state-centricity is still elemental as Track 2 cannot be understood apart from Track 1. It is also probably true that economic growth in SEA has contributed to stability. For constructivists, interdependence as a factor for peace is interpreted in a subjective perception of commonality, rather than any objective expressions. This thesis thus make a case for analytical pragmatics that combines the insights of different paradigms as the best approach to give a more complete understanding of what Track 2 can offer to the dynamics of Asian security.[16]

2.3 The Concept of Security Community

The concept of "security community" was developed by Karl Deutsch and his colleagues in 1957 as an integral part of regional integration theory. Deutsch identified a *security community* whenever a group of states became integrated with a *sense of community*, accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practices that assured "*peaceful change among members with reasonable certainty over a long period of time*" (1961:98). By "sense of community" Deutsch meant a belief that problems must be resolved by a process of peaceful change; that is, the assurance that members will not settle their dispute violently. States that belong to a security community come to see their security as fundamentally linked to other states and that security can only be attained if they cooperate with each other. Security communities come in two forms: an amalgamated security community, which is the formal merging of a group of no-more sovereign political units into a single larger unit, and a pluralistic security community, in which the members retain their independence and sovereignty. It is the latter form that is relevant to the case of ASEAN.

Even though Deutsch' approach was state-centric, he was one of the first architects that viewed IR beyond the relations between nation states to the social

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[16] See Katzenstein and Okawara (2001) for a discussion on analytical eclecticism. See also Adler and Haas (1992) on a discussion on methodological pluralism and theoretical synthesis.

interaction of a wide range of state and non-state actors within international society. Deutsch' security community concept focused on the development of shared understandings, transnational values, and transactional flows, which could encourage community building, foster a sense of community, and offer the possibility of peace. The key aim of a security community is to develop common interests in peace and stability, rather than to deter or balance common threat, in contrast to an alliance, a security regime or a security complex (Acharya 2001:17-19; Jervis 2002; Buzan and Wæver 2003).

Theoretically, Deutsch′s concept represents a direct challenge to the dominating models of security and goes beyond the neo-realists versus neo-liberals division (Adler and Barnett 1998:13-15, 64). First and most controversially, it contemplates the possibility of international community that goes beyond the nation state. Second, the approach requires an examination of the complex relationship between state power and transnational forces that might influence states to pursue a different security behaviour. Third, it challenges the realists' idea of security dilemma. By contrast, the idea of security community perceives international relations as a process of social learning and identity formation, driven by transactions, interactions, and socialization (Wulan et al. 2007:6).

The concept consists of two main elements: security and community. If we adopt the Deutschian perspective on security, then *security* is the presence of a durable peace among member states, reflecting a lasting absence of war among them. *Community* is the presence of a cooperative and shared identity among these states formed by a common understanding about certain norms, including a commitment to abstain from using force against each other. In a community there should also be a direct and constant interaction among its members (ibid.:8).

However, Deutsch′s classic conceptualization of security communities has limitations regarding the usefulness as an analytical tool in the study of Southeast Asian security. First, being Western in origin, it is important to question the applicability of the concept in SEA. ASEAN does not meet Deutsch' prerequisites

such as in the European pluralistic community because ASEAN members neither share liberal democratic values, nor are bound by a high degree of mutual interdependence. Before the formation of ASEAN, 23 % of ASEAN exports were directed to other ASEAN countries. This figure dropped to 12 % in 1974, before slowly recovering until it exceeded the mid-1960 figure in 1995 (Kivimäki 2005:105). Deutsch' work was not explicitly based on assumptions about the pacific effects of liberal democracy and interdependence, but his main area of research was Europe and the North Atlantic. Emanuel Adler (cited in Acharya 2001:31, emphasis mine) argues that "*members of pluralistic security communities hold dependable expectations of peaceful change not merely because they share just any kind of values, but because they share **liberal democratic values** and allow their societies to become interdependent and linked by transnational economic and cultural relations*". In contrast, Timo Kivimäki (2001) argues that the absence of war in ASEAN can be explained by any set of shared norms, not necessarily democratic ones, as long as there is a shared sentiment on commonality. ASEAN attests to the fact that community-building can proceed despite the absence of a common liberal democratic political culture.

Second, as Deutsch looked to transactions as the source of new identifications, the framework has been criticized for an excessive preoccupation with quantitative measuring of transactions (Acharya 2001:21). According to Adler and Barnett (1998:8-9), Deutsch′ emphasis on quantitative measures overlooked the social relations that are generated by those transactions. The model ignored international organizations and social groups such as decision-makers, business elites, and experts, and how their self-interest and identity motivated their behaviour, and by that the model becomes inattentive to the complex way in which state power, international organizations, transactions, and social learning processes can shape new forms of mutual identification and security relations, for example the complex interaction between Track 1 and Track 2 and its influence on security relations in ASEAN.

2.3.1 A Constructivist Security Community

In order to address such limitations, constructivist scholars, like Adler and Barnett (1998) and Acharya (2001), have adopted a qualitative and sociological approach with important implications for the understanding of ASEAN as a security community. Regarding the notion of absence of war, they have elaborated Deutsch' concept of security community by adopting the constructivist's argument that international actors are embedded in a structure in which both material and ideational elements will lead to stable peace (Ruggie 1998:879). The ideational element may comprise of new ideas about cooperation. The material elements may include common threat perceptions; or events in international relations that might change the framework on politics and security. Proponents of a constructivist security community also see the development towards a security community as an evolutionary process. For example, Acharya views ASEAN as a "nascent" security community, a term developed by Adler and Barnett (1998) and is the first stage on an evolutionary pattern from "nascent" to "ascendant" to "mature" security community.

The influence of constructivism on security communities can be found in three areas (Acharya 2001:3-4): First is the social construction of security communities. Cooperation among states is a social process; hence the "long-term habit" of peaceful dispute management results from interactions, socialization, norm setting and identity building. Second is the focus on the transformative impact of norms. Norms not only regulate state behaviour, but also redefine state interests and identities, including the development of collective identities. Norms play a crucial role in the socialization process leading to peaceful conduct among states. Important to this study is the social learning process, which can be defined by Haas and Haas (2002:576) as "*the process of reflection by social scientists in conjunction with policy makers as they jointly develop new practices and policies intended to improve the human condition*". According to Jeffrey Checkel (2001:554), constructivists give insufficient attention to the process of social learning. But because actors have a potential for learning, it opens up for the role of experts in changing the interests and actions of states, for

example by promoting new ideas on cooperation. Finally, constructivism allows us to look beyond material forces and focus on inter-subjective factors, including norms, ideas, identities, and knowledge. Thus, constructivism provides important insights into the emergence of a "sense of community", a crucial feature of security communities. A constructivist approach, which recognizes the importance of ideational factors for transforming international structures and security politics, is thus best suited to take seriously how international community can shape security politics and create the conditions for a stable peace (Adler and Barnett 1998:59).

2.3.2 What is missing from the concept of SC?

The security community approach implies a propositional definition which entails both the presence of community and security, and causation – (a) a sense of community (b) creates (c) the assurance of peaceful change (Emmerson 2005:171). If (a) and (c) are empirically confirmed, only then can we examine whether security is a consequence of community or the other way around. To explain (b) is not an easy task and raises the problem of tautology. We have to avoid circular reasoning and identify norms and ideas independent from the effects to be explained. In this respect, a norm central to the formation of a security community is the non-use of force to explain the existence of a security community which has ruled out the use of force. This is a tautology and constitutes a weakness in constructivist literature (N. Khoo 2004:41). According to the constructivist security community approach, norms are the independent variable used in explaining ASEAN's development as a nascent security community. Once established, norms redefine state interests and create a collective identity that is critical to the emergence of a security community. But Farrell (2002:60) argues that constructivist approaches to security studies face two methodological problems: proving the existence of norms, and showing the impact of norms on behavioural outcomes. Since we cannot directly observe norms in their entirety, we cannot conclusively establish the causal relationship between norms and behaviour, or in this case – between the ASEAN Way and the ASEAN Peace. Track 2 activities have a great potential in cultivating the kind of sense of community that

seems to be required for ASEAN to become a community. Supplementing the constructivist security community approach with the actor-oriented epistemic community approach is helpful in this regard, with a focus on the carriers of norms and ideas as the independent variable rather than the norms and ideas themselves.

However, it is not my intention to try to explain this causal relationship fully. My aim is to draw on the insights from the literature on epistemic communities, hoping that a study of expert networks may contribute to a better understanding of this process. The logic is that transnational networks may help produce a "we-feeling", trust and confidence through a diffusion of common norms, knowledge, identity, understanding of regional problems, and perhaps solutions to these problems.

2.4 Epistemic Community

The literature on epistemic communities is perhaps the most used and referred to theoretical approach that focuses on the role of experts in shaping international policy. In an increasingly complex international system, it is difficult for states to choose between different alternative actions and sometimes decision-makers have to make decisions based on incomplete information about an issue-area. Thus, experts can have an important role in reducing this uncertainty and by this influence international policy. Ernst B. Haas first articulated the idea of "epistemic communities", a concept introduced by John Ruggie, comprising professionals "*who shared a commitment to a common causal model and a common set of political values*" (E. Haas quoted in Ruggie et al. 2005:23). Ernst Haas expressed the belief that science would affect the way in which states′ interests are defined. Especially in issue areas dependent on technical information, and where there is a growing demand for such knowledge from policy-makers, epistemic communities have a greater likelihood to gain influence (Haas & Haas 2002:592).

The epistemic community approach in IR theory was later defined by Peter Haas (1992:3) as *"a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area"*, and he considered their importance as *"channels through which new ideas circulate from society to government as well as from country to country"* (ibid.:27). Peter Haas′ primary concern is to explain the influence of science on politics by introducing a potential for learning. What, then, is an epistemic community? A group of experts turn into an epistemic community, or knowledge-society, when they meet experts from other nations or organizations to discuss problems and possible solutions that their respective decision-makers are formally supposed to solve. Through frequent and direct face-to-face relations, shared academic language, and common understanding of the problem, ties develop between experts. And when ASEAN governments get together to discuss a particular issue, they will discover that they share some similar ideas and opinions on many matters because their respective experts have all offered nearly similar advice, providing new incentives for regional cooperation.

2.4.1 How to recognize an epistemic community when we see it?

An epistemic community is something more than just a network of experts meeting regularly at international conferences. The network must share some basic understandings and operate within the same "paradigm", using Thomas Kuhn′s concept of a set of language and norms within a certain group of experts (Østerud et al. 1997:184). In order to identify an epistemic community, Haas (1992:3) suggests four indicators that are quite theoretical and difficult to grasp; (1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs; (2) shared causal beliefs; (3) shared notions of validity; and (4) a common policy enterprise. Because the indicators are quite vague and cannot be easily measured, it is difficult to confirm the existence of an epistemic community. Young (1994:96-97) address the problem of testing the concept and determine when the epistemic community is independent of the process itself. In order to link empery to theoretical propositions, we need to be clear on who are

inside and who are outside the community. Still, all four definitional indicators deal with the cohesion of community. My understanding of these indicators is that this cohesion is a result of socialization, in terms of convergence of behaviour and interests but also social identities. An epistemic community exists to the extent a group of analysts come together through the identification of a problem, develop a common scientific understanding, but most importantly have a clear understanding on how to go about and solve the problem. Then, when governments turn to their respective epistemic communities, they will get the same advice. Because it is difficult to identify the existence of an epistemic community, my discussion and conclusion is strengthened by secondary literature.

2.4.2 Conditions for influence

Epistemic community literature highlights the aspect that experts have greater opportunities for influence on issues with high *uncertainty,* when experts share *consensual knowledge*, and through *links* to officials. Social learning may be more likely in a situation of uncertainty because actors lack sufficient knowledge about its own or other's interests in a particular situation (Checkel 2001:563). The epistemic community approach deal with the process of decision-making where officials get together with their non-formal counterparts to discuss a particular problem. The task of policymaking relies heavily on social scientists for input, even if there is no clear causal connection between social science consensus and public policy outputs (Haas and Haas 2002:600). Still, the "*growing technical uncertainties and complexities of problems*" make policymakers to seek information elsewhere (Haas 1992:1). If the subject is sensitive and difficult to grasp, decision-makers turn to specialists for advice to ameliorate the uncertainties and to understand the complex issues involved. In so far as epistemic communities develop common understandings of problems and solutions, they may help their respective governments reach convergent solutions and entail new learning and discourse. More specifically, epistemic communities can give advice on likely outcomes of different actions, provide information on inter-linkages

between complex issues, help states redefine their interests, and help formulate policies (ibid.:15).

The potential to influence decision-makers will increase when the epistemic community is strongly consensual in their interpretation on research. If there is a high degree of ambiguity within the community, they do not possess the authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge. In addition, the epistemic community approach suffer from an implicit assumption that scientific consensus leads to political consensus and implementation (Skodvin 1999:4-5). Scientific knowledge does not explicitly address the particular policy-problems decision-makers struggle with, and it is usually provided in a technical form which is not applicable to policy-making. It is therefore important with a transformation process in which scientific knowledge is transformed into premises for policy choice. In this process, the competence of both scientists and policymakers is needed to ensure authoritative knowledge and applicability. Such a transformation process resembles the science-policy interaction which is the focus in this study.

Consensual knowledge and uncertainty among decision-makers are necessary but not sufficient conditions for influence. The epistemic community needs access to the decision-making process. Hence, if the epistemic community is to exert influence over policy-making, they must develop links to decision-makers. The relationship between experts and state bureaucracies is therefore central to Haas. Close links to the bureaucracy increase the likelihood of influence. Without such links, it is questionable how significant epistemic communities can be. According to the early writings of Peter Haas (1992:30), this can happen by capturing positions within political bureaucracy. However, in this context, this is not the main method. Track 2 diplomacy is taking place through informal dialogue forums, workshops, conferences, seminars, and the like, before policy recommendations are submitted to governments. In their later writings, Ernst and Peter Haas (2002) viewed institutions as venues in which analysts and policymakers interact and develop new practices and policies. Even though Peter Haas (2002:75) is sceptical about the direct effects of

international conferences on member states' behaviour, he still acknowledge their indirect effect in promoting broader processes of social learning, the construction of new conceptual frameworks, issue clarification, and the introduction of new policymaking approaches to government officials. I see ASEAN-ISIS and its Track 2 activities as such a venues, in terms of the characteristic personal relationship between Track 2 actors and policymakers.

2.5 Preliminary hypotheses

Regarding the research question, there is no doubt that there is a transnational community of security experts operating within ASEAN-ISIS. The question is to what extent this group of experts is an epistemic community, is able to gain political influence, and be a factor for peace. Because experts are considered a defining character of the Track 2 diplomacy, the epistemic community approach is plausible in analyzing the relationship between experts and officials. Participants in Track 2 diplomacy consist of a *network of professionals* that are recognized for possessing some expertise within a given issue-area. When operating in an unofficial and informal sphere through its close link to officials, Track 2 diplomacy occupies the potential of being a *channel* through which policy advice and new ideas are promoted from experts to decision-makers. Through conferences, seminars, research publications, and both formal and informal communication to policymakers, problems are identified, common understandings and values are developed, and political solutions are promoted. Based on this reasoning **I assume that we can identify a security epistemic community in ASEAN (H1).**

Consequently, we must examine how and under what conditions these expert-groups can gain political influence in the area of security cooperation, as discussed in 2.4.2. The actual application of policy recommendations depends on the ability of expert groups in transmitting their advice to officials. If experts operating in Track 2 diplomacy should have any significance in shaping international policy, they must have direct links to the actual decision-makers. A recommendation that is not

acknowledged by government remains irrelevant. Thus the epistemic community needs access to the venues of policy-making. And when ASEAN governments get the same advice from their respective epistemic community, they will find new incentives for cooperation. In this way, the epistemic community can play a security community-building role by helping states specify norms of behaviour and provide a framework for socialization that could regulate state behaviour and lead to the development of a sense of community. But a too close relationship may resemble what Herman Kraft (2000a) labelled the "autonomy dilemma of Track 2 diplomacy" when expressing his concern about independent and autonomous scientific research. A degree of autonomy is therefore important to establish and preserve integrity and confidence in the community as impartial experts, but involvement in the policy process would be equally important to get findings and conclusions across to decision-makers. This interaction implies a risk of political "contamination", but a perfect balance is only an ideal type.

