

How do Other States View Norway as an International Peace Negotiator?

Is there a Gap Between the Norwegian View and How Other States View Norway?

Elsa Marie Mohr Nordviste



Master's Thesis – Peace and Conflict Studies

University of Oslo, Norway
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“I think one of the problems with peace negotiations as a field, is that everyone is searching for the limelight. So it’s one of the illnesses of that field, frankly, that sometimes undermines the ability to search for a real solution.”

Anonymous source, interviewed

“This is a huge risk in all public peace negotiations, that if they fail, you can get a renewal or reinforcement of violence.”

Terje Rød Larsen, interviewed

“We want a stable world, and a stable world requires engagement...I think it is more a question of *how* to engage, not *if* we should engage.”

Knut Vollebæk, interviewed

“It’s very hard to engage in peace work, if you’re not prepared for a rough treatment.”

Previous Norwegian ambassador to Sri Lanka, Hans Brattskar, interviewed

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to find out how other states view Norway as an international peace negotiator, and whether the Norwegians' own perception of themselves on this matter match the views of others. I also aim to look at how the Norwegian self image has developed.

It is a qualitative study which is largely based on semi-structured interviews with experts from the political arena, non-governmental organizations and research institutions as well as academics and journalists. The interview objects are from Norway, as well as from Sweden, Canada, Sri Lanka, the US, Switzerland, the UK and Finland.

The main argument of this thesis is that there exists a gap between the way Norwegians see themselves as international peace negotiators and the view others have of the Norwegians' role. This is due to factors such as the Norwegian national media's biased selection of topics on published stories and, the fact that the Norwegian public appreciates the efforts of the peace negotiators, rather than what these people actually achieve. Efforts are more easily spotted than results, as results often appear over a long period of time.

Another factor is the delusional self image some Norwegian politicians possess. As they display this image publically, the Norwegian people are left with a wrongful illustration of themselves.

I have chosen to include the interview guide used at the end of the thesis. This is done to make it even clearer what I have asked the different categories of people.

This is a well documented thesis which indicates a trend of overrating Norway's view of itself as an international peace negotiator which should be re-evaluated.

100 pages (30029 words)

Supervisor: Dr. Arild Underdal.

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A special thanks also goes to my family, friends and boyfriend for the countless encouragements throughout this process. Especially to my father, Arne Nordviste, who has tirelessly helped me by reading through drafts and giving great, honest advice along the way.

Due to a temporary medical issue I received a two and a half months extension for this thesis, and although not all this time was used it was of great help.

I have much appreciated the understanding and support from you all through this trying time.

I take full responsibility for any mistakes made in this thesis.

Elsa Marie Mohr Nordviste.

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1. Introduction

This thesis will focus on how Norway is seen as an international peace facilitator by other states, and how Norwegians see themselves. Is there a gap between the Norwegian and non-Norwegian perceptions? If so, how has this self-image developed?

Firstly, I will start by presenting some background information with regards to the situation Norway found itself in during and after the Cold War, followed by information on the Oslo Process and how this shaped Norway's peace negotiation future.

The Methods chapter will include explanations of the techniques and procedures I have used to gather and analyse the data. It will highlight the methodological challenges met whilst writing the thesis as well as an evaluation section which will explain the measures taken to address these methodological challenges. Following this will be an overview of what sources have been chosen to write this thesis.

A theory chapter will discuss several questions. As my research has led me to believe there exists intended shared characteristics within the Norwegian population, I will look into constructivist literature discussing the collective identity. The theory chapter will also include definitions of negotiation, the different varieties of third party engagement, the conditions needed to be in place for the use of these strategies, what is needed for a peace agreement to be signed, as well as what can be expected from Norway according to all this.

In the Analysis I will look into whether the "The Norwegian Model" is a concept used today. Following this will be a section on the characteristics of Norwegian peace politics which will include the special relationship between NGOs and the government. The analysis will also explore the Norwegian identity; how do Norwegians see themselves, and how did this reputation emerge? Finally the analysis will investigate the possible advantages Norway has as an international peace negotiator.

The fifth section of the thesis will look into how Norway is viewed as an international peace negotiator by other states, and why the country would chose to get involved in this type of politics.

Before the main conclusion, I will briefly discuss which precautions Norway may face in the continuation with peace negotiations.



Conflict resolution is a complex concept. It has many dimensions, such as power politics, conflict transportation, structural prevention and so on.¹ “Peace negotiations are not just the point in time where you sit around a table discussing issues”², the Norwegian Ambassador to the US, Wegger Ch. Strømme very correctly points out.

During the Cold War states were locked to either one side of the conflict. This was also true for Norway, however, after the tensions decreased, a new playing field emerged. Norway realised this and wanted to take advantage. Norway was then, and still is, in a position with a rather large range of means as well as a good number of organisations with international connections and co operational relationships. “An old system is gone and, although it is easy to identify what has changed, it is not yet clear that a new system has taken its place. Old patterns have come unstuck, and if new patterns are emerging, it is still too soon to define them clearly”³ the Committee on International Conflict Resolution stated in 2000.

Democratisation, increased globalisation of economic power and information as well as the increased joint efforts of international cooperation with regards to security policy and cross boarder efforts to stop crime and violence is emerging, and with these changes come new ways in which governments, as well as other actors, try to set

¹ Committee on International Conflict Resolution (2000) “Conflict Resolution in a Changing World”, Chap. 1 in Stern, P. et al. (Eds) : *International Conflict Resolutions after the Cold War*. Washington DC: National Academic Press. p.5.

² Strømme, Wegger Ch. Interviewed by phone. 05.04.2012.

³ Committee on International Conflict Resolution (2000) “Conflict Resolution in a Changing World”, Chap. 1 in Stern, P. et al. (Eds) : *International Conflict Resolutions after the Cold War*. Washington DC: National Academic Press. p.1.

limits to violence.⁴ A new system has given room for new actors and new manoeuvres.

It is imperative that the trust between the warring parties are as good as immaculate for any state to gain access to a third part role. To find this balance can be challenging, Terje Rød-Larsen describes with the following example. “What is important is to have a balanced relationship to the conflict. This can be very hard, because sometimes you have to take very strong positions. For example in Libya, Norway didn’t just turn against Gadaffi, but also sent the Norwegian Air Force as part of the NATO campaign. By doing that we took a stand. Although Norway ran a secret channel with Gadaffi during that war, it is incredibly hard to be balanced, even with the advantages.”⁵

During the 1980`s it was felt, by the foreign ministerial elite, that Norway did not have the mentality, expertise, nor tradition to have any international effect. However, after the end of the 1990`s, the Norwegian media, as well as politicians, claimed that Norway had become a land of peace and a great humanitarian power.⁶ So what changed?

1.2 The Oslo process; breakthrough and a defining moment for Norway

In 1993 Norway did something that no other country had managed to do, they got the two parts of the Gaza conflict together for talks. Although unique, many including former Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg has stated that the Oslo Process was a declaration of principles, not a final peace agreement, and that this declaration was not strong enough to withhold two generations worth of hatred and hostilities.⁷ He also

⁴ Committee on International Conflict Resolution (2000) “Conflict Resolution in a Changing World”, Chap. 1 in Stern, P. et al.(Eds) : *International Conflict Resolutions after the Cold War*. Washington DC: National Academic Press. p.1.

⁵ Larsen, Terje Rød. Interviewed by phone. 12.04.2012.

⁶ Tvedt, Terje (2003). *Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt. Den norske modellen*. Oslo. Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS. p. 41.

⁷ Stoltenberg, Thorvald (2001). *Det handler om mennesker*. Gjøvik: Gyldendal Norske Forlag AS. p. 274.

said that the Oslo Process did not survive the reality it was created for.⁸

The Oslo Process was a “unique-a quasi-official process in which political authorities in the end, endorsed and adapted their work.”⁹ Their work was memorable, however it was a very special situation that probably will never occur again. The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) needed a friendly country, which also was trusted by Israel, Norway was one of the very few states that matched these criteria.¹⁰ Norway’s good relationship with the United States made it even more attractive.¹¹ The parties wanted Norway because it was a trusted and respected facilitator that would provide all their necessities as well as not have any control over the parties.

However, not everyone was equally content with Norway’s peace negotiation policies. Øyvind Østerud has claimed that “Norway’s idealist intentions are not matched by achievements in terms of lasting peace”¹², he cites the Middle East and Sri Lanka as examples. “Interventions for peace have rarely been successful and tend to ignore the fact that institutional conditions for peace and democratic stability have emerged- where we find these-through complex and long-term historic processes. Both the dilemmas involved and the often unintended and negative consequences of peace interventions tend to disappear in the rhetoric of the Norwegian engagement policy.”¹³ Many others, among them Terje Tvedt are critical to Norway’s role and share Østerud’s views.

In the 1992 White Paper on Norwegian development aid, Norway is not considered as having particular tradition or competence for peace promotion.¹⁴ Peace promotion was put under the headings of democracy promotion and humanitarian assistance, and was

⁸ Stoltenberg, Thorvald (2001). *Det handler om mennesker*. Gjøvik: Gyldendal Norske Forlag AS. p. 274.

⁹ Saunders, Harold (2000) “Interactive conflict resolution: A review for Policy Makers in Making and Building Peace”, Chap. 7 in Stern, P. et al. (Eds) : *International Conflict Resolutions after the Cold War*. Washington DC: National Academic Press. p.255.

¹⁰ Fixdal, Mona (2013, forthcoming) *Ways out of War: Peacemakers in the Middle East and Balkans*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Ch. 5, p. 8.

¹¹ i.b.i.d.

¹² Sørbo, Gunnar et al. (2011) *Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009*. NORAD. p. 17.

¹³ i.b.i.d.

¹⁴ Skånland, Øystein Haga (2011) “Peace promotion as National identity: The emergence and Reproduction of Norway’s Activist Peace and Reconciliation Efforts.” Page 1-22. Paper presented at the 2011 ECPR Conference, Reykjavik, Iceland. p.9.

hardly mentioned during the Parliamentary debate over the White Paper.¹⁵

However, after the “Oslo Process” in 1993, Norway was seen more as an international player. It was shocking to many that a small country like Norway managed to do what a super power like the United States did not. As well as having opportunity, Norway also has the will to engage in international conflict resolutions. Most governments want to be involved in international peace negotiations if they think it can promote their image and co operational relationships, and Norway is no different. It was included as a vague statement in a White Paper until after Norway’s involvement in the “Oslo Process”. The engagement put international peace negotiations firmly on Norway’s foreign policy agenda. To begin with it was an untraditional way of thinking about Norway,¹⁶ but after the “short-lived” successes of the Oslo Process, Norway was thrown into the international spotlight and quickly gained a reputation for being a skilled international peace negotiator. Negotiation efforts in the Middle East, Colombia, Guatemala, Cyprus, Mali, Sudan, Sri Lanka and Haiti, as well as peace-promoting work in Europe and Eurasia through the OSCE, are all included in Norway’s peace portfolio.¹⁷ Since 1993, a wide range of other practices such as humanitarian assistance, development aid and support for the UN peace efforts have been linked to the Norwegian peace promotion image. As a result of the Oslo Process, scholars were able to give Norway a “scientific” verification of the self image, or some would say myth of self image, and the process is still today largely attached to the representation of the Norwegian identity.¹⁸

Norway saw that its involvement in peace negotiations benefitted the Norwegian perception abroad. It opened doors and connected high powered people.

¹⁵ Skånland, Øystein Haga (2011) “Peace promotion as National identity: The emergence and Reproduction of Norway’s Activist Peace and Reconciliation Efforts.” Page 1-22. Paper presented at the 2011 ECPR Conference, Reykjavik, Iceland. p.9.

¹⁶Egeland, Jan. Interviewed by phone. 17.10.2011.

¹⁷ Skånland, Øystein Haga (2010) “Norway is a peace nation: A discourse analytic reading of the Norwegian peace engagement.” Page 34-54, in *Cooperation and Conflict* 45 (1). Sage Publications. p. 37.

¹⁸ Bekken, Sigmund (2007) “Identities and peace promotion in Norwegian foreign policy.” Page 1- 76. Master thesis from Australian National University. p. 56.

2. Method; techniques and procedures for gathering and analyzing data.

How to proceed to find the answers needed? What obstacles may arise? Why did I choose this type of research?

As a main source of information collection for this thesis, I have chosen interviews as a qualitative research method. This has been done to enable “an inner experience of participants”... “and to discover rather than test variables”¹⁹. This is important in the field of international peace negotiations as personal determination, characteristics and contacts are vital for peace negotiations to take place. Considering my research questions they would be hard to answer without using this qualitative method. Qualitative research puts much more emphasis on the interview object’s views than in quantitative research where the interview is reflecting the researcher’s views.

The reasons for putting so much emphasis on interviews are many. Firstly, I want to know what certain people had to say about specific issues. Norway’s role as a peace negotiator has been researched before. However the aim of this thesis is not only to find out what profiled Norwegians think of the issue, but also to compare this with what professionals in the same sectors abroad think.

Secondly, I want to have total control over whom I collect information from. Books and articles have been used, especially in the methods and theory chapters as they require more theory based information. Thirdly, interviews were chosen to achieve a more “vibrant and alive” feel to the thesis. The aim has been to create a debate on paper.

I am using semi-structural interviews to give me the room I need to add or subtract questions, but also to have enough similarities in the questions so that comparing the answers is feasible. Alan Bryman provides the following definition for semi-structured interviews; “This is a term that covers a wide range of instances. It typically

¹⁹ Corbin, Juliet and Strauss, Anselm (2008) *Basics of Qualitative Research 3e*. California, USA: Sage Publications Inc. p. 12.

refers to a context in which the interviewer has a series of questions that are in the general form of an interview schedule but it is able to vary the sequence of questions. The questions are frequently somewhat more general in their frame of reference from that typically found in a structured interview schedule. Also, the interviewer usually has some latitude to ask further questions in response to what are seen as significant replies.”²⁰ This is the definition I have chosen to follow.

I am conducting what is known as factual interviews. The wording of questions asked is particularly important here as you are looking for a particular answer. You also want the interview objects’ true opinion. Explaining the importance of the questions, not twisting the wording or questions is central as it may result in a different outcome. I am comparing my data using constant comparison. Constant comparison is used to group together answers to frequent questions and thereby to look at and analyse the various perspectives and opinions. The similarities and differences in the data are then compared.²¹ When I am looking through the data I will be looking out for key words and phrases that will make comparing, and contrasting, arguments easier.

2.1 Many methodological challenges can be highlighted in this thesis

The first problem comes when trying to measure or define “successful.” If a peace process has broken down or the conflict reassumes, has the peace facilitation then failed? What constitutes a failure or a success in international peace negotiations? Are the standards maybe too high, too optimistic? Long term vs. short term peace also needs to be taken into account. It is therefore hard to determine how many successes and failures Norway, and other nations, have had in the field of peace negotiations.

Another issue is what to measure Norway against. Size? If so, with or without sea areas? Population? Wealth? When many of the interview objects talk about Norway as a small state, they often mean in terms of land size and population.

²⁰ Bryman, Alan (2008) *Social Research Methods*. New York: Oxford University Press. p.196.

²¹ Corbin, Juliet and Strauss, Anselm (2008) *Basics of Qualitative Research 3e*. California, USA: Sage Publications Inc. p. 73.

The third problem that arises is to get a good answer to the question; “Are we as good at peace negotiations as we think we are?” How will you really know the answer to this? I have chosen to ask people who are working with peace negotiations on a daily basis and/or do/have done research into the topic. These would be the people with the most relevant knowledge and will thereby be able to give me the most concrete answer.

The fourth methodological challenge will be that Norwegian literature and interviews have been translated by myself. Kvale and Brinkmann mention the ethical issue that arises during the transcription phase of an interview. They emphasise how important it is that “a transcribed text is loyal to the interviewee’s oral statements.”²² One of the reasons I have chosen to categorize my interview objects, is to overcome this challenge. By doing so I disconnect the argument from some of the specific persons who wish to stay anonymous, and eliminate the risk of someone being perceived in an unfortunate light. Many of the quotations are, however, connected to the interview object due to the interview objects’ current profession or past careers. All the useful and relevant parts of the interviews have been transcribed and can be seen upon request. A variable must be directly observable to be used. This is the reason I have chosen to only include the relevant and useful parts of the interviews in the transcripts, leaving the internal and to a larger extent, the external validity, which refers to relevance, high. I found that transcribing all the interviews myself has helped me to process as well as familiarize myself with the data. Being aware of the fact that when you use quotes from interviews you are at risk of taking the quotes out of context and thereby slightly change their meaning.²³ This is something I have been very cautious to prevent.

The fifth problem that may arise is related to the fact that failures are reported less frequently than success stories. This raises questions about to what degree it is possible to trust the information received with regards to peace processes. Secrecy is widely used as a tool to make parties more willing to come together and attempt negotiations.

²² Kvale, Steinar and Brinkmann, Svend (2009) *Interviews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research Interviewing*. California, USA: Sage Publications Inc. p. 63.

²³ Bryman, Alan (2008) *Social Research Methods*. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 553.

Another challenge I will face is that many of my interview objects have limitations to what they can say on record. The more distinguished interview object, the more involved they have been in peace negotiations and the more knowledge they possess, but the less open and straight talking they may be able to be.

Sixth, I noticed that few of the interviews lasted for more than 40 minutes, and I also became aware of that many of the interview object work under a lot of stress and that this is something I must be aware of and take into consideration. This Kvale and Brinkmann called the interview situation²⁴.

The seventh issue contains the challenge when Norway cooperates with other states and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the negotiations. It will then be hard to separate efforts and result for each participant.²⁵ It would be very hard, if not impossible to prove whether a different strategy would produce a different result, this is known as the conceptual problem of counterfactual history. The Fundamental Problem of Casuals Inference, Gary King at al. discuss. In their article they state that we cannot rerun history to see whether changing the dependant variable would have any effect on the independent variable in a given scenario.²⁶ It would be impossible always to know exactly what went wrong or right in a given negotiation, and who caused this effect. It is important to keep in mind that history will never repeat itself when you attempt to compare historical events. Roger Bullen stated that “(H) history is what historians write; the past is something different.”²⁷ We will never be able to fully grasp or understand the past as it truly was because the interview objects’ views will be colored by different experiences.

The eighth problem I will face is that a researcher brings all his/her own knowledge, views, experiences, as well as biases into all aspects of a thesis.²⁸ This has been

²⁴ Kvale, Steinar and Brinkmann, Svend (2009) *Interviews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research Interviewing*. California, USA: Sage Publications Inc. p. 63.

²⁵ Sørbo, Gunnar et al. (2011) *Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009*. NORAD. p. 66.

²⁶ King, Gary et al. (1994) “Increasing the Number of Observations.”. Page 208-230. In *Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. p. 208.

²⁷ PECOS 4020: Lecture # 6 with Olav Njølstad, “Methodological issues in archive research”. 15.09.2010.

