

From Afghanistan to Abéché

*The Norwegian contribution to MINURCAT:
applying a framework of interests and values*

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applying a framework of interests and values*

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Map of Chad retrieved from: African Studies Centre. University of Pennsylvania.

Available at URL: http://www.africa.upenn.edu/CIA_Maps/Chad_19866.gif (Accessed 10.06.2011)

List of acronyms

AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
DIS	Chadian Police Force
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EUFOR	European Military Force
IDP	Internally Displace People
IFS	Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
MFA	The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in DR Congo
NAF	Norwegian Armed Forces
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NOK	Norwegian Krone
NOU	Norwegian Official Report
NUPI	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
PRIO	Peace Research Institute Oslo
PSO	Peace Support operations
SRSG	Special Representative to the Secretary-General
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Mission in Darfur
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
USG	Under Secretary-General

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research question

In November 2005, a newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre made a promise in an address to the Norwegian Storting¹:

The government intends to step up the Norwegian participation in UN operations, with a particular focus on Africa. The government wishes to re-establish Norway's credibility as a contributor to UN-led peace operations. We want to enhance the UN's ability to lead complex operations because we know that in many cases the organization is well suited to the job.²

The same sentiment was affirmed in the *Platform for governmental cooperation between The Norwegian Labor Party, Socialist Left Party and the Centre Party 2005-09* (hereafter: Soria Moria Platform 2005-2009)³. Five years later the Norwegian Government was being criticized for its deployment of troops in a UN peacekeeping operation in Africa, more specifically the contribution to the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT⁴). In 2008, the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Ban Ki-moon had requested Norway to assist with a so-called enabling force for the UN troops in Abéché in Chad. Norway replied willingly and in May 2009 they provided a Level II hospital deployed with military health personnel and a water-drilling unit. The Norwegian contribution in Chad was a notable break from 17 years without Norwegian military contribution to a UN-operation in Africa.⁵ However, in June 2010, the enabling force withdrew after just one year of deployment. This decision was reached despite the UN pleading Norway to stay, and predictions that the entire operation would break down if the hospital closed down.⁶

In sum, Norway chose to materialize the political promises of Soria Moria by deploying a high quality hospital with a limited time frame of one year. Critics held

¹ The Norwegian Parliament.

² Minister of Foreign Affairs, Støre, G. J. *Statement at the Norwegian Storting*, 09.11.2005. Translation by Norway's Permanent Mission to the United Nations [URL].

³ Soria Moria Platform 2005-2009, 11.

⁴ The operation's official name is MINURCAT II, but will hereafter only be referred to as MINURCAT.

⁵ Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence, '2.3.4 FN sine fredsoperasjoner' In: *Gov. prop. 1 S (2010-2011)*, 2 *Tryggingsspolitiske rammer og norske hovudprioriteringar*. 2010.

⁶ Høybråten, D. *Spørretimespørsmål*. 24.03.2010.

that the Norwegian contribution was too expensive and too brief, arguably reflecting a general trend of Western states' willingness to finance peacekeeping in Africa without the political staying power to establish long-term stability. Even though the Norwegian contribution to MINURCAT was an attempt to change this unfavorable trend of Western states, the critique was seemingly the same.⁷

The main objective of this thesis is to contribute to existing research on the Norwegian *commitment to peace* by analysing the political considerations regarding Norway's contribution to MINURCAT. By acknowledging that the considerations may consist of differing motivational factors and that the complex set of variables can indeed vary from each operation, this thesis sets out to shed light on the factors that influenced the political considerations for entering and exiting Chad. The choice of case is inspired by the questions raised by political commentators and academic researchers concerning the motivational factors for the two decision-making processes. The two-folded research question this thesis will address is:

What were the basic motives and rationales for the Norwegian contribution to MINURCAT, and how much relative influence did the differing interests and values have on the decision-making processes?

Assessing the motivations for engaging in peacekeeping operations is important for several reasons. Motives may be the benchmarks that steer the engagement in a particular direction, and which define the initial objectives for the operation.⁸ Motives may also affect a state's ability to function as a facilitator or a mediator. To this, Norway has benefited from a position as a country that has continuously been praised for its commitment to peacekeeping without trying to enhance national interests or a hidden agenda.⁹ On the other hand, one can just as easily argue that clearly established value-based motivational factors can also include more hidden elements of self-interests. Motives can thus include more rhetorical aspects; by framing the intentions in a certain way allows the politician to present his agenda according to how he wants

⁷ See for example: Carvalho, B., Aune, I., and Solhjell, R. *Empty rhetoric on Africa peacekeeping*. The Guardian. 13.05.2010.

⁸ Kristoffersen, L. *Interesser i norsk engasjementspolitikk*. 2009, 6.

⁹ Kristoffersen, 7.

to be perceived, both by his national audience and the international community.¹⁰ Moreover, an analysis of the motivational factors influencing decision-making processes must include both the official explanations as well as an assessment of more concealed variables often characterized by more interest-based traits.

In the specific case of peacekeeping operations, the process of whether or not to participate is a joint decision of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), a partnership that primarily must deal with two tasks. Firstly, the two departments will have different agendas and objectives, respectively focusing on security issues and foreign affairs. The effort to make the two agendas compatible may cause political struggle and necessitate a compromise that may weaken the final result. Secondly, there should be a fair amount of concurrence within the departments, as well as between them, on basic motivation for engagement. A guideline for these challenges is based on the notion that peacekeeping operations are stated as part of the Norwegian *engagement policy*, and contributions to peacekeeping are arguably motivated by a value-based agenda. On the other hand, the motivations and rationales for contribution to such operations is an area of foreign policy that is particularly prone to the intertwining of both values and interests. This so-called *dualism* can be found in several of today's international military operations, and have subsequently been studied by a variety of researchers and academics.¹¹

In order to grasp the ever-changing dynamics of international politics, continuous attempts are made to theorize and define states' behaviour. Traditionally, political scientists have applied the concepts of *interests* and *values* to explain the motivations for states' behaviour. Broadly formulated, there are three separate ways of applying these concepts in order to analyse contemporary foreign politics: There are those who argue that there has been a shift away from nation state and interest-based policy-making to more globalised and value-based approaches.¹² Others argue that no real change has occurred, and that the realist framework of the Cold War era still holds; values are just a new way of justifying interest-based policies.¹³ Finally, there are

¹⁰ Kristoffersen, 7.

¹¹ See for example Berger, H. *Verdibaserte og realpolitiske interesser?* 2005.

¹² See for example Kaldor, M. *Human security: reflections on globalization and intervention.* 2007.

¹³ See for example Duffield, M. *Development, Security and Unending war: governing the World of Peoples.* 2007.

scholars who claim that it is not particularly useful to separate the two approaches, as they very often coincide to support the same ends.¹⁴ The various interpretations point to different trends and characteristics of the international system as explanatory factors for why states behave the way they do. Accordingly, this thesis acknowledges that there is no undisputed way of revealing what are the underlying motives for states' behaviour; the subject matter is too complex to grasp within one limited approach.

1.2 Analytical approach

The classical understanding of small states holds that the smaller the state, the greater importance external factors play to state security.¹⁵ Moreover, it is argued that small states have limited international influence on the circumstances affecting their integrity and welfare.¹⁶ However, the Norwegian historian Olav Riste argues that Norway's security policy is to a large degree influenced by internal factors.¹⁷ This exception from the trend of small states is explained by the following: as a country that believes that upholding a certain reputation and international norms is in its own self-interests can also be expected to lay self-images and international law as basis for its actions.¹⁸ This suggests that Norway's security policy is relatively more influenced by promoting an image as a *peace nation*, whereas more distinct security concerns arguably are downplayed. Also, it suggests that upholding international norms and promoting humanitarian values indeed can be in Norway's self-interest.

Another understanding of the motivations for both foreign affairs and security policy is described as a continuous fluctuation between idealism and realism. In the words of Thune and Ulriksen:

Norway's foreign relations [...] are like a pendulum swinging from side to side, between national interest and national values, between the will to secure the state and its territory and the will to represent a global cosmopolitan spirituality.¹⁹

¹⁴ See for example Leira, H. *Folket og freden. Utviklingstrekk i norsk fredsdiskurs 1890-2005*. 2005; Thune, H. and Larsen, T. *Utenrikspolitikk uten software. En teori om omdømme, populisme og andre politiske trekkrefter i små staters utenrikspolitikk*. 2000.

¹⁵ Knudsen, F. O., *Beslutningsprosesser i norsk utenrikspolitikk*, 1997, 71.

¹⁶ Riste, O. *Norway's foreign relations – a history*. 2005.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Berger, H. *Verdibaserte og realpolitiske interesser?* 2005, 28.

¹⁹ Thune, H. and Ulriksen, S. *Norway as an Allied Activist – Prestige and Penance through Peace*. 2002, 3.

Describing the aspirations of the Norwegian government as a pendulum may be particularly suitable to the decision-making process of engaging in Chad, as the contribution was initially praised for its efforts, and thereafter criticized for its discontinuation. One critic of the withdrawal, Research Fellow at NUPI, Benjamin de Carvalho, voiced his concern in an article published by *The Guardian*. de Carvalho argued that compared to the time and efforts spent on other conflicts such as the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, the brief mission in Chad has appeared cursory and uncommitted.²⁰ Even though this might be an accurate analysis, it is not particularly convincing without a clear understanding of the Norwegian government's intentions for participating in the operation. If the contribution was motivated by a desire to assist the UN troops until they had managed to stabilize the region, then yes: withdrawing before the mission was completed appears cursory. But if the motivations were based on the intentions of showing support for a shorter time-period, and then leaving the responsibility to another country, it may rather be considered as an unfortunate event that no other country was willing to cover the running of the hospital, causing Norway to depart MINURCAT with allegations of abandoning its responsibility. Consequently, it is important to get a well-founded understanding of the Norwegian government's intentions for engaging in the peacekeeping operation in Chad.

In order to untangle the research question, this thesis will propose two sets of hypotheses. The hypotheses are developed from the information collected from official documents from the Ministries of Defence, Finance and Foreign Affairs, as well as interviews with decision makers and advisors in the various departments. The two events of entering and exiting Chad will include three sets of proposals to the motivational factors in the decision-making processes. The reason for dividing the operation in Chad into two separate case studies is based on indications from reports on the subject matter suggesting that the motivation for engaging in Chad differ substantially from the decision to withdraw. Although it might have allowed for a more thorough analysis to limit the discussion to the entrance or the withdrawal of the Norwegian forces to Chad, this thesis holds that a more holistic conclusion may be drawn on the Norwegian peace engagement by discussing both actions. The six

²⁰ Carvalho, B., Aune, I., and Solhjell, R. *Empty rhetoric on Africa peacekeeping*. The Guardian. 13.05.2010.

hypotheses that will be tested in this thesis are the following:

Hypothesis H1(a): Values were the main explanatory factor for why Norway chose to participate in the UN-led operation in Chad.

Hypothesis H1(b): National interests were the main explanatory factor for why Norway chose to participate in the UN-led mission in Chad.

Hypothesis H1(c): Both values and national interests affected the decision to contribute to the mission in Chad.

The considerations concerning the contribution to MINURCAT stretched over a two years period. As Thune and Ulriksen's aforementioned pendulum illustrated, Norwegian foreign relations are apparently influenced by both the will to accomplish peace and security in other countries and the will to secure national interests. Over time, this swings from side to side, in the same way as political considerations may change from the one motive to another. Based on this observation, this thesis' method of separating the two events allow for the study of whether the motivations and rationales for participating in MINURCAT perhaps moved from a rather substantial value-based consideration for participating, to a situation where more interest-based considerations were given more importance, resulting in the withdrawal of the Norwegian troops. The other set of hypotheses are therefore the following:

Hypothesis H2(a): Values were the main explanatory factor for why Norway chose to withdraw from the UN-led operation in Chad.

Hypothesis H2(b): National interests were the main explanatory factor for why Norway chose to withdraw from the UN-led mission in Chad.

Hypothesis H2(c): Both values and national interests affected the decision to withdraw from the mission in Chad.

Relying on the premises of *interests* and *ideals* put forward by Thune and Ulriksen, this thesis will assess the data collected by applying two theoretical perspectives. The first theoretical perspective will assess the motivation and rationales for participating

in Chad from a value-based perspective. Values as motivational factors will in this regard mainly rely on Max Weber's concepts of 'ethics of conviction' and 'ethics of responsibility'. The other perspective will consider the interest-based motivations for the operation, including 'hard' interests such as national security and economic interests, but also the 'softer' interests such as success rate and promoting an image as a peacekeeping nation. Moreover, the answers provided by the data sources will be analysed based on indications. Indicators will in this regard not refer to the typical statistical conceptions of the term, but rather what the findings imply: What direction are the findings from official documents pointing to? Is the data suggesting that interests, values or both factors motivated the political decisions?

1.3 Norway's commitment to peace

The willingness to contribute to peacekeeping operations can be placed within a broader *commitment to peace*. This commitment springs from Norway's *engagement policy*, which includes commitment to human rights, promotion of peacebuilding and environmental issues, and supporting development through aid and assistance.²¹ According to the 2008 report *National Interests* published by the MFA, Norway is regarded as 'an open, globalised, tolerant, peace-loving and egalitarian country, [...] and Norway's policy of international commitment is often cited as unequivocally benevolent and effective.'²² Even though it may be tempting to concur with these favourable characteristics of Norway, it is still important to question the rather stereotyped image. Hence, this thesis calls for a more critical assessment of the variables constituting the motivational framework of the engagement policy, and especially the basis for participating in peacekeeping operations.

Norwegian authorities spent almost 1 billion NOK on peace and reconciliation efforts in 2008,²³ which placed Norway as one of the main financial contributors to UN peace operations. Although financial contributions are appreciated as a token of commitment and trust, Norway's relationship to the organization was strengthened through the 2005 Governmental Proposition *Soria Moria* declaring that the government aimed to

²¹ Lunde, L. and Thune, H. (eds). *National Interest: Foreign Policy for a globalised world*. 2008, 6.

²² Ibid, 46.

²³ Ibid, 68.

increase Norwegian presence in the UN's ground forces in general, and specifically peacekeeping operations on the African continent.²⁴ This objective was also reaffirmed in *Soria Moria II*, but without the emphasis on Africa.²⁵ Increasing support to peacekeeping – especially in a fairly neglected region like the African continent, upholds Norway's image as a peace nation and gives 'the appearance of being a country strongly oriented towards peace and reconciliation.'²⁶

The branding of Norway as a responsible 'humanitarian superpower'²⁷ is something that is carefully grounded within a value-based framework, where altruism and solidarity play fundamental roles.²⁸ This does not, however, imply that national interests or traditional pragmatism such as state security and economic interests are absent from the equation. To place Norway's *commitment to peace* within a more idealistically oriented framework is rather a way to underscore that the main rationales for committing to international peacekeeping operations should first and foremost be to secure peace in that area, and if that objective leads to securing Norway's state interests, that's considered as a positive bi-effect. This train of thought is well known in Norwegian foreign politics, and constitutes the claim that Norway is more secure in a secure world. There are, however, those who claim that Norway's *commitment to peace* has increasingly been justified on the basis of Norwegian self-interests.²⁹ Based on a realist model, this proclaimed tendency is explained on the notion that the so-called *peace diplomacy* is primarily an instrument to enhance national business- and security interests. On the other hand, the traditional notions of diplomacy are also combined with an outwardly idealistic objective to secure and maintain peace. This proclaimed merger of two potentially opposing motivations might be the cause of tension within a country's foreign policy.

1.4 Introduction to the humanitarian and security situation in Chad

Chad, officially known as the Republic of Chad, is a landlocked country in the middle of Central Africa. Surrounding countries are Libya to the north, Sudan to the east, the

²⁴ Soria Moria Platform 2005-2009, 11.

²⁵ The Norwegian Government, *Platform for governmental cooperation between The Norwegian Labor Party, Socialist Left Party and the Centre Party 2009-2013*, 10. (hereafter: Soria Moria Platform 2009-2013)

²⁶ Lunde and Thune, 68.

²⁷ The Norwegian Government. '12.1 Norge som humanitær stormakt' In: *NOU 2003: 19, Makt og demokrati*. 2003.

²⁸ The Norwegian Government, *Government Proposition no. 15 Interesser, muligheter og ansvar*. 2009.

²⁹ Harpviken, B. K. and Skjelsbæk, I. *Skjerp Fredspolitikken!* Aftenposten 29.11.10.

Central African Republic to the south, Cameroon and Nigeria to the southwest, and Niger to the west.³⁰ The country is one of the least economically developed and most corrupt countries in the world, and over 60 per cent of Chadians live in extreme poverty,³¹ generally accepted to be caused by failed crops following draught and periods of civil war. The country was liberalized from French rule in 1960, but has, as an independent country continued to suffer from political instability, periods of civil wars as well as sporadic armed conflicts with neighbouring country Libya in the period between 1978 and 1987.

In recent time, Chad has continuously been affected by the instabilities in the region. Since the breakout of the 2004 Darfur crisis in neighbouring country Sudan, the eastern part of Chad has been an unstable and insecure area.³² Oxfam reports that over half a million people have fled their homes in Sudan to come to camps in the region, involving 250,000 Sudanese refugees, 180,000 displaced Chadian and 70,000 refugees from Central African Republic who are entirely dependent on humanitarian assistance.³³ The UN states that the armed activities and banditry in eastern Chad threatens the security of the civil population. Furthermore, the atrocities committed by rebels in the region have resulted in serious human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law.³⁴

In September 2007, the UN Security Council approved a resolution to send a European military force (EUFOR) of 3,700 troops and a Chadian police force (DIS) under the UN umbrella (MINURCAT) to protect all civilians. EUFOR was established by a request from the Chadian government,³⁵ and by UN Security Council Resolution 1778 EUFOR forces was intended to:

³⁰ Store Norske Leksikon, *Tsjad*. [URL]

³¹ Globalis. *Tsjad*. [URL]

³² Oxfam. *Oxfam and the Chad crisis – March 2009*. 2009.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 1778, 2007.

³⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 1778, 2007, 2.

[...] help create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons, inter alia by contributing to the protection of refugees, displaced persons and civilians in danger, by facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic (CAR) and by creating favourable conditions for the reconstruction and economic and social development of those areas.³⁶

By that resolution and acting under Charter VII of the UN Chapter, the EU military force was deployed to support the MINURCAT mandate. Before the completion of EUFOR's mandate in March 2009, the Security Council authorized the deployment of a military component of MINURCAT to follow up EUFOR.

MINURCAT was envisaged to entail a 5000-strong UN peacekeeping force managed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). When entering Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), MINURCAT was set to carry out a wide range of functions in a more multi-faceted operation than the EUFOR. Although the new MINURCAT mandate was introduced in order to strengthen the forces' ability to secure the situations of the refugees, commentators have argued that it was simply 'more of the same.'³⁷ The transition from EUFOR to MINURCAT did, however, not involve noticeable security gaps, as many of the EU troops previously stationed in Chad remained on the ground as part of the new MINURCAT mission. However, a few EU countries decided to depart the mission during the troop turnover, including Italy, which had been in charge of the running of a field hospital in Abéché.

Following Italy's departure, the DPKO sent a request to Norway to continue the running of the field hospital in joint efforts with Serbia. Norway provided a National Deployable Hospital (NDH) deployed with a total amount of 150 personnel, including health personnel and a support division. In addition, Norway assisted with a well-drilling unit in Abéché to improve the hospital's supply of water until its departure in

³⁶ MINURCAT, *Minurcat Mandate*. [URL]

³⁷ Fick, M. *The EUFOR to MINURCAT transition in eastern Chad: it may not be pretty*. 17.03.2009.

May 2010.³⁸ A more elaborative description of the Norwegian contribution to MINURCAT will be provided in Chapter 6.1.