It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness and influence of Track 2 diplomacy on state behaviour, much because governments never refer back to Track 2 as the source of their policy. But by way of a hypothesis, we can say that **epistemic communities that are able to mobilize more of the dimensions below will have a stronger impact on ASEAN member states than communities that are unable to mobilize as many (H2)**; *Socialization:* meaning the impact of Track 2 on the perceptions and attitudes on foreign policymakers and building of trust. *Communication:* meaning building informal back channels that can be used in crises when Track 1 cannot deal with sensitive issues. *Policy innovation:* meaning how ideas arising in Track 2 are being adopted in Track 1. Does Track 2 play an independent role, or is it just a tool for official Track 1 diplomacy? *Institution building:* meaning how Track 2 influences the institutionalization of ideas in state policies and practices and the creation of permanent institutions, in this case the ARF.

These dimensions will be further discussed in Chapter 4.[17] The analysis is further organized around three ideal models. One is that epistemic communities are independent from the effects to be explained. This is in contrast to a realist view that asserts that epistemic communities have no influence at all. Epistemic communities would only be instruments to secure state interests. Finally, recent studies argue that epistemic communities are significant, but only if they gain political support from other actors (Sending 2003).

As the ten Southeast Asian countries encompass a diversity of political regime types, it is also interesting to see how expert influence varies among political systems in the region when discussing the integrity and autonomy of the epistemic community. This task will hopefully shed some light on situations where the epistemic community has been influential and situations where the same community has failed.

2.6 Conclusion – Towards an embedded security approach

In this chapter I have tried to elaborate on the theoretical framework that will guide this study. I will focus on a constructivist security community approach and the epistemic community approach in order to *describe* one particular case of Track 2 diplomacy, to *explore* the relationship and interaction between Track 2 actors and decision-makers, and contribute to *explain* the outcome of this process, namely an international community in SEA that might develop a pacific disposition. In combining the two approaches, my suggestion is to include the role of Track 2 experts as an explanatory factor to the ASEAN Peace. From this framework I have derived some propositions that will guide the analysis of empirical findings. I hope this framework will contribute to understand to some extent the causal relationship implied in security community literature; that a sense of community creates the assurance of peace or security.

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[17] These dimensions are borrowed from Susan Shirk, Director of the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the

3. Research Design and Methodological Considerations

3.1 Case Study

This study was conducted through a qualitative analysis in order to answer the research question and the hypotheses in a way that secured a high degree of validity and reliability (Yin 2003). Given the nature of the questions addressed and the purpose of the study, a quantitative analysis wan not an option. The analysis rely on both primary and secondary sources, as I have tried to use a source base as large as possible in order to strengthen the reliability of the study. Borrowing the words of Skodvin (1999:13); "*doing an in-depth analysis with an aim of exploring, describing as well as contributing to explaining the nature, dynamics and outcome of processes of science-policy interaction implies a data intensive analysis in which we have to rely on multiple sources of evidence. To keep the analysis manageable, we have therefore chosen a single-case over a multiple-case study*". The sources used in collecting data will be elaborated in section 3.2. To understand the interaction between experts and decision-makers, and thus examine the role of experts in the ASEAN Peace, I will focus on a domestic-international linkage of actors as seen in Figure 1. Through a single-case study of ASEAN's Track 2 diplomacy, with specific analysis on ASEAN-ISIS, this study will develop an empirical analysis on how ASEAN-ISIS analysts promoted their ideas concerning security and influenced the development towards regional security cooperation.

University of California, and her evaluation of Track 2 programs in the Asia-Pacific. See Zuckerman (2005).

3.1.1 Unit of analysis

According to Yin (2003:13), "*a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident*". My area of interest is the security architecture in SEA. Within this context the empirical case selected for the analysis is ASEAN-ISIS, a region-wide network of Track 2 institutions, from its establishment in the late 1980s to the time of writing this thesis. The case is not representative of a larger sample, but one that is interesting in itself. Case selection is commonly referred to as perhaps one of the most difficult tasks involved in case study research. There is a risk that the selection of cases biases the results of a study. In this context this is not necessarily a problem, because in SEA the concept of Track 2 is generally attributed to ASEAN-ISIS. Because the unit of analysis is a small group, the persons to be included within the group must be distinguished from those outside (Yin 2003:24). This will be done in section 4.7. An embedded unit of analysis, the establishment of the ARF in the early 1990s, will be examined as an illustrative example of this group's role and influence on ASEAN security discourse. The Track 2 process provides a good opportunity to study science-policy interaction and the relationship between state and non-state actors. Track 2 diplomacy implies the participation of both experts and policymakers, but the case study will show that this relationship varies between ASEAN member states.

It is impossible to conduct a thorough analysis on all ASEAN members within the scope of this study, so I have chosen to focus on experts in three key countries in the region: *Singapore*, *Malaysia* and *Indonesia*. The Track 2 actors in the three countries are considered among the most active and important in the region. As the ten Southeast Asian countries encompass a diversity of political regime types, it is interesting to see how expert influence varies among political systems in the region, and among original members of ASEAN and the newcomers. The epistemic community approach evolves around the debate about whether state behaviour is constrained by systemic factors, or whether state interest's and thereby state

behaviour are subjects to change. Haas expected that "*the range of impact that we might expect of epistemic and epistemic-like communities remains conditioned and bounded by international and national structural realities*" (Haas 1992:7). As the three key countries vary in their level of democracy, we should expect that all other things being equal, less democratic political structures would allow less channels of influence, thus less chances of Track 2 success. In the opinion of William Case (2002), SEA with its diverse regime types and strong elites, offers a good format in which to demonstrate the significance of agency. Accordingly, this study calls attention to the role of Track 2 agents and it is reasonable to examine the significance of Track 2 agency conditioned by regime type. This approach would bring the agent-structure debate inside the discussion on epistemic communities, and could offer something in the study of the epistemic community-bureaucracy relationship through an understanding of what the Track 2 process could offer for security policy (Wendt 1987). It seems that a good management of Track 2 could open for more channels of influence in a country that is otherwise less open to new inputs.

3.2 Sources and data collection

I have made an effort to triangulate my data with multiple sources in order to base my analysis on solid empirical ground.[18] According to Yin (2003:85), there are six main sources of evidence that are most commonly used when doing case studies. The data for this study has been collected from both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources cover "archival records" and "interviews". The archival research focused on collecting ASEAN official documents such as communiqués, declarations and treaties; and ASEAN-ISIS official documents such as Memorandums. The first ASEAN-ISIS Memorandum (1991) is of particular importance in this research. Participant lists from Track 2 conferences and meetings will be used in identifying a regional network of experts.

The secondary sources for this study consist of books, articles and periodicals; working papers and concept papers from ASEAN-ISIS research institutes; data statistics from the online database Dialogue and Research Monitor; and some newspaper articles. I have to be attentive about the weakness in using secondary sources as evidence, namely reporting bias or selective bias. The former occurs when the author′s bias is reflected in the data, the latter occurs when a collection is incomplete (Yin 2003: 86). At an early stage of the research process I gathered background information from the library at the University of Oslo. Relevant literature was also collected from the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS) in Copenhagen during a two-week scholarship, and at the libraries at CSIS in Jakarta and RSIS in Singapore. These institutes provided me with invaluable access to their libraries and magazine archives. I was also in contact with Dr. Timo Kivimäki at NIAS, one of Scandinavia′s leading experts on ASEAN security in general, and Track 2 diplomacy in particular.

3.2.1 Interviews

Conducting interviews was much needed because of the nature of the research topic. The purpose of the fieldwork was to gain insights into the nature of second track processes in the SEA region beyond those noted in the literature, and to gain greater understanding of the Track 1-Track 2 relationship. Because I am identifying a regional network of experts as an epistemic community, and studying a political process in which a defining feature is personal relations among its participants, it is crucial to get an understanding of their shared sentiment towards regional security, about their relationship with other experts and officials, and if they feel their work are influential. By asking informants about their sense of "we-ness" and their cognitive understanding of influence, we can gain primary data that can be supplemented by documents and literature. The interviews were conducted as semi-structured, a form

[18] On triangulation, see Udo Kelle (2001) and Alexander Massey (1999).

which is structured enough for me to control and set the agenda and topics of discussion, while it is flexible enough for the informant to elaborate on what he or she finds interesting (Thagaard 2003:85). At the same time it gives me the opportunity to ask follow-up questions, and the same themes and issues will be covered.

The selection of informants has been skewed towards those who have been involved in ASEAN-ISIS and its activities. The selection of informants is limited to the three key countries. A selection of informants from additional countries and additional institutes might have been the ultimate goal, but limited time, funding and access to relevant experts constrained the selection. My selection also represents the problem of guided selection. The selection was guided by my contacts throughout the project, it was guided by my limited knowledge of the issue, and it was guided by time and space. Using Singapore as a hub and travelling from there to surrounding institutes was the easiest and cheapest solution. At an Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) conference in Copenhagen, where expert involvement was a major topic of discussion, I got in contact with Sastrohandojo Wiryono.[19] Wiryono is a former Indonesian ambassador to Australia, and a senior researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta. Wiryono was leading the Aceh peace negotiations prior to President Mahtti Ahtisaari and has worked extensively on Track 2 diplomacy in the region.

Because I was to study experts involved in Track 2 activities, I contacted Track 2 institutions in the ASEAN countries I was to do fieldwork in. Through email correspondence with Track 2 institutions in Singapore (SIIA and RSIS) and Malaysia (ISIS), I got in touch with other leading experts in the Southeast Asian Track 2 network. A total of 12 interviews were done during a short fieldwork in November-December 2007. Some of the interviewees have been heavily involved in Track 2

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[19] Thanks to Dr. Timo Kivimäki for inviting me to the conference of ASEM Education Hub Thematic Network on Peace and Conflict Studies:"Lessons of Peace Processes", Copenhagen, 31 August 2007.

activities for several years and are considered key persons in the community, like Mely Caballero-Anthony, Kwa Chong Guen, Lee Lai To, Tan See Seng, and Stephen Leong. A new generation of Track 2 participants were also interviewed; Joanne Lin (SIIA), Hiro Katsumata (RSIS, CSCAP), Elina Noor (ISIS Malaysia), and Shahriman Lockman (ISIS Malaysia). SIIA is one of the smallest ASEAN-ISIS research institutes, with very few full-time staff members, so it proved difficult to visit it. However, I got in contact with a young SIIA research associate, Joanne Lin, and the former director of SIIA, Lee Lai To. Lee has worked extensively on Track 2 activities regarding the South China Sea, and participated actively in producing the important 1991 ASEAN Memorandum, a document that will be analyzed in this study. Mely Caballero-Anthony at the RSIS is a long time member of CSCAP Singapore and ASEAN-ISIS. She is also an associate fellow at the ISDS, Philippines. Kwa Chong Guen was referred to as Singapore's "Mr. Track 2". He has participated at numerous Track 2 activities and has been a council member of SIIA. He is now a member of CSCAP through the RSIS. Stephen Leong is Assistant Secretary-General of ISIS Malaysia. Mr. Leong suggested me to interview Elina Noor and Sharihman Lockman, two researchers of a "new generation", to supplement or contest his answers.

A disproportionate selection of informants made on other people′s suggestions poses serious questions to the validity and reliability of any study. I have tried to cope with this problem by controlling the selection of interviewees on the basis of varying nationality, varying seniority (from junior experts to senior experts), varying age (old and young), and varying involvement in the Track 2 process (from key persons to affiliated members and "outsiders"). All informants were selected based on their authoritative knowledge to the issue in focus.

The target of interviews should ideally include both experts involved in Track 2 activities and officials (on national and regional levels). Unfortunately I was unable to get in contact with national or ASEAN officials (except Wiryono who is a former official, now senior researcher), resulting in weaker conclusions on the extent of adoption and acceptance of expert's policy recommendations. There is also a

possibility that the interviewees tend to give more positive answers because they are part of the process I study. To compensate to a certain degree, I tried to conduct interviews with persons close to the security discourse who are supposed to have a more "objective" view on these questions than members of the Track 2 process. The interviews with Alan Chong and Christopher Roberts were conducted in this regard, as "outsiders" to the Track 2 process. This was done to see if there were any contrasting views between members of Track 2 activities and people outside. Chong is a professor at the National University of Singapore with research interest on Singapore's foreign policy and regionalism and identity in SEA. Roberts is a young associate research fellow at the Track 2 institution RSIS, but has yet to be personally involved in Track 2 activities. Analyzing official ASEAN documents to see if they reflect ideas and recommendations given by experts is also a way to compensate for the lack of interviews with decision-makers.

3.3 Validity and reliability of data

The quality of any study is by large dependent upon the data′s validity (relevance) and reliability (trustworthiness) (Hellevik 1999), because the findings may be influenced by how we collect and treat the data-information. The problem occurs if I skew towards a subjective judgment of data collection and do not pay fully attention to develop a sufficiently operational set of measures. This can be solved if we address the four criteria below (Yin 2003).

In order to meet *construct validity*, and not measure anything else than the theoretical variables I am interested in, I must establish the right indicators. It is difficult to operationalize abstract and latent variables and terms, and the definitions of epistemic community and security community are rather theoretical which make certain limitations to the construct validity of the study. What I am trying to establish is *to what extent* the Track 2 network is considered an epistemic community and *how* this community has influenced the ASEAN Peace, with a focus on its contribution to regional security cooperation. When identifying an epistemic community I will assess

Haas' four indicators discussed in the previous chapter. The dimensions noted in section 2.5 will serve as indicators for a discussion on the influence of Track 2 diplomacy. I will also address construct validity by triangulating data from multiple sources, which will then support a more complete picture of the phenomena of study.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the security community approach proposes a causal relationship: a sense of community creates an assurance of peace. This causal relationship cannot be observed, but I hope to infer this by building an explanation on the role of experts in this process based on interviews and documentary evidence, thereby addressing the *internal validity* of the study. However, my focus is to understand complex processes of political and scientific interaction, rather than the causal relationship of variables. I reemphasis that my study only aims to help understanding this relationship, not explain it fully.

I should be careful with claiming that the study′s findings will be generalizable, have *external validity*, to other cases beyond the case of ASEAN. Generalizations on the basis of a qualitative case study should always be made with caution. I only investigate one case of science-policy interaction, so I have to be careful with determining the scope of validity of the findings. According to Yin (2003:38), I should instead try to generalize findings to "theory". If findings should suggest that network of experts do influence regional security policymaking, linking epistemic communities to security community may become a vehicle to examine similar cases of science-policy interaction.

A high degree of *reliability* means that we can trust the results. Readers can trust the results in this study if I use the data-information accurate, and do not bias the information for the good of the analysis. There is always the risk that the information used is coloured by my subjective position, but other students should end up with the approximately same result when using the same data. As the phenomenon in focus is complex, others might have asked different questions or see the same data from different perspectives, thereby reaching different results, so my choices and interpretation of data are at best subjective. I hope to increase reliability by using

primary source data controlled against available secondary literature, and by demonstrating my approach and the premises for my conclusions as accurate as possible, using correct citations and references.

3.4 Conclusion – From here to there

This chapter has outlined the research design, or logical sequence, that connects the study′s initial research question ("*here*") to the empirical data and, ultimately, to its conclusions ("*there*") (Yin 2003:20). One advantage of the case-study design is the ability to focus on one particular phenomenon within a complex context of state interaction and policy formation. This study focuses on one set of non-governmental actors, namely experts operating in Track 2 activities in Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, and how their influence on regional security cooperation have contributed to peace. As expert influence on policy is conditioned by a large number of factors, propositions and circumstances, it is difficult but equally important to discuss their role in political processes. To secure the study a high degree of validity and reliability, I have tried to triangulate data from multiple sources, collected from interviews, documents and secondary literature.