²⁸ Corbin, Juliet and Strauss, Anselm (2008) *Basics of Qualitative Research 3e*. California, USA: Sage Publications Inc. p. 32.

impossible to avoid in my case. As a master student, my knowledge of this field is far more limited than of those I have interviewed. This limited knowledge may also be reflected on the questions asked, perhaps making the questions not as fruitful or to the point as they might have been if I had more experience and knowledge.

The ninth challenge is to refrain from asking leading questions. However, in cases where information is being withheld a leading question may help you on the right track. A follow-up question is not necessarily as “forceful”, but this might also influence the interview object to take different turns.

Finally, it has proven easier to obtain Norwegian interview objects than it has been to get foreign experts' opinions. It is very important to the thesis that the different Norwegians views are well represented so that there is something to compare others' comments to, however I believe it would have given an even better insight into this issue if a few more critical views from abroad had been granted.

2.2 Evaluation approach

To attempt to combat some of the challenges highlighted above I have taken the following measures: I have interviewed a very wide range of people to get a large sample and thereby a result that is as correct as possible. I have tried to interview people in the similar or same political positions in Norway and abroad, ensuring that a comparison would be as credible as possible. This also goes for NGO workers and researchers. The Norwegian media has been included to hopefully get a view from outside the interconnected web of Norwegian politicians, researchers and NGO employees. I have conducted interviews with Norwegian foreign correspondents to attempt to get a more truthful idea of how Norwegians think about themselves when it comes to peace negotiating. The journalists are generally more outspoken and honest about their opinions in addition to the fact that they do not have to defend any parts of the Norwegian policies. By using a qualitative research method with semi-structured interviews I will find factual as well as emotional information which will help me to paint a fuller picture of events from multiple angles.

As pointed out by Corbin and Strauss, the important thing is the quality of your research material that is to be analysed.²⁹ However, it is also important to try to cover the whole spectre of opinions. This is done by finding the negative case. The negative case is an exception to the patterns unfolding in your research.³⁰

I have chosen the definition of “success” that is used in the 2010 “Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009” report by NORAD. It states that success in peace building terms “must ultimately involve shifts in the structural determination of the conflict.”³¹

Another measure I have taken is to ensure the limitation of biased views. To do this it is important to focus on sensitivity. Sensitivity means “having insight, being tuned in to, being able to pick up on relative issues, events, and any happenings in data.”³²

Ethically there can be many pitfalls when it comes to semi-structured interviews. This became even more evident as I did a large number of interviews over the phone. Not having face to face interaction limits the ability to interpret answers, register facial expressions etc, even though body language is not regarded as a reliable source.

However, by not doing personal interviews you eliminate the risk of the respondent’s answers being affected by characteristics of the interviewer. Alan Bryman discusses this and points to characteristics such as class and ethnicity, as well as the fact that interview objects sometimes answer questions in certain ways to satisfy the interviewer.³³ This is limited with phone interviews. Phone interviews also make it easier to use notes or check up on information during the interview. Kvale and Brinkmann also discuss the issues that interviewing elites may bring. They mention the fact that these people are very used to being interviewed and will often have

²⁹ Corbin, Juliet and Strauss, Anselm (2008) *Basics of Qualitative Research 3e*. California, USA: Sage Publications Inc. p. 27.

³⁰ i.b.i.d. p. 84.

³¹ Sørbø, Gunnar et al. (2011) *Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009*. NORAD. p. 10.

³² Corbin, Juliet and Strauss, Anselm (2008) *Basics of Qualitative Research 3e*. California, USA: Sage Publications Inc. p. 32.

³³ Bryman, Alan (2008) *Social Research Methods*. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 198.

developed “talk tracks”³⁴. As I have spoken to people on more than once, I noticed this pattern of “pre-conducted answers” to certain questions, as well as recognizing some statements from books and articles. This is hard for an interviewer to eliminate, but where it was possible I tried to ask follow-up, more explorative and more challenging questions.

While on the topic of ethics, I should point out that all the interviews have been recorded with permission from the interview objects, informed consent has always been given. Some stated that they do not want to be quoted on certain statements which of course have been respected together with confidentiality.

Another problem-eliminating initiative has to do with the difficulty of getting persons of a certain position to answer certain questions. To overcome this problem I have aimed to interview people who have been involved in negotiations, but not at the highest level, as well as researchers in the same field. I have written an interview guide to help me in my research, as well as to organize my work. The interview guide should not include questions that are too specific.

To combat certain problems another measure taken is to divide the interview objects into groups. E.g. Norwegian foreign correspondents, foreign NGO workers and so on. This has been done to maximize the clarity and consistency in my research. This includes breaking information down into sub groups so that within group comparison is made easier. This also allows us to talk about a degree of explained variance. This variance describes how much x, y, and z explains when looking at a, as well as allowing us to look at the interaction effects. This is what I aim to accomplish when dividing the interview objects into different categories. It is important to note that a correlation does not automatically mean an explanation. A does not have to be cause B, or C, or D etc. It is important to have both correlations as well as mechanisms to have a theory.

³⁴ Kvale, Steinar and Birinkmann, Svend (2009) *Interviews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research Interviewing*. California, USA: Sage Publications Inc. p. 147.

2.3 The reasons for focusing on some chosen countries

I have contacted people from Sweden, Finland, Netherlands, France and Canada because these are all countries that have been categorized together with Norway on many relevant occasions. They are all countries that have been involved in peace negotiations, and house good research institutions in this field. I have also attempted to include interview objects from the United States as I wanted to find out what a superpower thinks of Norway's peace negotiation efforts.

The main departure from the original research design is the non inclusion of "the Norwegian model." To start with the "Norwegian model" was going to be a central theme in the thesis, however, after much research it has become clear that only a minute selection of people actually believe that this model exists. More information on this can be found in the Methods chapter.

2.4 Sources: This thesis has been developed with the following combination of sources

Interviews:

I am using qualitative research methods, basing a large part of my research on interviews. I have aimed at getting a large number of high profiled experts in this field. Some interviewed experts have led me to others. The interviews have been conducted face- to- face, by phone, email and letters. The Norwegian interview objects have been interviewed in Norwegian, whilst the others have been interviewed in English. I have myself translated and transcribed all the interviews where this has been necessary.

Primary written sources:

I have used a large number of books and articles published on this subject. Many of the authors have later become interview objects. I have not applied to get access to any databases that the University of Oslo does not already grant me access to.

Unpublished works:

I have been able to read through and use Mona Fixdal`s unpublished work on peace negotiations. This book is going to be published in 2013 by Palgrave Macmillan.

3. Theory: Qualitative analysis: “A process of examining and interpreting data in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge”.³⁵

It is important to note that academic knowledge and actual negotiation practice are two very different things. To have the academic tools and knowledge about techniques etc. is all well and good, however, every conflict is unique and it is the underlying issues and local history in every conflict that are key areas to understand and master.

I was planning on supporting my arguments with a theoretical framework; “The Norwegian Model” and use this as a basis for my research. This model describes the characteristics of the “Norwegian way” of doing international peace negotiations. By its founders the “Norwegian model” is presented as a co-existence between NGOs, the state, research institutions and organizations which represent the civil society, however in reality, “many of these large organizations are lead by stately paid bureaucrats and politicians.”³⁶ As the research has progressed it has become clear that not many believe in the existence of a so called “Norwegian model”. This goes for Norwegians as well as foreigners. Most of the interview objects concur that Norway has certain traits when it comes to peace negotiations, such as openness, fairness, time and financial resources, but as all conflicts are so vastly different it is impossible to call something a Norwegian model as Norway has to adapt as a facilitator in any given situation. There has been no grand plan or template followed in any of the peace negotiations Norway has been involved in. Rather it has been a case of the right people at the right time as Jan Egeland has stated.³⁷

Other common traits that reoccurs in Norway`s approach to peace negotiations are the use of soft power trough facilitation and dialogue, backchannel support provided by

³⁵ Corbin, Juliet and Strauss, Anselm (2008) *Basics of Qualitative Research 3e*. California, USA: Sage Publications Inc. p. 1

³⁶ Tvedt, Terje (2003). *Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt. Den norske modellen*. Oslo. Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS. p. 227.

³⁷ Egeland, Jan. Interviewed by phone. 17.10.2011.

various NGOs, ownership by opposing parties, a relative wide agreement on domestic politics, as well as informality and flexibility.³⁸ The close ties that link the NGOs, government and the academic and research institutions together can also be seen as something negative. This interlinked bond of cooperation can result in an uncritical and biased system that is “marked by elite circulation and vested interests.”³⁹ Talking on an equal basis to both sides of the conflict has been a Norwegian trademark, but this has become harder to follow after 9/11 as talking to blacklisted non-state military actors is seen to be a thing of the past.⁴⁰ As Vidar Helgesen (2007) points out, Norway’s “peace diplomacy has been caught between anti terror policies that it cannot influence and peace diplomacy ambitions that it cannot live up to,”⁴¹ furthermore, he claims “Norway struggles to square the circle of being a loyal team player, helping to demonstrate a united international front against terrorism, and at the same time wanting to support negotiated solutions to conflict in which one side is labelled a terrorist organisation.”⁴²

The Norwegian traits may be useful when it comes to bringing the actors to the negotiation table, however a more powerful actor is often needed to implement a final agreement. The limitations of Norway’s influence and power in this field might not be clear to the Norwegian public as this is not spoken of to a large degree outside the inner circle of negotiators.

3.1 Constructivist literature discusses the collective identity:

Who are we?

How do Norwegians view themselves? What role(s) do they actually play when involved in peace negotiations? “Identity with its appropriate attachments of psychological reality, is always identity within a specific, socially constructed

³⁸ Sørbo, Gunnar et al. (2011) *Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009*. NORAD. p. 4.

³⁹ i.b.i.d. p. 17.

⁴⁰ i.b.i.d. p. 75.

⁴¹ i.b.i.d. p. 80.

⁴² i.b.i.d.

world,”⁴³ Peter Berger argues. Alexander Wendt states that just as people have different identities which are correlated to institutional roles e.g. as son, teacher and citizen, a state may also have multiple identities like imperial power and sovereign.⁴⁴ The failure of specified roles makes defining situations and interests more difficult, and identity confusion may arise.⁴⁵

In the Sri Lanka peace negotiations, Norway played the role of peace facilitator, aid donor as well as ceasefire monitor.⁴⁶ Alexander Wendt claims that the “(P) process of identity-formation under anarchy are concerned first and foremost with preservation or “security” of the self.”⁴⁷ With international peace negotiations Norway lifts its identity and gets more involved on the international arena. This makes Norway a more valuable player and increases its security. “Small powers do not have the luxury of relying on national means and may therefore learn faster that collective recognition is a cornerstone for security.”⁴⁸ Norway has played many different roles in different conflicts. In Sri Lanka, Norway had the role as a sole facilitator, whilst during the post-election violence in Kenya, Norway took a supportive role, strengthening the efforts of others.⁴⁹ As mentioned before, the roles of a facilitator are vast.

3.2 Definition of negotiation: basic concepts in the field of peace negotiations

A peace agreement is not only present or none present, there are many shades of gray to this concept. If a peace agreement is negotiated and signed, its effectiveness,

⁴³ Wendt, Alexander (1992) “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics”. Page 391-425, in *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No 2. p. 397/398.

⁴⁴ i.b.i.d. p. 398.

⁴⁵ i.b.i.d. p. 398/399.

⁴⁶ Sørbo, Gunnar et al. (2011) *Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009*. NORAD. p. xv.

⁴⁷ Wendt, Alexander (1992) “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics”. Page 391-425, in *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No 2. p. 399.

⁴⁸ i.b.i.d. p. 415.

⁴⁹ Sørbo, Gunnar et al. (2011) *Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009*. NOR AD. p. 13.

distribution of benefits as well as its stability will all be important aspects to look at⁵⁰. If none of these are accomplished, have they moved in a more positive direction during the negotiations? Fred Charles Ikle defines negotiations as “a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching an agreement on an exchange or on the realization of a common interest where conflicting interests are present.”⁵¹ Actors will only enter into negotiations when and if there are no other ways for them to obtain what they want, it is an option when no other options are available. However, it also needs to be the best way to handle the situation from the point of view of the involved parties.

Propositions are needed for the negotiations to get started, a negotiation would not start unless the parties involved believe that there is a settlement range present. A settlement range is a range of solutions that both parties consider better than the starting point. The common reference point is the Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA), and a negotiation set is a range of alternatives in the settlement range that are considered to be Pareto optimal. A states` resistance point is what can be achieved by a state without cooperation/negotiations with others.

Norway acts, mostly, as a third party intervener in peace negotiations. The rational choice assumption claims that states involved do not only care about their personal gain. The pay-offs other states achieve also matters. But the questions are when and to what extent will governments take other states` pay-offs into account?⁵² Here you commonly see two different, mutually compatible traits, drawn from the same fundamental concern.⁵³ Defensive competitiveness is when a state is attempting to maximize their own gain relative to the adversary`s gains, and constraining altruism is the focus on not losing, instead of “winning”.⁵⁴ This is a used strategy for Norway.

⁵⁰ Hopmann, P. Terrence (1996) *The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts*. South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press. p. 28-30.

⁵¹ i.b.i.d. p. 25.

⁵² Underdal, Arild (1992) “Designing Politically Feasible Solutions”. Page 221-254, in (Ed) Malnes, Raino; et al. & Underdal, Arild. Universitetsforlaget. p. 239.

⁵³ i.b.i.d. p. 240.

⁵⁴ i.b.i.d

However, for a negotiation to get started you need ripeness. Ripeness is mostly a result from a mutually hurting stalemate where both or all parties recognise that they are at “the point where they can no longer escalate their way to victory and the sunk costs plus the countering efforts of the other side makes for a costly deadlock,”⁵⁵ Zartman (1996) stated.

Norway is focused on being a “peace aider” not a “peace creator”⁵⁶ according to the Foreign Ministry. A conflict has to be ripe for negotiations to take place, this means that all parties to the conflict believe in the possibility of finding an agreement that all can accept. If the parties in the conflict have not created the state of ripeness, aiding the creating of peace is impossible. Norway needs to be invited to play a role in the negotiations by all parties involved, and all parties have to agree that Norway is a wanted facilitator for their situation. It is not so that Norway can decide to intervene on its own.

3.3 What are the different varieties of third party engagement? What types of strategies can a third party intervener use?

A facilitator is involved at a minimum level. There are many different aspects of a negotiation that needs different kinds of facilitators. One such type is the process facilitator. Here the facilitator will attempt to create conditions that are needed to reach an agreement, these conditions are often referred to as the provision of good offices. The venues where the negotiations take place as well as all the logistical arrangements around the negotiations are all important tasks that fall to the facilitator. A facilitator may also help the negotiating parties improve communication, set the agenda e.g. by deciding on easier issues to be discussed first,⁵⁷ as well as finding facts

⁵⁵ Pruitt, Dean G. (1997) “Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks.” Page 237-250, in *International Negotiations 2* (2). Kluwer Law International. p. 237.

⁵⁶ The Norwegian Foreign Ministry website; Fred og forsoning: Den norske modellen. (accessed 03.04.12) http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/tema/fred_og_forsoning/fredsprosesser/fred-og-forsoning-den-norske-modellen.html?id=446704

⁵⁷ Hopmann, P. Terrence (1996) *The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts*. South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press. p. 231.

and clarify issues when needed. The second role of a facilitator is the facilitator of communication, meetings and compromises.⁵⁸ During negotiations parties will vary of who makes the first concession and who makes the first and firmest commitments. The facilitator's role here is to "facilitate mutual and simultaneous flexibility"⁵⁹ as well as trying to ensure that one party does not try to exploit the others' concessions. A way of doing so is to communicate concessions from one party to another like it is the facilitators' idea, this may make the proposals easier to accept and also help to save face.⁶⁰

The third facilitator role is the facilitator of cognitive change⁶¹. Sometimes helping a party to see an issue in a new light can help them to change their viewpoint. This form of facilitation is used mostly in cases where "stalemate seems to be caused more by different perspectives of the same issues, misunderstandings, or other psychological or personality factors, rather than by conflict of interest."⁶² This type of mediation is often referred to as conciliation. Here the facilitator will try to adjust the parties' view of each other by clarification and comparisons.⁶³ Ideally the situation should be seen as integrative bargaining, where the opponent are looking to find a common solution together, rather than distributive bargaining where the opponents basic goals are in conflict with each other, and the primary focus is on your own maximization of utilities. If an atmosphere of integrative bargaining is achieved, it is easier to find common ground. Both facilitation and formulation are considered integrative strategies as they help the opponents find alternatives that work for all parties involved.⁶⁴ As Norway does not have any hard power to either threaten or force an outcome, integrative bargaining is a much desired tactic. It is important to try to see the disagreements from your opponent's point of view, however, doing this you

⁵⁸ i.b.i.d.

⁵⁹ i.b.i.d. p. 232.

⁶⁰ i.b.i.d. p. 233.

⁶¹ i.b.i.d.

⁶² i.b.i.d. p. 234.

⁶³ i.b.i.d.

⁶⁴ Beardsley, Kyle C. et al. (2006) "Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes". Page 58-86, in *Journal of Peace Resolution* 50 (1). Sage Publications. p. 63.

may risk that your domestic audience feels like you are “selling out to the enemy”.⁶⁵ Another benefit to the facilitation role is the use of an incremental approach. This approach focuses on minor issues first and leaves more difficult issues till the end after other things are already agreed on. This is seen clearly in the Oslo Process.

A second role a mediator can take is as a formulator, this is someone who will help the parties come up with different and new solutions to their problems,⁶⁶ within the limits set by party interests. The degree of direct involvement is larger here than with a facilitator. The mediator as a formulator helps the two parties help themselves, by tactful, sympathetic, accurate, straightforward prodding and suggestions.⁶⁷

A manipulator is the most forceful of all types of negotiators. A manipulator will use his/ her power attempting to bend the outcome in their wanted direction. They can sometimes be so involved that they can be seen as another party to the negotiations instead of the third party negotiator. The manipulator tries to control many aspects of the negotiations that the facilitator and the formulator will not be able to influence. They will try to be in charge of when certain concessions are made, moving the negotiation in the direction they want, control what information is available to whom, as well as try to manipulate the international atmosphere so that it may have an effect on the outcome.⁶⁸ Beardsley et al. claim that all three styles are intertwined. To be a manipulator you need facilitation to bring the parties together, and formulation to structure proposals, he claims.⁶⁹

⁶⁵ Hopmann, P. Terrence (1996) *The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts*. South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press. p. 236.

⁶⁶ i.b.i.d p. 237.

⁶⁷ i.b.i.d. p. 237.

⁶⁸ i.b.i.d. p. 240.

⁶⁹ Beardsley, Kyle C. et al. (2006) “Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes”. Page 58-86, in *Journal of Peace Resolution* 50 (1). Sage Publications. p. 65.

