Attitudes towards Gender Equality in South Africa

Changes and variations in the period 1990-2007.

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Content

Tables and figures

1 Introduction

The issue of gender equality continues to be an issue on the global agenda, even on into the 21st century. There has been substantial progress towards global gender equality, but great disparities still persist. Women in many societies face substantial gaps in the division of household responsibilities, limitations in educational opportunities and economical resources, as well as legal and structural barriers to political power (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 4-5).

In the '60s and the '70s economic growth was emphasized as the most effective strategy for achieving human development and improving the living conditions and the status of women, and there was hope that economic development would automatically benefit women in poorer societies. By the end of the twentieth century, the limitations of growth were clear, and it has since become clear that the problems of gender equality are more complex and intractable than the early theorists assumed (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 4-5).

Gender equality is still a topic of debate, and although there has been substantial progress towards gender equality in much of the world, great disparities still exist (Norris and Inglehart 2003: 3). Because of the great differences existing between countries, a great amount of research on the causes of gender inequality has been performed. After the limitations of economic growth as a key to improve the status of women became clear, researchers found that cultural barriers helped to explain a great deal. Nevertheless, systematic survey evidence monitoring cultural attitudes toward gender equality across many societies remains scattered and inconclusive (Inglehart and Norris 2003:10).

However, we have seen that rising gender equality has been a part of a global trend. Gender equality is a central tenet of what in the Western world[1] is considered to be democracy. And democracy is spreading - as are democratic values and egalitarian attitudes (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 284). Democratization and rising gender equality go hand in hand, and they are among the recent worldwide movements towards a more prosperous everyday life for many women.

South Africa is a country which is part of this global trend, and has gone through major structural changes in a short period of time, including improved living conditions and improvements in the social status of women. Since South Africa had its first free election in

[1] With the term "Western World" I refer to Western Europe, Northern America, Australia and New Zealand.

1994, the country has not only changed from the apartheid regime into a legitimate democracy, but has also gone through economic and social developments. As a part of this process, South Africa has gained the status of a "gender promoting" nation, and has been ranked as one of the world's most gender equal countries by the World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap index (Hausmann et. al. 2010). These developments have clearly led to structural changes in the lives of South African women, but this does not necessarily indicate that the attitudes towards gender equality held by South Africans themselves has changed. I would argue that changing social structures are necessary for this development, and that such changes might lead to acceleration in the "rising tide" towards gender equality[2].

1.1 Research Questions

The thesis will thereby be concerned with two main research questions:

1. How have attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa changed over time?

2. What can explain variations in attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa? I.e., do differences in social structure explain the variation in this matter or can different value dimensions provide a better explanation?

Both research questions are addressing South Africa's population on an individual level. The study will explore why there presumably is a gap between two types of gender equality in South Africa: the integration of women in South African society on an aggregate level, and the traditional values and negative attitudes towards gender equality found in the population on an individual level[3]. In addition, I seek to examine the attitudinal variations present, both among individuals and over time. By doing this I am at the same time testing whether revised theories on modernization, cultural and value change can be used in explaining attitudinal variation in a developing country.

To explore the variations in attitudes towards gender equality over time, the focus will be on finding out which explanations are the most fruitful: Value-based explanations or structural explanations. According to Ronald Inglehart (1997) modernization leads to value change. Inglehart and Norris (2003) have found that value changes have led to changes in attitudes

[2] "The Rising Tide" is the title of Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris' book on gender equality, referring to the rise in worldwide gender equality.
[3] By "aggregate" level I am referring to the national level.

towards gender equality. However, modernization takes much longer than 17 years. I nevertheless expect the process of modernization undergoing in South Africa to have led to changes in terms of attitudes towards gender equality at this point, and I wish to explore if such changes are detectible in South Africa in this time period.

I will look at the variations and the changes over time by using data from World Value Survey, with data collected in South Africa in four surveys in 1990, 1996, 2001 and 2007. I will be doing a statistical analysis, using the OLS method of regression analysis and the effect change design. I will be discussing this in detail in chapter four. The moment of democratic transition[4] (1990-1994) is relevant because gender egalitarianism is a one of core ideas of a democratic society. Not only did South Africa become a democracy at that time, but the country also experienced a change in its societal structure. I wish to explore how the situation is now, as compared to at the time of the democratic transition.

1.2 Overview and background

Before 1990 South Africa was a non-democratic, discriminating society, as the country was governed by an ethnic minority while the majority of the population was living under poor conditions (Seekings 2007: 1-3). From 1990 to 2007 the country's GNI per capita[5] increased from 3,220 US$ to 5,730 US$ (UN data 2011). Compared to the economic developments in many European countries, the "miracle" of East Asia and American developments, this increase is not of great dimensions, but it is nevertheless an impressive improvement for an African country. Even though disparities exist and other factors play a role, research has found a positive relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction (Roemer and Gugerty 1997: 9). Also, we know that the countries in the world with the highest standard of living are, with few exceptions, democracies (UNDP 2010).

In South Africa, the democratic transition began around 1990, and in 1994 the country had its first democratic election. South Africa is unique in an African context, because of its late democratization, the history of apartheid, and the country's economic development. The

[4] Apartheid ended in 1990 and the first democratic election was in 1994.
[5] Gross national income (GNI) comprises the value within a country (i.e. its gross domestic product) together with its income received from other countries, less similar payments made to other countries (Cf. Lequillier and Blades 2006).

southernmost state of Africa is also the most advanced economy on the African continent (Butler 2009: 55).

South Africa is nevertheless no unique case in having experienced structural societal change in its recent past. Since the Second World War and throughout the past decades the world has changed radically. Particularly the Western world has changed, and concepts such as "modernization" have been established when conceptualizing these changes. Democracy is spreading and so are democratic values and egalitarian attitudes. In the western world and in affluent democracies egalitarian attitudes are included in the democratic society (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 284). It has taken a long time, but now women have achieved a socio-legal status equal to men, including the right to vote, to participate politically, to have a working career, and several other rights when claiming gender equality in large parts of the world.

South Africa has done well in a regional context, also in terms of gaining gender equality. In the Global Gender Gap report, published yearly by the World Economic Forum (WEF)[6], South Africa was ranked as the 12th most "gender equal" country in the world in 2010. The ranking of countries is based on four indicators: Women's economic participation, education, political participation, and health and living conditions of women. The high ranking is much due to South Africa's impressive work in bringing women into parliaments, something which began immediately after the ANC[7] took over the government. Major changes have occurred for the women in South Africa since before the democratic transition, with the 1994 election resulting in women comprising 27% of all parliamentarians (Goetz 1998:250). This happened largely to ANC's internal quota system, and pushed South Africa from almost the bottom of the world classification of women in national parliaments to close to the top. This was a tremendous change, given that the total number of women in parliament had never previously exceeded eight (Geisler 2000: 606).

Today, women in South Africa are participating in politics and the labor force to a large extent, as compared to other developing countries. The radical changes towards gender equality have been politically initiated. During the 1990s the South African government started up several initiatives to improve the status of women (Geisler 2000: 610-616).

[6] "The World Economic Forum is an independent organization committed to improve the state of the world, by engaging business, political, academic and other leaders of society to shape global, regional and industry agendas" (WEF 2011).

[7] ANC: African National Congress, the political party that won the 1994-election, and it has won every election since.

Political and economic quotation was introduced in the country. The ranking of South Africa as a gender equal country is thus elite-initiated, promoted by politicians who are likely to belong to the higher classes of society in terms of education, income level and profession.

South Africa is at an early stage of the development process, compared to countries in Europe, Asia, Australia, and the Americas. Thus, the introduction of gender equality policies in South Africa was, in that sense, not a natural stage of their development. Rather this is something that has been introduced by politicians, initiated by a strong women's movement in the early '90s (Hassim 2005: 180-182). Reaching the same level of gender equality in politics, has taken a long time in countries that are gender equal today. The great rise of women in the Norwegian parliament happened during the 1970's and 1980's (Stortinget 2010), which was at a late stage in Norway's developmental process, as compared to South Africa.

In 2010 South Africa was ranked number 110 out of 169 countries on the HDI index, with a value of 0.597 (UNDP 2010). South Africa is an agrarian society (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 34). Research has shown that people living in societies with a high degree of traditional values can be expected not to have gender equality as a prioritized topic of concern (Inglehart and Norris 2003:155-156). We can expect South Africa to be a society with high degree of traditional values; thus, it is unlikely that the majority of South African citizens would place gender equality as a topic of high concern.

Research has shown that there is a strong and significant relationship between attitudes towards women in politics and the actual proportion of women in parliament (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 138). It is not yet confirmed that more women in parliament will lead to more "female-friendly" policies, or that egalitarian values in society have an effect on the democratic process, but some research has showed that there might be such a relationship (Reynolds 1999: 549). If such a relationship exists, a change towards more positive attitudes towards gender equality could indicate an increasingly democratized South Africa.

Hopefully, if we gain a better understanding of the relationship between gender equality on the aggregate level in developing countries on one hand and the attitudes held by the citizens on the individual level on the other, we might improve our understanding of how to carry on the rising tide of global gender equality.

1.3 Why South Africa?

It is a fact that radical changes in attitudes towards gender equality in the western world have occurred (Inglehart and Norris 2004: 3). In the non-industrialized world, including Africa, the topic has not been given the same attention. All countries on the African continent are still under development and undergoing societal changes. South Africa is chosen as the case of study because South Africa is a developing country where gender equality is a contemporary topic of debate, and because South Africa is at a point in its history where one can except to see undergoing structural changes, both on an aggregate and individual level. As mentioned, South Africa has gone through a rapid transformation from an underdeveloped non-democracy to an increasingly industrialized democratic nation in two decades.

In addition to the present economic and the political changes, South Africa is an interesting object of study due to its unique history of apartheid. The country has experienced a long and recent history of societal inequality, and has been a society where non-egalitarian attitudes were deeply rooted. During the period of apartheid, major inequalities existed between the different ethnicities and this relationship of inequality from the past has since affected the policies chosen by the post-democratic government. Despite the development process, South Africa is still a developing country with the majority of the population holding onto traditional and survival values (Inglehart and Welzel 2005:57). People holding these values are likely to be more negative towards gender equality than people holding the opposite - secular-rational and self-expression values (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 153-156).

As a result, South Africa's highly ranked position on the Global Gender Gap index is not due to societal change "from below". Instead, it is caused by the actions from the women's movement and politicians within the ANC. The number of women in South African politics is a direct result of a gender promotion strategy adopted in 1997, including the use of gender quotas (Cf. Bauer 2006; Geisler 2000). All the countries in the Southern African region (SADC)[8] have been adopting the same strategy, but few with results as positive as those in South Africa.

[8] The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is an inter-governmental organization. The members are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The politicians of South Africa and other developing countries have prioritized putting gender equality on the agenda, a value which is strongly linked to the "modern world". This leads to the core of my thesis: What tendencies can be found in terms of attitudes towards gender equality in a country undergoing development, structural and societal changes, while at the same time strategies towards more gender equality are implemented? Are these strategies only giving South Africa international status, or are they actually changing the lives of women on an individual level?

1.4 Disposition of the Thesis

Chapter two will focus on the theoretical background of the study, providing definitions and giving explanations of the relevant concepts. Central is the difference between attitudes and values, and how these concepts are interconnected. Moreover, I will the differences between structural and values based explanations. I will present parts of the work of Ronald Inglehart, the theories of value change and how these theories are relevant for the study of attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa. Further on, I will describe the different value dimensions I will be using in this study. I will present fifteen hypotheses based on the theoretical background I am presenting, stating what results I am expecting to find in the analysis.

Chapter three will be an introduction to the South African case clarifying the context of the study. A brief historical background focusing on the Apartheid-regime and the transition to democracy will be given, and the focus will be on understanding what South African society looked like before democracy in 1994 and the years before that, and how South Africa has changed since 1990. I will also give brief background information on relevant issues in the South African context. In this chapter I will also present some data on the social status of women in South Africa over time to provide some background information, and present some indicators explaining the economical situation of South Africa and data from the United Nations placing South Africa in a comparative perspective on Human Development indicators.

In chapter four I will present the dataset I am using, in addition to the operationalization of the different variables and a presentation of the use of regression analysis as a method of analysis. Moreover, I will discuss the challenges I face by using survey data and other methodological

difficulties, including a discussion of the validity and reliability of the study. I will also present the effect change design, which I am using to interpret my findings, and what advantages and disadvantages I can expect when using these methods of analysis and design. In addition to the operationalization of the dependent and the independent variables, I will present some detailed information about the variables, such as their mean values and standard deviations.

In the fifth chapter I will address the first research question: Whether attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa have changed over time. I will present a correlation matrix, showing the correlations between the dependent variable and all the dependent variables over time, and discuss my findings from the bivariate analyses.

In chapter six I show the results of sequential regression analyses with attitudes towards gender equality as the dependent variable. The results are presented in four tables. I will analyze the results by using the effect change design based on Hellevik (1988). I will go through the hypotheses presented in chapter two and all hypotheses will either be confirmed or not confirmed based on my findings. I will also go through what has been my main findings over time, and I will discuss briefly what I believe might be the reason in those cases where I get unexpected results from the analysis.

Chapter seven will include concluding remarks, based on the results of the correlation matrix, the bivariate analyses and the four sequential analyses. Here I will conclude to what extent the analysis provided sufficient results to answer the research problems I addressed. I will summarize with my main findings and I will focus on the changes I have seen over time, and the effects that appear to be the most important ones. I will present a review of the fifteen hypotheses I presented in chapter two in a table which gives an overview of the results of the topics addressed in the hypotheses in all four survey years. I will conclude by commenting on any tendencies that I have discovered in the results of my thesis.

2 Theoretical background

2.1 Introduction

The work in this thesis is based on the theoretical concepts of gender equality, attitudes, and values. Furthermore, I wish to explore whether theories created to explain social change in the developed world can also be used for explaining social change in a developing country. These theories include concepts such as modernization, postmodernization, materialist-, and postmaterialist values.

In this chapter I will present these central theoretical components, and briefly explain how they are expected to be interconnected. Moreover, the central aim of the thesis is to study how attitudes towards gender equality have changed over time and what may be the reasons for any such changes in South Africa. In order to explore this, I have chosen to focus on two different paths of explanation: structural explanations and value-based explanations. The structural explanations are based on the work of Daniel Bell (1976), Harold Wilensky (2002) and Johannes Bergh (2006) on the subject. A number of works published by Ronald Inglehart concerning modernization and cultural change form the basis of the value-based explanations. Ronald Inglehart has found that societal change in Western Europe has led to certain predictable changes in people's set of values, something which he refers to as a revised modernization theory (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 15-22). Based on his findings Inglehart has found that two value-dimensions can explain a great deal of this variation: a traditional-secular dimension and a materialist-post-materialist dimension (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 20, 97-106). There is to be an interconnection between people's positions on the value-dimensions and their attitudes towards gender equality (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 15-18). In addition to these two value dimensions, I will include a third value dimension, the left-right materialist dimension, which is based on the findings of Oddbjørn Knutsen (1995) and Johannes Bergh (2006).

First I will present a conceptual description of gender equality, values, and attitudes. Based on the definitions of gender equality and attitudes I will present what I am going define as attitudes towards gender equality in the thesis - what definitions form the basis of my operationalization. This leads to a minor discussion on the predicted relationship between gender equality, attitudes and values. I will also present the causal model that forms the basis

on my thesis. Further on, I will present the structural variables I am using in this thesis and the theories regarding the structural explanations. In addition, I will introduce the value dimensions and the theories related to value change. I will present the differences between "old politics" and "new politics". This will lead to a brief discussion on Inglehart's work on "new politics", modernization, and postmodernization and his findings based on data gathered from the World Value Surveys. Lastly I will present my argument and the hypotheses based on my argument. These are the hypotheses I am going to test in the analyses in chapter five and six.

2.2 Gender equality

The term gender refers to socially constructed roles and learned behavior of women and men associated with the biological characteristics of males and females (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 8).

Gender equality can be difficult to define, because there is no single definition of the concept. One label that may be used could be equal opportunity or the promotion or the advancement of women, but also emancipation, equality, or empowerment of women (Lombardo et. al. 2009: 1). However, gender equality can lose its dynamic when fixed to one particular understanding (Lombardo et. al. 2009: 3).

Since the meaning of gender equality is not explicitly given, several different definitions of gender equality exist. Generally gender equality describes equality between men and women, traditionally what has been called simply "equality" (Cf. Hirsch 2010). The idea of equality is something which is included in the idea of human dignity. Human beings in themselves deserve respect from laws and social institutions. This is an idea that has many roots in the worldwide democratic ideal (Loutfi 2001: 45). Even though no simple definition exists; specific aspects of gender equality are universal, such as access to education, political rights, and employment.

According to Mason (2001), in a gender equal society, women and men are entitled to the same social, legal, and economic rights. More specifically, "a gender system is a set of beliefs and norms, common practices, and associated sanctions through which the meaning of being male and female and the rights and obligations of males and females (…) are defined" (Mason 2001:161).

Inglehart and Norris state that in societies where a culture of gender equality predominates, a climate is provided where de jure legal rights are more likely to be translated into de facto rights in practice. In such a society women embrace expanded opportunities to attain literacy, education and employment (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 8). In the *Rising Tide*, when comparing gender equality in different societies, the indicators used are measuring women's employment, their level of education, the contraceptive prevalence rate, the percentage of very young mothers, the degree of female literacy, a gender-related HDI-index, and female empowerment (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 37).

The Global Gender Gap report

The Global Gender Gap report, published annually by the World Economic Forum, states gender equality in the following way: "The report examines the gap between men and women in four fundamental categories: Economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, political empowerment and health and survival" (Hausmann et. al. 2010:4). The four pillars form a concrete framework for defining and measuring gender equality. This index ranks countries according to their proximity to gender equality, rather than to women's empowerment, and uses 14 different indicators in order to form the four pillars (Hausmann et. al. 2010:5).

The first pillar, economic participation and opportunity[9], is measured by female labor force participation, wage equality between women and men for similar work, estimated female earned income, female legislators, senior officials and managers, and female professional and technical workers.

Pillar two, educational attainment, is measured by educational attainment, female literacy rate, female net primary level enrolment, female net secondary level enrolment, and female gross tertiary level enrolment.

Pillar three, health and survival**,** is measured by female healthy life expectancy and sex ratio at birth.

The indicators forming pillar four, political empowerment, are the number of women with seats in parliament, women at the ministerial level, and the number of years with a female head of state or government (Hausmann et. al. 2010: 5).

[9] All indicators are converted to female over male ratio.

United Nations' Gender Inequality Index

The United Nations' Gender Inequality Index (GII) reflects women's disadvantages in three dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment, and economic activity. Reproductive health is measured by maternal mortality and adolescent fertility rates, while empowerment is measured by the share of parliamentary seats held by each gender and attainment at secondary and higher education by each gender. Economic activity is measured by the labor market participation rate for each gender. This index replaces the previous Gender-related Development Index and Gender Empowerment Index used by the UN. The GII shows the loss in human development is due to inequality between female and male achievements in the three GII dimensions (UNDP 2011). The aggregation of the GII dimensions is done to capture the inequality between women and men. The GII is expressed as the relative difference between two means: the harmonic mean and the reference mean. The reference mean is obtained assuming equality of genders in all three GII dimensions (UNDP 2011).

On this index, South Africa was ranked as number 82 in 2008, much lower than on the Global Gender Gap index (UNDP 2010).

Gender empowerment

Perhaps the most important factor when speaking of an increased level of gender equality in South Africa is that women have entered the political arena and the national economy to an increased degree. Gender empowerment can be measured by the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM). The GEM measures women's participation and is calculated by tracking the number of seats in parliament, the number of female legislators, senior officials and managers, and the number of female professional and technical workers, in addition to the gender disparity in earned income (UNDP 2007/2008).

In her analysis of the steps which women must overcome on their way up the parliamentary system, Nina Raaum use four institutional thresholds developed by political scientist, Stein Rokkan (1970; 1987): 1) Legitimization, the stage where women conquer public space for their interests; 2) Incorporation, the introduction of universal suffrage and the right to stand for election; 3) Representation in parliament; and lastly 4) The executive power, the achievement of cabinet and ministerial power (Raaum 2004: 137-139). In South Africa, black women overcame these four steps almost "over night" in 1994.

Indicators addressing gender equality

In this thesis I am going to use the indicators used in the Global Gender Gap report, the GEM, and the Global Inequality Index as a framework for my own definition of gender equality, in addition to my own assumptions.