The internal political situation in Chad was highly challenged by the conflict with neighbouring Sudan, where the UN had a limited political mandate to interfere.³⁹ By restricting the mandate of MINURCAT to the protection of civilians and fighting the widespread occurrence of sexual violence, it was difficult to establish the necessary conditions for a safe return of refugees and IDP's. Although MINURCAT achieved relatively good results in the areas of security and to the strengthening of the justice and corrective system, the forces were asked to leave by President Déby, after only two years of deployment.⁴⁰ The government did, however, underscore that they wanted the civilian activities, including the hospital, water-drilling unit and general logistics to remain.⁴¹ At the end of 2010, MINURCAT handed over its main tasks to the Government of Chad and the UN agencies present, responsibilities including 'security of refugees, IDPs and humanitarian workers in eastern Chad.'⁴² The authors of the NUPI report *An Honourable Exit for MINURCAT?* claim that there is 'a high risk that eastern Chad, which was on its way to early recovery, may again become a humanitarian crisis.'⁴³

³⁸ Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' archives. *NDG og MINURCAT – forventede refusjoner*. Dossier no. 40, 13.10.2009

³⁹ Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' archives. *Tsjad. Statssekretær Larsens møte med SRSG Angelo i Oslo, 1. Oktober. Oppsummering*. Dossier no. 37, 02.10.2009

⁴⁰ Karlsrud, J. and Solhjell, R. *An Honourable Exit for MINURCAT?* Policy Brief, NUPI 2010.

⁴¹ Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' archives. Dossier no. 67, 26.03.2010

⁴² Karlsrud and Solhjell, 2010.

⁴³ Karlsrud and Solhjell 2010.

CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGY

Peace and Conflict Studies is a uniquely challenging discipline, characterized by its multifaceted make up. Due to the complex nature of its multi-disciplinary design, it lacks the well-defined and established research methods of the more traditional disciplines that it is comprised of. However, combining work from a wide range of academic disciplines, thus relying on a more inductive explorative methodology that is not controlled by firmly established theories,⁴⁴ may offer new insights to the academic debate. Appreciating the strengths of a combined framework of sociology, international relations, political science and general theories from peace and conflict studies, can provide a more holistic approach to the questions about foreign policy in general, and specifically in peacekeeping operations. While recognizing that researchers disagree on the applicability of a multi-disciplinary approach and the criteria for a good methodology, this thesis holds that the explorative design is a useful way of structuring the political considerations for the Norwegian MINURCAT contribution.

2.1 Sources

The interplay between domestic security issues and foreign political affairs have been subject to various analysis,⁴⁵ and the particular case of Norway's engagement policy has indeed been explored from various perspectives. A review of the existing research articles on this subject shows that there are many scholars focusing on the intentions and motivations behind the Norwegian engagement in general, but few have conducted a case study of the motivational framework of a specific peacekeeping operation. It is only the IFS report by Lene Kristoffersen, *Interests in Norwegian engagement policy* that analyzes Norwegian authorities' motivations for engaging in specific peacekeeping operations. Kristoffersen's report gives a thorough study of the triggering motives of Norwegian peacekeeping efforts, discussing the cases of Guatemala, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sri Lanka and Sudan.⁴⁶ Kristoffersen's findings

⁴⁴ Andersen, S. *Case-studier og generalisering: Forskningsstrategi og design*. 2003, 102.

⁴⁵ See for example: Knutsen et.al. *Europeisk sikkerhet i en foranderlig tid: En analyse av Norges utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitiske handlingsrom*, 2000; Lange. *Holdninger og handlinger. Norges Midtøstenpolitikk i FNs Sikkerhetsråd 2001-2002*. 2005.

⁴⁶ Kristoffersen.

functioned as a valuable platform for this thesis' study of the Norwegian efforts in Chad, and the variables assessed were especially inspiring to the theoretical make-up. The report found that 'the main driving force behind Norwegian peacebuilding efforts has been humanitarian value-based motives rather than specific interests.'⁴⁷ However, it is underscored that interests have not been insignificant, especially in the case of the engagement in Bosnia. Moreover, Kristoffersen found that in the case of Guatemala, Sri Lanka and Sudan, 'traditional national interests such as security and economic incentives played a minor role.'⁴⁸ The study's choice of motivational factors, such as prestige, visibility, access to central players etc., has been borrowed to constitute the theoretical framework of this thesis. However, partly due to a more narrowed focus, this thesis did not include all of Kristoffersen's explanatory variables, such as the element of individual aspirations and ambitions.

In order to get a well-founded understanding the particular case of the Norwegian contribution to MINURCAT, it is helpful to place the motivations and rationales within a larger framework of the Norwegian commitment to peace. This rather broad investigation of the motivations for the Norwegian engagement policy and the various experiences with peacekeeping efforts allows for a general overview of the historical trends. Relevant reports in this regard are the works of Leiv Lunde and Henrik Thune in the MFA report *National Interest: Foreign Policy for a globalised world*, as well as the NUPI report edited by Halvard Leira, called *Norwegian self-images and Norwegian foreign policy*. While recognizing that the various explanations do constitute some of the very fundamentals of the Norwegian engagement policy, this thesis aims at complementing the results with empirical findings from the particular motivational factors of the MINURCAT contribution.

When applying a framework of interests and values, Professor of International Politics, Janne Haaland Matlary, contributes to the discussion with a useful understanding of how the terms are perceived by decision-makers in Norwegian foreign politics. As part of a five years study conducted by the Faculty of Social Science at the University of Oslo, called *Makt –og demokratiutredningen*, Professor Matlary analysed the

⁴⁷ Kristoffersen, 2.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

relationship between value-diplomacy and *realpolitik* in Norwegian foreign policy. The empirical study was based on interviews with government officials, and found that the strategies of the Norwegian engagement policy, or what Matlary calls ‘value-diplomacy’ is not characterized by direct strategic thinking, but neither can it be classified as purely altruistically motivated. The study concludes that Norwegian foreign policy has a much sought after ‘capital’ in its value-diplomacy, which has not yet been subject to sufficient reflection.

This thesis has especially benefited from the empirical data provided by the interviews with Norwegian government officials and Professor Matlary’s interpretations of the various ways of how government officials relate to the dynamics of interests and values in foreign politics.⁴⁹ Further, Helene Forsland Berger’s Master Thesis on the considerations prior to the 2003 war in Iraq has provided additional knowledge on the decision-making processes of whether or not to participate in international military operations. Berger’s thesis explores the factors contributing to Norway’s decision of refraining from participating, and finds that value-based interests such as international law and Norway’s image as a peace nation were guiding in the considerations prior to the war, whereas more interest-based factors such as the importance of allies and *reciprocity* characterized the debate succeeding the US-invasion.⁵⁰

The empirical data is collected from official documents research papers, as well as seven interviews: one former State Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, one Senior Advisor at the Ministry of Defence, one Senior Peace Operations Advisor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one Deputy Military Adviser at the Permanent Mission of Norway to the UN, one Research Fellow at NUPI and former Special Assistant to the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) to MINURCAT, one Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies and one Professor at Oslo University Collage. Each of the interviewees is knowledgeable of the issues concerning Norwegian foreign policies, and especially the questions regarding peacekeeping operations and Chad.

⁴⁹ Matlary, J. H, *En strategisk analyse av norsk utenrikspolitikk*, 2002.

⁵⁰ Berger, 2005.

2.2 Conducting a case study: the method of process-tracing

The choice of case study methods allows for a close examination of the causal mechanisms affecting the two processes, thus testing the hypotheses set out to explain both actions. In the words of Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, the motivation for this methodological choice is based on the following consideration: a case study approach involves the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events.⁵¹ It is not the intention of this thesis to develop a theory that will be applicable to the motivational framework of peacekeeping operations in general, although some basic assumptions regarding political trends in Norwegian foreign affairs will be made. The intention is rather to discuss which theoretical framework has the most explanatory power in interpreting the motivations for the MINURCAT contribution. To this point, this thesis recognizes that the theoretical explanations only offer a limited description of reality, and will therefore not be used as a way of confirming or discarding theories. Nevertheless, the theories will contribute with helpful terms and concepts, which will constitute the fundament of the analysis. In order to explore the motivations affecting the political considerations, this thesis especially relies on the method of process-tracing, attempting to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes.

In process-tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case.⁵²

In other words, the process-tracing involves a rather *intensive* study of one event, in this case the MINURCAT contribution – and the independent variables affecting the decisions of contributing and withdrawing. The type of process-tracing applied is the so-called *analytical explanation*, where the historical narrative is converted into an analytical causal explanation ‘couched in explicit theoretical forms.’⁵³

It is important to note that the extent to which a historical narrative is transformed into

⁵¹ George, A. and Bennett, A. *Case studies and theory development in social science*. 2005, 5.

⁵² George and Bennett, 6.

⁵³ *Ibid*, 211.

a theoretical explanation indeed can vary, and when analysing political considerations or chain of events, there is seldom a linear, straightforward causality, but rather a complex form where the decisions are affected by several variables. Such complex interaction effects are difficult to identify and pose as a challenge to the method of process-tracing. For that reason, this thesis has paid special attention to the historical events contributing to the basis of contemporary Norwegian foreign relations and aimed to make a thorough analysis of the basic events leading up to the MINURCAT contribution. The different variables are presented in an attempt to map out some of the more linear factors affecting decision-making processes of today. Others, less concrete variables are of course more difficult to trace back to historical events, and will consequently offer more ambiguous explanations.

2.3 Challenges to the case study: 'selection bias' and the magnitude of results

Contrary to the objective of statistical studies; case study methods do not necessarily aim to use the findings of the study to generate better understanding of a broader part of society, but rather to map out a detailed understanding of contextual factors. While statistical studies allow for a more wide ranging study of tendencies and trends, case studies open for more in-depth questions and thorough elaborations of concepts and connections. Further, 'case studies have powerful advantages in the heuristic identification of new variables and hypotheses through the study of deviant or outlier cases and in the course of field work – such as archival research and interviews with participants, area experts and historians.'⁵⁴ As George and Bennett argue, the researcher can be flexible to the explanatory variables, as new information gathered from interviews and studies of documents would have to be included and perhaps also change the initial hypotheses, which again must be tested through previously unexamined evidence.

Although case studies are generally valuable in testing hypotheses and particularly useful for theory development, there are certain limitations and potential drawbacks of applying this method. One of the most common critiques is that this method is particularly prone to 'selection bias,'⁵⁵ which commonly occur when the subjects are

⁵⁴ George and Bennett, 20.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 22.

self-selected and chosen because they share a particular outcome. Although selection biases are a potentially severe problem, analysts and practitioners have argued that they should not be rejected out of hand, as it does not involve the same challenges as it does to statistical research. In statistical studies, a selection bias will understate the strength of the relationship between the independent and the dependent variable, and statistical researchers should therefore not select cases on the dependent variable.⁵⁶ In case studies, however, selecting cases on the dependent variable ‘can help identify which variables are not necessary or sufficient conditions for the selected outcome.’⁵⁷

Before deciding which motivational factors to include in this thesis’ analysis, several explanatory variables were assessed, and based on preliminary informative interviews conducted they were later eliminated on the basis of not being particularly relevant to the subject matter. As several of the interviewees requested that the interview was not recorded, the information collected was only noted, and later sent to the interviewees for final approval. Even though the interviewees were not balanced according to institutions and gender, all provided useful information in supplement to the theoretical perspectives and the official documents. In order to avoid the dangers of ‘selection bias’, this thesis would perhaps have benefited from an even more extensive sample of interviews and official documents. However, by including arguments posed by both political advisors, decision-makers, critics, commentators, researchers and academics, the rather inclusive sample size was an attempt to avoid the dangers of excluding variables that appear contradictory to the theory.

Another challenge related to case study methods is what George and Bennett explains as case studies’ ability to only make tentative conclusions on *how much* a variable mattered to the outcome, limiting the analysis to assessing *whether* and *how* it mattered. As the decision to participate in a peacekeeping operation indeed is guided by several variables, this thesis is particularly vulnerable to this challenge: it is only possible to map out what the interviewees and the official documents regarded as decisive factors in the process, and less possible to say *to what extent* the variables affected the decisions. The study is thus in danger of being too descriptive, reporting

⁵⁶ George and Bennett, 23.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

on the stated motivational factors, with little ability to evaluate how the various motivations have affected the decisions differently. Therefore, the analysis of this thesis will give a more thorough assessment of the opinions that received the most attention, both in the political and public debate.

Based on the theoretical framework, the different motivations for engaging in peacekeeping operations can be operationalized in a model of three components: national interests, value-based motivational factors, and national costs. However, this simple approach is not very useful, as motivations can often be both rational and non-rational at the same time, depending on the interpretation done by both the informant and the researcher. It is inevitable that, when repeated, another researcher will achieve different results when interpreting the results from the data. This is due to the fact that even though the interviewees are indeed informed and trustworthy, conceptions will naturally change over time, as new information is acquired, new theories are developed, more context known, and general political thinking changes. Also the very fact that it is qualitative makes it in some way subjective; as the observers will interpret the results differently. Therefore, the analysis' conclusion cannot evaluate to what extent the different variables affected the decision-making process, only map out how it was perceived by the different informants, and how those perceptions were communicated to the researcher.

2.4 Trusting the findings: validity and reliability

As the latter sections have articulated, the methodological framework of this thesis applies a qualitative research design on one specific case or event, a strategy, which constitutes an inductive approach to the relationship between theory and research. The question of how well the case study fares in order to illustrate the motivations of the Norwegian government in the decision-making process, is thus dependent on the way it is conducted, according to the principles of validity and reliability; methodological measures applied to determine whether the operationalization of the study is satisfactory.⁵⁸ When conducting a case study, the researcher is able to achieve high levels of conceptual validity, or to identify and measure the indicators that best

⁵⁸ Hellevik, O. *Forskningsmetode i sosiologi og statsvitenskap*. 2002, 473.

represent the theoretical concepts the researcher intends to measure.⁵⁹ A high level of validity refers to whether the results from the study are actually answering the questions posed by the research question, in other words: concurrence between the question and the collected data. To strengthen the validity of the thesis one must be aware of the relationship between the theoretical and operationalized definitions, in a fashion where the results gathered from the study is actually in line with the theoretical questions that were posed. As the theoretical concepts of interest and values are subject to various usages and understandings, this thesis presents a thorough review of how these terms are defined in this context. Both terms may include a number of variables, but due to the limited scope of this thesis, only six have been selected to reflect the motivational framework. This may of course have weakened the final results, as there are variables such as ‘personal aspirations’ that would have contributed to a broader understanding.

In order to establish a satisfactory level of validity, the data must have a high level of reliability. Reliability involves the question of whether the data from the study are trustworthy. To this, the thesis relies on concepts in the social science, which are extensively elaborated on in the theoretical framework of this thesis. The empirical data is collected from official documents and interviews with government officials or researchers on the subject matter. As mentioned, the interviewees were all well informed on the subject of peacekeeping operations, and all quotes were sent for final approval. The semi-structured interview guide that was used for the interviews can be found as an appendix to this thesis, where also all the interviewees are listed.

2.5 Methodological concerns: defining motivational factors

Motivations indicate the driving forces behind an action,⁶⁰ and relating to foreign policies it can be described as the *intentions* prior to Norwegian peacebuilding efforts. According to political scientist Gunnar Fermann; political motivations differ from political behaviour, where the latter refers to the various instruments and techniques that are applied to implement policies.⁶¹ Even though the actual results of the

⁵⁹ George and Bennett, 19.

⁶⁰ Kristoffersen, 12.

⁶¹ Fermann, G. *Utenrikspolitiske målsettinger og virkemidler*, in Kristoffersen, 12.

MINURCAT contribution are not subject for analysis, the implementation of the policies might reflect the motivational factors, and thereby telling us something about the state's intentions. To this, the authors of the MFA report *Norwegian interests*, acknowledges an important truth: 'If perceptions of Norway that influence foreign policy turn out to have little basis in reality, our foreign policy may well fail to reflect our real interests.'⁶² If the implementation of the policies is not consistent with the intentions officially stated, it might also indicate the presence of other governing motives.

In this thesis' analysis, the concepts of interests and values are applied as analytical tools to grasp the political intentions of the MINURCAT contribution. As stated, the various usages and understandings of these terms do pose as a challenge to the validity of this thesis. Also, there are factors that deliberately have not been included in the analysis. Several more 'hidden' variables that were not part of the initial framework have been discovered, explored and included in the research process. Moreover, one might find that there is no clear set of motivations separating interests from values, but rather the intertwining of both sets of motivational factors affecting the decision-making processes. As this thesis aims to analyse both the driving factors for engaging in *and* withdrawing from MINURCAT, it might find that the decisions were motivated by completely different sets of rationales. Basically, the study has benefited from its explorative design, as the analytical discussion was flexible to new variables, and was able to assess their explanatory power. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that a complete understanding of all the relevant variables has not been accomplished. However, the findings from the data sources led to relatively satisfactory conclusions, although a more comprehensive study would have been desirable.

⁶² Lunde and Thune, 46.

CHAPTER 3. DEFINING CONCEPTS

3.1 The concept of peace

As the point of departure for this thesis' analysis is the Norwegian contributions to peacekeeping operations, it is of vital importance to define the concept of peace, and peacekeeping operations. Based on the division made by Harpviken and Skjelsbæk, this thesis will rely on a two-folded definition of peace. The limited definition focuses on absence of war, where the goal is to end violence and establish a truce. Peace in the more extended version refers to basic welfare, rights and safety in everyday life, commonly linked to the concept of *human security*. This extended definition of peace has broadened the mandate of peacekeeping operations, and has led to increasing demands to states participating in such. As the peacekeeping mission in Chad was not related to a direct internal conflict, but rather to secure the humanitarian condition of the refugees from the troubled Darfur region and internally displaced people, the MINURCAT operation falls under the second part of the definition of peace, as the UN forces sought to obtaining human security for the people in the region.

The mission was worded in the broadest sense, including contributing to 'the protection of civilians; promote human rights and the rule of law, and promote regional peace.'⁶³ This inclusive mandate is a symptom of how the UN recognizes that in order to secure sustainable peace, one must handle the root causes of conflict, and manage to protect civilians. This approach to enhancing peace is based on a current desire within international peacekeeping operations to prevent atrocities that follow a civil war. As the turmoil in Chad has yet to reach the stage of internal war, the MINURCAT operation is contributing to preventive efforts. The following section will illustrate that peacekeeping efforts are indeed a complex and ambitious project, and has subsequently been subject to various revisions and attempts of improvement.

3.2 Peacekeeping perspectives

In *Understanding peacebuilding*, Professor of International Security, Alexander Bellamy, outlines seven forms of peacekeeping operations and the various challenges related to the objective of managing peace. In order to appreciate the complex nature

⁶³ United Nations, *MINURACT Background*.

of the considerations prior to the deployment of peacekeeping operations, the following sections will provide a brief introduction to Bellamy's various ways of peacekeeping and the efforts made to relate to the changing character of conflict. *Preventive deployments* are regarded as the most effective form of peacekeeping, as outside forces are deployed before warring factions break into battle. Such deployments exist more in theory than in practice, as it is difficult to get the mandate and financial resources to apply this form of peacekeeping. *Traditional peacekeeping* usually takes place between ceasefire and a political settlement, where the warring factions need to be separated. Prior to the operations are three basic assumptions, called the holy trinity: consent from the government, impartiality from the intervening forces and a minimum use of force.⁶⁴ *Wider peacekeeping* occurs within a context of ongoing violence, and tends to take place during 'new wars.'⁶⁵ It's applied where 'Westphalian and post-Westphalian ideas collide,'⁶⁶ meaning that the operations are based on the holy trinity, but has to relate to new conditions following new types of conflict. Bellamy's argument is that the UN mandate is inadequate, as the UN troops are not certain of whether they should protect the civil population, or only work as a military force.

Peace enforcement refers to Charter VII of the United Nations, which gives the Security Council authority to determine whether a threat to peace has occurred; order provisional measures under Article 40, and order enforcement measures against a state, or entities within a state.⁶⁷ Bellamy argues that the mandate of peace enforcement operations is often quite vague, and there is still debated whether the UN should engage in war fighting at all. *Assisting transitions* aims to build peace from within, with a goal to engage local actors to take part in the operations to foster a stable peace, founded on ownership and freedom from external control. A similar strategy is *Transitional administrations*, although the external actors are given a mandate to control a territory. David Chandler criticizes this type of peacekeeping, claiming that transitional administrations are just a new form of colonialism; where

⁶⁴ Bellamy, A. and Williams, P. *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2010, 173.

