

Civil-Military Relations in Uganda

A Cultural Approach

Lene Heiberg



Masteroppgave, Institutt for Statsvitenskap

UNIVERSITETET I OSLO

Vårsemesteret /2010

Tusen Takk til :

Takk til min veileder Karin Dokken, som hjalp meg å komme i gang med oppgaven, og takk til instituttet for at jeg kunne levere på overtid.

Takk til Paul Opatah for personlig støtte.

Lene Heiberg

Oslo

April 2010

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2010

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Lene Heiberg

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Trykk: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo

Summary

New and unstable democracies have to overcome many challenges before the new political system is fully consolidated. Reconstructing the civil-military relations is a vital part of the democratization process. This paper explores how and why new democratic regimes continue to rely on military power as a source of legitimacy, and how this affects the professionalism of the military organization.

The traditional theories on civil-military relations are based on the western experiences and conceptions of democracy. The main argument of this analysis is that these theories fail to grasp the realities of how the military intervenes in political decision making, and how the military is manipulated by the democratic civilian government in non-western societies. A more context-sensitive approach is advocated by Chabal and Daloz in their works on showing how African politics are based on a different rationality than the Weberian legal-rational, even when there is formal separation between the public and the private.

The civil-military relations of Uganda are chosen as a case study of how patron-client networks continue to operate within formal state structures.

Three aspects of the civil-military relations are singled out for analysis; the ethnic composition of the army, which has reinforced ethnic and regional cleavages, the corruption in the military which serves to maintain political influence and regime support, and the employment of military forces in the electoral process.

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Theme

Democracy is the only viable form of governance in the present political climate all over the world. Authoritarian regimes in various forms have all been discredited in the eyes of the international community, among the ordinary citizens around the world, in the financial world and even among former authoritarian leaders themselves. The advantages of the democratic system include socio-economical development as well as less violent conflict on all levels as democracies generally do not wage war against each other. It offers the opportunity for popular discontent to be mediated and resolved through the workings of the democratic institutions. National leaders who could have more to gain by holding on to their power and access to resources through non-democratic styles of government, now finds that the only way to secure political, financial and military aid from the international community is by at least paying lip service to the demands for democratizing their regimes. Further more; military officers also realize that the times of successful coups have passed, and that their ambitions and grievances are better dealt with by the ballot than by the gun.

1.2 Political Culture

The focus of this paper is not to discuss whether these assumptions about democracy are valid, or whether democracy indeed can be linked directly to socio-economic development and greater respect for civil and political rights, it simply takes as it's starting point the undeniable fact that after the end of the cold war there is a general consensus among political actors on all levels that

democracy is the only desirable option. Instead this paper wishes to explore the reasons why it is so difficult to achieve consolidated, stable democracies with democratic civil-military relations that are able to deliver a minimum of security in developing countries. There are an abundance of theories attempting to explain the failures and shortcomings of unconsolidated democracies. The whole spectrum of political theory is represented in theories ranging from agent centered rational choice, to institutionalism and dependency theories. Is the great project of democratizing the world failing because of bad governance or because of inherent, structural flaws in the international system? Not denying that both schools of thought have a certain amount of explanatory power, this paper wishes to take an all together different starting point; *the importance of political culture in the process of consolidating democracy.*

Lane and Ersson(2005) investigate the connections between cultural and political identity. I have chosen to focus on Pye's definition from 1986 as Lane and Ersson(2005 p 31) presents it:

“Political Culture is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics. A political culture is the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of the members of that system, and thus it is rooted equally in public events and private experiences.”

This concept may be defined in either broader or narrower terms, but Pye's definition offer the distinct advantage of allowing for comparisons of both historical and recent events ,and to conduct analysis on both macro and micro levels. More importantly, this definition takes into account that political culture is psychological and subjective in nature; it is the norms, values and attitudes a group of people share in regards to how politics should be conducted in their society.

Democracy is more than just establishing a formal set of procedures and mechanisms for elections; it requires a set of values such as trust, tolerance, moderation and participation. Many transitions to democracy have been achieved through pacting and negotiations among the elites, but eventually these values must be internalized and shared by the majority of the population. These democratic values form the basis of what could be called a democratic political culture. People learn how to navigate and express their interests in the political system based on the opportunities and constraints it offers. The purpose of this analysis is to investigate how civil-military relations function under non-democratic political systems, and how they will continue this behavior even when democracy is introduced unless this system change is also accompanied by a corresponding profound change in the overall political culture.

1.3 Different notions of political rationality

If political culture is treated as a system of meaning, it is possible to incorporate the notion of rationality in the analysis, even when the political behavior in question seems to be quite contrary to achieving any kind of political goals. People may be said to act rational if their actions are in accordance with their overall system of meaning. It is a basic part of human nature to attempt to explain their surroundings and events with the analytical tools available to them. This is the basis for the cultural approach advocated by Chabal and Daloz in their work on understanding African politics (1998 and 2006). They do however not wish to speak of “political culture” as a variable that can explain or be explained using traditional political science methods of analysis. Instead they insist on applying a context sensitive perspective on the political processes themselves. Accepting the fact that the formal political institutions and procedures are in fact hiding underlying and informal political processes, their method is based on identifying the real politics that take place.

As their work in “Africa Works” illustrates, concentrating analysis on the formal aspects of politics like political parties, government policies and elections fail to grasp the real politics that are often played out in the blurring lines between the public and the private, and also the subtle influences on politics, such as ethnicity and superstitions.

This paper will investigate how civil-military relations are structured according to the real power distribution between the government and the military establishment, and how each side will use different strategies to manipulate the relationship.

1.4 The importance of the civil-military relations

Put very simply, civil-military relations in a democracy is the result of the power struggle between the elected government, which is the highest expression of the people’s political will, and the military organization, which forms an extremely potent part of the state administration. It is widely recognized that the different branches within the state take on a life on their own so to speak, as they will promote their own areas of politics and try to gain as much resources as possible for their department. What makes the civil-military relations so unique is twofold, firstly, and perhaps very obvious but none the less striking, *the military posses arms*. It has the potential for wrecking havoc which no other part of the state apparatus can match. Secondly the tasks most often associated with the military are of vital importance to the whole state, and enjoys a very high degree of status. Defending and promoting national interests on the international arena is high politics par excellence.

These two unique characteristics of the military means that the military has a very strong bargaining position. The democratic government’s solution is often to award the military substantial sovereignty in matters which are strictly military, and to rely on the military’s expertise while retaining control over vital

policy decisions. Huntington (1995) terms this form of control “objective civilian control”. This is a key term in much of the civil-military relations literature, and will be discussed further in the theory chapter. The opposite of objective civilian control is subjective civilian control over the military, which simply put is the use of propaganda and divide and conquer techniques to ensure the loyalty of the military to the civilian government.

1.5 Political legitimacy based on military power

The relationship between the military and the civilian leaders is of course highly reciprocal. The military may abuse its powers for various reasons, but equally dramatic and possible devastating is the abuse of military means by the civilian government.

In stable democracies, the government’s legitimacy is based on being elected through free and fair elections, popular participation, and allowing for and incorporating opposition through an active civic society. There is a clear separation between the formal and informal sectors of society. The state exists almost like a separate entity, and the state bureaucracy is based on the Weberian legal rationality. It is able to provide basic services, such as physical security through police and military establishments.

Civil-military relations are mostly regulated as described above, both sides having internalized the basic values of democracy and therefore following the procedural rules of the game in praxis as well.

In many new democracies, the actual situation is quite different. In many former colonies that adopted the formal democratic system of governance after independence, democracy failed to consolidate, and became nothing more than a hollow shell. Traditional modes of power and legitimacy continued to operate within this shell of formal institutions. Some democracies failed

completely, while others continued to operate as hybrids between authoritarian and democratic states. Africa alone experienced more than fifty military coups in the decades following independence. There are an abundance of theories aimed at explaining the failures of these new states, but for the purpose of this paper it is sufficient to note the prominence of military intervention in politics. All governments must base their regime on some sort of legitimacy. When democratic values are insufficiently internalized, it is possible to extract legitimacy through socio-economic development or even the personal charisma or heroism of a particularly popular leader. These modes of legitimacy are however of such a frail nature that a crises of legitimacy is almost inevitable. Regime stability and legitimacy may then ultimately be achieved by military means, suppressing political dissident through intimidation and violence. Experiences with this kind of political legitimacy would then foster a type of political culture where this is considered acceptable.