Also, I will address the division of gender roles in the home and in the family in my definition, as also done by Inglehart and Norris (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 31). In this indicator I will include that women should be able to have children without depending economically on a man, that women should have the right to choose not to have children. In practice, this includes access to paid birth leave, legalized abortion, and access to contraceptives. I regard the following six main indicators/questions as overall measures of gender equality:

i. To what degree should men and women have the same access to education?
ii. To what degree should men and women have the same access to employment?
iii. To what degree should men and women have the same access to health care, food and other necessities?
iv. To what degree should men and women have the same access to political empowerment?
v. To what degree should men and women have the same family rights (division of work in home/family)?
vi. To what degree should a woman be independent of a man, in order to have and to raise children and to keep a family?

Hence, in a society with equality for men and women, the answer to all questions is "full degree".

2.3 Values

A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence. Moreover, a value exists in a state along a continuum of relative importance (Rokeach 1973: 5). A value is a single belief and transcends objects and situations; it is a standard (Rokeach 1973: 18).

Van Deth and Scarbrough define values as something that cannot be observed, they can engage moral considerations and they are conceptions of the desirable (Van Deth and Scarbrough 1994: 28). Moreover, values appear to be crucial in explaining social and political change. Milton Rokeach argues that the antecedents of human values can be traced to culture, society, and its institutions, and that the consequences of human values will be manifested in virtually all phenomena that social scientists might consider worth investigating and understanding (Rokeach 1973: 3).

Political values are prescriptive beliefs which individuals would like to see implemented in the political system (Knutsen and Kumlin 2005: 125). Value orientations often originate in socio-political cleavages. Moral value dimensions and economic left-right values are often referred to as "old politics", while "new politics" refers to value conflicts emerging from post-industrial society (Knutsen and Kumlin 2005: 125). Other ways of conceptualizing "new politics" is by including an environment versus economic growth value dimension, or a materialist-non-materialist value dimension. It is reasonable to argue that the materialist-postmaterialist value dimension incorporates significant aspects of the other post-industrial dimensions (Knutsen and Kumlin 2005: 126). Therefore I do not see it as necessary to include all three in this analysis.

The central value dimension that will be used when analyzing the relationship between value orientation and attitudes towards gender equality are:

The central value dimensions in the thesis

1. Religious versus secular values
2. Materialist versus post-materialist values
3. Economic left versus economic right values.

The first and the third value dimensions mainly measure "old politics", whilst the second dimension measures the presence of "new politics". According to Bergh (2006) all three value dimensions can be expected to be connected to attitudes towards gender equality.

2.4 Attitudes

The two concepts of attitudes and values are connected, but they are not one in the same and must therefore be distinguished from one another. An attitude differs from a value in that an

attitude refers to an organization of several beliefs around a specific object or situation (Rokeach 1973: 18).

First, attitudes always have an object of reference, and one always has an attitude towards something or someone. Also, attitudes are usually pro or con, favorable or unfavorable, well-disposed or ill disposed, and so on. One is not necessary solely negative or positive, one can be ambivalent, but usually both negative and positive attitudes towards the concept exist (Allport 1961: 347).

Contrary to values, attitudes are no basic and unchangeable elements in someone's personality, but they last much longer than a moment. Therefore, they are relatively lasting (Knutsen 1985:8).

2.5 The Culture shift

Due to societal changes a substantial change has happened in relation to attitudes and values. According to Ronald Inglehart, this "silent revolution" in advanced industrial societies has led to a culture shift, including a change of values and the modernization of society.

During the past 60 years it has become apparent that specific cultural changes have happened in the industrialized world. In *The Silent Revolution (1977),* Ronald Inglehart argues that a shift from materialist to postmaterialist values has happened in the industrialized world. In *Culture Shift in advanced Industrial Society (1990)* it has become apparent that this is only one aspect of a much broader syndrome of cultural change, involving the decline of traditional religious orientations and conventional social and sexual norms (Inglehart 1990:7). In *Modernization and Postmodernization (1997),* Inglehart claims that the changes have led to a shift of values.

Modernization theory is used to explain the modernization of societies, and the central claim of modernization theory is that industrialization is linked with special processes of socio-political change (Inglehart 1997: 8). Modernization theories originated in the works of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 11). The theory has been much disputed because the central claim is that virtually all societies will be changing in the same direction, with social progress and the development of societies. According to modernization theorists, underdeveloped countries have been expected to change culturally in the same matter as the

western world did, regardless of their own culture and heritage. As a response to modernization theorists, one of the main findings in the '80s was that cultural change in non-western societies did show patterns very different from those discovered in the industrialized west (Inglehart and Welzel 2005:17-20).

Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris present a revised modernization theory connected to gender attitudes[10] in *The Rising Tide*. They form a hypothesis stating that human development brings changed cultural attitudes toward gender equality in virtually any society that experiences modernization linked with economic development (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 10). According to Inglehart and Norris, modernization does bring systematic and predictable changes in gender roles, through two key phases: industrialization and post-industrialization. Industrialization brings women into the paid workforce, with natural consequences. Post-industrialization introduce more women to management and political influence. These two phases correspond to two dimensions of cross-cultural variation, namely a transition from traditional to secular-rational values and a transition from survival to self-expression values (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 11).

In the early stages of industrialization there might be forces both leading to the increase of women's rights and at the same time weaken informal family networks that disproportionately hurt women's interests. Societal modernization both expands opportunities for women, while others create new inequalities (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 21). The best explanation for the increased worldwide gender equality is the welfare state and the increasing self-expression values (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 283).

There are three basic reasons for the decline of traditional religious and sexual norms in advanced industrial societies: an increasing sense of security, the welfare state replacing the family, and changing traditional worldviews. The increasing sense of security diminishes the need for absolute norms. Societal and religious norms usually have some functional basis; many of these norms have become less crucial. The welfare state has taken over many of the previous tasks of the family. People's traditional worldviews have changed, due to the lack of consistency between the world as it was painted in the tradition of the Old Testament and the world as it appears now (Inglehart 1994: 177-179).

[10] Attitudes towards gender equality will also be referred to as "gender attitudes" in the thesis.

South Africa is a non-industrialized and a traditional society. One cannot yet expect to find the same patterns of cultural development in South Africa as in the west. Inglehart (1997: 268) already established through the World Value Survey performed in South Africa in 1981, that there were few post-materialists in South Africa at the time, in addition to few differences between the young and the old in having such values. In former value surveys the data from South Africa also showed that the country in the 1980's experienced a movement away from postmodern values. From 1980 to 1990 the South African population became less postmaterialist than earlier - something which can be explained by the economic and political instability in the country in the '80s (Inglehart 1997: 276). In the same period South Africa also shifted toward greater emphasis on religion, thus emphasizing the importance of more traditional and religious values (Inglehart 1997: 284).

However, South Africa has experienced major economic changes and increased prosperity during the 1990s. Therefore I assume that this should have led to a change in the population's set of values, and that their values have become more postmaterialist. If this is the case, then one can expect to find more self-expression values and secular-rational values in South Africa in 2001 and in 2007 than in 1990 and 1996, and these values are linked to gender equality (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 153-156). Thus, this possible change of values might have led to a change towards more positive attitudes towards gender equality.

2.5.1 Attitudes towards gender equality

Briefly stated, attitudes towards gender equality are attitudes that concern gender relations in society (Bergh 2006: 6). As stated above, there is an object of reference involved, in this case gender, and it is a measure of how people perceive different aspects of gender equality.

Over the last 40-50 years, people in advanced industrial societies have seen a change in people's attitudes towards gender equality (Bergh 2006: 5). In advanced industrial societies this is linked to a change of social structure and value change. In traditional societies, gender is generally linked to the religious and biblical meaning of gender roles. Therefore, attitudes towards gender equality are strongly linked to religion (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 53-64). The societies around the Western world used to be much more religious and traditional, and the view that a woman's place was in the home prevailed in western societies well into the twentieth century (Chhibber 2003: 186). Thus, we can expect to find such attitudes in a country under development, such as South Africa.

In this thesis six dimensions form the basis for the definition of attitudes towards gender equality, based on the dimensions related to gender equality. E.g. a person with very positive attitudes towards gender equality would for find that women should have the same right to education as men, that women should have the same right to any job as any man, that women should have the same right to healthcare as men, that women must have all political rights and access to political power and that women should decide over their own family situation without being dependent on a man.

The indicators are all indicators measuring different aspects of a gender equal society, and some of the indicators are likely to have a stronger effect on certain groups, and vice versa. It is likely that people in general find it more important that women should have an equal right to education, than women being equally talented political leaders. An equal right to education is usually implemented in a developing society before the right to equal political representation is, and therefore it is likely that less people have developed positive attitudes at an early stage of the political empowerment of women. Therefore I am using indices measuring different aspects of gender attitudes in this thesis.

2.6 Explanations for change in gender attitudes

By employing the modernization perspective on gender attitudes, one will come across at least two different accounts of how the change in attitudes came about, and why gender attitudes vary: a structural explanation and a values explanation (Bergh 2006: 5). The two are not excluding one another, and the idea here is to present both, and to explore which account is more suitable for explaining possible changes in attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa in the period 1990-2007. This is done by including both structural variables and value-based variables in four regression analyses and by studying statistical data.

2.6.1 Causal model

The causal model illustrates the effect of social structural background and values on gender attitudes.

Table 2.1 Causal Model



The idea in this thesis is to explore how variations in attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa can best be explained: Which explanation variables are relevant and which are not. The causal relationship is that between the social structure the values and the gender attitudes of the South-African population. Social structure can have a direct effect on attitudes because there are no underlying effects. Structural explanations are defined by the social characteristics of the population. Social structure in this thesis is defined as age, gender, ethnicity, region, religion, urban versus rural place of residence, education, income, and social class. Values can both be determined by social structure and have a direct effect on attitudes.

The thesis will examine whether the direct effect of social structure is stronger than the direct effect of values. By performing sequential regression analyses and by interpreting the data with the effect change design, I will be able to see if the effects are direct or indirect and which variables have the stronger effects on gender attitudes.

2.6.2 Structural explanations for attitude change

Harold Wilensky (2002) argues for a structural explanation of the changes in attitudes towards gender equality. Having studied rich countries, he discovers a continuous process of industrialization. The unskilled workers are no longer the dominant group, but the skilled workers are (Wilensky 2002: 186-187). It has become more costly to have children, and there is an increased need of educated labor.

Wilensky (2002) says that with structural change women are receiving higher levels of education, and they are increasingly included in the workforce over time. When women work and study alongside men, the men become more accepting of women. Wilensky claims that individual gender attitudes are shaped by educational achievement and experience of gender relations on the individual level. On the aggregate level, a country's level of economic development should correlate with gender attitudes (Wilensky 2002: 28-30).

By industrialization Wilensky means the increasing and widespread use of 1) tools that multiply the effects of their initial applications of energy and 2) inanimate sources of energy. The convergence theory[11] is based on the idea that as rich countries became richer, they developed similar economic, political, and social structures - and to some extent values and beliefs (Wilensky 2002: 3).

Wilensky found that the more highly developed the country; the higher the female participation rate in the non-agricultural labor force (Wilensky 2002: 6). Ideology also plays a part, however, as Wilensky states that official ideology is a minor influence, and that a country's economic development is a crucial determinant of the status of women (Wilensky 2002: 7).

To measure the effect of social structure on attitudes towards gender equality, I will be using the independent structural variables of gender, age, and ethnicity, urban or rural place of residence, region, religious denomination, income, social class, and education. In the analysis, I will examine to what extent these factors affect gender attitudes, and how these effects are changing over time.

2.6.3 Human values explanations for attitude change

The basic idea behind changing attitudes is the same for both explanations: That socioeconomic development changes people's values, priorities, and attitudes in a number of ways (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 13). A reduction of poverty leads to less material constraints and people do not need to worry about basic needs. Moreover, when people gain increased levels of education and access to mass media this improves the spreading of information and the spreading of knowledge. The development of society also diminishes cognitive constraints on human choice, something which is fuelling a sense of intellectual independence. The change in the workforce is essential, and increased occupational specialization leads to a diversifying of human interaction. Over time, people increasingly free themselves from fixed categories such as gender and class. Economic change does lead to social change, change of values, and change of attitudes (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 12-15).

[11] The convergence theory states that all industrial systems would converge in their social, political and economic systems because of the determinant effects of technological development.

Ronald Inglehart has been a major advocate for the value explanations in change of attitudes (Bergh 2006: 8). The theory of Inglehart with regard to gender attitudes is that the predominant values of advanced industrial societies (especially post-materialist values) facilitates people's acceptance of women's self-realization and equality with men (Bergh 2006: 9; Inglehart and Norris 2003: 63.69). When addressing the question of attitudes towards gender equality, there are two central value dimensions defined by Inglehart (1997) relevant in explaining this matter: the materialist-postmaterialist dimension and the religious-secular value dimension. Both of these dimensions change over time.

The traditional/secular-rational values dimension reflects the contrast between societies in which religion is very important and those in which is it not (Inglehart et. al. 2004: 10). Societies near the traditional pole emphasize the importance of traditional family values; they reject divorce, abortion and suicide, and support a nationalistic outlook. Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite preferences (Inglehart et. al 2004: 11). The values on the materialist- and the postmaterialist value dimension reflect an intergenerational shift from an emphasis on economic and physical security toward one of increasing emphasis on self-expression, subjective well-being and quality of life concerns (Inglehart 1990; 1997; Inglehart et.al. 2004).

Moreover, self-expression values have the strongest effect on gender equality, regardless of which other explanations are included (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 282). Self-expression values are a result of postmodern values. Attitudes towards equal rights for women tend to be rejected in societies where survival seems uncertain, whereas they are increasingly accepted in societies that emphasize self-expression values. The responses to the question whether "Men make better political leaders than women" are very strongly correlated with the survival/self-expression dimension (Inglehart et. al. 2004: 14).

Arguably, gender issues constitute the most central component of value change in post-industrial societies (Inglehart et. al. 2004: 15). Johannes Bergh (2006) has found in his study of modernization and attitudes towards gender equality that values have a strong effect on attitudes towards gender equality. Bergh has studied 17 industrialized countries in Europe, America and Japan, but no non-industrialized countries. Therefore this may possibly be the case exclusively for industrialized countries.

Other scholars have added a third dimension: The economic left-right materialism dimension. This dimension stems from the industrial revolution and class conflict (Knutsen 1995: 2-3). Johannes Bergh refers to this dimension as "egalitarianism". (Bergh 2006: 8). "Left materialism" refers to a belief in, and support for, equality, an active government and harmony between social classes. The other pole, "right materialism", denotes support for personal freedom, a relatively weak government, and economic liberalism (Van Deth 1995: 10). In other words, people holding left materialist values are likely to hold positive attitudes towards gender equality, linked to their support for equality and harmony between the classes.

Thus the three value dimensions are used for measuring the value explanation when studying gender attitudes in this thesis: post-materialism, religiousness, and left-right materialism.

2.7 Argument and hypotheses

South Africa is ranked as a middle income country with traditional values, rather than secular, and the population has slightly more survival values than self-expression values. The religious values are very strong in South Africa. The country has a score of around 85 per cent (Inglehart and Norris 2004: 54). Studies have shown that the attitudes concerning religion and family show high levels of constraint (Inglehart 1990: 182). It is precisely those who have experienced the least economic security in their lives that have the greatest need for guidance from familiar cultural norms and religion (Inglehart 1990:185).

South Africa is a society where traditional and religious values are strong; it is therefore unlikely to find a high presence of positive attitudes towards gender equality. However, since people are experiencing more economical and political security now than in 1990, I expect to see movements in the direction of more positive gender attitudes.

I expect to find that the socio-structural variables will have the strongest effect on attitudes towards gender equality. This I expect because South Africa is at an early stage in the industrializing process, and has not reached the cultural change necessary for values to have a stronger effect on attitudes. At the same time, I expect to see a change over time – that the effect of values is increasingly important in explaining variations in gender attitudes in the period 1990-2007.

A government's promotion of gender equality will affect people's values, but above all this development will manifest most concretely in the upper socio-economic level of society.

Some scholars have found that a very small portion of South Africans prioritize materialistic values (Kotzé and Lombard 2003: 200). I believe value differences can explain a great deal of the gender attitudinal variation, and I believe I will find that there are large socio-structural differences affecting gender attitudes. Moreover I assume that both the structural and the value-based explanations can be used for understanding the relationship between gender attitudes and the independent variables when I discuss the hypotheses.

I have based the following hypotheses on my assumptions:

2.7.1 Hypotheses

H1: In South Africa, there has been a positive shift since the democratic transition, and South Africans have become steadily more positive towards gender equality.

South Africa has become a democracy and experienced economic growth and modernization (Faulkner and Loewald 2008:1-5). Even though South Africa is at an early stage of modernization, I assume that these changes have led to people being more positive towards gender equality today than twenty years ago, based on the theories described in this chapter. The gender equality promotion strategy by the government is also likely to have affected people towards more positive gender attitudes.

H2: Younger people are more likely to have positive attitudes towards gender equality than older people.

Generational comparisons have provided indirect evidence in post-industrial societies that the traditional gender gap is strongest among the elderly (Inglehart and Norris 2004: 161). The change of attitudes is clear in affluent societies, but I believe it is reasonable to believe that this change also is occurring in developing societies. The younger people of South Africa grew up after the end of apartheid and with a more prosperous future and more economic security. The younger generation also experiences the gender promotion strategy implemented in the ‘90s. In affluent societies, younger generations are more likely to be positive towards gender equality than older generations (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 38). I expect to find the same tendency in South Africa.

H3: Women are more likely to have more positive attitudes towards gender equality than men.

In many nations today, women hold more left-leaning values than men. Included in these orientations are postmaterialism and gender equality (Inglehart and Norris 2004: 161). Inglehart and Norris (2003: 41) have found that there are differences between men and women with regards to gender equality in all three types of societies: postindustrial, industrial, and agrarian societies. Thus, this should also be the case for South Africa.

H4: White South Africans are likely to be more positive than black, coloreds and Asians. Black South Africans are likely to be the ethnic group with the most negative attitudes towards gender equality.

I expect to find differences between the ethnicities in attitudes towards gender equality because there are socio-structural differences between the ethnic groups. The income distribution among the South Africans has been in favor of the whites over a long time period, and it still is today (Leibbrandt et. al. 2010: 13). The white ethnic group had economical advantages during apartheid and has been superior over the other ethnic groups. As discussed in chapter two, economic security leads to more postmaterialist values, which again leads to more positive gender attitudes. I assume the black population to be the most negative towards gender equality for the opposite reason. The black population has been the mostly disadvantaged ethnic group in South Africa over a long time period, thus I believe they have more traditional and religious values than the other ethnic groups, and consequently they are more negative towards gender equality than the other groups.

H4B: White Afrikaans speaking South Africans are likely to be more negative towards gender equality than white English speaking South Africans.

I base this hypothesis the assumption that the Afrikaans speaking white community has more traditional values that the English speaking white population. For example, the National Party[12] has taken a more traditional perspective on women in politics, and opposing affirmative action and abortion (Goetz 1998:246). Since people holding more traditional and religious values are likely to be less positive towards gender equality (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 153), I expect to find this tendency among the Afrikaans community.

[12] The National Party was the ruling party during apartheid and had mainly white Afrikaans-speaking members.

H4C: The white population of South Africa has gained more positive attitudes over time, while in the black population attitudes towards gender equality have not remarkably changed since the democratic transition.

Some groups of the South African society have become even better off after the transition, whilst others experienced a decline in their economic situation, including expanding within-race inequality (Faulkner and Loewald 2008: 6-7). In South Africa there is still a racial divide in terms of economical differences. The white population had a better starting point in 1990, and they have increased their living standard over this period of time. From 1993 to 2008 the white population of South Africa increased its per capita income level from ZAR46 486 to ZAR75 295[13] (Leibbrandt et. al. 2010: 13). Due to the theories of societal changes that were discussed in chapter two, the white population is more likely to have gone through a shift of values, which has led to a shift of attitudes towards gender equality. The black population on the other hand, has not experienced a large change in economical terms, and is still the ethnic group with the lowest income level, far below the other ethnic groups (Leibbrandt et. al. 2010: 13). Thus, since this ethnic group has not experienced many changes towards more economical security, I do not expect to find major changes towards gender attitudes in this group.

H5: People living in the cities are likely to be more positive towards gender equality than people living in the countryside.

Lipset and Rokkan (1967) developed a framework for studying social cleavages in western democracies The urban-rural dimension sprang out of the industrial revolution and created a cleavage in the commodity market between peasants and others employed in the primary sector and those who wanted to buy the products of the primary sector, particularly the urban population (Knutsen 2006: xii). These two groups had opposite economic interests, and this gap between the urban and the rural population creates a divide between the two groups in terms of their belonging to different social classes.