⁶⁵ Ibid. 194.

⁶⁶ Ibid. 195.

⁶⁷ Ibid. 214.

outside actors rule without the consent of the governed.⁶⁸ A top-down approach to state building can also be in danger of implying that the local authority is not capable of creating sustainable peace on their own, and consequently not allowed to determine their own political affairs.⁶⁹ *Peace support operations* (hereafter PSOs) is developed as a solution to the lessons learned by previously often unsuccessful peacekeeping operations, and includes a ‘multifaceted mission that combine a robust military force with a significant civilian component.’⁷⁰ The main difference from traditional forms of peacekeeping is that PSOs don’t require consent from the local government, as consent is understood as ‘variable, multi-layered and malleable.’⁷¹ One challenge is that the concept of PSOs is not universally acknowledged, and the operations carry the negative hallmarks of intruding foreign powers to local conflicts.

As illustrated by Bellamy’s seven forms of peacekeeping, there is not yet an ideal form, or a consensus on an acceptable way for an outside actor to contribute to peacebuilding. Intra-state conflicts of the contemporary world are often too complex to be handled by one single strategy, and peace support operations have thus become the popular way of dealing with conflict and intra-state war. Although MINURCAT was established in order to contribute to the protection of civilians; promote human rights and the rule of law; and promote regional peace,⁷² the primary responsibility for ensuring the security of its civilians was still in the hands of the Chadian government. In this sense, the operation is more similar to the traditional forms of peacekeeping. According to the UNSG: ‘MINURCAT has been an unusual and unique United Nations peacekeeping operation in that it was devoted solely to contributing to the protection of civilians, without an explicit political mandate.’⁷³ As the multi-dimensional mission was not mandated to provide a political solution to the conflict, the peacekeeping efforts became highly concerned with the building of infrastructure such as roads and water-drills.⁷⁴ The UN Secretary-General’s statement illustrates challenges similar to those outlined by Bellamy: by limiting the mandate to the

⁶⁸ Chandler, D. *Universal Ethics and Elite Politics: The Limits of Normative Human Rights Theory*. 2001, 87.

⁶⁹ Moyo, D. *Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How there is a Better Way for Africa*. 2009.

⁷⁰ HMSO, *Joint Warfare Publication 3-50*, 1999. in Bellamy and Williams, 279.

⁷¹ Bellamy and Williams, 282.

⁷² UN Security Council Resolution 1778. 2007, 1.

⁷³ UN Security Council. *S/2010/611*, 2010, 16.

⁷⁴ Hansen, K. F. *Professor at Oslo University Collage, Development Studies*. Interview 4.11.2010

protection of civilians, the troops did only have limited ways of tackling the root causes of the on-going violence in the region.

3.3 Effects of the Cold War: introducing the concepts of new wars and human security

During the Cold War, the tension between the US and the USSR was the focus of attention for many politicians and academics. The 44 years of political tension, proxy wars and military competition has been thoroughly analyzed by applying various theories concerning international relations, ranging from realist to liberalistic perspectives.

During the Cold War period the international system was characterized by inter-state conflicts, often led by formal acts, such as declarations of war. This norm has changed during the last two decades, as 95 per cent of armed conflicts have taken place within states rather than between them.⁷⁵ The traditional perception of security as concerning external military or territorial threats was now challenged by the increase in intra-state conflicts, and new and controversial issues came into play, such as the ‘rights of the individuals’ and human security. This is typically described as a shift away from the classical bipolar situation⁷⁶ to the more globalised world of the early twenty-first century. Professor of International Relation, Kimberly Hutchings, understands globalization as an international system with greater transnational integration and with a complex mutual dependence.⁷⁷ By acknowledging the changes in international politics, the UN became a more trusted actor where one of its pivotal tasks was how to relate to the ‘new wars’ and the challenges that followed intra-state conflicts. Professor of Global Governance, Mary Kaldor, explains the ‘new wars’ as the disintegration and collapse of states, following the effects of globalization on the international system.⁷⁸ To Kaldor, globalization and the interrelationship between states are partly understood as the causes of intra-state conflicts, but can also explain how internal conflicts become global, thus affecting countries outside their own region. In other words – as

⁷⁵ Sheehan, M. ‘The Changing Character of War’ In: Baylis, J., et.al. *The Globalization of World Politics*. 2008, 222.

⁷⁶ Hutchings, K. *International Political Theory*. 1999, 14.

⁷⁷ Robinson, in Hovi and Malnes, 381.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

changes in the international system may have led to the changing character of war, this may in turn have led to changes in the foreign politics of states.

Although the statistics illustrate a change in the types of conflict, there are of course many opposing arguments on the magnitude of this proclaimed shift and the consequences of the 'new wars' on international relations and state sovereignty. Scholars who argue that new wars have had little actual change on international politics questions states' willingness to intervene in internal affairs, the ability of the UN to respond, and whether the traditional principles of non-intervention should apply to intra-state conflicts. There are, however, two conflicts that marked the 1990's, which are said to have changed discourse and ideas in international forums since the end of the Cold War: the 1992 civil war in Somalia and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. As the crisis in Somalia mainly had been handled by the US, the stolid tackling of the situation in Rwanda was to a larger degree the responsibility of the Security Council. Subsequently, the wide spread criticism of the UN regarding it's lack of intervention in Rwanda laid the ground-stone for the pivotal debate within the UN on how to relate to mass atrocities.

In challenging the principle of 'freedom from intervention', by referring to crises like Rwanda, the debate regarding human security and the norm of non-intervention experienced a change of discourse. Some scholars have described the debate that followed as the 'clash of competing imperatives,'⁷⁹ where the high ideals of traditional treaties and declarations were challenged by the UN's role in maintaining standards for individuals within states.⁸⁰ Thus, the concept of 'human security' was now one of the major tasks of the UN, and would be a vital part of the framework for future humanitarian interventions. As the mass atrocities in Rwanda did unite the international community on the importance of intervention and prevention, the member states agreed that in some cases, consent from the national government should not necessarily be a condition for intervention. This groundbreaking consensus has yet to be applied, as the rhetoric and discussions in the General Assembly has not transformed into real-world solutions. This illustrates that human security is a concept

⁷⁹ Evans, G. *The responsibility to protect: ending mass atrocity once and for all*. 2008, 25.

⁸⁰ Taylor, P. and Devon, C. in Baylis et.al. *The Globalization of World Politics*. 2008, 321.

that indeed challenges the sovereignty of states and the norm of non-interference, but not to the degree that it precedes state sovereignty. Nevertheless, this thesis will, without further investigation, support the claim that the new commitment to human security and the rights of individuals has *challenged* state sovereignty, which traditionally has pervaded the international community.

CHAPTER 4. THEORETICAL APPROACH

Previous chapters have been devoted to the political history of peacekeeping operations, and presented some of the systemic trends in foreign policy during the Cold War and post-Cold War era. This chapter will focus on the theories and ideas explaining the underlying motivational factors of foreign policy, with special emphasis peacekeeping operations. A classical design of analyzing motivational factors separates values and interests into two distinct categories, where value-oriented idealism is often defined as contrasting the self-interests of states. Even though this thesis indeed recognizes how motivational factors are often intertwined, a separated discussion of the two is nevertheless useful as a point of departure for the further analysis. The first part will consider a value-based approach to explaining motivational factors, where Max Weber's ideas of 'ethics of conviction' and 'ethics of responsibility' offer a useful division. The Norwegian engagement policy is commonly defined within a value-oriented framework,⁸¹ and is separated from other parts of the foreign political agenda, such as trade and security. As peacekeeping operations are part of the wider engagement policy, it naturally falls within the same motivational framework. Even so, there may be other factors present in the decision on where and how to contribute to peacekeeping, factors that may be categorized within a more interest-based framework. For that reason, the second part will discuss interests as motivational factors, outlining several driving factors, such as security issues, economic interests, access to forums and powerful leaders, the importance of allies, and image and prestige.

4.1 Value-based approach: applying a Weberian framework

In Max Weber renowned lecture *Politics as a Vocation* it is argued that ethically orientated actions can be guided by two fundamentally different maxims, namely 'ethics of conviction' and 'ethics of responsibility.'⁸² By applying to 'ethics of conviction' the actor is judged purely by his or hers underlying intentions, whereas by

⁸¹ Weber, M. (1919) In Toje, A. 'Norsk utenrikspolitikk – en kritikk'. In *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift*, 2010, Nr 01-02. 2010, 211.

⁸² Weber, M. *Politics as a Vocation*. 1919, 83.

‘ethics of responsibility’ the actor is judged by the outcome.⁸³ Although Weber separates the two value-based actions into different categories, this does not imply that both can’t exist in the same action. The point is rather to draw attention to the principal justification for the action, in order to understand how the actor perceives the degree of success. As the following sections will show; challenges are attached to both actions, as ethically oriented actions may have several unintended consequences.

4.1.1 Ethics of conviction

Actions guided by ‘ethics of conviction’ are principally viewed as a success if the intentions were good. Determining what is good is of course relative to the ethical principles one holds, depending on cultural norms, tradition, religious beliefs, etc. In regards to the Norwegian engagement policy, the motivations are arguably guided by solidarity and altruism, principles that are generally viewed as righteous. This is not to say that an action not guided by these principles doesn’t qualify as good, there are of course endless ways to distinguish good intentions from bad. It is rather a way of narrowing down a comprehensive and stretched concept as ‘good intentions’. When an act is judged purely by its intention and not its result, it creates a situation where the actor is excused for the consequences of the action, whether good or bad. As the considerations are based on the actor’s motives, and not on the consequences of the action for the subject, there might occur a situation where the actor is accused of not being fully devoted to its subject. Basically, the result is irrelevant as long as the motivation was intentionally good.

Weber refers to the ethically oriented conduct of conviction to be guided by an ‘ethic of ultimate ends.’⁸⁴ He argues that an action of good intentions that leads to bad results, doesn’t necessarily have to be the actor’s fault, but could be blamed on external factors or actors. Weber’s rationale for his argument is that ‘no ethic in the world can ignore the fact that in many cases, the achievement of ‘good’ ends is inseparable from the use of morally dubious or at least dangerous means, that we cannot escape the possibility or even probability of evil side effects.’⁸⁵ The risk of creating counter-productive side effects is what is referred to as ‘unintended

⁸³ Weber, 84.

⁸⁴ Ibid. 120.

⁸⁵ Ibid. 84.

consequences', where an operation that was meant so save lives, can actually create strong dependencies to the intervening party, and undermine local ownership. These undesirable outcomes are hard to predict and avoid, and must therefore be recognized and dealt with, before the intervention is completed. The alternative could be the creation of a new Somalia or Afghanistan.

NUPI researcher Halvard Leira, refers to missions purely guided by good intentions as 'engagement for the sake of engagement.'⁸⁶ Basically, the actor is not kind for the sake of being kind, but to be acknowledged for his/her efforts or to improve his/her self-image.⁸⁷ The dynamics of the process is thus related to the process itself, and not to the final result. Consequently, the actors involved in the process on the ground may not be aware of the reasons *why* they are doing what they are doing, as it is the institutional mechanisms such as funding and attention that become the prime ambitions.⁸⁸ Michael Ignatieff has argued that operations and engagement in countries where the donors don't have the necessary motivation for long-term efforts, becomes what he terms as Empire Lite; 'imperialism in a hurry, to spend money, to get results, to turn the place back to locals and get out.'⁸⁹ This is perhaps the worst form of an act based on ethics of convictions: when the mandate is motivated by showing support, and not including a plan for lasting, stable recovery, the operation becomes 'too light' and may be considered as a failure by the local population.

Even though an action based on ethics of conviction is in principle a success if the intentions were good, it is however important that the pure intentions are not suppressed or misunderstood by the audience. To this point, outside perception of the motivations is particularly important, and the actor will strive to present the motivations for the actions as altruistic and humanitarian. If he doesn't succeed in doing so, he may be accused of disguising selfish interests to gain moral return. To this point, human rights attorney Kenneth Roth holds that a peacekeeping operation or humanitarian intervention motivated by purely humanitarian grounds probably

⁸⁶ Leira, et.al. *Norske selvbilder - norsk utenrikspolitikk*, 2007, 37.

⁸⁷ Tønneson, S. *Utenriksanalyse: Norske interesser og verdier*. 2009.

⁸⁸ Kristoffersen, 35-36.

⁸⁹ Ignatieff, M. 'Empire Lite'. 2003, 19, in Duffield, M. *Development, Security and Unending War*. 2008, 8.

couldn't be found.⁹⁰ The reason for this claim is the inevitable realization that pressing new security challenges are forcing countries to prioritize the conflicts that in the short-term are of the most acute nature to their own safety. Presenting a peacekeeping operation as purely altruistic is therefore a great challenge in contemporary international relations.

4.1.2 Ethics of responsibilities

The other maxim, the 'ethics of responsibility', de-links the motives from the politics, and implies that the actor who makes a political decision must also take full responsibility for the consequences. Weber exemplifies this by referring to a person who is 'aware of a responsibility for the consequences of his conduct and really feels such responsibility with heart and soul.'⁹¹ By emphasizing the notion of 'responsibility', politicians are made more accountable for their actions, because the decisions made are not based on 'the mean' but 'the end'. The moral criteria is no longer the motivation and agenda, but the result. By using this line of thought, peacekeeping operations become more comprehensive, as the final result of the action is of highest importance and one may therefore be more willing to invest in the project until the desired objectives are achieved. The probability of success is less than in an intervention based on convictions, as the unforeseen pitfalls along the way are difficult to take into account. Nevertheless, the 'ethics of responsibility' provides an important lesson in regards to peacekeeping operations: not only must the intervention mechanisms secure a 'just cause' with the ultimate goal to re-establish peace, the devotion and commitment to stay the time it takes are just as important.

To the interrelationship of the two maxims, Weber points to the problem of the justifications of means by ends, where he argues that it only has the 'possibility of rejecting all action that employs morally dangerous means – in theory.'⁹² In the case where one chooses to justify the use of force for the sake of peace, Weber claims that it is not possible to unite ethics of convictions with ethics of responsibility, because it is impossible to justify which end should justify which means. If peace is the ultimate end, then violence should not be the factor solving the problem, since violence is the

⁹⁰ Roth, K. *Setting the Standard: Justifying Humanitarian Intervention*. 2004.

⁹¹ Weber, 127.

⁹² Weber, 122.

problem itself. For an actor applying to ethics of conviction, violence may be an appropriate tool, if the intention of gaining peace is the fundamental goal. For an actor applying to ethics of responsibility, this may not be an acceptable choice of action, because violence may lead to more suffering, and is thus ruining the final result. This does not, however, imply that ethics of convictions is the same as irresponsibility, or an ethic of responsibility the same as indifference to convictions, only that if one acts out of ethics of conviction, one cannot be evaluated on the outcome, if the intention was good.

It is important to bear in mind that in Weber's lecture *Politics as a Vocation*, he does not consider the normative contents of politics, but focuses instead of giving a value-free analysis of the fundamental motivations and rationales for ethically oriented actions. Whether one holds that altruistic intentions with an unsuccessful result is *better* than an egoistic act with greater success is thus merely a subjective opinion. Broadly formulated, Weber notes that 'politics is made with the head, but is certainly not made with the head alone.'⁹³ He further suggests that 'an ethic of [conviction] and an ethic of responsibility are not absolute contrasts, but rather supplements,'⁹⁴ an indication that both should be present in sound politics.

4.2 Interest-based approach: applying a realist framework

4.2.1 Conceptual change?

Interest is a term well used in analyses of foreign policies, and consequently there are a variety of ways to understand what interests may mean, and how it influences the political agenda. The traditional, 'rather narrow way to define [interests] emphasizes territorial and state security and safeguarding of material interests.'⁹⁵ According to a report published by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), '“interest-oriented’ foreign policy [...] mean[s] a policy that systematically endeavours to further the welfare and security of Norwegian society and the political values on which it is based.'⁹⁶ As this statement shows, the traditional notions of interests are still a vital component of Norwegian foreign policy, but contemporary foreign politics has also

⁹³ Weber, 127.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Kristoffersen, 27.

⁹⁶ Lunde and Thune, 17.

incorporated a wider understanding of what interests may include. This new understanding includes factors that are called ‘softer interests,’ which contain more value-oriented traits. This is also exemplified in the MFA report, where it is argued that ‘pursuing ethical principles has an independent intrinsic value.’⁹⁷ Including ‘softer’ interests with value-based traits in the foreign policy agenda may be supporting the notion that the post-Cold War world has taken a more holistic approach to foreign policy, where fundamental ethical principles and global common interests are given precedence. An explanatory factor for this was stated in the introductory chapters of this thesis, which argued that changes in the international system may lead to the changing character of war, which in turn lead to changes in domestic politics of states. Global change is also affecting Norway’s security policy, as

globalization introduces Norway to a new security factor: uncertainty through external instability. That includes threats shaped by international development, or events, which have a significant impact on Norway’s political, economical and social interests.⁹⁸

In the Norwegian MFA report *Norwegian Interests*, globalization is presented as one of the central factors affecting Norway’s security policy today. The authors hold that Norway’s future security threats are therefore dependent on the strategies used to deal with the issues, as it is difficult to predict the magnitude of the changes the international community are facing. The concept of security is no longer strictly attached to state territory, but includes security in a regional and global sense, where national interests often coincides with common interests.⁹⁹

As a way to manoeuvre in an increasingly complex network of interests, foreign policy thus requires ‘a considerable degree of prioritization.’¹⁰⁰ The Norwegian foreign policy agenda is guided by a prioritization principle, which emphasizes the need to distinguish between the situations that are both important to Norway, where Norway is able to make a difference, opposed to situations where Norway can’t contribute, or are not as important.¹⁰¹ This statement underscores an important fact, namely that Norway

⁹⁷ Lunde and Thune, 17.

⁹⁸ Ibid, 93.

⁹⁹ Matlary, J. H, *En strategisk analyse av norsk utenrikspolitikk*, 2002, 2.

¹⁰⁰ Lunde and Thune, 14.

¹⁰¹ Lunde and Thune, 15.

has a vested interest in contributing in resolving conflicts that are not only a threat to human security, but also has a relatively high probability of success, both to uphold Norway's self-image as a 'peace-maker' and strengthen our role on the international arena.

The interest-based motives are therefore two-folded: national interests include the basic notions of realist theory such as national security and economic interests, and the importance of how allies and international organization perceive Norway. To the latter point, it is also critical that Norway supports other countries in their peacekeeping missions so that they eventually will return the favour if Norway ever need their assistance – thus strengthening Norway's future national security. Moreover, it can be argued that all national interests are inter-linked to support the same goal. This thesis will, however, support the claim that national interests are affecting traditional value-based areas, constituting a trend towards a more covert peacekeeping agenda, where national interests are affecting the motivations in new ways.

4.2.2 Security

Security has traditionally been perceived as the most important element of a state's foreign policy agenda. But as previous sections have illustrated: Western state's are now relating to new types of threats, and consequently having to change the traditional strategies on how to obtain state security. Peacekeeping operations, however, is a type of military operations that isn't necessarily deployed to enhance national security. However, as previously mentioned, national interests – in many cases national security – is nevertheless affecting the decision-making process of engaging in peace operations. The security-factor may motivate the policy-makers to contribute to peacekeeping in conflict areas where peace and stability might have a positive effect on national security. Professor of International Relations, David Chandler describes this rationale by stating that peacekeeping is characterized by a 'lack of strategic concern with large areas of the world, such as sub-Saharan Africa.'¹⁰² By this, Chandler is simply claiming that the sub-Saharan African region lacks the important strategic element of *security* to make it interesting for Western states to invest

¹⁰² Chandler, D. *Unravelling The Paradox of the 'Responsibility to Protect'*. 2009, 29.

resources in peacebuilding efforts. Instead, military troops are rather placed in conflict areas that have more relevance to the national security of states. This assertion leads to a more thorough study of how security concerns affects the considerations of where to place peacekeeping efforts?