3.3.1 Which conditions need to be in place for the use of these strategies?

For a facilitator to be effective you need very skilled, knowledgeable and professional individuals. These people have to be able to develop an atmosphere of cooperation and a shared wish to find a common solution.⁷⁰ It is important to be able to make the other part out to be just as human as you are and also to create a safe atmosphere to work in. Keeping a negotiation secret is one way of minimizing pressure and the fear of failing and thereby making matters even worse for the parties involved. A great deal of power is not necessary here, but a good amount of resources is key. A facilitator does not have a direct say in the matters discussed and will help the parties to find common ground rather than to force an outcome.

The formulator must have more power to convince the parties than a facilitator. He or she must have the ability to influence and manipulate the outcome of the negotiations. They become an “advocate for a specific solution, and tries to persuade the parties in noncoercive ways to accept the proposed solution. Furthermore, the formulator is no longer concerned solely or primarily with the process of negotiation; rather he or she plays a role here in responding to the content of the negotiations and shaping the substance of the eventual agreement.”⁷¹ Often a formulator has its own desired outcome of the negotiations.

The manipulator will be required to use force and “introduce resources of power, influence, and persuasion that can be brought to bear on the parties to move them to agreement. This is a role that can only be played by a powerful mediator, and is more likely to be played by a partisan mediator or one who has an interest at stake in the outcome of the negotiations.”⁷² For this role you need hard power, leverage as well as support from other players. Norway may have the support from others, but it lacks hard power and leverage over others.

⁷⁰ Hopmann, P. Terrence (1996) *The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts*. South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press. p. 237.

⁷¹ i.b.i.d. p. 239.

⁷² i.b.i.d. p. 240.

3.3.2 What is needed for a peace agreement to be signed, and what is needed for long term tension reduction?

When facilitation is used, parties have, in theory, been able to work out the peace agreement between themselves, with some added help and guidance from the facilitator. As the disagreeing parties have stood for the large majority of the negotiations and been very active in the solution finding, the agreement if reached, has the best chance of endurance and non-reoccurrence compared to a formulated or manipulated agreement. A facilitated peace agreement will reduce post crisis tensions and be the easiest to commit to due to the parties` heavy involvement.⁷³ However, the facilitation approach can be unsuccessful when it comes to dealing the asymmetric power balance between two, or more, parties.

“Facilitation and formulation lend themselves best to reducing long-term tension reductions among crisis actors. Information revelation helps bring the perceived set of options that are preferable to fighting in line with the actual set of options that would be realized under complete information.”⁷⁴ Furthermore, Beardsley et al. writes that “(B) by contrast, manipulation only alters relative costs of conflict and deflates each party`s reservation point. Such a strategy is likely to have a lesser effect on tension reduction because it does not necessarily lead to an outcome that is in line with the true distribution of capabilities.”⁷⁵

“The proposed logic that links facilitation and formulation to tension reduction also contributes to a deeper understanding of commitment problems. Commitment and informational problems are not mutually exclusive, and we expect that uncertainty will make agreements difficult to both reach and implement.

When formulation is used, tension reduction is lower than with no peace negotiations at all.⁷⁶ During a formulation approach the parties does not get very involved in the

⁷³ Beardsley, Kyle C. et al. (2006) “Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes”. Page 58-86, in *Journal of Peace Resolution* 50 (1). Sage Publications. p.83.

⁷⁴ i.b.i.d. p. 69.

⁷⁵ i.b.i.d.

⁷⁶ i.b.i.d. p. 79.

negotiations, and this may lead to an uninterest and a wish to go back to a pre negotiation status.⁷⁷ Manipulation may give the fastest results, but as it is not a procedure that takes time to look at root causes, tension reduction can be minimal. Peace agreements that have been negotiated by a manipulator will usually have a short term effect, as the underlying causes of the hostilities have not been dealt with. Werner and Yuen found that “conflicts in which the disputants are pressured into an agreement will be less stable after settlement than other conflicts.”⁷⁸

Manipulation can be the most effective style of negotiations to secure a formal agreement, and conflicts where formulation is either the most important or the highest negotiation style are more likely to end in a formal agreement than conflicts that are not mediated or that have used facilitation is the most important or the highest negotiation style.⁷⁹ “Facilitation only has a statistically significant effect on formal agreement when it is the most crucial mediation style.”⁸⁰ However, it is vital to remember that these figures are with regards to signing an agreement or not, and does not take into account how long the agreement lasted or if the tensions surrounding the conflict has been reduces. A manipulation style negotiation can be good for avoiding bargaining failures with the use of threats and promises as well as expanding the set of alternative solutions; however, it is not the best approach when it comes to achieving post-crisis tension reduction.⁸¹

Tension reduction is higher after a negotiation than it would have been if the conflict was not negotiated and a peace settlement would not have been attempted.⁸² As expected, Beardsley at al. finds that conflicts that are part of a prolonged disagreement are less likely to reach tension reductions than conflict that have not been present that long.⁸³ If a crisis is mediated the chance of reaching a formal agreement, according to

⁷⁷ Beardsley, Kyle C. et al. (2006) “Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes”. Page 58-86, in *Journal of Peace Resolution* 50 (1). Sage Publications. p. 83.

⁷⁸ i.b.i.d. p. 69.

⁷⁹ i.b.i.d. p. 77.

⁸⁰ i.b.i.d.

⁸¹ i.b.i.d. 83.

⁸² i.b.i.d. p. 79.

⁸³ i.b.i.d. p. 80.

Beardsley et al. is 48.28%, however, if not mediated, there is only a 7.25% chance of reaching a formal agreement.⁸⁴

Mixing the three different negotiation styles will allow for a better result, and it is important to note that formulation and manipulation are almost always used in combinations with other, less invasive mediation methods.⁸⁵

3.3.3. What can be expected from Norway according to the above facts?

Norway is a facilitator by nature. The weakness with the facilitator role is that there is not much power in the implementation phase. Habeeb discusses the importance of power and stresses that power is not only measured in military capabilities.⁸⁶

Tawney's definition of power is as follows; "the perceived capability of one side to produce an intended effect on another through a move that may involve the use of resources."⁸⁷ Power "is the process by which actor A causes actor B to change his behaviour."⁸⁸ For this to be possible a state needs to be able to influence another state to a very high degree. They need to be forceful in their approach and they must to a certain degree be either feared or deeply respected. However, Norway does not have any of these types of power. Norway acts as a facilitator in most international peace negotiations for this reason. Norway is an affluent country and funds are also easily distributed, which makes for a fast reaction. With the excess of funds the country has, together with the very low level of internal conflict, it is easier for Norway than for many other states, to spend money on getting involved in different conflict resolutions beyond their own borders.

⁸⁴ Beardsley, Kyle C. et al. (2006) "Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes". Page 58-86, in *Journal of Peace Resolution* 50 (1). Sage Publications. p. 77.

⁸⁵ i.b.i.d

⁸⁶ Habeeb, William Mark (1988) "Ch. 2: Power and Negotiations." Page 10-26, in *Power and Techniques in International Negotiations, How Weak Nations Bargain With Strong Nations*. John Hopkins University Press. p. 10.

⁸⁷ Zartman, I. William, and Rubin, Jeffrey Z. (2000) "Ch. 1: The Study of Power and the Practice of Negotiation." Page 3-28, in *Power and Negotiations*. University of Michigan Press. p. 14.

⁸⁸ Habeeb, William Mark (1988) "Ch. 2: Power and Negotiations." Page 10-26, in *Power and Techniques in International Negotiations, How Weak Nations Bargain With Strong Nations*. John Hopkins University Press. p. 14.

Power, according to Habeeb is a three-dimensional concept. Aggregated structural power is the total of an actor's capabilities and resources⁸⁹ as well as position. It includes such national resources as military capabilities, economic positioning and demographics vs. the external environment.⁹⁰ Norway is a state without much aggregated power, although the country has a good sized economy, its military capabilities and its ability to convince, influence or threaten another state is not strong, some even claim nonexistent. Issue-specific structural power is about a country's capabilities and resources vs. another actors' when it comes to a specific issue.⁹¹ Control is a key component here. Here Norway can have some advantages in certain situations. These advantages may be a previously established political relationship, or more common, that NGOs have established a connection with the local community and maybe worked with issues related to the conflict over an extended period of time. Trust is the key here. If a Norwegian NGO has played their cards right, a party, or multiple parties, in a conflict may trust them, but if the work is seen as biased this may affect the Norwegian presence very negative. An example of this is from Sri Lanka. Norway was blamed for being more supportive of one side in the conflict and therefore many became very sceptical. Norway does not have the power to scare or threaten parties, however, in some cases, if the negotiators are being truly trusted; it can be possible to have some influence. As a facilitator with large financial freedom, Norway can easily provide certain conditions that may make the negotiations easier or more comfortable for the parties involved.

One of Norway's biggest "successes" in international peace negotiations is the Oslo Process. Some key factors were in place both before and during the negotiations, that helped ensure the result, for as long as it lasted. There was motivational ripeness from both sides, prior to the start of the negotiations and as well as this they both had

⁸⁹ William Mark (1988) "Ch. 7: Conclusions: Findings and Implications." Page 129-146, in *Power and Techniques in International Negotiations, How Weak Nations Bargain With Strong Nations*. John Hopkins University Press. p. 129.

⁹⁰ Habeeb, William Mark (1988) "Ch. 2: Power and Negotiations." Page 10-26, in *Power and Techniques in International Negotiations, How Weak Nations Bargain With Strong Nations*. John Hopkins University Press. p. 17.

⁹¹ i.b.i.d. p. 19.

Hamas as a common enemy, which helped bringing them together.⁹² Working trust, the feeling that both are serious about the negotiations was present, and so was a feeling of optimism with regards to finding a common solution.⁹³

Both sides had provided valid spokesmen that were recognised as such by the opposition,⁹⁴ and as the negotiations commenced and de-escalation on both sides was desired, they both brought in a high level spokesman. This is a signal of seriousness and it can also increase the working trust.⁹⁵ As soon as it was deemed appropriate, Norway took a back-stage role, allowing the parties to communicate directly. The secrecy that surrounded the negotiation was vital to the outcome, especially as the conflict had been going on for so long.⁹⁶ Secrecy meant fewer interruptions, less pressure and the involvement of not more people that needed. “The stronger the motivation to achieve de-escalation on both sides, the more effective are small countries and the more useful is a good offices approach to third party intervention,”⁹⁷ Pruitt states. Norway took a facilitator role in these negotiations where the PLO and Mr. Arafat were in charge, whilst in Washington, a manipulation role was taken which did not lead to much progress. Norway did decide to leave some issue that were considered hard to agree on to later stages in the negotiations, whilst issues such as refugees, sovereignty, settlements, borders and the issue of Jerusalem were not to be discussed at all. Hilde Henriksen Waage claims that the Oslo process was not an ordinary peace agreement. She says that Peres gave Arafat “a stick which he grasped because he was drowning”⁹⁸, whilst for Arafat “the Oslo Accords was the best agreement possible in the worst of circumstances.”⁹⁹ Even though the power balance in the Gaza conflict was asymmetric, Norway had no way of altering this balance.

⁹² Pruitt, Dean G. (1997) “Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks.” Page 237-250, in *International Negotiations 2* (2). Kluwer Law International. p. 248.

⁹³ i.b.i.d. p. 248.

⁹⁴ i.b.i.d.

⁹⁵ i.b.i.d. p. 249.

⁹⁶ i.b.i.d.

⁹⁷ i.b.i.d.

⁹⁸ PECOS 4100: Lecture # 6 with Hilde Henriksen Waage, “Third parties in asymmetric peace negotiations: The case of the Oslo process.” 05.09.11.

⁹⁹ i.b.i.d.

Like Dennis Ross said; “Norway had to embrace the Israeli position. It would be no deal otherwise.”¹⁰⁰

Jan Egeland recalled the end result of the Oslo Process from a different angle; “It was the Israeli and the Palestinian peoples themselves, through the visionaries courage of their leaders, who made this historic peace agreement. We were the midwives, happy to see the baby delivered in the end-safe, sound and beautiful.”¹⁰¹ Hilde Henriksen Waage concludes one of her articles with this statement; “...the results that can be achieved by a powerless facilitator are no more than the strongest party will allow.”¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2005) “Norway’s Role in the Middle East Peace Talks: Between a Small State and a Weak Belligerent”. Page 6-24, in *Journals of Palestine Studies* 34 (4) Institute for Palestine Studies. p. 19.

¹⁰¹ Egeland, Jan (1994) “Norway’s Middle East Peace Channel-an Insider’s view”. Page 349-251, in *Security Dialogue*. Sage Publications. p. 351.

¹⁰² Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2005) “Norway’s Role in the Middle East Peace Talks: Between a Small State and a Weak Belligerent”. Page 6-24, in *Journals of Palestine Studies* 34 (4) Institute for Palestine Studies. p. 20.

4. Analysis: Is there anything that can be called “The Norwegian Model”?

PRIO’s Stein Tønnesson, as well as Terje Rød Larsen, claim that the so called “Norwegian Model” does not exist and Tønnesson does not know anyone who thinks so.¹⁰³ They both think that it would be impossible to have a “one size fits all” policy when it comes to peace negotiations as all conflicts are unique, and the conditions for each conflict spans immensely. They compare peace negotiations to a tool box. As previously stated, all conflicts are unique and because of this you will have to use different approaches and methods each time. Geir Otto Pedersen, who works at the Norwegian Foreign Ministry claims that the “Norwegian model” is not used as a template for peace negotiations in general. “It identifies some characteristics to do with Norwegian facilitation, however these characteristics are not necessarily all present in our engagements.”¹⁰⁴ Fellow Foreign Ministry employee Jon Hanssen-Bauer says that they try to distance themselves from the term “Norwegian Model”. It has become too self-assertive and too based on the Oslo Process and is not used as a template.¹⁰⁵ Petter Bauck at NORAD says that he still finds it hard to clearly say what the “Norwegian Model” is beyond an active cooperation between research institutions, civil society organizations, flexibility and the will to allocate funds when needed.

“To the degree that there exists a “Norwegian Model” it would be that Norway has no model”, Kristian Harpviken states.¹⁰⁶ He adds that Norway has always been very keen to use the opportunity that arises to be able to play a constructive role, this is often done through individuals who have been particularly involved in a peace process, like diplomats, NGOs, businesses or a Norwegian church leader.¹⁰⁷ He also points out that this can always result in larger personalities being able to test their dreams, whilst the more quiet and reserved type may not get a chance.¹⁰⁸ This can be seen in the history

¹⁰³ Tønnesson, Stein. Interviewed by email. 27.04.2012.

¹⁰⁴ Pedersen, Geir Otto. Interviewed by email. 02.05.2012.

¹⁰⁵ Hanssen-Bauer, Jon. Interviewed by email. 12.03.2012.

¹⁰⁶ Harpviken, Kristian. Interviewed by phone. 28.02.2012.

¹⁰⁷ i.b.i.d

¹⁰⁸ i.b.i.d

of Norwegian peace negotiators, as many of the same names repeat themselves during different negotiations. Norway may have a large network of researchers on the subject of peace negotiations, but not that many have been physically involved in the processes.

“Not only the Foreign Ministry, but the entire government and the Labour party are very taken with the Norwegian and Nordic “models” as a concept for self – legitimacy, and that it is a legitimate attitude. However I do not see it as meaningful to do so”¹⁰⁹, Vidar Helgesen says. A reason for this may be that the brand “Norwegian Model” is easily saleable and may boost foreigners` positive opinion about Norway. After all, the politicians working with foreign policies are dependent on their foreign colleagues wanting to cooperate with them.

Kristian Harpviken says he speaks “to Norwegian diplomats about this, including people who work in the Peace and Reconciliation section at the Foreign Ministry, and they are the people who have the “Norwegian Model” in their portfolio. Either they do not use the term as all, or they use it in quotes, this they have done for many years. But the interesting thing is that the list is still published on their website.”¹¹⁰

It is believed by many that if there is one thing that can be called the “Norwegian Model” it is that there is absolutely no blueprint for how Norway will act in a negotiation as all conflicts are different, however, it is desirable that certain ethical guidelines are followed at all times.

Without such a thing as a Norwegian model for peace negotiations, is it possible to exemplify the Norwegian way of doing this type of work?

¹⁰⁹ Helgesen, Vidar. Interviewed by phone. 16.03.2012.

¹¹⁰ Harpviken, Kristian. Interviewed by phone. 28.02.2012.

4.1 How can Norway`s methods of peace negotiations be characterized?

Terje Tvedt describes seven characteristics with regards to the Norwegian way of doing peace negotiations. First, he points out that humanitarian work is seen as much more important in Norway than in any other country, and that the state gives more support to these volunteering organizations than any other state.¹¹¹ He also claims that the organizations and the state are much more in agreeance and have a closer bond than in many other countries, this is also something that a large number of interview objects have mentioned.

The leaders of the NGOs and the state interchange their place of work more frequently than in other countries.¹¹² This is a phenomenon disliked by many. Whilst some claim that this ensures good cooperation and the sharing of knowledge, others feel it creates an inner circle of people who will not be critical of each other.

Terje Tvedt mentions that it is a typically Norwegian trait that leaders of the NGOs have a large amount of freedom to manage the financial contributions they are given as the state is liberal in its administration politics.¹¹³ This is done to decrease the chance of a project being slowed down or halted by bureaucratic processes. This has been mentioned by many as something specific for Norway`s way of doing peace negotiations.

The financial flexibility is key to the way Norway undertakes this type of politics, but just as important as having funds to spend , in the importance of having the ability to be able to spend it fast, Kristian Harpviken points out.¹¹⁴ An example is “the Norwegian foreign ministry wins over the Swedish every time, because we are faster at getting the cheque book out!”¹¹⁵ Although speed is essential in many negotiation situations and a long bureaucratic process of obtaining needed funds may ruin an opportunity for progress, the projects the money goes to will not be critically evaluated and time for a second opinions may not be prioritized. The easy access to

¹¹¹ Tvedt, Terje (2003). *Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt. Den norske modellen*. Oslo. Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS. p. 80.

¹¹² i.b.i.d

¹¹³ i.b.i.d

¹¹⁴ Harpviken, Kristian. Interviewed by phone. 28.02.2012.

¹¹⁵ i.b.i.d.

funds may cause quick and not thought through decisions that may end with a negative result.