The social classes most likely to subscribe to post-materialist values in Western Europe are the new middle class, the better educated and the post-war generations (Inglehart 1997: 448-252). I am expecting to find the same tendency in South Africa, that the social classes residing in urban areas, the middle class and the better educated, are more likely to hold postmodern

[13] Measured in constant 2000 South African Rands.

values, and thus be more positive towards gender equality. In South Africa an urban residential area may provide better access to areas of economic opportunity and to formal education.

H6: There are no significant differences between different regions in South Africa in terms of attitudes towards gender equality, except for the inhabitants of KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and the Western Cape, where the inhabitants are likely to be more positive towards gender equality.

In the same study of the social cleavages of Western Europe, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) identified the regional division as a center-periphery cleavage, associated with the national revolution. This was a conflict related to the central nation-building culture and the increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically and religious subject population in the provinces and the peripheries (Knutsen 2010: 556).

In South Africa, wide variations in economic performance, job availability, and population structure divide the provinces. Jobs are extremely scarce in the rural provinces and poverty is widespread (Butler 2009: 44). Gauteng is the economic heartland of South Africa, accounting for more than a third of the Gross Domestic product (GDP) and contains both Johannesburg and Pretoria[14]. KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) hosts the nation's major port of Durban, and is the most populous province (Butler 2009:44). However, in the provinces of South Africa, the rich and the poor, and a number of different ethnic groups live side by side (Butler 2009:44-46).

South Africa has also gone though a nation-building process during the time period studied in this thesis. After apartheid the government tried to unite the very diverse and scattered nation. However, I expect the nation building process in South Africa to have taken a different path than in Europe, and that the major social cleavages goes between the white and rich and the black and poor, rather than between the central provinces and the peripheries. Thus, I do not expect to find large differences between regions in South Africa with regards to gender equality attitudes, because most regions consist of diverse populations. However, I do believe that the inhabitants of Western Cape[15], KZN and Gauteng to be more positive towards gender equality, due their proximity to the most important cities.

[14] Johannesburg is South Africa's most populous city, while Pretoria is the executive capital.
[15] The economically strong and politically important city of Cape Town is located in the Western Cape.

H7: People that do not belong to a religious denomination are likely to have more positive attitudes towards gender equality than people that belong to a religious denomination. Moreover; I expect to find that the Catholics and the Protestants are the least negative towards gender equality and that the Muslims are the most negative towards gender equality.

An extensive body of work suggests that religion has functioned as one of the most important agencies of socialization determining social norms and moral values with regard to gender equality in all societies and influencing support for feminism and the women's movement (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 50). Inglehart and Norris (2003:67) have found that the type of religion matters far more for beliefs about gender equality than the strength of religiosity. They find that traditional religious values and religious laws have played an important role in reinforcing social norms and a separate and subordinate role for women as homemakers and mothers. The biggest gap they find is between the Islamic societies and religions found in the West (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 68). Reynolds (1999: 568-570) also finds that there are significant differences between women in parliament and the religious denomination held by the majority of the population when comparing many countries. Buddhist, Orthodox Christian, and Muslim countries have significantly lower numbers of women in parliament than do Catholic countries. Moreover, few mainstream religions can reasonably be interpreted as friendly towards the election of women to political office (Reynolds 1999: 551). Also, the literature shows that a Protestant religious heritage improves the status of women in a country (Inglehart and Norris 2003 and Alexander and Welzel 2007 in Jacobs 2009: 28).

H8: People with higher levels of education are likely to be more positive towards gender equality than people with lower levels of education.

Education has long been emphasized as a central factor in encouraging non-traditional attitudes (Kane 1995: 74). The explanations for this relationship can be divided into two groups, where the first emphasizes education as enlightenment and assumes that education can change the fundamental nature of inequality. The second assumes education's impact in such a way as to make it unrelated to any fundamental change and is implying that education reproduces rather than challenges inequality (Kane 1995: 74-75). The ones who argue for education and enlightenment, such as Lipset's (1960) notion, state that people are anti-democratic until they are socialized by educational institutions stressing democratic values (Kane 1995: 75).

Wilensky (2002: 7) argues that the growth in the education level of women (and that of men) leads to women increasingly participating in the labor force, thus this is likely to result in more accepting attitudes towards gender equality amongst men. Men with higher educational levels are more likely to work alongside with women, due to the type of profession they enter after higher education, thus they become more tolerant of gender equality. Moreover, in their cross-national analysis of attitudes towards gender equality, Inglehart and Norris (2003: 47) find that support for gender equality was stronger among the well-educated. Regardless of the foregoing process, the impact of education level on attitudes towards gender equality is clear, and I expect to see the same tendency in South Africa. The effect of education I assume is a combination of increased enlightenment towards democratic and egalitarian values, in addition to social structural change leading to a change of values and attitudes, as women are introduced into the higher positions.

H9: People with higher levels of income are likely to be more positive towards gender equality than people with lower levels of income.

Owen and You (2009: 135) have found on an aggregate level that there is a relationship between income, attitudes towards women and the economic outcomes for women. High-income professions usually means less emphasis on physical strength, and women are increasingly able to partake in the workforce (Owen and You 2009: 136). With increasing levels of income, both women and men are employed in new sectors and belong to other social classes that are more likely to have positive attitudes. In addition, with increasing levels of income, people are more economically secure, which leads to an increasing presence of post-material and self-expression values, as discussed earlier. This again, leads to more positive attitudes towards gender equality.

H10: Respondents belonging to the unskilled workers class and farmers are likely to be the most negative towards gender equality. South Africans who are routine manual employees or belong to the service class are likely to have more positive attitudes towards gender attitudes than persons belonging to the other social classes.

According to Inglehart (1997) the new middle class in European countries will have more post-modern values and consequently be more positive towards gender equality. The middle class of South Africa in this thesis is defined as being comprised of mainly the routine manual employees and also the service class. As discussed in chapter two, I expect to find some of the

tendencies of the revised modernization theory in South Africa. Thus, I expect that the middle class of South Africa in addition to the service class also has more postmaterialist values and positive gender attitudes compared to South Africans belonging to the unskilled- and skilled working class and the farmers.

H11: People with postmaterialist values are more likely to be positive towards gender equality than people with materialist values.

As already discussed, based on the findings from the World Value Surveys, Norris and Inglehart (2003) have found that postmaterialist values are connected to self-expression values, which leads to more positive attitudes towards gender equality.

H12: People with secular values are likely to have more positive attitudes towards gender equality than people with religious values.

Inglehart and Norris (2003: 71) found in their study that religiosity continues to exert a strong influence on social norms about the appropriate division of sex roles in the home, the work force, and the public sphere, especially in agrarian societies. At the same time they found that secularization combined with modernization has led to a fuelling of the rising tide (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 71).

H13: People with leftist values are more likely to be positive towards gender equality than people with rightist values.

Bergh (2006:8) argues that the left-right materialism value dimension taps the degree to which people hold egalitarian values. Since "left materialism" refers to a support for equality (Bergh 2006:8), I assume people holding more leftist values are more likely to have positive attitudes towards gender equality.

3 South Africa: A history of inequality and discrimination

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters, I have introduced the theoretical background for the thesis, and I have stated some reasons for why it is scientifically interesting to study attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa. I have chosen to study gender attitudes in South Africa for two basic reasons: South Africa's history of inequality and the recent developments towards gender equality. South Africa has not gone through all phases of modernization, but it has gone through radical political and economic developments in a short time. It is relevant for understanding the results of the analysis to gain an understanding of the historic background of South Africa. History shapes society and will subsequently shape both the culture and the social structure of the population.

I will give an historic background of the apartheid state and the democratic transition in South Africa. I will here focus on South Africa in the period of white rule, and the post-apartheid era, and I will not go into detail, but will rather provide simple background information. I will introduce some general facts about the economical and political situation of the country from 1990 until today, and present statistical facts about women in South Africa in the period 1990 to 2007 on some indicators, such as education, employment, politics, health, and life expectancy. I will conclude with what I can expect to find in my analysis on gender attitudes, with regards to empirical facts and the theoretical background.

3.2 The Apartheid state

The segregated state in South Africa was more extensive than in other colonial African states. Black people were not only politically and economically segregated from the white minority, in South Africa the native Africans were forced to reside in distinct ethnic homelands (Butler 2009: 20). Many countries on the African continent were colonized and experienced minority rule by European settles. However, the apartheid state of South Africa was special because of the well-organized system; all inhabitants of South Africa belonged to a racial category. Moreover, the system lasted for so long. The apartheid state existed more or less from 1948-

1990. It came to an end with the release of the opposition leader, Nelson Mandela in 1990, and South Africa has its first democratic election in 1994 (Butler 2000: 23-31).

South Africa is one of the most complex societies in Africa south of Sahara, in terms of ethnicity. A number of different African tribal communities reside in South Africa and during the 18th century the European search for gold and diamonds brought settlers from around the world there. The white population was divided into two main groups: The British and the Boers. The latter were descendants of settlers from Holland and Germany, and the language they came to speak was named "Afrikaans". This language is also spoken by the large number of coloreds in South Africa today. The coloreds are a mixed race category, a result of white Afrikaners mixing with the native population, and with imported workers from other African countries and from Asia (Butler 2009: 37-40).

The European interest in South Africa started in 1867, when diamonds were discovered and initiated foreign investment. Diamonds were soon overtaken by gold, discovered in 1886 (Butler 2009: 12). The demands for stability and labor led the imperial power, the British, to break the resistance of the black African policies through military force. Britain's High Commissioner Miler viewed manipulation of black African chiefs as necessary to keep control over the colonial economy (Butler 2009: 13). There have been tensions between the European settlers ever since the beginning, when the "Boer War" between British and the Afrikaners was fought in 1899-1902, which the British ultimately won (Butler 2009: 10).

The decade after 1910 saw continued English dominance and deepening racial segregation under the auspices of a political alliance between Afrikaner agriculture, white mine owners, and those dependent on them (Butler 2009: 14). From 1933-48, South Africa emerged from the depression into a second industrial revolution (Butler 2009: 14). The mid- to late 1930s marked the first high-point of segregation. Legislation passed in 1936 consolidated the native reserves and removed propertied Africans from the cape voter roll (Butler 2009: 15). The wartime economic bonanza of 1933-1948 saw a relaxation of segregation and an inexorable urbanization, and the number of blacks moving into towns was striking, and for the first time many of these were women (Butler 2009:15). 1948 was the year when the Nationalist party (NP)[16] won the election, but the real beginning of apartheid in the sense it is remembered today was initiated in the 1960s. 1948 is the also the year of the population registration act,

[16] The Nationalist Party was the ruling party during Apartheid.

which enforced the classification of people into four strict racial categories: White, colored, Indian/Asiatic, and native (later Bantu or African)). In the years since the sixties more and more segregation laws were encompassed in South Africa (Butler 2009: 17).

3.3 Transition to democracy

A number of factors led to the final demolition of Apartheid, and as in the breakdown of most regimes, it is difficult to point to any single factor. Long-range international developments profoundly influenced the circumstances within which apartheid collapsed and a democratic settlement was ultimately negotiated (Butler 2009:23). The importance of technology transfer and international collaboration for modern industry redoubled these pressures (Goodman and Pauly 1993 in Butler 2009: 23). Ideological shifts among white intellectuals in the NP party and more contact with ANC[17] leaders in exile and South African business leaders contributed to the fall of apartheid. There were also few ideological differences between NP and ANC, both parties were nationalistic and took the same stands of economical issues (Butler 2009: 26). In addition, there was a massive international pressure placed upon the government, including economic sanctions (Levy 1999: 415-418). The end of Apartheid is best explained by structural economic changes and associated shifts in political organization, in combination with international factors (Butler 1998: 158).

South Africa's first democratically elected president, Nelson Mandela, was imprisoned in 1964 and he was released in 1990. The years from 1990 to 1994 were crucial in shaping modern South Africa. He was then elected president in 1994, which marked the start of the era of ANC rule. Nelson Mandela insisted on putting the past behind him, and requested all South Africans to do the same. White ministers were given positions in the government, and the president worked for reforms in favor of cooperation and non-segregation of the ethnicities. Yet some people claim that there has been no true revolution in South Africa. The black population has taken office, but this is not the same thing as taking power (Alexander 2002: 60). The black population of South Africa is still underprivileged in terms of income and unemployment (Leibbrandt et. al. 2010: 13).

[17] ANC: African National Congress. ANC has won every election since 1994 with more than 62-70 per cent of the votes.

South Africa is one of the youngest democracies in the world. However, South Africans started with political activism and mobilization long before the democratic change actually took place. The democratic transition was initiated in 1990 with the release of ANC-leader Nelson Mandela, and the country had its first democratic election in 1994. After the first democratic election, the country has gone through major changes throughout the past 20 years. After Mandela left office, Thabo Mbeki held office from 1999-2008, followed by Jacob Zuma who is the president of South Africa today. ANC has been the dominant party since democratization, and receives the majority of the votes[18]. Essentially the reason is that party support goes along racial lines. The majority of the black population continues to vote for ANC (Habib and Taylor 1999: 110).

3.4 The Socioeconomic status of South Africans

3.4.1 Ethnicity

South Africa is a country consisting of a large number of different ethnicities, where the majority is of native black African heritage. In the population censuses from South Africa in 2010 and 2001 the population by "race" and "mother tongue was as follows:

Table 3.1: Population by mother tongue 2001

Primary Household Language	% of population
IsiZulu	23,9
IsiXhosa	17,6
Afrikaans	13,3
Sepedi	9,4
English	9,2
Setswana	9,2
Sesotho	7,9
Xitsonga	4,4
SiSwati	2,7
Tshivenda	2,3
IsiNdebele	1,6
Other	0,5

Source: Statistics South Africa 2003 (Butler 2009: 36).

[18] In 2004 ANC won 69.69% of the vote and in 2009 the ANC won 65.90% of the seats.

Table 3.2: Population by race 2010

Race	% of population
African	79,4
White	9,2
Colored	8,7
Indian/Asian	2,7

Source: Statistics South Africa 2010.

3.4.2 Provinces

The population of South Africa in 2010 was estimated to 49, 99 million people (Statistics South Africa 2010). The population of the South African provinces is as follows:

Table 3.3: Provinces in South Africa

Province	Percentage
Gauteng	22,4%
KwaZulu-Natal	21,3%
Northern Cape	2,2%
Limpopo	10,9%
Eastern Cape	13,5%
Free State	5,7%
North West	6,4%
Western Cape	10,4%
Mpumalanga	7,2%

Source: Statistics South Africa 2010

3.4.3 The HDI index and economic growth

In macroeconomic terms, South Africa has developed much since democratization. Between 1996 and 2000 only, South Africa's total exports increased on average by 6.7% per year. GDP[19] in South Africa grew on average by 2.32% per year in the same time period. Moreover, the GDP of South Africa grew 1.2% annually in the period 1990-2008 (UN data 2011). However, the South African economy was also growing before the end of apartheid (Levy 1999: 415-420).

Today South Africa is one of the more prosperous countries in the developing world. South Africa has a medium HDI rating, and is ranked as country number 110 in 2010 with a rating

[19] Gross domestic product (GDP) refers to the market value of all final goods and services produced within a country in a given period.

of 0,597 (UNDP 2011)[20]. This is a low number compared to the developed world, but only handful African countries have a higher HDI-ranking. However, in 1990 the HDI-rating of South Africa was 0,601 (UNDP 2011). Thus, South African citizens have not experienced an increase on their levels on the HDI-scale after democratization. Rather, the level has decreased. The HDI-indicators are life expectancy, education and income (UNDP 2011).

The low HDI-ranking is connected to a low score on the life expectancy indicators. South Africa has one of the world's highest numbers of people infected with HIV. The annual number of deaths rose by 93% between 1997 and 2006 (Avert 2011). In 2006, HIV was recorded as a cause of death in 14,783 cases. However, according to researchers from the Medical Research Council of South Africa (MRC), this figure is a massive underestimate, because the majority of deaths due to HIV are misclassified (Avert 2011). In 2010 the total number of people living with HIV is approximately at 5, 24 million.

In 1990 the life expectancy women was 63.5 years, and the tendency has been that women actually have a longer life expectancy than men in South Africa. In two decades this has decreased radically, and in 2010 the life expectancy for women was 55, 2 years (Statistics South Africa 2010). That women live longer than men is the tendency in many countries, despite the fact that more women than men are infected with HIV (Avert 2011). In 2010 10, 5% of the total population of South Africa was infected by HIV, but in fact 19, 7 % of all women were infected (Statistics South Africa 2010).

Table 3.4: HDI-index in South Africa for the period 1990-2010 for both genders

	Life expectancy	Expected schooling	Schooling, mean	GNI/ capita	HDI value
2010	52.0	13.4	8.2	9,812	0.597
2005	51.8	13.4	7.7	9,020	0.587
2000	55.8	..	7.2	7,923	..
1995	60.5	13.4	8.2	7,806	0.634
1990	61.4	11.5	6.5	8,162	0.601

3.5 Gender inequality in South Africa

The numbers for gender equality in South Africa are inconclusive. 34 per cent of parliamentary seats are held by women, which is impressive compared to many other nations.

[20] The Human Development Index (HDI) is a comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy, education and standards of living for countries worldwide. In total 169 countries are included in the HDI index ranking. In 2010 Norway ranked no. 1 and Zimbabwe ranked no. 169.

66 per cent of adult women have a secondary or higher level of education compared to 68 per cent of their male counterparts. Moreover, female participation in the labor market is 51 per cent compared to 67 per cent for men.

3.5.1 Female political empowerment

Before 1994 the female representation was low in the South African, and black women were excluded from politics. In South Africa, white women were allowed to vote in elections from the early nineteenth century, while black women could not vote until the end of apartheid. Some black men were entitled to vote before 1994, but not all. In 1989 3.5% of the parliamentary seats were occupied by women. This number rose radically after 1990 (Eisa 2011). In 1994, after the first post-apartheid election, the percentage of women in national office leapt from 2.4 to more than 26. The percentage increased significantly again, in parliamentary elections in 1999 and 2004. During the '90s, the ANC-government continued with initiatives to improve the status of women, and political quotation was introduced in the country (Geisler 2000: 610-616).

Table 3.5 Number of women in the South African parliament 1994-2009

Year	Total seats	Women's seats	% women
2009	400	172	44,5
2004	400	131	32,8
1999	400	120	30
1994	400	111	25

Source: IPU

3.5.2 Female employment rates

In terms of employment rates, women have been less active than men in South Africa. There has been a dramatic increase in the labor force participation of women in South Africa since the mid-1990s. The gap has diminished a great deal, and the differences between men and women in the 2000s are smaller. In 2001 27, 1% of the women were employed, while the rest were either unemployed or not economically active. For men the number of employed was 54, 4% (Statistics South Africa 2001). In 2007 the division between the genders has changed a lot, and more women are participating in the work force.

Table 3.6: Employment in South Africa in the period 1990-2007*

Year	1990		2001		2007	
Sex	**Male**	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**
Employer/Self-employed	5,89%	2,33%	No data	No data	13,56%	12,52%
Employee	56,53%	33,97%	54,43%	27,13%	83,67%	82,04%
Unemployed	10,28%	11,97%	23,19%	24,98%	No data	No data
Not working	27,29%	51,74%	35,40%	47,9%	No data	No data
Unpaid family worker	No data	No data	No data	No data	1,65%	3%
Paid family worker	No data	No data	No data	No data	1,1%	2,43%
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: Statistics South Africa (1990-2007)
*The numbers are based on a selection of the population.

3.5.3 Female level of education

With regards to education, South Africa has performed better than many other developing countries. Most South Africans received primary education 20 years ago, and almost all do today (Statistics South Africa 1991). However, in 1990, the women were the losers in terms of receiving education. Out of the people without any education in 1990, 56, 3% were women. In the lower education levels, from grade one up to matric[21] women are more or less equally represented versus the men. The major difference was between the percentages of people having a higher education, a bachelor, master or doctor's degree, where the majority is men (Statistics South Africa 1991).

More women than men are categorized as having "no schooling" according to the 1996 census. More men than women have also completed primary school (Statistics South Africa 1996). However, the amount of men and women that have completed primary, secondary school and higher education, is almost the same. Thus, the data shows small differences between the education level of South African men and women in 1996. The same tendency is present in 2001, where even more women are enrolled in primary and secondary education. But at a higher level, the gender equality diminishes, and only 32, 46 % of the ones who took a masters or a doctoral degree were women. The data from the 2001 census is based on a 10% sample of the population and shows that there is a minimal difference between the genders in terms of education (Statistics South Africa 2001). Substantially more women are without any schooling.

[21] Equivalent to Videregående skole in Norway.

