From autonomy to autonomy light

A case-study of French ESDP policy

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Important abbreviations

ARRC	Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Forces
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives
CPN	Crisis Prevention Network
DCI	Defence Capabilities Initiative
DG	Directorate General of the European Union
D-SACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC	European Community
ECAP	European Capability Action Plan
ECMM	European Commission Monitoring Mission
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDC	European Defence Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EMA	Etat-Major des Armées
EP	European Parliament
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	EU's Security Strategy
EU	European Union
HG	Headline Goal
HI	Historical institutionalism
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
IR	International Relations
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
LI	Liberal Intergovenmentalism
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NATO-SG	NATO Secretary General
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
TofA	Treaty of Amsterdam
QMV	Quality Majority Voting
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WEU	Western European Union

1 Introduction

Despite being only a middle-ranking power, France has always had an ambition, nearly a vocation, in promoting her vision of the world. In the long-term perspective France has lost influence in International Relations (IR) theory, while the self-assertion of forming something of a counterweight to the US has remained strong. The Gaullist[1] features of national sovereignty and international independence (Terpan 2005:1) looked increasingly old-fashioned in the new Europe going into the 90s. An essential backdrop is the growing military gap between the US and its European partners. The dilemma facing policy-makers in France was and remains twofold: how can one *both* preserve sovereignty and attain extra capabilities in the defence sector? The answers, but also the challenges, are to be found behind the acronym ESDP, European Security and Defence Policy. France and the ESDP is the theme of this dissertation.

The ESDP has developed profoundly since its *de facto* foundation at the groundbreaking (Knutsen 2003:63) St.Malo summit between the UK and France in December 1998. Since then, other developments have taken place on institutional arrangements, military improvements and the engagement in actual operations. On European defence, France has for a long time been considered to be in the driving seat. Given the central role of France, her vision will be imperial for the future framework of understanding European security issues. A logical follow-up question would then be on where France wants to go/what they want with the ESDP? “French ESDP policy” is the dependent variable in my work.

1.1 Theoretical divide on likelihood for *change*

From these initial ideas the challenge is to find the right means to elucidate and understand French ESDP policy. The goal is to find the analytical tools to generalise. For this purpose, a number of theories *could* have been chosen, but the scope of the thesis implies an early choice. As Donald Puchala (1999:329) argues, any scientist must deal with the standard of quality and reliability set forward by Andrew Moravcsik[2] and his liberal intergovernmentalism (LI). Nevertheless, Paul Pierson and historical institutionalism (HI) offer one of the most pertinent alternatives. Here I will

concentrate on the works of Paul Pierson, with additional thoughts from, most notably, but not limited to Simon Bulmer, Michael E. Smith and Cathrine Gegout.[3]

LI and HI have been chosen because they are theories with clear and focused concepts. Importantly, the two theories provides different answers on one key question: who controls and influences the ESDP integration, the state *and/or* the ESDP institutions at large (White 2001:89)? And further, they differ on the likelihood for *change* in French preferences. I will further elaborate this below.

Mark A. Pollack claims the convergence between realist, liberal and institutionalist approaches around a "single rationalist model, which assumes fixed preferences and rational behaviour among all actors in the EU, something which includes individuals, governments and organisations" (2001:222). According to this view my two theories are quite similar. The idea is therefore that they are compatible and describe different aspect of the same phenomenon. They would not necessarily be in opposition. HI and LI can, to some extent, be reconciled, as they both adopt rational understandings of the decision-making process (Hix 1998:47). And further, it is *not* a test of the two theories, but rather to find out concepts which could function to bring about a large explanatory power of my case. The purpose for my analysis is not to verify the first hypothesis. Rather, I will use the logic of *falsification*[4] from Karl R. Popper. This means to point out that a hypothesis has a *tendency* towards being either wrong or untenable. The overall goal with this plan is to strengthen or to modify the existing theories (Andersen 1997:73), here the LI and HI. If the alternative hypothesis can be ruled out, the original hypothesis has strengthened its position. Therefore, falsifiability is a necessary property of empirical statement, but importantly not a sufficient property. I will use a pattern-matching logic which compares an empirically based pattern with a theoretical predicted one (Yin 1994:106). Overall, I take the general theoretical concepts of national preference formation and locked-in effect and see if they coincide with the empirical material, in a hypothetical-deductive method. Indeed, interaction between induction and deduction is the hallmark of all research (Andersen 1997:134), and the goal here is to make an empirical investigation with a deductive logic and a methodological consciousness.

1.2 Approach and hypotheses

From these considerations originate the two-folded empirical and theoretical approach.

1. What have the *preferences* and *strategies* of French ESDP policy been and have they *changed* from 1996-2005?
2. Have the strategies and preferences of France been developed from a consideration of her *own interests alone* or has there also been *locked-in effect* as a result of participation inside ESDP?

Based on the theories chosen, the hypotheses are as follow:

a) LI derive **H0**: Change or continuity in French ESDP policy can *only* be explained from an internal French preference formation.
b) HI derive **H1**: Change or continuity in French ESDP policy can be explained from a locked-in effect from the ESDP system.

The research-design applied tries to satisfy two principles. Firstly, a precise *description* of the facts of the case is done in chapter five. What have French intentions been in participating in the ESDP cooperation? Often, French foreign policy is directed by clichés and consequently I want to find out more about the rationality behind such policies. Further, the UK is widely seen as having changed their policies on occasions[5], but what about France? In a way this is to understand the obvious. France did not *seem* to change much in the period, but is this really the case? In chapter six I will make an assessment whether *change* has taken place or not. Secondly, in chapter two the factors of explanation are outlined theoretically and operationalised in chapter three. Conclusions must derive from an explanation which is in *accordance with the facts*, i.e. the methodology involved is outlined in chapter three (Andersen 1997:136). The last chapter is a discussion whether they coincide with the empirical reality.

1.3 The framing of the ESDP-domain

The ESDP is neither a classical security alliance, nor a strictly military alliance. It is more a *non-identifiable military object* to change slightly the words of Jacques Delors.[6] Since the St.Malo Declaration in 1998, the two *de facto* initiators of the ESDP, Britain and France, have diverged upon the material manifestation of what exactly the ESDP is. Still, the declaration points in five directions. For reasons of analytical clarity, these five directions assemble my categorisation of ESDP-policy. Internally in the ESDP I have identified four: a security strategy, military capabilities, institutional framework and actual military operations. In addition, the ESDP must be understood in its larger context, indicating that the term *ESDP-domain* and consequently *French ESDP policy* also constitutes the transatlantic relationship. As NATO is and has been the existing institutional framework for European security, one cannot understand French ESDP policy without referring to NATO. This will not mean there is a struggle between NATO and ESDP, as some might argue, but rather a complex interaction.[7] Further explanation of the main developments inside the ESDP will be done in chapter four.

Importantly, this is an analysis of the strategic considerations made by policy-makers, and therefore not a study about the military facts and numbers. Still, military considerations naturally matter for the politicians. Consequently, the ESDP analytically speaking constitutes a number of *events* where the policies have been shaped. I have analysed the following type of events; European summits, NATO summits, other summits, most notably between the larger EU members, France, Britain and Germany, statements and political initiatives from central policy makers, common declarations, interviews and other sources of information like newspaper articles after important decisions have been taken.[8] Briefly, each event is analysed to identify the French position on a given subject inside the ESDP. Further, the least unit in this thesis is the phrases originating in these events. With another name, these statements can be called the *embedded units* in the analysis (Yin 1994:119). An embedded unit is here a lesser unit than my case study French ESDP policy itself. Naturally, the universe of statements is almost unlimited. To remedy this difficulty, I will narrow down the French positions to include the policy towards the ESDP-domain

taken by the President and the French government.[9] Taking into account the large role played by the French President in foreign policy, the government is likely to follow his determination.

1.4 French ESDP policy: preferences *and* strategies

In the first part of the thesis the focus is to explain the theme empirically. Despite the narrowing down of the potential events, they still represent a considerable material to analyse. All these statements defined amount to a large universe of embedded units, something which calls for an organisation. To get a whole picture of the French ESDP policy I have found it necessary to distinguish between French *preferences*, the ultimate goals of a policy, and *strategies*, the means or instruments to accomplish such goals (Gegout 2002:69).[10]

How do I identify the French preferences and strategies over the timeframe 1996-2005? *Preferences* are defined quite extensively as a long-term conventional policy strategy through our period. They are the highest in order, over strategies. In many ways it is the fundamental principles of French foreign policy in general terms and more specifically regarding the ESDP. The St.Malo Treaty points in four directions and these form the framework where I put the different statements made by France: security approach, military capabilities, institutional framework and on actual operations. Each phrase is analysed to form the French position. Inside each sub-category, a critical assessment of the French attitudes and values behind their position-taking is done. As regards *strategies,* they can be described as the instruments France has to achieve her preferences. Already said, strategies are subordinate to preferences in order and are likely to change more often. Ostensibly, the strategy should follow the long-term objectives and support these. Six instruments of French ESDP policy will be elaborated here: multilateral EU-talks, bilateralism with the UK, bilateralism with Germany, the conception of a directory of France, UK and Germany, the notion of avant-garde, unilateral moves and lastly the French transatlantic strategy.

These choices do not exclude other potential strategies, but are what the author claims to be the most important. Throughout the timeframe, each of these strategies has been present and the content will be further described in the second part of chapter

five. Because of limited space, it is impossible to describe the French position on every occasion where she has had an opinion. Therefore, in the four sub-categories of preferences and in the strategies I will concentrate on describing the main dimension of the empirical material and further if change has taken place. It can be described as operative indicators of recurring events which catches the main variation in the material. The ranking of preferences and strategies will be essential in the discussion over change inside either preferences or strategies.

1.5 The dichotomy change-continuity

To find comparable, complementary and compatible analytical tools to explain the empirical developments is the goal of this dissertation. How do I empirically qualify if a statement has changed according to earlier statement? The starting point is the St.Malo declaration, in itself a document which defines quite extensively French ESDP policy as defined here. Then, at the end of the timeframe, what is the French position then? In between has change taken place? A policy will be described as changed if is *qualitatively different* meaning reinforcement or weakening of the initial statement. In the methodology chapter this is discussed further. In chapter six I make a qualitative assessment whether change has taken place. This is based in the French positions identified in chapter five inside the four sub-categories of preference and the six strategies. Therefore, I use through induction of the positions identified whether *French ESDP policy* strategies and preferences have changed. These "empirical" conclusions form the basis of the synthesis with the theories in chapter seven.

1.6 Timeframe

The St.Malo summit between France and the UK in December 1998 marks the starting point of a real sustained defence policy inside the EU. Informally, it prepared the ground for the ESDP, as the two significant military powers in Europe embraced the idea of an autonomous EU capability in defence. This marks a defining moment in European security policy as it goes considerably longer than the ESDI[11] perspective inside NATO, which started in 1994. For the first time in St.Malo, there existed a political compromise between France and Britain in playing a full EU-role on the

international stage and to have autonomous capacity. I would on occasion refer to developments before St.Malo when this is necessary for our conceptualisation. This is the reason why I have included 1996 in my approach, as the year represents French rapprochement with NATO.

The end of the timeframe is 2005. The justification is that important, although smaller, developments were made with the signing of the Convention, the establishment of a European Defence Agency and the formation of the battle groups. These represent further materialisation in building the ESDP.

2 Theoretical framework of LI and HI

Neither of the two theories is ready-made to be used on the study of the ESDP, and a certain application to fit with my empirical case would be in place. Below I will outline each theory on how they are described from a pure theoretical perspective. Then each of the theories will be adapted to the empirical case of French ESDP policy.

2.1 LI: national, state, rational, intergovernmental

LI is a general theory of international negotiation inside a given policy area, applicable to European integration, but not exclusively for this purpose. In contrast to the path-dependency approach on European integration, the theory does not see European integration as *sui generis*, a unique case, but rather a general example of interaction between the state and the international system (Wallace 1999:156).

Moravcsik combines the insight from three different sub-disciplines in IR theory: liberal regime theory, negotiation theory and intergovernmentalism (Chryssochoou 2003:47). These are clearly recognisable in three distinct sequences. First, there is a domestic process within each member state participating in an international regime, which will end in the formation of the unitary national position on the specific topic. Second, the member states take with them their national preferences to the interstate negotiation-table. Here they would bargain over their positions. Different models of how this will succeed are drawn up, most notably deriving from Putnam's classic two-level game analysis (1988). Third, the negotiations will either conclude in the development of an institutional arrangement or they will fail. Applied directly to the EU context, the different heads of state in the member state are aggregating the interests of the respective countries they govern, a notion taken from classical liberal theory. In the next stage, they go to Brussels to negotiate with the other heads of state of EU member states, an idea originating in negotiation theory. This will end in success or failure, explained so by institutional intergovernmental theory (Caporaso 1999:160). On the whole, the threefold "economic interests, relative power and credible commitments account for the form, substance and timing of major steps toward European integration" (Moravcsik 1999:4).

2.1.1 Application of the LI theory

Overall, I take as starting point four basic assumptions in the LI approach. First of all, the liberal assumption in LI declares preferences can be chosen upon, i.e. they are not taken for granted. The construction of French preference and strategies is *prior* to the ESDP negotiations and are a result of pressure from internal sources, the internal economic dimension (Irondelle 2002:85). Therefore, French preferences are unaffected by norms and inter-state bargaining inside the ESDP meaning France will pay little attention to earlier negotiations and integration. Said plainly, there are no feed-back effects coming from the ESDP system of states. With a theory of national preference formation LI tries to reconcile the domestic element with ideas about international cooperation and the LI makes another contribution on how these are made (Sæther 1998:51). After the preference formation has taken place inside France, the government and the President will negotiate on behalf of the French state. The final result of the preference formation is a unitary French position, i.e. there exist only one national position. Due to her national character LI connotes that preferences are fixed in a certain order and France negotiates in ESDP-domain on this ground.

Secondly, the characteristic of the ESDP negotiation process from the LI approach is the centrality of the French state. The states are "initiators, promoters, mediators, legislators and promulgators of deepening and broadening European integration are the national governments in general, the governments of the major EU countries in particular, and heads of government, heads of state and powerful ministers specifically" (Puchala 1999:319). Member governments are capable of acting as entrepreneurs, providing ideas and brokering agreements with other member governments (Moravcsik quoted in Pollack 1997:126). With the emphasis on the centrality of the state one can claim it is highly based on the actor side in the structure/actor discussion in IR.[12] The Community system constitutes an intergovernmental bargaining setting.

LI[13] acknowledges that ESDP forms a "negotiation setting" structural element which increases the possibility of successful cooperation (Ginsberg 1999:441). But importantly, states do *not* give away authority or loyalty to other forums. LI would argue that supranational actors are agents of the member states rather than autonomous

actors (Pierson 1996:135), as international organisations mirror intergovernmental priorities and do not play an essential role in the integration process. An organisation is, in the last resort, dependent on the states that formed it. The member states still select the institutions they think would maximise their interests in the future (Polack 2001:232-233). Actually, institutions strengthen the role of national governments, firstly, by increasing efficacy through a cost reducing function with lower transactions costs and with provision of information. And secondly, by being a facilitator in interstate bargaining of a positive-sum game where the end results of an intergovernmental bargain is the delegation to some kind of "negotiated policy co-ordination" (Chryssochoou 2003:5&46-47). Moravcsik claims "the incentive to enhance the credibility of interstate commitment" (Puchala 1999:326) is the rationality behind an organisation. According to the argument, France will be indispensable in developing the ESDP, either as a break or as a catalyst. In sum, France would have an imperative role, and not subject to influence from the system *per se*.

Thirdly, the overall rationalist framework of Moravcsik's analysis (1998:19-20) is a core postulation in the liberal IR direction[14], forming four fundamentals (Gegout 2003:4). Applied to France, this will entail first that she is goal-oriented, as she would aim to enhance her security if threats are present. Second, France will calculate costs and benefits with the goal of maximising the utility of agreements inside ESDP (Hix 1998:46). Third, France would have hierarchal ordered preferences in the ESDP domain. Fourth, in LI, identities are taken for granted. France would be a rational egoist with relative indifference to what others achieve in negotiations. She is concerned only about creating a win situation for herself. Derived from this rationality, France is aware of the consequences of the outcomes of her decisions. This will mean that France would be "back to zero" after an intergovernmental negotiation and accordingly she will not be locked-into a later positions, nor will she follow a path-dependency future. France will be on the alert in taking decisions that will imply the binding of its future sovereignty. Moravcsik make therefore an opposition to the spill-over, locked-in and path-dependency theories[15]. The French national interest remains unchanged by the participation in the cooperation (Tonra 2003:734).

Last of all, ESDP influence is not evenly distributed between the states

participating (Irondelle 2002:85). Outcomes of the negotiations inside ESDP are a product of the relative bargaining power of national governments and by the distributions of preferences among them. Bargaining power is linked to the intensity of the preferences, i.e. a political element, and not only to military and material capabilities. Said simply, in the LI approach, space is found for both traditional notions of power and to the intensity of the preferences. According to Moravcsik, there will be no final common policy with bigger states opposing one another openly (Ginsberg 1999:442). Because of power there will be a "gradual process of preference convergence among the most powerful member states, which then struck central bargains amongst themselves and offered side-payments to smaller, reluctant member states" (Pollack 2001:226). As a consequence of her status, LI predicts an imperative and indispensable role for France in the ESDP. And further, the result will be close or identical to the one state with least desire to go forward with integration, what is called a least common denominator (LCD) agreement. If France would like to block any agreement, LI says she would be able to do so. On the other hand, one of the strongest tools in this interstate bargain draws from the notion of exclusion. This is that a group of countries threaten to still go forward with deeper integration despite reluctance from some other member states. France can use the argument of exclusion vis-à-vis countries reluctant to integration inside ESDP.