Jonas Gahr Støre has pointed out six trademarks in Norway's way of conducting peace negotiations. Firstly, he mentions a broad consensus about the direction foreign affairs take, secondly, establishing competence through presence in conflict areas, and thirdly, the Foreign Minister mentions the strong cooperation between NGOs, research institutions and the government.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, he mentions the will to take risks, and fifth, the little personal interest we have in others' territories and the fact that we are not biased, and finally our persistent will and ability to handle and create silent processes.¹¹⁷

These characteristics have been mentioned by a large majority of interview objects and they are all visible in the way Norway conducts peace negotiations. The fact that there has emerged a general consensus with regards to foreign policy between all parties in the Norwegian parliament results in the Norwegian peace engagement being motivated by realism and idealism without any particular conflict between the two.¹¹⁸

E.H. Carr argues that statesmen often are torn between reality and utopia, or realism and idealism.¹¹⁹ Henrik Thune describes this phenomenon with the following statement; "According to a standard view, popular Norwegian commentators and historians, Norway's foreign relations after World War II are like a pendulum swinging from side to side, between national interests and national values, between the will to secure the state and its territory and the will to represent a global cosmopolitan spirituality."¹²⁰ This is where the enlarged view many Norwegians have of themselves can affect the negotiations. If a larger task is taken on without the proper knowledge or experience, on the grounds of someone thinking they are capable, a situation may quickly go from bad to worse.

¹¹⁶ Harpviken, Kristian Berg and Skjelsbæk, Inger (2010) "Tilslørt fredspolitik" Page 379-388, in Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift # 4. Universitetsforlaget. (translated by E. Nordviste.) p. 385.

¹¹⁷ i.b.i.d

¹¹⁸ Langmore, John (2011) "Distinctive Features of Norwegian Foreign Policy: Possible Lessons for Australia." Page 1-12. From the Australian Political Science Association Conference 2011. p.1.

¹¹⁹ Bekken, Sigmund (2007) "Identities and peace promotion in Norwegian foreign policy." Page 1- 76. Master thesis from Australian National University. p. 15.

¹²⁰ i.b.i.d

NGOs may have better conditions to execute their wishes and what they stand for than the government, as a government will have many other responsibilities and priorities, whilst NGOs often specialises in one or a few areas.

A very interesting issue that Thomas Hylland Eriksen pointed out is the fact that a Norwegian peace negotiator does not come across as they are leaders of superpower with a crisp suit and a limousine, but rather they may arrive in a conflict zone with messy hair and sweat stains on their shirt.¹²¹ This is something that makes us appear less harmful and more like an average Joe which can be a great advantage when acting as a third party in a peace negotiation. The naive optimism and the belief that all people are Norwegians, they just do not know it yet is clearly visible. That they are corrupt is just because they have not realized that what they are doing is bad, and through agreements, campaigns and different measures you can get rid of many of the world`s problems. This is all a typically Norwegian idea.¹²² These are archetypal examples of the Norwegian mindset.

However, not all are convinced that Norway even has any unique characteristics. David Malone (President of International Development Research Center, Canada) stated that he could not think of any characteristics unique to Norway.¹²³

The view described by Hylland Eriksen above it a very typical Norwegian characteristic, as is the easy transference of funds, the little interest Norway seem to have in other countries, the cross party political agreement on the issue of peace negotiation and the down to earth impression they exude. There is also another strong characteristic to the Norwegian way of presiding with peace negotiations, this is discussed below.

¹²¹ Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. Interviewed 26.03.2012.

¹²² i.b.i.d

¹²³ Malone, David. Interviewed by email. 21. 03.2012.

4.1.2 “The triangle”

Norwegian NGOs, research facilities and the government work very closely together. This is definitely a specific trait of Norwegian peace politics, and I have chosen to call this phenomenon “the triangle”.

It is regularly seen that the people in top positions “switch hats” and go from one of the three to another. The close connection between Norwegian NGOs, research institutions and the government is very specific for Norway, and Thorvald Stoltenberg says that this is a real strength, and “even though we just passed 5 million people, we are a small nation and we cannot afford not to cooperate.”¹²⁴ The fact that people in this triangle swap places he finds brilliant, it makes them all understand each other, he points out, and adds that this is something he is proud of.¹²⁵ The Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre said that “You make changes when different actors have the safety to cooperate...It creates opportunities to make good by playing on different strings.”¹²⁶ The Foreign Minister states he is very concerned with the individuality of the different actors, and adds that he thinks this debate lives more in the academic sphere than it does in real life. “We have to be open about people “changing hats”, going from one organization to another, but especially in a small country like Norway, this will happen. The important thing is that people know what you stand for in your current position”¹²⁷ he adds.

It is clear that for example in the Oslo Process, the role of NGOs was vital. This is clearly described by Terje Rød Larsen. “A characteristic of the Oslo process was that an NGO, namely Fafo, organized the negotiations. It was funded, but not organized, by the Foreign Ministry. In a bureaucracy it is impossible to conduct secret negotiations, over a longer period of time, because of written reports etc. The parties involved did not want a state to be present, they wanted research facilities, because of the liability.”¹²⁸ However, this is an exception rather than something that happens frequently. Terje Tvedt says that Norway`s success as an international peace

¹²⁴ Stoltenberg, Thorvald. Interviewed 29.03.2012.

¹²⁵ i.b.i.d

¹²⁶ Støre, Jonas Gahr. Interviewed by phone. 04.07.2012.

¹²⁷ i.b.i.d

¹²⁸ Larsen, Terje Rød. Interviewed by phone. 12.04.2012.

negotiator is very often said to exist due to the very close cooperation between academics, the state, and the humanitarian actors. This type of close cooperation is very rarely seen anywhere else.¹²⁹

Previous Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Hans Brattskar says that “I wouldn’t say it’s unique to get input from research facilities about current affairs. It’s very normal for example in the USA.”¹³⁰ When I worked as a peace mediator in the Philippines, I worked with foreign research facilities, because not many Norwegian research facilities were interested in that area.¹³¹ Knut Vollebæk thinks it is positive that Norway has the cooperation between NGOs, research institutions and the government, in the way that it gives Norway available resources the government otherwise wouldn’t have, this he considers very important and fundamental. At the same time he thinks it’s important to use research facilities or NGOs as resources, because they can go further than a government sometimes can. They do not have to take so many considerations into account, when it comes to the formal aspects of the work, as a government has to. Because of this Vollebæk is sceptical of too much mixing of the government and NGOs.¹³²

“In the Sri Lanka process, the NGOs were drawn in to the ministry and the government, I don’t think that’s very wise. You lose a player that you would normally have, a player who could have operated more freely than a government. You need a distance to some of these institutions, which is very useful, because it creates diversity, and provide us with more instruments to play on.”¹³³ Here again the ability to be self-critical can be limited due to the tight cooperation.

This “triangular” relationship has its benefits in the sharing of knowledge and the bond of trust created through cooperation, however, these advantages do not outweigh the disadvantages the “triangle” represents. As stated previously, to lose the healthy amount of scepticism and that critical voice towards others work is very unfortunate.

¹²⁹ Tvedt, Terje (2003). *Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt. Den norske modellen*. Oslo. Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS. p. 41.

¹³⁰ Brattskar, Hans. Interviewed. 13.04.2012

¹³¹ i.b.i.d

¹³² Vollebæk, Knut. Interviewed by phone. 13.04.2012

¹³³ i.b.i.d

4.1.3 Norway and the Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs)

The Norwegian government has a very close relationship with Norwegian NGOs, which is a clear characteristic of the Norwegian peace negotiation strategy. Peace is not made by governments alone, it is made by the people,¹³⁴ Harold Saunders states. Norwegian NGOs, with the missionary organizations, have been engaged in humanitarian causes in other parts of the world since the 1860`s, however, it was not until the 1960`s that this type of politics became a part of the Norwegian development aid.¹³⁵ The merging of these two concepts, humanitarian work and development aid, helped develop an international consensus with regards to NGOs involvement in both. Vidar Helgesen claims that peace negotiation is a very natural extension of Norway`s humanitarian engagement. It would be pointless to spend large amounts of money fixing the consequences of war without trying to reduce the chance of more conflict through peace negotiations, he says.¹³⁶ Although this is true, it is the level of cooperation, dependence and interconnectedness that is unusual and some may claim, not always positive. “NGOs are playing a growing role, directly and indirectly, in international conflict resolutions only in part because they can make good use of some of the less traditional, integrative strategies of conflict resolution. More importantly, states are increasingly less willing to run the risks created by strategies to mitigate violence. The humanitarian NGOs are at the forefront of those that confront most directly the consequences of great power disengagement and privatization in the complex humanitarian emergencies that are now considered legitimately as part of international conflict.”¹³⁷ The NGOs may act as buffers at times, however, this is a role that is accepted by the NGOs. “The influence of the Norwegian NGOs and the

¹³⁴ Saunders, Harold (2000) “Interactive conflict resolution: A review for Policy Makers in Making and Building Peace”, Chap. 7 in Stern, P. et al.(Eds) : *International Conflict Resolutions after the Cold War*. Washington DC: National Academic Press. p.252.

¹³⁵ Skånland, Øystein Haga (2011) “Peace promotion as National identity: The emergence and Reproduction of Norway`s Activist Peace and Reconciliation Efforts.” Page 1-22. Paper presented at the 2011 ECPR Conference, Reykjavik, Iceland. p. 3.

¹³⁶ Helgesen, Vidar. Interviewed by phone. 16.03.2012.

¹³⁷ Stein, Janice Gross (2000) “New Challenges to Conflict Resolution: Humanitarian Non governmental Organizations in Complex Emergencies.” Chap. 10 in Stern, P. et al.(Eds) : *International Conflict Resolutions after the Cold War*. Washington DC: National Academic Press. p.384.

state goes both ways in peace negotiations as it does in many other areas, our collaboration and the way we use our funds clearly also influence the NGOs' priorities,"¹³⁸ Geir Otto Pedersen who works at the Norwegian Foreign Ministry claims.

NGOs such as Human Right Watch, which do not take any funding from governments to ensure independence, have through time established trustworthy contacts in countries like Egypt, Syria and Libya. When the Arab Spring "kicked off", the contacts were already there and it was made sure that valid information left the countries. Mona Juul, who was heavily involved in the negotiation of the Oslo Process, said that "(T) the ministry is quite limited when it comes to expertise. We have the money, they have the contacts,"¹³⁹ and by "they" she means the NGOs. The Foreign Ministry has on many occasions needed the NGO's local knowledge, which is of vital importance in order to make any sort of real and lasting changes to a conflict. Norway prides itself on having good, local knowledge, NGOs presence is therefore needed on a regular basis. With the use of NGOs you may be able to connect with the local population etc. in a better way, but maybe more important, you gain the possibility to blame others for a failure.

Terje Tvedt states that the Norwegian Foreign Ministry gives large amounts of money to humanitarian organizations, and that during the 1960`s there was no major difference in the budget and the number of employees at the various NGOs, but today about 70% of all the Foreign Ministry`s donations goes to the five largest NGOs. (Refugee Council, Norwegian Church Aid, Red Cross, Save the Children and Norwegian Peoples Aid.)¹⁴⁰ The more independent the government regards an organization, the more funds it may get. This very close bond of dependence is something many disagree with.

¹³⁸ Pedersen, Geir Otto. Interviewed by email. 02.05.2012.

¹³⁹ Tvedt, Terje (2003). *Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt. Den norske modellen*. Oslo. Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS. p. 118.

¹⁴⁰ i.b.i.d. p. 66.

Norwegian NGOs are important to Norway, but how are they viewed by the international community? Terje Tvedt claims that in many countries it is not the Norwegian Ambassador who is seen as the most important, but the employees from certain NGOs such as Norwegian People Aid and Norwegian Church Aid. Furthermore, evangelists have on more than one occasion received papers from the Foreign Ministry stating they are travelling as representatives of the Norwegian state.¹⁴¹

As assistance and relief to victims is being privatized in many cases, NGOs face new, more complex as well as more dangerous responsibilities.¹⁴² Both the NGOs budget and workload increase as “privatization of assistance and the withdrawal of states and international organizations from the field”¹⁴³ occur more rapidly.

As the Norwegian state funds these NGOs heavily there is reason to question the NGOs` independence from the state.

4.1.4 How important are the Norwegian NGOs to the peace negotiation projects? Are they sufficiently independent from the Norwegian state?

Norwegian NGOs have taken on many different roles throughout the peace negotiating history. Like in Guatemala where they were heavily involved, to their complementary roles in Eritrea and Ethiopia, and in Sudan where they played a moral role, just to mention some. Gro Harlem Brundtland claims that “the degree of independence varies with each of these NGOs. It depends on the number of direct alliances and direct work programmes they obtain with the Norwegian government. It is up to each NGO what profile they choose to adapt.¹⁴⁴” It is not so unthinkable that if

¹⁴¹ Tvedt, Terje (2003). *Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt. Den norske modellen*. Oslo. Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS. p. 123.

¹⁴² Stein, Janice Gross (2000) “New Challenges to Conflict Resolution: Humanitarian Non governmental Organizations in Complex Emergencies.” Chap. 10 in Stern, P. et al. (Eds) : *International Conflict Resolutions after the Cold War*. Washington DC: National Academic Press. p.384.

¹⁴³ i.b.i.d. p.388.

¹⁴⁴ Brundtland, Gro Harlem. Interviewed by phone. 29.02.2012.

an NGO assists a governmental mission, they receive some funding from the government, however this is not the main concern. The questions arise when a NGO gets so intertwined with the Norwegian government's peace negotiation missions that it acts more like a partner than a provider of assistance. The government has no responsibility for the NGOs actions or employees, but to outsiders they may act as this is the case. This could put the government in tricky positions. The NGOs may also get associated with the Norwegian government when they make mistakes. After the corruption, bribery and "gin and tonic parties" in connection with refugee camps in Sri Lanka, the Norwegian government took a firm stand trying to separate themselves from the NGOs...to be a Norwegian in Sri Lanka these days it not exactly a plus.¹⁴⁵

When Thorvald Stoltenberg was asked whether the close economical ties between the government and the NGOs lead to NGOs working more in the government's direction, he answered "yes, but I see no harm in that. I have never seen that the Foreign Ministry have been involved in anything that NGOs couldn't also be a part of."¹⁴⁶ This criticized contact, however, is also a great strength in the trust that has been created, Kristian Harpviken says. He pointed to the fact that the NGOs can always be blamed for things that may go wrong in the negotiations.¹⁴⁷

"Norwegian NGOs are often a political card that the Foreign Ministry can play during negotiations. It becomes a type of carrot: If X accepts to demobilise in area Y, the Foreign Ministry can guarantee that Norwegian People's Aid start mine clearance, and that the Norwegian Refugee Council build centres for internally displaced persons and refugees. This is often important elements of a successful agreement. The large Norwegian NGOs put great emphasis on being independent, but due to the fact that the Foreign Ministry is one of their main sponsors, it will take much for the NGOs not to go along with the Foreign Ministry", says an interview object who wishes to be anonymous.

¹⁴⁵ Klem, Bart. Interviewed by phone. 17.02.2012.

¹⁴⁶ Stoltenberg, Thorvald. Interviewed 29.03.2012.

¹⁴⁷ Harpviken, Kristian. Interviewed by phone. 28.02.2012.

Ambassador Kai Sauer, Vidar Helgesen and others, were asked if the fact that states can blame NGOs if something goes wrong is a reason why they are welcomed as contributors to the peace negotiations. They answered that this is certainly the case, and that it is not a surprise, everyone knows this. “Success has many fathers, and failure is usually allotted to one, usually the NGO in this regard,” Kai Sauer adds.¹⁴⁸ “The whole point is that it is a cooperation model, that it is not a relationship with tensions, that they are partners.”¹⁴⁹ Because the tasks are distributed it makes it an easy and cheap way of doing peace negotiations,¹⁵⁰ Jan Egeland states.

Professor Goodhand claims that “It’s clear in the way that Norway funded organizations in relation to the Sri Lankan peace process for quite an instrumental purpose, and this was related to the belief that NGOs could play in and supporting the peace process, building a constituency for peace, creating an economic peace dividend and building links between communities on different sides of the conflict.” “If you look at the funding trends”, Dr. Goodhand continues, “you’ll see a big boost of funding to NGOs, but it wasn’t just Norwegian NGOs it was also to a lot of Sri Lankan organizations, in particular to FCE” (Foundation for Co-Existence) “and Milinda Moragoda’s organization” (Institute for Peoples’ Empowerment (MMIPE)) “an anti landmine, clearance organization.”¹⁵¹

Not all governmental cooperation with NGOs, Norwegian or foreign, end favourably for the parties, this can be seen in the example provided by Oliver Walton. “Norway did support some Sri Lankan NGOs in this context, however, they were to some extent damaged by their association with Norway as the peace process began to unravel”¹⁵² Bart Klem discusses the Sri Lanka case in particular and states that “most people don’t single out the Norwegian NGOs from the rest. Frankly a lot of people on the ground wouldn’t know the difference between a Swedish, Danish or a Dutch, or French

¹⁴⁸ Sauer, Kai. Interviewed by phone. 20.02.2012.

¹⁴⁹ Egeland, Jan. Interviewed by phone. 27.02.2012.

¹⁵⁰ i.b.i.d

¹⁵¹ Goodhand, Jonathan. Interviewed by phone. 10.02.2012.

¹⁵² Walton, Oliver. Interviewed by email. 27.02.2012.

NGO...or even a Japanese one for that matter, they're just foreign."¹⁵³ "Though amongst the more politically aware class of course it was known that it could be used as a side for Norway's political engagement."¹⁵⁴ Through the Norwegian press, Norwegians get the impression that Norwegian NGOs are clearly visible, doing vital work in every situation. The NGOs have many different roles and are not often solemnly responsible for an operation or their results, this does not become clear in the Norwegian media.

Norwegian NGOs are GONGOs, Journalist Kjell Dragnes claims, explaining this as Government organized NGOs.¹⁵⁵ He would not call them independent, but maybe rather dependent on the Norwegian state, which is not good for the country where peace negotiations are underway, or for Norway itself.¹⁵⁶ NGOs are too tied together with the government and have a straw in the Treasury...in other countries they will be associated with the official Norwegian politics,¹⁵⁷ Kjell Dragnes states. A positive effect of having NGOs involved in peace negotiations is the critical eyes they may look at the government's work through, however, if this view is lost due to the interconnectedness of the two, the NGOs and the government will lose out. Mistakes may be discovered later, or not at all, and the people who are already in difficulties are the ones who will suffer; a situation can deteriorate without the right amount of scepticism. And who would bite the hand that feeds you?!

4. 2 The Norwegian identity; how the Norwegians see themselves

States like Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands have had just as good conditions as Norway to get involved in peace negotiations, however the difference was what Norway allowed themselves to approach the issue differently, Jan Egeland claims.¹⁵⁸ After Norway saw the benefits of a successful peace negotiation, international peace

¹⁵³ Klem, Bart. Interviewed by phone. 17.02.2012.