The short answer to this question is that security issues following 9/11 have undoubtedly shaped the political agenda of the Western world. In the article *The Responsibility to Protect: is anyone interested in humanitarian intervention?* the authors argue that it is ‘necessary to marshal evidence for the redefinition of [the great powers’] short-term and long-term national interests.’¹⁰³ This implies that contemporary foreign politics of the Western world are mainly focused on the immediate threats to their national security. Immediate threats are referring to the direct and sometimes obvious consequences of not interfering in a conflict, such as increased migration or escalated criminality in neighbouring countries. Another aspect of the new the conflicts are of course the direct threat perceived by civilians in Western states following terrorist attacks on national soil such as suicide bombings.

Although such violent acts occur in a relatively small degree, it affects the sense of security felt by the population, thus stimulating Western governments to provide resources to national preventive measures as well as security efforts in countries hosting terrorist. Consequently, the areas that receive the most attention are the ones that propose the greatest and most direct threat, such as the war in Afghanistan. The case is much more difficult to make for more remote conflicts, such as Sudan or the Democratic Republic of Congo. The security issue may be the factor that separates the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq from the non-interventions in Rwanda, Sudan and Kenya. Precisely because the latter countries don’t pose a great threat to international peace and security, the Western countries can ‘afford’ to leave the responsibility to the African Union. The same argument can work the other way around, as the conflicts in the Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan are too ‘dangerous’ to let the Middle East handle on their own.

¹⁰³ MacFarlane, N. et.al. *The Responsibility to Protect: is anyone interested in Humanitarian Intervention?* 2004, 988.

The ‘Copenhagen School’ of International Relations theory has drawn attention to the increase in resources, by politicians, policy makers and security professionals, to processes of ‘securitization’. The term is used to describe the way such actors use *security* to ‘compete for visibility, influence and scarce resources’¹⁰⁴ on the national arena. This term highly relates to the self-interest of the states, as issues on the political agenda receive more attention the more they pose as a danger to state security. Framing political issues as threats to national security, the focus is thus on the consequences of the state of not intervening or reacting to situation at hand, and less on the consequences for the fragile state. This way of ‘selling’ military operations may have consequences for the outcome of the mission: If the underlying motive for stabilizing a region is the fear of the violent groups spreading members and ideas, the mission is completed when those groups are disarmed, or caught ‘dead or alive’ – a policy pursued by President Bush since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001.

When security aspects become high priority on the foreign policy agenda, the motives of a peacekeeping operation are subsequently blurred. The methods applied by terrorists, such as suicide bombings and kidnapping, are creating fear in countries that not necessarily are in danger of attacks. Nevertheless, public fear motivates policy-makers to grant funding to military operations where such violations take place. Consequently, peacekeeping operations might be perceived, or ‘sold’ to the public, as ways of enhancing national security. If the intention of a peacekeeping operation is to enhance stability in a war-torn country, it is of vital importance that a distinct mandate for the operation is in place, and subsequently communicated to the audience.

4.2.3 The importance of allies

Alliances are commonly understood as joint efforts to enhance national security, between two or several sovereign states.¹⁰⁵ According to Stephen M. Walt, such collaborations may be formal or informal, but will always include a certain level of commitment, and expectations of reciprocity. The concept of reciprocity reflects a relationship consisting of a mutual exchange of support and assistance between states, where it is expected that the other party will return the favour in the same manner that

¹⁰⁴ Duffield, M. *Development, Security and Unending War*. 2008, 3.

¹⁰⁵ Walt, M. S. *The origins of alliances*. 1987, 1.

it is given. Being a member of an alliance does therefore involve a responsibility to assist allies by providing extensive resources, which in turn will affect the political considerations of whether a state will benefit from the membership. According to Walt, this decision making process will be affected by the evaluations concerning the aggregated power of the allies, including population and military capacity, geographical closeness, and offensive power – the ability to attack enemies without great costs.¹⁰⁶

In every alliance there will almost always exist a skewed balance of power, as small states would seek alliances with greater powers in order to secure protection from external threats. Such relationships will in turn lead to dependencies, where the smaller states are reliant on benevolence of the greater powers, and will strive to maintain their position by offering other services besides the military assistance expected from the greater powers. Walt argues that strategies pursued by smaller states in order to stay closely connected with the leaders of the alliance, may include respectfulness and loyalty to the alliance, which in turn strengthens the leaders ability to maximise their self-interests.¹⁰⁷

According to Professor of International Conflict Studies, Øyvind Østerud, the Norwegian participation in international military operations have ‘one open and one hidden card’. By using this approach, one can understand the Norwegian contributions as both inspired by the willingness to support peacekeeping commitment in general, and also as a way to persuade ‘our powerful allies’ that we are willing and able to contribute to a joint campaign, and in that sense ‘deserves help if we are ever in trouble ourselves.’¹⁰⁸ This assumption underscores the marriage of values and national interests, and how they can be combined in shaping the Norwegian peacekeeping agenda. Even though the main objective of a peacekeeping operation is to contribute to stability and change, Norway’s national security interests are maintained by investing in relationships with more powerful allies. For a more thorough understanding of the

¹⁰⁶ Walt, 29-30.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 170.

¹⁰⁸ Østerud, Ø. ‘Lite land som humanitær stormakt?’ In: *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift*, 2006 Nr 04. 2006, 304.

Norwegian commitment to such alliances, it is useful to take a closer look at the history of Norway's alliances.

The Second World War demonstrated the importance of powerful allies, and how they contribute in times of trouble. Unlike Sweden, who remained neutral during the war, Norway became a member of NATO at its establishment in 1949, and has continuously showed its commitment to the organization. The latest example is the contribution to the NATO troops in Afghanistan, ISAF; which in many ways also shows a clear support and commitment to Norway's powerful allies, USA and UK. Norway also joined the UN at its creation, and the first UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, was Norwegian. The unceasing engagement in these organizations has proven Norway to be a commitment member, which can be trusted as a loyal partner to powerful countries like the US and the UK. Norway benefits from this loyalty of being an active member by getting access to international decision makers and arenas. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gahr Støre, holds that increased access to central actors in the US can be regarded as Norwegian security interest, and a way to promote issues that have a direct significance for Norway.¹⁰⁹ Access in this regard can be defined as both an interest in itself, and as a mean to reach other objectives.¹¹⁰ Whether access to important forums has been a direct consequence of Norway's peacebuilding diplomacy is difficult to determine and will not be discussed in this thesis.

4.2.4 Image and prestige

The concept of prestige is often used to describe something that induces respect or admiration. In relation to foreign politics, one may associate this with an act that leads to peace or change within a certain field or region. Professor of Political Science, K. J. Holsti defines prestige as the following: 'There is no precise meaning to these terms as applied to the relations between states, but let us simply use them in a common sense way: Political associations seek to generate deference, respect and sometimes awe among others.'¹¹¹ Arguably, there is an underlying and well-defined 'national identity' based on Norway being a nation of peace. Even though the Norwegian commitment on the ground has been almost absent since the 1960's, the financial contribution to

¹⁰⁹ Kristoffersen, 30.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ K. J. Holsti, *International politics. A framework for analysis*, 1995, 107. In Kristoffersen, 30.

peacekeeping, as well as mediation efforts in Sri Lanka and the Middle East, has contributed to the creation of what is commonly referred to as a *peace engagement*.

The branding of Norway based on its commitment to peace constitutes a vital part of the national identity, and functions as a point of departure for the political considerations concerning peacekeeping operations. Further, articulating a commitment to peace is not only affecting Norway's self-image, being a promoter of peace and reconciliation has undoubtedly also marked Norway's reputation on the international scene. Branding, visibility and reputation are important ingredients for a small country to get access to important arenas and events. The IFS report *Interests in the Norwegian Engagement Policy*, argues that 'status and prestige may give a state a certain sort of power through what the political scientist Joseph Nye describes as 'soft power.'¹¹²

According to Professor Joseph Nye, 'soft power' is what 'rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others,'¹¹³ thus the ability to persuade your opponent or enemy without having to resort to threats of violence. Nye argues that a country's ability to manage the persuasive 'softer' power proceeds from the following: 'its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign politics (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).'¹¹⁴ In other words, to attain status and prestige on the international arena, a country's foreign policies must not contradict its political values, which again should reflect the nation's general culture. Applied to Norway, the peace engagement should be rooted in the Norwegian culture – a tradition of peace, and must be promoted in a way that inspires authority and legitimacy. A more thorough discussion on the debatable issue of whether Norway is in possession of such a *peace tradition* will be presented in Chapter 5, but it can nevertheless be noted that Norway has a distinct ambition to be perceived as a nation of peace. Whether the efforts of branding of Norway as a 'humanitarian superpower' has been a tactical strategy to

¹¹² Kristoffersen, 29.

¹¹³ Nye, J. *Soft power. The means to success in world politics*. 2004, 5.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, 11.

increase its 'soft' power will be discussed in the following section concerning how interests and values intertwine.

4.2.5 Necessity versus generating success rate

The final interest-based motivational factor introduced in this chapter involves the political considerations regarding the necessity of contributing to a peacekeeping operation opposed to the chances of generating success. In other words: the two variables are significant to the decision-makers; (a) the so-called 'need'-factor, concerning the situation of the recipient country, and (b) the 'risk'-factor, meaning the chances of the donor country succeeding in its mission. When aiming to grasp the motivational framework for engaging in peacekeeping operations, the so-called 'need' factor may seem rather obvious, but should nevertheless be discussed: in today's world there are internal conflicts that are so critical and acute that national interests are downplayed in the considerations of whether or not to contribute to peace and stability.

It must, however, be emphasized that as much as there are examples of *less acute* conflicts that have gained great international attention and assistance, there are also *more acute* conflicts where the international community has remained relatively passive. This is often explained by the concept of *selectivity*; a component of national interests motivating the decision of where to place the efforts. The concept of selectivity is therefore used to explain how countries will invest resources in peacebuilding in areas that are affected by conflict, and which in addition are of a certain interest; being political, economy or security related. Although assistance to war-torn conflicts in many cases is guided by solidarity and altruism, or in this case: motivated by need and necessity, these variables will often be accompanied with more strategic elements. This leads to the second factor initially introduced, namely the ability for the donor country to generate success, or the opposite: the possibility of losing more than they invested – constituting the risk factor. Moreover, when deciding where to place peacekeeping efforts, there is a question of the amount of resources the contributor must deploy in order to generate success, which in this regard is peace and stability in the affected area.

As argued by Bellamy, the new and extended tasks of peacekeeping operations do indeed affect the willingness of states to involve their troops in such operations. For example, the operation in Afghanistan has surely lasted longer than many NATO states expected, has required more resources and has caused more public debate than first assumed. Whether or not this will affect the willingness of states to again involve troops in such complex matters is yet to be seen, but as proven in both Iraq and Afghanistan, it is of vital importance to have a clear and well-rooted objective for such comprehensive operations, both to the civil population in the conflict states, but also to gain or retain popular support at home. The danger of ‘losing face’ to their own population and allies by engaging in an unsuccessful operation is too dangerous for many governments, and it is thus safer to refrain from engaging at all. On the other hand, the argument can work the other way as well, as the probability of success may increase the willingness to states to participate, in order to increase the completion rate of operations, and thus improve their reputation as a contributor to peace and stability. This may lead to a situation where states prefer to invest resources in the ‘softer’ types of conflict, where they anticipate good results without investing a great amount of resources.

Combined, the two factors emphasize the need for governments to mark success and results to the public, and also demonstrate the importance of contributing to conflict resolution and peacekeeping. According to political advisor to the Norwegian government, Liv Tørres, the choice of where to contribute is thus based on the following factors: legitimacy (the conflict must be acute), former alliances (where loyalty may strengthen national security), a request from the parties of a Norwegian ‘safe heaven’ (invitations to contribute makes it more legitimate) and the absence of business interests or national interests (which also strengthens the legitimacy of the contribution).¹¹⁵ Engaging in conflicts where these factors are in place will thus strengthen the Norwegian profile as a both a strategic and humanitarian actor. This merger of necessity and will to succeed is perhaps what Knut Frydenlund predicted in his renowned book from 1983, *Lille land – hva nå*, where he argued that ‘idealism – as the peace and engagement policy is an expression of, will conflict with national

¹¹⁵ Tørres, L. *Globalisering og utfordringer for norsk engasjementspolitikk*. 2000.

interests in new ways.’¹¹⁶ Exactly how these assumable opposing variables may conflict is of special interest to the following section, discussing how interests and values intertwine.

4.3 The relationship between interests and values

4.3.1 *How interests and values intertwine*

In his book *Development, Security and Unending War*, Professor of Development Politics, Mark Duffield states the following: The moral and ethical imperative of developing countries and fragile states’ right to move from poverty and conflict to prosperity and stability, may also be a political imperative: tackling poverty and instability which may lead to civil wars, will again lead to failed states and safe havens for terrorists – thus increasing global instability and insecurity.¹¹⁷ Duffield’s statement illustrates how ethics and values such as altruism and solidarity are accompanied by more strategic security concerns relating to the self-interest of states’. Duffield gives a value-free analysis in the sense that he does not conclude that the relationship between interests and values necessary produces negative results. Rather, it is a way of demonstrating that states’ incentives to ‘do good’ can partly be motivated by more strategic motivations. Moreover, Duffield argues that interests, especially national security, are decisive driving factors for why states engage in peacekeeping operations. Both interest-based factors such as ‘risk’ and ‘consequences’, as well as more value-based factors like ‘need’ and ‘necessity’, are all part of the decision-making framework. In the words of Duffield: political considerations are not only guided by the ‘moral duty of effective states to protect and better the lives of people living within ineffective ones, but such help also strengthens national security.’¹¹⁸

A similar reasoning is articulated in the 2009 Government Proposition *Interests, responsibilities and opportunities*,¹¹⁹ where it is stated that:

¹¹⁶ Harpviken and Skjelsbæk, 2010b, 381.

¹¹⁷ Duffield, 2008, 2.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Author’s Translation.

Security shall provide for the individual citizen's physical integrity and protection from abuse by foreign powers. At the same time it must seek to safeguard the liberal rule of law and human rights that is essential to preserve peace between countries and to prevent radicalism and conflict in many parts of the world. Poverty reduction and contribution to positive social development in Africa or the Middle East is rooted in international solidarity, but it is also necessary to ensure the global social web of which Norway is deeply dependent on.¹²⁰

If there is a tendency towards a merger of interests and values affecting decisions concerning peacekeeping operations, it makes it increasingly difficult to recognize one clear set of motivational factors – and also mapping out the wanted outcome for the engagement. Are national interests placed ‘under’ or ‘next to’ the value-based motives, or has foreign policy, and thus peacekeeping operations, expanded to what Professor Janne Haaland Matlary coins as ‘value-diplomacy’?¹²¹ To Matlary, value-diplomacy is contrasting *realpolitik*, which relates to the traditional notions of national interests, where security issues and economic interests take precedence. Value-diplomacy, on the other hand, has arguably been developed independent of strategic thinking, and is rather ascribed to the personal efforts of individuals, coincidences and requests from external actors.¹²² It refers to the part of the foreign policy portfolio that includes ‘peace mediation, peace operations, aid, state building, democracy, human rights work, both multilateral and bilateral.’¹²³ In that sense, value-diplomacy refers to the same elements of foreign affairs as the *engagement policy*, although the latter also includes environmental issues.

In the article *A strategic analysis of the Norwegian foreign politics*, Matlary analyses the relationship between value-diplomacy and *realpolitik* in Norwegian foreign policy. Matlary holds that ‘any value may be an interest if one specifies how the value should be promoted, interests are very often values as well, such as international justice, equality, peace, etc.’¹²⁴ By pursuing this line of thought, one may get the impression that there is no divide between interest and values, because both can be explained within the framework of interests. Furthermore, Professor Matlary claims that

¹²⁰ The Norwegian Government. *Government Proposition no. 15 (2009) Interesser, muligheter og ansvar*.

¹²¹ Matlary, 2002, 4.

¹²² *Ibid*, 21.

¹²³ *Ibid*, 4.

¹²⁴ Matlary, J. H. *Den ufullendte*, in *Aftenposten*, 29.04.09

politicians prefer to talk about *values* when discussing foreign policy because they escape the analysis, criticism and requirements to prioritize. A more nuanced approach to the relationship between interests and values in Norwegian foreign policy is offered in Matlary's three types of foreign policy decision-makers. *The activist* enhances a 'value-diplomacy' without strategic ideas of how he might translate values and ideals into 'harder' power. *The strategic activist*, however, is aware of how international relations are affected by visibility and reputation, thus using his 'soft power' as an instrument in international politics. *The actor guided by realpolitik* is indeed knowledgeable on how 'soft power' may enhance visibility, and thus uses this 'capital' to promote national interests through a strategic holistic thinking.¹²⁵ By applying this three-folded model onto Norwegian foreign policy, Matlary aims to discover the relationship between strategic thinking and 'value-diplomacy'. Moreover, the study interviewed central actors within Norwegian foreign politics, and asked whether they perceived strategic thinking as the basis for the value-based foreign policy, and if they reflected upon how power attained through 'value-diplomacy' might translate into real political power.¹²⁶ The study concludes that strategic thinking has not yet affected the relationship between 'value-diplomacy' and *realpolitik*,¹²⁷ in the sense that the values such as a peace image, has not been used as a strategy to attain power and prestige. It notes, however, that the relationship between 'value-diplomacy' and *realpolitik* is changing, and several interviewees call for a more insightful approach to the two elements of foreign policy.¹²⁸

Further findings of the study suggests that the engagement policy has to some extent given Norway a reputation as a 'peace activist', which arguably has the danger of labelling Norway as a nation without strong national interests, characterized by its values alone.¹²⁹ Consequently, the perception of Norway is as an actor that is not feared, nor included in international strategic planning. The study emphasizes that Norway must manage the art of balancing *realpolitik* and value-diplomacy, in order to use its image as an instrument to enhance a closer relationship with European

¹²⁵ Matlary, 2002a, 3.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid, 21.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid, 23.

governments. By using values as a way to enhance national interests, one may be perceived as cynical, which in turn may ruin the credibility of the peace engagement. For that reason, value-diplomacy should always be considered as an expression of genuine commitment. Even though this study was undertaken to reveal the guiding principles of Norwegian foreign policy agenda, the framework may be transferable to the peacekeeping agenda, and deserves a closer investigation in the analysis part of this thesis.

4.3.2 Why distinguish between interests and ideals?

Even though peacekeeping operations undoubtedly is coloured by solidarity and altruism – one is willing to risk the lives of national troops to secure the lives of strangers, it has been argued that in many cases national interests are present as motivational factors as well. As argued by scholars, this isn't necessarily a problem: the strategic and national-interest aspects of a peacekeeping operation don't have to be counterproductive to achieving peace and security in a war-torn country. Whether or not the underlying motives are based on the desire to secure the region, acquire new allies or show support for an organization or institution doesn't have to affect the true efforts of the peacekeeping troops. What is important is a clearly defined agenda. In the words of the American diplomat Chester A. Crocker; 'in order to know the limitations and possibilities for peace engagement in conflict areas, one must know the national motives for the operation.'¹³⁰

To assess whether the Norwegian contribution to the mission in Chad was a success or a failure, the premises of the commitment must be clearly established. Although the contribution to MINURCAT had a precise mission and a timeframe, it is less obvious what were the intentions of the Norwegian government when committing to the operation. As argued by Harpviken and Skjelsbæk, assessing the Norwegian peace policy is important for the following reasons: Norwegian voters must know why the government spend money and political capital in processes where the outcome is uncertain and risky. Second, the population of the war-torn society must know why, on what grounds, they should trust Norway and their contributions to peacebuilding. To

¹³⁰ Crocker, C. A. et.al. *Taming Intractable Conflicts. Mediator in the hardest cases*. 2004,15. In Kristoffersen, 5.

accomplish this, the Norwegian diplomats must be familiar with the concepts and beliefs that make up the foundation of Norwegian peace policy.¹³¹ For that, it must be clear in what sense the peace policy springs from idealism and solidarity, or a strategic framework based on interests and national security, or to what extent the two motivational factors are interlinked.