2.2 Historical institutionalism (HI)

Pierson and HI acknowledge the state's preference formation *can potentially be* based on a rational calculation of interest.. There is an actor-based approach in the model, with a focus on agency within a principal-agent framework.[16] But politicians cannot foresee the consequences of their decisions and the later impact it will have. If full rationality of the actors could be attributed, the level of information should be perfect (Hix 1998:48), something which is rarely the case, according to HI. Systematic growth of the EU has led to unintended consequences where state executives no longer can act as gatekeepers. Therefore, institutionalism, in its various forms[17], acknowledges another aspect of European integration; institutions matter. I have used the definition of institutional decision as "the rules of the game in a society or, more formally… the

humanly constraints that shape human interaction" (Pierson 1996:126). Bulmer & Burch (1998:604) compose a four point categorisation: first, formal institutional structure, second, processes and procedures, third, codes and guidelines and fourth, cultural dimension. These are overlapping and therefore only analytically separable. With this, HI entrench the function of culture defined as cognitive and normative principles and rules, in which more specific institutions are embedded.

HI has two components, institutional and historic. First, the institutional side of the argument claims that institutions are not neutral arenas of negotiation and they will influence the behaviour of actors. Information asymmetry, transactions costs and the credibility of the engagements (Irondelle 2002:87) are factors contributing to the path likely to be followed at a later stage by the state. With this HI modifies the rational actor model of LI, as it emphasises the decision-makers lack of information and the consequences of earlier decisions. In the end institutions contribute to the forming of other actor's behaviour, through norms and conventions of behaviour. Institutions create the boundaries of possible state behaviour. Moreover, Pierson's focus is the output side of the process, that institutions shape the end result of a social process. Institutional conciliation shape intentions and consequences in what can be called a broad exogenous contextualisation of action.

Second, the reasoning above becomes stronger when studied over time as acknowledged by the other component of HI, the historical context. Social processes must be understood as an historical phenomenon and take into account the decisions made in the past. When a decision is made this would have certain implications for the future, and, according to the HI, this would narrow the space for possible later negotiations. With the words of Pierson "limited information and knowledge about future consequences will lead to unintended consequences and spill-over which an actor can never fully comprehend or control" (Pierson qouted in Andersen 2003:11).

2.2.1 Application of the HI approach

In addition to accept France's endogenously made preference of France, HI would also argue for the exogenous impact of the ESDP institutions and the historical context. France *is* a rational actor, but the ESDP institutions will embody rationality[18] over

time, due to time pressure and limited knowledge about the future (Pollack 1997:100). Therefore, France cannot *only* calculate costs and benefits because "institutional change cannot be explained solely, or primary, in terms of aggregated rational choices based on utility maximisation" (Andersen 2003:7). The institutions, broadly speaking inside ESDP, will systemise, structure and constrain the creation of France's preferences and consequently the pursuit of her interests. In many ways, all the instruments of the ESDP, not merely the institutions themselves, but also the political commitments, would constitute what must be seen as some sort of *acquis politiques* which must be taken account of. Norms will be continuously be built into the institutional organisation, and normatively, the process can be irreversible and with a culturally *locked-in* effect.

A decision-maker would be dependent upon decisions made by their predecessors.[19] Pierson maintains: "actors may be in a strong initial position, seek to maximize their interests, and nevertheless carry out institutional and policy reforms that fundamentally transform their own positions (or those of their successors) in ways that are unanticipated and/or undesired" (Pierson 1996:126). Then, whether or not France wants it, when the next decision is about to be made, there will be a different background base, other conditions which will constitute the scene for the next decision-making. The procedures are institutionalised as the game goes on; it gradually changes character and consequently the basic ground rules change. HI preferences are not fixed as they vary according to actor's interactions, i.e. the dynamic element is stronger in the HI than in the LI. From this argument originates that processes must be dealt with over time. It is not possible, as LI contends, to catch the process in glimpses. Instead, the analysis has to be concentrated over a time-span of years. Further, in contrast to the LI, HI would focus on decision made in between the larger European summits on the ESDP, when the member state control is considered to be smaller.

France will be influenced on the ground of what rules, formal and informal, roles, identity and discourse exist inside the ESDP (Chryssochoou:48-49). Also, they are not only material, but also formed by ideational factors as the theory acknowledges the role of norms and identities as part of France's preferences. France will be apprehensive about the future of the whole ESDP cooperation as risk of failure would

be present. Also, France would be concerned about the gains, but not in the absolute terms as predicted by LI.

Pierson asserts *gaps* would occur in the member state control over the further evolution of cooperation, in intergovernmental organisations as well (Hix 1998:49), for three different reasons[20] (Pierson 1996:132-137). First, decision-makers have a *limited time horizon* when taking decisions. Put simply, politicians would tend to calculate the short-term effects, due to re-election concerns, and paying less attention to long-term outcomes. This is even truer when institutional arrangements are a response to crisis and as a result the decisions can be based on rather *ad hoc* arrangements. Pierson argues "long-term institutional consequences are often the by-products of actions taken for short-term political reasons" (Pierson 1996:136).[21]

Second, even supposing that decision-makers pay attention to the long-term effects of a policy, there will still be the danger of unintended consequences (Hix 1998:47). Social processes, like ESDP negotiations, have a high number of actors and "always generate elaborate feedback loops and significant interaction effects that decision makers cannot hope to fully comprehend." Why would this be so? There is a problem of overload making control difficult. "Time constraints, scarcity of information, and the need to delegate decisions to experts" (Pierson 1996:137) could occur, especially in time of crisis. Asymmetrical access to information is likely to be higher in a complex negotiation process. Also, we talk about spill-over, which is defined as "the tendency of tasks adopted to have important consequences for realms outside those originally intended, or to empower actors who generate new demands for extended interventions." In this analysis, I understand spill-over to occur inside ESDP-cooperation, between different policies areas inside ESDP.

Third, changing circumstances and new information on a subject, as well as the fact that governments come and go, mean national preferences can be changed over time.[22] A consequence for political science from this is that changes are "of temporal quality," it is therefore a necessity to analyse a process over time. When a gap in control has been created it would be hard to close because of two developments[23], according to Pierson (1996:142-145). Firstly, there could be institutional impediments to reform. This would include the whole spectre of what HI believes to be the

institutional framework of the ESDP: treaties, bilateral agreement, statements etc. Included are the role of norms and the sense of loyalty to the process itself. Although not impossible, the barriers to reform a process is usually very high politically speaking and to go back on an agreement would be even more difficult. In all, institutions are sticky; they tend to have certain conservatism around them. Secondly, and linked to the argument above, overall cooperation involves sunken costs and the rising price of exit. Commitments, and from there on the reversal of the policy inside an area is unappealing. Basically, actors decide on the rules of the game which later leaders would not necessarily prefer. Then, the later leaders are entitled to support the arrangement because the cost of exit from the arrangement would be to pricey political-wise. "The crucial idea is the prevalence of increasing returns, which encourage a focus on a single alternative and continued movement down a specific path once initial steps have been taken" and further in a situation with complexity, "new institutions and policies will often generate high fixed costs, learning effects, coordination effects, and adaptive expectations" (Pierson 1996:145). This is so because of the cost of exit has been rising. One can even argue that inside some policy areas the threat of exit is non-existent, partly due to the invested prestige and means in the earlier projects.

3 Methodology

3.1 Research-design

With the words of Andersen (2003:8), all interpretation implies generalisation, and vice versa. Analytical simplification of a multifaceted reality is the objective, as it is in all social sciences research. Unfortunately, there are no simple rules to take us from some knowledge about the world to theoretical generalisation with concepts. Still, the goal is to enhance the construct validity in maintaining a chain of evidence (Yin 1994:98); to find explicit links between the initial research questions asked, the data collected, and the ultimate conclusions drawn. The research-design imply a number of choices. It is the goal of this chapter to consciously scrutinise the alternatives and see whether they are in accordance with the standard I want to set when it comes to validity and reliability.

3.2 Case-study, strength and weaknesses

The dependent variable is French ESDP policy, analysed as a case-study. A case-study is quite simply the intensive study of one or a few analytical units, a relatively discrete and bounded event or set of events (Andersen 2003:15). The independent variables are what I have derived from the theories in the former chapter, either to be *national interest formation* or *ESDP locked-in effect*. A common problem in any academic work is to decide on the scope of the thesis, both in depth and how broad it should be. Intuitively, one can argue the empirical scope should have included a study of Great Britain, for comparative reasons and for a broader understanding. This could have been done, but not without taking focus away from the study of France.

A case becomes the opportunity to discover knowledge about how it is both specific to and representative of a larger phenomenon (Andersen 1997:126). French ESDP policy is part of a class of 25 other country's ESDP policies, which we can call the universe of the cases concerned. Despite this, my study is interpretative and the goal is *not* to make systematic generalisations beyond my empirical field of investigation. The conclusions *might* be applicable to other cases, but this *not* something I allege. Often in case-studies, there is a goal to find the most deviant case.

HI predicts a feed-back mechanism from ESDP on French ESDP policy. I claim France in this regard is a specific hard case. Due to the French history of Gaullism and the share size of France, I *a priori* believe the country to be prudent when it comes to being under influence from ESDP. If the thesis will recognise such an influence, it is *probably* applicable to other countries.

Overall, to avoid a so-called holistic fallacy (Miles & Huberman 1994:263), meaning to interpret events as more patterned and congruent than they really are, is central in this thesis. Naturally, some features are brought to light whereas other characteristics are left out, making it a possible fallacy (Yin 1994:104). Inference derived from data can be biased, the author can hardly be said to be objective here. In the end, data does not speak for itself; they use models and simplifications as medium. To make sure the conclusions are representative, efforts are made in making generalisations compatible with existing knowledge in the field (Andersen 1997:83-85). In addition to the large analysis of the embedded units in the thesis, I have undertaken wide-ranging research in secondary literature in the field.

And, further, with rich case material the researcher can use his previous knowledge about the case to identify important additional variables or validity requirements. In concentrating on one single case, one can use insight inside public policy process and social science theory to establish links of evidence (Yin 1994:111). In choosing a case-study as the analysing technique one can have the analytical control through a theoretical guided selection and with a good framework of investigation. This way, systematic theoretical conception can be connected with empirical implications. In particular, it gives the opportunity to search consciously for contrasting events, or outliers, to go against the pattern. Divergent events and statements which contrast the main story are sought. With a case-study, each event and statement can be analysed in greater depth and look for *deviant examples* positively, i.e. looking for negative evidence going against the theories (Miles and Huberman 1994:269 & 271). The pattern-matching logic made here compares an empirically based pattern with a predicted one. By constantly challenging the pattern predicted, the *internal validity* of the study is enhanced when seeking conclusions (Yin 1994:106). If there are outliers which do not fit the overall pattern, I have to discuss what

constitutes these outliers. In other terms, I am continuously seeking disconfirmation of the theories.

Case-studies cannot measure partial coherence, i.e. *how much* the independent variables influence the dependent variable. That a factor is part of a pattern which leads up to a given result is *not* a sufficient condition to say there is a causal connection. Case-studies undertake complex questions and the impact of the independent variables is difficult to determine.. Other potential problems include first, the a danger of *interplay* between the two theories, simply meaning they will influence each other. Second, multi-causality can occur (Andersen 1997:92-93&138), with some factors of explanation influence together with other factors. Potentially, numerous independent variables other than the ones adopted by our theories LI and HI can influence the dependent variable. Third, related to this, is the danger of *spurious effect*: there could be a third variable influencing both the independent and the dependent variable (Miles and Huberman 1994:272). By focusing on two specific independent variables derived from specific theories, the presence of certain variables precludes the presence of other possible independent variables.

These are potential problems and Yin (1994:123) says there is a goal to have an analysis which takes into account all major rival explanations. Still, I see this more as an ideal. The scope of this thesis makes full exploitation of rival theories difficult. But, what are the possible other variables? The external environment, the international system of states, are some of them. This will be touched upon in the thesis, although not systematically. They are drawn into the discussion where appropriate, most notably in chapter five and the discussions on the other alternative factors of explanation.

The case under study is analysed chronologically, over a time-span of 6 years, therefore giving it an element of a *time-series* approach. One reason are the theories chosen: HI predicts change in state behaviour as a result of participation in ESDP. The theories predict two different outcomes *over* time, and this therefore becomes a crucial part of my analysis. But time-series approach has an additional advantage. It is a more complex way of doing research and any match with the actual time-series would constitute strong evidence. In time-series, it is important to identify the specific

indicator(s) to be traced over time as well as the specific time intervals to be covered. Also, there is an advantage of tracing multiple changes in the variable (Yin 1994:113-118), simply meaning enhanced flexibility in the examination of the connection between variables. Important in this regard is that the array of statements and events into a chronology permits the investigator to have an idea about causal events over time. In this respect, the ESDP is a moving target, as it is in continuous evolution in our period under examination. The subject under scrutiny does not stand still. France must constantly deal with a different reality. To put it simply, the ESDP in 1999 was not the same as in 2002 or in 2004. Therefore, and perhaps self-evidently, the order of events is of vital importance.

3.3 Induction of the analytical unit France

I will use a descriptive approach, a *case description*, of French ESDP policy, which can serve as a base for my theoretical analysis. In reality, this is a construction of the empirical reality to make it comprehensible and ready for analysis. The smallest analytical unit in this thesis is the written content from the events, each *statement* from the French policy-makers. The universe of statements is almost never-ending. By another name, these can be described as the raw-data. Each phrase can be interpreted and I put the information obtained during the data-collection into thematic categories. By making this generalisation, a complex universe of embedded units can be described in a simple manner (Andersen 1997:130&135). I will identify what have been the *preferences* and *strategies* of French ESDP policy. By including strategies, a more complete picture of the case can be constructed.

At least some reference must be made to the methodological choices made in constructing the dependent variable in this study. The goal is not to make the categories for preferences and classification of strategies mutually exclusive. This means that more than one strategy and more than one preference can be “working” at the same time. French preferences and strategies are not in watertight compartments. Nonetheless, for analytical purposes we need to draw a line. However, I acknowledge the categorisation between preferences and strategies are only analytically separable, and thus artificial. They are the result of my own interpretation of the empirical

reality.

3.3.1 The concept of change-identification

Theoretical consideration is the justification of making change the central notion of the thesis, as it distinguishes the two theories. The induction of the empirical reality on each sub-category constitutes the basis for making a qualified judgment and discussion whether change has taken place. Therefore, my methodology for finding change is done through induction, on the preferences, on the strategy, and finally, all taken together, on French objectives.

The St.Malo declaration is used as a starting point. Then, I analyse the whole of the timeframe. To qualify as a policy the statement must be a pronouncement repeated over time, either in the form of actual action or in the reiteration of the position, in other words a continual policy. A problem in this regard is the possibility that France does not have an outspoken/identifiable position on a given subject, for instance on security strategy. If this occurs, I will quite simply state that France did not have a clear position. It is in itself an observation.

I have used criteria to identify change. A policy will be described as changed if is *qualitatively different*. Essentially, change is different as regards values, conduct and attitude towards a political theme inside the ESDP. This means reinforcement or weakening of the initial statement in either preferences or strategies. Reinforcement signifies new objectives or strategies which were not there before. Weakening represents goals and tactics which are interpreted to be either lower in importance or abandoned. Despite the definition, the operational criteria for *change* are not intuitively identifiable. Rather, I consciously acknowledge that it is largely a question of interpretation. It is frequently a question of small differences of degree and small shifts I expect to find, and it is a conscious choice not the make water-tight compartments of the dichotomy continuity/change.

3.4 Application of theory: operationalization

The central question here is; how can I identify the theoretical difference between HI and LI empirically? Theory is the systematic use of concepts, here my independent

variables, to make interpretations and explanations of a complex phenomenon, shortly to enhance our understanding (Andersen 2003:5) of French ESDP policy. A concept is a thoughtful recapitulation of one or more characteristics which define a class of events. They are supported and derived from a number of assumptions and they cannot be directly tested (Andersen 1997:70, 73 & 143). Importantly, here, I ask whether the operational indicator adequately capture the full content of the theoretical concept? And conversely, are there any elements that do not fit in who are included in the indicator? The answer to these two questions will decide the *content validation*. It is hard to make an indicator embrace everything from a former systemised concept. The choice is often between an operational indicator which captures everything in a complete way, but with high complexity, and a simpler one indicator, and one which is incomplete.

Analytical clarity is important. Consequently, it has been an aim to make LI and HI as mutually exclusive as possible inside some characteristics, despite seeing them, as said above, as compatible theories (Yin 1994:108). Both the LI and the HI approach are not made specifically for the purpose of being applied on the study of defence policy. I have used additional implications to make them fit to be put up against the empirical material (Andersen 1997:140). The understanding of how this is done are therefore one of methodological importance.[24]

The theoretical variable *national interest formation* includes the following empirical indicators. First of all, has there been change in French ESDP policy? If there has not been, then the H0 has been strengthened. The story should be told in the words of power, LCD, national preference formation, absolute gains, and no locked-in effects from previous arrangements. Is there evidence of these characteristics in the empirical material? Additionally, if there has been change, this must come from the internal preference formation in France and from only that source of influence. If change is identified in chapter six, are there signs in the empirical material of internal preference formation?

For the HI, the *locked-in effect* is the independent variable which predicts change. Because change would in essence mean that France would act differently than she otherwise would have done. If change has occurred I should look in the material of

informal, discursive and formal commitment France has made leading up to this change. Can ESDP rules and norms be identified that have made France change her position? What possible norms can be identified? Can major explanations be excluded?

3.5 The critical assessment of the selection of sources

The search for data, i.e. statements, is necessarily limited to the sources available. Still, I do not consider this to be a large problem, rather a common problem in any research in social sciences. The data is collected from a number of different sources and there are strengths and weaknesses connected to this. I have undertaken initial interviews of persons who I call *confidants* (Miles & Huberman 1994:275). These seven interviews are, on the request of the interviewees, anonymous (for further information, look in annex 4). I have used the unstructured interviews as guidance to my study (Yin 1994:84). They have provided insights and in-depth knowledge I would not have otherwise found as they gave opinion on the case under study, as well as embedded units in the study. Also, they provided shortcuts to prior history of the situation, helping to identify other relevant written sources of evidence. Still, they have not been given systematic weight in the analysis, although briefly referred to on an ad hoc basis. It is worth to mention the fact that these informants have enhanced the quality of the study. It has been a goal to offer some sort of data triangulation (Yin 1994:92) using both interviews and documents, although in a informal manner and only at the start of the process.