¹⁵⁴ i.b.i.d

¹⁵⁵ Dragnes, Kjell. Interviewed by email. 29.02.2012

¹⁵⁶ i.b.i.d

¹⁵⁷ i.b.i.d

¹⁵⁸ Egeland, Jan. Interviewed by phone. 17.10.2011.

negotiations became a much bigger part of the foreign ministry's agenda. Thorvald Stoltenberg pointed out that after the Oslo Process, Norway was being followed a lot closer.¹⁵⁹ To be engaged in humanitarian issues as well as conflict resolution has become tradition for Norway. This, some claim, can be seen in the examples of the Nobel Peace Prize, the Peoples League's efforts in the mid war years, the humanitarian efforts shown by Fridtjof Nansen, and the bridge building and UN engagement shortly after the Second World war.¹⁶⁰ Moreover, some say this trend can also be seen in the opening of the Nobel Peace Centre in Oslo as well as the repeated markings of anniversaries for different peace agreements. Even the annual celebration of the constitution on the 17th of May can easily initiate peace ambitions.

However, just because some individuals have taken certain political directions and others have decided that some things are more important than others to take notice of, does not automatically make Norwegians a nation full of reconciliation loving peace negotiators. It has been shown, in organizational studies, that a person's nationality will have an effect on their cognitive schema, values, demeanour as well as language, and this will in turn have an effect on individual actions and also on group performances.¹⁶¹ Normally collective or single identities are temporary, they will always be objectives to transformation and reproduction, Terje Tvedt (2009) says.¹⁶² However, in the case of Norway this image has stuck. "It is striking that people often pressure their image in the face of what seems in retrospect to have been clear evidence to the contrary. We ignore information that does not fit, twist it so that it confirms, or at least does not contradict, our own beliefs, and deny its validity."¹⁶³ The more exposure, the more this belief may be reinforced. This is what many claim

¹⁵⁹ Stoltenberg, Thorvald (2001). *Det handler om mennesker*. Gjøvik: Gyldendal Norske Forlag AS. p. 275.

¹⁶⁰ Østerud, Øyvind (2006). "Lite land som humanitær stormakt?", page 303-316, in *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift* 4/2006. p. 303.

¹⁶¹ Gøglund, Kristine (2011) "Obstacles to Monitoring: Perceptions of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission and the Dual Role of Norway." Page 210-225, in *International Peacekeeping* 18 (2). p. 217.

¹⁶² Tvedt, Terje (2003). *Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt. Den norske modellen*. Oslo. Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS. p. 36.

¹⁶³ Jervis, Robert. (1976) *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Relations*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. p. 43.

happened after the collapse of the Sri Lanka negotiations as well as with the Oslo Process.

NGOs are often seen as a smaller actor which respects the civil society in Norway compared to the “big, bad” state, and they symbolize, not only to themselves but to the world, that we are all doing something.¹⁶⁴ This feeling of togetherness and cooperation makes the individual feel like they are making a difference in the world by simply being Norwegian. This feeling of empowerment and importance is not something that the general population wants to give up.

Harpviken and Skjelsbæk have written that “(P) peace politics has become a symbol that builds and strengthens our national identity. Peace politics is not based on ethical foundation only, but also on a strong idealistic self image. Ethics and self image strengthens each other. Likewise is the public debate full of objections to the image of the peace loving Norwegians, but most of it seems to just repel off.”¹⁶⁵ Thorvald Stoltenberg claims that thinking we are better than other is an unfortunate view to have. “If you are told on a regular basis that you are a peace creator then you will start believing it. Then you can even believe that you have larger possibilities to create peace than others who are interested in peace.”¹⁶⁶

However, when asked if Norway does have any reason to do better than others the former Foreign Minister said that “Yes, we do! In the sense that if the parties genuinely want a solution we can have an advantage because we are harmless, but not necessarily because we are so peace loving!”¹⁶⁷ However, most Norwegians will not be able to differentiate between the reasons why we may be attractive to others. It is assumed by many that Norway has a stronger peace tradition than most other comparable states in this field of work, however, in other countries, this image has not

¹⁶⁴ Tvedt, Terje (2003). *Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt. Den norske modellen*. Oslo. Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS. p. 115.

¹⁶⁵ Harpviken, Kristian Berg and Skjelsbæk, Inger (2010) ”Tilslørt fredspolitikk” Page 379-388, in *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift # 4*. Universitetsforlaget. (translated by E. Nordviste.) p. 382.

¹⁶⁶ Stoltenberg, Thorvald. Interviewed 29.03.2012.

¹⁶⁷ i.b.i.d

become part of the other nations' self-image.¹⁶⁸ This peace practice has become its own justification stating that Norwegians should promote peace because it is simply who we are and what we do.

The Norwegian self image and identity is lined with exceptionalism; the idea that Norwegians have "special abilities in promoting peace, international justice and humanitarian values, appears to be an important part of Norway's identity and self-image.¹⁶⁹ In Norway the national identity is publicly discussed, but it is also a large part of the citizens' mental and social skills that are taken for granted.¹⁷⁰ Even through striking changes in a state's culture, their national identity may stay firm, this collective national identity can also act as a self-fulfilling prophecy by influencing politics.¹⁷¹

Journalist Gro Holm thinks that Norway at times can have an exaggerated idea of the role it can play. "It can become a bit pathetic how we run after every conflict and want to play a special part."¹⁷² She also says that "there are not many cases where Norway has the special qualifications to play a role, beyond what other countries can do,"¹⁷³ however she does add that Norway is seen as a peace negotiator who is rather selfless during the negotiation process it is a part of.

"We have of course been involved in a series of conflicts where we haven't had enough knowledge in Norway to base it on. For example talking about Sri Lanka, there were maybe two or three researchers in Norway that would have anything interesting to say about it", Erik Solheim says, furthermore he adds "I don't mean to be arrogant, but we have much more use of researchers in India, the USA, or Great Britain. Not many Norwegian NGOs or research facilities are relevant in regards to

¹⁶⁸ Bekken, Sigmund (2007) "Identities and peace promotion in Norwegian foreign policy." Page 1- 76. Master thesis from Australian National University. p. 38.

¹⁶⁹ Skånland, Øystein Haga (2010) "Norway is a peace nation: A discourse analytic reading of the Norwegian peace engagement." Page 34-54, in *Cooperation and Conflict* 45 (1). Sage Publications. p. 36.

¹⁷⁰ Hylland, Eriksen Thomas et al. (2011) "Fra Slektsgård til oljeplattform: Norsk identitet og Europa." Page 413-436, in *Internsjonal Politikk*. Årgang 69, nr. 3. Universitetsforlaget. (translated by E. Nordviste.) p. 414.

¹⁷¹ i.b.i.d. p. 424.

¹⁷² Holm, Gro. Interviewed by phone. 29.02.2012.

¹⁷³ i.b.i.d

this area, so you have to base your knowledge on something broader than Norway.”¹⁷⁴ Journalist Fredrik Græsvik argues that Norway does not have a history of entering into armed conflicts, but when it does, it has been done with peacekeeping forces, which is what leaves people with the idea of Norway as a peace negotiating nation.¹⁷⁵ This is another explanation as to why Norwegians may have a slightly deluded self-image.

“A lot of countries can say they’re positively disposed or regarded, and again I think that’s by virtue of history, culture or how you’ve evolved in terms of national identity. But that’s a forged identity. Just like we have a forged identity as a country that has contributed to international efforts in different ways at different times. That forged what our public thinks we do internationally. That might not always be consistent with the reality, but it’s a forged national identity,” an anonymous source said.¹⁷⁶ The source continues to say that “if tomorrow, a Norwegian government came into power and said that we do not get enough out of this at the end of the day, there’s not been enough tangible results delivered, then it’s no longer your national identity.”¹⁷⁷ This proves how fragile this “identity” really is and how easily it potentially could be taken away.

International peace negotiation is as already mentioned an important part of Norwegian foreign policies. The former Foreign Minister Knut Vollebæk thinks the Norwegians perception of themselves come from their background of religious ideas, and conservative as well as radical political socialist thinking. “We have this responsibility, we have possibilities, we have resources, and we are going to utilize them. We also have this conception of ourselves as a small country that has not been at war with other countries in a very long time, besides being occupied by other countries. We haven’t been in any aggressive war since the Viking age. We see ourselves as a country with long standing traditions of peaceful engagement with neighbouring countries and the world at large.”¹⁷⁸ Furthermore, he claims that “It

¹⁷⁴ Solheim, Erik. Interviewed. 01.06.2012.

¹⁷⁵ Græsvik, Fredrik. Interviewed by phone. 05.03.2012.

¹⁷⁶ Anonymous source.

¹⁷⁷ i.b.i.d

¹⁷⁸ Vollebæk, Knut. Interviewed by phone. 13.04.2012.

might be that it's in our nature, our orientation, to look at ourselves as more important than we actually are. It might be a kind of inferiority complex that results in a form of... not arrogance, but a feeling of having something that others need, when they've never actually asked for it, we might think that others *should* ask for it. At the same time you can say that, for some politicians, it's been more a question of how to use Norwegian resources and advantages, to the extent we have any, than to promote Norwegian interests. In that case it has been more of a modest review of "what can we contribute with, that would be interesting, and will put Norway on the map".¹⁷⁹ It is clear that peace negotiation and what this engagement represents are both intertwined in the Norwegian self image. Norwegians see themselves as more peaceful and more peace creating than most other states. But why is this?

4.3 How did the reputation of Norway as an international peace negotiating "superpower" emerge?

There are many explanations as to why the Norwegian public may see themselves as an international actor that plays a large role in creating world peace. One such explanation may be that "no other European leader(s) attaches its people's identity with helping the world's poor and creating peace."¹⁸⁰ However, Tvedt claims that "(F)ew, if any, knows the effect of the multicultural in e.g. Torit in Sudan, Andikola in Nepal or Norway's role as a peace negotiator in Somalia, Sudan, Sierra Leone etc."¹⁸¹

4.3.1 Can the politicians be held partly responsible?

Some prominent Norwegian politicians are partly responsible for the view some have of Norway as a peace creating nation. "This has been a rather conscious project by the

¹⁷⁹ Vollebæk, Knut. Interviewed by phone. 13.04.2012.

¹⁸⁰ Tvedt, Terje (2003). *Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt. Den norske modellen*. Oslo. Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS. p. 17.

¹⁸¹ i.b.i.d. p. 21.

Norwegian Foreign Ministry Services,” Kristian Harpviken claims, adding that Norway hosts the Nobel Peace Prize, which is the world’s most important award.¹⁸² This prize distribution may have a confusing effect on some, as they believe it to be connected to Norway in some way. The reason why it is handed out in Norway is actually unknown.

In Kjell Magne Bondevik’s new year’s speech as a Prime Minister on 31.12.1999 he stated the following: “Norway must be a nation of charity and solidarity. Let us follow in Fridtjof Nansen’s footsteps with faithful efforts for refugees and sufferers in other countries. Our nation is now deleting the poorest development nations` dept. Norway is one of the best when it comes to assistance.”¹⁸³ Furthermore the ex Prime Minister said “Remember, as a solidarity state, we have reasons to be proud.”¹⁸⁴

As a Prime Minister you have tremendous influence over a large number of the population and even though some may not agree with your politics, everyone wants to hear and believe flattering words about their country and themselves as a people.

Bondevik also said in the same speech to the Norwegian people that “Norway has to be a nation of peace -an actor for conflict resolution and peace creating actions. A nation that follows Nordahl Grieg’s strategy: `If you create human worthiness, you create peace. I wish that our capital shall appear as a city of peace. Remember, as a peace nation, we have reason to be proud.”¹⁸⁵ Here Kjell Magne Bondevik talks of peace negotiations as one of Norway’s most important traits, and by linking this tradition to national heroes, the country’s history and a Christian culture he suggests that this characteristic of peace negotiations has to do with the very nature of the Norwegian nation and its people. Øystein Haga Skånland points out that “(I) if we follow Bondevik’s line of reasoning, peace promotion indeed appears as a necessary

¹⁸² Harpviken, Kristian. Interviewed by phone. 28.02.2012.

¹⁸³ Tvedt, Terje (2003). *Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt. Den norske modellen*. Oslo. Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS. p. 17.

¹⁸⁴ i.b.i.d

¹⁸⁵ Tvedt, Terje (2003). *Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt. Den norske modellen*. Oslo. Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS. p. 17.

practice for the reproduction of Norwegian identity.”¹⁸⁶ Acclaimed journalist Hans-Wilhelm Steinfeld said that the Norwegian’s image of themselves as a great peace negotiating nation comes from the politicians and how they boast about making a significant difference. He illustrates his point with this analogy: “a mouse sitting on a cart dragged by a horse along a dusty country road and looks back at all the dust swirling up and says “wow I am creating lots of dust!”¹⁸⁷ Fellow journalist Kjell Dragnes also claims the Norwegian politicians are responsible for the misguided view Norwegians have of themselves. He mentions the quote from ex Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland who said that “to be good is typically Norwegian.”¹⁸⁸ Many journalists agree with the above statement, amongst them is Kjell Dragnes who thinks that the view many Norwegians have of themselves is exaggerated as the successes have not been that many, with an exception of Guatemala in the 90`s.¹⁸⁹ There have been surprisingly many interview objects who critically opposed the mainstream opinions about Norway.

Thomas Hylland Eriksen claims that many politicians have an inflated self image, not only in relation to the nation, but also in relation to themselves.¹⁹⁰ He points out that many might say that this is the case in many countries, but he gives two reasons for why he believes this is not true. First, “in some states, like in Great Britain, they actually make a difference. What David Cameron does, gets ripple effects in Malaysia, and secondly, in many countries you have other things to talk about besides your own excellence like unsolved social problems and corruption.”¹⁹¹ The lack of social conflict and the large amount of money Norway has, he claims is a recipe for national selfishness. “The smaller you are, the more important you find others opinions of you.”¹⁹² It is a fact that small countries have to work harder to be noticed abroad, however there is a difference between being noticed abroad and thinking a

¹⁸⁶ Skånland, Øystein Haga (2010) “Norway is a peace nation: A discourse analytic reading of the Norwegian peace engagement.” Page 34-54, in *Cooperation and Conflict* 45 (1). Sage Publications. p. 41

¹⁸⁷ Steinfeld, Hans-Wilhelm. Interviewed by email. 22.02.2012.

¹⁸⁸ Dragnes, Kjell. Interviewed by email. 29.02.2012.

¹⁸⁹ Dragnes, Kjell. Interviewed by email. 29.02.2012.

¹⁹⁰ Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. Interviewed 26.03.2012.

¹⁹¹ i.b.i.d

¹⁹² i.b.i.d

little too highly of yourself at home.

When Vidar Helgesen was in the Foreign Ministry he asked if they could end the use such expressions as humanitarian superpower, which was challenging as Kjell Magne Bondevik was the Prime Minister at the time,¹⁹³ Helgesen stated.

Simply being involved in a fairly high number of peace negotiations and peace creating projects does not make Norway a peace negotiating nation. Attempts are good and mostly well meant, however how many true successes has Norway really obtained? The answer to this is maybe surprising to many. Norway`s former Prime Minister, Thorbjørn Jagland stated in 2008 that “close to all the peace processes we have been involved in now lie in ruins’.”¹⁹⁴ It is also important to remember that Norway rarely undertakes a peace negotiation mission where it acts alone as a facilitator. Norway has not got sticks nor carrots, and this will inevitably limit the country`s own efforts and possibilities. Even though Norway is an affluent country it does not have the right resources to guarantee peace settlements without the contribution of other states.¹⁹⁵ It all comes down to the country`s lack of hard power.

It is not a problem for anyone that Norway wants to “play with the big boys.” Norway has funds and no power so if other more powerful nations can be a part of a peace process and get some of the praise and glory, why not? “When the foreign ministerial elite established a political project, they gave it legitimacy within the general population. As this elite decided to make Norway a humanitarian power, they had to influence the Norwegian opinion in a way that made them not just support it, but celebrated it. Without this, there is no point being a politician!”¹⁹⁶, Terje Tvedt says. He also claims that the media was a part of building this support, and that there is a close bond between the media and the foreign policies.¹⁹⁷

So what role may the media have in the Norwegians` perception of themselves?

¹⁹³ Helgesen, Vidar. Interviewed by phone. 16.03.2012

¹⁹⁴ Skånland, Øystein Haga (2010) “Norway is a peace nation: A discourse analytic reading of the Norwegian peace engagement.” Page 34-54, in *Cooperation and Conflict* 45 (1). Sage Publications. p. 47.

¹⁹⁵ Taulbee, James L. et al. (2006) ”Bridging the Gap: Building Peace Norwegian Style.” Page 479-505, in *Peace and Change* 31 (4). p. 485/486.

¹⁹⁶ Tvedt, Terje. Interviewed. 07.02.2012.

¹⁹⁷ i.b.i.d

4.3.2 Is the view Norwegians have of themselves connected to how Norwegians are portrayed in their national media?

Images on Norwegian TV channels from e.g. the Red Cross or Norwegians People Aid in refugee camps in Rwanda or with starving children in the Horn of Africa, are shown not only because it represents news, nor because it gives new information about the humanitarian crisis, but because it shows that the Norwegian people are present, making a difference and that the Norwegian community has a conscience and morality.¹⁹⁸ Public support for this type of work is vital to politicians, and from 1980 to 2001 almost one billion Norwegian kroner has been allocated to information measures to affect the public opinion.¹⁹⁹

Today's media is an influential tool that reaches the whole Norwegian population one way or the other. The feeling of "all" Norwegians doing their part simply by being Norwegian comes from the media to a large extent. In 2002 and 2003 the Norwegian newspaper "Dagbladet" featured articles about Norwegian aid ministers' travels in different African countries.²⁰⁰ These articles were not so much about Norwegian foreign policy as they were about the image of Norwegians as good Samaritans and how appreciated the Norwegian's presence was in these countries.²⁰¹ The cost for the journalists to join the politicians on their travels was not always covered by the news companies, but by the Foreign Ministry, this important point was not mentioned in any of the articles.²⁰² With articles like this which can be viewed as highly misleading, it is not strange that the Norwegian's self image as peace-spreaders is present.

In the time period from 01.01.2000 to 01.08.2002 the major Norwegian newspapers VG, Dagbladet, Vårt Land, Aftenposten and Dagsavisen published a total of 654 articles related to Norway's efforts in Sudan, Guatemala and Sri Lanka.²⁰³ Out of the 119 articles Aftenposten had featured on Sudan none were about the Norwegian

¹⁹⁸ Tvedt, Terje (2003). *Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt. Den norske modellen*. Oslo. Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS. p. 115.

¹⁹⁹ i.b.i.d. p. 149.

²⁰⁰ i.b.i.d. p. 153.

²⁰¹ i.b.i.d.

²⁰² i.b.i.d.