4. ASEAN's Informal Networking

4.1 Southeast Asia's Track 2 networks

This chapter is dedicated to identify and describe the network of Track 2 actors in ASEAN that works on regional security issues and have gained considerable attention through their involvement and participation in Track 2 diplomacy. The focus is particularly on Track 2 actors in some key Southeast Asian countries (Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia) that are engaged in the process of getting policy inputs about foreign relations for regional cooperation from policy communities to decision-makers. This exercise is based on the view that transportation of ideas and knowledge onto the policy agendas of the regional states and between the decision-making communities of the region is likely to be via the existence of a regional policy network of experts. Track 2 exists in a confounded variety of forms and range from small ad-hoc workshops designed to address specific issues, like the series of informal workshops and meetings on "Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea Project", to networks that are most likely to have a longer-term impact on regional security. These include the PECC that provides policy inputs to the APEC forum, CSCAP for the ARF, and CAEC for ASEM. However, a common view is that the individuals of the Track 2 policy network in SEA are concentrated around the network of strategic studies institutions known as the ASEAN-ISIS. The concept of Track 2 is generally attributed to ASEAN-ISIS, as it constitutes the core of the Track 2 activities in SEA and the Asia-Pacific region at large. According to Desmond Ball, ASEAN-ISIS is "*central to much of the networking and discourse with respect to security cooperation in the region*" (1994:169), while Herman Kraft notes that "*track two in Southeast Asia is largely synonymous with ASEAN-ISIS*" (2000a:345). Some scholars even argue that the story of ASEAN-ISIS "*could be read as the story about Track 2, how it came into being, how it was evolved, and the challenges it faces into the future*" (Soesastro et al. 2006:1).

In assessing the Track 2 processes of ASEAN-ISIS and its network of research institutions, I will trace and describe the origins, purposes, and the formal and informal linkages that structure the access to policy processes, expressed in the key tenets of the epistemic community approach; uncertainty, interpretation and institutionalization (Haas 1992:3). Hence we can identify common features and characteristics that can form the base of an epistemic community of security experts. The epistemic community approach will be assessed in Chapter 5.

4.2 Defining ASEAN-ISIS

4.2.1 Origin: A Track 2 network emerges

ASEAN-ISIS, or ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies, is a loose network of think tanks in all ASEAN countries except Burma, involved in studying and monitoring issues relevant to the political and military security of the region as a whole, and of the region′s component countries. While it has a small secretariat located at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, and is registered as an NGO with the ASEAN Secretariat, it is built upon personal relations between researchers affiliated with these research institutions rather than complex structures. ASEAN-ISIS originated through a personal friendship among some leading experts and scholars. Jusuf Wanandi, now Vice Chair of the CSIS, first initiated an informal network of SEA scholars in 1984. A number of these individuals happened to be heading research institutions or think tanks on strategic or security studies, and formed the core of the emerging network of scholars on security issues. They included Nordin Sopiee of Malaysia′s Institute for Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Carolina Hernandez of the Filipino Center for Integrative and Development Studies (then CIDS, now ISDS), Lau Teik Soon of the Singapore Institute of International Studies (SIIA), and Kusuma Snitwongse of Thailand's Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS). In 1988 the ASEAN-ISIS was

formally launched with the signing of the Statutes of ASEAN-ISIS.[20] The informal network also included members from Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) and IDSS/RSIS (both from Singapore), but these institutions are not formally part of ASEAN-ISIS.

4.2.2 Purpose: The uncertainty of security

According to a study commissioned by ASEAN-ISIS, the purpose of establishing ASEAN-ISIS was two-fold (Soesastro 2006:7). On the one hand, ASEAN-ISIS was established for idealistic reasons. ASEAN-ISIS was the only approach to promote regional cooperation outside the government framework and to provide ASEAN with input from non-state actors in order to strengthen peace and development in the region. According to one of the founders, this objective was important because of the uncertainty that followed the changing security challenges in the region that were affecting the member states of ASEAN after U.S. lost the war in Vietnam (Wanandi 2006:31). Because U.S. presence in East Asia had been a guarantor for regional peace and stability, this new uncertainty together with bilateral disputes in ASEAN and the Cambodian conflict, lead CSIS to organize a number of informal meetings to discuss regional security and cooperation. As Haas argues, decision-makers are assumed to be in need of substantial knowledge and information (1992:12-13). But the governments in the ASEAN countries were not capable of dealing with the increasing complexity of international relations due to limited research and policy analysis abilities (Katsumata 2007 [interview]). Thus, financial and human resource constraints in ASEAN countries expanded the roles of Track 2 actors. Although, the objective of the meetings was not limited to only discuss such topics. Carolina Hernandez, also a founding member, notes that: "*initiating policy*

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[20] Later, ASEAN-ISIS has included the Brunei Darussalam Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (BDIPSS); Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP); Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA) Laos; and the Institute for International Relations (IIR) Vietnam.

dialogues with each other, with ASEAN partners and other states in the region through non-official channels, these dialogues were important steps towards reducing tensions and building confidence in the region" (quoted in Caballero-Anthony 2005:161). In other words, the founders of ASEAN-ISIS also sought to shape and influence regional policy in order to contribute to regional peace and stability through Track 2 diplomacy. Most ASEAN-ISIS papers are between 10 and 20 pages (the Memorandums are only 2 pages), which emphasizes that their analysis may be applied quite immediately and practically. This policy-oriented output differentiates Track 2 from academic seminars and conferences that have a more theoretical framework (Noor 2007 [interview]).

On the other hand, ASEAN-ISIS was created for more practical reasons. As there were few individuals engaged in regional studies, ASEAN-ISIS was important to maximize the availability of scholars in the region. The stated purpose is to encourage regional cooperation and coordination of strategic and international research among policy-oriented ASEAN scholars and analysts, and to contribute to intensified communication and cooperation between ASEAN members by promoting knowledge and understanding of problems and issues affecting the region (see the Statutes of ASEAN-ISIS).

4.2.3 The role of ASEAN-ISIS: Authoritative interpretation of knowledge

Following its formal establishment in 1988, experts operating within the framework of the ASEAN-ISIS network emerged as important actors in shaping decision-makers by providing *authoritative interpretation* about the uncertainty of regional peace and stability and alternative courses of action for their respective governments. It was not given that Track 2 should become so essential in security policymaking and diplomacy in a region where most governments have been sceptical about sharing policymaking with organizations outside government. But because of the context that followed the end of the Cold War, decision-makers turned to a group of experts that were recognized as authoritative within the particular field

of concern. Arguably, ASEAN-ISIS made some significant impacts on the security affairs in Southeast Asia. Some of these impacts are intangible and therefore not easily quantifiable. But, with reference to the dimensions in 2.5, its influence can be discussed to the extent it could:

- Produce new ideas and solutions and be a useful source of advice
- Provide an alternative route when deliberations have become deadlocked
- Have a socializing function
- Build lasting institutions

First, the Track 2 process can produce innovative *new ideas and solutions* that are difficult to achieve through the bureaucracy. Track 2 can thus serve as a useful source of advice to governments by providing studies on issues that officials neither have the time nor the resources to address in order to develop a substantial base of expertise. In this regard, Track 2 diplomacy can act as a useful mechanism for capacity-building, as seen for example in its suggestion on reform and strengthening of ASEAN (Memorandum 1991; Memorandum 2006). On the basis of their authoritative body of knowledge, Track 2 activities have been recognized as being a testing ground for the acceptability of new or different ideas. Often these ideas or issues in question are too sensitive to be raised in official meetings. The ASEAN Way has emphasized low-profile exchanges and negotiations, especially on sensitive issues. ASEAN-ISIS and other Track 2 channels have provided governments with the cover under which such negotiations can take place. Without the formal constraints, Track 2 participants can discuss issues and policy options in a more exploratory manner and greater frankness than is possible for officials in their capacity as officials. To this end, ASEAN-ISIS has played an intellectual leadership role in ASEAN security issues. There is also a matter of funding, as Track 2 lives off its ability to bring new ideas into the policy process. But this brings up the question to what extent ideas arising in Track 2 are adopted and used by Track 1. Does Track 2 play an independent role, or does it just constitute a source of encouragement and reinforcement for Track 1 efforts. This relationship will be further analyzed in this study.

Related is the *alternative* route of communication Track 2 diplomacy can provide when progress at Track 1 diplomacy level becomes deadlocked. A good example is how the Indonesian-sponsored South China Sea Workshops provided a forum where disputing states could meet and discuss the potential for cooperation in areas such as environmental protection, search rescue at sea, and claims over the Spratly and other islands.[21] According to one of the initiators of the SCSW, at the start of the initiative contact between some of the regional governments was almost non-existent (Ball et al. 2006b:11). Track 2 processes can have the advantage of opening doors for officials in areas where they would otherwise be blocked. For this reason the choice between different tracks can be a matter of political convenience for governments. Track 2 is used to complement where Track 1 is inadequate, especially when dealing with sensitive issues. In this way, ASEAN-ISIS has provided the means for the socialization of multilateral security cooperation behaviour.

Thus it will be argued that Track 2 activities can performed *a socializing* function. Track 2 meetings are the venue where personal relationships between participants develop. More significantly, Track 2 meetings allows for socialization of the idea of regional cooperation through dialogue. Through networking and building personal relations, cooperative habits are learned and help promote international cooperation. At a basic level, adversaries have the opportunity to meet face-to-face and get to know each other. Track 2 diplomacy thus serves as a trust building mechanism. This psychological factor should not be underestimated and represent an untapped source for students of IR.[22] Track 2 diplomacy is in many ways a function of social psychology, in terms of human relationships and changes in perception of each other. This is of great importance in a region where personal bonds underlie positive relations between governments as well as provide the basis for intellectual and policy exchanges (Kraft 2000a:346).

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[21] For an examination of the SCSW Track 2 dialogue, see Tom Næss (1999), Xavier Furtado (1999). For background and analysis on the SCS disputes, see Kivimäki (eds.) (2002).

[22] For a study on the psychodynamics of IR, see Volkan (1991).

Fourth, an indication of Track 2 influence is the institutionalization of ideas and policy recommendations in government policies and the creation of permanent institutions. ASEAN-ISIS has been recognized as a significant player in the formation of the ARF and the CSCAP. This institution-building function will be explored in Chapter 6.

4.2.4 Forums

An important feature of ASEAN-ISIS activities since its inception has been its organization of various international conferences. They have evolved to become significant venues for security experts, scholars and officials in the region to share information, analyze issues of common concerns, and generate policy recommendations. This kind of Track 2 activity offers the opportunity for networking. Strong personal contacts are developed and socialization of the idea of regional cooperation through dialogue is allowed. Through networking and personal relations, cooperative habits are learned and help promote international cooperation. According to Caballero-Anthony this "*kind of socialization provided by track 2 diplomacy is part of ASEAN′s mechanisms of conflict management*" (2005:165). ASEAN-ISIS organizes three "flagship" activities: the Asia Pacific Roundtable (APR) for Confidence Building and Conflict Resolution, the ASEAN-ISIS Colloquium on Human Rights (AICOHR), and the ASEAN People's Assembly (APA). It is at the APR meetings that most of the ideas on security cooperation have been tested and launched.

The APR started in 1987 and has now become the largest regular security dialogue channel in the region, with over 250 scholars, diplomats, military officers, journalists, and senior government officials acting in their private capacity gathering in Kuala Lumpur each year. It was initially organized by ISIS Malaysia, but has been organized by ASEAN-ISIS since 1993. The forum provides the opportunity for developing policies on sensitive issues and, to the extent it is possible, be a part of the regional decision-making process by generating policy recommendations and forward

them to governments. For officials, ideas can be tested and reformulated after responses from other participants. From her own experience, Caballero-Anthony (2005:163) also notes that the APR seeks to include many voices by inviting all network members to suggest topics and issues for forthcoming conferences. A committee then consults each other and decides on the final format, content and who to invite.

Since 2000, ASEAN-ISIS has also hosted the ASEAN People′s Assembly, an event that brings together a large number of NGO leaders and representatives of grassroots organizations and civil society movements throughout SEA, and a small number of senior officials.[23] But the development of Track 3 activities is limited in the region (see 5.7.3). Grassroots participation is not a common feature of Asian security policymaking. Though, ASEAN-ISIS is currently trying to involve civil societies more with ASEAN through the APA. In the Annex for ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action, the role of APA in ASEAN community-building is encouraged.

AICOHR is the third dialogue activity that has defined the ASEAN-ISIS network over the past decade, indicating the commitment to human rights promotion. In this context, AICOHR is a testimony to the role played by ASEAN-ISIS in identifying issues of policy concern to ASEAN and its member-states. It also shows how ASEAN-ISIS went beyond the traditional considerations of inter- and intrastate conflict, arms race, and security cooperation, and given greater attention to non-traditional security issues. AICOHR has provided a forum for discussing an issue that was considered too sensitive for Track 1 in an open and candid manner without having to worry about political repercussions.[24]

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[23] For more on APA, see Caballero-Anthony (2004).

[24] For more on AICOHR, see Kraft (2006).

4.2.5 Processes of Communication

ASEAN-ISIS has submitted policy recommendations in the form of Memorandums to ASEAN officials and their respective governments. Important to this study is the first ASEAN-ISIS Memorandum, entitled *"A Time for Initiative"*, produced at the ASEAN-ISIS meeting in Jakarta 1991. In the Memorandum, the participants of ASEAN-ISIS put forward their proposals for an ASEAN initiative concerning security in the region. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, ASEAN-ISIS' contribution to the development of multilateral security cooperation will be analyzed through its role in establishing the ARF.

Apart from the Memorandums, there are very few formal channels between officials and non-officials. In the first years of ASEAN-ISIS, the network did not have any institutional relationship with the ASEAN. Members of ASEAN-ISIS networked with their government-officials in order to transmit information and advice on relevant policy issues affecting the region. It was not until 1992 that a formal institutional relationship was forged with the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (ASEAN SOM). Once a year, prior to the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), the heads of ASEAN-ISIS meet with this group of ASEAN officials. In 1999 these linkages was further developed when ASAN-ISIS started to have formal meetings with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers. Even though ASEAN officials recognize the contribution from experts by formalizing this link of communication, the few official channels illustrates that the communication between officials and academics is limited to informal interaction.

It is important to note that close informal links between Track 1 and Track 2 exist. These links are maintained by conferences, workshops and seminars, but most importantly through informal personal relationships. Established personal relationships with top government officials are critical in regional policy circles and are based on trust built up over decades. These relations are often established during informal occasions, such as over dinner, during breakfast and lunch meetings, or on the golf course (Tan 2007 [interview]). In addition, some "academic" members have

a number of "hats". Many individuals in Track 2 processes have served in government itself or as government advisers (Emmerson 2004:548). One example of this "revolving door" is former ambassador Wiryono, a retired official now serving as senior researcher at CSIS. Some ASEAN-ISIS members have also gone on to serve as ministers or senior officials.[25]

4.3 The Track 1-Track 2 symbiosis

The partnership between ASEAN and ASEAN-ISIS approximates the ideal model of a relationship of complementarities between Track 1 and Track 2. Informal personal relationship provides access to privileged information and position from which experts can directly influence official policy. The researchers and government officials know each other well and can share friendly dialogue. Through such channels, inputs are sent to governments. These informal but close links are very important for an understanding of the significance of the ASEAN-ISIS activities. But the close link can affect the potential for critical thinking and, consequently, the quality of analysis and discussion. Identified as the "primary Track 2 agent of Southeast Asia" (Job 2002:258), the dividing line between non-governmental and governmental is thin to non-existent in several of the participating institutes. Yet the situation differs among the countries. Particularly the newest members of ASEAN-ISIS, which represent the newest member countries of ASEAN as well, are based within governmental ministries and led by government officials. This creates an impression that Track 2 largely represents the views of foreign policy bureaucrats. The founding members of ASEAN-ISIS are relatively autonomous from their respective governments, as they have no official links with the ministries, political parties or other government bodies. They are financially independent and do not receive any instructions. Or so they claim (see their respective websites). However, in

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[25] For example, Mari Pangestu was Executive Director of CSIS Indonesia before she became Minister of Trade. Sukhumband Paribarta, former Director of ISIS Thailand, became deputy foreign minister.

reality, their autonomy can be questioned. Through a set of interviews with staff members from Track 2 institutions in Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, I was presented with arguments of a relatively high degree of autonomy. On the other hand, they admitted some kind of self-censorship by not criticizing their respective governments. That kind of behaviour was in fact seen as irrational if Track 2 activities should continue to be relevant (Kwa 2007 [interview]). Because they need the funding and the channel of influence, they do not see the point in jeopardizing this relationship. Most Track 2 institutions balance the dilemma between a desire for independence from government against the need for government financial resources and interest in influencing government policies.