Despite the guiding interviews, the overall important sources have been documents. Important here is the *reliability* of data, if the collection and management is done in an accurate manner. I have used four types of written sources. First, official EU and French government documents. In the ESDP arena, this would be statements from EU-summits and other official documents from the EU institutions. One problem here is the diplomatic language often applied, although a thorough analysis can make it fruitful. Second, the different member states' positions and sentiments as seen through declarations, rapports, statements etc, evidently most notably those of France. Typically, these are often vague, with a diplomatic side effect of being part of a

positioning towards other states. This would imply a tactical game and are not necessarily part of the state's actual preferences and the change in policy. Any change would potentially be very controversial in French policy matters. Still, these texts can be analysed in a methodical way. Thirdly, secondary sources are by far the biggest contribution. This implies the articles and books written by political scientists and others. A critical assessment must be applied as their information can be distorted and be based on misunderstandings. They take a certain position and could be biased. Also, they appear often long after the actual events have taken place. And lastly, newspapers and magazines. I have concentrated my readings on quality newspapers, as the highly regarded Le Monde, Financial Times and the Guardian, as well as some others.[25] These are valuable for an update on the daily developments on the subject, essential for this case as it is recent. But these kinds of sources must be treated with care as they are second-hand literature, with its possible shortfalls.

Our biggest objections, methodologically speaking, are the possible biased selectivity and reporting of sources made by the researcher. To avoid this error, the researcher has had the possibility to triangulate the sources of information. The documents written by informants close to the process and with extended knowledge will be more likely to the best ones (Miles & Huberman 1994:268). On validity of the document, it is enhanced if it correlates with other sources, either on specific details or inferences made. There is a danger of over-relying on documents. I make inferences from observations made in documents to categories which are not necessarily directly observable. Still, I have tried to solve this by looking at different set of documents, such as declarations, newspapers and written articles. To have a variety of types of documents, with their different content, will enhance the quality of the study. Still, it is important with a critical assessment of the usefulness of anything written for the public (Yin 1994:82 & 84). And I consciously that different types of written sources often *are* written for different purposes than the one taken up in this thesis.

With the second-hand literature prominent in the ESDP field, there is room for bias and the interpretative validity can be in danger (Miles & Huberman 1994:268). But I do use informants with knowledge of the process. I try to look with a critical eye on my own efforts; I do try to check against hard facts and not least to check against

alternative accounts of a story. Quite frankly, the documents give new ideas of inference and causal links, although there is a danger of false leads (Yin 1994:81). To identify these divergences are part of the methodology and if appropriately managed, would enhance the validity of the study.

4. From autonomous action to actual capability

4.1 *Autonomy* for the first time in St.Malo

The St.Malo declaration between France and Great Britain in 1998 states: "The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage."…."To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises."

Using the word autonomous was groundbreaking in the relationship with NATO. St.Malo marks the starting point of a real defence policy inside the EU as it goes considerably longer than the ESDI perspective from 1994. It has been characterised as a fundamental U-turn as it broke 50 years of UK veto on European defence initiatives. The military weight of the UK gave the declaration credibility and legitimacy (Howorth 2001:769) and Europe could potentially, and more than the previous wishful thinking in Paris, be a security actor in its own right. At the Cologne summit in 1999 the ESDP saw its official inauguration as the passage from an ESDI to an ESDP were conceptualised on a full EU basis (Dumoulin *et al.* 2003:136). This was the first time the word *autonomous* appeared as EU vocabulary in this domain, along with the WEU terms of *conflict prevention* and *crisis management.* Despite this groundbreaking development, how autonomy was to be achieved, to be discussed in political as well as academic terms in the years to come, remained vague and ambiguous. Ambiguities were looming and in sum, one can maintain "the St.Malo declaration agreed on the principle, but left out agreement on the motivation, substance and details of the declaration" (Howorth 2002:6-7). Five thematic legacies from St.Malo will be briefly discussed in this chapter to act as a background for the analysis of in later chapters; security strategy, military capabilities, institutional framework, actual operations and relationship to NATO.

4.2 A strategy? From Petersberg Tasks to the Solana paper

"The means to decide to use them" from St.Malo refers to the strategy behind ESDP. ESDP is built to take on crisis management responsibilities, laid down in the

Petersberg Tasks,[26] something that implies taking an operation from start to finish (Hunter 2002:85-88). A collective defence clause, as with NATO, has *not* been the preoccupation. The Nice Treaty and the 2001 Laeken EU-summit included conflict prevention and civilian crisis management pointing to a broader concept including both civilian and military crisis components (Dumoulin *et al*. 2003:152-159). Still, on the actual specific purpose of the Tasks there was no such thing as a European response until the European Security Strategy (Solana 2003).[27] Despite being quite broad in its approach, it essentially represents a compromise between the Atlanticist and European sides of the EU. It names three key objectives, stability and governance in Europe's immediate neighbourhood, building an international order based on effective multilateralism and finally, tackling the threats, whether they are old or new. Further, it is implied that, if military power were to be used, it is likely that the peace-operations would be long-term civilian-military operations to stabilise regions, with rather large-scale operations and with a certain amount of risk involved (Ulriksen 2003:132). A combination of instruments are at the disposal of the Union: conflict prevention, RRF, and later battle-groups and police cooperation. With this, one can argue that EU is different from the US in that it deals more inclusively with the background reasons for a conflict. It does not tackle the issue of the doctrine of pre-emptive strike, the US strategy adopted by Bush (Black 2003), At least Solana has made something of a military doctrine, which supports international institutions and international law.

4.3 Military capabilities[28]

St.Malo stated "the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning." A growing gap in military terms towards the US was felt in both London and Paris and was later to be hardened by experiences in the Kosovo War, where Europe's military impotence was revealed (Van Herpen 2004:10). The gap can be said to consist of two related factors - technology and money. First, technology is vital in C4IRS: Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance, seen as indispensable for strategic command and

leadership. Broadly speaking, the ESDP needed soldiers to perform their policies. The ESDP had, during our whole period, shortages in every domain. Capabilities are also a question of money. The actual cost of the military equipment and the low military budgets in Europe are likely to further widen the military gap (Bertram 2004:17), a tendency already seen over recent years. With the Soviet threat diminishing, the major powers in Europe, the UK, Germany and France, have all cut their defence budgets (Boyer 1998:102).

Taking into account these shortages, three solutions have been at the forefront and relevant at different stages in our timeframe. First, for most operations under the Petersberg Tasks this capacity is not desperately needed, or it can at least be borrowed from NATO. The later development was to be known as the Berlin+. Second, the ESDP should develop their own autonomous military structures if not in all, then at least some military domains. Third, capacity can be found in a member state, under the lead-agency concept. Inside these categories, I ask questions on the topic of EU armament, actual military forces and the question regarding a military HQ.

4.3.1 Cooperation with NATO: Berlin+[29]

The grand bargain between NATO and the Europeans during the 90s was to facilitate the creation of ESDI, built within NATO, possibly drawing upon military capabilities "separable but not separate" from the Alliance.[30] WEU would be given the right to make use of certain NATO assets when the US would choose not to be engaged (Hunter 2002).[31] The Washington NATO summit[32] in 1999 stressed the importance of improving of EU member states' defence capabilities and guaranteed *ready access* for the EU of NATO capabilities. Later the same year, during the EU summit in Cologne, these intentions were out into EU documents. After various rows over the actual agreement, where both Greece and Turkey threatened to veto[33], the so-called Berlin+[34] arrangements were finally signed in December 2002. In essence, the Berlin+ essentially enables the EU to use the planning and logistic means, including the intelligence assets, of NATO, which the Union needs to conduct military operations. In fact, operations both in Macedonia and in Bosnia were made from SHAPE. Consequently, a special EU armament policy is desirable to enhance both ESDP *and*

NATO capabilities. An ERRF could be in compliance with the Berlin+, but the EU HQ is not seen as strictly necessary.

4.3.2 Making EU capabilities: HQ, commando structure and intelligence

Certain military capabilities are held by many states and some duplication of the different national armaments inside the EU is natural, although counter-productive to the overall output. Less than 5 % of European countries defence research and technology budget is spent collaboratively in the EU, according to Solana (2005). Armament purchases have be seen as a natural sovereignty issue and protected by article 296 which one can proclaim to make an exception from the rules of the single market. This leads to duplication of military equipment and contributes to ESDP shortfalls in the military capabilities in intelligence, transportation and offensive assets, such as cruise missiles and air protection defences. This was one of the legacies from Serbia and Kosovo, especially the shortfall of high-technology military capabilities (Hunter 2002:55).

Cologne outlined the EU military capacity (White 2001:151) and underscored "the need to undertake sustained efforts to strengthen the industrial and technological defence base, which we want to be competitive and dynamic" (Cologne European Council).[35] Further initiatives were taken afterwards. The Capabilities Commitments Conference (CCC)[36] specified the following national contributions in support of the Helsinki Headline Goal: 100 000 personnel, 400 combat aircraft and 100 naval vessels. From the CCC Conference papers, by 2003 the EU should "be able to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks" (Hunter 2002:96). Equally importantly, it should be possible to identify areas where there should be an upgrading of existing assets, investments, development and coordination to secure autonomous EU action. Later the same year, the Nice-summit signalled a focus on command and control, intelligence and strategic air and naval transport capabilities, three areas originally under the Berlin+ arrangements (Hunter 2002:110). These joint efforts were followed up during an EU defence minister meeting in November 2001 where additional shortcomings were identified with a plan to remedy them. Quantitatively speaking, the goals were

summoned up in a Force catalogue and operationally speaking in a capacity catalogue (Dumoulin *et al*. 2003:148-158). Some of the challenges included force protection, logistics and operational mobility. Shortly after the EU conference, a European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) was agreed upon by the EU member states (Howorth 2002:13), in essence about the HG.

In 2003, EU-ministers backed the plans of and EDA (Keohane 2004). The goal of the agency is to fill the gap the Union has when it comes to armament and stimulate the European integration, together with the Commissioner for industry, in the field of defence industry. Harmonising military requirements, coordinating defence research and development and encouraging the convergence of national procurement procedures are the main purposes of the Agency. Undeniably, this was the focus for the newly appointed leader of the agency Whitley said that rather than focusing on tanks, European armies need more high-tech equipment, such as effective communication tools and analytical equipment (EUobserver29/09/2004). Part of this enhanced cooperation was seen in February 2004, the EU planned for an extensive research program in defence and security, worth up to €1bn. Potential projects were intelligence sharing and surveillance.

Renewed acknowledgement of these shortages resulted in the Helsinki Headline Goal (Giovachi 2004:177), setting the target for a 60 000 strong European Rapid Reaction Force, ready within 60 days and sustainable for a year. It was to be deployable by 2003 (Rutten 2001:88). This RRF was to act under the Petersberg tasks, where the self-sustained element was envisioned to provide intelligence capabilities, logistics and air and naval assets. At the Laeken European summit in December 2002, the EU declared its military capacity operational with "The Union is now capable of conducting some crisis-management operations" (Piana 2002:4), something which was more political than real. Clearly, at this stage the EU could only fulfil the lower end of the Petersberg Tasks. Further initiatives were needed and in November 2004, the Defence ministers of the EU agreed to create 13 different battle groups[37] consisting of 1000-1500 men each. They should be ready for deployment no later than 2007 and can be deployed around the world at short notice with possible tasks ranging from peace-keeping combat missions operating under UN mandate.

The question of an EU command structure was something new (Howorth 2001:768). The command structure handles the strategic level, where the aim is to win the war, and the operational level, where the responsibility of leading campaigns.[38] At the strategic level, the operation Command HQ has three possible options: it can either be borrowed from NATO, or from a member state or the EU develops this capacity itself. In our timeframe all possibilities have been used. As part of the compromise which St.Malo constitutes, the EU was expected to use the intelligence, evaluation and strategic planning capacities of the WEU. This was not to become an option. Intelligence has been a weakness for CFSP, and would be for ESDP as well. National foreign services favour their own bureaucracy and an exchange of military intelligence inside the EU will certainly question the links to Pentagon and the CIA (Hill 2004:151). An issue coming up during the Iraq crisis was the proposal from Belgium of an EU operational planning capacity, baptised the Tervuren proposals[39], deemed absolutely necessary by the peace-camp and especially Belgian Prime Minister Verhofstadt (Howorth 2004:187). Later, under the Italian presidency, at the EU foreign minister gathering in Naples 29-30 November 2003, major steps forward were taken in this area, as the ESDP agreed to establish a EU strategic HQ in Brussels (Giovachi 2004:188).

4.3.3 Lead-nation concept or each state responsible?

The lead-nation principle means one state takes the main responsibility for an operation with the contribution of a military framework: it provides leadership for an operation with most of the forces and the command structure (Ulriksen 2003:132). Other states can thereon plug in their contributions if complementary assets are deemed necessary. A problem with lead-nation is that costs fall where the assets are, that the military powers also take the biggest part of the burden, seen in ad hoc funding of operations like Concordia and EUPM (Dempsey 2004d).[40]

By and large**,** the three developments are interlinked, and only analytically separable. A number of problems with European military capacity have been identified, but according to Ulriksen (2003:137&156) the real problem lies elsewhere. The EU is, overall, by far the second biggest military power in the world. So rather

than military capabilities, the question is rather what purpose the forces should be used for, linked to the deficiency in a common security platform. And further, coordination and making priorities of forces and operations is a problem foremost at a strategic level, and not the least at a security-political level. For the latter, the institutional framework is central and to which we now turn.

4.4 Institutional framework of the ESDP

The institutional structure of ESDP has seen a development in our timeframe, from "impotent" (Rynning 1999:119) to something of a clear structure. Still, huge dilemmas remain. "Policy is to be made within a more institutionalised cooperation inside the EU," and further "the means to decide to use them" was stated in St.Malo and are linked to the institutional build-up of the decision-making procedure in defence. Undoubtedly, the ability to make independent decisions is important for autonomy as a whole. As an overall structure, the WEU was increasingly seen as the problem (Howorth 2002:6-7), not the solution to the construction of a viable European pillar. Consequently, through the Cologne and Nice summits, the WEU became irrelevant (Missiroli 2001:2).[41] The aftermath of St.Malo saw the construction of the future politico- military institutions of the ESDP in Cologne[42] and Helsinki. The four temporary institutions from Cologne (White 2001:151) were made permanent under the Finnish Presidency and incorporated into the Nice Treaty.[43] It established the Political and Security Committee (PSC) (Cops in French), the EU Military Committee (EUMC) supported by the EU Military Staff (EUMS)[44], completing the institutional structure of the ESDP.

The Cologne summit allowed Defence ministers to meet in the GAC.[45] The reunion of defence ministers was envisaged in St.Malo, but successive presidencies did not decide definitively upon this. Until 2002, the defence ministers only met at an informal basis (Dumoulin *et al.* 2003:300). The power relationship between the political and military dimensions inside the EU work in separate ways, but according to Howorth, the coordination required inside the military wing of the EU is essentially driven by the defence ministers and this is likely to have some coordination effect on the political level. There is a consensus between the Defence ministers, on the contrary

of the divergence found between the foreign ministers of EU (Howorth 2001:779-782).

The establishment of the position of HR-CFSP was made during the negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, and former NATO-SG Javier Solana became, after his appointment in 1999[46], also the "Mister ESDP." Strengthening the visibility and coherence of the foreign policy of the EU were two obvious goals, but the HR-CFSP can also be seen as a figure that will strengthen the position of a more Brussels based policy in the EU becoming the locus of decision-making and the collective representative. What comes out of the institutional build-up remains to be see, but a future of potential institutional fights will make clear the direction of the EU (Howorth 2001:776&787). In many ways, the ESDP decision-making structure are still based on consensus and a high degree of coordination, both between pillar structures and the Union and its member states, and appears vulnerable, likely to be governed by political will (Ulriksen 2003:137). But it can also be seen as flexible and therefore fostering a new way of thinking about security.

ESDP is in many ways dependent on a viable CFSP. The structure agreed at in Cologne and Helsinki paved the way for potential dispute between new and older EU institutions as there is a certain bureaucratic fight between the Cops , who generally exercise "political control and strategic direction" (Rutten 2001:191) of the EU's military response to any crisis, on one hand, and the COREPER and PoCo[47] on the other (Piana 2001). Still, Cops got a key role in crisis management in the Nice Treaty (Missiroli 2001).

The prominence of the idea of avant-garde over the last years owes much to two developments. First, the Danish rejection of the TEU created the path of "opt-outs" in ESDP. This was concretised in Amsterdam's "constructive abstention" and in the "Structured Cooperation Procedure" which was written into the Constitution. Therefore there is a change in position from the British. Members could take smaller steps in European integration, but also the contrary argument of "opt-ins" was strengthened. Flexibility was the key-word, where some countries could decide to leap ahead. Second, and equally important, the Joint Task Forces (CJTF[48]) concept paved the way for the possibility of a participation of only a limited number of NATO

countries, facilitating later concepts of avant-garde in the EU and increased cooperation between some countries (Gnesotto 1998:49-50).

4.5 Actual operations undertaken

"A readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises" from St.Malo focuses on the EU will to act. Relevantly so, as the later lesson from the Kosovo War saw overall sixty percent of the sorties made by the US and eighty percent of the air-strike sorties. On top, the Europeans had been almost totally dependent on US intelligence, US transport, and US communications and logistics (Van Herpen 2004:10). On 1 of January 2003, the EU launched its first civilian crisis management operation in Sarajevo. EU was given the operation of policing in Bosnia.[49] The EU plans for Bosnia included both civilian and military measures to help the Bosnians to fight organised crime. In December 2004 an EU-force took over from NATO in Bosnia, including 7000 troops organised through the Berlin+ arrangement (Grevi *et al*. 2006). PSC and the EUMC update NATO on the progress of the operation[50]. Part military, part civilian, it is the most complex operation undertaken to date.