²⁰³ i.b.i.d. p. 156.

strategies in the conflict torn country, but rather they were rewarding Norway for not giving up on the peace negotiations.²⁰⁴ In Dagbladet's 57 articles about Sudan the focus was on issues such as the Norwegian minister Hilde Frafjord Johnson seeing images she would never forget.²⁰⁵ Once again the focus was on Norway's humanitarian side and not the actual policies that they try to implement to improve the conditions in the country. In VG's 61 articles, Dagsavisen's 65 and Vårt Land's 30 articles on Sudan, during the same time period, there were no mentioning of the Norwegian political efforts.²⁰⁶

In the same five major newspapers there were 129 articles published on Guatemala, but not one mentioned what efforts Norway had implemented to aid the situation.²⁰⁷ Furthermore, out of the 403 articles these five newspapers wrote on Sri Lanka (during the same time period) it was only mentioned that "we", the Norwegians, have been present.²⁰⁸ The extent of how the national media twist Norway's presence in a conflict torn country to gain public support and unity around a peace negotiation mission is alarming.

During the interviews with some highly esteemed Norwegian journalists, a question about whether safety working as a Norwegian journalist in certain areas sometimes decrease was asked. Fredrik Græsvik said that "Yes, because it may be that someone does not like Norway's engagements, in some cases it has lead to dangerous situations where it is complicated to be a Norwegian journalist like for example in Gaza."²⁰⁹ This is not an angle of the Norwegian peace efforts that is being covered much by the national press. If there was a hundred per cent wish for peace in a country, you wouldn't have a conflict. The people who want war are often a minority,²¹⁰ Erik Solheim claims. "If you involve these minorities in peace negotiations, you might also import terrorist problems to Norway, which can create insecurity for Norwegians and

²⁰⁴ i.b.i.d.

²⁰⁵ i.b.i.d.

²⁰⁶ Tvedt, Terje (2003). *Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt. Den norske modellen*. Oslo. Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS. p. 156.

²⁰⁷ i.b.i.d. p. 157.

²⁰⁸ i.b.i.d.

²⁰⁹ Græsvik, Fredrik. Interviewed by phone. 05.03.2012.

²¹⁰ Solheim, Erik. Interviewed. 01.06.2012.

especially Norwegian peace negotiators. You always have to consider this.”²¹¹ This dilemma was also mentioned by Jonas Gahr Støre during my interview with him. Another journalist raised a valid point reporting on the Norwegian peace efforts. The very detailed information is often kept from journalists so reporting on these issues becomes difficult. Furthermore, the progress made is often so small that it is hard to report in the media. However, the information that does come out is blown up by the Norwegian press, if the public support increases, so may the financial contributions from the public. As the financial support for newspapers’ foreign news sections has decreased, the reliance on journalists to portray the ‘Norwegian Samaritan’ has increased.²¹² But although this may be needed to maintain the view of Norway as an international peace negotiator of a certain standard, Terje Tvedt claims that “(T) the journalists have seemed to, without a principle reflection, let themselves get overwhelmed by the kindhearted regime’s moral status and values.”²¹³ An example is the general way that the Norwegian Middle East involvement was covered in the national media. The coverage “crystallized around certain discursive constructions, resulting in the emergence of a very positive representation of Norwegian peace efforts in general. This representation remained dominant, even when challenged by emerging alternatives. It thus supplied the interpretative optic through which other Norwegian peace initiatives were seen, and added to their status and perceived importance.”²¹⁴ A peace negotiation always has two, or more, sides to it, however it is a rarity to get both, or all, the different sides served in the Norwegian media. The viewpoint through Norwegian glasses takes priority.

Another renowned Norwegian journalist stated that the Norwegian press has hyped up the facilitator work Norway contributed to the Middle East for many years after the peace process collapsed and Norway was out of the conflict. “We always want to believe the best about ourselves”, the journalist claim. “A small country, with little

²¹¹ i.b.i.d

²¹² Tvedt, Terje (2003). *Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt. Den norske modellen*. Oslo. Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS. p. 161.

²¹³ i.b.i.d. p. 164.

²¹⁴ Skånland, Øystein Haga (2010) “Norway is a peace nation: A discourse analytic reading of the Norwegian peace engagement.” Page 34-54, in *Cooperation and Conflict* 45 (1). Sage Publications. p. 37.

conflict becomes very self-centred; Aftenposten and NRK have hyped Norway so much that people in the end start to believe that we are an important country.”²¹⁵

Thomas Hylland Eriksen claims that this could have happened independently of our role in the Oslo process. “If they write about Jonas Gahr Støre’s trips to different countries every day then people will get the impression that everybody in Jordan and Syria know very well who he is and admire him because he is smarter than you and looks good in a suit, just because Aftenposten says so.”²¹⁶

For people who have an analytical relationship to this topic, the Oslo Process may have made a difference to their perception of themselves, but “for most people I believe that it is what you hear in the news and in the newspapers that characterized the national self image and get the impression that Norway is an important country.”²¹⁷

“It is probably so that the media is not so interested in elaborating on the details. It is more catching if the Minister of Foreign Affairs has visited eight countries in five days and jetted around and still looks sharp. The media apply hero worship or the opposite, and when Norwegians are abroad and getting noticed in a very specific sector then this creates a lot of media attention back home,”²¹⁸ Vidar Helgesen continues saying “I remember when we were in Sri Lanka I joked that the media know of only two terms related to peace processes. The one being breakthrough the other collapse. Everything not being one or the other holding no significance.”²¹⁹

The news editors are concerned about the number of newspapers sold or the number of TV viewers, which will both increase with “juicy” and powerful headings and catchy stories. Who doesn’t like to hear encouraging words about themselves!? It is also much easier to grasp efforts, than it is to grasp results. Results are usually a long time in the making and they might appear gradually. Efforts are typically more action filled, full of optimism and it therefore “feeds” the Norwegian self image.

²¹⁵ Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. Interviewed 26.03.2012.

²¹⁶ Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. Interviewed 26.03.2012.

²¹⁷ i.b.i.d

²¹⁸ Helgesen, Vidar. Interviewed by phone. 16.03.2012

²¹⁹ i.b.i.d

So when did these trends developed by politicians and the media begin? Many will say it all started with the “Oslo Process”.

4.3.3 Has the Oslo Process affected the way Norwegians and others see Norway`s peace negotiation efforts today?

Has this view roots in reality or has there maybe been created a “myth” regarding Norway`s “humanistic” ways? Do we live of old history? “Yes, absolutely! The name Oslo as well, it refers to Norway, this is something that people remember and have knowledge of,”²²⁰ this was Knut Vollebæk`s response when asked if the Oslo Process is still the basis of how Norwegians are evaluated today.

Jan Egeland points out that if the Oslo Process had been kept secret, like he wanted, then “Norway would be a nation that is connected to mediation on a smaller scale.”²²¹ *Aftenposten*, on the 29th of April 2012 wrote that next year is the 20th anniversary of the modern Norwegian peace nation. This was justified by the upcoming 20th anniversary of the Oslo Process, which, it stated, was seen by many as the starting point for Norwegian peace negotiations.²²²

During the “Oslo Process” the Norwegians NGO Fafo was heavily involved to the point where the drafts were written on official Fafo paper, so that if anything leaked, you could say that it was only an academic exercise. In a lot of sensitive negotiations, it is very beneficial to have an NGO as a partner to a state.²²³ The “Oslo Process” with its ripple effects further fueled the cooperation between Norwegian NGO`s and the state.

²²⁰ Vollebæk, Knut. Interviewed by phone. 13.04.2012.

²²¹ Egeland, Jan. Interviewed by phone. 27.02.2012.

²²² Aspunvik, Sophie Gran (2012). “Ekosportvare: Norsk oppskrift på fred”, *Aftenposten* April 29th. (translated by E. Nordviste)

²²³ Larsen, Terje Rød. Interviewed by phone. 12.04.2012.

4.4 What advantages, if any, might Norway have as an international peace negotiator?

All interview objects, regardless of background, gave very similar answers to this question. The desire to solve conflicts and to provide aid seems well connected to the feeling of a moral obligation to help and to show that they care. Many Norwegians feel an almost nationalistic urge to show that they notice wrongdoings and are not turning a blind eye.

One of the things that make it possible for Norway to engage itself in these political aspects is the fact that the country has no colonial past. This makes the country very attractive as a third part intervener as it limits the fear parties might have as to why Norway wants to be involved. With no colonial past, Norway is not out to gain territory or symbolic relics.

Norway is a small country, with a population which just reached five million citizens, but if you take the country's widespread maritime economic zone into account Norway places amongst the 15 largest states in the world.²²⁴ This makes Norway gain economic power in areas such as seafood, shipping as well as petroleum and puts Norway in the category as one of the richest countries in the world, as well as being an important player in the international energy sector.²²⁵ It is also important to look at the political power that this ranking gives Norway, for instance in the Arctic region. Kristian Stokke also states that this resource-based national wealth is the reason for the country's disproportionate international engagement in humanitarian assistance, peace promotion, development aid, contributions to the UN as well as to the cause of climate change.²²⁶

Peter Petrusek, Professor at Ottawa University, claims that Norway has three distinct advantages: "a foreign policy consensus..., the capacity for independent action, outside EU rules, and up till now, at least, some willingness to take risks; and third,

²²⁴ Stokke, Kristian (2010) "The Soft Power of a Small State: Discursive Constructions and Institutional Practices of Norway's Peace Engagement." Page 137-173, in *Democracy in Practice: Representation and Grassroot Politics*. PCD Press. p. 141.

²²⁵ i.b.i.d

²²⁶ i.b.i.d. p. 141/142.

the money to finance lengthy and costly processes.”²²⁷

When asked what characterises the Finnish way of doing peace negotiation, Finnish Ambassador to Indonesia Kai Sauer said that “(W) we do not come with baggage, we have no colonial past, we are honest brokers, we have a rather pragmatic mentality and we also like to treat the parties equally, this we have in common with the Norwegians and the Swedes.”²²⁸ This shows how very similar Norway’s and other countries really are and that the characteristics that many consider special to Norway are in fact traits possessed by many. The advantages Norway has are “not necessarily unique to Norway as there are other countries that have the same qualities. But it’s a combination of those things all together: positive international perception, positive engagement, international efforts, investment in development cooperation, plus the all-party commitment, and the infrastructure within government to train and sustain staff that are knowledgeable. That package of things is an advantage in terms of being able to engage positively,”²²⁹ an anonymous source stated.

Jehan Perera, who works at the National Peace Council for Sri Lanka, points out the fact that not only is Norway small, rich and far away, but it cannot force or impose anything on anyone.²³⁰ This makes Norway a safer bet than other states when it comes to negotiating.

“I would say money holds great significance”²³¹, Vidar Helgesen points out, financial funds hold their importance in giving Norway many partners around the world.²³²

However, this is not something typically Norwegian, but something that Norway happens to possess due to oil resources. Ambassador Wegger Strømme agrees with this. “You often have to stay involved over a long period of time, peace negotiations are something that can come from the involvement of humanitarian assistance over many years,”²³³ this happened in both Sri Lanka and Sudan. Fellow (ex) Ambassador

²²⁷ Petrusek, David. Interviewed by email. 26.04.2012.

²²⁸ Sauer, Kai. Interviewed by phone. 20.02.2012.

²²⁹ Anonymous source.

²³⁰ Perera, Jehan. Interviewed by email. 14.12. 2011.

²³¹ Helgesen, Vidar. Interviewed by phone. 16.03.2012

²³² i.b.i.d

²³³ Strømme, Wegger Ch. Interviewed by phone. 05.04.2012.

Hans Brattskar said that “We are often viewed as a player who is more neutral than other countries. In Sri Lanka, they tried to find out why Norway was there... Is it to convert the country to Christianity? Is it to take over the oil resources that haven’t yet been found? They didn’t have a plausible thing to point out. Such an altruistic approach is hard to swallow for many people, as cynical as you may be. This is true for Norway and many other countries as well.”²³⁴

These advantages that Norway possesses are mostly unrelated to direct political actions, but rather to history and geographical factors. Having no colonial past diminishes the idea that Norway has any “personal” interests in states they are trying to help. Having the oil sources have provided Norway with a well equipped Treasury, which in turn is beneficial as the cost of facilitation and ensuring long term tension reduction is high. Moreover, the agreement across different political parties helps to carry on the peace negotiation work regardless of who’s elected into government.

Above, how Norwegians see themselves and the different characteristics of Norwegian peace politics have been discussed, but how do other states perceive the Norwegians and their peace negotiation efforts?

²³⁴ Brattskar, Hans. Interviewed. 13.04.2012

5. How is Norway viewed as an international peace negotiator by other states?

How a state looks at itself or ought to see itself has been widely covered in the literature. When Norway started with international peace negotiations and humanitarian assistance it was made very clear that it was to be work done purely out of solidarity and humanitarian cooperation, and not to promote economical, political or religious interests.²³⁵ However, in October 1999, the Foreign Ministry produced a report concerning the modernization of the foreign politics. This report concluded that it was important to have one clear voice to promote Norway`s interests internationally.²³⁶ The Norwegian society will benefit from the largest amount of power possible,²³⁷ the report stated.

The Norwegian journalists who were interviewed for this thesis all had a rather similar idea of how Norway is seen by other nations when it comes to peace negotiation efforts. One of the journalists pointed out that when it comes to the Middle East conflict the Palestinians feel that in the end of the day, Norway only does what the EU and the US want, and that Norway does not really dear to challenge Israel, it is only talk , no action. For Israel, some of the journalists say that the US is the only country that counts. Norway, on the other hand, prides itself on the Oslo Process, and its so-called “success”. Norway is seen as a naive country, one journalist states, a country that has no idea of actual realities on the ground.

Norway had a peak after the Middle East conflict resolutions, and was involved in Sri Lanka and a few other conflicts, but this is nothing that the outside world is paying much attention to, Fredrik Græsvik claims.²³⁸ And when asked whether his foreign colleges look at Norway in the same way as the Norwegians do he said: “In no way,

²³⁵ Tvedt, Terje (2003). *Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt. Den norske modellen*. Oslo. Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS. p. 48.

²³⁶ i.b.i.d

²³⁷ i.b.i.d

²³⁸ Græsvik, Fredrik. Interviewed by phone. 05.03.2012.

Norway is a small bracket in the world, that is just the way it is.”²³⁹ Fellow journalist Kjell Dragnæs said that in some conflicts Norway is seen as a party in the conflict itself. The best example of this is in Sri Lanka where the government in Colombo saw Norway as the Tamil’s spokes person.²⁴⁰ This can be the result of a country without carrots or sticks intervene in a heavy, long lasting conflict.

The Norwegian academic Terje Tvedt says that “Jan Egeland wrote in a chronicle that Brussels, Washington, Moscow and New York looked towards Oslo, there exists no evidence of this within any sources.”²⁴¹ He continue saying that “There are no sources which states that Moscow at any point has discussed or considered turning to Oslo to help solve conflicts, and there has not been many incidences of the Americans doing this either, although they have asked Norway for advice as they have done with other allies.”²⁴²

Terje Tvedt mentions that in many books written by foreign authors about peace negotiations, e.g. in Sudan, Norway is not even mentioned; this, he says, is another example of the gap that is present. This is an aspect of peace negotiations that the Norwegians are consciously shielded from. It hardly fits well with the image of Norway as a great Samaritan for all in need of Norway’s “outstanding” values and ethics.

“When it comes to the involved elites, Norway has a presence, they are aware of Norway,”²⁴³ says Thomas Hylland Eriksen when asked about how Norway is viewed by other states. “However, the biggest problem in the reputation project by Jonas Gahr Støre, which he started a few years ago, I think it was not that Norway a bad reputation, but that they did not have a reputation at all! People in large parts of the world never think about Norway, and knows little about our country. However, in

²³⁹ Græsvisk, Fredrik. Interviewed by phone. 05.03.2012.

²⁴⁰ Dragnæs, Kjell. Interviewed by email. 29.02.2012

²⁴¹ Tvedt, Terje. Interviewed. 07.02.2012.

²⁴² i.b.i.d

²⁴³ Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. Interviewed 26.03.2012.

areas like Guatemala, Sri Lanka and Gaza, where Norway has been actively involved in the attempt to create peace, Norwegians are looked upon as naive and idealistic.”²⁴⁴

Norway definitely does not have a bad reputation after all their peace negotiation involvements, but some places where Norway has been heavily involved, the reputation is negative. This is mostly the view of the parties involved in the conflicts. Of course many Norwegians have been critical to different peace projects Norway has been involved in, however, this is not generally reflected in the public opinion. Stein Tønnesson is under the impression that Norway is a state which has been noticed by others for its work, but he also adds that there are some who feels that Norway is a rich and naive country which does little productive.²⁴⁵ Furthermore, he also mentions that some see Norway as a state that seems to acts neutral when they really promote the USA, the West and the Israeli`s values, whilst others see it as a country that has no power at all to create peace.²⁴⁶ These views are believed to be more common than people want to think.

Professor Jonathan Goodhand at London`s School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) stated that “certainly Norway thinks it is very positively viewed, because of its role in relation to peace, humanitarian and human rights issues. Norway sees itself as getting a seat at the senior tables at discussions and getting access to major powers because of its role.”²⁴⁷ During his research Prof. Goodhand found that the US was very positive to Norway playing this kind of a role “because Norway was able to do things that the US was not, but would like somebody to do.” He mentions that this would be for example “to talk to warring parties and to get access to multiple sides, which a global hegemon would find much more difficult to do.”²⁴⁸ Here Norway is used as a tool by more powerful states to achieve their goals in certain peace negotiations. This is a way for Norway to get on a hegemon`s good side.

²⁴⁴ Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. Interviewed 26.03.2012.

²⁴⁵ Tønnesson, Stein. Interviewed by email. 27.04.2012.

²⁴⁶ i.b.i.d

²⁴⁷ Goodhand, Jonathan. Interviewed by phone. 10.02.2012.

²⁴⁸ i.b.i.d

A source, who wishes to stay anonymous says that there are “two schools of thought” when it comes to how Norway is viewed by others as a peace negotiator. One is an idea of courage and capabilities and the other claims that Norway actually never achieved any positive results.

Jehan Perera described Norway as a small state in a positive way, which is located off the centre of the world’s power politics, she continues to say that this is why Norway has made peace making part of its identity.²⁴⁹ Those who are critical of Norway describe the country as an attachment to the US policies.²⁵⁰ An anonymous source said that Norway used to be perceived as a more essential player, but nowadays it is less risk-taking than it was. “It has aligned itself very much with the US on many, many cases, and has spent a great deal of effort developing this relationship across the Atlantic.”²⁵¹ This does damage to Norway’s image of neutrality²⁵², the source states. “Just because they are Norwegians they think they are born negotiators. Even though Norway has some of that heritage it does not mean that all Norwegians are good negotiators,”²⁵³ says another source who also wished to remain anonymous. “Frankly, I think a lot of people in Sri Lanka didn’t really bother to consider what they thought about the Norwegians.”²⁵⁴ “Norway was selected because they were weak, far way, had no major interest this is something that Norway cannot change.”²⁵⁵

Different countries evaluate Norway differently, Erik Solheim pointed out. “India or China will for example perceive that we are close to the Americans and Western countries, while USA will perceive that we are a more independent actor.”²⁵⁶ This distinction is interesting and shows the way Norway is perceived differently through different eyes. Many will see Norway as a state that acts much on behalf of the US, however, as the US uses Norway in different situations, they choose to see Norway as independent which suits them better.