In 2007, the level of education was quite equal between men and women in South Africa. This is the case for all education levels. The only major difference is between men and women who have completed master's or PhD degree, where the percentage is 37, 15 % women. Data from recent years show that the differences between the education level between men and women are small. In primary and secondary education, the number of women and men is more or less the same, and there are actually more women with a postgraduate diploma. Out of the total percentage of people in the sample with no schooling at all, 58, 8 per cent are women (Statistics South Africa 2007). However, considering that the sample includes all generations, this is not surprising, because older women who are alive today were less equal when they went to school.

3.5.4 Gender related violence

Perhaps one of the most important contradictories to South Africa's rise towards gender equality is that women are experiencing a great amount of sexual violence in South Africa. There is also a relationship between physical abuse and HIV-infection, and as mentioned, the women are the ones with the highest infection rate, and this is directly related to sexual violence (Kalichman 2010: 681-687). South Africa reportedly has one of the highest rates of violence against women in the world, with 53, 008 rapes reported to the police in 2000 and 123 women reporting rape per 100, 000 population (Kalichman 2010: 682). In comparison, the same number in the UK is 16 per 100, 000. In 1998, three out of ten women surveyed in the Metropolitan region of Johannesburg reported that they have been victims of sexual violence in the previous year (Martin 1998 in Kalichman 2010: 682). There is little doubt that the attitudes towards women in South Africa are of a major concern, when faced with the numbers of sexually related violence.

3.6 South Africa and gender inequality today

This chapter has shown that South Africa has changed largely in short time, also in terms of gender equality. However, women still face many obstacles. South Africa is still a country where a large percentage of the population is living in traditional societies, where women are expected to be in charge of the family. Gender equality is on the rise in South Africa, but women are still behind the men and they are experiencing gender related violence to an extreme extend. E.g. the GII value for South Africa of 0.635 is "only" ranking it 82 out of 138

countries based on 2008 data (UN statistics 2011). South Africa's "HDI neighbors", Namibia and Congo, are ranked at 75 and 121 respectively on this index.

The ending of apartheid has led to major changes in occupational structure, and black South Africans have entered new parts of the labor force, including increased female participation. South Africa has experienced economic expansion and increased GDP per capita. Also, there has been an increasing amount of women in higher education. An economical change such as the one undergone in South Africa has led to changes in the labor markets, the end of economic sanctions, with new foreign investments and with an increasing economy. In addition, the mean years of schooling have gone up, as has the GNI per capita. According to a structural explanation, we could expect that the changes in the labor market and in the education system should have lead to a change towards more positive gender attitudes.

4 Method and Operationalization

4.1 Introduction

Statistical analysis within social science must be performed with a clear focus on challenges one is likely to meet when handling large amounts of data. The data and the results of the analysis also must be evaluated in terms of reliability and validity. I will return to this in the methodological discussion later in this chapter.

In this chapter I will first present the dataset and the research design, and describe the data I am using. Further on, I will present the method used, sequential regression analysis. I will also briefly explain the effect change design I am using in order to interpret the results of the analyses. I will also discuss the methodological challenges, validity and reliability of the analysis. Moreover, I will present the operationalization of the dependent variable and the independent variables, the socio-structural variables and the three indices measuring religious-secular values, left-right materialist values and materialist-postmaterialist values.

4.2 Dataset and Research design

The data used in this thesis is existing data from the World Value Surveys. South Africa has been included in five waves of the WVS. However, the data from 1982 are very limited, and does hardly include any relevant information for this thesis. Therefore, I am using data collected in 1990, 1996, 2001 and 2007. The four surveys are adequate for this thesis, because I am mainly interested in the attitude change in the period from the beginning of the democratic transition until recent time.

The World Values survey provides data from almost 80 societies, and grew out of a study launched by the European Values Survey group in 1981 (Inglehart 2003:1). The data is available for the public, and has been available for me through World Values Surveys online data analysis. The questionnaires are not the same in all the four different survey waves, something which I must take into account in the analysis. Especially this affects the dependent variable, attitudes towards gender equality. It is possible to look at changes over time, but I must take into the account that the formulations of the questions have changed, and that this can affect the results that I get.

In the analysis I will compare the status of South African attitudes towards gender equality at four different points of time. The population studied is South African citizens and their attitudes towards gender equality and value orientations in the period from 1990 until 2007. The selection of individuals is different in every survey, thus I will study the tendency of the South African population as a whole.

The level of analysis is on a micro level, studying the behavior of individuals. The individuals are South African citizens living in South Africa in the period 1990-2007 over the age of 16. The study will look at a random selection of the South African population, focusing on structural and value-based variables. The number of respondents in 1990 was 2736, and the number increased slightly and has remained stable between 2935-2988 in the three surveys in 1996, 2001 and 2007.

In the 1990 survey the procedure for collecting data was different for white South Africans. They received questionnaires to fill in, while the survey was conducted by face to face interview by the blacks, coloreds and Asians. In 1996, 2001 and 2007, data from the whole sample was collected by face to face interviews (WVS 2009).

4.3 Method

In the model for linear regression, some preconditions must be present.

- The relationship between the variables must be linear.
- The residual variations are 1) Homoscedastic; 2) Normally distributed; c) Independent of each other (not auto-correlated)
- The independent variable and the residual are not correlating with each other (Skog 2004: 237).

In binary regression analysis, the coefficient expresses the expected difference in mean value on the dependent variable for units which are one unit of measurement apart on an independent variable (Hellevik 1988: 155).

The method used is regression analysis, where the dependent variable is “attitudes towards gender equality”. This is a variable on an ordinal level of measurement, because the categories are mutually exclusive, but in ordered in range (Hellevik 2002: 177). When using regression analysis as the method, one requirement is that the variables should be on an

interval or continuous level of measurement. Ulleberg and Nordvik (2001) states that when the variables have many values, it is common to claim that they can be said to be close to an interval level of measurement and they can be included in a regression analysis without being changed to dummy variables Some people have argued against the use of linear analysis claiming that the results are meaningless, but these meanings are disputed. The advantage of linear analysis is the intuitive meaningfulness (Hellevik 2007: 59). In this case I find the advantages of using linear regression many, and I believe it outweighs the problems caused. The dependent variable, "attitudes towards gender equality" is measured on a scale from 0-10 and is close to being on an interval level of measurement.

We use regression analysis because we want to describe the relationship between a known number of variables. We want to describe the strength and the direction of the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables. Regression analysis is also a useful tool when we wish to explore whether statistical interaction is present, whether the effect of one independent variable on the dependent is depending on the effect of other independent variables (Skog 2004: 214-215). Regression analysis is used to explain the strength and the direction of the connection between the dependent variable and the independent variables. I can separate direct and indirect connections between the dependent and the independent variables. Moreover I will be able to explore the relative effect of the various explanations (Skog 2004: 214).

I am performing the analysis by doing sequential regression analyses. This means that the independent variables are included in the analysis in a prioritized order. This gives more detailed information than a simultaneous regression analysis (Christophersen 2009: 149). The analysis uncovers how the new variables change the effects of variables already included in the model, and how new variables increase the predicted variance (Christophersen 2009: 149).

4.3.1 The effect change design

Due to the sequential analysis, the variables are already ordered causally in the analysis, based on theoretical assumptions on how they stand in order to each other. In order to interpret the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable, I am using the effect change design.

The effect change design we find the various causal components by studying the changes in association between two variables, resulting from controlling for other variables (Hellevik 1988: 70). An indirect effect is found when a component due to an intervening variable X between two other variables Y and Z results in a change of the effect of Y on Z (Hellevik 1988: 77). The total causal effect is defined as the association net of all prior variables in the model, while the direct effect is defined as the association remaining after all other variables influencing own vote in the complete model have been controlled for (Hellevik 1988: 77). When a component of the relationship between two variables is due to prior variables, the causal interpretation of this component is a spurious effect (Hellevik 1988: 78).

By applying the effect change design, I am able to find the indirect effects on attitudes towards gender equality, which gives a more complete understanding of how the different variables affect the dependent variable.

4.3.2 Methodological challenges, reliability and validity

Valid measurement is achieved when scores meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the corresponding concept (Adcock and Collier 2001: 530). In the next section I will present information on the variables I am using in the analysis, capturing the measurement validity. In the theoretical discussion in chapter two I discussed the face validity of the dependent variable: Attitudes towards gender equality. The data for all four surveys include a large amount of units, which strengthens the validity and decreases the possibilities for selection errors. Also, it is an advantage to my analysis that the data is collected from the World Values Surveys, thus I know that they are of good quality and collected in a professional way.

Further on, it is an advantage that many questions are asked, thus I have the opportunity to create indices which increases the reliability and the validity (Hellevik 2002: 309). When we collapse more measurements of the same characteristics about people, we can increase the reliability of the data (Hellevik 2002: 309). Since I am interested in studying particularly values in relation to attitudes, World Value Surveys is unique in this matter and provides an opportunity to study this over time.

The use of attitudinal variables in statistical research can cause some methodological challenges, which is also the case when including values as independent variables. Attitudes and values are not something tangible and visible to the eye, such as other qualities held by

human beings, for example level of education or religious belief. One of the challenges I face when measuring attitudes is they are strongly connected to values. In this study I define how they differ from each other by the way they were measured; I.e. the question; “Do you approve of women being single mothers?” in stead of; “To what extend to you support gender equality?” I agree with Inglehart and Norris (2003) that there must be a relationship between values and attitudes, as described in the causal model in chapter two.

One challenge when using survey data collected over time is that not all information is given in all four surveys. One of the challenges I face is the large amount of missing units on some of the variables. In some cases this has led to the exclusion of variables, which lowers the validity of the results. The data from 1990 has a reliability problem in the sense that the collection of data was different for white people and black people. It is likely that people being interviewed will give different answers than people filling out questionnaires.

A disadvantage of using enquetes is that people might not return the questionnaires (Hellevik 2002: 105). On the other hand, when using interviews, as is done here, one is risking that people feel less free to give honest responses, and that the interviewer is the affecting the respondent (Hellevik 2002: 105). However, when performing interviews, it can be done in the language of the respondent, and in the case of South Africa it can be an advantage because of language problems, there are likely to be a large number of people who cannot read English, and one could risk that people misunderstood the questions. Thus I believe it strengthens the reliability in this case that the surveys have been done with interviewing in the language of the respondent, which makes it more likely that everyone has understood the questions. It does weaken the reliability in the sense that people might have been less honest when answering.

As described by Hellevik (1995) one measurement problem can be the response set, something which might be a problem when the respondents are to say they agree or disagree with something. People are often more likely to answer “yes” or “agree”. One advantage with the indicators used here is that they are formulated in different ways. Thus, I believe this is making in less likely that people have responded more positive. In addition, one indicator using the “approve” and “not approve” dichotomy, “Do you approve or disapprove of a woman being a single mom?” my results show that people generally disapprove more than they approve, something which I will come back to in the analysis. This means that the problem of the response set is not likely to be a large problem for the reliability.

Moreover, I must take into account that it is difficult to say if the potential changes on the age variable in attitudes and value orientation is due to life cycle or cohort effects. It does not say if the age groups are different because they have reached different stages of their lives, or if they represent cohorts growing up under different circumstances (Hellevik 2002: 286).

When it comes to the potential of generalization, there is a problem of missing values. In some cases I have solved this by giving the missing units the mean value, for example on the income variable which has many missing. Where this option has not been available, for example on the social class variable, the units have been excluded from the analysis.

I find it problematic to generalize from the 1990 survey due to missing "colored" respondents. As described in chapter three, ethnicity is an important factor in the South African society. In addition, I can not generalize too much of the results of being "black", because with in the "black" ethnic group there are a number of different cultural groups. I have decided not to include these differences in this analysis, but it is important to know that there are major differences within this group. I did not include this because this would have meant a very large amount of variables, which I found would complicate the results of the analysis.

In terms of external validity, the results of this thesis will be difficult to use for generalization. Firstly, South Africa is a developing country, and in addition, I believe the special mix of the population makes it difficult to apply the results on other counties. I believe one can draw some experiences from the results within the different groups over time, and also to look at the development of values over time, however only in developing countries with a similar cultural background.

4.4 Operationalization

4.4.1 Dependent variable: Attitudes towards gender equality

The World Value Surveys includes a number of questions asked towards perceptions on gender equality. Therefore it is appropriate to include as many as possible to increase the validity of the dependent variable: Attitudes towards gender equality. Preferably, more questions regarding this matter would be available in the four surveys; however, questions regarding gender equality are few in 1990 on one hand, and many in 2007 on the other. This confirms the worldwide trend, that the question of gender equality is becoming more

important. In the analysis, I will in total use five indicators included in World Value Surveys in order to measure gender attitudes by creating two separate indices. The operationalization of the two indices is based on the theoretical discussion of gender equality in chapter two.

Set of indicators

One thing that complicates the analysis in this thesis is that some of the questions regarding attitudes towards gender quality in the surveys are not asked at all four points of time. Therefore, I must create two indices, and both indices will include three indicators. One index will be used to measure attitudes towards gender equality in the years 1996, 2001 and 2006, and the other index will be used for the 1990 data set. The use of two different indices measuring the dependent variables complicates the comparison of the 1990 analysis versus the analysis for the three other surveys. However, I find this solution preferable to the use of an index based on only one or two indicators. I will take this into account when I compare the results from the 1990 analysis to the other analyses.

I have based the operationalization of the dependent variable on the five items index used by Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris in *The Rising Tide*. These items are similar to those commonly contained in the more comprehensive psychological scales of gender equality, tapping attitudes towards politics, the workforce, education and the family (Inglehart and Norris 20054: 32).

Norris and Inglehart examined the reliability and consistency of the five-item Gender Equality Scale within different types of societies. The coefficients proved to be slightly stronger in post-industrial societies (Inglehart and Norris 2004: 176). They also found that when excluding the two indicators concerning sex roles in the family and child care, the primary contrasts between societies remain, showing that gender equality in politics, the paid workforce, and education can be regarded as reflecting some of the most basic demands the women's movement have been fighting for around the world. Many other indicators are commonly made in order to promote full equality for women and men, and if data were available, a more comprehensive scale could capture these dimensions. The Gender Equality scales should not be regarded as reflecting the actual lives of women and men, it rather reflects cultural attitudes towards gender equality (Inglehart and Norris 2004: 177).

I will not be using an identical five-item scale in my analyses, because some of the indicators are missing in some of the South African value surveys. However, the indices I am using are based on the same material. Some of the indicators use statements with Lickert-style four-point agree-disagree responses, while the responses of the other indicators are dichotomies. I will recode the indicators so that higher values consistently represent greater support for gender equality. The indicator "NEEDKID" is included only in the 1990 analysis, because the question is not asked in the 2007 survey, and "BOYEDUC" and "MENPOL" were not given in the 1990 survey.

Index construction: Indicators used in the 1990 analysis

The relevant indicators measuring attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa in 1990 are the following:

MENJOBS: "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women". Alternatives for answers are: 1) "Don´t know", 2) "Agree", 3) "Neither", 4) "Disagree". The values are recoded in the following way for the factor analysis: "Agree" is assigned the value 0 and "Neither" the value 1 and "Disagree" the value 2.

SGLMUM: "If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent but she doesn't want to have stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove?" Alternatives for answers are: 1) "Approve", 2) "Disapprove", and 3) "Depends" (is not read out, only coded if volunteered). The values are recoded in the following way for the factor analysis: "Disapprove" is assigned the value 0 and "Depends" the value 1 and "Approve" the value 2.

NEEDKID: "Do you think a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary?" Alternatives for answers are: "Needs children" and "Not necessary". The value "Needs children" is assigned the value 0 and "Not necessary" the value 2.

The indicators have face validity because they all address the question of the women's status, and also because I know they have been included in other analyses measuring attitudes towards gender equality (Norris and Inglehart 2003:32). "MENJOBS" address the question of women's equal right to work. This is one of the indicators (ii) of gender equality, based on the theoretical framework. "SGLMUM" and "NEEDKID" are indicators linked to gender equality indicators v and vi: Men and women should have the same family rights and women

should have independence. Based on the theoretical background, I believe the three indicators are suitable for index construction. I control this by running a factor analysis.

Factor analysis of the indicators used to measure attitudes towards gender equality: 1990

Table 4.1: Factor Matrix for the dependent variable: 1990

Factor Matrix* N=2503	Factor 1	Factor 2
A woman has to have children to be fulfilled	.329	-.235
Jobs scarce: Men should have more right to a job than women	.425	.090
Woman as a single parent	.115	.338

* The factor analysis is run with the varimax method and with orthogonal rotation.

The results of the factor analysis indicate that the three indicators form a factor. The total variance explained in factor 1 is 37, 6 %. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test[22] gives a value of less than .50, which indicates that the correlation pattern of the indicators is not the best for a factor analysis (Christophersen 2009: 2007). In addition, the Cronbach's Alfa test of reliability is negative, in the sense that the three indicators turn out to have a low degree of inner reliability to form an index. However, I choose to use the three indicators because I believe they are suitable based on the theoretical discussion of gender equality, and because the factor matrix shows that they form a factor. I must also take into account that I do not have any really good alternatives in order to measure gender attitudes, and I believe it is better to create an index based on more than one indicator of gender equality than to use only one or two indicators. In addition, it is preferable to get results from the 1990 data set, than to exclude this survey year from the analysis.

The index is based on the recoding shown above. The index is an equal weighted additive index with values from 0 to 10. Units that have missing values on more than one indicator are removed from the analysis.

Index construction: Indicators used in the 1996-2007 analyses

In 1996, 2001 and 2006 I will measure attitudes towards gender equality using the following indicators:

[22] Test to assess the appropriateness of using factor analysis on data.

MENJOBS: "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women". Alternatives for answers are: 1) "Don´t know", 2) "Agree", 3) "Neither", 4) "Disagree". The values are recoded in the following way for the factor analysis: "Agree" is assigned the value 0 and "Neither" the value 2 and "Disagree" the value 4.

MENPOL: "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do". Alternatives for answers are: 1) "Strongly agree", 2) "Agree", 3) "Disagree", 4) "Strongly disagree". The values are recoded in the following way for the factor analysis: "Strongly agree" is assigned the value 0, "Agree" the value 1, "Disagree" the value 3 and "Strongly disagree" the value 4.

BOYEDUC: 'A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl'. Alternatives for answers are: 1) "Strongly agree", 2) "Agree", 3) "Disagree", 4) "Strongly disagree". The values are recoded in the following way for the factor analysis: "Strongly agree" is assigned the value 0, "Agree" the value 1, "Disagree" the value 3 and "Strongly disagree" the value 4.

The indicators above all have face validity for the same reasons as for the indicators described for the 1990 index construction. "MENJOBS" address the question of women's equal right to work; "BOYEDUC" address women's right to equal education and "MENPOL" address the female right to empowerment. Therefore, the three indicators cover three of the main indicators of gender equality described in chapter 2; i, ii and iv, thus they form a valid theoretical basis for the index construction.

In the starting point, I wanted to include a fourth indicator in the index construction, "SGLMUM", however a factor analysis showed that this variable has a weak correlation with the other indicators in the 2007 data set, thus I will exclude this indicator from the index construction.

Factor analysis of the indicators used to measure attitudes towards gender equality: 1996-2007

A factor analysis for the three relevant indicators is performed in the 1996, 2001 and 2007 data sets, and gives positive results. Both the KMO test and the factor matrix show that the three indicators form a factor.

Table 4.2: Factor Matrix for the dependent variable: 1996-2007

Factor Matrix*: Factor 1			
	1996	2001	2007
	N=2458	N=2713	N=2786
BOYEDUC	.317	.540	.494
MENJOBS	.660	.431	.542
MENPOL	.483	.709	.617

* The factor analysis is run with the varimax method and with orthogonal rotation.

I have controlled that all three indicators have satisfying levels of skewness and kurtosis and therefore are acceptable for a factor analysis to be performed. The KMO test shows that the three indictors have a satisfactory degree of bivariate correlations for a factor analysis of the indicator set (Christophersen 2009:207). Factor 1 for the three surveys explains totally around 50% of the variance of the indicator set. Cronbach's Alfa test of reliability gives results between .471-.553, which indicates medium inner consistency (Christophersen 2009: 219).

The index is based on the recoding described above. The index will be an equal weighted additive index with values from 0-10. Units with missing values on one or zero indicators are included in the index, the rest are excluded.

4.4.2 Independent variables: Socio-structural variables

Age

Age is a continuous variable. The youngest age included in the surveys is 16, while the oldest person included is 94 years old. A larger percentage of younger people than older have answered in the surveys, which is in accordance with the South African population universe.

Gender

Except for in 1990, where there are more women than men included in the survey samples, the distribution of male and female respondents is quite even in all four surveys. Male will be coded low (0) and female will be coded high (1). This is done because I expect women to have more positive attitudes towards gender equality than men, and this gives the results of the analysis more intuitive meanings.