31 March 2003 saw the first EU *military* peacekeeping mission of 350 men in Macedonia, finalised by the end of the same year. The limited operation *Concordia* in Macedonia was run through the elaborate Berlin+ arrangements and was followed by a policing mission. Operation *Artemis* was the first EU peacekeeping operation outside Europe, placed in the Congolese city of Bunia with 1800 men deployed. The force was largely led by France in the framework of the lead-nation concept. Both these operations in FYROM and DRC show the significant steps the Union has made in the field of defence. In addition, there have been a number of smaller operations from 2003-2005, in places like Georgia, Kinshasa, Palestine, Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur, Iraq, Palestine again and also the troubled region of Aceh in Indonesia.[51] The presence in Gaza and the foreign ministers decision to surveillance of the border to Egypt showed once again the importance of the EU in making peace (Benderman 2005b). The financing of the operations has occurred to be rather ad hoc, with much of the burden falling on the ones undertaking a specific operation.

4.6 The changing nature of NATO and the US

Careful reading of the St.Malo declaration finds some reference to NATO: "in order for the European Union to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged…without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU" and further ESDP to be in "conformity with our respective obligation in NATO" at the same time as it should strengthen European capacity.

Madeleine Albright[52] explained Washington reservations to St.Malo with the three Ds (all from Chaillot Paper 47). The first, "any initiative must avoid pre-empting Alliance decision-making by de-linking[53] ESDI from NATO" relate to the non-acknowledgement of the implicit primacy of NATO and the idea of an ESDI within the NATO framework. There was nothing in the Cologne summit's declaration of NATO's primacy (Andréani 2002:991-992). The second "avoid duplicating existing efforts" (Hunter 2002:41). The US would not like see the EU use limited resources in building a new set of capacities that they could acquire from NATO. The third concern was to "avoid discrimination against non-EU members". What would be the role of those countries which were members of NATO, but not the EU?[54] These concerns were taken notice of with Cologne where final paper stated that NATO members could participate in "fully and on an equal footing" (Cologne). Albright had sustained the US support for the ESDI "within the Alliance" and the development of capacities (Hunter 2002:33): "The key to a successful initiative is to focus on practical military capabilities." However, the three Ds were judged by Pentagon to be excessive. The Americans have accepted the European project, but inside SHAPE or inside a European lead-agency state, but it was also reassuring that Europeans could have the ability should the US chose not to get engaged (Hunter 2002:30-35). Strobe Talbot[55] reiterated "whereby the European members can address and solve problems without always requiring US combat involvement" (Talbot quoted in Fanning 2000:219).

There is a fundamental difference in the two sides' strategic assessment. Indeed, there has been considerable doubt whether the US would bother to deal with crisis management, essentially the aftermath of war and humanitarian aspects (Howorth 2002:6-7). Indeed the US was sceptical of using ground forces in Kosovo, not least

because of a volatile public opinion. Washington was preoccupied with other initiatives in the NATO domain. The Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) at the NATO-summit in Washington aimed at improving several aspects of the NATO capabilities. In September 2002 Rumsfeld proposed[56] a NATO RRF, finalised in as a 9000 strong men force in 2003 (Hill 2004:157). This development would take NATO out of area, closer to the war on terror and it offered a solution on the problem of interoperability. From this emerged the new streamlined command structure, inside NATO, promoted by Britain (Howorth 2004:180). Lastly, one has to bear in mind the development of NATO and US engagement in the period, as the US in 2004 announced their plans to withdraw up to a third of their troops from Europe.[57]

5. French efforts to fill the gaps of ESDP

5.1 French preferences thematically

5.1.1 French security approach and identity

France made new strategic considerations after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Elevated demands for peace-keeping forces were the trend both in NATO's CJTF-concept and with the WEU Petersberg Tasks. The White Paper on defence from 1994 puts Europe as the central arena as "the ability for France to keep its position in world affairs is to a large extent linked to the capacity to influence the construction of Europe" (Livre Blanc 1994)[58]. Furthermore, the paper underpinned defence reforms when pointing to the humanitarian aspect and military *raison d'être* for the later ESDP. Specialised professional soldiers with a high degree of mobility, precision, flexibility, and able to be deployed at distance were part of the priorities of France. Furthermore, greater emphasis was put on the interoperability of the armed forces, the intelligence gathering with satellites and concomitant organizational capacities, known as "force projection model" (Rynning 1999:99-104). Concrete measures followed. France and Germany managed to rally the support of Belgium, Spain, Italy and Luxembourg to support the incorporation of the Petersberg Tasks into the EU framework in the IGC leading up to the TofA.

As top-priority for France there is prevention of crisis[59], international law and international solidarity are explicitly mentioned principles. Blended with these overall principles are the strategic objectives; to construct a stable international environment primarily inside the UN, NATO and ESDP. One can label this a Grotian notion of the international system, for it to be based on the rule of law, on international institutions and with the UN at the centre of the mechanisms available (Hill 2004:155). Taken together these principles, French argue for a multi-polar world, often defended by the President himself:[60] "It is certainly possible to organise the world from logic of power. But experience teaches us that this type of organisation is unstable and leads, sooner or later, to crisis or confrontation" (Tréan 2004). Indeed, common norms of international behaviour will bring legitimacy. The scope and instruments of the Solana Paper and

the US Security Strategy in 2002 show transatlantic difference, with French support for a multilateral approach to match US unilateralism.[61] France naturally pushed for her fundamental principles to be included in the ESS. Already during the EU summit in Thessalonica 2003, Chirac said he was not in favour of mentioning the American idea of preventive action (Lemantier 2003). The difference between the US and France is expressed on this point, not least on the willingness to the use of power, civilian and military peace-keeping and the higher French willingness of taking risks. The goal was to make a strategic instrument at the disposal of the EU whereby the continent could become a more self-conscious, coherent and efficient player on the international arena.

Still, the Solana paper also had the aim of rebuilding the transatlantic relationship, not least with the explicit reference to terrorism. And further, both the ESS and the Constitution fall short of a European art.5 of "all for all" mutual assistance in case of war that France was promoting. With the British concession on EU-HQ and *enhanced cooperation* in 2003 (see below), France agreed not to push further for the solidarity clause in the negotiations for the Constitution. Importantly, the difference between France and the US should not be overstated. A softer French approach yes, but with firm military backing to be used in hot-spots like the Balkans, Africa (Sudan, West-Africa) and Afghanistan. The danger, seen from the French standpoint, will be a division of labour where the US does the war and the EU the peacekeeping afterwards. For that reason, France defines the Petersberg Tasks broadly[62] "to be prepared for all non-article 5 contingencies" (Hunter 2002:64).

5.1.2 Military capabilities-pushing for greater cooperation

5.1.2.1 Armament, research and military industry

French aspirations have been quite clear on defence industries; a European industrial base and the development of high-tech military equipment. Therefore, France has been a driving force in providing Europe with effective communication and analytical equipment. The French, British and the German governments declared themselves in December 1997 in favour of an aeronautic and defence initiative (Giovachi 2004:179). Indeed, France and the UK agreed on, from St.Malo the need for rationalisation and restructuring of European defence industry. As a striking example, a lack of larger

transport planes in Europe was identified[63] (Ulriksen 2003:140-147). An agreement[64] on cooperation not reached until 2004 (Spiegel 2004). Another important development was the Galileo project has been funded heavily by France where the European Commission[65] shared the ideas of independence from third countries in such a strategic area as satellite navigation (Benderman 2005a).

The Franco-UK summit in Le Touquet in February 2003 (Dempsey 2003a), presented with German support,[66] initiated the idea of what was to become the later EDA. In the establishment of the agency, there have been tensions. On one hand, the French position was a broad aim for the Agency, putting weight on research and industrial cooperation, with the goal of matching the US in this regard. Potential progress should be made, according to Paris, on the financing of the EDA, learning from the previous failure of EU capacity plans, to enhance investment in research and avoid inefficient internal EU military duplication (Canus *et al.* 2004). Part of this was to strengthen the European industry in seeking new markets, with a preferential treatment of European products. On the other hand, the UK wanted free markets with more emphasis on capabilities (Zecchini 2004a). Defence analysts also in France see greater coordination in form of the EDA as the key to getting better value for money inside capabilities as it seeks to become a bigger global force (Castle 2004). In the end, EDA responsibilities contained both the preferences of France and UK.[67] Despite the French support of an EU single market for defence equipment, France still maintains an intergovernmental vision of the EDA. Such a position is not least due French self-belief in having an advanced military industry.

5.1.2.2 European Army? HG and the battle group concept

In the making of a European army there has been an evolution from the joint Blair-Chirac proposal of the Headline Goal (HG) in Helsinki 1999 to the establishment of the battle groups in 2004. St.Malo and consequently Helsinki can be seen as, building on the Eurocorps idea, being a Blair response to persistent invitations from Paris and Berlin to join the Eurocorps (Fanning 2000:217). Leading up to the EU Cologne summit, the Franco-German summit in Toulouse proposed to adapt *Eurocorps* and prepare the lead-nation perspective. Indeed, a French attempt at fronting RRF in

making it available for the service of the EU (Dumoulin *et al*. 2003:135-137). In 2003, France advocated that the Eurocorps should be made available for either NATO or the EU.

Howorth (2001:772) contends the Helsinki summit was a trade-off between the Brits and the French. Britain safeguarded real military capacity with the establishment of a European RRF[68] and the French secured seniority at the new institutional body COPS. In Nice 2000, Chirac allegedly insisted on the HG should be independent on NATO's military HQ. On the other side, Tony Blair stressed harmony with NATO. Therefore, in the implementation of St.Malo and Helsinki, deep mutual cross-interpretation persisted (Howorth 2002:9). Still, the next year, the CCC Conference were held and in the Force Catalogue, France contributed 12 000 troops, 15 ships, Helios observation satellites and 75 aircraft (Hunter 2002:95). Overall, it can be argued that since St.Malo, and even before, the organisation of the French Army and the definition of the missions have been modified in a way which is coherent with ESDP developing process.

London and Paris made detailed plans[69] of the battle group concept in November 2003, before a tripartite summit with Schröder in Berlin who endorsed it. One of these was to "improve significantly the interoperability of member states." Another was "in addition to preparedness, military effectiveness, deployment ability, and sustainability of forces" (Wintour 2003). Highly supportive, France was to have one group on their own, one in cooperation with the Eurocorps countries and one with Belgium (Le Monde 2004b). Also France proposed and headed the new post-conflict gendarmerie force, agreed to within the EU in Autumn 2004 (Kirk 2004b). Importantly for French policy, Africa was seen to be the testing ground.

5.1.2.3 Head Quarter (HQ): SHAPE, lead-nation or EU-HQ?

Appropriate structures, with the capability of relevant strategic planning and sources of intelligence, have been the French ambition in promoting capacities in building a military HQ. The question has rather been in what form and inside which structures? Three parallel developments have occurred in my timeframe, with a French preference

for developing a lead-nation concept *and* EU-HQ, to the detriment of a Europeanised SHAPE.

First, one could Europeanise SHAPE and thereby avoiding duplicating of NATO resources. The grand bargain[70] between France and NATO in 1996 referred to earlier WEU-led operations, command arrangements, headquarters and inclusion of all NATO-members,[71] essentially the later Berlin+ (Hunter 2002:15-18). If NATO assets are to be used, this would involve the use of the D-SACEUR (Stryken 2002) to lead the operation. Yet, the planning capacity inside NATO had been anticipated at the Nice-summit in 2000 and became manifest with French support in the 2002 Berlin+ arrangement.

Second, France is more than willing be a lead-nation in lending their HQ *Etat-major des Armées (EMA)* to command operations on either a strategic or an operational level. One problem is that only a few countries, France, UK an Germany, can be a lead-nation at operational level, as pointed out by Solana (Solana conference). For instance, only France, the leading European power in this respect, and Britain, have their own communications satellites. One solution is creating institutional frameworks where the states are contributing resources to common pools. Each state can focus its resources on a limited number of tasks and thereon cut back on other activities.[72] According to Ulriksen (2003:131 & 137-141), there has been a clear tendency of sharing responsibilities.

Third**,** in the mid-90s France wanted a WEU with an operational planning cell and reconnaissance capability (Boyer 1998), not yet realised. The later adoption of an ERRF included the creation of a wide range of command, control, intelligence and strategic transport capabilities, which, for Robert Hunter[73] (2002:64), were the capabilities the Berlin 1996 agreement said the EU should get from NATO, i.e. an unnecessary duplication. France was very much pushing for declaring the EU operational. Alain Richard said it was inevitable for the EU to dispose the instruments to be able to conduct an operation to manage crisis (Dumoulin *et al*.2003:133&152): the capacity of information and the preliminary analyse, a planning with responses to a crisis and finally a capacity for putting in place a proper response. This refers essentially to HQ capabilities France wanted.

France supported the Tervuren initiative, but reluctantly. The French agreed in principle with its necessity and could not refuse such an invitation from Belgium[74], but the timing of it was wrong (Interview 1, see annex 4). And indeed, France dropped the demand from Tervuren for a big independent military HQ. French withdrawal from the initiative brought change in Blair's position. From an internal document quoted in the FT Franco-British agreement was that "the European Union should be endowed with a joint capacity to plan and conduct operations without recourse to NATO resources and capabilities" (Happold 2003). Thereon a compromise was made between UK, France and Germany in Berlin 20 September. This paved the way for an EU-HQ agreed to in December that year to be placed in Brussels (Dempsey 2004c). Part of the agreement was that the Constitution should not have any reference to a mutual defence clause, the European dimension of SHAPE was made permanent and that defence decisions should remain subject to national veto (Hall 2003). The cell came in addition to that provided by lead-nations Britain and France (Dempsey 2004a). Later, Solana said the EU needs own planning HQ if the EU should be able to carry out high-level military combat missions or strategic planning for peacekeeping operations.[75] As said by a French representative in Brussels, the goals were "more efficient, cost saving, time saving, quite simply easier if in Brussels" (Interview 3, see annex 4).

5.1.3 Institutional framework of the ESDP

At the heart of the French dilemma is how to make a viable defence and, at the same time, preserve sovereignty. Any construction or alteration of the existing institutional framework will result in this dilemma. Before my timeframe, President Mitterrand had for a long time wanted defence on the EU list of competences rather than the second-best security identity[76] seen in from 1984 onwards (Gnesotto 1998:55-56). The French plan increasingly adopted in the 90s was to empower the EU by empowering the WEU (Deighton 2002:724). Before and during the Amsterdam summit, both the French and the British asked for a merger between the WEU and the EU (Andréani 2002:986), also endorsed by a similar Franco-German proposal in 1996. Yet, the WEU did not possess any operational capability (Treacher 2004:59). Increasingly, the WEU was

seen, both in London and in Paris, as the problem (Howorth 2002:6-7) rather than the solution to the construction of a viable European defence pillar.

France would like to have an ESDP that is *institutionally* efficient (Dumoulin *et al*.2003:307 & 301-303) on the international stage. This entails GAC for Defence Ministers, a seniority in the ESDP positions, including the one of HR-CFSP, French promotion of an EU foreign minister and support for an EU President.[77] Early in my timeframe, France was in favour[78] of a Council of Defence ministers, leading Chirac to post a formal French proposal in August 2002. A GAC could potentially galvanise French goals of cooperation during crisis and in common armament,[79] indeed seen with the speeding up of the decision-making process of the ESDP agreed to in 2005. In addition proposed with partners, both the HR-CFSP and the permanent President of the Union. Solana[80] "met the French criterion for seniority and pro-activism, the British criterion for user-friendly Atlanticism and the German criterion for Europeanism" (Howorth 2001:771). Chirac and Blair have agreed upon the importance of visibility and international prestige. Before the Cologne summit the French saw the opportunity to lead the debate on European institution and wanted COPS to be just below the national foreign ministers. France wanted senior ambassadorial representation whereas the UK wanted a lower rank order to ensure national contact . The French got what they wanted as the new institutions COPS and the Military Committee largely reflect suggestions made by the French and the Germans (Stark 2002:978). Later advancement in the area of institutions was when France sustained that an elected President of the EU should be in the position for 2 ½ years. Clearly, France wants seniority and importance to EU-positions with the goal being enhanced visibility in the world.

Still, there are challenges. The obvious inter-pillar problem of the Union will have to be addressed if a feasible and real defence policy shall be reality. Therefore, the need for synergies between the Commission[81] and the HR-CFSP, pointed out by France, is a question that needs to be addressed. France has been divided over the issue between pure intergovernmentalism and QMV, the first defended by UK, the latter by Germany. Intergovernmentalism prevailed for France in 1999 (Rynning 1999:114). Put simply, France does not want to involve the Commission and the EP too much,

revealing their doubtfulness in transferring too much sovereignty to Brussels. HR-CFSP, "ESDP-institutions" and the EDA are based in Brussels and can potentially strengthen the city as the locus of decision-making. France as would be sensitive to too much external impact (Interview 1, see annex 4). Notwithstanding earlier position-taking, France and Germany came with a joint proposal[82] of QMV in defence policy (Lefevbre 2003a), any such move was later to be watered down (Parker 2003).

France is sceptical about an inefficient enlarged EU, also seen during the negotiations over the Convention. France supported the clause of *constructive abstention* in Amsterdam (Article j.13.1) and the later *enhanced cooperation* in the Convention, permitting reluctant members to step aside. The making of coalitions of the willing is at stake here. The UK said no to enhanced cooperation in Nice (Missiroli 2001), but constant French pressure led to the acceptance from London during fall 2003. French strategy paid off, at last. Importantly, unanimity inside ESDP should still prevail, although the strategy to achieve this might have changed.