Despite the fact that one of the major driving forces behind democratization is the wish for eliminating warfare, both external and internal, and abolish the horrors of previous regimes; civil-military relations do not often make it into these definitions.” State monopoly over the legitimate use of force” is an often cited prerequisite of democracy, but this vague term does not say anything about what constitutes a healthy state monopoly of the use of force. The military can be more or less formally under the control of democratic state institutions, and still exercise a degree of independence in the policy making and missions that are in violation of the people’s will or in extreme cases are a threat to the society.

Democracy is not easy to achieve; no matter what specific experiences the country have had in the past, it requires compromise from all the actors involved; a level of knowledge of the proper workings of democratic institutions and a number of favorable socioeconomic circumstances in order to succeed.

Many of the states struggling to consolidate their new and fragile democracies in what is often termed the third wave of democratization, have had experiences with internal violence, which in many cases have involved the military forces overstepping their boundaries and committing human rights violations, whether the military have had formal authority as part or head of government, carried out suppressing measures on its behalf or acted in opposition to the government. On the other side of the relationship are those instances where civilian governments have used the military ensuring regime legitimacy, to suppress political opposition and manipulate the populace.

There are three key areas which are very important to deal with in order to help consolidate new democracies with such bad civil-military relations;

Firstly the military must be placed firmly under civilian control, which is a difficult task where the military, both the elite and the common soldier, have enjoyed special privileges. Secondly, the democratic government must not attempt to use the military for it's own political agenda.

Finally, the atrocities carried out by the military in the past calls for justice on behalf on the victims, and the ability and willingness of the new democratic government to do so depend on the strength and legitimacy of the government and the transition process itself.

1.6 Research question

There certainly seems to be a need for more research on the topic of civil-military relations and the impact this relationship has on democracy, especially in the case of new and emerging democracies.

Following these initial reflections on the importance of healthy civil-military relations in consolidating democracies, and likewise the importance of deeply rooting democratic values, a number of important questions can be asked;

- What exactly constitutes healthy civil-military relations?
- In what ways is the military establishment able to preserve their prerogatives when these have been eradicated by constitutional changes?
- What happens when civilian leaders continue to abuse and manipulate the military forces for their own political gain and legitimacy?
- How important is the state of the civil-military relations for the overall political culture in countries that are trying to move towards democratization?

These initial reflections led me narrow down the scope of this paper to single-case study and formulate the following research question about the civil-military relations in a country with an especially problematic history of military rule;

How can civil-military relations in Uganda be explained by using a cultural approach?

1.7 Case presentation

Uganda was colonized by the British until 1962. The army left behind by the British was composed mostly of soldiers from the north, and Milton Obote, the first president, was also from the north of Uganda. He continued to favour the north, and thus the ethnic cleavages between the north and the south became even deeper. When Idi Amin came to power in 1971, he feared the many soldiers from the north, and disposed of the majority of them and replaced them with soldiers who had strong cultural and ethnic ties to himself. Museveni came to power in 1986 with his National Resistance Army (NRA), but he was opposed by northern based rebel groups such as The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) which continues to destabilize whole regions of Uganda today.

The NRA leaders were not particularly interested in creating a democratic government after their victory, this was due to both a lack of knowledge and the challenges they faced trying to create legitimacy for their government. Therefore they created a so called broad based coalition Movement, which was little more than an attempt to co-opt their political opposition. But in keeping with the former tradition, they mainly relayed on the military to stay in power. One way to do this was to expand and strengthen the size and force of the military. The army grew from 10000 to over 100000 in less than five years, and the military expenditure grew as well. According to Amii Omara-Otunnu (1998), this helped the regime to reach four major goals:

to allow the regime to dominate the state by coercive force, secure themselves from internal threats, make the population behave in a disciplined manner akin to the military and finally it would give employment to an otherwise restless population.

1.8 Current civil-military relations in Uganda

The official Ugandan army, The People's Defense Force (UPDF) consists of 60000 soldiers, with an additional 2000 members of paramilitary border patrol units. Finally there are Local Defense Units (LDU) which are trained and operated by the UPDF, but they are financed through the Ministry of the Interior. The estimated number of soldiers serving in the LDU varies from 15000 to 37000.

President Museveni held the rank of general in the UPDF until April 2004; at that point he had to retire from the military due to new legislation that barred active military personnel from being active members in political parties. Although the constitution formally separates the military from the civilian

government, this distinction does not apply in the actual civil-military relations in Uganda. The military does not act as an a-political branch of the state structure; rather it is the main source of power and political legitimacy for the civilian government.

The main problem areas of the current civil-military relations in Uganda may be summarized as the following:

- The inability to resolve the conflict with the LRA
- Human rights abuse by the UPDF and lack of punishment for this.
- Large scale corruption among UPDF officers
- Lack of professional autonomy for the UPDF
- The government's use of the military to deter political opposition

A focal point of this paper is to explain why these problems persist as Uganda is on the path to distance itself from the military rule of the past, and establish democratic institutions. When applying the above mentioned cultural approach, it seems the answer lies in the heritage of a political culture characterized by a widespread militarization of both politics and society.

Amii Omara-Otunnu(1998) writes about the militarization of the political culture in Uganda (and Africa in general).The widespread occurrence of military coups in Africa, does not only hinder and marginalize fundamental requirements for democracy, such as free elections and the right of association, but also tend to generate considerable changes in the political culture. The result is the emergence of militarism in the society as a whole. The hegemonic rule by the military, in which the military substitutes its preferences for the will of the general population, and the legitimizing of the use of political violence creates a situation where the people have no choice but to acquiesce in the values and priorities of the military, rather than subscribe to them voluntarily. This undermines the very basis of the moral authority of the state.

1.9 Structure of the paper

In this paper I intend to explore the role of civil-military relations in new democracies, and my first task will therefore be to define what constitutes a healthy or good relationship between the democratic institutions and the military. This is no easy task as the very presence of a military force can be seen as a threat to democracy itself; I will return to this inherent contradiction in the first sections of the theory chapter.

Since theoretical considerations are given a very important role in this paper, the relevant theory will be presented over two chapters. Chapter 2 deals with the dominant literature on civil-military relations. Chapter 3 is dedicated to a brief introduction to the illusive concept of political culture, and considerations on how a cultural approach will be very useful in this analysis.

Methodology will be discussed in chapter 4. The main limitation is the lack of first hand data, and this problem is sought to be rectified by data triangulation. The strength of this paper lies in longitudinal perspective on the selected case, which will ensure that a wide specter of variables and possible connections are considered.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 consist of the actual analysis, where the relevant theories will be put to use in the attempts to understand and explain the mutually predatory relationship between civil government and the Ugandan army.

The conclusion in chapter 8 will sum up the findings from the previous chapters, relating the neo-patrimonial character of the civil-military relations to the overall political culture of Uganda.

2 Theories on civil-military relations

2.1 Context sensitivity

The study of civil-military relations is a broad field, cutting across different disciplines, such as sociology, history and political, and also touching on many different sub disciplines within political science such as transition studies, democracy studies, political theory, development studies, constitutionalism and organization theory.

I will start with a presentation of some notions about the civil-military relations which are found in the classical discussions about the inherent contraction between the civilian authority and the military authority. Then I will explore the key concepts “objective control” and “subjective control” which refers to the two basic means for ensuring civilian control over the military. Theories about the perception of the threat environment and role and mission assignments are also important to consider in this analysis.

Many of the theories and concepts developed in the past have been culturally biased, taking the western style of society as its starting point. As Chabal and Daloz (1999) have shown in their work on the reality of African politics, it is necessary to consider the context of the cases we are studying. Analyzing politics in Africa, for example, can not be done in a meaningful way without taking into consideration the widespread neo-patrimonial practices which exists alongside official state institutions and administration. All societies have different notions about the different organizational structures they adhere to, and ideas and values regarding the proper working of these structures and how the individual should interact with them. This extends to the civil-military relations as well, and people in different contexts have different ideas about

how this relationship should be, and what role the people themselves should have in this relationship.

For now it is sufficient to note that there does not exist one, ultimate set of perceptions and ideas about how the civil-military relations should be organized in any given society, and that these ideas and values may vary quite much even between states that are formally democracies. This has important implications for how theories should be understood and used in the study of civil-military relations in developing countries.

As I intend to be as context specific and sensitive as possible in analyzing the civil-military relations of Uganda, I will then enter into the discussion about political culture, how it emerges and which circumstances that create different form of civil-military relations in a separate chapter.