Ethnicity

South Africa is a diverse society with many different tribal communities, however with four "main" racial categories: Black, white, colored and Asian. These are the four categories created during apartheid, and they are still used in South Africa (Butler 2009: 33). In the World Value Surveys six categories are used, because "Asians" and "coloreds" are divided. The former into east and south in the 1990 survey, these two categories will be merged. Also, I will merge the two categories "colored (medium)" and "colored (dark)". None of the categories had respondents in 1990 and the last category only had respondents in 2007. I believe the distinction between the two categories should not be relevant in this analysis, because I am not going in debt with a study of the differences between the ethnicities. However, I will split the category "white" into "white English" and "white Afrikaans". This I do because I expect there to be cultural differences between the two "white" groups that might affect the results of the analysis. This decision is based on my own assumptions, discussed in chapter two.

In the 1990 survey, the sample was stratified by race over representing minority races (WVS 2009). The dataset comprise a weighting variable which weight the ethnic groups to their size in the South African population. This weighting is consistently used in the analysis below. Ethnicity is a categorical variable, thus the variables will be recoded into dummy variables, and in the analysis "black" will be used as the reference category.

Table 4.3: Distribution of ethnic groups when weighted

	Year survey*			
	1990	**1996**	**2001**	**2007**
Asian		6.7	3.6	3.5
Asian: East	11.6**	-	-	-
Asian: South	2.9	-	-	
Black	63.9	55.1	71,4	69.4
White	21.5	24.8	14.2	17.4
Colored		13.4	10.7	9.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

*The 1990-2001 datasets are weighed with the enclosed s017 weight. The 2007 dataset is not weighed.
**Measured in percentage of the population sample

Urban-rural-dimension

The urban-rural dimension will be measured by using the indicator x049 "Size of town". No questions regarding this matter were included in the 1990 survey and therefore this variable

will only be included in the 1996-2007 survey analyses. The variable used in 1996 has eight categories and is different from the one used in 2001 and 2007, where only 6 categories are given. From the outset, in the analysis I will be using a 6-category variable and use the same labels as were used in the 2001-2007 surveys. This causes the 1996 division to differ slightly from the 2001-2007 division, but I presume this not to affect the results of the analysis. Both variables tap location on an urban-rural dimension with values from 0 to5.

Table 4.4: Categories used urban-rural variable

Category	1996 survey	2001-2007 surveys
Rural	Up to 2000*	Up to 499
Village	2000-5000 5000-10000	500-7999
Small town	10000-20000 20000-50000	8000-39999
Large town	50000-100000	40000-99999
City	100000-500000	100000-249999
Metro	5000000 and more	250000 and more

*Number of inhabitants

Region

In 1990 the variable "Region where the interview was conducted" has 78, 5% missing. The variable will therefore not be included in the analysis for 1990. Before 1994 South Africa was divided into four provinces, and then it was changed into today's nine provinces. In the 1996-2007 surveys, all nine provinces are included. In the analysis, the regional variable will be recoded into a set of dummy variables. Since I expect that the inhabitants of the Western Cape, KZN and Gauteng to be have more positive attitudes, as discussed in chapter two, the choice of reference category will be randomly chosen among the other provinces. I will use Northern Province/Limpopo as the reference category.

Religion

There are two questions asked regarding religious denomination in the surveys. First, the respondents are asked if they belong to a religious denomination, where the answers are "yes" or "no". Then the respondents who have answered "yes" are asked about belonging to religious denomination. In the 2007 survey, respondents without denomination are coded 0 (Medrano 2005:598). Thus the units labeled "missing" in the 2007 survey will be given the label "no denomination".

The categories differ in the surveys 1990-2007, and in total 16 different categories are presented. Some of the categories have very few respondents, thus some of the categories will be merged. The main confessions are however included in all the four surveys. I will group the other categories under broader categories, such as "other Christians" and "The Protestant Church". The variable is categorical and will be recoded into dummy variables, where the reference category is "no religious denomination". The categories are as follows:

Table 4.5 Religious denomination

Religious denomination	Includes categories
No religious denomination	
Anglican Church*	
Buddhist	
The Protestant Church	Protestant, Presbyterian, Pentecostal, Evangelical, TAC**
Hindu	
African Independent Church	
Other Christians	The Orthodox Church, Jehovah's Witnesses
Jew	Jew, Zionism
Muslim	
Other	
Roman Catholic	

*Response category is only included in the 1990 survey.
** TAC=Traditional Anglican Communion; originates in the Protestant tradition.

Education

The World Value Surveys use a number of different variables for measuring education level, and the variables used are not identical in the four survey years. It is favorable for the results of the analysis to use variables with as many values as possible, because this increases the validity of the results. I have considered each survey on its own to find the most suitable variable for the each analysis. To explore what variables are preferable, I have run a bivariate correlation analysis with the different measures of education level.

In 1990, I will use the variable "highest education level attained". In the 1996, 2001 and 2007 surveys I will use the variable "education (country specific)". A bivariate analysis shows that this variable has a high bivariate correlation with the dependent variable. This variable also has less missing units than the other educational variables. The categories "technical", "secretarial" and "other" are coded missing. The range is based on the South African educational system. I have compared the results with the continuous variable "At what age

did you complete your education", and the results show that the indicator "education (country specific)" has a much stronger correlation with the dependent variable.

Table 4.6: Education level

	1990	1996	2001	2007
0	Inadequately completed elementary education	No schooling	No schooling	No schooling
1	Completed (compulsory) elementary education	Some primary school	Some primary school	Some primary school
2	Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type	Primary school completed	Primary school completed	Primary school completed
3	Complete secondary: university-preparatory type	Some high school	Some high school	Some high school
4	Some university without degree	Matric	Matric	Matric
5	University with degree	Some University	Artisan´s certificate obtained	Artisan´s certificate obtained
6		University Degree completed	Technikon diploma/ degree completed	Technikon diploma/ degree completed
7		Postgraduate	University Degree completed	Some University
8			Professional	University Degree completed
9				Professional

Income

Income is a categorical variable on an interval level of measurement. The World Value Survey has not been using the same levels of measurement in the four surveys. I will not collapse these categories together, because I believe this might lead to loss of information. Thus, I will keep the income variable in all four years, and I will keep the respective divisions, and recode all of them so that low income is coded 0. In 1990 there are 8 categories, in 1996 there are 11 and in 2001 there are 19, and in 2007 there are 10 categories. The different scales makes the comparison over time more complicated, but it gives a more correct analysis of the respective surveys. However, the mean value of income cannot be used as an indicator of change over time.

The income variable has a large amount of missing, which makes the use of the variable less attractive, because important information disappears from the analysis when excluding many missing units. Due to the high number of missing, I must control if there is any correlation between the dependent variable and the income variable. A correlation analysis indicates that the correlation is significant, but weak. In data sets with a large number of units, such as this one, even small correlations can be significant (Christophersen 2009: 166). Thus, the missing

units on the income variable in 1990, 1996 and 2001 will be given the mean value of the income variable scale.

Social class

The sociological concept of "social class" can be difficult to operationalize, because there is no universal and easy understanding of the definition. There are different practices, but I have chosen to use job/profession as an indicator of the independent variable "social class". I will be using the definition of social class presented in the model of Ericson and Goldthorpe (1992). "Social class" has been defined in many different ways in sociological literature. The so-called Ericson/Goldthorpe (EG) class schema was originally developed in connection with social mobility studies, and is considered to be the most influential conceptualization and operationalization of social class in European mobility (Knutsen 2006: 13).

The aim of the class schema is to differentiate positions within labor markets and production units, to differentiate such positions in terms of the employment relations they entail (Ericson and Goldthorpe 1992: 37). Their class schema has been delineated with regards to the difference between employers having a service relationship with their employers and those whose employment relationships are essentially regulated by a labor contract (Ericson and Goldthorpe 1992: 42). The class scheme includes 11 social classes in the full version (Ericson and Goldthorpe 1992: 38-39).

The class schema is not constructed around any single hierarchical principle (Ericson and Goldthorpe 1992: 44). However, four categories can be presented hierarchically based on the relationship between the service class and the working class, and the use of autonomy in the working situation: The service class, the routine employees and the skilled and unskilled working class. The last class, the farmers, is more distinct and more difficult to place in relation to others (Ericson and Goldthorpe 1992: 42-44).

The categories on which the EG class schema is based are only partially included in the response categories given in the WVS surveys for 1990-2007 in South Africa. The variable x036 "Profession/Job" has 12 response categories in the 1996-2007 surveys and seven response categories in the 1990 survey. The 1990 survey variable has 63, 4 % missing, therefore the class variable will not be included in the 1990 analysis. In order to create a reliable version of the scheme, I will be using a five category version of the EG class scheme,

with some adjustments of the original version based on the categorization of Knutsen (2006). In this data set we both have the case of low cell count in some categories, and some excluded categories, and a five-class version is the best option available (Knutsen 2006: 17-19).

Respondents who have replied that they are “not the chief wage earner in the household” will be placed in the categories of the chief wage earner of the household where this information is available. Respondents who have replied “never had a job”, “not employed” and “member of armed forces” will be coded missing. The variable is on a nominal level of measurement, and will be recoded into dummy variables. The categories will be recoded as follows:

Table 4.7: Social class scheme

Value	Social class	WVS 1996, 2001 and 2007: Includes categories
1	**Farmers**	"Farmer: Has own farm"
2	**Unskilled workers**	"Semi-skilled manual worker", “Unskilled manual", “Agricultural worker"
3	**Skilled manual workers**	"Foreman and supervisor", "Skilled manual"
4	**Routine non-manual employees**	"Non-manual office worker"
5	**Service class**	"Employer with 10 or more employed", "Employer/manager with 10 or less employed", "Professional worker", "Supervisory non manual office worker"

4.4.3 Independent variables: Value-based variables

I will use three independent variables based on value dimensions in the analysis: The economic left-right materialist dimension, the materialist-postmaterialist dimension and the religious-secular values dimension.

Religious-secular values

The four World Value Survey questionnaires in South Africa do not all include the same questions regarding religious-secular values. In 1990-2001 a set of questions regarding beliefs are asked. The variables F50-F55: What do you believe in? Where the answers are; 1) God; 2) Life after death; 3) That people have a soul; 4) Hell; 5) Heaven and/or; 6) Sin are listed. However, these questions are not included in the 2007 survey.

A different indicator measuring religious-secular values is included in all four surveys, "How important is god in your life?" The answers are rated on a scale from 1 to 10. Religious values are coded low for the factor analysis.

The factor analysis shows that the six questions regarding beliefs are appropriate for index construction. The index is created as the mean value of all six indicators, and is given values from 1-10.

To test which indicator for religious-secular is the most appropriate for the analysis, I run a bivariate correlation analysis with the dependent variable and the two respective variables: The six-item index and the single indicator "How important is God in your life?" The correlation analysis shows that the single indicator is a reliable indicator for measuring religious-secular values, and when comparing all four surveys this indicator has a stronger correlation with the dependent variable than the six-item index. In addition, an advantage in using this indicator is that this variable exists in all four surveys years, which makes the results easier to compare over time. Thus, I will be using the single indicator "How important is god in your life?" to measure religious values in the regression analysis. Below is the results of the univariate analysis from the 1990 data, and the results were similar for the other three surveys.

Univariate analysis between the dependent variable and the two variables measuring religious-secular values, 1990 survey

Table 4.8: Univariate analysis, the religious-secular dimension, with attitudes towards gender equality as the dependent variable (1990)

	Attitudes towards gender equality
Religious-secular values 6-item index	.042*
Religious secular value single item index	.153**

**Correlation is significant in the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 (2-tailed).

Left-right materialist values

The indicator set measuring left-right materialist values includes the following indicators:

Index construction: Indicators included in the left-right dimension

E035: Income equality: How would you place your views on this scale? The number of values is 10. The scale is turned and the values are recoded in the following way for the factor analysis: "We need larger income differences as incentives" is assigned the value 1 and "Incomes should be made more equal" the value 10.

E036: Private versus public ownership of business. How would you place your views on this scale? The number of values is 10. "Private ownership of business should be increased" has the value 1 and "Government ownership of business should be increased" the value 10.

E037: Government responsibility. How would you place your views on this scale? The number of values is 10. "People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves" has the value 1 and "The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for" the value 10.

E041: Wealth accumulation. How would you place your views on this scale? The number of values is 10. The scale is turned, and the values are recoded in the following way for the factor analysis: "People can only get rich on the expense of others" is assigned the value 1 and "Wealth can grow so that there is enough for everyone" the value 10. The indicator is not included in the 2001 survey.

All indicators have scales from 1-10, and rightist values are coded low.

The variables have satisfactory levels of skewness and kurtosis. I have performed a factor analysis in the aggregate dataset including all four surveys shows that the four indicators are suitable for an index construction. KMO is .554. The Cronbach's Alfa test show a result of .370, which indicates that the indicator set does not have a very strong inner reliability. However, based on theory, the four indicators all measure left-right values in terms of "belief in and support for equality, an active government and harmony between the social classes" (Bergh 2006:8), thus I find the results adequate for an index construction. Units with more than one missing value on the four indicators will be excluded from the analysis.

Factor analysis of the indicators for left-right materialist values 1990-2007

Table 4.9: Factor Matrix left-right values

Factor Matrix* N=7857	Factor 1
Income equality	.401
Private versus public ownership of business	.158
Government responsibility	.783
Wealth accumulation**	.192

* The factor analysis is run with the varimax method and with orthogonal rotation.
** This indicator is not included in the 2001 dataset.

Materialist-postmaterialist values

I will use the indicator set created by Inglehart, which is already present in the aggregate SPSS-file I am using to analyze the data. The 12-item post-materialist index has 6 possible results, where 0 equals materialist, and 5 equals' postmaterialist values (WVS 2010). The existing index will be multiplied by two and given the values 0-10.

The Materialist-postmaterialist value priorities were measured by asking the survey respondents a series of questions which began with "There is a lot of talk these days about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. (…)" Then people are presented with goals that they are to give top priority (Inglehart 1997: 108). In total 12 goals were presented, and among these six goals were intended to emphasize survival needs, and were designed to tap "materialist" values. The rest were to tap postmaterialist values (Inglehart 1997: 108). The materialist-postmaterialist items were presented as three batteries where respondents were to rank the first and the second most important political value (Knutsen 1995: 55). I will not perform a factor analysis on these indicators, because I presume that the factor analysis performed by Inglehart (1997) is sufficient in order to use the materialist-postmaterialist value dimension in this analysis. The goals presented were:

List over materialist/post-materialist goals

- Maintaining a high level of economic growth.
- Making sure this country has strong defense forces.
- Seeing that people have more to say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities.
- Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful.

- Maintaining order in the nation.
- Giving people more say in important government decisions.
- Fighting rising prices.
- Protecting freedom of speech.
- A stable economy.
- Progress towards a less imperial and more humane society.
- Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money.
- The fight against crime

4.5 Overview all variables: Means and standard deviation

Table 4.11 and 4.12 give a complete overview over all variables included in the four sequential analyses. I have presented the mean values of the variables on an interval or continuous level of measurement. However, some of the variables, such as income and education, do not have the same scales. Thus, their mean values can not be compared over time.

I also present an overview over the frequencies of the categorical variables. I am presenting this in frequencies rather than percentage, because I find that this is useful information in order to understand some of the results in the analyses. By this I refer to the fact that some of the categories have very low number of respondents, such as the religious denomination "Buddhist".

Table 4.10: Mean values and standard deviations

Independent variables	Values	Mean				Standard deviation			
Year Survey		**1990**	**1996**	**2001**	**2007**	**1990**	**1996**	**2001**	**2007**
Age	Continuous	36.50	37.66	35.60	38.82	14.745	13.347	13.903	16.583
Gender	M=0, F=1	.519	.524	.50	.50	.500	.500	.500	.500
Education	Interval	1.963	2.464	4.38	3.457	1.442	1.540	1.612	1.922
Income	Interval	4.18	1.669	5.19	3.838	2.113	2.243	4.214	2.377
Urban-Rural	Interval	-	2.241	3.874	3.629	-	2.167	1.813	1.964
Religious-secular	Index 1-10	1.96	1.906	1.912	1.839	2.028	1.743	1.750	1.537
Left-right	Index 1-10	6.003	5.655	5.798	5.345	2.014	1.900	1.984	1.678
MPM	Index 1-10	4.189	3.295	3.467	3.448	2.239	2.114	3.467	2.074

Table 4.11: Frequencies: Categorical variables

	Number of units					Number of units		
Variable	**1990**	**1996**	**2001**	**2007**	**Variable**	**1996**	**2001**	**2007**
Ethnic group					**Region**			
Asian	397	75	108	106	**Limpopo**	300	137	165
Black	1749	2151	2143	2073	**KwaZulu-Natal**	609	458	570
Colored	-	245	322	288	**Gauteng**	631	1429	886
White	590	-	-	-	**Mpumalanga**	199	64	139
White Afrikaans	-	276	254	299	**Eastern Cape**	409	201	400
White English	-	187	172	222	**Northern Cape**	37	52	50
IN TOTAL	**2736**	**2934**	**2999**	**2988**	**Western Cape**	309	321	371
Religious denomination					**Free State**	210	157	203
No religious denomination	242	310	402	503	**North West**	231	182	204
Other	-	-	99	168	**IN TOTAL**	**2935**	**3000**	**2988**
Muslim	349	33	84	54	**Social class**			
Hindu	113	47	54	54	**Farmer**	41	7	17
Jew	-	290	7	-	**Unskilled Workers**	1643	479	1245
African Independent Church	-	-	435	396	**Skilled Workers**	326	592	450
Protestant	1491	1631	1469	1376	**Routine Emp.**	153	270	262
Catholic	280	385	337	364	**Service class**	521	123	643
Other Christians	-	58	6	60	**IN TOTAL**	**2684**	**2855**	**2617**
Buddhist	-	3	1	8				
Anglican	261	-	-	-				
IN TOTAL	**2736**	**2757**	**2894**	**2988**				

The mean values over time show that the selection of population included in the four surveys is fairly stable. The mean age is slightly higher in 2007, thus more older people have responded. The division of the two genders is also very stable. The income variable can not be compared over time. However, the three value dimensions can be compared. The results are somewhat interesting, because it appears that people have less postmaterialist values, less secular values and less leftist values in 2007 compared to 1990. This is the exact opposite result of what I was expecting to find. The regression analyses will provide more information about these tendencies. Moreover, there are few Asians included in 1996, also when the data set is weighted. There are an overweight of Muslims and Hindus in 1990 compared to the other three years. In addition, the distribution of Jews is very uneven.

5 Analysis 1: How have attitudes towards gender equality changed over time?

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter I am going to look at the development on attitudes towards women in South Africa from 1990 to 2007, to examine what changes have occurred in this time period.

As described in chapter two, according to Inglehart and Norris (2003), South Africa is still a country under development and a traditional society. Because of this, South African citizens are unlikely to have gone through a culture and value change to a large extent, and postmodern values such as self-expression values, might not be strongly present in society. Nevertheless, even if the South Africans have not experienced a shift towards more postmodern values, they have experienced structural, political and economical changes. Gender equality has been brought to the political agenda. As described in chapter two, I expect these changes to have led to a change towards more positive attitudes towards gender equality over time, and that a period of seventeen years has transformed society to such a degree that both men and women of all ages now are more positive towards a society where women and men are equal. Since the end of apartheid there has been an allocation of work, and more women are employed in different sectors, this might have led to an attitude change, pointing to the structural explanations described in chapter two.

To examine this research question I look at the mean values of the index measuring attitudes towards gender equality over time, and compare the results from the four different points of time. To support the findings I also look at the mean value of some of the single indicators measuring attitudes towards gender equality. Further on I will study the bivariate correlations between the dependent variable and the independent variables by looking at their Pearson's R values and the results from bivariate regression analyses with the categorical variables.

5.2 Mean values: Attitudes towards gender equality

Firstly, before I take a look at the relationship between the dependent variable and the different explanation variables over time, I will present the mean value of the dependent variable of in the four survey years. This shows us the support for gender equality in South Africa by the index construction described in chapter four.

Table 5.1: Mean values: Attitudes towards gender equality

Attitudes towards gender equality index:	1990	1996	2001	2007
N	N=2690	N=2882	N=2986	N=2957
Mean value (on scale 0-10)	3.266	5.974	6.445	6.057

The mean value shows what the average respondent of the survey populations have responded to the questions regarding gender equality used in the indices. The mean values are similar in 1996-2007, with 2001 having the highest mean score, but the mean value in the 1990 survey is much smaller. I suspect this to be a result of the 1990 index being constructed by a different set of indicators than the three other survey years. It could be that the three indicators used in the 1990 index construction are measuring a different set of attitudes towards gender equality, since some of the questions are directed at other indicators measuring gender equality.