4.3.3 A shift towards value-led policy-making?

In his book *Hollow Hegemony*, Professor of International Relations, David Chandler, discards the notion that the post-Cold War can be explained by a shift away from nation state and interest-based policy-making to globalised and value-based approaches.¹³² In his opinion, the conceptions of the contemporary world has been dominated by an overall accepted notion that power is no longer related to territorial hegemony, but rather projected as value-led acts:

It would seem that the Cold War world of *realpolitik*, where territorial interests of state security were considered primary, has been transformed into post-Cold War world of globalised, values-led policy-making in which security has been redefined in terms which see the security of regions of the world as interdependent, rather than conflicting priorities, and the issues of concern extend away from threats in the military sphere to internal questions of democracy, good governance and relief from poverty.¹³³

To Chandler, explaining contemporary international relations by the rather narrow categories of interests and values, and thus claiming there has been a shift from the one to the other, one neglects to investigate the reasons for such a shift. Chandler's argument holds that instead of applying a realist approach to understand the Cold War era, and idealist or constructivist approaches to explain the contemporary world, one must investigate the gap between the social and political context and the 'discursive forms in which power is projected internationally.'¹³⁴

¹³¹ Harpviken and Skjelsbæk, 2010a.

¹³² Chandler, 2009a, 183.

¹³³ Ibid, 185.

¹³⁴ Ibid, 183.

For Chandler, there is a clear lack of ‘long-term strategic policy-making,’¹³⁵ which he explains by a lack of ‘political responsibility when interventions are made.’¹³⁶ By phrasing intervention within a value-based framework, politicians apply to ‘ethics of convictions’ where they are judged by their motives, and not by the results. Chandler argues that ‘western elites seems to be more interested in policy declarations of intent than practical outcomes,’¹³⁷ thus widening the gap between means and ends. In sum, the asserted shift towards value-led decision-making is, for Chandler, an easy way to escape responsibility and long-term commitment. If this argument stands, why are interventions initiated in the first place? Chandler’s answer to this is inspired by Zaki Laïdi’s notion of a ‘world without meaning,’¹³⁸ where the western powers experienced a loss of importance and power on the international scene after the end of the Cold War. Chandler’s understanding of the Western countries reactions to the lack of influence in the contemporary world is what he refers to as *hollow hegemony*, where the idealized policy discourse and practices rather reflect the ‘hollowing-out of the traditional frameworks of meaning which reflect and structured western power.’¹³⁹ Interventions are thus understood as a way to maintain some sort of position on the international arena, by creating an image as a responsible and morally grounded capacity.

In sum, Chandler refrains from characterizing Western states’ policy-making as either interest-based or value-based. Instead, he argues that there is a lack of strategy and tactics in Western states’ foreign policy agenda, caused by a lack of motivation and intensity in contemporary international politics. This intensity was what characterized the Cold War era, an era where it was justifiable to have an outspoken interest-based strategy. Today’s threats to Western states’ cannot be compared to the imminent danger of a nuclear war, nor are the conflicts in remote areas able to bring about public involvement. The foreign policy of Western states is simply in a vacuum, where no threat is so dangerous that they *have to act*, and no conflict is so acute that they *want*

¹³⁵ Chandler, 2009a, 205.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Chandler, 2009a, 205.

¹³⁸ Laïdi, Z. *A world without meaning: the crisis of meaning in international politics*. 1998.

¹³⁹ Chandler, 2009a, 205.

to act. Instead, they are often half-hearted committed to an operation, lacking the motivation and stamina needed to create long-term stability and peace.

CHAPTER 5. THE NORWEGIAN COMMITMENT TO PEACE

Being a small nation in the outskirts of Europe has proved to be both a challenge and an advantage. Without the strong political power of the greater countries, Norway must employ other methods to be noticed on the international scene. As Chapter 4 illustrated, employing new types of ‘soft’ power, countries attain prestige and authority through its morally grounded actions and its ability to persuade opponents without resorting to violent means. To Norway’s benefit, such traits have proved to be increasingly relevant in international politics. However, as stated in the opening section of this thesis: ‘If perceptions of Norway that influence foreign policy turn out to have little basis in reality, our foreign policy may well fail to reflect our real interests.’¹⁴⁰ Essentially, Norway likes to paint its actions in the colour of values, as it creates an image of a ‘tolerant, peace-loving and egalitarian country.’¹⁴¹ However, as the former statement put forward: the Norwegian image as a ‘humanitarian superpower’ is perhaps hiding the deeper reality of an outline drawn by interests. In order to get an exhaustive understanding of Norway’s self-images, the following chapter will conduct a study of the Norwegian engagement policy and the commitment to peace, focusing on the motivational factors outlined by official documents and independent reports by Norwegian research institutes.

5.1 Self-images in a globalised world

Norway’s international engagement policy is a term initially coined by the Norwegian historian Rolf Tamnes and includes the promotion of peacebuilding, environmental issues, human rights, development and aid.¹⁴² Foreign Minister Gahr Støre explains the motivational factors for the engagement policy to be the global common interests, Norwegian self-interests, access to important actors and forums, as well as protection of certain values,¹⁴³ such as democracy and human rights. The premises for these ambitious objectives are grounded on the notions that Norway is a small country without the difficult legacy of being a colonial power, and its location in a peaceful

¹⁴⁰ Lunde and Thune, 46.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Kristoffersen, 6.

¹⁴³ Minister of Foreign Affairs, Støre, G. J. *Statement at the Norwegian Storting*, 20. May, 2008.

part of the world, factors that supposedly obligates Norway to contribute to development and peacekeeping processes.¹⁴⁴ The Norwegian engagement policy is a highly debated issue in contemporary political science, but due to the necessity of a narrowed focus, this sections will not provide an in depth description of this subject matter. However, it is viewed as critical to the validity of this thesis to provide a brief summary of the part of the engagement policy that involves peace and peacebuilding, the so-called *commitment to peace*, along with a short history of the *peace tradition*, and a discussion of the various explanations of the motivational factors for the Norwegian peacebuilding efforts.

When studying the Norwegian commitment to peace there are two distinct features that are consistent throughout the readings; firstly that Norway is a small country, and secondly; that Norway is a country dedicated to peace and stability. The two features are not much debated, as the former is indisputable, and the latter seems to be an opinion well rooted in the so-called Norwegian *peace tradition*. In order to obtain an inclusive understanding of the Norwegian commitment to peace, it is worthwhile to take a step back and consider the origin of this concept, and why it is often presented as something inherent in the Norwegian political culture. In the early 1900's, former Norwegian Prime Minister, Jørgen Løvland, was the first to articulate the Norwegian peace oriented manifest of foreign affairs, stating that Norway should abstain from participating in alliances that could eventually lead to wars.¹⁴⁵ Former Foreign Minister Halvdan Koht reinforced this declaration in 1936, articulating the Norwegian objective as the following:

We are a small nation, and our voice will not reach far, but nonetheless we would always cry, almost as loud as we can, cry out that we want and need to work for peace. It is our wish; because we want peace and that there shall be peace in the world.¹⁴⁶

The quote reflects the inevitable realization that Norway will never become a great nation in territorial terms, but will nevertheless take on the great responsibility of promoting peace internationally, sentiments that are continuously present in

¹⁴⁴ Harpviken and Skjelsbæk. 2010b, 382.

¹⁴⁵ Former Prime Minister Løvland, J. 1905, quoted in Leira, 2006, 1.

¹⁴⁶ Former Foreign Minister Koht, H. 1936, quoted in Leira, 2006, 1.

contemporary Norwegian foreign politics. The mission has thus been to encourage other nations to cooperate and work to achieve peaceful settlements, a responsibility that seems to be rooted in an accepted idea of Norway's duties being a small, developed country with a well-functioning democracy, a strong civil society and a modern history free of conquest and imperialism.

What has changed, however, is *in what ways* Norway should work to succeed in this mission. In the article *Norge – en fredsnasjon?*, NUPI research fellow Halvard Leira outlines how the strategies for the peace engagement have changed from the early 1900's liberalistic world views of *laissez faire* and international law, through the 1950's established confidence in the UN, to the contemporary ideas of Norway's more direct contribution to reconciliation and mediation processes.¹⁴⁷ Leira's argument holds that the notion of Norway as a *peace nation* has moved from being a vague and latent idea, to a more outspoken purposive concept characterizing contemporary Norwegian foreign politics. Today, there is a confident belief in the advantages of being a small country located in the outskirts of Europe, because it provides the ability to comment 'the system from the outside and change it for the better.'¹⁴⁸

5.1.2 Motivations for the engagement policy and the commitment to peace

As a self-declared nation of peace, Norway has not only been participating in a number of peace and reconciliation processes, but also been a dedicated supporter of UN peacekeeping operations. The Norwegian *commitment to peace* is a vital component of the engagement policy, and a continuation of the overall efforts to enhance democracy, human rights, conflict resolution and peace. The outspoken rationale for the Norwegian *commitment to peace* is arguably that Norway is one of the wealthiest countries in the world, and therefore has a 'distinct responsibility to contribute where we can,'¹⁴⁹ an attitude that supposedly work as an asset for gaining a notable position as a 'humanitarian superpower' in international politics.¹⁵⁰ The 2003 Norwegian Official Report (NOU) *Power and Democracy* explains the ability of branding Norway as a humanitarian superpower by the abovementioned rather

¹⁴⁷ Leira, 2006, 2.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Harpviken and Skjelsbæk, 2010b, 382.

¹⁵⁰ The Norwegian Government. '12.1 Norge som humanitær stormakt'. In: *NOU 2003: 19, Makt og demokrati* [URL]

peaceful history and location, stating that using ‘idealism as a trademark would be more difficult for a country with greater political power capability and tradition.’¹⁵¹ Once more, the properties of geography and history are highlighted as explanatory factors for why Norway can manage the onerous vocation of *committing to peace*. What remains to discuss is why Norwegian governments continuously choose to take on such great responsibilities?

An explanation to why Norway aims to be acknowledged as a ‘humanitarian superpower’ is provided by the NOU *Power and Democracy*, stating that effort of introducing Norway as an international brand connected to peace, is part of a strategy to adapt to the new international conditions following the last decades of increased globalization.¹⁵² This explanation is in line with the arguments made in the introductory chapters of this thesis, namely that contemporary threats to international peace and security go far beyond aggression by states, and include poverty, civil war, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and transnational organized crime. As threats to the nation-state have increasingly been globalised, the security strategies applied to cope with such threats are increasingly globalised as well. This means that negotiating peace and decisions to engage in peacekeeping operations are placed in international forums, where small states like Norway have little decision-making power and influence. The *commitment to peace* has thus become a way of gaining international acceptance and respect, whereby contributions to the UN’s peacekeeping efforts appears as a favourable arena for the vocation.

Another argument to why Norway is so distinctly dedicated to peace relates to the abovementioned bi-effects of contributing to UN peacekeeping efforts, where the crucial element of state security is enhanced by securing peace in war-torn countries. This two-folded consequence of participating in peacekeeping is firstly connected to the outspoken solid confidence in the UN as the primary responsible for international peace and security. As articulated by Foreign Minister Gahr Støre: ‘the support to the UN peacekeeping operations is one of the most important as well as the most demanding and complex tasks [...] and the methods for participation and support must

¹⁵¹ The Norwegian Government. ‘12.1 Norge som humanitær stormakt’. In: *NOU 2003: 19, Makt og demokrati*.

¹⁵² Ibid.

constantly be updated.’¹⁵³ As the UN first and foremost is dedicated to obtain peace and security; the main objective for Norwegian engagement in UN operations is to secure the lives of the people living in the countries where the operations take place. Second, peacekeeping operations will always have a regional, and sometimes global element, where peacekeeping efforts in a country increase international security, thus increasing Norway’s national security. For that reason it is only to be expected that the Norwegian Ministry of Affairs acknowledges this important component as a motivational factor. This line of reasoning may appear rather obvious, but is nevertheless important to underscore: A purely *altruistic* peacekeeping operation will never take place, as the globalised world of today will always experience the consequences of political and social turmoil in other countries, whether it leads to increased immigration, the need for assistance in various ways, or the spread of radical ideas such as religious extremism. It must however be noted that there are also conflicts so remote, or with a distinct local character, which will never directly affect Norway’s national security. Nevertheless, in sum, there will almost always be a strategic component to every humanitarian effort, as the bi-effects of peacekeeping will generally have a positive effect on states’ security.

As argued in the latter section, the idea that Norway is a nation of peace, is more or less the same as it was to former Foreign Minister Halvdan Koht who argued that Norway would ‘cry out that we want and need to work for peace’. At the same time; the branding of Norway as a *peace nation* has become more important for the reputation on the international arena, and is therefore placed higher on the foreign political agenda. To this point, Leira is curious to where motivation for this acknowledged *commitment to peace* actually springs? According to him, the common reply to this question is that Norway is promoting peace because of the Norwegian *peace tradition*. Leira, however, challenges this accepted notion by stating that ‘the more precise answer is perhaps to say that Norway is a *peace nation* because we have tradition of having a *peace tradition*, to perceive ourselves as peace nation.’¹⁵⁴ Being a nation of peace because there is a certain peace tradition is not a solid explanation if

¹⁵³ Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gahr S. J. 2010. *Innlegg i debatten om fredsbevarende operasjoner*.

¹⁵⁴ Leira, 2006, 2.

Norway lacks a history of peace efforts and experiences needed in order to claim such a *tradition*. If the Norwegian *peace tradition* is more present in theory than in practice, the rationale for the Norwegian *commitment to peace* must be explained by something other than ‘this is the way it has always been’.

When attempting to analyze the motivational factors and explanations for the Norwegian *commitment to peace*, it is important to separate the various elements of peacekeeping efforts, as different operations may be grounded on different rationales. For example may the national interests and strategic concerns play a larger part in the decision making process of fighting terrorism, than for example in the efforts to establish peace in a war-torn African country. However, in general, peacekeeping efforts are usually explained by value-based factors such as altruism and solidarity, and the justifications for engaging in peacekeeping operations are generally embedded within a larger framework of international humanitarian law.

The Norwegian government has a rather broad and inclusive objective when participating in peacekeeping operations: both to strengthen national security, and ‘simultaneously contribute to international peace and stability, increased respect for human rights, and enforcing the purpose and principles of the UN-Charter.’¹⁵⁵ This illustrates how peacekeeping is an arena where values and national interests are merged, combining national security and humanitarian aspirations. It is important to underscore that even though strategic interests and security are unavoidable parts of foreign policy agenda, and subsequently the *commitment to peace*, the outspoken agenda ordinarily emphasizes values as the primary framework of motivational factors for engaging in peacekeeping operations. Based on this, the analysis part of this thesis will investigate to what extent values were used as motivations for the peacekeeping mission in Chad, and whether Max Weber’s terms of ethics of conviction and ethics of responsibility have explanatory power to the Norwegian contribution to, and the withdrawal from, MINURCAT.

¹⁵⁵ Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *Gov. prop. No. 38 (1998-99): Tilpasning av Forsvaret til deltagelse i internasjonale operasjoner*.

5.2 General trends of Norwegian peacekeeping operations

In the Norwegian context, international military operations are commonly separated into two main categories: *Article 5 operations* and *international peacekeeping operations*. Both types of operations can be categorized as *peace enforcement*, with an overall objective to restore peace and security. Examples of peace enforcement operations are the 1999 NATO military operation in the former Yugoslavia and the ongoing US-led military operation in Afghanistan.¹⁵⁶ *Article 5 operations* refer to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, also equivalent to UN Article 51, and may be invoked in situations of self-defence. In addition, such operations embody the principle that an attack against a member of the Alliance is considered as an attack against all.¹⁵⁷

International peacekeeping operations, also referred to as ‘non-Article 5 operations,’¹⁵⁸ are not used as a mechanism to secure a nation’s own territory or as self-defence, but rather to create the conditions for lasting peace in war-torn countries. Such operations are usually led by the UN and are based on a UN mandate.¹⁵⁹ In contrast to peacekeeping operations; military operations under Article 5 are not part of the Norwegian engagement policy, and therefore, this thesis will not elaborate any further on this particular subject matter. The focus of this section will rather be on the Norwegian contribution to UN peacekeeping operations, including a discussion of the motivational framework for such efforts.

According to the Norwegian Ministry of Defence; the international peacekeeping operations are often categorized according to intensity, complexity or ‘generation’ – relating to the different periods in time the operation took place. ‘First generation’ operations refer to the classical missions like the operations in Lebanon and the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the main ambition was to restore peace. ‘Second generation’ operations refer to the more complex operations, which include political, economical and humanitarian efforts, like the operations in Cambodia and El

¹⁵⁶ Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *Fakta om Forsvaret 2003, Chapter D. Internasjonale Militæroperasjoner/Krisehåndtering (“Flernasjonale operasjoner”)* Published 02.04.2003.

¹⁵⁷ NATO handbook, *Chapter 7: Policy and decision-making: The defence dimension*. 2002.

¹⁵⁸ Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 1998.

¹⁵⁹ Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 2003.

Salvador, where Norway contributed from 1992-1993.¹⁶⁰ ‘Third generation’ operations also include elements of peace enforcement, such as the operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia.¹⁶¹

The Ministry of Defence presents operations ranging from the relatively less intense deployment of *preventive action* and military missions to observe, to the more intense forms such as *peace keeping*, *peace enforcement*, *peace support operations* and *humanitarian intervention*.¹⁶² This way of classifying operations is similar to Bellamy’s previously mentioned typology, illustrating how the complexity and intensity of an operation varies from the different ways to manage peace. Although the typologies are useful ways to categorize peacekeeping operations, it must be noted that when applied to the real world, the different types of operations incorporate elements from each other, making the distinctions less noticeable.

According to the *Principles for Norwegian participation in international peacekeeping operations* outlined by the Ministry of Defence; the Norwegian government’s position is that ‘Norway should in principle be prepared to contribute to all of the abovementioned types of international military operations, provided that we possess the adequate forces needed.’¹⁶³ It is further underscored that that the operation is in line with the following criterion: Compliance between the required contribution from the forces on the ground, and the mandate given the force, the rules of engagement and the equipment available to complete the task.¹⁶⁴ This statement is in accordance with the Norwegian prioritization principle; considering not only the normative question of where Norway *should* contribute, but also distinguishing between what is important and where Norway can make a difference, opposed to situations where it is more difficult to make a contribution and that are not as important.¹⁶⁵ The main objective is thus that the operation is manageable for the Norwegian forces and important for national security.

¹⁶⁰ United Nations Association of Norway, *Norge og FNs fredsarbeid*.

¹⁶¹ Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 1998.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ Lunde and Thune, 17.

5.2.1 Norway's peacekeeping experiences

The Norwegian commitment to the UN began in 1949, when five Norwegian military officers were sent to monitor the truce between India and Pakistan. Since then, Norway has been a devoted UN member by several contributions to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) since its establishment in 1956, and was for a long period one of the main contributors to UN peacekeeping operations.¹⁶⁶ Initially, the Norwegian peacekeeping efforts were so-called *first generation peacekeeping*. Relevant examples in this regard are the mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Lebanon. The United Nations Operation in DR Congo (ONUC) was established in July 1960 to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance. The Norwegian contribution lasted from 1960-1964, entailed 1173 soldiers from the Norwegian Army and Air Force, and was so far the most comprehensive UN operation since its establishment.¹⁶⁷ The long-lasting efforts in Lebanon, called the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL I) was given the mandate to confirm Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon; restore international peace and security; and assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in the area.¹⁶⁸ Lasting from 1978-1998,¹⁶⁹ Norway was excessively involved, including the endowment of 900 soldiers.

From 1949-2010, more than 60 000 Norwegians have participated in UN peacekeeping missions.¹⁷⁰ However, since the late 1990's, the international participation in peacekeeping operations has been dominated by extensive NATO-led operations, first in the Balkans, and later through the on-going operation in Afghanistan.¹⁷¹ During this period of time, there have only been a few Norwegian contributions to UN-operations: in February 2011, Norway was providing scarcely 64 soldiers, policemen and military observers to the UN,¹⁷² compared to 413 Norwegian troops currently stationed in

¹⁶⁶ Minister of Defence, Strøm-Erichsen, A. *Norges internasjonale engasjement for fred og sikkerhet*, Speech at NTNU, 01.12.2007.

¹⁶⁷ Angell, O. *Jubileum for Kongoveteraner*, The Norwegian Armed Forces URL.