²⁴⁹ Perera, Jehan. Interviewed by email. 14.12. 2011.

²⁵⁰ i.b.i.d

²⁵¹ Anonymous source

²⁵² i.b.i.d

²⁵³ Anonymous source

²⁵⁴ Klem, Bart. Interviewed by phone. 17.02.2012.

²⁵⁵ i.b.i.d

²⁵⁶ Solheim, Erik. Interviewed. 01.06.2012.

Norwegian Ambassador to Sudan Jens-Petter Kjemprud says that if we do not follow the main guidelines for involvement, like treating both sides equally and being wanted as a peace negotiator, Norway can be seen as “pretentious, pushing above our weight... and sometimes seen as useful idiots for the parties involved.”²⁵⁷ “Most people do not have the impression of any particular state as peace negotiator, most people think of the UN as a peace negotiator.”²⁵⁸ Jan Egeland does not believe that there are many in this world who connect Norway with peace negotiations, but he also points out that there are not many nations that peace negotiations is associated with at all.²⁵⁹ However, if you ask diplomats who work for the UN in New York or in Europe, many will associate Norway with peace negotiations, Jan Egeland claims. He adds that the Oslo agreement is one of a small number of very well known peace agreements together with Camp David and Dayton Agreement.²⁶⁰ The Guatemalan Peace Accords in 1996 is an agreement that is forgotten by many. It is remembered only in Guatemala and in certain sectors in Norway, as the success it was.²⁶¹

It is not surprising that Norway’s work is known within certain sectors, however the large majority of people working within politics in other states do not associate Norway with peace negotiations, but, in Norway people are under the impression that this is what Norwegians are known for abroad.

Jon Hanssen-Bauer, at the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, has a different idea of how Norway is seen. He claims that Norway has a positive reputation in peace negotiations, and that Norway collaborates well with most other countries who are involved in the field, moreover, he states that we get a large amount of respect for the work we do which again is seen in the top level contact we achieve.²⁶²

²⁵⁷ Kjemprud, Jens-Petter. Interviewed by email. 13.12.2011

²⁵⁸ Egeland, Jan. Interviewed by phone. 27.02.2012.

²⁵⁹ i.b.i.d

²⁶⁰ i.b.i.d

²⁶¹ i.b.i.d

²⁶² Hanssen-Bauer, Jon. Interviewed by email. 12.03.2012

There are many different perceptions of Norway, but what made Norway choose to focus so much on peace negotiation?

5.1 Why get involved in peace negotiations at all? What effects can this involvement have on a state`s foreign policy?

Norwegians wish to see themselves, and to be seen by others, as a people promoting peace, human rights, equality and democracy. It all boils down to the fact that many feel the Norwegian society is better and more fair than almost all other societies and that “Norwegian values” will create progress for most other states. This is typical of the Norwegian mentality. Norwegians have to be best, or else there is no point trying. “Norway is not present in Europe, but has been very present in the UN since the beginning, and this indicates some ideas that democracy is easy to make happen as long as you just want it bad enough,”²⁶³ this is an idea that Norway and the US have in common, Thomas Hylland Eriksen claims.

When Terje Tvedt was asked why he thought it was not written more about Norway`s unsuccessful peace negotiation attempts, he responded that “those who wrote the NORAD report are the same people who have given advise to the Foreign Ministry with regards to Sudan, they have given advise in connection with Sri Lanka, and this is not research...it is not an historical analysis about Norway`s role in Sri Lanka.”²⁶⁴ Furthermore, Norway does not have independent think tanks and journalistic groupings like e.g. in the US, where the Foreign Ministry is constantly being presented with reports on Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam.²⁶⁵

The Foreign Ministry increases its power. This is in contradiction to what Norwegians think and wants to think,²⁶⁶ Terje Tvedt stated.

²⁶³ Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. Interviewed 26.03.2012.

²⁶⁴ Tvedt, Terje. Interviewed. 07.02.2012.

²⁶⁵ i.b.i.d

²⁶⁶ i.b.i.d

Norwegian NGOs have often been involved with humanitarian work in conflicts where the Norwegian government later decides to negotiate peace. Therefore, Norwegian development aid can be strongly linked to many a Norwegian peace negotiation effort. When asked why Norway would go from humanitarian assistance to peace negotiations, and if Norway really can make a difference, Ambassador Wegger Strømme said; “Maybe not as often as people hope, but sometimes I believe we can make a difference. If the violence keeps on whilst you provide aid, it can create a moral dilemma.”²⁶⁷ Some claim that one of the major reasons this aid continues is because it provides the negotiators with invaluable contacts and maybe also a better reputation. Isak Svensson et al. state that it is probable that there would be a minimum, if not no Norwegian aid to Sri Lanka if it was not for the Norwegian NGOs’ involvement in the peace process.²⁶⁸ Due to the NGOs close relationship with governments they can act as an early warning system when a conflict is deescalating.

In White Paper nr. 1, 2008-2009 titled “Interests, responsibilities and opportunities” it is stated that “it is not possible for the Norwegian government to safeguard the Norwegian society’s interests without at the same time contribute to making global public goods safe.”²⁶⁹ “It can become unclear whether it is peace or security that the Foreign Ministry has had as a goal when resources are put towards other countries conflicts. There is not always a sharp divide between peace politics and security politics. (C) “contributing to peace and reconciliation work is a form of modern security politics...The Foreign Ministry should mostly be engaged with issues concerning Norwegian interests, but I think it is also in Norway’s interest that conflicts do not turn violent, and that they can be solved peacefully,”²⁷⁰ Jonas Gahr Støre states.

Many have blamed the government of spending more of their diplomatic resources on

²⁶⁷ Strømme, Wegger Ch. Interviewed by phone. 05.04.2012

²⁶⁸ Svensson, Isak et al. (2011) “Schizophrenic soothers: The international community and contrast strategies for peace-making in Sri Lanka.” Page 166-184, in *Cooperation and Conflict* 46 (2). Sage Publications. p. 174.

²⁶⁹ St. Meld. Nr. 15 (2008-2009) ”Interesser, ansvar og muligheter. Hovedinjer i norsk utenrikspolitikk.” Det Konglige Utenriksdepartement. Page 1-176. p. 85.

²⁷⁰ Støre, Jonas Gahr. Interviewed by phone. 04.07.2012

building peace other places in the world then securing citizens at home.”²⁷¹ Harpviken and Skjelsbæk say that when commitments to the alliance as a NATO member results in Norway participating in conflict operations outside of NATO’s area, it raises questions on how independent Norway is with regards to peace politics.²⁷² Norway wants to be seen as self determined and neutral by not joining the EU, and at the same time it has wished to increase its security by being an active NATO member. Norway gets involved with peace negotiations “to maintain our own interests”²⁷³ many politicians claim. A violent conflict is not just a threat to people in the close proximity, but it can have a ripple effect on us, a typical example is Balkan, Thorvald Stoltenberg points out.²⁷⁴ He also mentions that as a small country Norway has a greater need for foreign policy.²⁷⁵

Knut Vollebæk, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, was quoted in *Aftenposten* in 1995 saying that “(W) when I talk with Kinkel, with van den Broek and Axworthy and Talbott, they are very interested in what happened in the Middle East. What did I make of my visit there? What is my view on that? And then I slip in some words about salmon and the gas market directives and such things, because I have already given them something.”²⁷⁶

It is correct, what Thorvald Stoltenberg pointed out that we are only 0.08 ‰ of the world’s population and to act like 0.08 ‰ of the world’s population would not benefit Norway’s national interest²⁷⁷, however how much of the reasons for doing peace negotiations is doing good and how much is done due to national interests? That to be involved in politics may raise a state’s standing internationally is not negative, however it depends on the reasons for the involvement in the projects. Terje Tvedt argues that “This is what we have chosen to do”, although “the expertise is not very

²⁷¹ Harpviken, Kristian Berg and Skjelsbæk, Inger (2010) ”Tilslørt fredspolitik” Page 379-388, in *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift* # 4. Universitetsforlaget. (translated by E. Nordviste.) p. 383.

²⁷² i.b.i.d. p. 386.

²⁷³ Stoltenberg, Thorvald. Interviewed 29.03.2012.

²⁷⁴ i.b.i.d

²⁷⁵ i.b.i.d

²⁷⁶ Skånland, Øystein Haga (2010) “Norway is a peace nation: A discourse analytic reading of the Norwegian peace engagement.” Page 34-54, in *Cooperation and Conflict* 45 (1). Sage Publications. p. 40.

²⁷⁷ Stoltenberg, Thorvald. Interviewed 29.03.2011.

high”²⁷⁸, during the Oslo Process there was almost no research done on the subject he adds. “Norway must do something, and we are outside the EU which gives Norway a potential others do not have.”²⁷⁹”

Thomas Hylland Eriksen argues that the reason for getting involved in peace negotiations is “about getting fame, or positive reputation as the Foreign Ministry calls it, so in this sense it is in Norway`s interest to be known and admired by the outside world. This is Norway`s big dream as it is for many small countries.”²⁸⁰ He claims that “the Norwegian Foreign Ministry has a wish to represent the good, which he believes is genuine in large parts of the ministry, they believe that they are representing something good, but also the fact that Norway shall become visible and well known, and not just as a appendage to Sweden, which was the humanitarian superpower in the mid 80`s. When Sweden found itself unable to continue with this kind of work, Norway was standing ready with its oil money.”²⁸¹

An academic had the following answer when asked why a state would go into peace negotiations at all. From the research on mediator motives, it is clear that political considerations are a driving force in mediation, yet there is little evidence in support of clear neo-colonial or imperialistic motives among mediators. Since any mediation effort involves costs in time, resources and prestige, mediators do get involved in mediation based on an estimation of the rewards they believe they will get from engaging in mediation activities. The rewards from a mediation effort can arise either from material rewards (such as access to new markets or enhancing security) or immaterial rewards (such as promoting certain values or gaining /earning prestige).²⁸²

Canadian diplomat Ben Rowsell said that the reasons you enter into an international peace negotiation is that “(I) if successful, peace negotiations lead directly to the termination of conflicts which stabilize international relations and generic negative

²⁷⁸ Tvedt, Terje. Interviewed. 07.02.2012

²⁷⁹ i.b.i.d

²⁸⁰ Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. Interviewed 26.03.2012.

²⁸¹ i.b.i.d

²⁸² Anonymous source.

knock-on effects like humanitarian disasters, mass migration, and the export of terrorism. It can have several impacts on a state's foreign policy, ranging from positive (raising profile, generating tangible outcomes if negotiations succeed in terminating conflict) to negative (exposing the country to greater criticism by local parties to a conflict, or requiring the country to refrain from passing judgment on human rights violations in order to retain credibility with all parties e.g. Human rights abuses by the Sri Lankan government in the final months of the civil war in that country).”²⁸³

Like Ben Rowswell points out, a state will always weigh the pros and cons when it comes to intervening in peace negotiations. Although the image of Norway being someone that helps all those in need, Erik Solheim pointed out some examples where Norway has denied negotiating peace talks. Norway has not been involved in peace processes in countries where Norway has considerable oil interests. Statoil has for example large investments in Angola, which could create problems. Another example is that Solheim got many inquiries about a Norwegian engagement in Chechnya. He said it would be very hard because Norway is a neighbouring country to Russia and has very strong interests in our relationship with them, therefore it would be very hard for us to be neutral in that conflict.²⁸⁴

A nation`s image that is part of its identity is hard to change. Even with failures like in Sri Lanka, the image Norwegians have of themselves has not changed. Vidar Helgesen points to the fact that much of the foreign policy questions have an element of the right people at the right place at the right time, much like what Jan Egeland stated. Vidar Helgesen explains; “(M) my boss when I was in the Foreign Ministry, Jan Pettersen, often talked about the underestimated dimension to international questions; coincidences. And that, I think, is really important. Common belief is that there is a strategy behind everything, but coincidences matters not least in this field. I

²⁸³ Rowswell, Ben. Interviewed by email. 27.03.2012.

²⁸⁴ Solheim, Erik. Interviewed. 01.06.2012.

believe additionally one must weigh the personal element or interest, because when engaging in foreign politics many processes are long spanned.”²⁸⁵

The Norwegian interview objects answered the question of why a state would choose to get involved in peace negotiations rather similarly. They look at Norway’s history as an explanation why this is something Norway is still actively involved in. Hans Brattskar explains Norway’s involvement in the peace negotiation field by saying that “We have long traditions for humanitarian work, ever since we became independent in 1905. It has affected us ever since, in different ways. Not just in regards to peace and reconciliation work, but also with significant humanitarian efforts and assistance. This is a part of our foreign policy, part of our national character if you may. The question is not if this is an important thing to do, it is more about how we do it, and do we do it right”²⁸⁶

Knut Vollebæk claims that the two main reasons why Norwegians are involved in peace negotiations are the religious process that began with the missionary movement in the 1850s, and the radical socialist solidarity movement from the 1880s.²⁸⁷

“Norway wants a stable world, and a stable world requires engagement. If we do not have a stable world, it will have economical consequences for us all, and consequences for our foreign policy in many ways. You have an element of national interest to promote Norway’s bilateral interests, and you have an overriding foreign policy interest of stability, not least in our part of the world, but a conflict anywhere in the world will have a consequence for Norway, considering refugee flows and what will happen afterwards, where we are asked to contribute with economical reconstruction and such. It’s a combination of those two,”²⁸⁸ Knut Vollebæk says.

It is true that a large conflict abroad can affect Norway in different ways and that it is in Norway’s interest to maintain a peaceful environment for cooperation, business and

²⁸⁵ Helgesen, Vidar. Interviewed by phone. 16.03.2012.

²⁸⁶ Brattskar, Hans. Interviewed. 13.04.2012

²⁸⁷ Vollebæk, Knut. Interviewed by phone. 13.04.2012.

²⁸⁸ i.b.i.d

shared opportunities, however, there is another reason why Norway is involved in peace negotiations. One fundamental thing is the political will to do this. Take a neighbouring country like Finland, Erik Solheim points out, “they have no wish to interfere in other countries’ conflicts. They have historically been in a very difficult situation, and they’re scared of getting into trouble, while Norway has a strong will to interfere in other conflicts.”²⁸⁹

Jan Egeland says that Norway’s peace negotiation engagement is present for two reasons. Firstly, contributing to peace has been a goal for Norway for a very long time like it is for most other states, and secondly, “it puts Norway in a whole different league in international diplomacy.”²⁹⁰

By having peace negotiations on their foreign policy agenda, many Norwegians feel that it helps promote the “Norwegian values” and spread a positive view of Norway internationally. This view is what the Norwegians see themselves.

Below, a very important reason why Norway chooses to facilitate peace is discussed.

5.1.2 Being involved in international peace negotiation can open doors

In the White Paper nr. 15, 2008-2009, it is written that “Norway’s role in peace processes is basically altruistically motivated, but we contribute, together with other actors, to global common goods. Norway’s visibility increases and gives access to actors in international politics that it otherwise would be hard for a small country like Norway to talk to.”²⁹¹ In the same document the following is stated: “A positive picture of Norway can open doors when it comes to contact with other states’ authorities and business life for Norwegian companies wanting to get established abroad.”²⁹² If a peace negotiation goes well, it offers you the seats at tables you

²⁸⁹ Solheim, Erik. Interviewed. 01.06.2012.

²⁹⁰ Egeland, Jan. Interviewed by phone. 27.02.2012.

²⁹¹ St. Meld. Nr. 15 (2008-2009) ”Interesser, ansvar og muligheter. Hovedinjer i norsk utenrikspolitikk.” Det Konglige Utenriksdepartement. Page 1-176. p. 87.

²⁹² i.b.i.d. p. 161.

otherwise wouldn't get invited to, if you're a smaller or middle power. It's that ability to have access, and the ability to be perceived as a player by bigger powers, that many think is a benefit to Norway's foreign policy, which is an important reason why Norway gets involved in international peace negotiations in the first place.

Vidar Helgesen stated that "it is not necessarily so that one uses this access particularly cynical and with purpose, e.g. that one talks peace for 15 minutes and then move on to politics of interest, but I do remember well from my process in Sri Lanka, at that time the Foreign Vice President of the U.S.A. was deeply involved. This gave me a great deal of access to him and not only with regards to Sri Lanka, but about Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan and also on other subjects, there was no trouble calling him at any time addressing issues and there is no doubt this sort of contact is very useful."²⁹³

Norway has found its niche and uses this type of policies as a way of opening doors. The Former Norwegian Prime Thorvald Stoltenberg said that "(W) when you are first recognized as a peace negotiator, it gives a network that is useful for Norway long after the conflict is over."²⁹⁴ Ambassador Wegger Strømmen also thinks that peace negotiations can open doors. "Very much of our time with the Americans is spent discussing regional conflicts. Sometimes the cooperation is very close, like in the Middle East where Norway's most important role was, and still is to chair the aid mechanism to the Palestinians. Any conversation between the Foreign Minister and the Americans will have a large component of "door opening". This is also the case in Sudan and Sri Lanka."²⁹⁵

Erik Solheim points to an important matter. He says that you cannot contribute with anything unless you have a good relationship with the USA, India, Russia, China and the EU.²⁹⁶ Peace negotiations may open doors, but according to Solheim you cannot do this type of work without certain connections. It varies from conflict to conflict

²⁹³ Helgesen, Vidar. Interviewed by phone. 16.03.2012.

²⁹⁴ Stoltenberg, Thorvald. Interviewed 29.03.2012.

²⁹⁵ Strømmen, Wegger Ch. Interviewed by phone. 05.04.2012

²⁹⁶ Solheim, Erik. Interviewed. 01.06.2012.

who`s involved, but the USA is always there, and one of the others will normally be there as well.²⁹⁷

For a small country like Norway, gaining high positioned contacts is very valuable. To have doors opening is definitely a benefit to Norway, but it depends on why this is done. Norwegians think that their country`s peace negotiation efforts come from a place of selflessness, and if this is not the whole truth, this should be widely known. With this in mind, what else is important to focus on going forward?

²⁹⁷ Solheim, Erik. Interviewed. 01.06.2012.

6. Conclusion

Before presenting the concluding remarks I want to demonstrate what some of the interview objects find important for Norway to be able to keep peace negotiations as a profiled part of its foreign policy.