To examine if this is the case, I look at the mean value of two indicators of attitudes towards gender equality that asked in all four survey years: 1) "If jobs are scarce, are men more entitled to a job than a woman?" (MENJOBS); and: "Do you approve with a woman being a single mom?" (SGLMUM).

Table 5.2: Mean values: "Men Jobs" and "Single Mum"

Mean value (Scale 0-4)	1990	1996	2001	2007
N	N=2736	N=2878	N=2923	N=2963
Mean value: MENJOBS	**1.497**	**2.246**	**2.49**	**2.274**
N	N=2634	N=2824	N=2901	N=2986
Mean value: SGLMUM	**1.205**	**1.259**	**1.72**	**1.509**

The mean values of the two single indicators confirms that there is a larger difference between the results from 1990 and the three other survey years, thus the two indices are both measuring the same attitudes towards gender equality. The mean value of the indicator "MENJOBS" is significantly smaller in 1990, as is the mean value of the indicator "SINGLEMUM". This confirms that the attitudes towards gender equality were less positive in South Africa in 1990 than in the years 1996-2007.

Another interesting tendency is also here confirmed: The attitudes towards gender equality are becoming more positive over time if one looks at the time period from 1990 to 2001, but there is a decline in the mean values for 2007, both for the index alone and for the single indicators.

The mean value changes with 2.708 points from 1990 to 1996, and considering that this is a 10-point scale and a large number of units are included (2690-2957) this is a major change in four years time. In other words, the South African citizens became much more positive towards gender equality in the short time period from 1990 to 1994. The South Africans continued to develop more positive attitudes on to 2001, but then the development stopped, and the average attitudes towards gender equality returned to the same approximate level as in 1996.

According to hypothesis 1, the citizens of South Africa should have become more positive towards gender equality over time. Since the mean value is an indicator of this potential change, then the hypothesis is unconfirmed. South Africans have not become steadily more positive towards gender equality in this time period, except for the change from 1990 to 1994.

5.3 Bivariate correlations: Pearson's R

In order to find the answer to how attitudes towards gender equality have changed over time in South Africa, it is useful to look at the bivariate correlations between the independent variables and the dependent variable.

The mean value of the dependent variable over time has already showed that the population of South Africa has not moved towards more positive gender equality attitudes in the time period studied here. In addition to simply looking at the value of the dependent variable over time, I also want to study how the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables has developed over time. In chapter six I will perform regression analyses for all respective survey years, which will explain how the variables interact in all four models. That will give more detailed information on the relationships between the different variables. In this section, I will examine the independent variables independently of each other.

Pearson's R is a measure of the correlation between two variables X and Y, and produces a value between 1 and -1. Pearson's R is used to measure the strength of the linear dependence between two variables. The Pearson's correlation coefficient between two variables is defined

as the covariance of the two variables divided by the product of their standard deviations (Christophersen 2009: 49). The correlation measures linear relationships, thus Pearson's R correlation between the dependent variable and the independent variables on a continuous or an interval level of measurement is presented here.

Table 5.3: Bivariate correlations: Pearson's R

Independent variables		**Attitudes towards Gender Equality Index**			
		1990	1996	2001	2007
Age	**Pearson Correlation**	-.151	-.127	-.119	-.046
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.013
	N	2689	2877	2934	2956
Gender	**Pearson Correlation**	.047	.164	.300	.277
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.015	.000	.000	.000
	N	2690	2882	2934	2957
Urban-Rural	**Pearson Correlation**		.078	.167	.074
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000
	N		2882	2934	2957
Education	**Pearson Correlation**	.228	.184	.263	.170
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	2	2744	2871	2898
Income	**Pearson Correlation**	-.206	.063	.143	.048
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.001	.000	.011
	N	2690	2882	2934	2813
Materialist-post-materialist values	**Pearson Correlation**	.076	-.014	-.034	-.035
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.450	.069	.061
	N	2538	2882	2811	2809
Left-right values	**Pearson Correlation**	-.135	-.095	-.124	-.033
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.075
	N	2682	2851	2925	2937
Religious-secular values	**Pearson Correlation**	.153	-.012	-.144	-.067
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.516	.000	.000
	N	2665	2848	2884	2942

The results of the bivariate correlation analysis produce some predictions on the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables over time. The overall tendency in this correlation analysis is that there are few bivariate relationships that are linear over time to be found. In other words: In the time from 1990 to 2007, attitudes towards gender equality were not changing or developing in a specific pattern, based on the independent variables here included.

One exception is age. The bivariate effect of age on attitudes towards gender equality is clearly decreasing over time, if one look at the Pearson's correlation. In 2007 people of different ages have the same opinions about gender equality to a larger extent than in 1990, where there is a much stronger strong bivariate correlation between age and gender attitudes. The effect of gender is developing in the complete opposite direction of age; it is increasing

over time and stabilizing in 2001-2007. In 1990, the bivariate correlation for gender is not very strong, but in 2001 and 2007, Pearson's R is clearly stronger. The difference between men and women when it comes to gender attitudes increases over time.

Education is one of few variables where the results over time are fairly consistent, and the correlation between level of education and attitudes towards gender equality is strong. This shows that level of education clearly has a bivariate effect on gender attitudes. However, when comparing the results of the bivariate correlations for all the four survey years, the Pearson's R coefficient is at the weakest in 2007, which might mean that the effect of education on attitudes towards gender equality is becoming less important. On the other hand, the coefficient is stronger in 2001 than in 1996, which indicates the opposite tendency. The variations in the education variable thus might be due to random differences.

The bivariate correlations between the urban-rural variable and the dependent variable are also significant in all three survey years where the variable is included. The effect is not very strong in 1996 and 2007, but it is quite strong in 2001. Also here, it is difficult to draw any conclusions, because the pattern is inconsistent. If we have a look at the mean values of this variable presented in chapter four, and compare the three survey years, the distribution of respondents on this variable was not atypical in 2001, thus the distribution of the respondents can not be the reason for 2001 having a stronger bivariate correlation.

When it comes to income the pattern is also not easy to interpret. In 1990 the bivariate relationship between income and gender attitudes is negative and fairy strong. This means that there is a connection between having low levels of income and positive attitudes towards gender equality. This is the opposite results of what I expected in my hypothesis on the effect of income. The correlation with income is weak in 1996 and stronger in 2001: but now the effect is positive. Thus, people with higher income are more likely to have answered positively towards gender equality in the surveys. In 2007 the effect is weaker than any of the foregoing years. This indicates that income means less for the matter of gender attitudes in 2007 than in the years before, and that there is not a consistent relationship between income and gender attitudes when comparing this over time.

Out of the three value dimensions, the left-right index is the value index which has the strongest and most consistent correlation with attitudes towards gender equality. The Pearson's R value is significant in 1990-2001, but the relationship over time is not linear and

stronger in 1990 and 2001 than in 1996, and not significant in 2007. The results show that it was a correct decision to include this value dimension in the analysis, because there is a relationship between left-right materialist values and attitudes towards gender equality. The value dimension provides gives results than the other two value dimensions, and adds information to the results of the analysis. The coefficient is negative in all four survey years, indicating that actually people holding more rightist values are more positive towards gender equality. Also here these results are the opposite of my hypothesis. This is something I will come back to in chapter six, after having running the regression analysis and controlling for the effects of other variables.

The results from the bivariate analysis of the materialist-postmaterialist dimension are also differing from the results that I was expecting. As I described in chapter two, the value dimension is constructed so as to measure the differences between materialist and postmaterialist values. The latter are likely to be held by many people living in highly developed postmodern societies, and I am not expecting that many South Africans are holding postmaterialist values. However, in 1990 there is a significant correlation indicating that people holding more postmaterialist values are more positive towards gender equality. The results of the three other survey years are insignificant, indicating that there are no significant differences between people holding materialist values and postmaterialist values with regards to gender attitudes. This is interesting because it appears that more people were postmaterialists in 1990 than in 2007, which are the opposite results of what I was expecting.

The religious-secular dimension has a significant Pearson's R coefficient in all years except for in 1996. The correlation is the strongest in 1990, and it is weaker in 2007 than in 2001. The coefficient is also negative for the two latter survey years, indicating that people holding more religious values are actually more positive towards gender equality, opposite of what I expected to find in the relationship between gender attitudes and religious-secular values.

The results of the bivariate analyses including the three value dimensions show that none of the three are giving the results I expected. The results I was expecting is based on the results found when measuring these values and gender attitudes in industrialized countries, as I discussed in chapter two. The bivariate analysis show that the value-based explanation model is not suitable for South Africa is this time period.

5.4 Bivariate correlations: Linear regression analyses

In this section I am executing bivariate analyses with the dependent variable and the four categorical variables included in the analysis; Ethnicity, region, religion and social class. Bivariate regression analyses (OLS[23]) with the independent variables described in the last section give the same results as in the Pearson's R analyses.

Table 5.4: Ethnicity: Bivariate regression analysis with attitudes towards gender equality as the dependent variable.

			Year survey					
N	**N=2690**		**N=2882**		**N=2934**		**N=2957**	
Ethnicity	**1990**		**1996**		**2001**		**2007**	
Coefficients	**B**	**Beta**	**B**	**Beta**	**B**	**Beta**	**B**	**Beta**
White	.847	.137**						
White Afrikaans			-.420	-.044*	-.286	-.029	.092	.010
White English			1.156	.101**	.614	.051**	.900	.086**
Asian	-.675	-.094**	.095	.005	-.042	-.003	.298	.020
Colored			-.948	-.094**	-.059	-.007	.187	.020

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The results of the bivariate analyses show that in 1990, white people are more positive than Asians, compared to the black. In 1996, there are no significant differences between the Asians and the black, but the white Afrikaans and the coloreds are more negative than the black. The white English however, are more positive towards gender equality. In 2001 and 2007 there is also a significant and positive difference between white English and black, but this effect is weaker than in 1996. There are no significant differences between black, white Afrikaners, coloreds and Asians in 2001 and 2007.

[23] OLS: The ordinary least squares method.

Table 5.5: Religious denomination: Bivariate regression analysis with attitudes towards gender equality as the dependent variable.

	Year survey							
N	**N=2690**		**N=2710**		**N=2830**		**N=2952**	
Religious denomination	**1990**		**1996**		**2001**		**2007**	
Coefficients	**B**	**Beta**	**B**	**Beta**	**B**	**Beta**	**B**	**Beta**
Anglican	.020	.002						
Buddhist			.972	.012	.655	.005	2.080	.039*
Protestant	-.302	-.059	.257	.045	.430	.077**	.449	.081
Hindu	-.783	-.062**	-.060	-.003	.265	.013	.441	.021**
Independent African Church					.130	.017	.144	.018
Other Christians			.669	.035	.315	.005	-.080	-.004
Jew			.195	.021	-.763	-.014		
Muslim	-.572	-.075**	.187	.007	.039	.002	.633	.031
Other					.184	.012	.184	.015
Roman Catholic	-.049	-.006	.339	.042	.385	.044	.503	.059**

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

In 1990 both the Hindus and the Muslims were more negative towards gender equality than the people who did not belong to any religious denomination. In 1996 there were no significant differences between the "no denomination" category and any of the religious belongings. In 2001 being protestant had a positive effect on attitudes towards gender equality versus the ones who had no religious denomination, and in 2007 being Hindu and Roman Catholic had a positive effect on gender attitudes. None of the religious denominations had a positive effect in all four years versus the ones who are not religious.

Table 5.6: Region: Bivariate regression analysis with attitudes towards gender equality as the dependent variable.

	Year survey					
N	**N=2882**		**N=2934**		**N=2957**	
Region	**1996**		**2001**		**2007**	
Coefficients	**B**	**Beta**	**B**	**Beta**	**B**	**Beta**
KwaZulu-Natal	.891	.129**	.572	.074*	1.262	.180**
Gauteng	.330	.048	1.502	.267**	.874	.144**
Mpumalanga	-.656	-.058*	1.138	.059**	.413	.031
Eastern Cape	-.530	-.065*	-.132	-.012	.464	.057
Northern Cape	-.529	-.021	-.785	-.036	-.494	-.023
Western Cape	-.496	-.054*	.783	.087**	.598	.072*
Free State	.229	.021	.153	.012	-.021	-.002
North West	-.593	-.057*	-.180	-.015	.731	.067*

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

When it comes to region, there are few results to be found in the bivariate analyses. However, the inhabitants of KZN has, as stated also predicted in the hypotheses in chapter two, more

positive attitudes towards gender equality than the people living in Limpopo, in all three years when it is measured. Also, the citizens of Gauteng have more positive attitudes in 2001 and 2007. The same is the case for the Western Cape. However, the effect is the opposite in 1996 for the inhabitants of the Western Cape. The effect of living in the North West is also inconclusive: Negative in 1996 and positive in 2007. The same is the case for the effect of being an inhabitant of Mpumalanga. Thus, it does not look like the effect of region variable is stable, and the variation in the results might be due to variations in the population selected in the four surveys, rather than lasting differences between the regions. However, in 2007, as assumed, the citizens if KZN, Gauteng and the Western Cape are more positive towards gender equality versus the citizens of Limpopo.

Table 5.7: Social class: Bivariate regression analysis with attitudes towards gender equality as the dependent variable.

			Year survey			
N	**N=2634**		**N=2791**		**N=2692**	
Social class	**1996**		**2001**		**2007**	
Coefficients	**B**	**Beta**	**B**	**Beta**	**B**	**Beta**
Farmer	-.969	-.042*	.283	.005	.148	.004
Skilled Manual	-.284	-.033	.674	.097**	.142	.019
Routine Manual	.220	.018	.853	.089**	1.069	.114**
Service Class	.589	.083**	1.014	.143**	1.038	.159**

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

When it comes to social class, the results of the bivariate regression analyses partially confirm the hypothesis regarding social class. The service class has more positive attitudes in all three survey years compared to unskilled manual workers. In 1996 the farmers are more negative than the unskilled manual workers, but there are no differences between the two groups in 2001 and 2007. The only significant differences between the unskilled manual and the skilled manual are found in 2001 where the latter group is more positive. The routine manuals are not more positive in 1996, but in 2001-2007 also the routine manual workers have more positive attitudes towards gender equality than the unskilled manual workers, confirming the hypothesis.

5.5 Main findings

The results from the study of the mean values of the dependent variable and the bivariate analyses have provided several predictions on the status of attitudes towards gender equality

in South Africa in the time period studied. Overall, attitudes towards gender equality became slightly more positive comparing the levels of the early nineties with the results from the 21st century. However, when we have a look at both the mean value of the index of the four surveys and also the mean value of the two single indicators, it looks like attitudes towards gender equality actually have become slightly less positive in the years between 2001 and 2007 in South Africa.

The bivariate correlations with the independent variables show some of the same tendencies. All the non-categorical independent variables have a stronger Pearson's R with the dependent variable in 2001 than in 2007, except for the materialist-postmaterialist dimension, which is non-significant. This indicates that the question of gender equality has become less important in society in general. The societal differences are decreasing with regards to attitudes on gender equality: which again might mean that society is becoming less fragmented in terms of socio-structural factors.

Thus the hypothesis, *H1: In South Africa, there has been a positive shift in values towards gender equality since the democratic transition, and South Africans have become steadily more positive towards gender equality since the democratic transition*, can not be confirmed. South Africans have not become steadily more positive towards gender equality in this time period, except for the change from 1990 to 1994

The bivariate correlation analysis indicates that the socio-structural variables have the strongest effect on attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa. The correlation of gender with gender attitudes increases over time, while the correlation effect of age decreases over time. The correlation with income and education is also decreasing over time, however education hold a fairly stable correlation effect on attitudes towards gender equality according to the bivariate analysis results.

The results of the bivariate correlation matrix for the materialist-postmaterialist value dimension show that this value dimension is not a good indicator for measuring attitudes towards gender equality in this time period. The Pearson's R for religious-secular values show that they do matter in affecting gender attitudes, but people that are more religious are more positive in the latest years. 1990 is the only survey year showing the results I expected: People that hold more religious values are clearly more negative. The effect of left-right

values is also decreasing over time, and is giving the opposite results: Leftist values are not leading to more gender equality positive attitudes in South Africa.

The results of the bivariate analyses clearly show that structural explanations are better than value-based explanations when it comes to explain attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa.

6 Analysis 2: What can explain variations in attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa?

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter I will address the second research question of the thesis, the question of what can explain variations in attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa from 1990 to 2007. In chapter five, I have already established some tendencies that can be found in the data from South Africa in this period, and the results from the bivariate analyses indicated the structural explanations are more suitable than the value-based explanations.

However, it is necessary to perform a more complex regression analysis to understand how the different variables affect each other, and test the hypotheses that I presented in chapter two. In order to test the hypotheses regarding the effects of socio-structural variables and value-based variables I will perform sequential regression analyses for all four survey years. Further on, I will apply the effect change design to study the effects on attitudes towards gender equality. In all four survey years, I will examine if the hypotheses can be confirmed based on the results from the sequential analyses.

The analysis is organized as a regression analysis performed in sequences. The first step only includes the ascribed variables, which are gender, age and ethnicity. The second step of the analysis includes semi-ascribed variables, which are religious confession, region and the urban-rural dimension. In the third step of the sequential analysis achieved variables are introduced, including level of education, income level and social class. The fourth step includes all the independent variables, also the three value-based variables: The religious-secular value dimension, the materialist-postmaterialist value dimension and the left-right materialist value dimension.

Test of statistical interaction

One of the advantages with regression analysis is the opportunity to test for statistical interaction. I suspect that there to be statistical interaction between education level and gender

and between age and gender with the effect on attitudes towards gender equality. Thus, I expect younger women to be more positive towards gender equality than older women and I expect women with higher levels of education to be more positive than women of lower education to be more positive towards gender equality. I test these predictions by creating variables for the interaction between education and gender and between gender and age, and I include these variables in a multivariate regression analysis, with all variables included.

In the 1990 and the 1996 multivariate analyses the two variables measuring statistical interaction show no significant effects, thus I will not include them in the sequential regression analysis. In 2001 the interaction between gender and age is significant, thus this is included in the sequential regression analysis. In 2007 both interaction effects are significant and are included in the sequential analysis.

6.2 The 1990 survey data: Analysis and discussion

Table 6.1: Sequential regression analysis, with attitudes towards gender equality as the dependent variable (1990). N: 2507

Independent variables	Step 1		Step 2		Step 3		Step 4	
	B	Beta	B	Beta	B	Beta	B	Beta
Ascribed variables								
Age	-.029	-.168**	-.029	-.166**	-.023	-.132**	-.021	-.123**
Gender	.239	.047**	.262	.052**	.322	.064**	.344	.068**
Ethnicity[24]								
Asian	-.571	-.078**	-.628	-.086**	-.977	-.134**	-.892	-.122**
White	1.013	.162**	1.009	.162**	-.189	-.030	-.239	-.038
Semi-ascribed variables								
Religious confession[25]								
Anglican			-.006	-.001	-.140	-.016	.123	.014
Protestant			-.351	-.069	-.431	-.085**	-.075	-.015
Hindu			-.089	-.007	-.263	-.020	.045	.003
Muslim			-.492	-.065*	-.609	-.080**	-.325	-.043
Roman Catholic			.016	.002	-.187	-.022	.113	.014
Achieved variables								
Education					.186	.105**	.157	.089**
Income					-.206	-.170**	-.195	-.162**
Value-based variables								
Postmaterialist index							.063	.055**
Left-right materialist values							-.064	-.050*
Religious-secular							.136	.108**
R2	.063		.068		.097		.112	
Adjusted R2	.061		.064		.093		.107	
Adjusted R2 change			.003		.029		.014	

[24] "Black" is the reference category.

[25] "No religious denomination" is the reference category.).

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 6.1 presents the results from the sequential regression analysis performed on the survey data from 1990. R^2 is not strong in any of the four steps of the analysis[26]. This indicates that the included variables in this analysis are not sufficient for fully explaining variations in gender attitudes in South Africa in 1990. The very small increase in R^2 when including religious confession in step 2 is not significant, which means that religious confession, does not significantly affect gender attitudes. R^2 does increase significantly from step 1 to step 3, so the explanation variables income and education clearly do have an effect on gender attitudes in this analysis. In step four the value-based variables are included in the analysis. This leads to a significant increase of R^2 of .014 from step 3. The three value dimensions do not include much explanation to the model compared to the ascribed and the achieved socio-structural variables, but they add a small amount of information to the analysis in 1990.

Several of the independent variables are not significant on the 0.05 level, so we cannot conclude that they have any significant effects on gender attitudes. However, some of the hypothesis can be tested at this stage. I will comment on the standardized beta-coefficients in order to describe the effects of the independent variables that are on an interval- or a continuous level of measurement. I will be commenting on the non-standardized regression coefficient B in the cases where categorical variables are recoded into dummy variables.