2.2 An inherent contradiction

The starting point of many discussions about civil-military relations is the inherent contradiction in the relationship between the civilian and military interests in democracies. On the one hand, a well-established democracy requires full civilian control and accountability over all areas of public interest, but on the other hand most countries deem it necessary to create and maintain military and security capabilities for their own protection and as a measure of international leverage. (From here on I will use the term “the military” to denote both military and official security forces, unless otherwise specifically noted)

The military is by its very nature a potential threat to democracy; it possesses a superior, highly effective organization, with arms at its disposal. The balance in the relationship between the military and the civilian democratic institutions is not often questioned in the minds of the ordinary citizen in peaceful and prosperous times, but it is very much a concern for those living under undemocratic regimes, or where the military have undue or excessive political

and societal influence and in extreme cases cast their professionalism aside for personal profit. What keeps the military from stepping outside of their defined areas of legitimate interest and intervene in the workings of the government and administration? With the gradual specialization of the society that followed the introduction of capitalism and the industrialization of the West, the answer came to lay in the professionalization of the military. I will return to this process and the theories underlying it shortly.

2.3 Good and poor civil-military relations

A natural point of departure for the study of civil-military relations is to find out what characterizes good or healthy civil-military relations on the one hand, and poor or unhealthy ones on the other. Even when being sensitive to the fact that there are different values and ideas about how these relations should be in different contexts, I believe it is possible to establish a minimum definition that corresponds to a minimum definition of democracy.

J. Samuel Fitch (1998:37-38) lists three essential characteristics of a democratic civil-military relation:

1. The military must be politically subordinate to the democratic regime.

This requirement goes directly to the core of the idea of democracy as a government of the people by the people. The government is an institution elected by the people, and it is therefore given the right to act on its behalf and promote the people's interests. The military constitutes a part of the society, and has its own special corporate interests, and there is no guarantee that these interests and goals will coincide with those of the rest of the society. The military can therefore never legitimately claim to represent the will of the people. The military can however have a limited influence in policy making and

exercising based on their professional expertise, but the military can not have the right to veto the government's proposals.

2. The civilian government must have full control over policymaking; there can not be a special area of security or national interests that are left exclusively in the hands of the military.

3. Military personnel must be subject to the same rule of law as the rest of the population. They have the same constitutional rights as non military citizens, and can not be granted special privileges.

Another author who have written well about this subject, is Michael C Desch in his chapter on "Threat Environments and Military Missions" in "Civil-Military Relations and Democracy"(1996 :13). He states that although one can say that the relationship is good when the military stays strictly within its professional realm, and poor when the military strays outside that realms, in the case of coups for instance; he suggests that a better way is to analyze how civilian and military authorities handle policy differences, and that a healthy civil-military relationship exists where the civilian stands prevails over the military ones. The author does not elaborate directly on this, but I take policy differences to mean both the broader questions of threat identification and mission assignments for the military, as well as policy differences in the sense of allocated defence budget and personnel management and appointment within the military.

2.4 Ensuring military subordination

Due to the potential danger the military establishment may pose both to the civilian leaders in government and the population at large, the military's capabilities and intentions must be placed under firm civilian control. In consolidated democracies this can basically be achieved through two mechanisms: objective civilian control, which is based on the professionalism of the military and subjective civilian control, which is based on politicizing the military. When it comes to the reality of many developing countries, it is necessary to also consider how neo-patrimonial practices are used to ensure military loyalty to the civilian leaders.

Huntington (1995) is generally optimistic about the success of reforming civil-military relations in the third wave of democratization around the world.

He states that with only a few exceptions, these countries have fared much better in subordinating the military to civilian authority and control than they have in establishing and consolidating other aspects of democracy or further economic development. He also assess that the civil-military relations have improved greatly in comparison to the situation before the transition towards democracy. He attributes these successes to several factors, including a spread and acceptance of the idea that the military needs to be a professional, apolitical institution subordinated to civilian control. These are norms that are spread by the interaction of military elites and cooperation between the nations. There has also been a growing understanding that establishing objective control is in the best interest of both civilian and military leaders. Military regimes around the world have learned the hard way that solving a countries socioeconomic problems is not an easy task, and they are therefore more willing to stick to their own areas of professional expertise and leave the politicks to the politicians. There has also been a move towards realizing that employing military forces to gain advantages in the political game is a

potentially dangerous enterprise on the behalf of the civilian leaders competing for power, and that their interest are really best served by keeping the military a professional, neutral force.

Thirdly, and in my view on of the most important factors in poor, undeveloped countries; civil-military reform that entails reduction of military spending, improvement in the respect of human rights, and transfer of military run business to civilian or state hands, are measures that are relatively easy to implement and which enjoys great legitimacy in both the eyes of the public and the international community. To be able to successfully carry out such reforms, the civilian government must of course already have a certain degree of leverage towards the military, and the first two points must already be in place.

2.5 Objective and subjective control mechanisms

Many scholars distinguish between two methods employed by the civilian authorities to ensure military subordination; objective and subjective control. These are key concepts in the study of civil-military relations, and were originally formulated by Samuel Huntington.

The objective civilian control mechanism refers to:

1. A high level of military professionalism, which means that the military officers recognize the limits of their professional competence,
2. An effective subordination of the military to the civilian political leaders who have the responsibility for policymaking, and
3. That the civilian leaders recognize and accept that the military posses a unique expertise, which
4. Leads to the minimization of military intervention in politics, and likewise less political intervention in the military.(Huntington 1996)

Objective civilian control is the preferred mechanism for ensuring military subordination to civilian control in consolidated, stable democracies. This mechanism may not be feasible in new democracies that often have had poor civil-military relations in the past.

In these cases subjective civilian control mechanism are often adopted instead, and this refers to how the civilian leaders politicize the military by the classic divide and rule tactics. According to Sundhaussen(1998: 336), this means that the military professionalism is not encouraged, and the military is not a separate institution set aside from the rest of the society. The main means of ensuring military loyalty is through ideological indoctrinations and propaganda. Different fractions of the civilian leadership may tie separate bonds with the military and use it for their own goals. This form of civilian control over the military corresponds best to the African reality, and will form an important part of the later analysis.

2.6 Internal and external threats

Michael C. Desch (1999) explores the linkages between the state of the civil-military relations, and the perceived and defined threat environments. The nature and the location of the threats the military is assigned to deal with, have a major impact on the power balance between the civilian and military authorities. The nature of the missions can be either military or non-military, and the location can be internal or external. Many states today face challenges that are both military, and non-military in nature, as well as a mixture of these. Desch(1999) claims that traditional challenges that are military in nature and external in location produce the most healthy civil-military relations. Desch (1999:12-15) argues that this is the case because the civilian authorities are forced to be more cohesive when faced with these kinds of threats, and thus

they can deal with the military in a more unified fashion. They adopt objective control mechanisms, granting the military substantial autonomy in their professional areas in return for complete political loyalty. The military becomes less inclined to meddle in domestic affairs, as their attention is focused externally. In times like these the civilian leadership may also enjoy greater legitimacy.

Unhealthy or poor civil-military relations are more likely to appear when a state faces internal threats, as the civilian leadership may be more or less divided, and politicize the military by bringing them into a civilian, domestic conflict. A significant domestic threat will also shift the military's focus to the domestic arena, and thus facilitate military intervention and coups.

A mixture of both external and internal threats does also have the potential for creating difficult civil-military relations, but generally not as poor as when the military is only focusing on internal threats. In the cases with mixed threats, or no perceived threats at all, other factors are more important in shaping the civil-military relations. Desch (1999) argues that the military's doctrine can be an important explanatory factor in these cases, which contains the prevailing ideas about what role the military should have in the society as well as ideas about what their proper mission should be.

2.7 Assigning the military its missions

There are conflicting views on what effects the assignment of non-traditional, non-military missions to the military will have on the civil-military relationship. As we have just seen, Desch (1999) is highly critical of shifting the focus of the military from traditional external protection missions towards internal non-military missions. Other scholars regard the participation of the national military forces in regional and international peacekeeping operations as very conducive towards shaping new, more democratic military values through the

process of learning by example and interaction with fellow soldiers from countries with more stable and democratic civil-military relations. It has also been noted that participation in such operations may help the militaries who are seeking to define their new role in a more democratic setting with more civilian control and less political influence find a new arena for their services.