4.4 Malaysian participation in Track 2 activities

The large and well organized Institute for Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) is officially an autonomous organization engaged in independent policy research and fostering dialogue and debate between the public sector, the private sector, and academia. ISIS often takes a leading role in ASEAN-ISIS activities.[26] It organizes the APR and the CSCAP Steering Committee and is home to Malaysia's CSCAP. Its objectives are to promote discussions on important national and international issues through organization of conferences, seminars, and dissemination of research findings and policy recommendations. It also seeks to provide a forum for individuals, experts, and intellectuals of various fields for the exchange of views, opinions, and research in a free and conducive atmosphere. However, its close relations with the government are well acknowledged and the government provides most of its funding (S. Khoo 2004:181). The government also appoints its Chairman. Malaysia is characterized by a relatively authoritarian state playing a dominant role, which makes it difficult for the policy community to be completely autonomous or

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[26] Su-ming Khoo (2004) discusses other research institutes and think tanks in Malaysia, but ISIS is the only research institution involved in Track 2 diplomacy.

independent. The interaction between state and non-state actors indicates how blurring the distinction between the political and academic world has become the modus operandi in Malaysia through networking, informal linkages and sharing of views (Camroux 1994:432). On the other hand, ISIS Malaysia is registered as a non-profit private company, regulated by the Companies Act. This confers greater independence than NGOs that are regulated by the more restrictive Societies Act (S. Khoo 2004).

4.5 Singaporean participation in Track 2 activities

The Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) is a non-profit, non-governmental organization dedicated to the research, analysis and discussion of regional and international issues, and a member of the ASEAN-ISIS network. It also located the Singaporean CSCAP, but in 1995 Singapore′s CSCAP moved to the governmental affiliated Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (IDSS), a move clearly limiting independent policy recommendations. SIIA is financially independent of the government and relies on various foundations to fund its activities. Its activities are also partly funded by member contingencies as it has more than 200 individual members. Despite its small staff of full-time researchers, SIIA is a leading institution for policy relevant research that is utilized for policy and public advocacy and dialogue to forge closer partnership between countries. SIIA communicate regularly with governments and policymakers to offer policy recommendations and advice, in which Southeast Asian peace and development is a current focus of policy research. It also seeks to bring people together, and organize regional and international workshops and conferences to seek new ideas and thoughts. SIIA promotes a sense of ASEAN identity through education programs on the history, geography and culture of SEA in order for students to better identify themselves with the region.

The IDSS, now a centre within the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), is actively working to increase Singapore participation in the CSCAP network, in order to promote security cooperation in the region. Together with the

Institute of Southeast Asia Studies (ISEAS), IDSS have also developed a strong reputation as Track 2 players, even though they are not formal members of ASEAN-ISIS. But both ISEAS and IDSS have begun to issue more policy recommendations on wider questions of regionalism and ASEAN (Tay 2006:138). Consequently, they have been recognized as important contributors to security dialogue in the region, they participate at the same conferences and workshops as ASEAN-ISIS, and there are overlaps in the key people participating in the networks (Kraft 2000a:345, 2000b:6).

4.6 Indonesian participation in Track 2 activities

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta is the largest institution among the ASEAN-ISIS members and has evolved from having a close relationship to government to being an autonomous institution. This change will be elaborated in 5.7.1. CSIS is financially independent of its government and is a non-profit organization focusing on policy oriented studies on domestic and international issues. Its mission is to contribute to improved policymaking through policy-oriented research channelled in various forms as independent input to government, universities, research institutes, media, business, and civil society organizations. CSIS also has an extensive publication program, like "The Indonesian Quarterly" (English-language journal) and "Analisis CSIS" (Bahasa Indonesia journal). Throughout the years, CSIS has actively developed a more international orientation, providing an opportunity for dialogue and cooperation in research with individuals in parallel institutions, as well as for providing input to Indonesian foreign policy development. In the wider Asia-Pacific region, CSIS is actively involved with regional and international networks of non-governmental Track 2 institutions that interact with intergovernmental activities. This includes hosting the Indonesian National Member Committee for CSCAP and the Secretariat for the ASEAN-ISIS. Through its active participation in Track 2 activities, CSIS takes part in efforts to promote regional cooperation (ASEAN) and intra-regional cooperation

(ASEM). CSIS determines Indonesian CSCAP membership and draws them from the Foreign and Defense Ministries, other think tanks, and the University of Indonesia. According to Simon (2002:186) these network members have known and worked with each other over an extended period of time, and form a core of strategic studies specialists that probably make them share some common understandings, but at the same time may limit innovative thought. Experts affiliated with CSIS have also been involved in the Aceh Peace Negotiations. Wiryono Sastrohandojo, a senior researcher at CSIS, was Indonesia′s chief negotiator prior to Martti Ahtisaari. Wiryono is also a former Indonesian ambassador to Australia. This illustrates the close link between government and experts.

4.7 Core people in the network

Despite an attitude of inclusiveness towards membership and participation, the number of individuals involved in dialogue activities from one state remains small. One reason for the very formation of ASEAN-ISIS was because there were few individuals engaged in regional studies. Most of those involved in regional dialogues belong to a professional elite of one form or another, particularly the Heads of the respective institutes (Lee 2007 [interview]). According to one observer, ASEAN-ISIS has "*built upon the energy of a small group of key players, sometimes as small as five or six and sometimes much larger*" (Evans 2006:103). The core group appear to combine friendship with common political cause and a collective agenda. ASEAN-ISIS developed around a number of leaders, mentioned in 4.2.1, and developed friendship and network among themselves and with officials. But of the five founding leaders of ASEAN-ISIS, only Jusuf Wanandi and Carolina Hernandez remain active today. But the leadership of the ASEAN-ISIS has been shifting to a newer generation, but this transition poses a serious challenge to ASEAN-ISIS because the new generation needs to develop their own personal networks with each other and with government officials. Nevertheless, apart from the Heads of the respective institutes it is a difficult task to identify a core group of Track 2 actors. Katsumata estimated a

core of about 20 key members (2007 [interview]). Based on interviews with Track 2 participants, participation lists from Track 2 meetings, and personal correspondence with Timo Kivimäki (personal correspondence: October 12 2006), I would argue that the core group include the two still active founding members above in addition to a second generation of intellectual leaders. In CSIS, the leadership of Hadi Soesastro as executive director, Rizal Sukma as his deputy director, and S. Wiryono as senior researcher and member of the board have been well established. And Clara Joewono is in charge of the ASEAN-ISIS secretariat and holds the network together. In Malaysia Mohamed Jawhar Hassan has succeeded Nordin Sopiee as Chairman and CEO, with Stephen Leong as assistant-director. In Singapore, Hank Lim (Director), Simon Tay (Chairman), and Yeo Lay Hwee (Senior Research Fellow) have succeeded Lau Teik Soon after his retirement from SIIA. Also former director of SIIA, Lee Lai To, still plays a significant role in Track 2 activities. Other key members in Singapore are Tan See Seng, Mely Caballero-Anthony, and Kwa Chong Guan.[27] Note that I have only included individuals from research institutions in Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, the three key countries I focus on in this study. A more complete study would include members from other countries, for example Noel Morada and Herman Kraft of ISDS Philippines and Suchit Bunbonkarn from ISIS Thailand. However, my data do not support a suggestion that goes beyond the three key countries.

Selection of the participants for Track 2 activities depend on the issue in question. Still, it is more or less the same people participating and Track 2 diplomacy is in danger of representing the "usual suspects". Track 2 is based on informal personal contact and ties, but these relations can be hard to untie. Unless new experts are allowed into the process, intellectual input to official policy could reflect old political realities rather than be a source of innovative thinking. But a third generation of Track 2 actors are emerging with Elina Noor and Sharihman Lockman in

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[27] Some of these key members are presented in 3.2.1.

Malaysia, Syafiah Fifi Muhibat and Alexandra Wulan in Indonesia, and Joanne Lin, Christopher Roberts, and Hiro Katsumata in Singapore (see 3.2.1).

4.8 Conclusion – A regional policy network

This chapter has attempted to trace and describe the origin and features of the Track 2 processes of ASEAN-ISIS. SEA′s informal networking is mostly arranged within the framework of ASEAN-ISIS, which in this way has contributed to the integration of experts in the policy-making process and the diffusion of a body of knowledge, norms and ideas. Through the network of ASEAN-ISIS, senior experts established close links to decision-makers and each other. The Track 2 processes approximate epistemic communities in the sense that they provide advice and expertise to governments that are limited in their capacities to deal with increasingly complex and diverse security issues. This *uncertainty* paved the way for the significance of non-state expert groups like ASEAN-ISIS. The close link between Track 1 and Track 2 illustrates the important function of epistemic communities as providers *of authoritative interpretation of knowledge* and advice. The link has been *institutionalized* in the meetings between the Heads of ASEAN-ISIS and the ASEAN Senior Officials prior to the AMM since 1993 and the formal meetings with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers since 1999. But in a region that highlights personal relationships, the communication link between Track 1 and Track 2 is based on informal personal contacts.

5. The Security Epistemic Community

5.1 Drawing Linkages

States that belong to a security community come to see their security as fundamentally linked to other states and bound by common norms, principles and expectations that facilitates cooperation. A habit of war avoidance found in security communities result from interactions, socialization, norm setting and identity building. These are processes that can be influenced by a security epistemic community. When government officials get together after they have turned to a security epistemic community for advice, the officials will find out that they share some similar ideas because they have gotten the same recommendations. This chapter will discuss (**H1**), which claims that it is plausible to analyze ASEAN-ISIS as a transnational epistemic community of security experts. In the analysis I will assess Haas' (1992:16-19) four criteria presented in Chapter 2 that distinguish epistemic communities from various other groups: (1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs; (2) shared causal beliefs; (3) shared notions of validity; and (4) a common policy enterprise. Whether experts have formed an epistemic community, or if they are just representatives of their respective states with no other agenda than the national interest will be examined. Its relationship with Track 1 will therefore be further discussed.

When recapitulating Peter Haas′ definition, epistemic communities are described as "*a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area*" (ibid.:3). Haas concentrated on a transnational network of experts which can offer special knowledge in a given issue area to governments. In the previous chapter we discovered that the Track 2 network is transnational, consisting of researchers from ASEAN-ISIS institutes. All ASEAN states but Burma have an ASEAN-ISIS member institute. Thus they have been able to integrate

policies and expertise across borders. The Track 2 network is an epistemic community to the extent it has "*an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge*" based on Haas′ four conceptual characteristics mentioned above. The concept indicates the existence of a consensus *within* a defined group, which means that there is also someone *outside* this consensus who draws different conclusions with different policy implications. As discussed in Chapter 2, Haas' definition and corollaries are criticized for being vague and can be interpreted in various ways. It demands a vast amount of data on the expert network, the experts themselves, and their link to officials in order to identify an epistemic community. As a result, the task of finding out whether the Track 2 network fits Haas′ definition is difficult, even though Sheldon Simon (2002:170) claims it fits perfectly. Various experts also argue that we can identify ASEAN-ISIS as an epistemic community (Rüland 2002, Simon 2002, Caballero-Anthony 2005, Hernandez 2006), but they do so without really assessing Haas′ propositions. But the policy network identified in Chapter 4 consists of a *network* of academics, researchers, and other *professionals* outside government, as well as officials in their private capacities. That is implied in the very definition of Track 2.[28] The Track 2 diplomacy also function as a channel *"through which new ideas circulate from society to government as well as from country to country"* (Haas 1992:27).

5.2 Shared set of normative and principled beliefs

In a constructivist study of Track 2, a reasonable starting point is to identify the norms and principles which have been shared by the participants of the Track 2 process. Norms play a crucial role in the socialization process leading to peaceful conduct among states, which form the core of security communities. For the identification of a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, this study has taken three approaches. First, norms have been inferred from Track 2 documents which the

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[28] See the entry on Track 2 in David Capie and Paul Evans (2007): "The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon".

participants have agreed on. In particular, the memorandum "A Time for Initiative" (1991) is a very important documentary source, together with the ASEAN-ISIS Statutes, and the respective institution's visions stated on their websites. Second, I have made an attempt to identify norms and ideas through interviews.[29] Finally, the primary data is backed up by existing literature on Track 2 in the region. This method is also used on the other three criteria.

5.2.1 Multilateral cooperative security

On the basis of these three approaches, a norm of *multilateral cooperative security* to escape the security dilemma may be identified. According to Gareth Evans, cooperative security refers to a broad approach to security *"which is multi-dimensional in scope (…); emphasizes reassurance rather than deterrence; is inclusive rather than exclusive; is not restrictive in membership; favors multilateralism over bilateralism; does not privilege military solutions over non-military ones; assumes that the states are the principal actors in the security system, but accepts that non-state actors may have an important role to play; does not require the creation of formal institutions, does not reject them either; and which, above all stress the value of creating "habits of dialogue" on a multilateral basis"* (cited in Tan 2001:33). The norm of cooperative security has three main elements: First, it encourages the ASEAN governments to be concerned about the security of the whole region rather than that of an individual country. Regional security can only be mutually achieved through the cooperative achievements of ASEAN. This may be emphasized by the fact that all Track 2 institutions are concerned with regional security issues rather than domestic issues. According to Katsumata (2007 [interview]), this security thinking is fostered in the European CSCE process which inspired many participants at APR conferences in the late 1980s. Encouraged by the CSCE process in terms of easing tensions during the Cold War, track two actors began to engage themselves in the discourse of security cooperation in SEA (as we

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[29] See Chapter 3 for a presentation on the interviewees and a discussion on the data's validity.

discussed in the origin of ASEAN-ISIS). The 1991 ASEAN-ISIS Memorandum also highlights that the region must learn from the experience from other regions, but "*in the process of establishing the appropriate processes for regional political dialogue for cooperative peace and stability in our region, we should not be encumbered by unnecessary intellectual baggage, terminologies, preoccupations and fixed notions that are either inappropriate, irrelevant, or counter-productive*". The Track 2 actors wanted to develop their own model and not, according to one Track 2 participant, have the CSCE process "*pushed down their throat*" (Kwa 2007 [interview]).

This view is further emphasized in the second element of the norm as it calls for efforts to enhance regional security through dialogue and consultation, while rejecting rigid rules and rapid institutionalization. Dialogue seems to have a value in itself, regardless of the "success" or "effectiveness" of the Track 2 diplomacy. This informal approach is meant to enhance a sense of mutual trust among the ASEAN governments through reassurance, multilateralism, and a preference for non-military solutions, and is in contrast with the Western formal approach of multilateral negotiations. A process of interaction, socialization, and identity formation will enable states to adhere to peaceful conflict management. This argument can be backed up by Caballero-Anthony who notes that despite their differences, Track 2 actors share a commitment to promote multilateral security dialogue (2007 [interview]).

Third, the norm emphasizes inclusivity, in terms of both participants and subject matter. States are accepted as the central actor, but non-state actors are recognized to have a critical role to play in managing and enhancing security. Just by being actively involved in Track 2 activities proves that Track 2 actors value non-state actor participation in the security dialogue (even though some question their influence), and recognize that states do not have monopoly on the security discourse. Related is the broadening of the security concept. Contrary to the mainstream security discourse driven by realist perspectives that tend to focus on "hard" security threats, members of the policy network have included a comprehensive security concept in

Track 2 activities.[30] This view was stressed by the Head of ISIS Malaysia, Mohamed Jawhar Hassan (2006), in a paper presented at the ARF's First Plenary Meeting of Experts and Eminent Persons. We find another example in the ASEAN-ISIS' fifth Memorandum (1993), in which we are told that comprehensive security is the means by which ASEAN is seeking to achieve its long-standing objective of creating a Southeast Asian order known as the ZOPFAN. Experts have initiated Track 2 initiatives on human rights, human trafficking, transnational crime, illegal immigration, drug trade, contagious diseases, pollution, and terrorism. The Dialogue and Research Monitor has documented an increase in number of Track 2 activities on comprehensive and human security (see footnote 1). Interestingly, and in contrast with Næss' study on epistemic communities in the South China Sea, Track 2 has been most active in forums of "high politics" (APR) compared to forums on "low politics" (APA, AICOHR). This may be explained by the proximity to government and the continued state-centric approach to security in the region.

All together it seems like the members of the Track 2 community share some normative and principled beliefs that inform their actions on the advancement of a multilateral regional security dialogue. Since the formation of ASEAN-ISIS in the 80's, the members have organized conferences and seminars, produced relevant policy recommendations, and publishes scientific articles, for the advancement of better management of the region. The Track 2 community has together pushed for a framework for multilateral security dialogue based on ASEAN, something that may witness of a normative consensus. During my interviews, I was unable to identify motivations and incentives for their involvement in developing policy-relevant recommendations, apart from their personal wish to be able to influence for the betterment of the region. Examining why experts are involved in such processes is a suggestion for further studies.