Hypothesis 2, *Younger people are more likely to have positive attitudes than older people,* is confirmed. The results of the 1990 analysis show that younger people are more likely to be positive towards gender equality than older people. The total causal effect is significant and stronger than the effect of gender. The effect of age does not change much when religious confession is included in the analysis, but the effect decreases with the inclusion of achieved variables and even more when value-based variables are included in the regression analysis. The explanation for this might be that younger people have higher education and higher income than older people, which results in a change in effect of age. The indirect effect of age is 4, 5 %, thus some of the causal effect of age on gender attitudes is a result of differences in other socio-structural factors between age groups and also differences in the values of younger and older people.

When it comes to hypothesis 3, *women are more likely to have positive attitudes than men;* this is fully confirmed in the analysis of the 1990 dataset. The total causal effect of gender

[26] The value of R^2 indicates the amount of predicted variance (Christophersen 2009: 141).

(.047) is significant, and the standardized beta-coefficient in the first and the second step of the regression analysis is significant. However, the effect of gender on gender attitudes is weak. When education and income is controlled for, gender has a slightly stronger significant effect, .064, on attitudes towards gender equality. Thus, when comparing the attitudes of men and women, female attitudes towards gender equality become slightly more positive when education and income is controlled for. This means that the attitudinal gender gap is small from the outset, but the differences increase with religious belonging and with differences in income- and educational levels. The direct effect of gender almost does not change with the inclusion of value-based variables.

The hypothesis regarding ethnicity, which state that white *South Africans are likely to be more positive than black, coloreds and Asian, and black South Africans are likely to be the ethnic group with the most negative attitudes towards gender equality, is not confirmed.* The results of the analysis show that Asians are more negative towards gender equality than black people in South Africa in 1990. The causal effect of white ethnicity is significant and positive, however it turns out that the positive effect of white ethnicity is an indirect effect: the direct effect of white ethnicity is not significant. White people do have more positive attitudes towards gender equality than black people, but this can be explained by other variables, since the coefficient is not significant in step 3 and step 4 of the analysis.

The effects of ethnicity changes radically with the inclusion of income level and education level in the model, and the effect of being white is no longer significant when education and income is controlled for in step 3. The direct causal effect of Asian ethnicity in step 3 is almost the double of the step 1 effect, which indicates that the negative effect of Asian ethnicity compared to black ethnicity is strengthened by income and education level. The direct effect of the Asian ethnicity variable is strong and significant.

When it comes to the hypothesis 7, stating that *people that do not belong to any religious denomination are more positive towards gender equality than people belonging to a religious denomination,* this is not confirmed. None of the direct effects are significantly strong in order to confirm the hypothesis. However, the results indicate that there is a difference between people with no religious belonging and the other groups, because almost all the regression coefficients have negative preceding signs, indicating that belonging to a religious denomination leads to less positive gender attitudes. The direct causal effects of being Muslim and Protestant is significant and strong in step 3, however the effects are no longer significant

in step 4. This indicates that values explain the differences between non-religious people and religious people in South Africa in 1990.

Hypothesis 8 states that *people with higher levels of education are likely to have more positive attitudes than people with lower levels of education.* This hypothesis is confirmed for the 1990 data set, and the beta-coefficients are significantly strong. The direct effect of education is somewhat weaker than the causal effect, thus there exists a small indirect effect via the value dimensions.

Hypothesis 9, *People with higher levels of income are likely to be more positive towards gender equality than people with lower levels of income,* is not confirmed. In the data from 1990, the results show the complete opposite tendency. The total causal effect of income is -.170 which means that when income increases, attitudes towards gender equality become less positive. The direct effect of income is also significant; however a small portion of the effect of income is an indirect effect via values.

When it comes to the hypotheses regarding values, H11, *People with post-materialist values are more likely to be positive towards gender equality than people with materialist values,* this is confirmed. The total causal effect and the direct effect of postmaterialist values on attitudes towards gender equality is .055. The effect is not very strong, but indicates that there is a relationship between the two, and that more postmaterialist values leads to more positive gender attitudes.

The religious-secular dimension provides the strongest direct and significant effect out of the three value dimensions. There is a positive and significant relationship between the religious-secular dimension and attitudes towards gender equality, thus hypothesis 12 is confirmed. *People with secular values are likely to have more positive attitudes towards gender equality than people with religious values.*

The hypothesis regarding the left-right value dimension, *People with left materialist values are more likely to be positive towards gender equality than people with right materialist values,* is not confirmed for 1990. The results shows the unexpected opposite effect, and people holding more rightist values are more positive towards gender equality in 1990.

6.3 The 1996 survey data: Analysis and discussion

Table 6.2: Sequential regression analysis, with attitudes towards gender equality as the dependent variable (1996). N: 2293

Independent variables	Step 1		Step 2		Step 3		Step 4	
	B	Beta	B	Beta	B	Beta	B	Beta
Ascribed variables								
Age	-.024	-.115**	-.022	-.101**	-.010	-.049**	-.011	-.052**
Gender	.913	.163**	.913	.163**	.959	.171**	.970	.173**
Ethnicity[27]								
White Afrikaans	-.149	-.015	-.321	-.032	-.888	.090**	-1.081	-.109**
White English	1.525	.125**	1.251	.102**	.570	.047	.467	.038
Asian	.145	.009	.157	.009	-.004	.000	-.031	-.002
Colored	-.747	-.076**	-.655	-.067*	-.802	-.082**	-.875	-.090**
Semi-ascribed variables								
Urban-Rural			.117	.090**	.070	.054	.065	.050
Religious denomination[28]								
Buddhist			1.096	.014	.922	.012	.862	.011
Protestant			.422	.074*	.395	.069*	.255	.045
Hindu			-1.184	-.056	-1.177	-.056	-1.258	-.060
Orthodox			1.471	.079**	1.472	.079**	1.375	.074**
Jew			.635	.072**	.613	.070**	.514	.058*
Muslim			.128	.005	.184	.008	.022	.001
Catholic			.042	.005	-.063	-.008	-.128	-.016
Region[29]								
KwaZulu-Natal			.816	.114**	.849	.119**	.739	.104**
Gauteng			.048	.007	.192	.028	.118	.017
Mpumalanga			-.855	-.075**	-.580	-.051*	-.628	-.055*
Eastern Cape			-.843	-.108**	-.647	-.083**	-.720	-.093**
Northern Cape			.341	.013	.411	.016	.364	.014
Western Cape			-.348	-.039	-.211	-.024	-.220	-.025
Free State			.327	.030	.422	.039	.273	.025
North West			-.537	-.055*	-.373	-.039	-.385	-.040
Achieved Variables								
Education					.316	.176**	.313	.174**
Income					.015	.011	.011	.009
Social Class[30]								
Farmer					-.679	-.031	-.794	-.037
Skilled Manual					-.160	-.018	-.165	-.019
Routine Manual					-.507	-.041	-.519	-.042
Service Class					-.138	-.019	-.149	-.020
Values								
Postmaterialist index							-.058	-.044*
Religious-secular							-.031	-.019
Left-right values							-.095	-.065**
R2	.063		.112		.132		.137	
Adjusted R2	.061		.104		.121		.125	
Adjusted R2 change			.043		.017		.004	

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

[27] "Black" is the reference category.
[28] "No religious denomination" is the reference category.
[29] "Limpopo" is the reference category.
[30] "Unskilled worker" is the reference category.

The 1996 model of analysis explains more of the variation than the 1990 model. In step four of the analysis with all variables included, adjusted R^2 is stronger in the 1996 analysis compared to in 1990. This change could be due to the inclusion of more independent variables adding to the explanation (religious confession, region and the urban-rural dimension). Adjusted R^2 is weak in the first step of the regression analysis, which means that gender, age and ethnicity alone explains little of the variations in attitudes towards gender equality. Adjusted R^2 increases from step 1 to step 2, with a significant change of 4, 3 percent. The semi-ascribed variables religious confession, the urban-rural dimension and region adds substantial information to the variations of the dependent variable. Also in step 3 adjusted R^2 increases significantly. However, the change in the adjusted R^2 is not significant in step 4, thus the value-based variables do not explain any of the variation in this analysis.

Hypothesis 2 can be confirmed for the 1996 data set, there are significant differences between older and younger people with regards to attitudes towards gender equality. The causal effect of age is -.115, thus younger people are more positive towards gender equality. The direct effect of age is much weaker, and a large portion of the age-effect is clearly due to differences in other socio-structural factors. However, different values are not the cause.

Gender has a significant effect on attitudes towards gender equality. The total causal effect is beta 0.163. The effect of gender is one of the strongest effects in the 1996 analysis of the data. The direct effect of gender is beta .173, thus the effect of gender is slightly strengthened with the inclusion of the other variables in step 2, 3 and 4. However, the difference is minimal: Women and men have different opinions about gender equality in South Africa, regardless of other factors. Hypothesis 3 is confirmed in the 1996 analysis, which confirms that women are more likely to be positive towards gender equality than men.

The hypotheses concerning ethnicity, 4a and 4b, that people of white ethnicity are likely to be more positive towards gender equality than people belonging to the black, colored and Asian ethnic groups, and that white Afrikaans speaking people are likely to be more negative towards gender equality than white English people, are partially confirmed.

There is a major difference in the effects of white English and white Afrikaans ethnicity. The white English speaking ethnic group is strongly and significantly more positive towards gender equality than the Black ethnic group in step 1 and step 2 of the analysis. The causal effect of English white is b 1.525, and the effect is somewhat weakened when regional and

religious variables are included in step 2. However, in step 3, the effect changes and the coefficient is no longer significant. This means that the inclusion of social class, income and education erases the positive effect of English white ethnicity on gender attitudes, and that white English speaking South Africans are in fact no more positive towards gender equality positive than black South Africans, they rather have higher education and income. Opposite of the results from the 1990 analysis, there are no significant differences between the black ethnic group and the Asian ethnic group. However, both the causal and the direct effect of colored ethnicity are strong and significant. Coloreds hold more negative attitudes towards gender equality than blacks in 1996.

The coefficient for white Afrikaans is fairly weak and insignificant in step 1 and 2 of the analysis. However, with the inclusion of achieved variables in step 3, the effect of white Afrikaans ethnical belonging, compared to the reference category Black, is strong and significant. The coefficient is negative, which means that people that are white and speak Afrikaans as their first language are more negative towards gender equality than Black South Africans. The direct effect of this variable is strong and significant (-1.081).

A quick look at a cross-table between level of education and ethnic group shows that white Afrikaners have higher education than the average population sample in this survey.

Table 6.3: Crosstabulation between education level and ethnicity

Education level	W. Afrikaans	W. English	Asian	Black	Colored
No schooling	.0 %	.0 %	3.9 %	14.0 %	5.3 %
Some primary school	.0 %	.0 %	6.6 %	24.6 %	18.0 %
Primary school completed	.4 %	.0 %	10.5 %	12.7 %	10.7 %
Some high school	23.1 %	12.3 %	38.2 %	36.1 %	43.4 %
Matric	39.4 %	38.5 %	23.7 %	8.6 %	15.2 %
Some university	5.8 %	7.0 %	5.3 %	1.1 %	1.2 %
University degree completed	10.8 %	12.8 %	3.9 %	.7 %	2.0 %
Postgraduate	2.9 %	8.6 %	2.6 %	.6 %	.0 %
Other	17.7 %	20.9 %	5.3 %	1.7 %	4.1 %
Sum (in per cent)	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %	100.0 %

Since the effect is not significant in step 1 and 2, this means that white Afrikaners are more negative towards gender equality than black despite higher education and income levels than black South Africans. Thus, when controlling for other factors white Afrikaners hold clearly more negative attitudes than black people South Africans.

Hypothesis 5: *People living in the cities are likely to be more positive than people living in the countryside,* is not confirmed. The direct effect of the urban-rural dimension is not significant. The regression coefficient is significant and positive in step 2, thus, the causal effect indicates that people are more positive towards gender equality when living in cities. However, this effect is an indirect effect of other variables. This is likely to be explained with people living in the cities having higher levels of education, higher levels of income and different professions that affect their attitudes towards gender equality.

In the case of the regional variable, several coefficients are significant: The causal effects of KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, Eastern Cape and the North West are significant. Thus, *H6: There are no significant differences between different regions in South Africa in terms of attitudes towards gender equality, except for the inhabitants of KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and the Western Cape, where the inhabitants are likely to be more positive towards gender equality,* is only partially conformed. The results indicate that there are few, but some differences between the regions when it comes to attitudes towards gender equality. The direct effects of four regions versus Limpopo are all significant and quite strong. People living in KwaZulu-Natal are more positive than people living in Limpopo, and people living in the three other regions are clearly more negative. Thus the prediction for KZN was correct.

I do not have the opportunity to study the reasons for these differences, I can only speculate. Some of the differences can possibly be explained by a different population living in the regions. While in Limpopo almost all people are of black ethnicity, in KwaZulu-Natal there is a large white and Asian population. In the analysis, I have not divided ethnicity into all the different ethnic groups that reside in South Africa, but it is important to bear in mind that these groups have different cultures. In KwaZulu-Natal almost the whole population consists of Zulus, and in Limpopo they are mostly Sotho, Tsonga and Venda.

The hypothesis stating that *people that do not belong to a religious denomination are likely to have more positive attitudes towards gender equality than people that belong to a religious denomination* is not confirmed in the 1996 analysis. That *the Catholics and the Protestants are the least negative towards gender equality and that the Muslims are the most negative towards gender equality* is also not confirmed. The response category "no denomination" is used as the reference category, but few of the regression coefficients are significant. There are no significant differences between people that have "no denomination" and people that are Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim or Catholic. However, the causal effect of Protestant, Orthodox and

Jew are all significant, and the direct effect of Orthodox and Jew are also significant. People belonging to the Orthodox religious tradition are more positive towards gender equality than the "no denomination" category in this analysis. The direct effect of "Jew" is also significant, but only one Jew participated. The number of the orthodox is also small, with 58 respondents. The difference between Protestant and respondents who do not belong to a religion is non-significant when values are controlled for. Religious confession is not an important factor in explaining variations in attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa in 1996.

The hypothesis regarding education is confirmed in 1996, where both the causal effect and the direct effect are significant. The total causal effect of education on gender equality is beta .176. The coefficient is also significant and quite strong in step 4 of the analysis, and most of the effect of education is direct in this model, the coefficient is almost the same with the inclusion of the value-based variables. People with higher education tend to be more positive towards gender equality in South Africa in 1996.

Neither the causal effect nor the direct effect of income is significant in the analysis for the 1996 survey, thus there are no differences between people with low and high income with regards to attitudes towards gender equality. Hypothesis 10 concerning the effect of social class is also not confirmed in this analysis: None of the coefficients are significant.

The hypothesis regarding the effect of the religious-secular value dimension on gender attitudes can not be confirmed in this model, because none of the regression coefficients are significant within the 0.05 level of significance. Thus, in 1996, there were no significant differences between people holding religious and secular values in this matter. The two other hypotheses regarding the effect of values can also not be confirmed. The direct effect of the postmaterialist index and the left-right materialist value indices are both significant, but the effects are negative. Thus, people with more materialist values are actually more positive than people holding postmaterialist values, and people holding right materialist values are more positive than people having left materialist values. According to the model used, variations in attitudes towards gender equality can mostly be explained by socio-structural variables in South Africa in 1996, and gender, education level and region have the strongest effects.

6.4 The 2001 survey data: Analysis and discussion

Table 6.4: Sequential regression analysis, with attitudes towards gender equality as the dependent variable (2001). N: 2485

Independent variables	Step 1		Step 2		Step 3		Step 4	
	B	Beta	B	Beta	B	Beta	B	Beta
Ascribed variables								
Age	-.015	-.073**	-.014	-.070**	-.002	-.008	-.003	-.015
Gender*age	-.026	-.184**	-.021	-.153**	-.023	-.164**	-.022	-.160**
Gender	2.756	.490**	2.554	.454**	2.693	.478**	2.642	.469**
Ethnicity[31]								
White Afrikaans	-.229	-.023	-.546	-.054**	-1.359	-.136**	-1.318	-.132**
White English	.697	.055**	.445	.035	-.461	-.037	-.196	-.016
Asian	.107	.007	-.048	-.003	-.209	-.015	-.220	-.015
Colored	-.293	-.034	-.340	-.039	-.204	-.023	-.237	-.027
Semi-ascribed Variables								
Urban-Rural dimension			.163	.105**	.056	.036	.057	.037
Religious denomination[32]								
Buddhist			.445	.004	1.075	.009	.848	.007
Protestant			.009	.002	-.067	-.012	-.251	-.045
Hindu			.004	.000	-.406	-.020	-.525	-.026
Independent African Church			-.373	-.049	-.253	-.033	-.385	-.050*
Orthodox			-.108	-.002	-.271	-.005	-.088	-.001
Jew			-1.157	-.022	-2.010	-.038*	-1.804	-.034
Muslim			-.319	-.019	-.542	-.033	-.625	-.038
Other			-.375	-.024	-.424	-.027	-.630	-.040*
Catholic			-.077	-.009	-.248	-.028	-.362	-.041
Region[33]								
KwaZulu-Natal			-.041	-.005	.391	.051	.344	.045
Gauteng			.550	.098	.684	.121*	.672	.119
Mpumalanga			1.432	.064**	1.812	.081**	1.815	.081**
Eastern Cape			-.772	-.070*	-.299	-.027	-.322	-.029
Northern Cape			-1.340	-.063**	-1.177	-.055**	-1.082	-.051*
Western Cape			.008	.001	.077	.009	.022	.003
Free State			-.559	-.045	-.213	-.017	-.163	-.013
North West			-.276	-.023	.001	.000	.081	.007
Achieved Variables								
Education					.414	.236**	.396	.226
Income					.020	.031	.008	.012
Social Class[34]								
Farmer					.778	.014	.499	.009
Skilled Manual					.045	.007	.015	.002
Routine Manual					.145	.015	.068	.007
Service Class					.214	.030	.121	.017
Values								
Postmaterialist index							-.002	-.002
Religious-secular							-.187	-.112**
Left-right values							-.101	-.072**
R^2	**.133**		**.191**		**.238**		**.253**	
Adjusted R^2	**.130**		**.182**		**.228**		**.242**	
Adjusted R^2 change			**.52**		**.46**		**.14**	

[31] "Black" is the reference category.
[32] "No religious denomination" is the reference category.
[33] "Limpopo" is the reference category.
[34] "Unskilled manual worker" is the reference category.

*The coefficient is significant on a 0.05 level (Two-haled test).
**The coefficient is significant on the 0.01 level (Two-haled test).

Adjusted R^2 is strong and significant in all levels of the sequential analysis for the 2001 data set. When only the ascribed social qualities of the respondents are included; gender, age and ethnicity, the model explains 13 % of the variance of attitudes towards gender equality. After having included all the other variables in the analysis, the full model explains 24, 2 % of the variation of the dependent variable.

Hypothesis 2 is partially confirmed in the data from 2001. The causal effect of age on gender attitudes is -.073 and significant, which means that when one moves up the scale measuring age, the level of gender attitudes descends with 7,3 per cent. The effect of age disappears when achieved variables are included and the direct effect of age is not significant. Thus, in 2001 in South Africa, younger people are more likely to be positive towards gender equality than older people, but this is a result of differences in education, income and social class.

There is statistical interaction between age and gender in the analysis. Thus, there are differences between younger men and women and older men and women when it comes to attitudes towards gender equality. Also, hypothesis 3 is confirmed by the results of the analysis: Women are more likely to have positive attitudes towards gender equality than men. The causal effect of gender on attitudes towards gender equality is almost the same as the direct effect. The fact that the direct effect of gender is very strong and that the effect of gender does not change much in any of the four steps in the analysis, means that women and men, regardless of social structure and values, hold different attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa in 2001. South African women are almost twice as much more positive than South African men.

Hypothesis 4a and 4b are partially confirmed. Black South Africans are not more likely to be negative towards gender equality than white, colored or Asian South Africans. The causal effect of white English ethnicity is significant, but this effect disappears when semi-ascribed variables are included, thus the effect is indirect. The effect of white Afrikaans is the opposite. The causal effect is not significant but the direct effect of white Afrikaans is strong, significant and negative: They clearly hold more negative attitudes towards gender equality than black South Africans. The direct effect is stronger than the direct causal effect in step 2, thus the differences between blacks and white Afrikaners increase when we control for education, income and social class. These results confirm what I also found in 1996: The causal effect indicates that white English speaking people are more positive towards gender equality than Black people, but this effect is in fact due to white English speaking people

having a different socio-structural profile, this is not a difference related to cultural belonging. Moreover, the results are the opposite for white Afrikaans ethnicity. The direct effect is negative and strong, which means that when controlling for other factors, white Afrikaners have clearly more negative attitudes towards gender equality than black in South Africa in 2001. There are also no significant differences between black South Africans and the Asian and colored ethnic groups, thus there are no significant results indicating that black South Africans is the ethnic group with the most negative attitudes towards gender equality.