5.1.4 Actual operations undertaken by the EU- Rapid launch

The French position has been to promote operations in the name of the EU, especially seen in Macedonia, Bosnia and Congo. When the Berlin+ arrangements were finalised in December 2002 they gave new opportunities for the ESDP to take on missions. In Macedonia, there was a row regarding the *right of first refusal* which the UK argued that NATO should have in the eve of a crisis. This was seen as ridiculous in Paris. In Brussels in October 2002, Chirac pushed for early EU replacement of NATO in Macedonia (Howorth 2004:181), something finally becoming a Berlin+ operation with assets from NATO. On *Artemis* in Congo, this demonstrated a new model of Brussels political leadership, operational command through a beefed up national command authority and a coalition of willing and able forces. The deployment of 1800 men, mostly French troops directed from HQ near Paris, was a short but important test-case for France as a framework-nation. The operation was done in close cooperation with the UN, who finally took over with their MONUC operation later the same year (Grevi *et al*. 2006).

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan is not an EU force, but is compromised largely by Europeans[83]. Chirac, in February 2004, offered to the NATO-SG that the Eurocorps[84] to take over in Afghanistan, in fact a Franco-German proposal. The goal ostensibly to enhance the credibility of the European defence project (Zecchini 2004b). The Eurocorps had previously undertaken missions in Bosnia and Kosovo[85]. Eurocorps finally took over the mission in Afghanistan in late 2004 (BBC 2004). In winter 2004, EUFOR took over the mission in Bosnia from NATO, making it the biggest peacemaking operations in EU's history. Problems have occurred in Bosnia as well where a smaller set-back for the EU led policy operation was the recent quarrel about who was to be in charge of the hunt for war criminals, where NATO won out over the EU. The defence minister of France, Ms Alliot-Marie, said there was no secret that the French wanted this to be an EU led operation, but they did not have the support from other countries (Bouilhet 2004).

Africa has widely been seen as a potential testing ground for the battle group concept, as the operations in Ituri and Bunia. Importantly, the UN are closely linked to EU-peacekeeping, where the EUPOL-police mission in Kinshasa stands as only one example. Also, reference to the ESS of a "more orderly world" was used when announcing the AMIS II operation in Sudanese Darfur. In Darfur, the cooperation was close with another regional body, the African Union. France has been mentioned to lead nation such a force, within the battle group concept. EU defence ministers offered air transport assistance to the African Union in Darfur, when they called for help in 2005 and France was in the forefront to provide transport for 1200 men (Mahoney 2005b). There exists a "progressive manner" where keeping up the momentum is important. A number of lessons learned on the operational part (Interview 3, see annex 4). Overall, efforts of rapid launching of the EU military missions. France has always been at the forefront in deploying forces to hot-spots, especially when these have a purely European nature. In addition, the relationship between France and UK has been improved during the peace-keeping operations in Africa and on the Balkans (Stark 2002:969). Overall, this can be seen as a willingness to take responsibility. When France puts money and men into operation, it shows certain credibility (Interview 4, see annex 4).

5.2 French ESDP strategies

5.2.1 EU-multilateralism-Europe puissance?

EU-wide multilateralism quite simply means the whole of the ESDP engaged in the negotiation process on equal footing, something rarely having been the case. As already stated, there was a conceptual embrace of Europe in the White Paper from 1994. Still, the position has deeper roots: "Western Europe, in military terms dependent, in political terms divided, in technological terms anachronistic, will every day become more vulnerable to the solicitations which sway her: submission to American imperialism or succumbing to neutralism, necessarily the route to Soviet domination" (Mitterrand quoted in La Serre 1996:23-26). Part from the Soviet threat, Mitterrand sums up many of the challenges still posing Europe as a whole. Chirac realised France could not obtain *la grandeur* (greatness) in its own right, and to this end; France has used the EU as a power multiplier (Treacher 2001:23) of French national interests. Increasing the EU's importance in the world will entail or raise the importance of France is the underlying idea. A transfer *à la car*te by the French preferences towards the European level was necessary.

But there has been a fundamental problem between two camps in the EU. On one hand, lead by France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg supported to partly structure Europe's defence inside the EU.[86] On the other hand, some states saw NATO as the principal point of reference in organising Europe's security, most notably the UK. The lack of the common interest still being a potential problem (Soetentrop 2002:121-122). The national veto in CFSP and the ESDP is rock solid and consequently the political will of the member states is the main question mark. In this, the internal debacle between the EU member states is the main issue, between small and bigger states, between interventionist and abstentionists and between powerful and not so powerful.

"The inconvenience of this system therefore is that Europe risks speaking with a weak voice, the weakest" (Ifestos 1987:286).[87] President Giscard d'Estaing's notion is even more pressing for the enlarged EU of today and even more so for the ESDP and the CFSP. A steady increasing number of member states in the EU have made the

decision-making system inefficient and in defence issues it is likely that member states would fight hard to defend their veto power (Zilmer-Johns 2003:11-12). For France, to overcome these challenges, has been a major challenge. How could France break the multilateral framework and impose her vision? Taken together, the politics of enhanced bilateralism, avant-garde and directory between powerful EU-states can be seen as a process where one makes different *fait accompli*, in the meaning France use a tactic where the decision has already been taken, either by a group of committed members as in avant-garde, or as a negotiation between powerful states, as in the directory (La Serre 1996:23). The initiative is thereon spread out to the rest of potential members, but the core content of the issues are already agreed upon and discussed in other forums, and they can therefore in little extent be changed.

5.2.2 Bilateralism with the UK- adjustments on autonomy

France does have bilateral relations with all EU-ESDP countries, but the ones with Britain and especially Germany are more institutionalised and important. These are used as a springboard to launch new initiatives and create compromises (Dumoulin *et al*. 2003:124-129). During 1994-96 it became increasingly clear for the French that a membership in NATO would *not* impede on their room for manoeuvre, but rather would be good card to play in order to allow the UK to participate in a militarization of the EU. A move from France would make a move from the Brits easier.

There are a number of reasons why France used a strategy to get Britain[88] on board, the most obvious was the sharing of strategically, political and economic arguments (White 2001:150). Conclusions from the war in Bosnia[89] and the then emerging Kosovo crisis and were bitter. Evidently, Europe could not handle their back-yard without help from the US. The increasing military capability gap EU-US made it necessary to both look at the effectiveness of the money spent on the security structure as well as the amount. Europe needed a credible military force, if not the Alliance would anyway be dead (Howorth 2002:6-7), an important thing for Britain to avoid, but also for France. Also, there was increasingly a “close-knit epistemic community” (Howorth 2004:174-175) between Paris and London having the same ideas about the legitimacy of the ESDP and sharing a culture of military intervention.

Lastly, Whitehall concluded that British interest in the future *could* potentially differ from those of the US (Treacher 2004:62) and consequently, reliance on the US military would mean reliance on the US diplomacy as well. This had long been the analysis in Paris. Still, and important to point out, Britain saw the ESDP as being compatible with still strong ties with the US administration, a view not shared to that extent in Paris. Part of the compromise or France was to live with the British self conceit as a bridge-builder between Europe and the US (Howorth 2000a:44).

In actual terms, the UK cooled down the implementation of St.Malo (Hill 2004:157), a policy slightly enforced with 9/11 as Britain underlined the relationship with the US in defence (Howorth 2004:180). Especially in the period 1998-2002, there was argument over the wording autonomous. UK perceived the ESDP as an "Alliance project involving European instruments," while for France, "it was a European project embracing Alliance capabilities" (both from Howorth 2004:175). Before Nice, President Chirac insisted that ESDP would be independent of NATO, while Tony Blair gave the opposite assurance. In 2001, the British government stressed the Atlanticism in the St.Malo declaration, to the bewilderment of the French who then argued that Britain denied the Europeanness of the situation (Howorth 2001:783-786). France and the UK interpreted the phrase "NATO as a whole" differently; the UK remaining firm in the "no duplication" idea, while France was of the opinion that the EU could act alone if NATO was not involved.

Although the concept of autonomy was and is still contested, in actual terms the St.Malo legacy remains. French leaders know there will not be a credible ESDP without the full participation of the UK as stated by Dominique de Villepin: "there can be no Europe without European defence and no European defence without Britain" (De Villepin 2003).[90] Not least, enhanced legitimacy beyond the Franco-German tandem was searched for. The most important goal for France is to keep Britain on board in actual terms with the realisation of concrete goals. Continuity should be stressed, despite some serious diplomatic setbacks as Tervuren and Nice. France is in this respect willing to adjust their diplomatic language and make Britain a privileged partner. Even the same year as the Iraq-crisis, the UK gave green light to EU planning-capacities in a HQ in September 2003 with France dropping the Tervuren plans (Black

2003a). It went beyond Berlin+ and therefore constituting duplication, a concrete step towards actual autonomy. Moreover, the establishment of the EDA constitute further commitment by Britain as did the important establishment of the battle group concept in 2003/2004.

Overall, Paris and London have made *fait accompli* over these issues. The St.Malo legacy was initiated and developed by the two and the establishment of the EDA was made single handed from London and Paris. Both processes started with a Franco-British initiative where, first Germany, and then others could attach to. When the question on the topic of who was to take the leading positions of the EDA, the French general Jean-Paul Perruche and the Brit Nick Witney shared the two most senior positions (Zecchini 2004a). Also, the UK is a useful partner as France often finds herself in a position between Germany and the UK. In some cases, like the argument for an intergovernmental process, the French can count on the British defending her position as well.

5.2.3 The containment of Germany- the making of a partner

The relationship to Germany in the ESDP is both a strategy and a goal itself for France which emphasise reconciliation by containment, and consequently, the Europeanisation of Germany (Sjøvang 1998:34). It would be better with a heavy Germany *inside* Europe than a Germany making their *Sonderweg* in world politics (Hoffmann 2000b:311). In this, there is a certain continuity from the early Mitterrand (Ifestos 1987:149), through German reunification and until today.

In fact, there is a certain acceptance among the other EU members of the leading role of France and Germany, but less so in the ESDP. In taking position prior to summits, the Franco-German tandem fixes the framework for negotiation and give guidance and direction to the decision that are to be taken later. Even in defence this dates prior to St.Malo as France and Germany jointly proposed a common European deterrence strategy[91] (Europe Documents, Nr. 6559, 9.9.1995, p 3). The French used and informed Germany in Potsdam 1997 and Toulouse 1999[92] about their ambition to create an operational capacity for the EU (Van Herpen 2004:10). Since St.Malo, the Franco-German relationship has seen a common understanding on the ESDP. With the

Tervuren noting, the relationship developed. The traditional Germany double fidelity both to Europe and the US (Gnesotto 1998:110) came to a test with the Iraq crisis, it remains to be seen if the break is a definitive one. With the anti-war alliance, it was a return to French-German *bilateralism plus*. In a way, back to the politics of the Eurocorps as an avant-garde policy.[93]

Still, differences hang about, as Old Europe of pacifistic Germany and a more military oriented France form an odd alliance.[94] A military arm is notoriously rejected so far in Germany (Bertram conference). Also on resource allocation, Germany does not spend enough in defence, according to France. This is seen as a major weakness concerning Germany's (Stark 2002:971-980), and by consequence, France's ambitions. It is clear that for France Germany will be a most welcoming and vital allied, although not totally inevitable, for a strong and autonomous ESDP (Orban 2003:8).

5.2.4 Directory

"If the three of us agree, Europe is likely to be more united" (Harding 2004) Foreign Minister Jack Straw said when Schröder, Blair and Chirac met in Berlin 2004. As a core concept, a directory involves more than bilateral talks and agreements, but stands short of EU-wide multilateralism. During certain periods, France has used both bilateral and trilateral summits with Britain and Germany, to form an informal directory inside to reinforce the dynamic of the ESDP process (Dumoulin *et al*. 2003:129). The military capacity these nations possess, most notably France and Britain, is the source of their influence. With enlargement, the Franco-German tandem has come under pressure. And in the ESDP Britain has more to offer. Further, the aspirations of Blair to become a European leader entail becoming part of some sort of directory (Halligan 2000:190-192). France wants to identify key partners to push the others member states as "there is no political will in NATO" (Interview 3, see annex 4).

A directory has been seen as a contradiction to the rules of the CFSP, but deemed necessary for a proactive EU-role in world politics. The European Council in October 2003 was preceded by a directory summit between the three in Berlin in

September, where the UK accepted the need for tighter and "structured cooperation" (acceptance of an avant-garde), a European HQ and a permanent European SHAPE (Howorth 2004:187). February 18 2004 saw the same constellation ahead of an economic EU meeting and was used to discussion on the setting up of an EDA. France and the UK brought Germany into the process. France, impatiently waiting to go forward in defence, often plays the card of either avant-garde or directory, when the integration process goes slowly. It is no coincidence that the Berlin 2004 meeting came after the failure to agree on the future Constitution in December 2003. In international politics, the Bosnian Contact group show tendencies at being a directory. Another example is the big EU-3 formed group established to diplomatically persuade Teheran from developing the atomic bomb.

Despite the examples cited above, an ESDP-directory is not an evident evolution as the bigger EU-states have highly divergent interests on their vision of Europe. But it is a goal for the French to get Germany and Britain on board. Another potential problem is the scepticism from the other EU Member States[95] and the problem about not letting somebody out, something also being relevant to the notion of avant-garde.

5.2.5 Avant-garde

Avant-garde refers to conception that a limited group of members states can decide to integrate in a policy area through the principle of enhanced cooperation, with other members possibly joining at a later stage. Intellectually, the idea has long existed. A Franco-German proposal from 1984 was essentially a Europe of two speeds. To get the mind-set of an avant-garde into the EU-framework in defence, as with enhanced cooperation, was a French priority and the UK backed down on the latter in September 2003 (Black 2003a) as mentioned above. Until then the UK, as manifested in Nice, stood steady on the veto in defence. France has always been ready to go ahead on the ESDP, to show the way, especially when the process has been slow, and the goal is to let France have more space for taking action (Lamassoure 2002:890). The whole impetus depends on the ability to drive the process forward and keeping up the momentum. EU in two circles, with France in *le cercle des solidarités renforcées* (the

inner circle) is often being mentioned. This has either been done by the President himself, as with the Iraq-crisis and the collapse of the IGC in 2003, but the mindset has been shared by Chirac's entourage, Alain Juppé and former foreign minister Védrine (Boyer 1998:99).

The scenery for the meeting in Tervuren, at the height of transatlantic tension, between France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg, pointed at the reinforce cooperation. These were the ancient allies of the Eurocorps.[96] Interviews suggest that France did not really push the agenda for reinforced cooperation in Tervuren, and that this was more of a proposal from Verhofstadt. France felt they had to sign up to it because of they agreed on the principle. But Chirac later publicly personally regretted the "pollution" it had caused on the debate and acknowledged the timing was wrong (Martin 2003), pointing to the downgrading of the avant-garde policy for France. But as mentioned under directory, when the failure of the Constitution was looking to happen, the French was threatening to go forward with a hard core of willing partners, a quite deliberate tactic (Black 2003b).

5.2.6 The French transatlantic strategy

As we have seen in the former chapter, NATO and the US have come up with objections on both different European and French proposals. For France, any initiative inside ESDP would have to be made cautiously and can be described as a balancing act between own ambition and the relationship to the US: how to reconcile a strategic and political autonomy in the Union with a strong and permanent NATO.

France accepted the necessity for some NATO structures in the 90s, particularly after the Bosnian War, with, at the same time, an increased understanding of the strong Atlantic ties many European states feel (Gnesotto 1998:53). Indeed, one can call this policy a French rapprochement to NATO. When France rejoined the Military Committee of NATO in 1995, she showed greater engagement than ever since 1966 (Andréani 2002:987). But this was not done without demanding return favours. France said they were willing to reintegrate into the military structure if NATO reformed its concept. At the 1994 NATO summit in Brussels,[97] both the ESDI[98] and the CJTP concept were endorsed, much to the wishes of Frances. Part of the goal was put

forward by then French Defence minister Charles Millon: “we intend to incite change... NATO’s renovation has already begun but is still incomplete” (quoted in Boyer 1998:102). Chirac wanted an adequate position inside NATO only if the organisation prepared the ground for a European identity, becoming formal with the Berlin+ arrangements. For France it was the best possible compromise between long-term aspiration of a *Europe politique* and the new strategic situation after the end of the Cold War. After the 1996 compromise inside NATO, dubbed the grand bargain[99] by some, one saw a return to *status quo*, as, in the end, the US perceived the Europeanisation as a “purely technical matter” (Gnesotto 1998: 50-51&62-63)[100] and the French hope for further European autonomy was never reassured (Hoffmann 2000b:314). In 1997, France declared[101] they would *not* rejoin NATO military organisation and moreover, they wanted a European to occupy the traditionally South Command of Europe. The political disagreements with the US returned. Partly because of this, the development of ESDP gained momentum. The Americans, who were consulted before the St.Malo summit, was nevertheless shocked by the stress on autonomy in the proposal (Lutz 2001:15).

After St.Malo, Albright’s three Ds was met with a willingness to reassure the sceptical Americans, but nevertheless was dubiously answered by Chirac[102] : “to consolidate a balanced relationship between the EU and the Alliance, avoiding any duplication, facilitating dialogue and cooperation between them but without calling into question the Fifteen’s autonomy in decision-making and their capacity to act, where appropriate, solely with EU capabilities” (Chirac 2001). A clear example of France’s balancing act. On duplication, and as a response to the capability gap, France argues still that some would be necessary if EU is supposed to do anything in the world. Consequently, more burden-sharing between US and Europe is set to improve the British goal of a healthy transatlantic relationship. The position of the US has changed in this respect in that the US is pushing the Europeans to take more responsibilities in crisis management, in this respect representing more a driving factor than a limitation for the ESDP. And further, for France, a certain decoupling is therefore necessary to make a balanced relationship. From a French point of view, discrimination is build into the very idea of cooperation (Howorth 2001:783). If there

is no independent decision-making procedure it will virtually give NATO, or the US and other NATO countries, a veto in ESDP. The fear in Paris is for the "right of first refusal" where the NATO was to decide whether NATO *and* the EU should act (Gegout 2002:70), giving away decision-making autonomy to countries like the US, Turkey and Norway.