3 Theories on political culture

3.1 The usefulness of political culture theories

The vague concept of “political culture” rarely enters into the study of international politics, as it doesn't seem to fit in with the ideals of how political research should be conducted. It is often relegated to a residual category, or simply dismissed as the domain of other sciences such as anthropology and sociology. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the usefulness of employing a cultural perspective on the challenges in reforming civil-military relations in developing countries. None of the previous mentioned theories are alone able to meaningfully explain why the military has so much political power, or why the political leaders continue to rely on the military as a political instrument despite great disadvantages and potential threat to their own regime.

The main drawback with using rational choice theories on developing democracies, is that they fail to take into account that rationality is dependent upon the cultural setting. Institutionalism presupposes that politics are actually happening within the institutions and structures in the political system, and not in the informal way of most African states. And finally, dependency theory is too focused on the interaction between states in the international system as a whole to provide insights into politics on the local level, in this case the civil-military relations within states.

Applying a cultural perspective to understand civil-military relations has several advantages:

- It allows for understanding the rationality behind seemingly irrational politics
- it allows for analysis on micro and macro levels

- it explains why internal and external, military and non-military role assignment impact on civil-military relations
- this perspective explains how illegitimate practices may in fact be considered necessary and even legitimate in the local context
- it makes it possible to trace the development of military attitudes, role expectations, as well as investigate the instrumental use of the military by the political leaders.

3.2 Ideal types of political culture

David R. Mares(1998) suggests a framework for analyzing civil-military relations based on two components; Political culture and the constitutive rules.

Mares(1998:3) gives a clear definition of the term:” Political culture comprises a people’s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideas, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of its country, and the role of the self in that system”. He contends that the study of their beliefs, values and ideals are sufficient for studying the civil-military relationship.

Political culture is shaped by a state’s particular history and ideas that have evolved over a long period of time, but it acts as a causal factor in today’s events. It is by nature very stable, and changes very slowly, most often only after a dramatic change in the power balance between the civilian and military authorities, e.g. after coups.

Mares(1998:3-5) identifies four ideal types of political culture: liberal, corporatist, militarist and neo-patrimonial.

A liberal political culture is characterized by its individualist nature and lack of a state fundament. The sovereignty lies with the people, and the government exists only to fulfil the minimum of services and functions for the people. The

military is one of these functions, and is as such subordinated to the will of the people through the government.

In a *corporatist political culture*, the starting point is not the individual, but groups of people who organize according to their own group's interests. Each group has a responsibility for the defence of the state, and they expect the state to care for the particular groups interests in return. The military itself is seen as one of the special interest groups and the constitutional arrangements opens the possibility for declaring a state of emergency fairly easily.

The military in the *militarist political culture* are the bearer of the national vision, and can legitimately assume leadership because it is viewed as superior to the civilian authorities who are motivated by self interest and who also hinders development. In short, the military is better at making decisions than the politicians because they tend to be ineffective whereas the military is the protector of the nation's interests and wellbeing. This also justifies maintaining a large military sector and defence budget.

Neo-patrimonial political culture entails a strong hierarchy, which do not involve the people as political actors in the typical ways, but rather as the clients in a patron-client relationship. The military is one of several groups of elites that seek to influence the civilian leader and whom the leader controls though his network of trading power and services.

Immediately it seems that Uganda falls into the category of neo-patrimonial political culture. The following analysis chapters will explore why this kind of political culture developed, and how it is in part maintained by the Museveni regime's manipulation of the military forces.

3.3 African political cultures

African societies displayed a variety of political structures prior to colonization, depending on complexity and size they went from loosely organized tribal societies to empires ruling vast territories.

Naomi Chazan (1994) gives a brief summary of the most common political values that existed in this era: Participation and representation were found among the Kikuyu's in East Africa and in Nigeria, and the kingdom of Buganda in Uganda incorporated interest groups in the decision-making process.

Debate and reaching a consensus was considered an ideal. There existed procedures for removing unpopular leaders, and illegitimate political decisions and procedures were sanctioned through informal and formal mechanisms. Political power was often decentralized, allowing for local governance. The focal point was on the community at large, rather on the individual itself, and deference to elders, village and political leaders were a common feature in most of these societies. Some societies also displayed values of an authoritarian nature, such as prominence of the leader, where he would be vested with supernatural powers, and the use of military strategies to enforce the will of the leader.

The colonial administrations were set up in such a way as to maximize the profit they could extract from the territories they acquired. The focus was on building efficient structures for domination, control and exploration of resources. Power structures were highly vertical in nature, with little or no opportunities for the local people to participate in the official state structure. Only a tiny portion of the locals were given access to the colonial administration through western education and positions in the official hierarchy.

Chazan argues that the emergence of anticolonial norms stemmed from the obvious discrepancy between the democratic norms the colonial powers were drafted on and the reality of the colonies were ruled. During the Second World War period this became evident to African political and military elites, and this contributed to the demands for independence. Freedom was the main political value in this period. Freedom from colonial rule and freedom to choose their own policies. The most important project was to mobilize as many groups of society as possible in this project, but the emphasis was on the collective rights as an independent nation, not on individual political rights.

The first attempts of liberal government in the post-independence African states failed and was replaced with authoritarian regimes, with The Gambia and Botswana as the only exceptions in this phase. Chazan argues that this was mainly due to the alien nature of democracy, coupled with unfavorable economical conditions. The effects of the failure of the initial attempts to introduce liberal, democratic government were twofold; firstly it greatly reduced the opportunities for protest and a healthy civic life, and secondly state structures, bureaucracy and the military grew markedly, resulting in a political culture of statism.

Political development in Africa continued to be lead by the western educated elites, and the implementation of participatory procedures and popular involvement in politics have been slow in most cases. Governance in all aspects has been an elite project, even attempts at introducing western style democratic institutions have failed to create the type of social trust that democracy is build upon.

3.4 Militarism in Africa

Amii Omara-Otunnu (1998) is concerned with the question of the widespread occurrence of military coups in Africa, which not only hinders and marginalize fundamental requirements for democracy, such as free elections and the right of association, but also tends to generate considerable changes in the political culture. The result is the emergence of militarism in the society as a whole. The hegemonic rule by the military, in which the military substitutes its preferences for the will of the general population, and the legitimizing of the use of political violence creates a situation where the people have no choice but to acquiesce in the values and priorities of the military, rather than subscribe to them voluntarily. This undermines the very basis of the moral authority of the state.

Omara-Otunnu (1998) then further divides the effects of militarism into two categories; the formal and informal subordinations of all or most of the civilian agendas to the military, and the emergence of militarization of the daily interactions of the population, where they result to armed and violent ways to interact with both each others and the government and the military forces.

He also proposes ways to determine the level and extent of militarism by analyzing the society on the following dimensions (Omara-Otunnu 1998:404):

- * An unreasonable percentage of the state's budget devoted to military spending
- * Extensive use of military symbols and language by those in power
- * The use of the military more to ensure internal order than to protect the country and its interests abroad.
- * The civilian population is passive in their relationship with the military and an insistence by the government that the people should be disciplined

- * Persecution of opposition
- * Presentation of political problems as really being military in nature
- * Military success is presented as the route for political and socio-economic mobility in the society.
- * The actual domination of civilian institutions by the military

3.5 The cultural approach

In their work "Culture Troubles", Chabal and Daloz (2006) propose a *cultural approach* to the comparative study of politics. This approach differs from most of the cultural theories per se. It is based on an anthropological view in the tradition of Geertz and in the sociological tradition of Weber, attempting to discern the meaning behind social structures. They place great importance on understanding political practices in the local context, and are highly sceptical of attempts to compare different societies using terms that could have very different meanings from one society to the other. This approach also calls for the need to use an interpretive method of analysis, and questions the validity and fruitfulness of reducing political behaviour to universalistic variables that can be quantified and studied apart from their local, specific setting. It is highly recommended that studies of political phenomenon should be very in-depth and sensitive to the local context.

Chabal and Daloz(2006) are sceptical to the tendency to narrow down the concept of culture to a set of strict variables in order to compare them using traditional means of analysis. Instead they advocate the need to place more emphasis on the interpretation of meanings, of how politics actually plays out within the formal procedures and institutions. In their view, "politics" do not constitute an independent variable, and "political cultures" should not be understood as dependent variables that can be manipulated or that they can

effect political evolution in any particular direction or lead to regime change. And neither do they believe that there is a neat causal relationship where culture determines politics. Instead the cultural approach investigates how culture shapes the practice of politics in specific settings.