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[30] See David B. Dewitt (1994), "Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security", Pacific Security.

5.3 Shared causal beliefs

It is perhaps not correct to apply Haas' term of "casual beliefs" in this context. It is more plausible to talk about a consensus with regard to their analysis of factors contributing to insecurity and instability in SEA. They need to identify the problem and agree on some cause-and-effect mechanisms which serve as a basis for clarifying the multiple linkages between possible policy action and desired outcome. According to Lee Lai To (Lee 2007 [interview]), this is "*the very beauty of Track 2*". Track 2 functions as test beds and brainstorming sessions for new ideas which help to balance the policy recommendations. In this way Track 2 meetings allow policy experts to develop a common understanding of problems by interacting and exchanging views in both formal and informal settings. When participants have learned to know each other's respective national standpoints, identified the commonalities, and acknowledged the differences, the Track 2 process has identified some common "causal beliefs" among its participators. This is not to say that there is complete analytical consensus and no variations among the members' motivations and strategies. Minor differences on causal explanations on regional peace and security are tolerated. But because you find the same conference-goers travelling to the same regional destinations year after year, it would be surprising if, in the course of this interaction, these people had not developed at least some shared language and key terms and an understanding of what the problem is.

In our case, the expert network knew in which direction one has to advance in order to enhance stability and secure peace in the region. And that is to let ASEAN "*play a central role in whatever processes and mechanisms arise*" (ASEAN-ISIS Memorandum 1991). The norm of cooperation addresses the fundamental question of what security is by underlining the notion of regional security that all countries have a share, and thus regulate state's behaviour by spelling out limits to their activities. The expert network suggested the promotion of two important ideas: the idea of establishing an inter-governmental forum for a multilateral security dialogue, and the idea of extending ASEAN's diplomatic style over a larger area. But this forum "*must*

not become a military or security pact" (1991 Memorandum) directed against specific enemies. In contrast, they seek to reduce the probability that power will be exercised to resolve conflicts through reassurance, multilateralism, and a preference for non-military solutions.

The 1991 Memorandum called for the establishment of an Asia-Pacific Political Dialogue (which later became the ARF), so including this notion in the memorandum shows that the Track 2 actors thought the SEA countries' informal approach to cooperation should be adopted as a model for promoting cooperation to a larger geographical area. This statement is backed by Rüland (2002:88) when he argues that the ASEAN-ISIS professionals have successfully lobbied Southeast Asian and other Asia-Pacific governments to consent to TAC as a regional Magna Charta for peaceful settlement of disputes, and thus ASEAN-ISIS Track 2 dialogues must be credited for keeping the region's post-Cold War uncertainties manageable.

5.4 Shared notions of validity

It is difficult to know whether there is a common notion of validity based on internally defined criteria for validating knowledge, meaning that they accept the methods used in their analysis on regional security. Nonetheless, the Track 2 members have the same professional backgrounds (political science, international relations, security studies etc.), and should understand the methods and models of their colleagues. Within one profession they belong to different theoretical strands with various ontological approaches, such as realists, liberalists, or constructivists. But decisions within ASEAN, including Track 2, are decided by consensus and lengthy consultations. This model has been criticized for being ineffective, but the model can still be taken into account for the adherents to validate knowledge based on social science methodology. The fact that the participants agree on a final report, a Memorandum, shows that they "*constantly evaluate what they have learned as professionals in what seemed to them to be the most rigorous way, and they were reluctant to urge policy actions on problems that had not been fully documented,*

even if the actions were consistent with their broader objectives" (Haas 1992b:189-190). The memorandums thus display a blend of lowest common denominator statements and some creative efforts to move beyond existing national positions.

5.5 Common policy enterprise

Do the security agenda of the policy community represent a common policy enterprise? And are voices excluded from the debate? In general, the same people participate every year, on the same conferences and seminars. This probably helps develop and strengthen a sense of community and a common policy enterprise among the participants, as they meet face-to-face regularly and get to know each other. As the members of the network begin to develop some common community norms, aggregate community views tend to take precedence over individual views. This strengthens the aggregate voice of the policy community, but it can also be a barrier to a free flow of ideas and exclude other voices. For example, one prominent Malaysian security expert has consequently been excluded from Malaysia's Track 2 activities, but has instead been invited to Singapore's Track 2 meetings (Simon 2002:185). The community cohesion seems affected by the elitist nature of Track 2 diplomacy. That the Track 2 network is elitist is well acknowledged among the members (Caballero-Anthony 2007 [interview]; Lin 2007 [interview]), and can prove it difficult for a "new generation" of experts to join the "usual suspects". But there is a move towards an opening for a new generation through special programs.[31]

Having a common policy enterprise means that the network agrees on which political steps one has to take. And the political steps the governments are advised to take are explicitly displayed in the Memorandums. Producing relevant policy recommendations distinguish Track 2 processes from more academic activities. Through my interviews, I was presented with an urge to make an influence. Their

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[31] See for example SIIA's Youth Education Programmes. In addition, many of the interviewees for this study belong to a "new generation" of scholars. See also section 4.7.

motivation was to contribute to a development for the betterment of the region. The policy recommendations reflect the community's common understanding of a problem and political steps to go about and solve them. Perhaps the most important political advice on regional security was submitted in the already mentioned 1991 Memorandum. It did not use the word "security" per se, but the proposal urged ASEAN to establish a forum for multilateral security dialogues and cooperation among ASEAN member states and beyond. Thus the community promoted the idea of establishing an inter-governmental forum for a multilateral security dialogue, and the idea of extending ASEAN's diplomatic style over a larger area, putting ASEAN in a central role. An analysis of ASEAN-ISIS role in the establishment of the ARF will be pursued in the next chapter.

5.6 Sense of community

Based on the above discussion, I will argue that the Track 2 network of ASEAN-ISIS share some important normative and principled beliefs, cause-and-effect understanding, notions of validity, and policy enterprise, and thus make up an epistemic community. It is therefore interesting to discuss if these commonalities represent some inter-subjective sense of community or "we-feeling" among the participants. Do they recognize being a part of an epistemic community? In the acknowledgements to her book "Regional Security in Southeast Asia" (2005), Caballero-Anthony gives her thanks to "*a community of scholars and experts*" on ASEAN, referring to other members of ASEAN-ISIS institutions which she later defines as an epistemic community (2005:159). Many interviewees also felt that they belonged to some kind of community, in the sense that they "spoke the same language" and used the same terms. Stephen Leong spoke of a "micro community" with a common ASEAN spirit (2007 [interview]). It is useful to reiterate a point made earlier. Experts meet frequently at conferences, workshops, and meetings. When they meet their counterparts from other states and institutions, and they share the language and understanding relevant to the issue-area, they can form stronger ties with their

international colleagues. Because the institutions these experts are affiliated with make up a network of research institutions, they themselves become a part of a network. It is hard to imagine that they have not developed a cognitive understanding of their role or a sense of community, as argued by Haas & Haas (2002). As one scholar has argued, Track 2 participants begin to identify themselves as part of a group that thinks differently than those outside the process (Dalia Dassa Kaye, cited in Ball et al. 2006b:12). In this way, they may develop a sense of community and identity.

It has been argued that if ASEAN is to form a security community it will need to change its state-centric "modus operandi". It must enable non-governmental actors to play a more prominent role in decision-making and take ownership in the community's development, thus engender a sense of common identity and "we-feeling" (Collins 2007). The Track 2 activities are important because they provide evidence for a "*movement beyond state-centric approaches to managing security*" (Caballero-Anthony 2005:262) and indicate a willingness amongst the governing elite to involve a network of professionals in policy formation. These are steps towards community-building and generating a regional identity among the peoples of SEA.

On the other hand, this sense of community among scholars can be contested. In a recent study by Christopher Roberts (2007 [interview]; Roberts 2007) he examined the existence of a sense of community and trust among the people and elites, including scholars, of ASEAN countries. The study showed a lack of trust among these groups. Theoretically, among members of a security community, war is unthinkable. Neither the publics, nor the political elites or the military, should expect war with each other (Jervis 2002:1). In this regard, a function of ASEAN-ISIS may well be to develop a shared strategic culture in which cooperative security can take root; build trust, confidence and reciprocity among member states; establish the norm of inclusiveness; and socialize states lacking significant historical experience in regional security cooperation. Informal forums thus serve as a platform for

socializing states and societies to the benefits and responsibilities of multilateralism. Vital is therefore the ability of the epistemic community as "agents" to bring with them the ideas and norms that are critical in shaping state policies towards a security community.

5.7 The Autonomy Dilemma

We have to go back to the Track 1 - Track 2 symbiosis discussed in Chapter 4 to see how these norms and ideas can find their way into concrete policies. Important in the epistemic community approach is the operations of the actors, rather than the "ideas" themselves. Ideas, Haas argues, "*would be sterile without carriers, who function more or less as cognitive baggage handlers as well as gatekeepers governing the entry of new ideas into institutions*" (Haas 1992:27). It is therefore necessary to specify how decision-makers relate to and are influenced by the actors that carry and advance the policy recommendations. There are only a few institutional links between Track 1 and Track 2, for example the annual ASEAN-SOM meeting between the Heads of ASEAN-ISIS and ASEAN officials prior to the AMM. Otherwise, in each country most interaction is informal and based on personal relationship and friendship between members of ASEAN-ISIS and government officials. These relationships are mostly maintained by conferences, seminars, lunch meetings and the like. ASEAN-ISIS is organized so that a few key persons make up the main link between Track 1 and Track 2 (see 4.7). It is mostly the Heads of the institutes, which means that they have large influence over the internal process within the network; they decide the focus of research, and what is communicated out. There are of course other key persons in the network, in which some participate more then others.

Track 2 has a unique access to the policy process through activities in which government officials also participates, compared to Track 3 or civil society organizations. It is essential that Track 2 is independent from official control, but at the same time it has been recognized that official involvement is necessary in order to

attract government resources and attention and not become mere "talk shops". In the words of Ball et al. (2006a:175), "*the prospects for implementation should count for as much as the intrinsic worth of any ideas generated in the second track process*". But even though the members of the community see the link to officials as critical for influence, Track 2 has been criticized for being too close to government. Many of the ASEAN-ISIS institutions are government institutions, controlled by their country's top leaders, or dependent on them for financial and political support. The success of Track 2 was made possible largely because of their linkages with governments in the region, and the dilemma of greater efficiency versus lower autonomy has opened to debate the continuing relevance of Track 2 diplomacy. As Kraft noted: "*the linkage between official and unofficial tracks provide the latter with access to privileged information and the position from which it could directly influence official policy. At the same time, it affects the potential of track two for critical thinking and, consequently, the quality of analysis and discussion. This problem is becoming more evident as the distinction between official and non-official tracks becomes increasingly blurred*" (2000a:346). Financial and political support can easily be withdrawn once these activities lose their utility or their goals are not perceived to be in compliance with government policies. The funding constraints make it difficult to maintain the Track 2 infrastructure and recruit younger scholars, resulting in a less dynamic Track 2 process. The autonomy dilemma thus questions whether the Track 2 activities have substantive and independent agendas for change, or whether they only represent and legitimize established government policy.

5.7.1 Regime types and the role of Track 2

The autonomy concern is particularly relevant for a region characterized by a wide variation of regime types. William Case (2004) classifies the Southeast Asian states ranging from formally democratic to semi-democratic to pseudo-democratic to authoritarian. Which country that falls in which category is not the issue here, the issue is that in recent years a change has emerged in ASEAN. Even though the quality can be questioned, the majority of ASEAN member states are developing

towards some type of democracy. The Philippines and Thailand are satisfying the procedural requirements of civil liberties and elections. After the drafting of the 1997 constitution, the elite democracy in Thailand changed in nature and gave place to a broader people-centred democracy. Indonesia, after the presidency of Suharto, has experienced perhaps the most dramatic change towards democratization. Singapore and Malaysia are the best examples of semi-democratic regimes, in which regular elections are held notwithstanding the dominance of their ruling parties. Opposition parties encounter restrictions on civil liberties, giving Singapore's ruling party PAP about 95 percent of the parliamentary seats. Vietnam, Laos and Brunei remain authoritarian without competing parties and a close watch over non-governmental organizations. As the ASEAN states differ concerning regime type, we should examine if there is something about the institutional frameworks that affects the potential influence of Track 2. The conventional hypothesis would lead us to expect that open, transparent and competitive political systems offer favourable conditions for the success of Track 2 diplomacy and vice-versa. The empirical findings in this case suggest that this view must be modified to some extent. The paradox is that Indonesia, which traditionally has been more authoritarian than Malaysia, seems to have a more dynamic and well-functioning mobilization of Track 2 activities.[32] Experts are competing for useful ideas and the configuration of Track 2 groups is dynamic. Especially in the past decade, CSIS in Jakarta has evolved from having a close relationship to government to being an autonomous institution (Sukma 2006:100). This change towards increased autonomy for CSIS took place after the Asian financial crisis in 1998 which resulted in the fall of Suharto. CSIS proved its autonomy in 1998 when Jusuf Wanandi threatened to close down CSIS when he felt that political support from the institute diminished after the financial crisis (see footnote 16 in Kraft 2000:347). If the research institute were to continue, it was supposed to do so on it's on terms. A change in regime then resulted in a change in the Track 1 – Track 2 relationship.

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[32] Thanks to Timo Kivimäki for making me aware of this paradox. Personal correspondence: October 12 2006.

In Malaysia, ISIS is officially an autonomous organization, but it's very close relation with the government is well acknowledged.[33] The government provides the majority of the funding, and the staff consists of government employees. For example, the heads of the Prime Minister′s department and the Finance Ministry have been chairmen of major think tanks in Malaysia, including ISIS. Founder and former director of Malaysia ISIS, the late Noordin Sopiee, had a very close relationship with former Prime Minister Mahatir Mohamad. Mohamad Jawhar Hassan and Stephen Leong have today replaced his role in the Malaysian policy elite, but much of the same people have participated from the very beginning. It seems like the Track 2 agents in Indonesia have managed to utilize the authoritarian system in a fruitful way, while Malaysian intellectuals have not been as successful in doing that, despite the fact that until 1999 their structural setting was more conducive to Track 2 than that of Indonesia.[34]

In the more authoritarian state of Singapore, SIIA is involved in ASEAN-ISIS, while IDSS/RSIS is Singapore's CSCAP member. According to Katsumata (2007 [interview]), both institutes have an equal opportunity to influence policy even though IDSS is the only one receiving government funding through its location at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. One reason for this is that researchers at the two institutions belong to the same epistemic community. The potential of influence in Singaporean policy has traditionally been low to non-existent for non-state actors and civil society. Thus Track 2 provides a rare opportunity for non-state actors to provide inputs to government policy. However, even though experts like Tan See Seng (2007 [interview]) feel they have some influence on policymaking, in the end their influence depends on the political agenda of the government. Kwa Chong Guan (2007 [interview]) readily admits that Track 2 deliberations, with their emphasis on cooperative security, are not given high

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[33] See David Camroux (1994) for an examination of the context in which a Malaysian policy community operates.

[34] After the elections in 1999, Mahathir resolutely moved the political development away from democracy, arresting dissidents and clamping down on the press (Case 2002: 146).

priority by the Singaporean government. But this clearly increases the importance of a close and personal relationship with officials.

Using political regime types as analytical categories can explain some differences in Track 2 influence among the ASEAN countries. Track 2 depends on some openness among governments. Yet these governments are not so open that all Track 2 actors have the same degree of influence, at the same time, most ASEAN governments are not so closed that all views are proscribed. Most ASEAN-ISIS institutions are relatively autonomous from their respective governments as they have no official links, are financially independent, and do not receive any instructions from the governments. However, the situation differs among the countries. The interviewees often claimed full autonomy in their own work, and less autonomy at other ASEAN-ISIS institutions.