The US concerns for autonomous action were subdued with the Helsinki accords and in 2001, Alain Richard said[103]: "all nations of the Union were invited to take part, no loss of sovereignty was envisaged, new and real capabilities had to be built, the European Security and defence policy was consistent with the role and responsibility of NATO (Speech by Alain Richard quoted in Hunter 2002:31). Once again, France is prudent coming to challenge the transatlantic link in actual wording.

Importantly, the French analysis is that the US position has changed in our timeframe, with three important lessons from this. First, European peacekeeping is not a US priority. Maybe the Europeans are the only one willing to take the burden of the so-called Petersberg Tasks? In this respect, the Europeans have found a niche. 2002 saw a Rumsfeld proposal which developed into the US announcement of a NATO RRF.[104] In a way, it was a competitor to the European RRF or battle groups. The duality reminds us to note the obvious fact that the improvement of NATO and the modernisation of ESDP military capabilities have been happening at the same time. As predicted, Alliot-Marie[105] insisted it should be a complement to the RRF and not an alternative (Howorth 2004:183). Second, Europeans should talk the language of Washington, with the increase in military capabilities. With EU military capabilities, this would mean more influence in Washington, merely from the point of view of the view shared there of influence after military capacities. A coherent Union will be taken seriously in Washington. And third, NATO has changed and could become an *ad hoc* organisation forming a flexible reservoir, something France can use as an operational toolbox, much in the same vision as the US (Interview 7, see annex 4). When it comes to NATO, one often get the impression that France would like to abandon the organisation altogether, but there is still an interest in preserving some of the functions of NATO (Interview 2, see annex 4). For France, NATO has its own credentials[106], as the operation in Kosovo shows (Interview 4, see annex 4). France supported the

Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) inside NATO, at least in official language (Hunter 2002:49). And lastly, Chirac[107] said on the topic of NATO response force "we are a leading contributor to that force" (Wright 2003). But the US policy towards NATO has changed, not least after 9/11 and Afghanistan, France became ever surer that they could not balance the US inside the Atlantic Alliance (Howorth 2002:17). What was the point of balancing inside an Alliance that the superpower did not care too much about?

As the Iraq war suggests, the Americans would like to do a strategy of divide and rule, something which will hamper the ESDP development. To counter-act, the French blocked the request from the US in giving military aid to Turkey through NATO (Orban 2003:7). It is possible to see this as a move by the French about undermining NATO. Also, Tervuren can be seen as a response and alternative diplomatic move against the warring partners in Iraq.

6 Discussion on change-continuity

In this chapter I identify whether change in French ESDP policy (preferences and strategies) have taken place. The focus on change is not done because I allege it is more important than continuity, but rather because change is the central concept distinguishing the two theories. The point of departure for identification is the former chapter and no substantial new information will be added in this chapter.

On *preferences*, I first identify statements which show a *qualitatively* difference from previous statements, either in the form of *reinforcement* or *weakening*. I will claim change has occurred in French preferences on the following topics: on the limited scope of the Petersberg Tasks, the letting out of an art.5 type of reference in the Constitution, the acceptance of three parallel developments in creating a military HQ and the enhanced importance of conducting peace-keeping operations. On *strategies*, I give two different accounts of the French strategies followed in my timeframe, either *Eurocorps avant-garde* or *UK-directory* (see definition below). I will point out there has been a gradual shift towards French emphasis on the UK-bilateralism and a directory with the big EU-3. This evolution come to the detriment of cooperation with the Eurocorps countries and the notion of avant-garde. Indeed, a change has happened.

6.1 Change or continuity in French ESDP preferences?

6.1.1 Changes identified in the French position

Although the Petersberg Tasks are quite clear, they remain dubious in scope. It is important to keep in mind the different interpretation of these Tasks. France still has ambitions in applying a wide definition. In principle, Paris apprehend peace-keeping to constitute any military operation as long as there is military striking power to back it up. In reality, there is a "right of first refusal" for NATO. A division of labour between EU and NATO is unsatisfactory for France. Yet, the realistic French politicians know there is a long way to go. Only 3-5% of the European forces can be deployed beyond the European national borders, something which contrasts with up to 75 % on the US side, according to the US ambassador to the EU (Mahoney 2005a). Nevertheless,

France has accepted the Petersberg Tasks as the framework for the military build-up of Europe. This constitutes a slight weakening of statements made in Nice of true autonomy. On security strategy, the Solana paper was a fulfilment of a long-term and indispensable French objective Yet, France had to compromise in 2003 in letting out an art.5-like reference in the Convention for return favours on the EU-HQ. Indeed, there was a weakening of the French preference. Once again inside security strategy, France had to admit the prevailing NATO officially.

The HG in Helsinki was not capitalised in a concrete European army, consequently France still had ambitions in this regard. The recent battle group concept is in line with French thinking where the interoperability between forces has been imposed on the other member states. Still, the battle groups constitute less in actual military power than originally intended in the HG. A small, but nevertheless weakening of the French position. Further inside capabilities, the NATO RRF is in competition with the battle groups. Although France says she supports the NATO-forces, she has a preference for the military operation to be conducted under an EU-flag. The question of military HQ is illustrative. France said HQ *had* to be part of the capacity the ESDP. French priorities changed in this regard, in accepting institutionally three forms of HQ. Lead-nation HQ and an Europeanised SHAPE fall short of French ambitions. The first because there is no burden-sharing within Europe for France. Consequently this constitutes using France's wide-ranging, in European terms, military capabilities. Yet, it is not a good alternative because France wants something independent from NATO.

The French pushing for EU-HQ was quite unsuccessful until 2003. France had to accept the defeat of the true aspiration of the Tervuren-proposals during Fall 2003. A compromise was reached EU-HQ, as explained above, but a smaller version than the one envisaged by France. The EU-HQ could potentially Corthenberg turn into something bigger. Important here though, French policy had changed.

The occurrence of actual ESDP-operations constitute a change in French ESDP policy. Due to having the right framework, France now have *enforced* ambitions. With the different Berlin+ and lead-nation concepts, France is more willing to take on responsibilities, linked to power ambitions and with the goal to enhance their own and

Europe's military legitimacy. France has given away forces and very actively promoted forces to be projected under the EU flag. Both in Macedonia and Bosnia, France wanted more responsibility, something rejected in Washington. After ESDP had gone through a conceptual phase from 1999 to 2002, the operational aspect in planning operations has been at the forefront ((Interview 3, see annex 4). France knows EU-states have to show they are capable of conducting military operations, not merely decide they are able. From 2002 onwards, France has increasingly promoted initiatives and operations.

6.1.2 Continuity identified in the French position

On other major developments identified in chapter five, I claim a continuance of French ESDP policy. With the EDA, France has found the right framework to foster armament cooperation. The UK gave up their long-standing hostility to such an Agency. It turned out that both Paris and London found the ongoing ECAP-process unsatisfactory in providing military capabilities. The establishment of the EDA was done jointly by France and UK to the detriment of others. It is hard to make an assessment on change here, as the Agency is quite recent. France wants wide-range tasks, but the budget is rather low and much is still in the sovereign hands of the member states. The code of conduct in armament purchases was an important development in 2005. Still, France has hardly changed her position here. France has been selective, in an intergovernmental fashion in choosing her partners on armament.

Institution-wise, the scrapping of the WEU was a change for something better, ESDP. The seniority in all institutions related to ESDP suited France. Here, France can hardly been seen to have changed much. Despite this, France had to agree to the Atlanticist Solana as Mr. CFSP to please Britain, but this was not a huge sacrifice. France remains steady on this subject of institutions, and has supported the small steps forward in institutional decision-making of the ESDP. Related to the topic of institutions, France sees the ESDP framework as inefficient. The remedy for this is, as explained under strategies in chapter five, to create directory, avant-garde and advanced bilateralism with core countries. Only this can bring the process forward. In this, there is a continuity in French preferences of defence matters being

intergovernmental. After 2003, Chirac's priorities have been the German axis and directory with Britain, with a de facto veto for all.

6.2 Change in French ESDP strategy?

According to Van Herpen, Chirac is said a volatile politician: "he opens doors and closes them, and can suddenly change his tactics, his allies, and even his ideas (2004:13-14). French ESDP strategy in the period does not give a uniform and straightforward picture. From my judgement, two different paths of strategies can be discerned. The first, called *Eurocorps avant-garde* refers to a special relationship to Germany and the other Eurocorps countries. There is a notion of avant-gardism on pushing the defence agenda inside Europe. The other, *UK-directory* denotes a highlighting of the relationship to the UK, a bilateralism plus, with a tripartite directory of France, the UK and Germany. Although these two paths are generalisation, with identifiable exceptions, they take hold of the main finding in the previous chapter. Moreover, they have been present at different times and with different strength during my timeframe. In relation to the concept of change, my main argument here will emphasize a gradual, but distinct, move from Eurocorps avant-garde towards UK-directory.

Europe puissance became, as time passed by, the only plausible route for French foreign policy. But the multilateral approach, in the meaning of making negotiations with all the ESDP partners, has rarely been used by France. This is due to the inefficiency of enlargement and to the fact that other strategies are more productive. Even though the enlarged EU makes integration slow, the aspiration for France *remains* EU-wide multilateralism. ESDP policies adopted should apply to the whole of the EU or at least sufficient enough to pool the most important resources from important member states. Very often EU-wide multilateralism occurred *after* the real initiative had been taken, as we have seen above. To reach her higher objective France had to find privileged partners, as seen when the ESDP integration went forward in 1998, 1999 and again in 2003 and 2004. To make coalitions of the willing inside the ESDP framework, preferably the ones with capabilities, is the French for both strategies. Cutting right through both types of strategies described below, France

has used the policy of fait accompli as a deliberate tactic. The alternative of going it alone was never to be prevalent in French ESDP policy.

6.2.1 *Eurocorps avant-garde* watered down

Avant-gardism is essential to comprehend this other direction in French ESDP strategy. The notion of exclusion is central here; to leave other countries out of the ESDP-cooperation. At least, the threat to make enhanced cooperation has been used. The rationality is to push those countries most willing, therefore the reference to the Eurocorps countries. Especially, Germany and France shared a common understanding. Legitimacy and money are the usefulness of German participation in this regard. The two countries managed to rally support for the Petersberg Tasks to become based in the TofA. France and Germany came with a joint proposal in 2002 (Le Monde 2002) of including in the EU-treaties the possibility of enforced cooperation, the very foundation for an avant-garde policy. Until 2003 the UK said no, most prominently expressed in Nice. Other than the example of Tervuren, the President has on several occasions defended such a viewpoint.

Eurocorps avant-garde has been present all along in my timeframe, but with different prominence. From St.Malo to Nice, UK-bilateralism was at the forefront. Yet, from Nice 2000 onwards one saw a gradual move away from the UK-bilateralism, with the 9/11 and especially the diplomatic rows over the radical avant-gardism of the Tervuren proposals in the aftermath of the US-led invasion in Iraq. German participation in the opposition to the Iraq war and the Tervuren proposals intertwined the two countries, even though the alliance remains to be tested in relation to strictly defence concerns. Degree of militarization is still a disputed issue between the two, but not impossible to overcome. France has *not* made huge changes in their assessment of the German ESDP participation in the period. In fact, there is continuance from Eurocorps in the early 90s to the Tervuren proposals as the same countries supported both initiatives. The advantage seen from Paris is that integration-friendly Germany is nevertheless pulling in the same direction as France when it comes to ESDP-relations with the UK. Bilateralism with Germany is very important for French ESDP policy, but the importance has changed. Instead of a Eurocorps avant-garde, it was replaced

with an EU-3 directory where Germany is included. Germany gives legitimacy to a possible EU-3 directory in security matters. There still exists a Eurocorps avant-garde path. Notwithstanding, I claim the strategy became lower in order than UK-bilateralisms.

6.2.2 *UK-directory* with enhanced prestige

My analysis is that France changed her tactics with St.Malo. French policy-makers saw compromising with the other major European military power, the UK, to be a necessity in cultivating a true European identity. In every document on European defence from St.Malo onwards, France accepted a transatlantic link, with important exemptions being Nice and Tervuren. From Fall 2003, reassuring both London, and to a lesser degree Washington, became more important (Zecchini 2004c). An example of this was the Franco-German proposal that Eurocorps could be under NATO-command in Afghanistan.

In the methodology chapter I underlined that the distinction between strategies and preferences is only analytical separable, i.e. subject to interpretation. I would claim that the relationship to the UK almost became a goal in itself in the period 1998-2005. When my timeframe is examined as a whole, the strategy to bring *and* keep the UK on board is the most striking feature. By accentuating the UK-cooperation, France has implicitly downgraded others. There is a line of continuance from St.Malo through to the establishment of the battle groups and the EDA, the high points of Franco-British ESDP cooperation. The 1996 rapprochement with NATO was used as a leverage to bring the UK into a European defence. Tactics paid off with the St.Malo agenda, where the actual arrangements were to be discussed in a two year period afterwards. St.Malo marked a high-point and the real beginning, but ended in Nice with the quarrel over transatlantic questions, in essence how to put into practice autonomy.

And yet, as I will discuss below, the pattern is not clear-cut at every event of the period. But it is important to emphasise that even though Franco-British relations was strained 2000-2003, with a culmination during spring 2003, some ESDP developments occurred. Remarkably so, the ongoing Berlin+ arrangements from 2002 remained

untouched, despite the Franco-American dispute over Iraq. Also, and noteworthy, the first ESDP operations took place in the same period. Tervuren thus marked a low-point in UK-bilateralism, but was soon forgotten. France returned to the support for enhanced bilateralism with the UK, the line initiated in St.Malo. In addition, the attachment to Germany was secured as well. Autumn 2003 and early 2004 saw two meeting between the big EU-3 setting the tone for the later ESDP-cooperation. They understood the added value on agreeing between themselves, undoubtedly in dealing with Washington. Concrete examples were agreeing upon an EU-HQ (Zecchini 2004c) and more diplomatically speaking EU-troika formed to deal with Iran nuclear. The occurrence of the directory of the big EU-3, constitute a change in strategy in France. Until then, there had been a lot of talk of directory. But whereas the old hypothesis from De Gaulle onwards was never to become manifest, I would claim one saw a cautious step towards such an EU-3 directory. Apparently, this is France's way of dealing with an enlarged EU. The idea of directory applies well with the enhanced French strategy of bringing the UK closer to Europe in military terms. It is important to underline that the battle group concept was an initiative from France and the UK, later to become a tripartite directory proposal with Germany. In the end, all EU-states participated in the concept. And importantly inside defence, influencing others should be made in accordance and often in actual cooperation with the UK.

The tendency is something of a combination between the two strategies of a directory with the UK and Germany and UK-bilateralism. To reach a common understanding can construct a foundation to make leaps forward. As an intellectual though, directory and avant-garde is highly related. They both serve the French preference of driving the process forward with actual and concrete developments, as seen inside our four thematic sub-categories of preference in chapter five. Therefore I will argue that the UK-directory strategy has a hint of avant-garde in it. In many ways, from Eurocorps based avant-garde to UK-based avant-garde. Still, this is pushing the defence agenda with the pace which the UK allows. Even though the President talks about making a core group of countries, avant-garde without the UK is not the solution at the end of 2005.

As a conclusion I will assert the overall French strategy changed the centre of gravity from the Eurocorps line to the enhanced bilateralism with the UK and directory. This is especially true for the periods 1998-2000 and 2003-2005. In between, the especially the quarrel over autonomy with the UK in Nice and the Iraq-war intervened. Therefore, it is *not* a thoroughly founded change I argue. Still, I discern a certain pattern right through our period. From a more forlorn and exclusive French unilateralism towards NATO France has showed an increasing willingness to go into an intergovernmental process with Britain. There has been an emphasis on the exclusiveness of the relationship with especially the UK, having in mind their special relationship to the US. In looking at my timeframe as a whole, the concluding pattern is the continuance of, even at the high costs of compromising on French red lines, developing the relationship to the UK inside the ESDP.

What changed in St.Malo was that the fight for autonomy was to be fought inside a qualitatively better framework for the French, inside an institutionalised ESDP itself. The future for ESDP was seen from Paris to be in cooperation with London. But the Blair endorsement of the later ESDP in St.Malo came at a cost. The consequence of the new framework including Britain was a stronger will to compromise. This was rarely seen until 2003, when important sacrifices were made.

Cutting right through these two paths of the often Janus-faced French ESDP strategy lays the relationship to NATO and the question of autonomy. The whole period is a story of confrontation and discussions with both Britain and the US on the concept of autonomy. In summing up the changes on preferences and strategies identified hitherto in this chapter, I analyse how the changes had an effect on the French quest for autonomy.

6.3 The end preference of French ESDP policy: autonomy

The French shift towards NATO in the 1990s was a strategy in the process of achieving its ultimate goal of a more viable European defence identity. French policies became one of creating capabilities, to avoid isolation[108] and with a stress on multilateral cooperation: from *singularité française* (singularity) to Europe (Gnesotto 1998:107-108). The goal was to stop the decline of France as a World Power. In the

end, only Europe could save the French vision (Hoffmann 2000b:311). Maybe the only way to oppose American power is in order to create a second, countervailing power? A balanced world is mutually beneficial, according to the French, although cynics might say it is just a way to put limitation on the hegemony (Howorth 2004:184-185). Coupled with the multilateralism and the emphasis on international law, one can argue the idea that only in a multipolar world France can play the independent international role that is *à la hauteur* of its ambitions.