Chabal and Daloz states that it is impossible set up and replicate experiments about social realities in the strict scientific manner of natural sciences. Instead they argue that such analysis must meet the test of plausibility, and be based on an inductive, not deductive method. They also advocate the need to ask real questions in the real world, and let the analysis be terrain driven. This should also include historical and anthropological research.

3.6 Rationality in different contexts

As part of this endeavor to apply the cultural approach to politics, Chabal and Daloz explores how the notion of rationality manifests itself in a variety of ways in different societies. They agree with the rational choice tradition that people will attempt to maximize the benefits of their actions, but they also stress that what is considered rational behavior in one part of the world, may differ radically from what is considered rational in another part of the world.

"Irrational behavior can be culturally logical"(p 76). In "Africa Works" this perspective is used to understand how seemingly irrational aspects of African politics make perfect sense to the people living in that particular setting.

Consulting witchdoctors or making references to black magic in the political game are rational when this is considered to have a real effect on the outcome. Attempting to fight against armed enemies with nothing but prayers and sticks are rational when people believe that they are immune to bullets, as in the case of the followers of Alice Lukwena in Uganda. A member of a low or untouchable caste in India may become utterly fatalistic and make little

attempts to improve his conditions because that is how he perceives his rightful station in life.

Rationality in this sense does not only apply to the personal level, it also determines how the individual will interact with the greater society and towards the state structures. Where the official economy is not working properly, people will engage in black market activities. This will deplete the state of necessary revenues, but it is the rational choice for people who simply try to make a living for themselves. Where the state is unable to provide basic services for its citizens, they will form small scale organizations to meet those needs outside of the state structures. Likewise, the excessive spending of money and resources by state leaders and big men in the community, often amounting to more than what they can actually afford, is rational in a society where the status of the leaders reflects positively on the supporting clients. The poor people will not take this display of wealth by their patrons as an offence; rather it is expected and welcomed as a way of strengthening the ties between them. These examples illustrate how practices that may seem irrational from a western point of view are in fact perfectly rational when they are understood in their particular cultural context.

The question of identity and the role of the individual in relation to the community are closely connected to this understanding of rationality. Again Chabal and Daloz points to important cultural differences that have major impact on the workings of politics. The western societies place the individual in the centre of attention, even though people are influenced by the different cultural, religious, ethnic and so on groups they belong to, the individual is still the focal point of any analysis. Other societies have a much more collectivistic view of the individual, where membership in the extended family, the clan or village will determine how they act under different conditions.

With identity come the closely related concepts of ethnicity and nationality.

Using the comparison of African politics to Western politics as an example of this, they show how it becomes meaningless to measure the degree of democratic consolidation in Africa simply by constitutional framework or formal institutions. In their own words (Chabal and Daloz 2006, p 29):" A cultural approach makes it possible to understand the extent to which the exercise of power, south of the Sahara, is predicated on a personalised concept of politics." This perspective then makes it possible to understand and explain why politics and power continues to be focused on the patron-client relationship, despite the introduction of democratic practices such as elections, participation and accountability. The underlying logic of the patrimonial practices continues to operate within, and on the side of the official democratic institutions. To tap into this underlying logic it is necessary to analyze how people themselves make sense of the political power structures they are a part of. "Africa Works" (Chabal and Daloz 1999) is a study of how African politics can be understood using this perspective. Political actions, structures and power relations that may seem irrational from a western, legal rational point of view, may in fact make perfect sense for the people they affect. Upholding patrimonial practices may be a rational political strategy even when it clearly undermines political stability in the long run, socio-economic development or even ultimately regime survival. The vertical patron-client network allows for the exchange of resources and privileges in return for legitimacy and political support.

4 Methodology

4.1 Applying the cultural approach perspective

This analysis is an attempt to answer the research question "*How can the civil-military relations in Uganda be explained by using a cultural approach?*".

As much as I recognize the importance of threat environment, mission assignment, objective vs. subjective control, socioeconomic development and external pressure in shaping a state's civil-military relations, I find it necessary to go one step further and explain why the state in question choose to employ the specific strategy and not the other. I believe the explanation lies in the political culture, as this is the underlying dimension guiding and causing the choices of missions, control mechanisms and perceived threat environment. For instance it seems common sense that a state with a predominantly militaristic political culture will have worse civil-military relations than a state with a more liberal or corporatist political culture, simply due to differences in the way people interact with each other.

The other variables will be treated as control variables, but due to the limited scope of the master thesis, this will by all means not be a complete analysis of all relevant factors and variables

The first step in conducting this analysis is to create a research strategy that secures the highest possible degree of validity on all levels. Yin(2003) offer guidelines for how case study research should be carried out, and the following design for this analysis is based on these recommendations.

4.2 Case selection

As stated in the introduction, democratization is a global trend, and the civil-military relations in any one of these emerging democracies could be interesting objects of analysis. Due to the very limited scope of this paper, this analysis will be a single-case study, although there would be great advantages to compare different types of political culture and their effects on civil-military relations. My interest in political culture in Africa was sparked by the perspective introduced by Chabal and Daloz(1999). I chose to focus specifically on Uganda for several reasons; first and foremost because of the extreme importance the military force have played and continues to play in Ugandan politics, but also because of the country's strategic security position in the region and the interaction between Uganda and the international community at large.

4.3 Single-case study

The longitudinal case study is one of several single-case study rationales Yin(2003) identifies. The object is to demonstrate how changes in a phenomenon can be predicted by the selected theory at certain specific times. The changes in Ugandan civil-military relations will be linked to the events that has had the most profound impacts on the political culture. The balance of civil-military relations is subject to much quicker changes than the broader category of political culture. The balance can go in favour of either parties depending on both internal and external events. As shown in the chapter on theory, the military will gain influence in times of foreign threats, or if the civilian government's hold on power is so weak as to allow for a successful coup to take place. Likewise, the civilian counterpart may gain more power over the military in peaceful times, when there is strong international pressures

to curtail the military's influence or if the civilian party employs divide and split techniques to manage the military forces. The gradual militarization of the political culture in Uganda will thus be pointed out to have emerged at the following mile stones in the recent history of civil-military relations:

- the ethnic composition of the army during colonial time, the Obote 1 administration, the rule of Amin, the second Obote government and the current Museveni presidency
- the near total collapse of state and society under the military dictatorship of Idi Amin
- the increasing tendency towards presidentialism during the recent years of Museveni's government.

Yin further differentiates between embedded and holistic case studies. This case study is clearly of the embedded type, many different sub-units are identified and the analysis is conducted accordingly to each sub-unit. The relationship between the civilian government and the military leaders is one of these sub-units, others include; the relationship between the military and the local population, the ethnic composition of the military in relation to ethnic tensions in the country as a whole and the impact of foreign political and military pressure. To avoid the pitfall of failing to relate the findings of each sub-unit to the larger unit of analysis, the conclusion will focus on bringing all the different findings together to show their effects on the actual situation of the Ugandan politics.

4.4 Establishing validity in the case study

The topic of this case study is of a quite theoretical nature, and in order to gather data on the empirical level, it is necessary to create operational definitions of the theoretical subject. The topic "civil-military relations in Uganda" is a vast subject, it covers many aspects, and it is thus necessary to break it down into operational definitions that can be analyzed with the data available. Drawing on the theories presented earlier, there are two aspects of the relationship which must be measured with the empirical data: the level of professionalism within the army, and whether the civilian government employs the military for their own purposes.

The first aspect can be further operationalized into the following dimensions:

- The professional autonomy of the military
- Military personnel subjected to the rule of law
- The military's attitudes towards upholding democratic values
- The military's susceptibility towards manipulation by the civilian government

In order to assess the civilian government's use of the military's capabilities, these dimensions can be singled out:

- What kind of operations and tasks the military is asked to perform, if they are oriented towards external, traditional military tasks or not
- Use of subjective control mechanisms
- Whether the government is using the military for legitimizing its political power

4.5 Internal validity

Internal validity deals with the establishing of causal effects, whether event x led to event y. In qualitative case studies it is not possible to determine such causal links with absolute certainty, and it is therefore important to be sure that all possible linkages between events are considered, and that there are not other factors causing the apparent relationship between the events. The researcher must rely on making correct inferences about the relationship between events, and Yin (2003) recommends using multiple strategies. The most applicable strategy for this study is explanation building. The separate dimensions outlined above will be assessed individually in relation to the hypothesis that the civil-military relations in Uganda can only be fully understood by using a very broad analytical perspective.