6.1 Norway's future peace negotiation strategies; what is important to focus on

The politicians have to think about the near future, but the solutions to these peace negotiation problems need long term solutions. Instead of trying to solve all from the top, we should focus more on laying one stone at the time.²⁹⁸ Many of the interview objects have mentioned that to continue this work, the importance of secrecy is key. In order to get long time enemies to talk or even to contemplate the possibility of being in contact requires a high level of secrecy. The big question here is whether these politicians and diplomats are worthy of our trust to carry out these efforts?²⁹⁹

During the Oslo Process, secrecy was a vital condition to meet, and a reason why it was managed to make some progress. It was something the parties required, not something that Norway came up with. The negotiations in the Middle East were secret until the very last stage, Erik Solheim underlines³⁰⁰, and without it, it would not have been possible. "We were in Sri Lanka for a year and a half in absolute secrecy; only two people in Colombo knew what we were doing."³⁰¹

When the Norwegian Foreign Minister was asked what percentage of Norway's peace facilitations are secret versus public, his answer was about 50-50%. "50% of what we do is not suitable to do publicly out of respect for the discretion needed."³⁰²

The Norwegian public seems to be very comfortable with the idea of secrecy. They

²⁹⁸ Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. Interviewed 26.03.2012.

²⁹⁹ Harpviken, Kristian Berg and Skjelsbæk, Inger (2010) "Tilslørt fredspolitik" Page 379-388, in *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift* # 4. Universitetsforlaget. (translated by E. Nordviste.) p. 385.

³⁰⁰ Solheim, Erik. Interviewed. 01.06.2012.

³⁰¹ i.b.i.d

³⁰² Støre, Jonas Gahr. Interviewed by phone. 04.07.2012.

know their government is doing something, they might not know the details, but they're satisfied that whatever their government's role is, it's a positive one.³⁰³ Are Norwegians a bit naive? Do they not care? Or do they know too little about the subject to understand the repercussions of a states' involvement in international peace negotiations?

“It is becoming clear that Norway may have overrated its own popularity in parts of the world. One thing is that Erik Solheim is the most unpopular person in Sri Lanka. If you look at Africa, there is a tendency that they want African peace negotiators, they would rather have Kofi Annan than Jonas Gahr Støre,”³⁰⁴ Thomas Hylland Eriksen points out. Many might wonder what skills Norwegians have to understand others, as they do not even know what real poverty it!

It is important to become a bit more sensitive to cultural and especially political cultural difference. Hylland Eriksen amongst others agrees on this. “Politics is about real scarcity, and this is something that Norwegians have difficulty understanding. For a lot of people life is full of difficult challenges and you cannot always take the moral high ground.”³⁰⁵ Despite the fact that the Foreign Ministry claims always to look at root issues in a conflict, many feel this is rather superficial as Norwegians do not have a good enough understanding of cultural differences and economical and material scarcities. It is hard to understand how people take pride in the fact that Norway consider peace negotiations very seriously and research the topic through and through, can neglect such an elementary part. “This may be due to the existence of a close nit community which always confirms each other's view of reality”,³⁰⁶ Thomas Hylland Eriksen comments.

The 2011 NORAD report points out several lessons which came out of Norway's efforts in Sri Lanka, but which also goes for peace building elsewhere. Sørbø et al. mention that “(T) there is a need to think about the balance between hard and soft power. Norway's approach may be suitable to bring parties into negotiations, but

³⁰³ Anonymous source.

³⁰⁴ Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. Interviewed 26.03.2012.

³⁰⁵ i.b.i.d

³⁰⁶ i.b.i.d

harder forms of leverage may be required to reach and implement a settlement...Norway should avoid situations where it is a weak and isolated mediator, with limited and inconsistent international backing. This means placing more attention on ‘multilateralizing’ peace processes by building links to, and borrowing the leverage of other more powerful actors and coalitions.’³⁰⁷ This is also a point that has been raised numerous times with the interview objects I have talked to.

Furthermore, the issue of aid in peace processes is being discussed. “Aid may play a supportive role in peace processes, but cannot short circuit complex political processes. Aid cannot be a substitute for politics. Moreover, poorly conceived aid has the potential to destabilize fragile political settlements. This necessarily involves a more modest but conflict sensitive role for aid in the context of peace processes.”³⁰⁸

If the knowledge of local history and core problems to the conflict are not fully known, the provision of aid could worsen a situation. Norway played many different roles in Sri Lanka, including humanitarian and development funder, diplomatic broker as well as arbiter of the ceasefire. As some of these roles are not naturally combined it is vital to create a stronger strategy to manage different roles simultaneously.³⁰⁹ As the “war on terror” has spread, new rules and strategies had to develop. “Norway has usually been a mediator in conflicts between a state and non-state actor, based on an approach of even-handedness and addressing issues of asymmetry. The Sri Lankan case highlights the difficulties of following such an approach in the context of the war on terror. This suggests a need for careful reflection on whether it is possible for Norway to square the circle of showing a united front with other international players on countering terrorism, whilst attempting to talk with ‘terrorists’ in order to bring peace.”³¹⁰

³⁰⁷ Sørbo, Gunnar et al. (2011) *Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009*. NORAD. p. xvii.

³⁰⁸ i.b.i.d

³⁰⁹ i.b.i.d

³¹⁰ i.b.i.d. p. xviii.

“Norway’s opportunity to play a role depends on the general power balance in the world, and how Norway has positioned itself in accordance to this,”³¹¹ Kristian Harpviken says. The Foreign Ministry has realized that what was not possible during the 90’s is now possible, after 2001. “After 2001, this solo role has been much more limited”, “we can no longer work solo, we have to cooperate with others”³¹² for the wanted result. This is a result of Norway’s lack of hard power.

An anonymous source claims that Norway has to communicate with their colleagues more than they do. “Unless you’re in this field, you don’t necessarily know what they are doing, you just have a vague understanding that Norway is doing something constructive...An example is the Oslo Forum. The Oslo Forum is a phenomenal event, behind closed door, which is what makes it special and unique, it’s an opportunity for mediators to really talk to each other, but they do not like other governments to be there. In some ways that inhibits the ability of others to build their capacity as well, as you’re not allowed on site.”³¹³ They want to learn more than they are willing to offer others. Although it is not Norway’s responsibility to ensure other states’ capacity of peace negotiations, this attitude is against all that the Norwegians think they represent.

To have a clear exit strategy is vital. As well as a realistic plan B. Peace negotiation failures far outweigh their successes. “There is a need for greater realism and better political analysis when preparing for negotiations”³¹⁴, Oliver Walton comments.

David Malone says what is vital for Norway to continue with peace negotiations in the future is “a large bank account (which it will have for the foreseeable future), political leadership with vision and a risk-taking disposition, and excellent negotiators.”³¹⁵

The Norwegian politicians and ex-politicians interviewed about what Norway should focus on to continue peace negotiations, have slightly different ideas to the other interview objects. It is important to continue to have support for this in the Norwegian

³¹¹ Harpviken, Kristian. Interviewed by phone. 28.02.2012.

³¹² i.b.i.d

³¹³ Anonymous source.

³¹⁴ Walton, Oliver. Interviewed by email. 27.02.2012.

³¹⁵ Malone, David. Interviewed by email. 21. 03.2012.

people, says Gro Harlem Brundtland,³¹⁶ whilst Thorvald Stoltenberg comments that it is important to “Be ourselves! Know what values we have. Some might read this and think that he does not know how self-centred we can seem, that we can easily exaggerate ourselves, but to this I say: for a small country it is natural to be self centred.”³¹⁷ We need to focus on Norway`s interest, and not apologise for taking the word, he states.³¹⁸ Knut Vollebæk claims that stamina is very important for Norway to continue their involvement in peace negotiations. “I think Norway has an advantage here, in comparison to larger countries. I remember from my engagement in the Balkans, we were asked to guarantee that the meeting would be positive, and we had to say that we could guarantee that it probably would not be positive. This led to the loss of interest, because they expected results immediately, but we have been willing to work with issues and engagement over longer periods of time, without having quick or immediate results. We are willing to put resources into processes that might take a long time.”³¹⁹ It is important to be able to get involved in peace negotiations for a longer period of time, however, it is equally important to know when to leave and not overstay your welcome.

Jan Egeland points out that he does not think there will be many “Oslo Agreements” in the future, “our role is different and we will to a higher degree be acting as a facilitator for the UN and to regional organizations.”³²⁰ The times have changed and the unique composition of factors present at the time of the Oslo Process is unlikely to appear again. Jan Egeland raises another interesting point as he explains that during the most spectacular agreements Norway achieved, like Guatemala and Palestine, when we got started with Sri Lanka and Sudan, there was no one who was employed at the Foreign Ministry with this as a portfolio. Now you have a whole department in the Foreign Ministry that works full time with these issues.³²¹

³¹⁶ Brundtland, Gro Harlem. (Interviewed by phone. 29.02.2012)

³¹⁷ Stoltenberg, Thorvald. Interviewed 29.03.2012.

³¹⁸ i.b.i.d

³¹⁹ Vollebæk, Knut. Interviewed by phone. 13.04.2012.

³²⁰ Egeland, Jan. Interviewed by phone. 27.02.2012.

³²¹ i.b.i.d

When Jonas Gahr Støre was asked about this issue he stated that “I have learnt that using the term “success” only for when you get parties to sit around a table, signing an agreement is too narrow a definition. What we do, in most cases, is to contribute to a positive development.” If your requirement for joining is “success”, it is not possible!”³²² When Norway’s role as a peace negotiator was seen as a side project, the results had a lot more impact than now when the foreign ministry, as well as a large number of NGOs and research facilities have a full time focus. Can this have been “beginners luck”? Back in the 1990’s there were many actors who strived for peace negotiations, but not as many as there are today. Can it be a case of the more chefs, the more mess!? When so many actors are joining forces to produce an international peace negotiation agreement, this may only end up complicating the situation.

6.2 Concluding remarks

Before I started my research I was curious to see how many interview objects I would manage to reach, and of course whom. This proved to be easier than I expected and most of the people were more outspoken than I anticipated. During my research I was also surprised by the number of critical voices to Norway’s work as a peace negotiator. Due to this, I feel I have sufficient grounds to conclude that there might be a gap between the Norwegians’ vs. non-Norwegians’ perceptions on this matter.

Harpviken and Skjelsbæk conclude their 2010 articles with the following quote: “The Norwegian government cannot choose to look past Norwegian interests or become pacifists. However, the peace politics are not saved by making it a part of interest based security politics...It is important to clarify what Norway does and does not do when practising peace politics. Only in this way it will be possible to get a principled clarification of fundamental values and the distinctiveness of the peace politics”³²³

³²² Støre, Jonas Gahr. Interviewed by phone. 04.07.2012.

³²³ Harpviken, Kristian Berg and Skjelsbæk, Inger (2010) ”Tilslørt fredspolitik” Page 379-388, in Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift # 4. Universitetsforlaget. (translated by E. Nordviste.) p. 387.

There is no doubt that Norway's peace politics has achieved some success. Especially the NGOs contribute has been, and still is, vital. However, it is Norway's connections, the enthusiasm to take on tasks other larger powers will not, and to fill gaps, that has made Norway appear as an important player in peacemaking.³²⁴ This cooperation will leave a win-win situation for Norway as well as for the major powers, but not always for the parties involved in the conflict. Norway attempts to gain power through international peace negotiations and through enforcing international norms and laws. This can also be seen in the country's leading efforts with the landmine and cluster munition bans.

“Norwegian foreign policy makers have got an extra incentive (to) make the image of Norway as a peace nation more visible to the outside world, and might thereby reinforce the Norwegian self-image which took part in forming the peace policies in the first place. Hence, the reciprocal relationship between practices and identities is further strengthened.”³²⁵ The self image developed due to characteristics that makes it possible for Norway to carry out any sort of peacemaking, has resulted in many “seeing it as self-evident that Norway is especially suited to, and has a special responsibility to, actively promote peace.”³²⁶

The idea that the Norwegian people are naturally peaceful, and that the foreign policy is controlled by the people, does not automatically make the foreign policy peaceful! The people who have been involved in peace negotiations through Norwegian history have had perceptions of Norway's successes that goes beyond reality. This may have been done to uphold a legacy, and maybe also to an extent to justify the negotiators' own actions.

“There is no interest for Norway, but for our role,”³²⁷ Erik Solheim says. This is for example due to the fact that Norway can talk to parties and countries the USA cannot,

³²⁴ Taulbee, James L. et al. (2006) "Bridging the Gap: Building Peace Norwegian Style." Page 479-505, in *Peace and Change* 31 (4). p. 499.

³²⁵ Bekken, Sigmund (2007) "Identities and peace promotion in Norwegian foreign policy." Page 1- 76. Master thesis from Australian National University. p. 69.

³²⁶ i.b.i.d. p. 70.

³²⁷ Solheim, Erik. Interviewed. 01.06.2012.

or will not talk to. This distinction seems to be overlooked by many. Most other states see Norway as a country with little hard power and lots of money and enthusiasm. For the most part, letting such an actor attempt to facilitate peace negotiations is harmless, and as a more powerful state often is needed to “close the deal” other gets to share Norway’s spotlight.

Norway is a state with some good characteristics for carrying out this type of work, but as it has no hard, and only moral power, this is not enough to be the international peace creating nation that some intensely dream of. There is a disconnection between what Norwegians think of themselves and the reality of Norway as a peace negotiating nation. The people feel they are the ones who create peace, however, the fact is that it is the parties who negotiate peace agreements whilst Norway facilitates the process who creates the peace. The point is not that Norway is not trying to do good, but rather that the national identity of Norwegians is strongly exaggerated. Parts of this are the politicians’ responsibility who I believe wishes the image of Norwegians as somewhat extraordinarily peaceful was real. They fire up under this image to keep it alive and hope that they themselves will somehow catch a small piece of the “superpower” that is spreading peace and helping others.

Unfortunately, just because Norway has seen some great countrymen throughout its history, does not make all Norwegians grand peace creators.

Despite mostly good intentions and honest desires to see results and changes, the political ambitions might seem too overwhelming. Unrealistic expectations and too high belief in the total of all domestic skills needed for success can help to explain the notable mismatch between efforts and results, and the view Norwegians and non-Norwegians have on this issue. Norwegians as peace negotiators is not necessarily a bad idea, but to make it a “trademark” for Norwegians or an “export article” for Norway is far from realistic.

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Appendix 1: Overview of interview objects, categorised.

NOTE: Some of these individuals can be placed under multiple categories, however I will only put them in the one I see most fit.

Norwegian politicians/bureaucrats:

- **Jonas Gahr Støre** (Current Minister of Foreign Affairs)
- **Jon Hanssen-Bauer** (Peace and Reconciliation, Foreign Ministry)
- **Eva Helene Østbye** (NORAD)
- **Petter Bauck** (NORAD)
- **Geir Otto Pedersen** (Foreign Ministry)

Norwegian ex-politicians:

- **Kjell Magne Bondevik** (Previous Prime Minister)
- **Gro Harlem Brundtland** (Previous Prime Minister, member of The Elders UN.)
- **Thorvald Stoltenberg** (Previous Foreign Minister)
- **Erik Solheim**
- **Knut Vollebæk** (Previous Ambassador to the US, previous Foreign Minister)

Foreign ex-politicians:

- **Jimmy Carter** (Previous President of the USA, The Elders UN)

Norwegian diplomats/Foreign Ministry bureaucrats:

- **Tore Toreng** (Ambassador to Nepal)
- **Jens-Petter Kjemprud** (Ambassador to Sudan)
- **Hans Brattskar** (Previous Ambassador to Sri Lanka)

- **Terje Rød-Larsen** (Heavily involved in the Oslo Process, President of the International Peace Institute)
- **Wegger Strømmen** (Previous Ambassador to the UN in Geneva, Ambassador to the US)

Foreign diplomats/Foreign Ministry bureaucrats:

- **Ben Rowswell** (Canadian diplomat)
- **Elissa Golberg** (Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the Office of the United Nations at Geneva and to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, in Geneva.)
- **Kai Sauer** (Finnish Ambassador to Indonesia, worked with Mr. Ahtissari)
- **Kimmo Kiljunen** (Special Representative for Peace Mediation of the Finnish Foreign Minister)

Norwegian NGO workers:

- **Kristian Harpviken** (PRIO)
- **Stein Tønnesson**, (PRIO)
- **Orrvar Dalby** (Previous Secretary-General ,Norwegian People`s Aid)
- **Andreas Indregard** (Norwegian People`s Aid)
- **Arne Ørum** (Rådet for Psykisk helse, aid worker in Middle East for more than 20 years)
- **Gunnar Sørbo** (Co-writer of NORADs “Pawns of Peace” report, Senior Researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute)

Foreign NGO workers:

- **David Malone** (President of International Development Research Center, Canada)
- **Barbara Simmons** (Executive Director of The Peace Center, US)

- **Oliver Watson** (Research Fellow, The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, UK)
- **Jehan Perera** (National Peace Council for Sri Lanka)
- **Bart Klem** (Co-writer of NORADs “Pawns of Peace” report, Bart Klem Research)
- **Jan Egeland** (Deputy Director of Human Rights Watch and the Director of Human Rights Watch Europe)
- **Vidar Helgensen** (Director IDEA, Sweden)
- **Scott Weber** (Director General of Interpeace, Geneva)

Norwegian academics:

- **Terje Tvedt** (Professor, University of Bergen)
- **Thomas Hylland Eriksen** (Professor, University of Oslo)

Foreign academics:

- **Isak Svensson** (Associate Professor and Postdoctoral Fellow at The National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, New Zealand)
- **David Petrasek** (Associate Professor, University of Ottawa, Canada)
- **Jonathan Goodhand** (Co-writer of NORADs “Pawns of Peace” report, Professor, SOAS, London)
- **Kristine Høglund** (Uppsala University, Sweden)

Norwegian media:

- **Sidsel Wold** (Journalist, NRK)
- **Kjell Dragnes** (Journalist, Aftenposten)
- **Hans-Wilhelm Steinfeld** (Journalist, NRK)
- **Fredrik Græsvik** (Journalist, TV2)

- **Gro Holm** (Journalist, NRK)

Others that I have met with to discuss my topic:

- **Sigmund Bekken** (UNE)
- **Ann Jones** (Journalist, USA)

Appendix 2: Interview guide used in the research of this thesis

1. According to you, how is Norway seen as an international peace negotiator by other states?
2. Why get involved in peace negotiations at all? What effects can this involvement have on a state`s foreign policies?
3. What advantages, if any, would you say Norway has as an international peace negotiator?
4. Are there any characteristics that can be said to be specific for Norway`s way of doing peace negotiations? E.g. have a good contact on each side before starting etc.
5. How important would you say Norwegian NGO`s are in the peace negotiation projects? Do they seem independent from the Norwegian state?
6. What are important requirements for Norway to continue to work with peace negotiations in the future?
7. Why do you think that some Norwegians consider themselves better and more active on the international peace negotiating arena than they perhaps are?
8. Is there any literature on the main topic of how Norway is seen by other states as a peace negotiator you may recommend?
9. Are there any persons you would recommend me to contact who has been involved in peace negotiations and/or have knowledge regarding this field?