5.7.2 "Old" and "new" members

These differences aside, there is a common agreement that the five founding members of ASEAN-ISIS are stronger and more autonomous than the newest member institutions, which are more-or-less considered government research-branches. A two-tier ASEAN, between new and old members, is reflecting itself in ASEAN-ISIS as well. The enlargement of ASEAN-ISIS in the second half of the 1990s coincided with the enlargement of ASEAN. The Vietnamese IIR, the Cambodian CICP, the Laotian IFA, and BDIPSS from Brunei, all became members of the ASEAN-ISIS. The relationship between government and the role of Track 2 is especially highlighted in the case of Burma. ASEAN-ISIS has yet to include a member from Burma because the lack of a think tank with a respectable degree of both independence and interaction with officials to serve a Track 2 function. The Myanmar MISIS has applied for formal membership, but so far it has only been given an observer status because of insufficient independence from government. What then are the implications of the new members being less autonomous than the old members? The original ASEAN-ISIS institutions have been able to be aware of the

policies and positions of their respective governments and yet not confined to blindly follow such policies and positions (Tay 2006:131-132). Despite facing an autonomy dilemma, these institutions have not suffered direct government supervision. The newer members do not enjoy the same degrees of separation and formal independence. For example, the IIR in Hanoi is part of the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and their staff is often cross-posted to other official positions. The same is the case of the Laotian IFA and BDIPSS in Brunei. This may lead us to ask why ASEAN-ISIS didn't find alternative partners. Perhaps was such an option not feasible given the socialist nature of regime in Laos and Vietnam and the centralization of governance and expertise in Brunei.

One consequence of the enlargement is that the newest members of ASEAN-ISIS are not included into our analysis of an epistemic community because they are too cautious in departing from official positions and policies, and thereby do not share the common understanding and policy enterprise as the other members. So when we talk about a Track 2 epistemic community we only have the original members in mind. If not, the memorandums and agreed documents would display a lowest common denominator that makes it more difficult to advance a (critical) common voice and merely mirror official circles. For example, a statement drafted by some members of ASEAN-ISIS and was critical of the coup in Cambodia was never released (Kraft 2000a:347). Some members of ASEAN-ISIS opposed its content, arguing that it violated the principle of non-interference. It was never formally issued as an ASEAN-ISIS statement, but it still made its way onto the desks of some ASEAN foreign ministers. On the other side, Track 2 diplomacy can arguably be part of a larger process aimed at transforming threat perceptions through trust and community building. One of ASEAN-ISIS' most significant contributions in community building has been its role in the informal socialization of the "new" members of ASEAN. The informal dialogues are well positioned to ease this transition and can offer friendly advice to the policy elites and intellectual leaders of the "new" members. Because some research institutions are closely allied to the state, by "socializing" the Track 2 representatives and make them better understand the

positions of other ASEAN countries, they will feel less threatened and bring their perceptions to official circles. The new members are presented for new ideas and are victim of a socializing and policy learning process. According to Morrison (2004:554), we can suspect "*that official participation in Track 2 and mixed Track 1/Track 2 procedures, particularly in the case of the newer ASEAN members and the transnational economies, has helped attune them to a more informal style of interaction and exploration of ideas*". In doing so, the exposure to international and regional norms that occurs in the Track 2 process may exert a positive influence in shaping the foreign policy orientation of the country the participants represent. Thus, the key to engage more authoritative countries lies in a basic shift in security thinking that makes cooperative arrangements acceptable and attractive.

It remains an open question whether democratization within some ASEAN member states will allow an increase of Track 2 activities, but this can also end the role of ASEAN-ISIS and Track 2 as we know it. The recent development towards democracy in the region creates new pressure on the role of ASEAN-ISIS. A process of democratization would increase the number of sources of policy inputs into ASEAN governments, and challenge the "monopoly" of the epistemic community. Perhaps is the elitist-based Track 2 community dependent upon semi-democratic conditions. In an authoritarian regime, Track 2 would completely loose its autonomy, as in Burma and to some extent Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Brunei. In a fully democratic regime, the special role of Track 2 may scatter. The favourable condition for Track 2 is then in the intersection between authoritarianism and democracy, which characterize the majority of ASEAN states. Perhaps are more authoritarian regimes "better" for T2 influence? In his study on the effects of regime type on economic growth, Carl Henrik Knutsen (2006) found that democracies performed better on average, but that Singapore and other authoritarian Asian countries were extreme success cases. Sometimes authoritarian regimes do well. Again we can ask if there is something special about Asia.

5.7.3 Relationship with Track 3 (civil society)

It has been argued that the Asian version of Track 2 diplomacy deviates from the western connotations of the concept (see 1.4). In the western sense of the concept, Track 2 relies stronger on the mediatory roles of NGOs and other elements of civil society. For example, in a recent study Ole Jacob Sending (2003) tried to supplement the epistemic community approach by liberating the analysis from one set of actors and trace the role of knowledge in relation to different forms of political agency. This does not seem to explain the ASEAN case. Unfortunately, Track 2 in SEA still tends to be elitist. Track 2 is the constituency of an elitist group seeking to directly engage and inform policymakers on issues concerning states. The involvement of civil society, or Track 3, in the policy process is on the other hand largely indirect. Track 3 refers to the activities of civil society organizations. Track 3 can also, like epistemic communities, function as transnational networks that are organized across national borders to promote causes, principled ideas, and norms. But the label "Track 3" is misguided in the way that most of these groups have only an indirect link to the policy process. The term suggests a natural link with Track 1 and Track 2, but the relationship between them is more complex than the terminology implies. Their participation in regional security dialogues has often been strongly opposed by non-democratic regimes because their discussions are deemed critical and oppositional to mainstream government policy, instead of complementary. There are few civil society groups outside Track 2 involved in security discourse. This deficiency of expertise on security matters limits the credibility of Track 3 meetings in policy circles. Some therefore argue that civil society groups do not have the essential authoritative claim to knowledge as epistemic communities and thus act mainly as megaphones for scientists.[35] ASEAN-ISIS has called for engagement with Track 3 because community-building in ASEAN must include all sectors of society, and that ASEAN must be made relevant to the ordinary citizen of each member state. In the

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[35] See the debate between Dave Toke (1999) and Claire Dunlop (2000) in *Politics* on the relationship between epistemic communities and social movements.

1991 Memorandum, ASEAN-ISIS deemed this necessary "because ASEAN should be a people's process" and that the widest possible participation of all sectors should be ensured. This is yet to happen even though the ASEAN People's Assembly (APA) has been established. A Track 2 – Track 3 collaboration could solve some of the above problems and bring their respective strengths into the same forum. Track 3 could provide Track 2 with more independent and creative thinking, while Track 2 would provide the infrastructure needed to shape the debate. The fact that Track 3 meetings are tolerated despite their critical stance emphasizes the increasing democratization in the region after the 1997 financial crisis.

5.8 Conclusion – an epistemic community?

In this chapter I have tried to examine the claim made by **H1**, that the Track 2 network in ASEAN-ISIS is an epistemic community who share a set of variables which are important both for identifying the expert network as an epistemic community, and for examining their role in towards Track 1. A habit of war-avoidance results from, among other things, a diffusion of norms and identity-building through a high level of interaction and socialization. It is difficult to measure the extent to which the community fits the variables, but based on the above discussion I would confirm positively to the hypothesis.

The Track 2 network has made a strong contribution to the security dialogue process by organizing seminars and conferences that discuss a range of Southeast Asian security issues, which have resulted in policy recommendations to the ASEAN governments. In the policy process, the linkage between Track 2 and official Track 1 is essential for influence. Track 2 gives the epistemic community a direct link to government officials, but a too close relationship can jeopardize the agents' autonomy. Hence, Track 2 finds itself in an autonomy dilemma.

6.   The Role and Influence of ASEAN-ISIS

6.1 The implementation of policy enterprise

In order to understand how Track 2 diplomacy can contribute to explain the ASEAN Peace, we can examine how the relationship between Track 1 and Track 2 has influenced regional security cooperation. We must then examine to which extent decision-makers have adopted the research conclusions and policy recommendations (inputs) from the ASEAN-ISIS experts as "guiding policy" (Underdal 2000:9). This chapter explores the political agency of the epistemic community in relation to ASEAN officials, and examines how ASEAN-ISIS has contributed to reinforce ASEAN's cooperation and promoted multilateral security cooperation in the wider Asia-Pacific region by looking at one specific case: the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum. In addition, I will demonstrate how ASEAN-ISIS continued its ideational contribution to the ASEAN Peace after the formation of the ARF by looking at the CSCAP process, the adoption of the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), and the drafting process of the newly signed ASEAN Charter

ASEAN-ISIS' contribution must partly be understood in terms of the introduction and promotion of a set of ideas and norms, and partly be understood in terms of organizing venues for socialization. ASEAN-ISIS based its authority on a common norm of multilateral cooperative security. This norm was underwritten by an understanding of security in which ASEAN should play a leading role. The idea of establishing a forum for multilateral security dialogue; and the idea of extending the ASEAN norms to a larger area, was initiated, introduced, and promoted by the epistemic community. ASEAN-ISIS' initiative on setting up a multilateral security forum is a good example that its role as an epistemic community has moved beyond mere provision of advice. Track 2 members have initiated policies without having to wait to be consulted by governments. With regard to the ARF, the decision-makers

accepted not only the substantial conclusions of the transnational community, but also the policy implications, or what Haas calls the "policy enterprise".

6.2 Power shifts and uncertainties in post-Cold War era

One of the objectives of the formation of security-related Track 2 processes in the region was the prevention of armed interstate conflict through reducing uncertainties and threat perceptions. The end of the Cold War brought about new uncertainties in Asia. In the Cold War era the bipolar security issues were clear, but they became more complex in the 1990's. A reduction in Russian and U.S. forces in the region followed the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Until this power vacuum was addressed, the region feared it would be more vulnerable than it had been during the Cold War and many countries responded by increasing defence spending (Rüland 2002:88). This shift was noted in the Joint Communiqué after the 1992 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM): "*The Foreign Ministers noted the profound impact of the end of the Cold War and of East-West confrontation in terms of new strategic uncertainties and fresh opportunities*" (ASEAN 1992, paragraph 10). ASEAN-ISIS emphasized this uncertainty when they established the Track 2 forum CSCAP in 1993: "*The ending of the Cold War and the fundamental transformation ensuing from the elimination of superpower rivalry have provoked a far-reaching re-evaluation of security arrangements in the Asia Pacific region*" (CSCAP 1993a). In addition, developments in the international arena occurred at the same time when the Cambodian situation was nearing its resolution.[36] Hence, the importance and demand of Track 2 became greater and more dynamic, resulting in more frequent meetings, both among the experts and between experts and officials. This was especially the case in Singapore where the contact between officials and Track 2 actors increased (Katsumata 2003:101).

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[36] Vietnam ended its occupation of Cambodia in 1989.

The structural changes in the international security environment after the end of the Cold War had a huge impact on the security thinking of the region, and opened up for "fresh opportunities". The ASEAN-ISIS members discussed these uncertainties and concerns and provided advice and policy recommendations to their respective governments. Hence ASEAN-ISIS can be credited for keeping the region's security challenges manageable, for example by lobbying Southeast Asian and Asia-Pacific governments to approve the TAC. Security related Track 2 processes represent an innovative response to the region's security problems. At the same time it has helped shape a regional security identity. The region's principal forum for multilateral security dialogue and confidence building, the ARF, would arguably never have come into existence without the ideational contribution of ASEAN-ISIS.

6.3 ASEAN-ISIS and the ARF

The ASEAN-ISIS role in the emergence and format of the ARF has been acknowledged (ASEAN 1994, paragraph 5). But it is difficult to measure this influence. At the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s people involved in ASEAN-ISIS was concerned on how to prepare ASEAN for changes in regional order and began fostering ideas about regional security cooperation that suited regional conditions. ASEAN-ISIS built a set of multilateral processes through which thinking on security cooperation could be informally and openly discussed before these ideas were taken to the Track 1 level. The annual ASEAN-ISIS led APR conferences in Kuala Lumpur was the main arena for discussions and exchanges of views about regional security issues, and provided the basis for ASEAN-ISIS to form and promote new thinking on managing the uncertainties brought about the end of the Cold War. Malaysia ISIS organized the APR, and members of ASEAN-ISIS have played significant roles in this process. The APR has also been well attended by experts and policymakers from the wider Asia-Pacific region, and due to inclusiveness and expertise of the participants the forum has been a dynamic place for airing new ideas on how to enhance regional security cooperation. The Track 2 participants felt the

need to create a similar framework at the official level, so the Chairman's Report of the ASEAN-ISIS Meeting in 1990, "*Superpower Military Presence and the Security of Southeast Asia: Problems, Prospects and Policy Recommendations*", recommended to create a Track 1 framework for regional cooperation. The report also suggested increasing the existing framework among ASEAN states and extending it to include Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, something ASEAN did during the 1990s.

The recommendations took more shape the following year when ASEAN-ISIS met in Jakarta and proposed a mechanism for multilateral security cooperation in the region. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the agenda to be proposed by ASEAN-ISIS to the governments participating at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting the following month, and at the Fourth ASEAN Summit in January 1992. The participants agreed on a Memorandum entitled "*A Time for Initiative: Proposals for the Consideration of the Fourth ASEAN Summit*". In the Memorandum, the participants put forward their proposals for an ASEAN-led initiative concerning security in the region, even though the word "security" was not used. Instead the call was for a "political" dialogue. Their security agenda was based on the norm of multilateral cooperative security discussed in the previous chapter, and included the idea of extending ASEAN's diplomatic style to a wider geographical area through a multilateral forum for dialogue. The Memorandum contained proposals that were outlined the year before in the Chairman's Report, and special attention was given to the idea of a multilateral security dialogue among Asia-Pacific countries to be held within the framework of the already existing ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC). Due to administrative and organizational reasons this turned out difficult, so the ARF was eventually built from scratch. The objectives of the dialogue process were: "*to contribute to the process of reducing conflict and resolving contentious problems; to contribute to the enhancement and enrichment of understanding, trust, goodwill and cooperation; and to contribute to the constructive management of the emerging processes in the region, with a view to the establishment of a multilateral framework of cooperative peace*" (1991 Memorandum).

The ASEAN-ISIS researchers fronted a common policy enterprise and proposed to establish a multilateral security dialogue among the Southeast Asian countries and beyond, with ASEAN as the leading actor. The suggestion to include countries outside ASEAN clearly results from the indivisible security view. Engaging all concerned Asia-Pacific countries, including countries in SEA that had yet to become members of ASEAN, was supposed to enhance the regional security. This represents an indication of Track 2 diplomacy's contribution to regional peace. As discussed in the previous chapter, one of ASEAN-ISIS' most significant contributions in community-building has been its role in the informal socialization of the "new" members of ASEAN. The view that security can only be achieved through cooperative activities is exemplified in the engagement policy towards China. Because China was a potential threat, realist security thinking would lead to a confrontational policy aimed at enhancing ASEAN countries through military build-up, defence cooperation within ASEAN, or security arrangements with external powers like the United States. But ASEAN-ISIS called for a cooperative approach and wanted to include China in any new regional security arrangement. An ASEAN-ISIS effort to engage China and promote mutual understanding had in fact already taken place since 1988 through the "Southeast Asia-China Dialogue". Naturally, the multilateral security dialogue of the greater region was to be based on ASEAN norms of diplomacy. The Track 2 actors thus emphasized that the informal approach to cooperation aimed at mutual trust should be promoted as a model for the region-wide dialogue.

The Memorandum was forwarded from each ASEAN-ISIS institution to their respective governments, and the proposal was well received. At the AMM in 1991, one month after ASEAN-ISIS put forward its agenda, ASEAN expressed its willingness to promote a security dialogue in a Joint Communiqué. And during the following year's ASEAN Summit, after numerous Track 2 activities, ASEAN officially agreed to initiate a regional security dialogue. The idea was announced during the Manila AMM in 1993, and the ARF held its inaugural meeting in Bangkok

in 1994. Since then, the ARF has operated on the basis of cooperative security within which ASEAN plays a central role in the process.

6.4 Did ASEAN-ISIS' input matter?

When we look at the nature and form of the ARF, we can clearly demonstrate a correlation with ASEAN-ISIS' proposals. But identifying correlations is insufficient. In tracking how the epistemic community perceived, articulated and formally proposed the ARF, it is reasonable to suggest that the main contribution of ASEAN-ISIS to the establishment of the ARF was in terms of ideas and socialization. Through workshops and seminars, the network of ASEAN-ISIS introduced and promoted ideas concerning regional security cooperation. But an important question we must address is to what extent decision-makers have positively adopted the policy enterprise shared by the epistemic community. And did ASEAN-ISIS' proposals represent an autonomous effort to promote its own security agenda?