4.6 External validity

External validity is the question of whether the findings of a particular study can be generalized. Case study research rely on analytical generalization. The results of the case study should illustrate or criticize the general theory in question. These types of case studies are examples of applied science, the main objective is explaining or interpreting event or phenomenon using existing theory. The main contribution to theory development occurs when such a study reveals that the existing theory is inadequate.(Andersen 1997)

The results of this analysis are based on the specific events that have shaped the particular political culture in Uganda, and how the political and military actors have shaped their relationship between themselves and society. It is thus not directly transferable to other cases. But the process of showing how western based theories fail to grasp the informal workings of the civil-military

relations in Uganda, point to the conclusion that these theories might also be inadequate to study such relations in other non-western societies.

4.7 Reliability

Finally, the design should emphasize reliability; all the different steps of the analysis must be clearly documented so that another researcher can be able to replicate the study.

The data used in this analysis are collected through secondary sources.

Reliability must therefore be secured by firstly choosing data sources that are in themselves reliable, and secondly the use of these data must duly credited. Most of the empirical data in this analysis have been published in international journals or been reviewed by other researchers in the field, and their validity is thus secured through the peer to peer quality control mechanisms.

4.8 Strategy for analyzing the data

The overall strategy for analyzing these data is following the theories on civil-military relations outlined in chapter 2 and 3 to explain **how** the civil-military relations have taken their current form in Uganda, and at the same time employ the broader cultural approach to investigate the underlying rationale for **why** they developed this way. Based on the operationalizations presented earlier in this chapter, the analysis will be broken down into three parts, the first dealing with the ethnic and regional cleavages, where the historical roots of the present situation will be traced from the colonial system through the various post-independence regimes, with special emphasis on the importance of the manipulation of the ethnic make up of the army. This forms the background for an analysis of the internal mission assignment of the UPDF in

combating the LRA insurgency, where the ethnicity plays an important role in explaining the prolonged conflict. Taken together, these two sub-units of the analysis are then related to an explanation of how ethnicity became the structure on which the neo-patrimonial logic operates, and how civil-military relations are managed in a patron-client relationship.

The second part of the analysis explores the external mission assignment of the UPDF in the interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which are in part motivated by the government's need to find new resources to feed the patron-client relationship with the military in order to maintain the military as a source of political power.

Extensive corruption within the military organization is also analysed as another important way for the government to ensure military loyalty.

The third part of the analysis deals with the ideology and electoral fraud of Museveni's National Resistance Movement, which allows for the extra-judicial use of military means to ensure regime stability.

5 The creation of neo-patrimonial civil-military relations

5.1 The background of Ugandan civil-military relations

According to the ideal of military professionalism, the military should have its own separate codex based on obedience to the civilian government who decides the role and mission assignment. The military should have a loyalty to the nation as a whole. Due to the colonial legacy of pitting ethnic groups against each other both within the army and between the army and certain ethnic groups and regions in the society at large, the Ugandan military never achieved such a loyalty. The Ugandan army was never able to form a separate collective identity strong enough to overcome the ethnic cleavages that it was originally created along. According to Howe(2001 pp27-73) and Otunnu(1998)the British colonial power recruited predominantly from the northern regions, and made sure to deploy the troops far away from their home areas as a safeguard against rebellion. The British favoured the Southern kingdom of Buganda politically, and upon independence, the first president Milton Obote saw the resourceful Buganda as a political threat. He sought to build up a strong support from the military by continuing the pattern of recruiting from the north. The Ugandan army continued to view itself as loyal to the more peripheral north, and in opposition to the central, politically dominant Buganda.

Another legacy from the colonial era was the lack of promotion based on merit. Initially the British preferred illiterate soldiers who would not be so susceptible to political independence movements. The Ugandan Army lacked a trained African officers corps at the time of independence, and Idi Amin himself was

an uneducated man who lacked the political, diplomatic and economical understanding necessary to run a country. In Museveni's NRM, combat experience from "fighting in the bush" became the most important qualification for political office, and likewise, a close relationship or family ties with Museveni could lead to a high rank military position.

It is clear that the legacy from the colonial army continues to influence the civil-military relations in Uganda when it comes to ethnic cleavages and the lack of military professionalism Huntington deems necessary for maintaining objective civilian control.

At the start of Museveni's military campaign to overthrow the second Obote administration in 1981, the country was sharply divided along the north/south axis, culturally, ethnically and religiously. It was clear from the onset that the NRM had to create peace and order in the whole country in order to legitimize its new regime. Right from the beginning of its official rule in 1986, the NRM was faced with armed opposition from rebel groups, predominantly in the north, but later also in the east and west of the country. Rubongoya(2007 pp81-84) states that some of the rebel forces were incorporated into the NRA, but that due to failure to address the underlying structural problems of underdevelopment and representation in the north, the insurgencies continued. As will be more fully explored below, the Lord's Resistance Army enjoyed popular support by the local population in in the beginning, due to the deep ethnic and regional distrust at the time of the NRM victory.

The NRM's failure to settle the severe security problems for the local population in the north, was evident in the strong support of political opposition in these areas. In the first presidential elections in 1996, the opposition candidate Paul Ssemwogere won up to 90% of the votes in the northern districts, as compared to Museveni's 74.2% of the national vote. Little had changed by the 2001 elections, where opposition candidate Besigye got the majority vote in the north, whilst losing the national vote.

5.2 Civil-military relations under Obote and Amin

Decalo (1990 pp133-198) gives an account of how the already precarious state of civil-military relations deteriorated even more during the personal dictatorship of Idi Amin from 1971 to 1979. Decalo too traces the root causes of military unprofessionalism and undue use of the military to the above mentioned ethnic and regional cleavages. In January 1964, the Ugandan army rose to a mutiny and demanded pay rise and more rapid africanization of the officer corps. These demands were granted, and showed how vulnerable the government was to the army's military strength. The previous small and underprivileged army expanded vastly, and at the same time gave young Ugandan soldiers the opportunity to rise in rank. It was at this time Idi Amin started to build up his ethnic support base in the army by recruiting from his own ethnic group, in competition with Obote's preference for soldiers from his northern districts. As the soldiers now had discovered how easily they could coerce the government into giving in for their demands for more specialized equipment, better terms of service and faster promotions, the size of the Ugandan army expanded vastly, as did its budget allocations.

A corresponding increase in military ethics and professionalism did not follow accordingly, as Obote chose to pit different fractions of the army against each other and establish special military forces for his own protection because he feared the general trend on the continent of army coups. Decalo(2000 p 160) illustrates this by quoting a sign at the main entrance to Army Headquarters that read:" Politicians Not Allowed".

His tactics were not successful though, and after a series of allegations of coup plotting and assassinations, Amin finally staged a successful take over assisted by his loyal support base in the army.

Amin's reign of terror did not only wreck complete havoc on the population, the economy and the entire Ugandan state and society, it also destroyed any professional capability of the Ugandan army. Out of fear of pro-Obote support, Acholi and Langi soldiers were systematically killed, and the military was issued the right to arrest any one suspected of any crime. Decalo(2000)quotes figures from the International Commission of Jurist that estimated that more than 250 000 Ugandans had been killed by it's own government by 1974.

With large numbers of the officer corps eliminated, promotions were given out without any regards to merit or experience. The fate of Charles Arube illustrates very well that these arbitrary promotions could have disastrous endings; he was promoted to colonel in 1972, reaching the position of chief of staff in 1973, and then assassinated by Amin the following year. (Decalo 2000 p 167).

Towards the end of his reign, Amin resorted to creating an image of an external threat to the nation. The rationale behind this desperate move was to secure his failing control over the army. In October 1978 he launched an attack on Tanzania, claiming that Tanzania had attacked first. Amin had grossly underestimated both his own army's capabilities and the strength of the Tanzanian army. By April 1979, Kampala had fallen and Amin fled into exile.

By 1979 Uganda was in every respect a destroyed country. The economy was in ruins due to failed privatization schemes, the expulsion of the important Asian trading community and the almost exclusive reliance on an informal market. A series of short lived interim coalitions was replaced in 1980 by the second Obote administration. Decalo(2000 p 189) blames the failure of Obote's attempts to build political legitimacy on the political culture of violence and coercion that now dominated the Ugandan society.

The new Ugandan army, Uganda National Liberation Army, became locked in dirty war against the National Resistance Army led by Museveni. The fighting was concentrated in the southern area known as the Luwero triangle, and the civilian population suffered from attacks from both sides, the number of civilian casualties reaching as high as 300,000. Eventually it was the accidental death of army chief of staff Oyite-Ojok that led to the NRA victory in March 1986.