¹⁶⁸ United Nations Peacekeeping missions, *UNIFIL Mandate*.

¹⁶⁹ United Nations Association of Norway, *Norge og FNs fredsarbeid*.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*.

¹⁷¹ Strøm-Erichsen, Speech 2007.

¹⁷² United Nations, *Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping operations*, as of 28.02.2011.

Afghanistan,¹⁷³ counting up to more than 7000 Norwegian troops which have been allocated in Afghanistan during the last decade.¹⁷⁴ Although this comparison alludes a severe lack of Norwegian commitment to UN peacekeeping efforts on the ground, there are also examples deviating the trend. In 2006, Norway was invited to join the UN-led forces in Lebanon referred to by the acronym UNIFIL II, where the government deployed 130 troops including both operational military personnel and an enabling force.¹⁷⁵ The UNIFIL II operation was mainly deployed to prevent weapons to reach Lebanon by sea, where Norway provided four military ships to control the coastline. In fact, this was the most extensive Norwegian military contribution to a UN operation,¹⁷⁶ and was regarded as a commitment to the outspoken goal in the Soria Moria declaration to increase the Norwegian presence in the UN's ground forces.¹⁷⁷

The 2005 Soria Moria declaration was not only to support UN operations in general, but specifically operations on the African continent.¹⁷⁸ During the 2000's there have been made five efforts to meet this goal: through the United Nations Mission in Sudan (referred to by its acronym UNMIS) and the African Union/United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), assisting the operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the enabling efforts to MINURCAT in Chad.¹⁷⁹ In 2009, UNMIS constituted Norway's largest military presence in a UN peacekeeping operation, including 21 military officers¹⁸⁰. The contribution to the African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur,¹⁸¹ was supposed to provide a team of 400 Swedish and Norwegian engineers to assist in the early stage of the operation. Due to the Sudanese government's resentment in allowing non-African countries to participate in the operation, the Norwegian government concluded that it was not able to sustain the offer, and had to withdraw the troops that were ready to enter Darfur January 2008.¹⁸² Although the attempt to provide a task force in Darfur¹⁸³

¹⁷³ ISAF, *Troops Numbers and Contributions: Norway*.

¹⁷⁴ Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *Fakta om antall skadde i Afghanistan*.

¹⁷⁵ Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *Fullfører UNIFIL II oppdraget*, published 13.03.2007.

¹⁷⁶ Strøm-Erichsen, Speech 2007

¹⁷⁷ Soria Moria Platform 2005-2009.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *FN – fredsoperasjoner*, updated March 2010.

¹⁸⁰ The Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations, *Peacekeeping operations*. 08.06.2009.

¹⁸¹ United Nations, *Protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian aid and helping political process in Darfur*.

¹⁸² Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *Ingen norske styrker til Darfur*, Press release Nr.: 2/2008.

¹⁸³ Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, press release, *Norge og USA bygger sykehus for voldtektsofre i DR Kongo*.

was considered a failure, Norway has managed to provide 8 civil police to UNMIS and 5 civil police to UNAMID. 9 Norwegian civil police have also been deployed to UNMIL in Liberia, to assist in the UN support to security reform following the ceasefire.¹⁸⁴ The efforts in DRC have mainly been to coordinate a security reform and assist with human rights observers. Last, but not least, are the 2009/2010 deployment of a water-drilling unit and a military hospital in Abéché, assisting and enabling the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad. As previously mentioned, this was the first time in 17 years that Norway deployed Norwegian armed forces on African ground.

In sum, the Norwegian contributions to UN operations in the African region on the ground are relatively small compared to the financial contributions to peacekeeping efforts. This is not to say that the money donated is not important contributions in achieving peace, but rather to underscore that it signals a lack of political will by placing the contributions through more reserved investments than on the ground forces. The trend where Western states choose to contribute financially, thus leaving the ‘dirty work’ to developing country, especially through the African Union (AU), has been accused as a way to disclaim responsibility for peace in African states. It must, however, be noted, that the rather newly established AU did indeed spring from a regional desire to be in charge of interventions on the African continent, and was initiated with the mandate to improve peace and security in the African region.¹⁸⁵ As the AU have the mandate to intervene in state affairs, the role and responsibility of the UN in the African region has subsequently been reduced. The new concept of ‘African solutions to African problems’ can thus be seen as a two-folded issue. On the one hand the role of the AU functions as a downplaying of the role of the UN – as it is argued that ‘regional solutions should take precedence over globally orchestrated action.’¹⁸⁶ In other words, there is a shift away from the idea that the West can solve internal problems on the African continent, to more regional approaches where African troops are the main resource. On the other hand, the support and encouragement to the AU has also been understood as an escape route for the UN to take responsibility in

¹⁸⁴ United Nations Mission in Liberia, *United Nations Police in Liberia*, 2003.

¹⁸⁵ Bellamy, A. *Responsibility to protect: the global efforts to end mass atrocities*. 2009, 78.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 80.

humanitarian affairs in Africa. Whether or not this is the case, it is obvious that peacekeeping missions have become weaker, when the UN has left the responsibility to another supranational apparatus, which lacks the capacity and influence embodied in the UN framework.

5.3 Chapter conclusion

Aspirations to assert Norway as a nation of peace is indeed an ambitious task, and fulfilling the task requires both political will, military resources and popular support. As stated, the *commitment to peace* entails amongst other efforts, contributions to peacekeeping operations, which initially has to spring from a political desire to deploy Norwegian troops. If such political will is in place, it is up to the Norwegian Army Force (NAF) to consider whether they are able to commit to the task, and have the resources required for a successful mission. However, it is vital for the NAF and the Norwegian government to gain substantial popular support for the deployment of Norwegian troops. In order to summit such support, there must exist a distinct rationale for *why* Norway should contribute to a specific operation. As this chapter has illustrated, such a rationale may be founded upon a general *commitment to peace*, which again springs from an assumed *peace tradition*. According to the *peace tradition*, Norway is a country that is dedicated to support other countries in times of troubles, a notion that arguably has been accepted as part of the Norwegian ‘identity’.

The notion that Norway ‘wants and needs to work for peace’¹⁸⁷ does not only include a commitment to the allies in NATO, but also to the peacekeeping efforts in countries outside the North Atlantic region. As the more remote conflicts are not automatically connected to national security issues such as the more pressing concerns of an attack on a NATO member, it is oftentimes relatively more difficult to produce a general acceptance for investing financial and human resources into peacekeeping efforts. Consequently, instead of appealing to national security, the motivations and rationales for such commitments are often articulated within a value-oriented framework, including the concepts of humanitarianism and altruism. In this sense, the

¹⁸⁷ Koht, in Leira, 2006, 1.

peacekeeping efforts in remote areas are commonly understood as more *altruistic* efforts, which Norway contributes to *because we can*.

Historically, the outspoken responsibility to ‘contribute where we can,’¹⁸⁸ has proved to be a motto that does not only illustrate the post-Cold War era, where Norway has strengthened its *commitment to peace* through various mediation and peacekeeping efforts, but a principle that actually dates back to the beginning of the 20th century. The question is, however, whether the ‘new wars’ and subsequent threats to state’s security in any way has challenged *values* as a basis for engaging in peacekeeping operations? Are the challenges of the contemporary world affecting the priorities of Norwegian decision-makers? If one were to argue that the abovementioned Norwegian contributions to peacekeeping operations originally were founded on value-based rationales, are today’s considerations of whether and how to contribute to peacekeeping efforts more affected by a strategic thinking? This is of course a rather comprehensive question and there may not be a straightforward way to respond to it. It may, however, function as a guiding puzzle for the following chapter of this thesis: what factors were decisive in the considerations prior to the engagement to, and the withdrawing from, MINURCAT?

¹⁸⁸ Harpviken and Skjelsbæk, 2010b, 382.

CHAPTER 6. ANALYSIS: VALUE-BASED INTEREST?

This thesis' focus of attention has revolved around the trends of Norwegian foreign policy, where special emphasis has been placed on the *commitment to peace* and the efforts to brand Norway as a 'humanitarian superpower'. It has been argued that Norway has an outspoken vision to support the UN, especially through increased commitment on the ground. As the failed attempt to participate in UNAMID was considered a great disappointment to the Norwegian government, the decision to contribute in Chad through MINURCAT can be explained as a re-affirmation of the commitment to Sudan.¹⁸⁹ The arguments put forward by Norwegian commentators points to the following ambiguity: if the desire to contribute to stabilize a war-torn region was of such great importance to the Norwegian government, it appears puzzling that they withdrew the troops before the mission was completed.¹⁹⁰

Preliminary to this part of the thesis' discussion, the first section of this chapter will provide an introduction to the line of events affecting the political decision-making processes of the MINURCAT contribution. Based on interviews with government officials at the MFA and the Ministry of Defence, as well as interviews with researchers and academics, this section's objective is to provide a detailed outline of the political processes. Further, the motivations for the entrance and the exit will be analysed by using the theoretical framework of interests and values.

6.1 Empirical basis for the political considerations

6.1.1 *Starting points*

The decision to deploy Norwegian troops in Chad dates back to the long-planned decision of contributing to the war-torn region of Darfur in West-Sudan.¹⁹¹ As stated in Chapter 5, the original plan of deploying a 400-strong Norwegian force to UNAMID was halted by the Sudanese government's decision to deny the entrance of UN peacekeeping forces. As the Norwegian soldiers were trained and prepared for an international peacekeeping operation, the troops were made available for other UN

¹⁸⁹ Respondent 101; Respondent 102.

¹⁹⁰ Hansen, interview 4.11.2010

¹⁹¹ State Secretary in the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Eide, B. E. Interview 16.05.2011.

missions. In January 2008, two operations needed Norway's assistance: the MINURCAT operation in Chad, and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Although the capacities of the Norwegian military engineers were specifically requested to contribute to restore a secure and stable environment in Haiti, the Norwegian government chose to place its efforts in Chad.¹⁹² According to State Secretary at the MFA,¹⁹³ Espen Barth Eide, it was later noted that it was not the capacity of the military engineers that was needed in MINURCAT after all, but in spite of this the Norwegian government decided to stand by its decision. This choice of action can be explained by Norway's general commitment to the Central African Region and Sudan, but more specifically it can be traced back to a previous request in 2007 by European Union Force (EUFOR) to contribute to the operation in Chad. At that time, EUFOR was tasked with training police and improving judicial infrastructure, and Norway had declined the appeal to participate.¹⁹⁴

By March 2009, the UN force took over under the MINURCAT mandate and it was envisaged that it would become a 5000-strong UN peacekeeping force.¹⁹⁵ Through the late 2008 discussions on whether the UN should replace the EU force with a UN peacekeeping force, the Norwegian government prepared for a new request to contribute, this time from the UN. When the transition was decided and the UN asked Norway to replace the operation of a field hospital previously managed by Italy, there was already a strong political will to contribute to MINURCAT. According to a Senior Advisor at the MFA: 'This willingness was based on the previous attempts to contribute to the situation in Darfur, and the Chad-operation was in line with the government's ambitions to support the UN and Africa.'¹⁹⁶ The readiness to contribute to MINURCAT was thus based on a general principle of supporting UN peacekeeping operations, and a specific desire to assist Sudanese refugees. Norway had no previous connections with Chad, but because of its geographic location neighbouring Sudan, the choice of supporting the operation was considered the 'second best' solution.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹² Eide interview 16.05.2011.

¹⁹³ Barth Eide was State Secretary at the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence from 2005-2010.

¹⁹⁴ Respondent 101.

¹⁹⁵ Fick, 2009.

¹⁹⁶ Respondent 101

¹⁹⁷ Respondent 101

6.1.2 Military evaluations

After welcoming the request from the UN, the next step in the decision-making process was to consider what sort of capacity the Norwegian military was capable of providing. This assessment was undertaken by the Norwegian Armed Forces (NAF), which subsequently reported to the Ministry of Defence. Because of the previous preparations for the mission in Sudan, the NAF was already in possession of a certain region specific expertise, which was relatively transferable to the mission in Chad. The response from both the Ministry of Defence and the NAF was therefore that the contribution was both *manageable* and *desirable*.¹⁹⁸ As there was already substantial and coherent political will to contribute to this operation, the positive NAF analysis was satisfactory to all parties. The only difficulty was that the UN had requested the hospital to be operative within two months, and considering that the NAF usually requires one year of preparation, they were pressured on time.¹⁹⁹ Despite the time constraints, the Norwegian contribution was in place June 2009,²⁰⁰ consisting of the financing and running of a water-well drilling unit and a field hospital for serving the UN personnel, managed in cooperation with Serbia.²⁰¹

The numbers provided by the 2009 budget of the Ministry of Finance states that the operation was initially supposed to cost 300 million NOK.²⁰² However, according to Norwegian newspapers and research articles, the total cost of the operation exceeded 500 million NOK.²⁰³ Additionally, although the request from the UN called for only 60 troops, the Norwegian contribution totalled 152 personnel.²⁰⁴ A Senior Advisor at the Ministry of Defence offers the following explanations for the gap in numbers: Firstly, the high costs of the contribution can be explained by the differences between the assessments made by the UN compared to that of the NAF.²⁰⁵ The Norwegian contribution included a large, modern level II hospital, which was in line with Norwegian standards. The Senior Advisor at the Ministry of Defence argues that the

¹⁹⁸ Respondent 102.

¹⁹⁹ Respondent 102.

²⁰⁰ Karlsrud, interview 09.06.2011.

²⁰¹ Harpviken and Skjelsbæk, 2010b, 380.

²⁰² Royal Norwegian Ministry of Finance, *Gov. prop. No. 67 (2008-2009) Tilleggsbevilgninger og omprioriteringer i statsbudsjettet 2009*.

²⁰³ Forsvarets Forum, *Forsvaret reiser hjem fra Tsjad*, 19.01.2010.

²⁰⁴ Holmen, B. *Counsellor/Deputy Military Adviser, Peace Operations, Political Affairs*, The Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations. Interview 10.06.2011

²⁰⁵ Respondent 102.

hospital in Chad could not be of any less quality than what was provided to Afghanistan. Deputy Military Advisor at the Permanent Mission of Norway to the UN, Bengt Holmen, explains that the reason for this is based on the military directive that the NAF shall only deploy units that are compatible with NATO-standards.²⁰⁶ Secondly, the evaluations undertaken by the NAF were based on the predictions of a complete UN force of 5500 soldiers, when in fact only half were deployed. However, this was also what the UN had accounted for when they requested a deployment of 60 personnel to the enabling force. Thirdly, the deployment had to be in line with the guidelines provided by Norwegian health advice, which demands certain standards for Norwegian soldiers that could not be negotiated. NAF could not offer a mid-range solution satisfactory to these standards. Finally, there is little room for the Ministry of Defence to comment, nor modify, the recommendations made by NAF, as they are in possession of the military expertise,²⁰⁷ and their judgment has to be trusted.

When Norway replied that they were willing to contribute to the operation, it was stressed to the UN that the NAF only had committed to manage the hospital for one year.²⁰⁸ According to Karlsrud, the UN had accepted Norway's offer with the possibilities of extending it for a longer period.²⁰⁹ Holmen refutes this claim, stating that the reason for the one-year time limit was that the Norwegian contribution was only to enable the EUFOR-countries to re-hat to MINURCAT and that the UN was aware of this premise.²¹⁰ The only thing DPKO had required was precise dates for when Norway would depart.²¹¹ Military contributions to international operations require extensive preparations, and the civil personnel from the health services stationed in Abéché had restricted contracts regarding how long they could be retained in the field. Late 2009, when the UN requested Norway to continue the running of the hospital, there apparently was not another set of civil personnel disposable to the NAF. Hence, the scarcity in human resources was given as the main reason for why Norway

²⁰⁶ Holmen, interview 10.06.2011

²⁰⁷ Respondent 102.

²⁰⁸ Respondent 102.

²⁰⁹ Karlsrud, interview 09.06.2011.

²¹⁰ Holmen, interview 10.06.2011

²¹¹ Ibid.

chose to limit the contribution to only one year.²¹²

6.1.3 Requests to prolong the contribution and deciding to leave

As the previous section illustrated, the Norwegian contribution to MINURCAT was intended to only last for one year, from March 2009, to May 2010. This time period was based on NAF evaluations, stating that the NAF department of sanitation, which controlled the deployment of civil hospital personnel, was not capable of sustaining the offer beyond one year.²¹³ A Senior Advisor at the Ministry of Defence argues that the time limits of the contribution had been stated very clear to the UN, thus late August 2009 Russia offered to take over the running of the hospital after Norway's departure. However, in December 2009, Russia announced that they were no longer able to contribute to the mission, and Norway was again asked to re-evaluate their decision to depart Abéché in May 2010. The NAF was consulted and replied that the Norwegian MINURCAT personnel were unable to extend their mission and instead had to be deployed in other contexts, or were obligated to return to Norway.²¹⁴ If they were to consider this request, the NAF needed more time to re-adjust, but the request came too late for the UN to arrange for another country to replace Norway in the meantime. According to a Senior Advisor at the MFA, the main reason for not continuing the running of the hospital beyond May 2010 was due to logistical challenges and time constraints. Another interviewee claimed that there was substantial political will to continue the contribution, and great disappointment when it was concluded that it was not manageable.²¹⁵ The decline was reported back to the UN in December 2009.

According to interviewees; the NAF, Norwegian politicians, the UN and international organisations such as the Red Cross, all considered the operation a success.²¹⁶ Labelling the operation as a success was especially due to the Dakar Peace agreement between Sudan and Chad, where the respective presidents in the two countries agreed to end their differences, normalize relations between the countries and to take the

²¹² Respondent 101; Respondent 102 (e-mail correspondence 13.04.2011); Eide, interview 16.05.2011.

²¹³ Respondent 101

²¹⁴ Respondent 101

²¹⁵ Respondent 102.

²¹⁶ Respondent 101

necessary measures to help achieve peace and stability in the region.²¹⁷ In spite of this, however, the Chadian government was not particularly satisfied with the UN presence. According to Professor of Development Studies at Oslo University Collage and author of the 2011 MFA report on Chad, Dr Ketil Fred Hansen; the main objectives for inviting the UN were primarily to stop Sudanese refugees from entering Chad and to have the UN assist in developing infrastructure.²¹⁸ MINURCAT was not mandated to hinder the flow of refugees from Darfur, whereby this would seem to explain why President Déby wrote a letter to the UN Secretary-General, January 15, requesting MINURCAT to withdraw its troops and pledged full responsibility for protecting civilians on its territory.²¹⁹

A Senior Advisor at the MFA holds that the UN was eager to continue its mission, but that this was out of the question without President Déby's support. At this point, it was already decided that Norway would not prolong its contribution, and the decision to leave Chad in May was still standing. Because President Déby had specified that he wanted the field hospital and the water-drilling unit to remain in Chad after MINURCAT withdrew, there was a third round of internal discussions within the MFA, this time whether Norway was capable of continuing its contribution until the end of 2010, when the MINURCAT mandate expired. According to a Senior Advisor at the Ministry of Defence, new considerations were now taking place: whether or not the contribution could be prolonged for only a couple of months. One of the decisive factors in this matter was that the rainy season in Chad began in July, which would make the return of the hospital especially difficult.²²⁰ The belief that the efforts required to extend Norway's contribution were not worth the rewards of continuing, did in the end won out, and the final conclusion was that Norway would stick by its decision to end its contribution in May. In sum, it appears as though the Norwegian government was willing but not able to continue the efforts in Chad.

²¹⁷ Dakar Agreement between Sudan and Chad, signed in Dakar, Republic of Senegal 13.03.2008.

²¹⁸ Hansen, interview 4.11.2010

²¹⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 1923 (2010)

²²⁰ Respondent 102.

6.2 Understanding the Mission in Chad: applying the framework of interests and values

6.2.1 How values and interests affected the considerations prior to the Norwegian contribution to MINURCAT

Limited commitment

The Norwegian *commitment to peace* has traditionally been characterized by value-based considerations. When assessing how values triggered the decision to engage in Chad, it is useful to return to Max Weber's concept of ethics: actions guided by 'ethics of conviction' and 'ethics of responsibilities'. Separating the two ethics is of course a rather narrow way of understanding the two terms, as both the intention to do good and the will to achieve good results should be present in what Weber refers to as 'sound politics.'²²¹ However, in order to consider the degree of success for both maxims, one must be able to understand where the initial starting points were. When considering the success-level of an action guided by ethics of conviction, one must clarify the actor's intentions. To establish the level of success of an action guided by ethics of responsibilities, one must clarify the final results the actor is trying to achieve.