The urban-rural variable is significant in step 2 of the analysis, thus this variable has a causal effect on attitudes towards gender equality. People living in the cities are more likely to be positive than people living in the countryside. The effect disappears when achieved variables are included, thus the effect of urbanism is in fact a result of people living in the cities having more education and higher income levels, and belonging to different social classes.

The hypothesis regarding the regional variables is not confirmed, and there are few of the regional variables that have any significant effects on attitudes towards gender equality. Mpumalanga and Northern Cape have an effect of gender attitudes versus Limpopo. However, no significant positive effects of coming from KZN, Gauteng or the Western Cape are present. The results are showing that people living in Mpumalanga have more positive attitudes than people living in Limpopo, while people living in Northern Cape have more negative attitudes. Thus there are some regional variations in terms of attitudes in South Africa.

Few of the regression coefficients for the different religious denominations are significant, thus H7 can only partially be confirmed. The direct effects of Independent African Church, Jew and "other" all have significant direct effects versus "no religious denomination". The effects are all negative, thus they hold more negative attitudes towards gender equality than the respondents belonging to "no religious denomination". However, the distribution of the respondents on the different denominations is uneven, and only seven respondents are Jews, one is a Buddhist and six respondents are Orthodox. Therefore, it is difficult to draw any conclusions regarding the effects of these religious denominations on people's attitudes towards gender equality. Moreover, in 2001 the Protestant and Catholic were not more positive towards gender equality than the ones that have "no denomination".

Turning to education, both the total causal- and the direct effect is significant and the hypothesis is confirmed. People with higher levels of education have more positive attitudes towards gender equality. When controlling for values, however, a small amount of the educational effect is an indirect effect via values (beta 0.010).

The income variable is not significant in 2001, thus H9 is not confirmed.

In 2001 none of the coefficients for social class are significant. The results show that there are no significant differences between the reference category "unskilled worker" and the four other social classes in terms of gender attitudes and hypothesis 10 is not confirmed. Hypothesis 11 is not confirmed in the 2001 analysis; there are no significant differences between people holding materialist values and people holding postmaterialist values.

The hypotheses regarding religious-secular values and left-right materialist values are also unconfirmed. The direct effects of both value dimensions are significant, but negative.

The total causal effect of religious-secular values is -0.112 and the total causal effect of left-right values is -0.072. Thus, people with more religious values are more likely to be positive towards gender equality than people with secular values, and people with left materialist values are more likely to be negative towards gender equality versus people holding right materialist values in South Africa in 2001.

6.5 The 2007 survey data: Analysis and discussion

Table 6.5: Sequential regression analysis, with attitudes towards gender equality as the dependent variable (2007). N: 2372

Independent variables	Step 1		Step 2		Step 3		Step 4	
	B	Beta	B	Beta	B	Beta	B	Beta
Ascribed variables								
Age	-.004	-.023	-.002	-.013	.003	.018	.003	.018
Gender*Age	-.013	-.105	-.015	-.123*	-.020	-.160**	-.021	-.163**
Gender*Education	.170	.135**	.153	.121**	-.112	-.088*	-.114	-.090*
Gender	1.467	.262**	1.608	.287**	2.713	.485**	2.720	.486**
Ethnicity[35]								
White Afrikaans	.071	.008	.242	.027	-.133	-.015	-.124	-.014
White English	.719	.069**	.666	.064**	.200	.019	.226	.022
Asian	.496	.035	-.358	-.025	-.519	-.036	-.502	-.035
Colored	.152	.017	.701	.076**	.555	.060*	.560	.061*
Semi-ascribed variables								
Urban-Rural			.073	.049	.037	.025	.035	.023
Region[36]								
KwaZulu-Natal			1.082	.153**	1.075	.152**	1.065	.151**
Gauteng			.335	.055	.313	.052	.324	.053
Mpumalanga			.278	.022	.364	.028	.378	.029
Eastern Cape			.232	.026	.226	.026	.227	.026
Northern Cape			-1.327	-.065**	-1.321	-.065**	-1.310	-.065**
Western Cape			-.330	-.039	-.300	-.036	-.306	-.036
Free State			-.475	-.043	-.399	-.036	-.389	-.035
North West			.515	.047	.560	.051	.570	.052
Religious confession[37]								
Buddhist			.960	.019	1.089	.021	1.070	.021
Protestant			.041	.007	.009	.002	-.042	-.008
Hindu			.128	.007	-.036	-.002	-.075	-.004
Independent African Church			-.290	-.035	-.284	-.034	-.330	-.040
Orthodox			-.424	-.022	-.454	-.024	-.510	-.027
Muslim			.078	.004	-.001	.000	-.055	-.003
Other			-.175	-.014	-.246	-.020	-.294	-.023
Catholic			-.158	-.018	-.182	-.021	-.213	-.025
Achieved Variables								
Education level					.269	.184**	.269	.184**
Income level					-.071	-.060**	-.068	-.057*
Social Class[38]								
Farmer					.213	.006	.195	.006
Skilled Manual					.200	.026	.192	.025
Routine Manual					.675	.072**	.656	.070**
Service Class					.591	.090**	.583	.089**
Values								
Postmaterialist index							-.017	-.012
Religious-secular values							-.051	-.028
Left-right values							.011	.006
R^2	**.097**		**.129**		**.155**		**.156**	
Adjusted R^2	.094		**.120**		**.144**		**.144**	
Change adjusted R			**.026**		**.024**		**.000**	

[35] "Black" ethnic group is the reference category.
[36] "Limpopo" is the reference category.
[37] "Not religious" is the reference category.
[38] "Unskilled manual worker" is the reference category.

*The coefficient is significant on a 0.05 level (Two-haled test).
**The coefficient is significant on the 0.01 level (Two-haled test).

The 2007 regression model of analysis explains less than the 2001 model. Adjusted R^2 is significant in step 1-3 of the analysis, but there is no significant change in the adjusted R^2 when the value dimensions are included in the analysis. Thus, in 2007, the value dimensions can not explain any of the variation in attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa.

In addition, the model explains significantly less than the same model used in 2001, which indicates that other factors are becoming more important for the understanding of the development in South Africa when it comes to gender equality.

The increase in R^2 is significant when the semi-ascribed variables are included in the model, and increases additionally when the achieved variables are included. In sum, the model with the socio-structural independent variables included explains 14, 4 % of the variance within attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa in 2007.

The causal effect of age is not significant, thus hypothesis 2 is not confirmed. Older people are not more negative towards gender equality than younger people. Knowing that the age coefficient was significant in the bivariate analysis performed in chapter five, this means that the bivariate effect of age is in fact something disappearing when controlling for other factors. This means that the generational effect found in previous years is no longer present.

The variable measuring the statistical interaction between age and gender is significant, thus, there are differences between young women and old women and young and old men with regards to gender equality.

A cross table between age groups and educational level confirms that the differences are substantial. The number of older people with high levels of education is clearly much lower. On the other hand, the differences within the different levels of income are not very large. This means that despite these differences, age is not an important explanation factor.

Table 6.6: Cross tabulation between age and level of education

Education level*	Age recoded**					
	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 and more
1 Low	2.3	7.4	14.0	20.9	32.4	40.4
2	3.4	3.3	8.1	14.4	10.1	10.4
3	.6	1.1	2.2	.5	1.0	1.5
4	5.4	12.0	10.9	10.1	9.5	5.2
5	53.0	32.4	29.3	30.0	24.2	21.5
6	31.3	37.4	24.9	15.1	15.7	14.1
7	1.1	.0	.5	.8	.3	.4
8 High	3.0	6.4	10.1	8.3	6.9	6.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Based on the variable x025 "Highest educational level attained". ** Measured in years

Table 6.7: Cross tabulation between age and income level.

Income level**	Age recoded*					
	15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 and more
1 Low	11.5	12.9	10.1	12.7	15.2	11.1
2	10.7	7.6	8.3	8.0	8.3	9.9
3	9.7	9.0	10.6	11.4	8.7	8.7
4	9.1	12.5	11.2	10.6	16.6	11.9
5	17.8	16.4	18.3	13.8	12.5	17.5
6	15.1	12.9	15.1	15.4	11.1	13.9
7	16.0	13.1	12.7	13.0	13.5	12.7
8	6.2	11.1	8.6	9.3	10.4	9.5
9	1.4	2.7	2.9	3.2	.3	1.6
10 High	2.6	1.7	2.3	2.7	3.5	3.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Measured in years. **Based on the variable x047cs "Income".

Hypothesis 3, women are more likely to have positive attitudes than men, is confirmed in all steps of the analysis. The total causal effect of gender is beta .262. The direct effect of gender is much stronger, when all the other independent variables are included in the model; the effect is almost the double. Gender has a very strong effect on attitudes towards gender equality, women are clearly more positive, and the effect strengthens when I control for income, education and social class. In addition, the interaction effect of gender and education is significant, which means that there are differences between women with higher education and women with lower education with regards to gender attitudes.

Hypothesis 4a states that South African white people are likely to be more positive towards gender equality than South Africans who belong to the three other ethnic groups: black, colored and Asian. In addition, black people are likely to be the ones with the most negative attitudes towards gender equality. This is not confirmed in the 2007 dataset. There are no significant differences between black South Africans, Asian and white Afrikaans speaking South Africans when it comes to gender attitudes in 2007.

The causal effect of "colored" is not significant, but the effect of being colored versus black is significant in step 2, 3 and 4 of the analysis. Thus, coloreds are more positive towards gender equality than blacks when semi-ascribed variables are controlled for. The variables measuring religious denomination are not significant, so place of habitation is likely to be the relevant factor in determining the differences between coloreds and blacks in 2007. The direct effect of colored versus black is .560, but the regression coefficient decreases when other variables are introduced in step 3, thus the effect is somewhat evened out with education, income and social class.

The causal effect of white English ethnicity versus black is strong and significant. The effect remains strong, also when semi-ascribed variables are included. However, again the positive effect of white English vanishes when education, income and social class are controlled for. The positive effect being white and English speaking has on attitudes towards gender equality is a result of differences in income, education and belonging to social class compared to being black.

Hypothesis 5, regarding the urban-rural dimension is not confirmed. The effect of this variable is not significant, indicating that there are no differences between people living in cities and people living on the countryside.

Also H6 is partially confirmed, there are only a few differences between people living in various regions in South Africa in 2007 with regards to gender attitudes. However, the regional differences are minimal. Out of the seven regional variables, only two have significant effects versus the reference category, Limpopo. People living in KwaZulu-Natal are more positive towards gender equality than people living in Limpopo and people living in the Northern Cape are clearly more negative towards gender equality than the citizens of Limpopo. Both effects stay more or less the same through all three steps of the analysis. Thus one of the regions expected has more positive attitudes, but not Gauteng and Western Cape.

Hypothesis 7 is not confirmed, there are no significant differences between people who do not belong to a religious denomination, and people that do belong to a religious denomination when it comes to gender attitudes. None of the coefficients are significant in the analysis.

Further on, hypothesis 8 is confirmed: There is a positive and significant relationship between level of education and attitudes towards gender equality in 2007. Both the total causal effect

of education and the direct effect is .184, which means that including value-based variables in the model does not change the effect of education level on the dependent variable. People with higher education levels are more likely to hold positive attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa in 2007, and education level is the strongest direct effect in the 2007 analysis.

H9, that people with higher income are likely to be more positive towards gender equality than people with low income, is not confirmed in the analysis. The results show that people with higher income levels actually are more negative towards gender equality. However, the effect of income is weak.

The hypothesis regarding social class is confirmed in 2007. There are no significant differences between people belonging to the unskilled workers class and farmers and skilled manual workers. However the causal effect of both routine manual workers and the service class are positive. People belonging to these social classes are more positive towards gender equality. The direct effect is the same as the causal effect, thus these variations are not changed by the value dimensions. The coefficients show that the routine manual workers are the ones who hold the most positive attitudes.

All the three hypothesis regarding values are unconfirmed: None of the coefficients are significant in the 2007 analysis of attitudes towards gender equality. This confirms what the results of the test of the adjusted R^2 already showed: In 2007 in South Africa attitudes towards gender equality can be explained by socio-structural variations but they not be explained by value differences.

6.6 Main findings

Both the results from the bivariate analyses in chapter five and the analyses in this chapter indicate than structural explanations are better than value-based explanations for understanding variations in attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa. The hypothesis regarding the three value dimensions are only confirmed in the 1990 dataset, and only two out of three. South Africa has not experienced a value shift in the period studied according to my findings. In addition, people were actually more postmaterialist in 1990 than in 2007, which is the opposite result of what I expected to find.

The structural explanations are quite suitable for understanding the development in South Africa in this time period. The differences between men and women when it comes to attitudes towards gender equality have become larger over time, while age differences have become smaller. The education variable is the most stable in the analysis: Higher levels of education have a clearly significant effect on gender attitudes. Social class has not been a determining factor, but this effect is stronger in 2007. Income level is on the other hand not a good explanation factor in explaining variations in gender attitudes in South Africa.

The hypothesis regarding place of habitation were only partially confirmed. Where the respondents live in South Africa is significant, but is affected by the fact that you find higher education levels and more access to different types of work in the urban areas. However, there are few stable regional differences to be found.

Also when it comes to religious denomination, this is not a strong explanation variable, and there are no consistent patterns indicating that people belonging to specific religions are more positive than others. This effect is less important in 2001 and 2007 than in the previous years.

When it comes to ethnicity, some patterns can be seen. White English speaking are more positive towards gender equality than black South Africans, but that is a result of education levels, income and social class. White Afrikaners are on the other hand, more negative, regardless of other factors. The results for coloreds and Asians are not consistent over time, but black people are clearly not more negative than any of the other ethnic groups, when controlling for education, income and social class.

The fourth hypothesis concerns the ethnicity of the South African population and states that the white population of South Africa has moved towards more gender equal attitudes, while in the black population's attitudes towards gender equality have not remarkably changed since the transition. This hypothesis is not confirmed. Black people do not hold more negative attitudes than the other ethnicities, and this has not changed over time. Thus, the differences found are not due to cultural differences. However, there are differences within the two main cultural belongings in the white ethnic group; The Afrikaners and the English.

7 Concluding remarks

The idea behind this master thesis was to examine the developments in South Africa with regards to attitudes towards gender equality. In the first chapters, I described how South African women have achieved political gender empowerment and increased gender equality. At the same time, South Africa has gone through many developments in their political and economical situation. It is an established fact that South Africa has achieved a great deal of gender equality on an aggregate level over this time period. More women are receiving higher education and are included in the work force. These improvements I described in chapter three. At the same time, South African women are still experiencing gender related discrimination; South Africa is still a traditional society, and women are in a weak position due to an extreme level of gender related violence. Knowing this, I wanted to understand if there is a relationship between the number of women found in the parliament today, and the potential attitude change over time. I found that the changes on the national level are elite-initiated, but I was wondering if these changes towards gender equality have "trickled down" on the attitudes of the population as such.

The first research question addressed was whether attitudes towards gender equality have changed over time. The answer to this question is that people were more positive towards gender equality in 2007 than in 1990, but they were in fact less positive in 2007 than in 2001. In addition, the attitudes have not changed much over time, except for the change from 1990 to 1994. The early change could perhaps be a result of many changes in the political system at the time, including the end of racial discrimination and a massive increase in the female political representation.

The second research question I addressed was: What can explain variations in attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa? In relation to this, I presented two different types of explanations, and I wanted to examine which of the two provided the best explanation model for attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa: A social structure based explanation and a value-based explanation. I have found the answer to this question by running bivariate and multivariate analyses with both socio-structural and value-based variables included.

The answer to the last question addressed is that the value-based model cannot explain much of the variations in attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa in this time period. The

structural explanation model explains much more, but the explanation potential of this model is also inadequate when we look at the changes I found over time. In 2007 the variables I included in the model explained only a small amount of the variation in attitudes towards gender equality.

7.1 Overview: Hypotheses and findings

Below is a table presenting the hypotheses for all four years, providing an overview over the findings from the analyses. Firstly I present a table with a repetition of the fifteen hypotheses presented in chapter two:

Table 6.8 Hypotheses overview

H1	In South Africa, there has been a positive shift since the democratic transition, and South Africans have become steadily more positive towards gender equality.
H2	Younger people are more likely to have positive attitudes than older people.
H3	Women are more likely to have positive attitudes than men.
H4	White South Africans are likely to be more positive than black, coloreds and Asians. Black South Africans are likely to be the ethnic group with the most negative attitudes towards gender equality.
H4B	White Afrikaans speaking South Africans are likely to be more negative towards gender equality than white English speaking South Africans.
H4C	The white population of South Africa has gained more positive attitudes over time, while in the black population attitudes towards gender equality have not remarkably changed since the transition.
H5	People living in the cities are likely to be more positive than people living in the countryside.
H6	There are no significant differences between different regions in South Africa in terms of attitudes towards gender equality, except for the inhabitants of KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and the Western Cape, where the inhabitants are likely to be more positive towards gender equality.
H7	People that do not belong to a religious denomination are likely to have more positive attitudes towards gender equality than people that belong to a religious denomination Moreover; I expect to find that the Catholics and the Protestants are the least negative towards gender equality and that the Muslims are the most negative towards gender equality.
H8	People with higher levels of education are likely to be more positive than people with lower levels of education.
H9	People with higher levels of income are likely to be more positive towards gender equality than people with lower levels of income.
H10	Respondents belonging to the unskilled workers class and farmers are likely to be the most negative towards gender equality. South Africans who are routine employees or belong to the service class have more positive attitudes towards gender attitudes than persons belonging to the other social classes.
H11	People with post-materialist values are more likely to be positive towards gender equality than people with materialist values.
H12	People with secular values are likely to have more positive attitudes towards gender equality than people with religious values.
H13	People with leftist values are more likely to be positive towards gender equality than people with rightist values.

Table 6.9: Overview: Hypotheses confirmed?

	Hypothesis confirmed?											
	1990			1996			2001			2007		
	Yes	No	Partially	Yes	No	Partially	Yes	No	Partially	Yes	No	Partially
H1 Time	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
H2 Age	X			X					X		X	
H3 Gender	X			X			X			X		
H4A Ethnicity		X				X			X			X
H4B Ethnicity	-	-	-	X					X			X
H4C Ethnicity/time		X			X			X			X	
H5 Urban-Rural	-	-	-		X				X		X	
H6 Region	-	-	-			X		X				X
H7 Religion			X		X				X		X	
H8 Education	X			X			X			X		
H9 Income		X			X			X			X	
H10 Class					X			X		X		
H11 MPM	X				X			X			X	
H12 Religious-secular	X				X			X			X	
H13 Rightist-Leftist		X			X			X			X	

I have found that if value change is a part of the modernization process, as stated by Inglehart (1997), South Africa is likely only to be in the initial faze of the modernization process, and the society has not yet gone through a cultural change which has led to value changes. The three values dimensions proved to give weak and insignificant results in the analyses on South African society in this time period. The materialist-postmaterialist dimension only gave the predicted results for the analysis of the 1990 dataset, which is indicating that postmaterialist values had a stronger effect on gender attitudes before the democratic transition, than after.

The value-based explanations are created for, and mostly tested on countries in the industrialized world. Thus I have confirmed that these explanation models using value dimensions are not suitable for explaining attitude change in a developing country at the stage South Africa is at.

I have found that age explains less over time and that gender explains more over time. Moreover, education is the most important explanation factor when it comes to attitudes towards gender equality. Thus, as more and more women are receiving higher education and entering all levels of the work force, perhaps this will lead to a change in the attitudes towards gender equality both among men and women. Whether this also is going to change the values of the South African citizens, only time will show.

South Africa is a country in its pre-industrial country phase of development, where the majority of the population is living under basic standards. South Africa is currently going through modernization, industrialization and structural changes. The country has a recent past of apartheid and different societal groups still live under varied social standards. The white minority which was the elite before democratization is still largely the economical elite. A large percentage of the South African population live under poor conditions and still family relations are traditional. With regards to the topic of gender equality, this status of South Africa also presented the paradox: They have managed to recruit women largely into politics and into other arenas where women usually are underrepresented in traditional societies.

My analysis has showed that the elite-initiated female empowerment has not led to more positive attitudes towards gender equality in the South African population in the time period studied. It appears that South Africa needs more time in order to achieve more positive attitudes towards gender equality among its citizens. My analysis does not provide any solution to this future development, however it appears that education is a key to attitude change, in addition to bringing women into all sectors of employment.

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