5.3 The impact of Obote's and Amin's regimes

As theories regarding civil-military relations presuppose that there is at least some separation between the civilian leaders and the military establishment, it is not possible to apply such theories directly to the kind of military tyranny Uganda experienced under the reign of Idi Amin. The impact of this period is however of great importance for the kind of civil-military relations that evolved later on after some degree of civilian government was reintroduced.

Heavy reliance on military power had become the most important source of political legitimacy. The country was deeply divided along ethnic and regional lines, and the subsequent government of the NRM has continued to rely on the military to secure political power and quell political opposition. This will be explored later on in this analysis, in relation with the elections of 1996 and 2001.

The effect of the ethnic and regional cleavages are also very important to take into consideration when analyzing the conflict between the NRM and the LRA. The previous ethnic manipulation of the army and the deep and mutual distrust between different groups of people and between the regions are important to consider in order to understand the root causes and the prolonged status of the conflict.

The military was denied an autonomous role as a separate state institution, and although large portions of the national budget were allocated to the defence sector, the funds disappeared into corruption, and did not go towards building up the professional capacity of the military. This trend of military corruption will be explored more fully later on in the analysis, as it is a prominent feature of the current civil-military relations under Museveni's government.

Although analysis of the Ugandan political culture has shown that the population is supportive of democratic rule, and mostly reject military and authoritarian regimes, it is doubtful if the necessary democratic political values have been sufficiently internalized. Without widespread societal values such as tolerance, moderation and cooperation, it is difficult to imagine how the overall political culture can shift from a militarised nature towards a more democratic one.

5.4 Internal mission assignment

Following Desch's (1999) typology of threat environments, the occurrence of high levels of internal threats coupled with low external threats would typically produce the worst types of civil-military relations. Uganda do not face any immediate external threat. The conflicts with the neighboring country of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) were initiated by Uganda, and the conflict with the other neighboring state of Sudan is mostly over internal insurgencies spilling over the borders, as the Sudanese government was accused of supporting the Lord's Resistance Army, and likewise the Ugandan government was suspected of backing the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army SPLM/A. The Sudanese support gradually diminished after a 1999 agreement between Uganda and Sudan, coming to an end in 2005 when SPLA came to Power. In later years Sudan has joined forces with Uganda in

cracking down on LRA activities in the DRC. The whole Great Lake region has been and continues to be plagued by violent internal conflicts that at times explodes and cause considerable instability, but still Uganda lacks any kind of external threat that could possibly have unified both civilian and military leaders in the common cause of defense.

The long lasting and extremely violent conflict between the LRA and the Ugandan government have had severe impacts on the civil-military relations, as well as on the Ugandan society as a whole.

Following Desch's theories we should therefore expect to find a tendency for the civilian government to use subjective control mechanisms, divided attitudes among the civilians, but a more unified military.

The North/South divide has been further deepened in terms of the regional divide between the "northerners" and "southerners", which has left the northern part of the country severely underdeveloped.

The ethnic divide within the military has likewise become more prominent, with mostly Acholi LRA rebels pitted against the UPDF that was created from the NRA veterans that "fought in the bush" with Museveni.

The conflict has drained and limited the amount of resources available to the NRM regime for sustaining patron-client relations, and is therefore creating more need for the government to rely on military and not democratic means to legitimate their regime and stay in power.

5.5 The Lord's Resistance Army

As stated, Uganda does face a high level of internal threats. The biggest threat is undoubtedly the LRA, which according to Human Rights Watch (HRW 2005) had caused 1.6 million people to flee their homes in northern Uganda by 1995.

The origins of the LRA can be traced to the return of soldiers from the defeated Uganda National Liberation Army/Front (UNLA) to their home districts in the north after the NRA victory. Initially the LRA received some support from the local population, but this support diminished quickly as the rebels retaliated against the local people suspected of helping the NRM. Eventually everybody who sought refuge in the refugee camps set up by the government was suspected of being an ally of the NRM. In addition to killing and looting the local population, the LRA also abducted children on a large scale, both for recruiting them into their forces and for exploiting them for labour and sex. By 1995 UNICEF estimated that at least 20000 children had been abducted. In March 2002, the government launched Operation Iron Fist, aimed at rooting out the LRA rebels operating from behind the Sudanese border. The result was that the LRA moved their bases back into northern Uganda, and expanded these to include western and east western areas as well. The atrocities against the local population escalated, with the number of IDP's doubling in less than a year, according to HRW (2005). Part of the NRM's strategy was to concentrate even more of the local population in camps. These camps were not secure from the rebel's attacks, HRW reports that more than 300 refugees were killed in an attack in 2004. Following this attack, the government tried to initiate peace talks, but they were unsuccessful. In the period between September 2005 and January 2007, the LRA moved their bases into the Garamba National Park in the DRC.

Joseph Kony and four of his commanders have been wanted for war crimes by the International Criminal Court since 1995. The LRA claims that these

warrants are hindering them in engaging in peace talks, and have successfully demanded that any such criminal investigation must take place in Uganda instead. In August 2006 the LRA and the Ugandan government signed a ceasefire agreement in Juba in Sudan. The agreement called for the LRA troops to gather in Sudan, but instead they stepped up their activities in the DRC. During 2007 and 2008 LRA fighters abducted civilians from Sudan and the Central African Republic, and gathered provisions in preparation for new attacks on the Ugandan government. The local Congolese were left mostly undisturbed and unharmed until September 2008, when Congolese army forces and MONUC launched Operation Rudia in order to cut off LRA supply lines and curb their fighting abilities. Only days later the LRA retaliated against the local population, killing, raping and abducting children. Ever since Kony failed to fulfil the conditions set by the last peace talks, The Ugandan government has sought support from Kabila in order to launch a new military operation against the LRA forces in Congo. After the September killings, Kabila agreed to support "Operation Lightning Thunder", which was to start on December 14.th 2008. The LRA retaliated with "the Christmas massacre" which was carried out on the local population during the Christmas celebrations, leaving close to a 1000 civilians dead.(HRW 2010). Although the Ugandan led operation officially ended in March 2009, there still remains 2000 Ugandan soldiers in the area for intelligence purposes, and Congolese and Ugandan military chiefs meet regularly to assess the situation.

5.6 The significance of ethnicity in the LRA conflict

The former UN under secretary-general Olara A. Otunnu (2006) stresses the underlying ethnic dimension of the conflict between the LRA and the Ugandan military. He claims the government is in fact allowing and participating in an outright genocide of the Acholi people of the three northern districts of Acholi, Lango and Teso, where 90% of the local population are forced to live in

detention camps. Although these camps are ostensibly created by the government in order to protect the population from LRA attacks, he claims that the IDP's are in fact subject to rape, killings and other human rights abuses by the soldiers stationed there. The entire Acholi people are "being systematically destroyed -- physically, culturally, and economically." These statements must be seen in light of Otunnu's Acholi heritage, recent election as President of the Uganda People's Congress, and his probable candidature in the February 2011 national elections, but they are illustrative of how deep the mistrust and resentment runs between the northerners and southerners.

There is however little doubt that ethnicity does matter in the LRA conflict, and the way it is handled by the NRM. Museveni started out with a very narrow base of support mainly from the Bantu tribes of southern and central Uganda. When the NRA defeated the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), which was made up mostly Acholi and Langi soldiers, many of these fled to the countryside in fear of retaliation from the victors. Uganda People's Democratic Army was formed from these soldiers fleeing the NRA, and became the first armed opposition army to fight the NRA. It soon disintegrated, with some soldiers joining the NRA, and other forming the Holy Spirit Movement.

The Ugandan military has since its creation been systematically manipulated according to ethnic dividing lines in order to provide the leader of the regime with much needed legitimacy and as a crude source of power. As a result, the armed forces have not developed as a distinct entity separate from the executive branches of the government. The civil-military relations reflect the situation in other areas of the state, with little or no actual separation between the institutions, or between the personal goals and power of the ruler and the state organization. As each authoritarian ruler has pitted different ethnic groups against each other, both within the military ranks, and between the military and the civilian population, ethnicity has emerged as both a threat and

guarantee for the population's security. Generation after generation have been scarred by this very unhealthy civil-military relationship, and the connection between ethnicity and personal safety has greatly contributed to the overall militarization of the political culture in Uganda. Even with the introduction of formal procedures for regulating civil-military relations in a democratic style, the political culture will still be dominated by the lessons learned from the past experiences.