When analysing the intentions and the results of the Norwegian contribution, it must be emphasised that this was indeed a significant change from a long period with no support to the UN forces on the ground in Africa. The decision to contribute in Chad certainly satisfied the promises made in the Soria Moria declarations. At this point, it must be stressed that Norway did not participate directly to peacekeeping in Chad, but was rather part of an enabling force to 'help the helpers.'²²² The goal was to empower the UN troops to be more effective in their efforts to secure the lives of refugees and IDP's. According to NUPI Research Fellow and also former Special Assistant to the SRSG to MINURCAT, John Karlsrud; USG Malcorra, head of UN Department of Field Support declared that a field hospital should be committed for three years, in order to enhance stability and predictability for the peacekeeping troops.²²³ Arguably, a long-term presence is highly important to secure peace – especially in such a war-torn region as Central-Africa. This statement was made after the withdrawal of the

²²¹ Weber, 127.

²²² Minister of Defence, Faremo, G. *Takk for innsatsen i Tsjad!* Speech, 27.05.2010.

²²³ Karlsrud, interview 31.01.2011.

Norwegian contribution, but without referring to Norway's decision as such.²²⁴

A Senior Advisor at the Ministry of Defence refuted this argument, claiming that this is not part of the considerations prior to engagement in international military operations.²²⁵ As the NAF only had capacity to run the hospital for one year, it was agreed that it was better to stay for a limited time period rather than not contributing at all.²²⁶ This statement reflects an intention guided by an ethics of conviction: a will to do good without necessarily achieving more ambitious objectives. The statement holds that it is *better* for Norway to contribute to MINURCAT, but better for whom? It is implied that it is better for the operation as a whole to have Norway providing an enabling force for a limited time period, but it can also be argued that it was indeed better for Norway's self-image to show its commitment for a short time period, rather than not contributing at all.

The motivation for contributing to MINURCAT can thus be analyzed on two levels. On one level, the intention of the Norwegian contribution was to provide a hospital for UN troops, and the mission was in that sense successful if the running of the hospital was successful. The field hospital was modern, equipped and deployed by a large number of skilled personnel, and was in that regard considered a vital contributing element to MINURCAT. On another level, the Norwegian contribution was motivated by a more extended ambition to contribute to peace and stability in the Central African region. As argued by Karlsrud, such results are more difficult to accomplish during a limited time frame of one year. One can therefore argue that while the *intention* of contributing to peacekeeping in Africa was met, it is more difficult to determine to *what extent* peace and stability was actually accomplished by the Norwegian contribution to MINURCAT.

In sum, it appears that a general framework of values inspired the Norwegian government to participate in Chad, but that the motivations can be better explained by Weber's ethic of convictions, than ethics of responsibility. The conviction was thus the point of departure for initiating the contribution, but unintended consequences such as

²²⁴ Karlsrud, interview 09.06.2011.

²²⁵ Respondent 102

²²⁶ Ibid.

military constraints hampered the full implementation of the policy. When guided by responsibilities the actor must apply a more steadfast strategy and follow through the commitment so that he achieves the desired results. The objective of MINURCAT was to achieve stability in Chad, equalling the desired result. Achieving stability and securing the lives of refugees and IDP's is in itself a good intention, but such a commitment requires solid political will to stay the time it takes to get actual results. In the case of Norway, the external factor of the military constraints hindered the government in trying to sustain its efforts for the period requested by the UN. One can therefore argue that in theory, the Norwegian contribution was guided by ethics of responsibility, but when trying to implement the ambitions it appeared more as an action guided by convictions. Limiting the contribution to only one year demonstrated that the government was more willing to 'do good' than to accomplish the more ambitious results that could have been possible by planning to stay for a longer period.

Why Africa?

The latter section illustrated that the MINURCAT contribution fulfilled a political goal of supporting the UN in Africa.²²⁷ This general objective has been stated several times by government officials as well as in official documents. Because it is emphasised as one of the general motivational factors, the origin of this commitment deserves a closer investigation. According to State Secretary in the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Espen Barth Eide, the Soria Moria objective is based on a 'desire to reintroduce a commitment to the UN and restore the balance between the contributions to the UN compared to NATO operations after 2001.'²²⁸ After a period of a strong commitment to its allies in NATO and a focus on fighting terrorism in Afghanistan, it was time to re-affirm Norway's commitment to the international organization. The contribution to MINURCAT did thus fulfil the aspirations set by the government, leading to political 'success' by deviating from the trend of 17 years without Norwegian peacekeeping troops in Africa.

This way of framing the intentions as fulfilling a general political goal does indeed question the Norwegian commitment to the particular operation in Chad. The

²²⁷ Press release by the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *Norsk feltsykehus til FN-operasjon i Tsjad*, published 16.12.2008.

²²⁸ Eide, interview 16.05.2011.

impression that the contribution to Chad was based on a quite imprecise objective is also identified in the Ministry of Defence's press release announcing the Norwegian contribution to MINURCAT:

Norway's view is that Western countries largely have left the countries in the developing world to provide forces to the UN's most challenging operations, which largely takes place in Africa. After our long-planned contributions to the UN operation in Darfur was hampered by opposition from Sudan's president last winter, it is particularly gratifying that we can contribute in neighbouring Chad, where the UN recently requested a high quality field hospital.²²⁹

The statement highlights a renewed commitment to peacekeeping in Africa in general, but does not explain why Norway chose to contribute to Chad in particular. In order to understand the decision of engaging in Chad, one must look at the surrounding circumstances, namely the element neighbouring Sudan.

Transferability: the element of interests

As there already was a trained competence within the NAF to contribute to Sudan, the military skills could relatively easily be transferred to the mission in neighbouring Chad. This argument of *transferability* has been consistent throughout this thesis but it has not been explained why the Norwegian government wanted to contribute in Sudan in the first place. Because the element of Sudan appears to have explanatory power for the motivation to engage in Chad, the analysis would benefit from a more inclusive examination of motivational factors for engaging in Sudan. First of all, one key argument to understanding the Norwegian commitment to the on-going conflict in Sudan is articulated by former Minister of Defence, Strøm-Erichsen: 'The great conflicts in Africa, first and foremost in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Sudan/Chad have taken more lives than any other conflicts in our time.'²³⁰

The statement reflects what previously has been described as the 'need'-factor: When deciding to contribute to peacekeeping operations, Norway considers the relative *necessity* of contributing. As stated by the former Minister of Defence, the humanitarian situation in the Central African region is too acute not to invest in

²²⁹ Press release by the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 16.12.2008.

²³⁰ Ibid.

peacekeeping efforts. Norway's commitment to peace in Sudan has been a long-lasting process, especially concerning the preparations for the 2005 peace agreement between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and the Government of Sudan. Additionally, Norwegian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have since the early 1970's contributed to the humanitarian efforts in the Darfur-region.²³¹ Apart from peacebuilding and humanitarian efforts, the MFA also recognizes that security concerns have been an additional driving force behind the commitment to Sudan. The abiding conflicts of the 1990's caused great instability in the region, which threatened Norwegian political and economic interests, especially the Norwegian/Sudanese oil cooperation.²³² In all, Norway's commitment to Sudan turns out to be characterized by genuine dedication to the humanitarian situation, with elements of self-interests.

Based on the long-term commitment to Sudan, it appears that the motivations for engaging in Chad are partly based on the aforementioned concept of *selectivity*: Norway chose to contribute in a region where there already were oil-related interests. Even though economic interests didn't directly affect the relationship between Norway and Chad, instability in the region affects – and is affected by – the conflict in Sudan. Consequently, by contributing to stabilize Chad, MINURCAT's peacekeeping efforts had a positive effect on the situation in Sudan. The outspoken motivation of engaging in Chad because it was regarded as a 'next door' solution to the desire to participate in Sudan might represent the strategic interests of the Norwegian government to secure its national political and economic interests.

In sum, the commitment to the region can also be explained by a certain *dualism*, where both values and interests affected the considerations. Values, as such, was thus the underlying factors for why Norway chose to contribute to peacekeeping efforts in general, whereas national interests might explain the choice of placing its efforts in the specific context of peacekeeping in the oil-rich country of Sudan. In the same way as NAF's military expertise on the conflict in Sudan was considered transferable to the mission in Chad, this section has illustrated that the intentions of engaging in Sudan might be transferable to the intention of engaging in Chad as well.

²³¹ Norwegian Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Hvorfor har Norge et bredt engasjement i Sudan*

²³² Ibid.

Making use of ‘soft’ powers

Being a small, peaceful country, Norway has the ability to act as a trustworthy partner, without its own political agenda. When considering how the importance of allies affected the decision making process, it is again valuable to refer to the outspoken ambition in the Soria Moria platform of supporting the UN in Africa. As a committed member of the UN, Norway is able to access powerful actors that might contribute to enhancing Norway’s interests.²³³ The international organization is also an arena where Norway can promote its ‘soft power.’ This term includes the ability to ‘shape the preferences of others’²³⁴ without the use of military power. Norway’s financial contribution to the UN has certainly affirmed its commitment to the organization, but the lack of commitment on the ground has been symptomatic of the lack of political will to peacekeeping in Africa – a trend that presumably undermines its self-image as a nation dedicated to peace.

Being a country struggling to live up to an image as a ‘humanitarian superpower’, one would assume that the contribution to MINURCAT was a strategic choice of action to change a unfavourable perception of a member only providing financial assistance. By making a positive exception by contributing on the ground, Norway wanted to deviate from the trend of inaction by Western states. To this, it must be noted that the MINURCAT operation consisting of EU forces naturally involved other European states, such as Ireland, Poland and Finland, and the Norwegian contribution was therefore not particularly remarkable. However, as stated by State Secretary Eide, Norway was the first country to step in to offer a contribution to MINURCAT after EUFOR’s departure, something that was highly appreciated by the UN,²³⁵ especially as it directly contributed to other European powers prolonging their deployments.²³⁶ Moreover, Eide argues that even though largely populated countries like India and Bangladesh are still taking on the majority of the responsibility by providing ‘boots on the ground’, it is especially important that Western countries assist with their niche capacities.²³⁷ Particularly because there has been a clear void of Western states on the

²³³ Kristoffersen, 30.

²³⁴ Nye, 2004, 5.

²³⁵ Interview 16.05.2011.

²³⁶ Karlsrud, interview 09.06.2011.

²³⁷ Interview 16.05.2011.

ground in Africa, Norway's contribution was certainly noticed by the 'new powers.'²³⁸ Contributing with a field hospital is a rather advanced form of assistance and by placing an expensive niche capacity in Chad, Norway signalled that it was making a clear effort to help in the Central African region.

In sum, the contribution led to an improvement in Norway's image as a committed peacekeeper, and thereby strengthening its overall reputation within the UN.²³⁹ As the Soria Moria platform appears to be a rather substantial part of the motivational framework for the contribution, one can argue that the importance of allies, and in this context, the UN; was a considerable motivational factor. Showing support and commitment to 'allies' in the UN doesn't necessarily involve the aspiration of reciprocity, but can rather be explained by a desire to be identified as a country that wants to be a credible actor on the international scene – perhaps even starring as a 'humanitarian superpower'.

Necessity and success – reintroducing NAF to Africa

One final point remains to be discussed; the necessity of contributing versus the ability to generate success. As emphasized by Foreign Minister Støre, considerations regarding where to place Norway's efforts depend on the following factors: considering where Norway *should* contribute, also referred to as the necessity factor, contra where Norway can make a difference, in this regard referred to as the success rate. Essentially, the main objective is to invest in operations that are manageable and relevant to Norway; where Norway can 'make a difference.'²⁴⁰ Accordingly, the Norwegian contribution, consisting of the running of a field hospital and a water-drilling unit, was relatively manageable and didn't involve the risk of Norwegian forces participating in a sensitive and dangerous mission. As the MINURCAT mandate was limited to the protection of IDP's, unaccompanied by the challenging aspect of state building and actively participating in armed conflict, the operation could to a large degree be considered as 'safe'. The Norwegian contribution to the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan was already stretching the NAF,²⁴¹ making them

²³⁸ Eide, interview 16.05.2011.

²³⁹ Eide, interview 16.05.2011

²⁴⁰ Foreign Minister Støre, G., J. Å gjøre en forskjell, 2008.

²⁴¹ Respondent 102.

unable to exert military resources in other more demanding peacekeeping missions. Conclusively, the mission in Chad met the requirements of the Norwegian prioritization principle of generating a relatively high level of success without risking being involved in a long-lasting, costly military operation.

Based on the previous sections, there are factors that stand out as decisive in the decision-making process of contributing to MINURCAT. It can be argued that the political considerations were partly guided by values, being the will to assist UN peacekeeping efforts in Chad. It has been argued that the Norwegian government wanted to re-affirm its loyalty and commitment to the UN, after a long period of being oriented towards the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan. However, as the will to place efforts in a UN operation in Africa certainly was an outspoken ambition, the choice of placing efforts in Chad appears more arbitrarily. It was argued that the Norwegian troops initially trained for deployment in Sudan were transferable to Chad. This factor loses its explanatory value considering State Secretary Eide's argument: during the considerations of where to deploy the troops, it became clear that it was not the prepared capacity of military engineers that was needed in MINURCAT after all.²⁴² Rather, it was requested from the UN that Norway contributed with the military engineers to the rebuilding of Haiti. Even so, the Norwegian government decided to keep its commitment to the Central African region and sent a different contingent to MINURCAT than the troops that had prepared for Sudan. This led to a closer investigation of why this specific region was so particularly important for the Norwegian government.

Conclusively, the findings showed that two elements were in place at the MINURCAT operation: it was both manageable for the NAF to run the field hospital – which offered a relatively high likelihood of success, and the Norwegian contribution was needed; both by the UN and for the NAF to build capacities for future deployments in Africa. The arbitrary nature of the support for Chad and the shortness of the commitment, together with the cost/-benefit analysis suggest that the Norwegian

²⁴² Eide, interview 16.05.2011.

government was looking for political gain in the UN rather than fulfilling a specific commitment to Chad.

6.2.2 Investigating how values and interests affected the considerations to end the contribution to MINURCAT

Something extraordinary

Before proceeding to the analysis of the motivational factors that influenced the decision to end the Norwegian contribution to MINURCAT, it must be stated that the premise for the Norwegian contribution was that it was only to last for one year – and in that sense; the withdrawal of the troops did not break any promises. The NAF provided a high quality field hospital and deployed a large number of health personnel, which in part enabled the UN forces to carry out their tasks. Nevertheless, the Norwegian contribution withdrew its troops even though the UNSG urged the Norwegian government to stay in Chad.²⁴³ When Norway declined the request to prolong the running of the hospital, the UN was left without adequate medical support, causing other countries to signal that they would withdraw and both Ireland and Finland pulled out²⁴⁴ when they realised that the Norwegian hospital would not be extended.²⁴⁵ If the contribution to MINURCAT was motivated by an objective to increase support to the UN, it seems contrary to the Soria Moria declaration to decline the request for prolonging the running of the hospital. In the end, and unrelated to the Norwegian withdrawal, it was the Chadian government that called in for the withdrawal of MINURCAT and ‘committed itself to take full responsibility for the security of the civilian population in eastern part of the country.’²⁴⁶ This, however, does not remove the very fact that Norway’s decision to discontinue the running of the hospital and likely would have had negative consequences for the success of the operation, and caused a significant weakening in Norway’s political prestige within the UN.²⁴⁷

²⁴³ Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives, unpublished. *Letter to Foreign Minister Gahr Støre from the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon*, 28.12.2009. Dossier no. 1425, p. 2.

²⁴⁴ Foreign Ministry of Finland (2010) *Finland to withdraw from UN MINURCAT mission*. Press release 122/2010 23.04.2010.

²⁴⁵ Karlsrud, interview 09.06.2011.

²⁴⁶ MINURCAT, *Minurcat Mandate*. [URL]

²⁴⁷ Karlsrud, interview 09.06.2011.

Senior Advisors interviewed, as well as statements from official documents, all hold that Norway's discontinuation of the hospital can be ascribed to the lack of personnel. This rather straightforward explanation makes the efforts of examining the motivations for withdrawing seem rather purposeless taken at face value. However, one argument inspired further study: a Senior Advisor at the MFA stated that 'if Norway were to prolong the contribution, something extraordinary would have had to take place. It would certainly have been for the better if we had managed to stay for a longer period.'²⁴⁸ It is this rather ambiguous element; *a lack of 'something extraordinary'*, which deserves closer investigation: given that factors such as apparent political will and international pressure to continue the contribution were present, one may ask why this was not sufficient enough to sustain the operation? In other words: can the framework of interests and values contribute to a more suitable understanding of why the Norwegian government ended the contribution?

Afghanistan versus Africa

When investigating states' motivations for contributing to peacekeeping efforts, it is useful to review the current international security situation. Contemporary threats to international security are broad and complex, characterised by a high level of uncertainty and unpredictability. According to Lunde and Thune, international security policy is currently largely concerned with the war in Afghanistan, where the enemy constitutes a non-state actor that lacks respect for international laws of war.²⁴⁹ Foreign and defence politics have therefore created new ways and new rhetoric to handle the challenges connected to terrorism, insurgencies and internal crises in other countries. State Secretary at the MFA, Eide, explains this transition by the following:

²⁴⁸ Respondent 101

²⁴⁹ Lunde and Thune, 215.

When we deployed Norwegian troops in the Balkans, people were questioning why we engaged in a conflict relatively unrelated to Norway's national security. When we deployed troops in Afghanistan, the same questions were asked, but then the efforts in the Balkans appeared more obvious. When we deployed peacekeeping troops in Chad in 2009, the reasons for our involvement in Afghanistan seemed more apparent than the rationales to place efforts in such a remote conflict as the Central African region.²⁵⁰

Eide's statement illustrates not only how difficult it is to justify peacekeeping efforts on reasons that are not directly affecting national security, but also how the perceptions of threats and national security are constantly changing. As of 2011, most of the NAF efforts are dedicated to the war in Afghanistan, where more than 7000 Norwegian troops have been deployed since 2001.²⁵¹ As argued by the Ministry of Defence, the extensive efforts in Afghanistan have both stretched the NAF's capacities, and led to a rather narrowed focus on this one particular area of conflict. It has been determined that the Norwegian forces will depart ISAF in 2014, and politicians, military experts and commentators are questioning what the Norwegian military should do post Afghanistan.²⁵² One could argue that a national military force benefits from a military operation because it enables them to maintain a certain level of competence. Thus, the NAF must start preparing for alternative missions when they return from Afghanistan.²⁵³ State Secretary Eide suggests that Norway should use its military efforts in wider contexts – such as peacekeeping in Africa, both to show commitment to the acute conflicts that are constantly unfolding and the efforts of the UN; an organization that has received relatively less attention after Norway's involvement in Afghanistan.

The Norwegian contribution to Afghanistan has thus provided two explanations to the efforts in Chad. The decision to contribute to MINURCAT may be explained by a desire to build military capacities in regions other than the Middle East. Contributing with a field hospital in Chad is thus a rather 'soft' way of introducing Norwegian soldiers to peacekeeping in Africa. The decision to discontinue the contribution has a two-folded explanation: After one year of deployment, the NAF had acquired their

²⁵⁰ Eide, interview 16.05.2011.

²⁵¹ Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *Fakta om antall skadde i Afghanistan*.