The ASEAN response to ASEAN-ISIS' Memorandum was at first cautious but not dismissive. ASEAN-ISIS was attempting to establish a new regional agenda "*somewhat ahead of the official position*" (Kerr 1994:403). The centrality of ASEAN and the notion of cooperative security constituted two key aspects of the Memorandum put forward by ASEAN-ISIS. The norm of cooperative security promoted by ASEAN-ISIS contains, as we remember, of three elements: a security concern for the whole region rather than the individual country; informal dialogue and consultation rather than rigid rules and institutionalization; and inclusivity in terms of participants and subject matter. These elements are all reflected in the ARF. In contrast to traditional security arrangements, such as collective defence through alliances, the ARF is a forum for the promotion of an indivisible security view in which each participant seeks to enhance the security of the whole region, instead of its own power. Furthermore, ASEAN-ISIS wanted to expand ASEAN's diplomatic norms of consensus and consultations which we discussed in 1.4.1. The ARF process is based on dialogue, rather than rigid rules and procedures, and aims to foster a sense

of mutual trust and understanding. Its purpose is to reduce conflict among its members and promote cooperation. The ARF Concept Paper states that institutionalization is not expected; and based on prevailing ASEAN norms and practices, decisions should be made by consensus after extensive consultations. The participants meet and discuss comprehensive issues affecting their security without presupposing friend-enemy relations. And as suggested by ASEAN-ISIS, the Memorandum brought attention to the regional norms enshrined in the TAC to maintain peace and stability in the region. All countries concerning regional security were invited, including "non-like-minded" countries like China, Russia, Vietnam and North Korea, and Southeast Asian states that were not yet ASEAN members. Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Burma later acceded to the TAC and it paved the way for the realization of the ASEAN-10. Elements from the cooperative security norm promoted by the Track 2 epistemic community can thus be found reflected in the ARF.

It is wrong to say that ASEAN-ISIS was the only actor considering the possibilities of regional security cooperation before the AMM in 1991 and the ASEAN Summit in 1992, or that ASEAN-ISIS was the only contributor to ASEAN's regional security agenda. In analyzing the role of the epistemic community, one could argue that the idea of a multilateral security forum that ASEAN-ISIS proposed and was carried out by governments was not entirely novel, but reflected the current thinking at the time. For example, the Philippine Foreign Secretary, Raul Manglapus, advocated a discussion on regional security issues at that time (Katsumata 2003:104). And in the interim period when the Memorandum was being submitted to ASEAN officials, Japanese Foreign Minister Tako Nakayama had articulated the need for a similar dialogue during the AMM in 1991 prior to ASEAN's consideration of the ASEAN-ISIS initiative. However, the Japanese proposal can be interpreted as an endorsement to the ASEAN-ISIS initiative, because a Japanese official present at the ASEAN-ISIS meeting in Jakarta brought the idea to Nakayama's attention. ASEAN-ISIS had actually requested the Japanese official to seek the support of Japan should the initiative be brought up at the AMM. As it turned out, the ARF reflected the main

points of the ASEAN-ISIS proposal, and as I have tried to demonstrate, the development of such ideas cannot be understood without the activities of ASEAN-ISIS. In a Joint Communiqué after the 1994 AMM, ASEAN Foreign Ministers welcomed the inauguration of ARF and "*noted with satisfaction that ASEAN cooperation was also being fostered on a parallel track, through the contribution, for example, of the ASEAN-ISIS*" (ASEAN 1994, paragraph 5).

The establishment of the ARF is interesting in a U.S. hegemony perspective. The United States saw an ASEAN-led regional security forum as a threat to the U.S. system of bilateral security relations and did not support the initiative. But with the new Clinton administration in 1992, the U.S. became more inclined toward multilateralism. An ASEAN-based security dialogue could complement the U.S. security structure (Narine 2002:104).

6.4.1 The Asian Values Debate

The Memorandum's distinctiveness can be understood in comparison with the Australian and Canadian suggestion for multilateral cooperation. In 1990, former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans suggested a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) as a framework for addressing security issues after the European CSCE process as a model. Former Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, proposed a similar idea the same month which implied a "Western approach" of rapid institutionalization of the cooperative framework. In contrast, the ASEAN-ISIS approach emphasized informality and a lack of rigid rules and procedures. The ASEAN-ISIS idea was in a way more related to the requirements and sensitivities of the region. ASEAN eventually decided to follow ASEAN-ISIS' advise. But why did ASEAN take the route of informality, of refraining legal formulations and legally binding commitments, and of avoiding regional, supranational institutions?

This discussion took place about the same time as the controversial Asian Values debate and can find its origin in postcolonial thinking. This debate was going

strong in the 1990′s, particularly advocated by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir Mohamad and Singaporean Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew. Asian values assume to embody a concrete distinction in the values and cultures of "East" and "West". In the same way Edward Said (1978) claims "the Orient" as a European invention that helps to define "the West" as its contrasting image, advocates of Asian values assert Asian uniqueness based on the dualism of Asia as the Orient and the West as the Occident, in order to differentiate "us" from "them". However, critics of the Asian Values concept argues that there is no distinct Asian value system because of the huge cultural, social, religious, and economic diversity throughout the region.[37] The Asian values debate is now dead, but the debate touches upon an important "postcolonial" element in this study. In the establishment of a regional security dialogue, it turned out crucial for the ASEAN governments that it took an "Asian" form as suggested by ASEAN-ISIS, in contrast to a Western model. The ASEAN-ISIS scholars were afraid to let ASEAN become a Western "object", in the sense that "we" follow "their" view on security cooperation and institutionalization. They wanted to promote security cooperation premised on their own requirements, and not by adopting external goals.

6.4.2 Prospect for implementation

This shows that the ASEAN-ISIS experts produced policy recommendations not in a political vacuum, but within a frame of reference that addressed the concerns of ASEAN officials. This relates to the complex balance between autonomy and involvement in the policy-making process also discussed in previous chapters. As Arild Underdal notes (2000:11), "*there is a price to be paid for strong and direct involvement in the policy-making process, and that some sacrifice of autonomy will be part of that price*". Or as Desmond Ball argues (1994:169), "*the prospect for implementation should count for as much as the intrinsic worth of any ideas generated at Track 2*". On one hand, the experts needs their distance from

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[37] For more on the Asian Values Debate, see Hoon (2004). See also the debate between David Kang (2003) and Amitav Acharya (2003/04) on whether an indigenous Asian tradition could sustain Asian security order.

governments to provide credible and independent policy focused research, on the other hand, these inputs need to be relevant for decision-makers if they are to be adopted. Producing policy-relevant studies is, as we remember, a characteristic of Track 2 activities. That is why the Memorandums are offered in the form of handy, ready-to-use modules. It seems like the Memorandum was well received because of the close personal linkages that characterize the relationship between ASEAN-ISIS scholars and government officials. The policy enterprise was brought into the policy-making process by the leaders of the ASEAN-ISIS and their staff. Because of the close link between Track 2 and Track 1, ASEAN-ISIS scholars are probably familiar with officials' preferences. Another reason may be that the governments did not have the capacity to think about new regional security frameworks. While ASEAN governments were preoccupied with the Cambodian issue, ASEAN-ISIS was able to conduct long-term analysis after the settlement of the issue. The ideas of ASEAN-ISIS also had a distinctly regional or Asian character, compared to the proposals from Canada and New Zealand, which probably enabled these new ideas to be accepted at the official Track 1 level by ASEAN states.

The problem with tracing the process as we have done above is that conclusions rely to some extent on counter-factual assumptions. Would the ARF been established without the ideational contribution of the ASEAN-ISIS? If yes, would it look the same? This composes a weakness to the conclusions. Sceptics may argue that ASEAN-ISIS would not make policy recommendations that are unlikely to be adopted by officials, and thereby marginalize their significance, even though the Memorandum on ARF touched upon areas where ASEAN governments were known to have serious reservations. Track 2's impact on the region′s other lingering problems has been less clear. On such issues, Track 2 has been "socialized" and adopted the Track 1 view that these issues constitute internal affairs and their discussion would violate the ASEAN principle of non-interference (Kwa 2007 [interview]. An illustrative example is the second Memorandum submitted by ASEAN-ISIS in 1992 on human rights and environment. This was *not* adopted by the ASEAN governments. It has not brought the South China Sea dispute nor forest fires

and haze from Indonesia to a solution, and has done little to address the region′s internal conflicts except in the Aceh peace negotiations. The peace process did not include ASEAN-ISIS, but according to former chief negotiator S. Wiryono (2007 [interview]), an informal Track 2 approach was important to build trust. In the ARF case it seems reasonable to conclude that the input from the scholar community did have an impact on the policy outcome of the decision-making process. Their recommendations, based on a careful balance between a political and intellectual function, were found valid and authoritative by officials that took some kind of collective action and established the ARF.

6.5 CSCAP, the ASEAN Security Community and the ASEAN Charter

ASEAN-ISIS' significance today should also be understood in terms of ideas and socialization. ASEAN-ISIS has continued to provide policy inputs into ASEAN and the ARF through the establishment of the CSCAP processes, the decision to transform ASEAN into an ASEAN Security Community, and in the drafting of an ASEAN Charter. The role played by ASEAN-ISIS in all these processes has been that of policy entrepreneur, with ideas that are based in the norm of multilateral cooperative security shared by the epistemic community.

6.5.1 CSCAP

The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) arose out of recommendations from ASEAN-ISIS in the early 1990s to enhance security cooperation amongst ARF members.[38] In 1992 ASEAN-ISIS co-organized a conference on "Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific" in Seoul where the idea of a wider second track process was aired. This was an important, ambitious and exciting

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[38] For a comprehensive study on CSCAP, see Desmond Ball (2000). For a discussion on CSCAP as an epistemic community, see Sheldon Simon (2002).

initiative in a region that had been opposed to multilateralism. CSCAP was formally established in 1993 as a Track 2 process to the ARF with its secretariat located at ISIS Malaysia. The CSCAP members are national committees set up within research institutions of the Asia-Pacific countries. In the ASEAN countries the CSCAP national committees are set up within the ASEAN-ISIS institutions.[39] CSCAP′s purpose is to provide "*a structured process for regional confidence building and security cooperation (…) by which political and security issues can be discussed by scholars, officials, and others in their private capacities*".[40] Through such discussions CSCAP aimed to provide policy recommendations to governments. Eight study groups that work on specific issue areas produces much of CSCAP′s output. By being part of CSCAP, ASEAN-ISIS has contributed significantly to the work and policy inputs for the ARF, which indicates a move beyond state-centric approaches to managing security and challenge some of the elements of the ASEAN Way. ASEAN-ISIS, and by extension CSCAP, has challenged the norm of non-interference through workshops, reports, and regular interaction with ASEAN officials, hence brought these discourses into the public domain. One of ASEAN-ISIS' most significant contributions to community-building was the formation of CSCAP.

6.5.2 Resurrection of the ASEAN Security Community (ASC)

The outbreak of the 1997 economic crisis seriously weakened ASEAN and its leadership role within the ARF. Together with the strategic environment after the 11 September attacks in 2001, ASEAN was faced with new regional and global challenges and political and security adjustments were required. Again, uncertainties called for the ideational contribution of ASEAN-ISIS, and in the 2003 Bali Concord II, ASEAN decided to transform itself into an ASEAN Security Community (ASC).

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[39] Except in Singapore where the CSCAP committee is set up at the IDSS/RSIS, while it is SIIA that is member of ASEAN-ISIS.

[40] See the CSCAP Charter (1993b).

Promoting a security community was undoubtedly the primary objective of the creation of ASEAN in 1967, and we can trace its historical development. At the first ASEAN Summit, in 1976, the ASEAN leaders signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). TAC was both a non-aggression pact between the ASEAN states and a code of conduct for state interaction in SEA, reaffirming the principles of the ASEAN Way. It's goals were to "*promote perpetual peace, everlasting unity and cooperation among the people which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship*"[41]. It also codified "*respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations*"[42], and obliged its signatories to settle disputes peacefully through consultation. Technically, TAC is a part of ZOPFAN. The establishment of SEA as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in 1972 was aimed to guarantee that each country in the region should bee free from external interference, and became the basis for a security community in SEA. Later, an important component to ASEAN's security cooperation was the signing of the treaty that declared SEA a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) in 1995.

The language of SEA as a community was first mentioned in TAC article 6 when describing a "prosperous *and peaceful community of nations in Southeast Asia*". In 1997 the ASEAN Heads of governments reaffirmed their commitment to bring ASEAN closer to ZOPFAN by 2020. In the "ASEAN Vision 2020" they envisioned ASEAN to be a "Concert of Southeast Asian Nations" and a "Community of Caring Societies".[43]

The development towards a Southeast Asian security community continued when Indonesian scholars and officials recently resurrected the idea of an ASEAN security community. At the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali in 2003, Indonesia officially launched the idea of transforming ASEAN into a Security Community in order to

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[41] Chapter 1, Article 1, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976).

[42] Chapter 1, Article 2) a, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976).

[43] ASEAN Vision 2020 (15 December 1997).

contain the prospect of war in SEA (Unidjaja 2003). This process illustrates a good example on how Track 2 influences Track 1, and how Deutsch' theory has been absorbed into the policy process. The commitment to a security community constituted an important part of the Declaration on ASEAN Concord II, as one of three pillars of an ASEAN Community. ASEAN-ISIS, through CSIS Indonesia, worked closely with the Indonesian government by giving inputs to the concept. In fact, CSIS scholar Rizal Sukma first launched the idea at a seminar in New York in 2003 (Sukma 2003). In his concept paper Sukma urged Indonesia to propose ASEAN to evolve into a security community, because "*the idea of ASEAN Security Community is meant to provide such a sense of purpose, a practical goal, and a future condition that all member states should strive for*". Even though neither the Bali Concord II nor the ASC Plan of Action (Vientiane Action Plan) explicitly mentions a well-crafted definition of the ASC, it is clearly influenced by the Deutschian concept of pluralistic security community. Adopted from Sukma's concept paper, Indonesia's proposal defined an ASEAN Security Community as "*member countries that has achieved a condition, as a result of flows of communication and the habit of cooperation, in which members share "expectations of peaceful change" and rule out "the use of force as means of problem-solving." Member States regard their security as fundamentally linked to those of others and their destiny is bound by common norms, history, political experience, and geographical location. Members of the ASEAN Security Community are convinced that individual security can only be attained if they cooperate with one another to achieve collective security. An ASEAN Security Community, then, is a regional grouping that has renounced the use of force as a means of resolving intra-regional conflict*" (Indonesia proposal, paragraph 14).

Other ASEAN-ISIS members acknowledged Sukma's proposals and distributed his ideas first within the network, and later it was adopted by the ASEAN officials. Sukma's concept paper has clearly influenced Indonesia's ASC proposal, which constituted the basis for the ASC part of the Bali Concord II in 2003. With regard to the ASEAN Community in Bali Concord II, two of three pillars involved the

engagement and thinking of ASEAN-ISIS. The ASEAN Security Community was as seen an Indonesian Track 2 initiative, while the ASEAN Economic Community was a Singaporean Track 2 initiative (Leong 2007 [interview]). The Bali Concord II reaffirmed the basic principles and policies underlying ASEAN's approach to regional security embodied in TAC and ZOPFAN, but it did not clarify how the process towards a security community would be undertaken; it only contained a general agreement on the realisation of the ASC. A concrete plan of action was needed, and in this process ASEAN-ISIS once again played a role in providing inputs to ASEAN governments. In 2004 ASEAN-ISIS members gathered to discuss the draft proposal prepared by the CSIS on how the ASC could be achieved. The results of the discussion were later sent to their respective governments before the 10th ASEAN Summit in Laos, which produced the ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action (Vientiane Action Programme, VAP) with an attached list of activities for moving towards an ASEAN Security Community by the year 2020

In its Annex, the VAP promotes "working towards development of an ASEAN Charter".[44] 20 November 2007 the Heads of ASEAN governments signed the ASEAN Charter in Singapore. The VAP also encouraged the contribution of people-to-people contacts and the contribution of the Track 2 network ASEAN-ISIS to political development.[45] . Much of the ideas that found its way into the VAP regarding ASEAN Security Community came from ASEAN-ISIS' brainstorming sessions.

6.5.3 The ASEAN Charter Process

ASEAN-ISIS continues to leave visible imprints in efforts to strengthen and promote ASEAN cooperation. These efforts were last demonstrated in the drafting process of the ASEAN Charter. However, in this case it seems like the initiative was

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[44] Annex for ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action, Section 2.2, "Shaping and Sharing of Norms".