Gegout argued in 2002 (Gegout 2002) that France has never changed her long-term preference; an autonomous EU decision-making structure and process in relation to NATO. The idea about autonomy has deep roots in the French conscience, notably because of De Gaulle's legacy. From this one can say that the old French preference of autonomy vis-à-vis NATO, initiated in De Gaulle's era, saw its manifestation in St.Malo and further, although with ruptures, came to force with the EU-HQ and the battle group concept. Autonomy entails military, operational, strategic and institutional structures. Importantly, the ESDP framework in 2005 is totally different from the one seen in 1996, where US domination is less. Inside this framework, the battle for autonomy could be lead. Therefore, St.Malo should not be underestimated. It marks the beginning of the gradual modification in French policy.

A natural follow-up of this analysis is how long the autonomy goes in 2005? The question is as posing today as they were when Albright first came up with the three Ds. Based on the empirical material, the balancing act of France remains rooted in autonomy, although in a lighter manner than before. Balance means to speak the US language of having actual military capabilities. The goal is to exert influence. In addition to having made new capabilities, militarily, strategy wise and institutionally, changes has been made in reinforcing ESDP operations. It is a more trustworthy partner the US now faces when coming to peace-keeping operations. The objective of developing military capabilities depends heavily on Britain. Therefore, there has been a change in French strategies towards an underlining the relationship to Britain. Because of this strategy, French goals of independent EU-HQ and art.5 of EU has not been pushed.

France does *not* seek to turn into a systematic rival to the US**,** rather she wants to be, and want to be seen as, America's diplomatic and military partner. And indeed, on capacities, the US wants Europe to do more. Also, the strategic concept of France sees the use of force as legitimate in solving conflicts, something in line with UK and US. Therefore, a central dividing line is *not* between soft and hard power, but rather between multilateralism and unilateralism, what the French see as between power and democracy. In this, Barnier's[109] words of alliance is not allegiance. The US must be stopped diplomatically at occasions, not least when breaking international law. Referring to the virtues of international law is a way of influencing USA (Howorth 2002:17), through balancing the US super-power. With balance, the French understanding of it is rather to bring more equity within the community of values underpinning the international system. The war in Iraq showed the scepticism of using force as a legitimate way (Howorth 2004:175). France is against the concept of pre-emptive strike implied in the US Security Doctrine from September 2002, a line followed in the UNSC from the previous autumn and the supported by international law.[110] "Regime change" is not a legitimate UNSC objective, as outlined by Chirac.[111] Indeed, there is a significant difference between France and the US in this respect whereas the latter see the UN as one of several different alternatives. Yet the French foreign policy in the period examined here has been ambiguous in relation to international law. The non-UNSC sanctioned war in Kosovo saw the participation of French troops (Hoffmann 2000b:315), and France and Germany made military contributions[112] to the US-led Afghanistan-campaign (Hill 2004:148).

The other Europeans must be convinced to accept the need for balancing the US. The analysis in Paris was she, with the enlargement of both the EU and NATO, would be increasingly undermined due to the increasing member of both these organisations. Therefore, France has concentrated more about having good relations to London in two distinct periods, 1998-2000 and 2003-2005. In the latter period, there were signs of the development of a directory between France, Britain and Germany. Compromises were made in St.Malo, Helsinki and Cologne, but came to a standstill in Nice over the question of autonomy. From 2003, important compromises were made with France and Britain on questions like military HQ, art.5 for the EU, EDA and

enhanced cooperation. It is therefore the conclusion that there was a change in strategy from *Eurocorps avant-garde* towards *UK-directory*. Therefore, the French quest for autonomy from NATO remains a preference, but it has been modified to suit Britain. Often, the policy has been one of coming up with the initiatives, to agree with the first the UK and then Germany. Lastly, the proposals reach the rest of the EU. With the adoption of the Headline Goals in Helsinki and with the EDA, this occurred.

The military capability can give way to more room for manoeuvres for politicians and foreign ministers. If the military component and the convergence of different European armies are already in place, this could have a spill-over effect on the political field at a larger EU context (Giovachi 2004:177&183-189). This is part of the French strategy. With the EDA, the arrangement is not perfect for France, but rather a first step towards more institutionally based integration. The same can be said about the battle groups. According to analysis made at the time, if the US was to be unable to take action, the EU could expand from the platform with battle groups and HQ agreed on in 2003. Despite the compromise, "I am convinced that this would develop" the Belgian Prime Minister said on the eve of the HQ achievements, somehow reiterated later by Solana as "the model of the cell is more important than the size"[113] (Solana conference). During autumn 2003, the planning-cell was seen as a Trojan horse[114] by the US because, as one diplomat said to Reuters, "it could develop from 20-30 men to 300" (Lauritzen 2003a). I would argue this was exactly the French ulterior motive (BBC 2004a). Despite the implicit right of first refusal for NATO in the agreement, one can see this as a French-UK *fait accompli* both towards the US and other EU member states (Martin 2003). Therefore, in managing to get the UK on board, and with Germany in a directory, France can rally much more legitimacy and political weight behind an argument inside ESDP.

Accordingly, part of the French strategy from 2002 in this regard has been to let actual operations undertaken by the ESDP to speak for themselves. The French way of doing business is to develop some kind of crisis-management concept. If a crisis-situation is about to occur, one does no know 100% how the EU will react. Therefore, EU-operations have been ad hoc when coming to which nations send troops, who

contribute economically etc. the operation in Macedonia was a typical example (Interview 7, see annex 4).

The challenge is the implementation of the balance on autonomy (Howorth 2002:3), seen with the quarrel about arrangements after St.Malo and negotiations during fall 2003. US is sceptical of anything which will disrupt the balance. One can say that the French strategic choice has been to try to influence the US, not by systematic approval inside international organisations, but rather from the outside. It appears that Britain, has more of an inside role and tries to establish a special relationship to the US. It seems like both camps, after the war on Iraq have overestimated their importance in playing either role (Howorth 2004:173&188). In the atmosphere of détente after the actual war many instead look at the common interests "old Europe" and the US actually share (Orban 2003:9). .

Overall since 1996, and more importantly so from 1998, the objective of autonomy has been modified towards a more realistic approach. As a consequence of the ESDP strategy France has chosen to follow, she has then had to adjust her end objectives to be in accordance with the British ESDP policy. Still, the autonomy from NATO is steady there, but with a stepping down of the emphasis on reducing the influence of NATO. In a way, the analysis in Paris is that NATO is reducing its importance itself over the long-term. Therefore, the change is rather subtle, as the overall goal is by first glance consistent. France can live with the UK, and to a lesser extent the US, making objections, and thereby letting the actual developments on capabilities, institutions, operations and strategy speak for themselves. France has chosen to change in accepting an autonomy light. Still, France has taken her role seriously, with actively promoting her vision. Therefore, I will not contend a complete change, but rather a *modification* of the French preferences of autonomy to an acceptance of an *autonomy light*.

7 Synthesis of French ESDP policy and theories

The chapter seeks to answer the second part of my approach: to figure out if the empirical pattern corresponds with the theoretical predicted one. I will make a discussion in this chapter on what can explain the modification of French ESDP preferences towards an autonomy light and the shift in strategy towards UK-bilateralism. As explained in the introduction, the two theories differ on the likelihood of change and the explanation for change. Can the change in French ESDP policy be explained from a consideration of her *own interests alone* or has there also been *feed-back* as a result of participation inside ESDP? LI and HI are at variance and I will conclude on which of the hypothesis (H0 or H1) has been strengthened in this thesis. As mentioned in chapter one, I do not aim to test the theories. Rather, I will try to see whether they can give different elucidating versions of the same empirical reality. The goal is to find out which of the theories are most able to explain the empirical material described until now. Below, I discuss two narratives based on the theories. Towards the end of this thesis, I see whether there is room for bridging the two theoretical approaches.

7.1 The LI narrative

Internally in France, the President of France has large powers. The change in office from Mitterrand to Chirac therefore played a role. Chirac was not necessarily the anti-American, despite the accusation of such a claim with the anti-war coalition in 2002-03 (Orban 2003:1-8). The security revolution taking place in France in the 90s can be seen as result of a new analysis among decision-makers. There had been a huge change in the external environment with the fall of the Berlin wall. Yet, the initiators of the new policies were French. The rapprochement with the UK can therefore be seen in the light of the White Paper, the ESDI the same year and the extended arm to NATO in 1996. One can argue the shift in focus towards another security concept was made before I start to assess the policy in my timeframe. France then changed her strategy and objective in accordance to the new security milieu. France became more tactical, less outspoken of own ambitions, in relation to NATO, as she realised the

weakness of standing alone regarding military capabilities. There are other external factors which were instrumental in determine the establishment of ESDP. Most prominent are the lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo, which revealed for the Europeans, not least the French themselves, the emptiness of their operational and decisional capacities. Such explanations are compatible with the LI approach, as it emphasise the internal debate in France. It underlined the growing understand of the necessity to act. When Britain changed position in 1998, the solution became an intergovernmental cooperation of ESDP.

Taken as a whole, the initiatives from the states in ESDP were "strictly intergovernmental" according to Dumoulin (*et al.*2003:122). St.Malo was a negotiation between two states, something that gave the push for the development of ESDP (White 2001:92). When St.Malo was agreed upon, it was a question of negotiations over numerous subjects as institutions, actual operations, capabilities and further. France, along with Britain, wanted to keep the ESDP in an intergovernmental framework, whereas Germany would like communitarisation. Later examples of initiatives have been exercised on an aggregated level, between the large member states. St.Malo, Helsinki, Cologne, EU-HQ, battle group and EDA are the best examples of preference formation around the larger member states, followed by EU-wide multilateralism. All the examples just mentioned see a Franco-British negotiation, with a common understanding shared by Germany, and then, negotiations on an all-EU basis. The example of Helsinki is illustrative. New structures were accorded, which largely have been seen as a trade-off between the UK and the French (Howorth 2001:772). Britain safeguarded real military capacity with the establishment of a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) which was to act in accordance with the Petersberg tasks, and the French secured seniority at the new institutional body COPS. Another example to underline the LI approach was when the EDA-posts were shared equally between UK and France, further pointing to the importance of these two states. Power clearly mattered and Dumoulin (*et al.*2003:130) has argued that it gave the bigger states a larger say in the development of the ESDP, especially the earlier stages of the negotiations. This is as predicted by the LI, both the reference to the intergovernmental process and the notion of power of the larger states.

I have already argued the legacy of St.Malo was contested. Not least Nice and Tervuren were ruptures in the overall trend of a UK-directory. What the LI theory does not explain so well, is the unsteadiness between choosing either of the two strategies above. Tervuren constitutes a deviant case in this regard. Orban has argued that France had different motivations in saying no to the Second Golf War (2003). Especially are national interests, internal politics and anti-American sentiment, but also the French belief in fundamental principles and the role of Chirac. Chirac wanted to be the Gaullist character in what must be seen as his own political project and is likely to maximise his reputation in promoting the policy of French *grandeur* further. Also, the changes referred to above which made me conclude with a autonomy light in the former chapter, is hard to explain from the LI approach.

If one chooses to see the Tervuren proposal coming as a consequence of an extraordinary event, the Iraq war, then the LI argument holds. Internationally, France *had* to stand up to the US. As a defender of a multilateral world order, a guiding principle in their policies, France could not go against this principle. not least the home opinion was sceptical about the real motives of the war. Anti-American sentiments were part of the internal political game. The French leaders had to face a strong and general public condemnation of the war in Iraq. The Tervuren-proposals revitalised the old French idea of an Eurocorps avant-garde, something which is in agreement with the LI and the *notion of exclusion*. It is clear it means a cooperation solely between those participating. As such, the avant-garde method can be seen as a process where on constructs various *fait accompli*, which other can join. Tervuren can be seen as a threat in going it alone. When talking ESDP-cooperation, the whole transatlantic debacle could put, and did put, the UK-directory line in danger. Although a blow for the UK-directory line, it was not at all vital.

To a certain extent, the resistance against war in Iraq can be seen within the scope of the LI. Indeed, from an ESDP perspective, the opposition to the war in Iraq show a hierarchy in French preferences and strategy. The autonomy and opposition to the US was more important than the relationship to the UK. The objective of autonomy from US and NATO was, even if in diminished fashion, upheld. Therefore, the change in strategy to greater interdependence between France and UK was

nevertheless inferior in order to the goal of autonomy from the US. Even though France had changed her strategy of rapprochement and cooperation of with the UK, from internal perspective and domestic opinion, it was not possible to advance the legacy of St.Malo when the war was looming. Indeed, this was not the first time the France and UK clashed, as quarrel in Nice had already been the case. Anyway, the result was a heated debate and the following Tervuren proposals. Significantly for the ESDP, Chirac soon regretted taking part in the Tervuren meeting.

Overall, there are convincing arguments from the LI in explaining the French ESDP development from internal preference formation, LCD and intergovernmental preference approximation. But important deviant cases have been identified with the case of Tervuren and Nice. More difficult is it to explain the French preference modification towards an autonomy light. France changed her strategy early in the period with rapprochement with NATO, then compromise with the UK between St.Malo all along to the establishment of the EDA. Indeed, preference can be seen to be steady, France never lost sight of her ultimate goal, autonomy. But this was changed to autonomy light, as seen above. The changes in French ESDP policy in 2003 was not autonomy as interpreted some years before. Here, the LI will this is part of the negotiations of any intergovernmental process. From the LI perspective, it is essential to understandthe French strategy in switching to autonomy light. As said above, the French analysis of transatlantic security was the increasing irrelevance of NATO, not least underpinned by US unilateralism. On the compromises reached in 2003, the battle groups, the EDA, the letting out of a an art.5 in the Constitution and the EU-HQ, it was better to reach some kind of agreement than none. At the same time, actual military operations, even within the NATO-framework, would speak for themselves. Only the future will show if the strategy will pay off. Although this has a logic resonance in accordance with the LI-argument, I still would argue that other facets must be included to understand the ESDP policy. HI provides the alternative story.

7.2 A narrative based on HI

It is plausible to maintain there has been a locked-in effect of participating inside ESDP. HI would claim this was due to the understanding found in 1998-99 on the topics of St.Malo, indeed a natural follow-up of the agenda there. The resemblance between French rapprochement to NATO and the Berlin+, St.Malo, Helsinki and Cologne on one hand and battle groups, EU-HQ and the EDA on the other, is striking. And further, actual operations undertaken by the ESDP can be seen as a continuance of the true aspirations of the HG. France signed up to the first mentioned agreements with Britain, something making it difficult to alter them at a later stage. Especially the shift in line in strategy towards UK-directory can be seen through the lenses of the locked-in effect. I would argue the change in French ESDP policy has come from the feed-back mechanism in having recognised the UK as a privileged partner. Also the empirical finding of a French acceptance of autonomy light corresponds well with the HI approach. By adjusting to the speed of Britain regarding ESDP initiatives, one can argue strongly for the locked-in effect. For instance, France made a deal on the HQ which was not understandable without a compromise with the UK. By taking Britain on board, the transatlantic cooperation is more in the forefront in French ESDP policy than it otherwise would have been if France was to choose alone.

One can say that France stood firm on the defence compromise in 1996 and 1998 in a long-term perspective until 2005. A reason for this was the analysis in France of the lowering importance of NATO, not least for the US. St.Malo was a compromise with the UK and the agreement in St.Malo became a moral obligation. Therefore, my argument is that the feed-back came not from the organisation ESDP in itself, but rather the commitment made in UK bilateral relation. This is not totally in line with HI predictions, as will focus on feed-back from the whole of the ESDP, not merely one country.

Despite this overall picture, there is a rupture in this development from 2000-03. The symbol of this policy became the Tervuren-proposals. Tervuren as such therefore constitute a deviant case not easily explained from the HI approach.

Still, in the HI perspective, the backing down on Tervuren shows the entanglement of France inside the St.Malo heritage. I would argue it is not likely

France would have acted in the same manner if the institutional backdrop was not there. Detachment from the UK occurred, but still, the overall picture inside ESDP is one of continuity. Iraq, and consequently Tervuren, was a set-back, but not an end to the ESDP-cooperation, as the important elements of cooperation *after* the Iraq war shows. The ESDP went into hibernation with the Iraq crisis. But hibernation does not mean the end and already in the same year as the war, the ESDP saw serious momentums. Chris Hill (2004:143) concludes there are no signs of renationalising inside ESDP what has already been achieved. There was incremental growth in ESDP operations even during the Iraq-crisis.

The year 2003 saw France riding two horses, both Eurocorps avant-garde and UK-directory. Tervuren can be explained from the long-term objective to form a European defence identity of the Eurocorps countries, indeed reference can be made to HI concept of entanglement in earlier agreements. The initiative came from Belgian premier Verhofstadt and France felt they could not possible say no to something they had desired for such a long time. An independent HQ was their true objective, the ideal objective, and such an invitation could not possibly be resisted in Paris. When Paris, right through from 1984 and arguably from 1966, had sought such a dimension, they could not avoid opposing the Iraq war and supporting measures against the UK and the US. Tervuren can be seen as a measure against the warring parties. It would have been perceived as indulgence towards the US and the UK *not* to make measures against their proper version of the transatlantic relationship.

Another explanation shows resemblance to the latter argument. Tervuren *was* a rupture to the St.Malo line, but it is possible to argue that this was because France's earlier agreements she had signed up to. French always felt an autonomous HQ was part of the agreement in St.Malo. From the French perspective, Tervuren was just the natural prolongation of the St.Malo. In operational terms, an ESDP without a HQ would be worthless and not much more than a sub-division of NATO.

As a third understanding of Tervuren, HI will argue state leaders will not know the consequences of their actions, a variable not existing in the LI approach (Gegout 2002:78). France has indeed been wavering between two strategies of Eurocorps avant-garde and UK-directory. Not least the Tervuren proposals showed bad timing

and accordingly pose questions on the rationality of the decision-makers. I have already referred to the regret stated by Chirac of the timing of the meeting.