²⁵² Respondent 102

²⁵³ Karlsrud, interview 31.01.2011.

desired experience and was ready to leave MINURCAT with the lessons learned from this UN operation. As stated by the State Secretary Eide: ‘the mission in Chad has restored our UN-competence,’²⁵⁴ and the military purpose of placing troops in Africa was thus met. Additionally, lack of resources available for a possible continuation was arguably because the NAF was too strained by the efforts in Afghanistan. To this, a Senior Advisor at the Ministry of Defence states that ‘if we had seen a relegation in Afghanistan, the total strain on the NAF would have been reduced, and the situation would have been different.’²⁵⁵

In sum, the Norwegian engagement in Afghanistan played an important role both to the considerations of engaging in Chad, and also to the considerations of withdrawing. Basically, the long-lasting commitment to ISAF has narrowed NAF’s capacities to handle other types of conflict and is also restraining the military from investing resources in other conflicts. Norway’s ambition to change this routine did perhaps serve the purpose of broadening the NAF abilities, but this intention did arguably not serve the best interests of MINURCAT.

A costly contribution – a show-off?

This analysis has suggested that the commitment to MINURCAT appeared to be guided by the rationale of ‘good intentions’, to a greater extent than achieving ‘good results’. Commentators have argued that it was quite irresponsible to leave the operation without a solution to how the field hospital would be managed.²⁵⁶ This realisation was to some extent affirmed by a Senior Advisor, stating that there certainly were some ‘lessons learned’ regarding the MINURCAT contribution:

The NAF should have tried to strip down the contribution. If we were to stay in an operation with such an extensive segment like the field hospital again, it would definitely be better to stay for longer. Norway does not want to repeat that mistake of departing prematurely.²⁵⁷

This statement reflects the two main critiques that have been posed by Norwegian commentators: the operation was too expensive and the troops left too early.²⁵⁸ The US

²⁵⁴ Eide, B. E. *Gjetord fra Tsjad*. Forsvarets Forum, 26.03.2010

²⁵⁵ Respondent 102

²⁵⁶ Horn, A. *Feltsykehus*, in *Klassekampen* 23.05.2010.

²⁵⁷ Respondent 102

²⁵⁸ *Aftenposten*, *Klaget på for flott norsk feltsykehus til Tsjad*. 18.11.2010

Ambassador to Norway, Barry White, recognizes the same sentiment. In a classified document published by Wikileaks, Ambassador White reports that it was the high costs of the Norwegian hospital that made Russia unexpectedly withhold its planned contribution to Chad.²⁵⁹ Moreover, it is reported by a US diplomat that the Minister of Defence, Grete Faremo, received complaints from MINURCAT administration when she visited Chad: an officer at MINURCAT claimed that the hospital was ‘so fancy’ that Russia refused to offer anything of any less quality.²⁶⁰ If so, this was indeed an unexpected and negative consequence of the Norwegian contribution.

The MINURCAT contribution was indeed an expensive affair; it has even been argued that it was the most expensive airlift operation in the history of NAF.²⁶¹ This thesis recognises that there are various explanations for the costly contribution, ranging from commentators arguing that the NAF wanted to test out new equipment,²⁶² to official statements claiming that Norway had to uphold a necessary standard.²⁶³ Because the reasons for withdrawing partly have been explained by budgetary constraints,²⁶⁴ it is productive to look at a political motivation for *why* it was so expensive. The Norwegian foreign policy scholar and commentator Asle Toje offers an explanation of this abundance. According to Toje, the main goals of foreign policy are the following: security, autonomy, economy and prestige. Toje holds that security has been used as the independent variable in the sense that it has determined whom to trade with, who to interact with, and where to ‘show off.’²⁶⁵ It is this latter element that is highly relevant to the case of MINURCAT: the Norwegian hospital indeed was of a higher quality, and deployed with approximately twice as many health personnel than what the UN had requested. In line with the answers provided by a Senior Advisor at the Ministry of Defence, State Secretary Eide affirms that ‘the average UN standard is not

²⁵⁹ Wikileaks documents referred to in Aftenposten, 18.11.2010

²⁶⁰ Aftenposten, *Klaget på for flott norsk feltsykehus til Tsjad*. 18.11.2010

²⁶¹ Karlsrud, interview 31.01.2011.

²⁶² Karlsrud, J. in Aftenposten, *Klaget på for flott norsk feltsykehus til Tsjad*. 18.11.2010

²⁶³ Respondent 102; Eide in Dagsavisen, *Svindyr i Tsjad*, 15.05.2010.

²⁶⁴ *Klaget på for flott norsk feltsykehus til Tsjad*. Aftenposten, 18.11.2010; Solhjell, R. in *Ny Tid FN-landet Norge?* 20.05.2010.

²⁶⁵ Toje, A. ‘Norsk utenrikspolitikk – en kritikk’. In *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift*, 2010, 207.

the average Norwegian standard. We use an enormous amount of money when we do something - *hell of a lot of money* - and we do it well.²⁶⁶

In sum, Norway chose to provide an expensive hospital to an international operation – thus representing an *image* of Norway as a country that makes an extra effort. Promoting an image as a generous UN member might have been motivational for engaging in Chad, but the expensive hospital did in the end backfire. If another country would have been willing to take over the running of the hospital, Norway's departure would not have appeared so irresponsible, and the image as a country committed to peace, would perhaps have been maintained.

Committed to peace or security?

Based on the Norwegian *commitment to peace*, it is argued that contributing to a peacekeeping operation in Africa is important in itself. The Norwegian engagement policy can thus be described as a platform for how Norway *wants* to behave. The problems arise when the idealistic aspirations materialize into real life politics: it will often occur a clash between *being* and *doing*. If Norway had an unlimited commitment to restore peace in Chad and securing the lives of IDP's, the Norwegian troops would not have departed MINURCAT. In real world situations, the commitment to peace is thus regulated by other factors, such as budgetary and military constraints. As stated by a Senior Advisor at the MFA, political will in itself cannot enable an endless stream of funds and resources.²⁶⁷ Even a wealthy country like Norway must prioritize its spending, and as the NAF already was involved in the ISAF-operation in Afghanistan, they were clearly stretched. Unnecessary to state, Afghanistan is substantially different from Chad; terror in the region poses as a more distinct threat to Norway's security, and contributing to ISAF is considered a better way of communicating support and commitment to Norway's closest allies. This factor is emphasised in the 2009 Government proposition *Interests, opportunities and responsibilities*,²⁶⁸ stating that 'expectations that our allies will engage for the benefit of Norwegian interests, if we ever need it, is closely related to our willingness to participate in the NATO-led

²⁶⁶ Eide, *Svindyrt i Tsjad*, Dagsavisen, 15.05.2010

²⁶⁷ Respondent 101.

²⁶⁸ Author's translation.

operations.²⁶⁹ In the dilemma between idealism and reality, state security and alliances with military powers appears to precede humanitarian concerns.

When discussing the interplay between *being* and *doing*, in this regard translated to values and interests, Professor Matlary's study of political considerations is of use. The study showed that Norwegian decision-makers seldom reflect on how a value-based agenda can translate into interest-based results. Perhaps the withdrawal from MINURCAT can be explained by an inability to envision how a value-based agenda could translate into more benefiting results? The previous sections have illustrated that an idealistic agenda of contributing to Africa was interspersed with interest-based factors such as re-affirming commitment to the UN, securing stability in the Central African region, and training the NAF for future UN-operations. But as the NAF capabilities were pressured, the more strategic operation in Afghanistan was considered more important. Perhaps the reason for the discontinuation can be explained by Norwegian policy-makers incapability to recognizing peacekeeping in Africa as important? According to Harpviken and Skjelsbæk, the Norwegian engagement policy is based on a 'naïve idealism, which overlooks essential Norwegian interests.'²⁷⁰ If the operation in Chad had been characterized by more interest-based traits, the political scenario would perhaps have played out differently. NUPI researchers Benjamin de Carvalho, Randi Solhjell and Jon Harald Sande Lie, claim that the conflict in Chad is of interest to Norway. The problem is rather how the Norwegian government perceives the situation:

It is important that Norway is involved in conflicts other than Afghanistan; to gain international experience from several conflicts and thus be better equipped to face new challenges in the future. Chad is not Afghanistan. Chad is more important than Afghanistan. In Chad, Norwegian forces make a difference.²⁷¹

In sum, basing a contribution to a peacekeeping operation on values and necessity is apparently not enough to sustain a long-term commitment. When pressured, the Norwegian government chose to concentrate on the mission in Afghanistan. As the previous section illustrated, this can be explained by either a lack of strategic interests

²⁶⁹ The Norwegian Government, *Stortingsmelding 15: Interesser, muligheter og ansvar*, 2009, 96.

²⁷⁰ Harpviken and Skjelsbæk, 2010b, 380.

²⁷¹ Cited in Dagbladet, *Valgflesk i Tsjad*, 18.03.2010.

in Africa, or an inability to recognize how peacekeeping in Africa can be in Norway's self-interest.

6.2.3 From entering to exiting: what caused the political motivations to change?

This thesis has persistently referred to Norway's role as a nation of peace, with both broad international legitimacy related to not being a former colonial power, as well as an international engagement connected to altruism and solidarity.²⁷² Affirming its role as an ally of Western states and a loyal member of the UN, Norway has participated in a number of peacekeeping operations, both NATO –and UN-led missions. Chapter 5 demonstrated how Norway has engaged in conflicts where they had little or no strategic interests. Furthermore, the contribution to MINURCAT was a continuation of an overall objective to support UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, and to restore the support of Western states in this fairly neglected region. Norway made an example as a devoted member of the UN, dedicated to peacekeeping efforts in regions relatively unrelated to the war on terror. By doing so, Norway introduced values such as 'solidarity' and 'humanitarianism' to a dialogue that increasingly has been characterized by 'preventing threats to national security' and 'a battle of opposing ideals and values'.

Joining a UN operation emphasised that Western states could be able to do two things: safeguarding national interests in supporting ISAF forces and promoting altruistic values by contributing to peace and stability in remote conflicts. This might have been the ambition when Norway chose to place troops in Chad, but this thinking cannot have been present when they chose to discontinue the contribution. During the period of deployment, the willingness and ability to grant the necessary means for an extended presence diminished. Researchers and commentators have offered various explanations for the changes that occurred during this time-period, one being the US decline of a joint continuation of the running of the hospital.²⁷³ During August and September 2009, State Secretary Eide initiated several discussions with the US to join

²⁷² Tørres, L. *Globalisering og utfordringer for norsk engasjementspolitikk*. 2000.

²⁷³ Hansen, interview 4.11.2010

the running of the hospital.²⁷⁴ However, Eide does not confirm that the US decline was a contributing factor to Norway's decision: 'although it would have been rewarding to cooperate with the US in Chad, their decline does not explain the Norwegian withdrawal.'²⁷⁵

Another interpretation of the assumed change in the political considerations is the claim that the government was opting for political support prior to the 2009 election by meeting one of the Soria Moria ambitions. This was also rejected by political advisors at the Ministry of Defence and the MFA, arguing that there is little popular support to gain by deploying peacekeeping efforts in Africa. Rather, it is easier to increase popularity by placing military efforts in regions that are neither declared as Norway's main partners nor the countries that need Norway's support the most. This might be explained by a more general trend on the international arena following the War on Terror: Globalisation and great-power politics are increasingly affecting Norwegian's perception of external threats, and consequently shaping the political agenda. Moreover, it can be argued that the value-based willingness of the Norwegian government to engage in Chad was eventually affected by the more general strategic interests of the 'international community' thus changing the political motivations, helping explain the brief mission in Chad. One explanatory factor for why Norway chose to contribute to MINURCAT was to prepare the NAF for UN-led operations post-Afghanistan. It has been argued that the focus of Western states' will move from state building in Afghanistan to peacekeeping in Africa. However, this is not a shift that can take place before the ISAF troops have withdrawn from Afghanistan. In the meantime it is likely that commitments to conflict solving in African countries will be characterized by more short-term deployment, like the Norwegian MINURCAT contribution.

Although the claim that the contribution to MINURCAT was a political strategy to gain popular support was refuted, the 2009 election was indeed important for the political will to continue efforts in Chad. Firstly, Grethe Faremo was appointed as the

²⁷⁴ Karlsud, interview 09.06.2011

²⁷⁵ Interview 16.05.2011.

new Minister of Defence, and she did naturally not have same relation to the decision-making processes regarding MINURCAT. Secondly, Sigbjørn Johnson was appointed Minister of Finance, and due to the 2008 financial crisis he was forced to pursue a much stricter policy regarding Norway's extensive investments in the hospital.²⁷⁶ The scenario had changed: the new political leadership did not have the same portfolios and engagement as the previous ministers and the financial situation had limited the political capacities.

²⁷⁶ Respondent 102; Karlsrud, interview 09.06.2011.

CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study has been to address the basic motives and rationales for the Norwegian contribution to MINURCAT and assess how much relative influence the differing interests and values had on the decision-making processes. It was viewed as critical for the validity of this thesis to begin with an outline of the current debate on how the concepts of interests and values are applied to understand states' behaviour. It has been argued that it is difficult to define what motivates states to participate in peacekeeping operations, as the rationales consist of a complex set of outspoken and more 'hidden' factors. Case studies based on interviews and document analyses are especially prone to the challenges of validity, because it essentially depends on the research design and the questions at hand. The explorative design of this thesis has allowed for flexibility in discovering explanatory variables for the MINURCAT contribution, but there is no guarantee for knowing whether an inclusion of other variables would have led to different results.

The framework of interests and values was used as theoretical tools to assess how the concepts could shed light on the political considerations. The hypotheses presented were used as analytical tools to evaluate to what extent the differing factors influenced the considerations. When exploring the two concepts, new sub-variables emerged, thus broadening the understanding of the political processes. In the analysis it was argued that 'ethics of responsibility' appeared to have been the initial motivation for engaging in Chad: through the MINURCAT contribution Norway wanted to inspire other Western states to commit to peacekeeping in Africa. By applying a high quality field hospital, EUFOR countries were confident of the security of their troops, and chose to re-hat to the MINURCAT mission. Consequently, one part of Norway's ambition was achieved. However, when applying ethics of responsibility, the actor must show a willingness to invest until the final results are achieved. By initially limiting the contribution to one year, the Norwegian government was thus restricting its overall commitment to the operation. This was not necessarily a problem, as it was planned for Russia to continue the running of the hospital when Norway departed. However, in

late 2009, it became clear that Russia was not able to act on its promise, and the UN was left without adequate medical support. This time, the need for Norway's continuation was more acute, and the premises for UN's request had thus changed. Even so, Norway chose to remain at its decision to depart Chad in May. Leaving a peacekeeping operation that so outspokenly needed Norway's assistance cannot be classified as 'ethics of responsibility'.

Throughout this thesis it has been argued that limiting the contribution to one year signalled a lack of responsibility to the situation in Chad. It has been referred to USG Malcorra's argument that an enabling force necessitates a more long-term deployment of troops. This was not doable in the case of Chad, because the UN troops were evicted before such objectives could be achieved. But as known, Norway chose to discontinue its efforts before this decision was official. Knowing that the fundamental objectives of the MINURCAT contribution could only be achieved by a long-term deployment, Norway did nevertheless state that they could only manage a one-year contribution. As Senior Advisors argued, there was political will to continue the efforts beyond the one-year time frame, but this willingness was restrained by the NAF's capacities. As the implementation of the political aspirations had been challenged by the military constraints, Norway's motivation was thus reduced to an action guided by values more similar to 'ethics of conviction': The Norwegian government was only willing to 'do good' by contributing with a field hospital in Abéché, but was not able or willing to continue the efforts. The 'lack of something extraordinary' proved that the commitment to the operation was limited by practical concerns and other priorities.

As the analysis illustrated, the motivations for contributing to MINURCAT were indeed composed of several other variables than the 'will to do good'. The preference of deploying troops to MINURCAT instead of the UN operation in Haiti was explained as the government's ambition to support the UN in Africa. Re-affirming Norway's commitment to the UN has consistently been emphasised by interviewees as an important motivational factor. Multilateralism has been highly valued by Norwegian politicians, and it has been argued that cooperation with more powerful states as well as good relations with the international community has been important to

a small country like Norway. The overall ambition of re-affirming commitment to the UN through the deployment of troops can be understood as a rather interest-based motivational factor: Image and prestige is a way of enhancing Norway's 'soft power' on the international scene. Deputy Military Advisor Holmen argued that this was accomplished by a one-year deployment, and in the long run the discontinuation of the hospital did hardly damage an already stated dedication.²⁷⁷ Contrary to Holmen's argument, Karlsrud claimed that the relatively short and rather expensive contribution did not produce the wanted political prestige within the UN.²⁷⁸ Norway was critiqued for spending an extensive amount of resources without a complementary political commitment and endurance.

However, the decision of supporting the UN in Africa translates as a rather general goal and does not explain the specific contribution to Chad. One reason for this choice was arguably that the military expertise was transferable from the long-term commitment to neighbouring Sudan. Even though it became evident that the military engineers were not needed in Chad after all, Norway still stuck by its decision. This was explained by the commitment to Sudan, and the motivations for contributing to UNAMID were thus influencing the decision to engage in Chad. The involvement in Sudan was characterized by the 'need'-factor together with more interest-based factors such as political and economic interests and Chad was thus chosen as 'next door' solution. But as the situation in Chad was *less acute* and had *little political and economic importance* to Norway, the element of transferability was perhaps too small to induce a sustainable commitment to MINURCAT. In other words: interest-based factors motivated the Norwegian government to contribute to Chad, but as those factors proved to be less relevant than first expected, the motivations for continuing the efforts in Chad diminished.

A third explanation for why Norway preferred Chad to Haiti required a discussion of the general trends of international security concerns. As the attention of the NAF primarily had been directed towards Afghanistan, the military did arguably need to diversify its capabilities by participating in other types of conflicts. This is especially

²⁷⁷ Holmen, 10.06.2011.

²⁷⁸ Karlsrud, interview 09.06.2011.

due to the predicted withdrawal of ISAF, which will lead to the deployment in other types of conflicts. Hence, one motivational factor for a short-term commitment in Chad was to prepare the NAF for future military operations in Africa. If a substantial part of the motivation for deploying troops in Chad can be explained by a desire to re-introduce the military to the UN and Africa, a short-term and rather ‘easy’ contribution is reasonable. However, basing a commitment on military needs necessitates considerable interest-based explanations, and reduces the validity of altruism and solidarity as motivational factors.

This thesis has detected evidence that supports the assumption that value-based motives initiated the Norwegian efforts in Chad. Furthermore, Norway was prepared to contribute to a greater extent than what the UN expected. However, this was only related to the costs and not the duration of the contribution. Norway had initially limited the efforts to one year, and stuck by its decision even though they were requested to stay. This thesis has deduced two explanations for this choice of action: The one-year contribution did apparently allow for the fulfilment of the political objectives set by the government: Norway’s self-image as a *nation of peace* was once again asserted, and the UN also noted its ‘hands-on’ commitment: Norway’s ‘soft power’ had been strengthened. In addition, the NAF was introduced to peacekeeping in Africa and returned with new experiences and arguably a more positive view on UN operations: thus Norway’s military power had been strengthened as well. Linking the findings to the hypotheses, it suggests that even though values were explanatory for Norway’s initial commitment to peacekeeping, it is gathered that national interests – or rather lack of interests in Chad, was explanatory for the decision to limit the contribution to one year.

In sum, it is argued that the MINURCAT contribution did not fully re-affirm Norway’s objective to ‘reintroduce a commitment to the UN and restore the balance between the contributions to the UN compared to NATO operations,’²⁷⁹ but instead symbolized a stepping-stone in the predicted transition from Afghanistan to Africa.

²⁷⁹ Eide, interview 16.05.2011.

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Appendix

Interview guide

1. What was your role in considerations concerning Norway's contribution to MINURCAT?
2. If we assume that Norwegian foreign policy is characterized by a dualism, in which both values and interests characterize the decision-making processes: Would you say that one of the lines was more important than the other in the decision to contribute to MINURCAT?
3. How important was the desire to help in Sudan?
4. What was the reaction within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when they received the request(s) from the UN?
5. How was the relationship between the MFA, MOD and the NAF in the decision-making processes?
6. How and why was it decided that the enabling force would last one year?
7. After several negotiations, the final result was that Norway refused to continue the contribution. How do you explain this behavior?
8. Are there challenges related to this decision? Are you familiar with any negative reactions from the United Nations?
9. Does this experience tell us something about the trends of Norwegian foreign policy of today?
10. Can the considerations tell us something about a general lack of political will to commit for a longer period in operations in Africa?

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