[45] Annex for ASEAN Security Plan of Action, Section 1.3.d.

taken by the ASEAN officials. At the 11th ASEAN Summit in 2005, the ASEAN officials decided to draft a formal charter as the basis of ASEAN cooperation.[46] A few months later, members of ASEAN-ISIS met to discuss a concept paper prepared by CSIS on the content of a charter. The discussion resulted in a Memorandum "*The ASEAN Charter*" (2006) that was submitted to the ASEAN governments and the ASEAN Eminent Persons Group (EPG). In recognition of the difficult challenges facing the region, ASEAN governments have invited an EPG of former and current high-ranking officials to advice on the policies to be taken into account in the framing of an ASEAN Charter, which has a close dialogue with the heads of the ASEAN-ISIS (Leong 2007 [interview]).[47] The 2006 Joint Communiqué back up this statement with a support of the EPG on engaging ASEAN-ISIS (ASEAN 2006, paragraph 9). Later that year ASEAN-ISIS met with the EPG, the Philippines Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong and Indonesia's Foreign Minister to advocate its views (Sukma 2006:94). Also the Track 2 institute (but not part of ASEAN-ISIS) ISEAS in Singapore has provided inputs to the ASEAN officials.[48] It is interesting to note that the leader of the ISEAS project team on the ASEAN Charter was Rudolfo Severino. He served as ASEAN Secretary-General (1998-2002) and is now a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the ISEAS. This illustrates the complicated link between Track 2 and Track 1 and the complex balance between autonomy and policy intervention. In substance, the Charter represents a clash of two sets of norms or values. The ASEAN Way, reflected in centrality of authority, order and collective welfare over individual rights, versus "western" values of a more institutionalized way of organizing society, promotion of human rights and democratic ideals. In the opinion of Appadurai (2001:7-8) the world is characterized by ideas in movement between places, in different directions, and with various speed. This creates a hybrid of local and global phenomena, in this case between the Asian Way and Western institutionalization.

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[46] See the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the establishment of the ASEAN Charter (2005).

[47] See the full list of EPG at: http://www.aseansec.org/18033.htm

The ASEAN Charter was signed at the ASEAN Summit in Singapore in 2007, but the Charter remains to be ratified by the ASEAN member countries. To this date, only five members have ratified the Charter (Singapore, Brunei, Laos, Malaysia, and Vietnam). The process is still going on, and it is too early to assess the impacts of ideas and inputs promoted by ASEAN-ISIS on the Charter. However, it clearly shows that ASEAN-ISIS continues to provide policy relevant knowledge and inputs into ASEAN and influence its policy process with ideas.

Is this historical development an indication on ASEAN moving towards a security community? Or is ASEAN best described as an "imitation community" as Jones and Smith (2002) argues? The term describes a regional institution that gives form but no substance to domestic and international arrangements (Kassim 2007). I would argue that with the help of Track 2, ASEAN is developing in substance. The informal venues of socialization and social learning are important in the contribution to a sense of community and an ASEAN Peace.

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[48] See Severino (eds.) (2005).

7. Conclusion – Interpretation of the findings

7.1 Summing up issues in focus

This thesis was based on the empirical observation that there has been no war between two members of ASEAN since its establishment in 1967. The research question guiding this study was *"how and to what extent has Track 2 diplomacy influenced the ASEAN Peace"*. The aim was to *describe* the organisation and function of one particular case of Track 2 diplomacy, the ASEAN-ISIS network, to *explore* the relationship and interaction between Track 1 and Track 2 actors, and contribute to *explain* the outcome of this process, namely an international community in SEA that might develop a pacific disposition. In other words, the purpose was to understand better the relationship between a community of security experts and regional security cooperation in SEA which lead to an absence of war.

My first task was to describe this community of experts to get a better understanding of why study Track 2 diplomacy in SEA. The global system has become too complex to be seen only in terms of a system of states; hence government-to-government interaction is not the only method by which diplomacy is conducted. Diplomatic engagement between states extends beyond official relations that occur at the government-to-government (or Track 1 level). Nor is Track 1 a sufficient vehicle to help states enhance their multilateral relations. Interaction between states is a transnational process that encompasses a wide spectrum of people-to-people and personal linkages. As discussed in chapter 4, perhaps the most essential feature of Track 2 diplomacy is that it is a process of analysis and reflection: because participants are contributing in their "personal capacity" they are free to think aloud and to propose creative solutions. Given the practical nature of Track 2, it is not surprising that it has burgeoned alongside Track 1. If we want to understand the entire complexion of Southeast Asian security, we cannot avoid a study of Track 2.

7.2 Main findings

The analysis has provided a strengthened view to the significance of ASEAN-ISIS as a political agent. My concluding answer to the research question is that the transnational network of experts has contributed to the ASEAN Peace through its influence on regional security. The logic is that a group of individuals first meet through the identification of a puzzle; in this case it was how to achieve security in SEA after the Cold War. Through reiterate workshops, conferences and seminars they developed a common understanding of the problem and solutions on how to solve this problem. Then new ideas and policy recommendations have been introduced to official decision-makers from analysts and social scientists within the setting of ASEAN-ISIS. The operating force was that of multilateral cooperative security, leading states to recognize their security in new ways. An interesting finding is that ASEAN governments have adopted many of their recommendations and put them into action. A good case in point is the network's role in the establishment of the ARF discussed in Chapter 6.

7.2.1 An epistemic community

The research question was analyzed through the lens of the epistemic community approach and the constructivist security community approach. The first question this study addressed was that of the existence of a security epistemic community **(H1)**. This approach provided me with an opportunity to explore the relationship between Track 2 and decision-makers. I discussed to what extent these experts constitute an epistemic community with (1) shared normative and principled beliefs, (2) shared causal understanding, (3) shared notion of validity, and (4) common policy enterprise, as defined by Peter Haas. The task was not easy because these attributes are vague and difficult to grasp. For that reason the answer is not a dichotomized "yes" or "no", but findings based on the discussion in Chapter 5 suggest that I confirm positively to the hypothesis, though my conclusion is moderate. The epistemic community operated within the Track 2 network of

ASEAN-ISIS, which has functioned as a venue for security discussions and policy recommendations and social learning through a set of conferences, workshops and seminars. Participants in Track 2 diplomacy consist of a *network* of academics, researchers, analysts, and other *professionals* that are recognized for possessing some expertise within a given issue-area. And through its close link to officials, Track 2 diplomacy occupies the potential of being a *channel* through which policy advice and new ideas are promoted from experts to decision-makers.

We then moved our focus to the influence of this epistemic community and analyzed how the relationship between Track 1 and Track 2 has contributed to regional security cooperation. Because one thing is to promote ideas, another thing is that government officials adopt and implement their advice. But how do you gauge success and influence of Track 2 diplomacy? In the analysis we divided the community's potential influence in its ability to mobilize these four dimensions: socialization, communication, policy innovation and institution building **(H2)**. And this ability was clearly conditioned by the community's relationship to government officials and access to the decision-making process.

7.2.2 Policy innovation

In the beginning of Chapter 6 I argued that ASEAN-ISIS' contribution to regional security must be understood in terms of the introduction and promotion of a set of ideas and norms that helped define the security discourse. Without this ideational contribution there would have been no ARF, at least not as we know it. The study of this process demonstrates that ASEAN-ISIS played a significant role in the formation of the ARF, and that non-state actors can make a difference in regional relations. The norm and ideas of the epistemic community, promoted in the 1991 Memorandum, was later institutionalized at the international level in the form of the ARF. Their policy recommendations was based on the norm of multilateral cooperative security and underwritten by a shared understanding of security based on ASEAN, exemplified in the idea of establishing a regional forum for security

dialogue with the aim of developing reassurance, trust and confidence building. Thus it is reasonable to argue that the ASEAN officials adopted the community's policy enterprise. The role of ASEAN-ISIS has therefore been that of a laboratory of ideas for the region, and it continues to experiment with various initiatives to foster understanding and promote regional security cooperation. Accordingly ASEAN-ISIS has played a policy innovation role.

7.2.3 Institution building

We should also ask ourselves the contra factual question if the security architecture in SEA would have looked different without the presence of ASEAN-ISIS. Do individuals, or a group of individuals, matter regarding the issue of war and peace? It is tempting to say no and treat regional institution building simply as a state-driven process. It is similarly tempting to treat regional institutions as the sum of state interests in which national governments have defined the agenda, direction and pace, with the outside policy experts left to fill in the blanks. However, an interesting finding was the independent influence of the epistemic community. ASEAN-ISIS was formed independently from the political process, in the sense that it was formed by heads of research institutions, not by governments. In addition, its institution-building role, in terms of the formation of a permanent institution (ARF), is an indication on Track 2's influence on the dependent variable. Track 2 *has* influenced the ASEAN Peace by contributing to the security cooperation in the region. In contrast to both a realist view that would not hold experts as an independent variable at all and Sending's (2003) recent study that do not see expert influence without the support from a larger political movement, findings in this study suggest that ASEAN-ISIS has played a significant role independent from the process itself. Sending tries to supplement the epistemic community approach by liberating the analysis from one set of actors and trace the role of knowledge in relation to different forms of political agency. Regarding ASEAN-ISIS, this does not seem to be the case. The agency of the epistemic community initiated something on their own that affected the security cooperation in the region. Based on these arguments I will conclude that my study to

some extent confirm the ideal model of the epistemic community approach set forth in 2.5. The epistemic community has, in this case, played an independent role. But the influence has not taken place through individuals positioning themselves in bureaucracy, as Haas suggests, but through Track 2 activities, seminars and conferences. These are venues in which personal relations between Track 1 and Track 2 are developed. However, despite their influence, Track 2 does not pose a serious challenge to the nation state as the main actor in IR. Track 2 is able to influence IR (peace) as an independent variable, but its influence is also contingent upon its close relationship to Track 1. And the community always has to struggle with its autonomy dilemma.

7.2.4 Socialization

The influence of the epistemic community can to a large degree be explained by the community's character. The personal and informal relationship between Track 1 and Track 2 actors has provided experts with access to important arenas of decision-making. Track 2 conferences, workshops and seminars have been venues where personal relations between participants develop. In a region where personal bonds underlie positive relations between governments, establishing personal relationships with government officials is critical for Track 2 actors. The psychological factor in meeting face-to-face and get to know each other should not be underestimated. Through these networks, cooperative behaviour is learned, perceptions and attitudes are changing, and trust is built. In this way, Track 2 contributes to the development of a sense of community and shared interests among foreign policy planners and other intellectuals across the region. Track 2 diplomacy can arguably be part of a larger process aimed at transforming threat perceptions through trust and community building. One of ASEAN-ISIS' most significant contributions in community building has been its role in the informal socialization of the "new" members of ASEAN. The informal dialogues are well positioned to ease this transition and can offer friendly advice to the policy elites and intellectual leaders of the "new" members. Because some research institutions are closely allied to the

state, by "socializing" the Track 2 representatives and make them better understand the positions of other ASEAN countries, they will feel less threatened and bring their perceptions to official circles. In this regard, it is important to remember that the ability of ASEAN-ISIS to play a significant role in the establishment of ARF may have been possible because Vietnam, Laos, Burma, and Cambodia were not yet members of ASEAN. Perhaps it would have proven difficult to agree on a memorandum if these countries were participating, because their Track 2 institutions are based within governmental ministries. In contrast to the first Memorandum on the ARF, both the ASC decision and the Memorandum on the Charter included the participation of the "new" members. In such processes, it is assumed that participants have gained a greater appreciation of each other′s respective national standpoints and have gradually begun to develop certain shared understandings. The "socialization" argument suggests that involvement in Track 2 activities will ideally not only impact upon the views of the individual participants, but that the exposure to regional norms may exert a positive influence in shaping the foreign policy orientation of the country they represent. To paraphrase, the kind of socialization provided by Track 2 diplomacy is part of ASEAN's mechanisms of conflict management.

But this relationship puts the epistemic community in an autonomy dilemma which jeopardizes their autonomy and integrity with regard to independent research versus efficiency and implementation. However, the demarcation between what is official and what is informal diplomacy is unclear in many SEA countries. Differences in the institutional affiliation of Track 2 institutions make it difficult to draw a sharp distinction among different tracks. They vary from being integral to the ministries of foreign affairs, to be totally or partly funded and staffed by their respective ministries, to have very close proximity to officials, to exhibiting a high degree of independence. In this diplomatic entanglement, the differences between "official" and "unofficial" may not be entirely explained by the actor's governmental or nongovernmental status, in the sense that private citizens are engaged in security dialogues.

7.2.5 Alternative route of communication

ASEAN′s problem in security cooperation has traditionally been its inability to address sensitive issues and settle disputes, due to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference implied in the ASEAN Way. Track 2 diplomacy illustrates a strategy to tackle sensitive issues by utilizing informal dialogue forums. Track 2 diplomacy has offered the organization ways to try out strategies on sensitive issues, without risking the status and political legitimacy of officials and states. In this setting, Track 2 deliberations offer an alternative route of communication to deal with sensitive issues and move beyond the ASEAN Way. It enables discussions on new ideas and initiatives before they are presented on the official negotiating table. It seems like a good fit for Asia, because preparatory and informal dialogue without any attempts of implementing binding agreements provides an open and exploratory communication.

7.3 Security community and peace – the way forward

How does my findings relate to ASEAN as a security community? And is the ASEAN Peace sustainable? To this date the level of trust among the SEA states, for example revealed in Chris Roberts' study, negates ASEAN to achieve the potential of a security community. Perhaps ASEAN is in fact best described as an imitation community? Track 2 by itself is also insufficient as an explanatory factor to peace because it does not solve disputes, only prevent or manage them by building trust and confidence. But this only means that ASEAN must continue to build trust and identity among its members, in both rhetoric and in practice. The empirical analysis in this study thus leads to a normative conclusion. ASEAN should strive to become a security community. To achieve this goal, the findings in this study suggest that Track 2 diplomacy is a fruitful vehicle to develop regional security cooperation which may create a sense of community in the long run. Involving Track 2, and with time Track 3, ASEAN governments can move beyond the limitations of the ASEAN Way. But if ASEAN will develop itself to become a security community, what then

will be the consequence for East Asia at large? This is a question for further studies. Should ASEAN continue to engage China and Northeast Asia in further Track 2 diplomacy, and perhaps include other institutes as members of ASEAN-ISIS? The scholarship on Track 2 diplomacy has focused on evaluating the "success" of Track 2 security dialogue, operationalized as the influence and/or effectiveness of these processes vis-à-vis the Track 1 level. But we also need to move beyond the current preoccupation with the established Track 2 institutions such as CSCAP, ASEAN-ISIS, and the South China Sea Workshops. Inadequate attention has been given to the relative utility of the many smaller Track 2 processes which are taking place, such as bilateral dialogues organized by regional institutes and think tanks. Also, a study looking at several case studies of Track 2 - Track 3 interaction seem to be a project worth considering. This deserves more attention because it contains important insights of Asian security studies and for the assessment of the region′s future. Track 2 clearly has conflict-management utility, and it is a mistake to believe that Track 2 diplomacy is only dialogue for dialogue's sake. It creates a positive atmosphere that is conducive to the formation of regional identity and community building. It is nothing wrong with being a "talk shop". It is through dialogue that Track 2 has made its small but important contribution to the ASEAN Peace.

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Interviews

Name	Position	Date
Hiro Katsumata	Research Fellow, RSIS	14/11/2007
Tan See Seng	Associate Professor, RSIS, former research fellow, SIIA	15/11/2007
Joanne Lin	Research Associate, SIIA	15/11/2007
Alan Chong	Assistant Professor, NUS	16/11/2007
Christopher Roberts	Associate Research Fellow, RSIS	16/11/2007
Kwa Chong Guen	Head of External Programs, RSIS, CSCAP Singapore	19/11/2007
Mely Caballero-Anthony	Associate Professor, RSIS, member, ASEAN-ISIS, member, CSCAP Singapore	19/11/2007
Lee Lai To	Associate Professor, NUS, Former Director, SIIA	20/11/2007
Stephen Leong	Assistant Director-General, ISIS Malaysia	22/11/2007
Elina Noor	Analyst, ISIS Malaysia	22/11/2007
Shahriman Lockman	Researcher, ISIS Malaysia	22/11/2007
Ambassador S. Wiryono	Research Fellow, CSIS Jakarta	27/11/2007

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