The military component in European integration should not be neglected. The armament of a military Europe can have important effects on the political coherent of the relation. In this, one can view the spill-over effect, argued by a couple of authors, notably Howorth (2001 and 2004) and Giovachi (2004). Related to this is the French idea of armament having exactly this effect, in that France has a deliberate tactic in developing the armament industry so that ESDP could maintain its momentum. With this approach, the pragmatic day-to-day cooperation can go on and progress can be found in more technical issues as military capacities, civilian instruments and interoperability (Howorth 2004:174). The building of certain capacities is paving the way for autonomy, i.e. military capabilities are, by definition, autonomy (Dumoulin *et al.* 2003:139). The ESDP was first coined at Helsinki, which was first set out to be a sub-set to CFSP, but after a while it created its self-related momentum (Howorth 2001:766). This is well understood in Paris, as they want to use the old method of first some sort of cooperation, then solidarity, then the firm institutions. Later, when the ESDP-apparatus is in place, action can take place. In many ways it is the policy of locked-in effects put into practice which is the method followed in Paris.

7.3 Combination of the two theories

In practical terms the integration is driven forward by operative, economical and political considerations (Ulriksen 2003:129), pointing forward to something more than mere intergovernmentalism. It would be a pricey and determined political will to reverse the process. The HI hypothesis has seen a strengthening with this thesis. But importantly, the LI bring to light important features of the empirical material.

On the French strategy, the two theories can be used together for better understanding French ESDP policy. LI points to the power of the bigger countries, as the empirical material has pointed out to be a striking feature. Still, France became locked-in the ESDP cooperation. Rather, France felt a commitment to both the strategies followed until then. Germany and Britain was to become privileged partners. In this, both the St.Malo legacy of UK-bilateralism and the German axis stand firm.

Not as predicted initially by the HI, from the whole of the ESDP-apparatus. The combination of the two theories give this insight. In conclusion, the central learning from this thesis is that French self-interest has played a major role, no doubt about it. Many of the major developments in my timeframe show the importance of the French national interest. Still, France has had to change this self-interest to suit Britain if there was to be a viable European defence in the future.

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Footnotes

[1] There are four major components in Gaullism: first a national industrial policy, second, an independent foreign policy, third, French nuclear deterrent and fourth a European dimension (Van Herpen 2004:2).
[2] Originating from a series of articles and books in the 1990s. Look in the bibliography under Moravcsik.
[3] Look at the bibliography for the relevant sources under the names listed.
[4] This means that it should be possible to make an observation that would show the proposition to be false.
[5] St.Malo in 1998 and Naples in 2003 are two obvious examples. Have a look later in the thesis.
[6] An analysis of a country will depend on how one looks at the broader process in the EU (White 2001:22-23) and the ESDP.
[7] I only allege that France will make decisions in relations to NATO having ESDP in mind. They will assess the impact.
[8] In the Bulmer (1994) defines thoroughly what is implied with an institutional setting. These include supranational and intergovernmental institutions, inter-institutional relations, internal institutional procedures, internal procedures and institutional norms. Instruments for the institutional setting include: treaties, constituent agreements, international law, secondary EU legislation and decisions, ECJ jurisprudence, soft EC and international law and political agreements.
[9] This concerns especially the position expressed by the foreign minister and the defence minister. A distinction is therefore made between these core members of government and other cabinet ministers. An element of dubiousness in the period is the five years of *cohabitation* between President Chirac and the socialist government of Lionel Jospin. Still, this thesis acknowledges this, but pays little formal attention.
[10] Originally take from Catherine Gegout (2002).

[11] ESDI: European Security and Defence Identity was, as the name says, a development of a European identity inside NATO agreed at the NATO Berlin summit in 1994.
[12] Still, on the other hand, Moravcsik said in his 1998 book that the pooling and delegation of sovereignty to the institutions serve as a mechanism to increase the credibility of the member states (Pollack 2001:232).
[13] With his 1998 book, Moravcsik clarifies his earlier work by stressing the theory of institutional choice and the "importance of credible commitments"; in this the supranational organisations might enjoy greater agenda setting power than previously admitted.
[14] Which the LI approach shares with realism and new institutionalism, although in different forms.
[15] Path-dependency and spill-over are different phenomenon. Path-dependency is often considered to be inside a policy-area, a policy sector, whereas the spill over might be between policy areas
[16] In this he is in line with LI and in opposition with more constructivist-resembling approaches inside institutionalism, like March & Olsen's claim that institutions constitute, and not only influence, actors and their actions.
[17] Institutionalism can be put into three broad categories, new institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism (Andersen 2003).
[18] On rationality, the main challenges therefore come from other theories. Constructivism would be one of those.
[19] This is not completely similar to spill over. Path-dependency is often considered to be inside a policy-area, a policy sector, whereas the spill over might be between policy areas
[20] In the theory, a fourth reason occurs, as there can be independent actions by the partially independent EC institutions, not relevant in this thesis. This is the Commission, the EP and the ECJ. They could have agenda-setting power, but this is unlikely to happen at larger extent in the ESDP area, where these institutions' competences are almost entirely restricted. The dilemma for the EU member states is that they would like to have both control over the decisions taken and efficient decisions making. In a Europe of an increasing group of member, this is not always possible. Also, the Commission can have what is called process power, meaning that the regulation requires experts, something the Commission can provide. Still, this would not be looked upon specifically in this thesis.
[21] There is of an "intentionalist fallacy" where the long-term consequences of the institutions, measured long after the initial set-up of the organisation, are often used to explain why they where established in the first place.
[22] Also a consequence is the short time-horizon of politicians.
[23] In Pierson's theory, there is also another component which will not be elaborated here. There would be resilience from the EU's supranational institutions that would use their resources, as budget control, to obstruct member state withdrawal from institutional arrangements. Still, this is of less importance in the area of ESDP, as mentioned earlier.
[24]There is always a menace that the author could misinterpret the original work. Therefore this author will hold open the possibility for other understandings of the theories and consequently underline the fact that this is applied theory and not the words of Moravcsik and Pierson themselves
[25] We have also used Nordic newspapers as Aftenposten, Politiken. Also FAZ in Germany.
[26] The Petersberg Tasks were developed inside the WEU context in 1992.
[27] It sets out the profile for an EU in foreign and security policy, identifying objectives, means and threats. The Solana Paper, adopted at the EU summit in Brussels in December 2003, was the first ever European Security Strategy made by Solana's top Diplomat, the British Robert Cooper.
[28] This is neither a list of all the possible assets missing in the quest for having European capabilities in the defence sector nor a consideration over the military problematic considering the shortages. A number of books and articles deal with this thoroughly. Rather, we would concentrate on the political will to remedy the deficiencies seen in Europe in this regard.
[29] Explanation of the Berlin Plus arrangements in annex 2 or in Haine 2006.
[30] See Ministerial Meeting in the North Atlantic Council/North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Declaration of the Heads of State and Governments, NATO Headquarters Brussels, Press Communiqué M-1(94)3, January 10-11, 1994, paragraphs 3-6.
[31] This includes staff officers, military equipment not available to the WEU states, the D-SACEUR and the CJTF headquarters (Hunter 2002).
[32] (Washington summit, April 1999, NAC-S (99) 64). NATO, Washington Summit Communiqué, Press Release NAC-S(99)64, April 24, 1999
[33] Around the Laeken summit in December 2001, Turkey used its veto power inside NATO to hold back NATO resources intended for use in the EU. This is a rather important element and it underlines the importance of the EU to have its own autonomous means, not to be blocked by outside members, most notably the US, Turkey or Norway, to state the most important ones (Knutsen 2003).
[34] Officially « *Déclaration OTAN-Union européenne sur la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense* »
[35] Cologne European Council, Presidency Conclusions, June 3-4, 1999, Annex 3, paragraph 2
[36] Was held 20-21 November 2000.
[37] Possible targets for inference should be so-called failed states, but indeed in limited regional crisis. The whole concept was the idea that forces could be sent out on 10 days warning and self-contained for up to 4 months. In addition, the whole concept had a civilian aspect to it (Ames 2004. The lead-nation principle, first tried in Bunia in DRC under the Artemis operation, with one country leading the command, would serve as the model (Beatty 2004).). Each group was to have force HQ and will be headed by a lead-nation which is to take up operational command
[38] Consists of HQ at three levels, the strategic, the common operational and the operational for each defence branch.
[39] The meeting on the 29th of April 2003 between France, Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium.
[40] For further information look at Missiroli 2003 and the financing of operations. ISS-website.
[41] In May 1999, the ten WEU members agreed to merge WEU with the EU (White 2001:150), and the Cologne summit gave the green light to bury it when the "WEU as an organisation would have completed its purpose." (Cologne source). At Nice, it was agreed that the functional link to the WEU would simply be cancelled (Missiroli 2001:2).

[42] The Presidential conclusion of the Cologne summit in June 1999 included an important part of how the ESDP should function (Hunter 2002:57), with the adequate institutional framework.
[43] The hitherto ESDP institutional construction was written into the Treaty of Nice as art. 25 where the tasks of Cops and the Military Committee were described in great detail (Treaty of Nice).
[44] These three bodies held their first meeting in the first half of 2000 (Salmon and Shepherd:73).
[45] They did so for the first time prior to the Helsinki summit in December 1999.
[46] Establishment of the position as Secretary-General of Council Secretariat to be High-Representative of the CFSP at the Amsterdam summit in 1997. Also, it clarifies and strengthens CFSP provisions; Common Strategies to be determined by European Council, policy planning and Early Warning Unit to be established inside the Council Secretariat.
[47] In similar fashion, the Political Committee (PoCo) deals with broader external issues than the COPS and they have lost the position- preparing functions they had to the COPS.
[48] The "Combined Joint Task Forces" (CJTF) in NATO from 1994 (Agreed at the Brussels summit in 1994) was essentially about the ability to act "out of area."
[49] Under the Acronym of EU Police Mission. This was part of the civilian initiative of Civilian Police initiative, integral element of the ESDP (Osland 2003: 83).
[50] Named ALTHEA.
[51] EUJUST in Georgia, EUPOL in Kinshasa, EUCOPPS in Palestine, EUSEC in DR Congo, AMIS II in Darfur (Sudan), EUJUSY LEX in Iraq, AMM in Indonesia, EUPOL COPPS in Palestine. For more information, look at (Grevi *et. al* 2006).
[52] US Secretary of State under President Bill Clinton
[53] In later references also called decoupling
[54] Discrimination refers to five members of NATO was in 1998 not members of the EU; Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey and the US
[55] Deputy Secretary of State under Clinton at the Berlin NATO summit.
[56] At the November 2002 NATO summit in Prague, the American proposal of a NATO Response Force emerged, and was endorsed by the UK
[57] 80 000 out of 119 000 troops were stationed in Germany at the date of the announcement (Mahony 2004), with 45 000 troops likely to be withdrawn from Europe. Also, some of the troops are to be moved further east, from Germany to the new NATO members, like Bulgaria etc. (Younge and Wilson 2004).
[58] An identical paper 22 years earlier had not mentioned such a possibility.
[59] For further information look at (Lamassoure 2002:886) (Howorth 2004:184) (La politique de défense de la France).
[60] What exactly this implies is not clear-cut, but key words are a rejection of puissance, international rules and a basis in the UN. Chirac has on a number of occasions defended a multi-polar world, where one of the last occasions was the visit to the UK in 2004 where this statement is taken from. Chirac also points to the common idea that the challenges of our time, amongst them, poverty, climate change, terrorism, proliferation of arms, would best, and perhaps only, be solved in a multilateral framework.
[61] This leads us to the fundamental difference between Europe and the US when it comes to power, where the former sees limitations to military power. For further reference see Rieker & Knutsen 2003. Also, The EU peace-keeping has two tracks**,** civilian and military**,** something that was adopted at the Feira Council in June 2000. The apparatus was supposed to be reacting quickly in regard to any crisis situation (Osland 2003:83-86).
[62] Said by the French ambassador to the US before the EU-summit in Nice 2000
[63] In fact, Antonovs 124 has been borrowed by the French for operations in Africa.
[64] Paris took steps to make transport aircrafts which were non-nuclear. Due to this fact, synergies between Paris and London became easier (Langellier 2004).
[65] In a 2001 Commission White Paper. Look in Benderman 2005.
[66] A joint French, British German proposal at the EU Thessalonica summit in June 2003.
[67] A support for strategically orientated research, making a European market for defence equipment competitive and enhancing the industrial and technological base.
[68] Which was to act in accordance with the Petersberg tasks.
[69] A joint communiqué between Blair and Chirac in November 2003 prepared the ground for the battle group concept. Later formally becoming a British, German and French proposal.
[70] The grand bargain ended with a quarrel in 1997 as France came into confrontation with the US when demanding the post (White 2001:148).
[71] But most important though, NATO's primacy was implicit and in the compromise and that the WEU could potentially do some military operations in the lower-scale of the Petersberg Tasks.
[72] A problem connected to this is the problem of not having the all the necessary assets and a nation will therefore be dependent on other nations for a given asset. As a consequence, the sovereignty of the country can become threatened.
[73] Former US ambassador to NATO, the problem was allocation of resources to military equipment already existing in NATO
[74] It was the Belgian premier Verhofstadt who came with the initiative.
[75] At the European summit in Brussels in June 2004.
[76] Coined at the 1984 Fontainebleau summit (Lefebvre 2004).European external identity suggested a link to the reactivation of the WEU in 1983-84, preferably fro France one that was independent of NATO and US control. But still, until 1989 there were a stalemate between the French and the British regarding the ESDI and the further progress by the process (White 2001:146-147).
[77] In February 2002 a Franco-British-Spanish saw a proposition of the election of a president of the Council. Later, Schroeder signed on to this proposal in November 2002. Later, France proposed, alongside Germany, to have the same position in the

Convention, developing into a new super minister of Europe. The possible rejection of the Constitution can put this development in danger.

[78] Even if it was only to be at an operational basis, and even if foreign minister Védrine was sceptical.

[79] Further, as time passed by, the issue became more pressing in that general capability of the EU was in movement and the Laeken summit declared HG operational.

[80] At the Helsinki summit late 1999. Up to date, Solana has a role to play in the event of crisis- management, but politically he is very much constrained by the national capitals (Dumoulin *et al*. 2003: 315).

[81] Despite being part of the Cops, the Commission has a rather weak influence. There is a structural anomaly between the pillars in this respect (Howorth 2001:777).

[82] The proposal came in January 2003 to be incorporated in the Constitution. But det vart teke forbehold om national interest.

[83] Although being a modest operation with 5500 men in and around Kabul

[84] Eurocorps was Consisting of 50 000 men from France, Germany, Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg

[85] SFOR and KFOR.

[86] According to Soetendorp (2002:121-122), this was a long historical line going back to the defence initiatives of the 1950s and 60s, the EDC and the Fouchet Plan.

[87] My own translation from French. Giscard d'Estaing even proposed a sort of enhanced cooperation by four big countries, France, the UK, Germany and Italy, to deal with world affairs.

[88] Some say it was a personal aspiration from the convinced European, Tony Blair, to act and behave as a European leader (Andréani 2002:986). There is a clear change in British policies with him, especially in the rhetoric.

[89] Still, a lesson from the Bosnian War was the positive aspect of French-British cooperation in Bosnia (Andréani 2002:986).

[90] Dominique de Villepin, then French foreign minister, said in London late 2003 (after the Iraq War):

[91] A meeting in Nürnberg 9 December 1996 they proposed that the *force de frappe* should be included in a common European deterrence strategy.

[92] Both Franco-German summits

[93] In short, the politics of Mitterrand as the Eurocorps members were the same as the Tervuren members, minus pro-American Spain, led by Aznar (Van Herpen 2004:11). Aznar was later replaced by more frankophile Zapatero.

[94] As military interventions in Africa show. France also supported the Kosovo War, which had not a UNSC mandate (Orban 2003: 8).

[95] The other EU members, especially Italy and Spain reacted against this meeting, as they also did with later occasions; in any case a suspicion had arrived.

[96] In 2003, Spain was not included, but when Aznar gave way to socialist Zapatero as prime minister of Spain in 2004, this was resolved with Spanish realignment.

[97] In fact, the French had three demands: First, NATO's command structure should be changed according to new military and geopolitical realities. Second, France demanded the willingness to change the political- military decision-making structure. Third, Europeans should be able to use NATO's assets. This would make the European contribution more visible and efficient.

[98] For the first time, a European dimension was legitimised by the NATO Alliance.

[99] By Hunter (2002).

[100] Before 1998, the US did change its mind in delaying any progress pushing the French to stop any progression towards the NATO reintegration in June 1997 into the integrated military structure.

[101] In June 1997, Jospin declared that the conditions for a return to the NATO military organisation was not fulfilled.

[102] President in a speech in June 2001

[103] France, personated by Alain Richard, stressed in 2001 four important points about St. Malo:

[104] The announcement in October 2003 of a 9000 men strong combat- ready Response Force (Hill 2004: 157). At the November 2002 NATO summit in Prague, the American proposal of a NATO Response Force emerged, and was endorsed by the UK. This development would take NATO out of area, closer to the war on terror and it offered a solution on the problem of interoperability. From this emerged the new streamlined command structure, inside NATO, promoted by Britain.

[105] French minister of defence.

[106] Also, the decision to nominate a general and an admiral to key NATO positions has been signs of reinforcement of the French position in NATO.

[107] In November 2003

[108] The previous French mantra of "*détente, entente, coopération*", which was the Gaullist model for the *dépassement* of the two- block policy, was in reality old fashioned with the end of the Cold war(Gnesotto 1998:52).

[109] During Condolezza Rice's visit to France in the beginning of 2005.

[110] i.e. in the UN Charter or custom

[111] Chirac outlined the position of France in an interview with New York Times in September 2002 (Howorth 2004:184).

[112] Although the military contribution for the European is reduced to some social forces.

[113] "Le modèle de la cellule est plus important que la taille."

[114] Also, a few EU foreign ministers received phone calls from Powell. The US felt the UK had crossed its red lines.