5.7 The significance of the irrational in the LRA conflict

The UNLA soldiers who returned to their civilian life after the NRM victory found it difficult to be reintegrated into the society. Acker(2004) mentions how this in part was due to their reluctance to undergo cleansing rituals, that was necessary to allow them back into the community. Human Right's Watch has investigated the common perception among the affected Acholi, and found that although people want justice and punishment for those LRA soldiers that have plagued them for so many years, it is also a widespread sentiment that there should be forgiveness. Acholi culture places a great stress on a ceremony called *mato oput*, in which the wrong doers must confess their crimes and pay retribution. The Ugandan government and the International Criminal Court(ICC) do however wish to prosecute Kony and other LRA leaders in the International Criminal Court in Haag. This has complicated the peace negotiations between the two parties, and is part of the reason why Kony refuses to fulfil all the terms of the agreement until he gets a blanket amnesty.

6 Maintaining neo-patrimonial civil-military relations

6.1 Involvement in external warfare

Assigning the military missions that are directed externally and that are of a traditional war fighting or defending nature, is supposedly conducive towards building a stronger sense of military professionalism, as well as keeping the military from meddling in domestic politics. William Reno (2002) argues that the opposite development has taken place within the UPDF in Uganda, especially since the 1996 invasion by Ugandan military forces into the DRC. The official reason for the invasion was the apparent failure by the Congolese government to control territory bordering with Uganda, thus providing Ugandan rebels with a platform for attacking Ugandan sovereignty.

Reno(2002) points out how the invasion was also motivated by the vast possibilities of economic exploitation of Congolese natural resources. He gives examples of how the official gold exports rose from \$12,4 million in 1994-5, to a staggering \$112 million two years later. High-ranking officers, as well as close relatives to the President were involved in the illicit business activities, and this situations created further disturbances in the civil-military relationship in Uganda. Reno(2002) states that although the increased state revenues helped finance public sector spending, and gave Museveni increased leverage towards the international donor community; the invasion severely shifted the power balance in favour of the military.

This was seen in the strong support of Besigye by many UPDF officials in the 2001 elections, and in complaints about how Museveni's relatives took advantage of military equipment and infrastructure in their business activities

in Congo, while many soldiers suffered loss of salary and commodities due to corruption like this.

The enrichment of military personnel also rose concerns about what would happen when the forces eventually were to return to Uganda and be reintegrated in their local communities. They would be hard to control for the government, building their own networks of clients and opposing the government's leadership and discipline.

Huntington's distinction between objective and subjective control mechanisms does not explain a great deal of why Museveni chose to adopt this strategy and allow the military to become involved in business activities in the DRC, it merely predicts the outcome, such as a weakening of professional values and ethics among the military. A more detailed, and context specific analysis will instead reveal that Museveni was facing at once both opportunities and constraints laid out by the international donor community. As both Chabal and Daloz(1999) and Reno(2002) argues, apparently weak states in the periphery of both political, economical and geographical strategic arena still have a measure of leverage and opportunities for manipulating the more powerful states in the international community. Uganda has been hailed by the international community as a successful example of structural adjustment programs, and this is part of the reason why the obvious practices of corruption, unconstitutional presidential decrees such as extending the terms of presidential terms and even military interventions have received less criticism and had fewer consequences than one would expect.

6.2 Military corruption

A vital part of healthy civil-military relations in any democracy is that the military are given the necessary funds to achieve their military objectives, that the technology is up to date, and that military personnel of all classes are receiving their pay and benefits. This enhances the military's professionalism, in Huntington's terms. Corruption may occur at all levels, both inside the military establishment, and by the civilian leaders. As will be demonstrated by concrete examples below, extreme cases of corruption has been documented in the case of the Ugandan military. This has had a profound impact not only on the actual fighting abilities of the UPDF, but on the organization as a whole, rendering it demoralized and unprofessional. With Uganda facing real military challenges from several opposing fractions, most notably the LRA and other rebel groups in the north, as well as a very tense regional security setting, it would seem that a strong, professional military would be a priority of the government. Instead, the national leader, and head of the defence ministry, president Museveni, has chosen to allow this corruption to continue and opted for controlling the military through subjective control measures.

Corruption is widespread in all levels of the military establishment in Uganda, from ordinary soldiers looting the population during security operations in the north, to large scale corruption involving million of dollars gone missing at the top. Tangri and Mwenda (2003) investigated this matter in the last decades, and found evidence of massive corruption especially dealing with acquiescence of equipment and large arms.

From 1996 to 1998 the NRM government and senior military officers were involved in the process of buying Russian helicopter gunship. In the end, Uganda paid \$12 million for two outdated pieces of machinery with falsified logbooks. Ruyondo, a foster child of Museveni, and Museveni's brother Salim Saleh received huge commissions from the deal, and they were found guilty of

corruption and bribery by a judicial commission. Saleh confessed to having received this commission for the arms deal, but was forgiven by the president, and simply urged to use that profit towards fighting the LRA.

A similar scandal occurred when it was decided to buy second hand jet fighters and anti-aircraft guns through Israeli middlemen, in order to fight the Sudanese attacks in the North. The jet fighters had insufficient gas tank capability to perform the trip to the fighting areas, and two of them even lacked a wing upon arrival. On top of that, this purchase ended up being more costly than buying them directly from the manufacturer.

Saleh, the Major-General, was also at the time acting as the de facto overseer of the Ministry of Defence. He was also operating as a businessman, providing services to the military, and made a huge profit transporting soldiers and materials to the Ugandan bases in the DRC.

Corruption and mismanagement of funds were also evident in the almost absurd case of food provisions that were claimed to be expired upon delivery. After serious disagreement within in the military, it was decided in 1999 to enter into a million dollar contract with a South African company, who was going to supply food rations. When the food arrived, UPDF officials claimed the food had expired. This claim was disputed by the South African company, and through international arbitration, the Ugandan government had to pay more than \$2 millions for breach of contract. In addition to a complete waste of money, the result was that thousands of UPDF soldiers stationed in the DRC went hungry during 1999 and 2000. The results of further mismanagement and corruption at the upper levels of the military administrations was also literally felt on the soldiers backs when 60000 pairs of uniforms supplied by a South Korean company turned out to be way too small in size to fit the Ugandan soldiers.

6.3 Corruption in the conflict in the DRC

The 1998 intervention in the northern parts of the DRC offered great opportunities for military officers to engage in illicit business activities under the guise of the military operation.

Saleh was among those exploiting this situation. A UN investigation in 2001 and 2002 found him, and the head of the UPDF operation, Kazini guilty of looting minerals and timber. A million dollars in cash was found in the remains of a plane crash along the border with the DRC in 1998, and it was revealed that it was meant for buying gold by a company Saleh was involved in.

Kazini was accused of spending funds allocated for the soldiers' pay on his own business activities. When the scandal surfaced, the officer responsible for paying the salaries was found dead, seemingly from committing suicide, but the opposition and his family claimed it was a military cover up. Another paymaster allegedly disappeared to Dubai with about a million dollars of the soldiers' pay three years later. According to the sources of Tangri and Mwenda(2003), this was another cover up by high ranking military officers.

Reno(2002) quotes figures on the export of natural resources from the DRC: Gold exports rose from \$12 million dollars in 1994-5, to \$112 million two years later. At the same time, gold production in Uganda barely rose at all in the same period. Clearly the gold exported from Uganda came from Congolese territory. By 1999, gold had become the second largest export article in Uganda. UPDF officers also engaged in other forms of business activities, such as operating cell phone networks, and using military owned means of transportation for private profit.

6.4 Explaining military corruption in Uganda

Organized, large scale military corruption has become an important instrument for Museveni to control the military. This can be understood as a rational choice when considering the state of the civil-military relations in Uganda as a whole. First of all, Museveni came to power through a military campaign himself, and has never attempted to keep military and politics separate. His political power is based on his near total control of the military. His claim for political legitimacy is narrow, and without the military to back him up, he would risk being ousted in elections.

Considering the dominant political culture in Uganda, where military coups have been a legitimate way of getting political power, he has good reasons for fearing a strong, professional army. If the army developed a value orientation towards democratic ideals, it would become less susceptible to his subjective control. Securing the continued support from the military is thus a major concern for the NRA government. The divide and conquer method, ethnic dividing and sheer terror employed by former rulers like Amin and Obote are not a viable strategy for Museveni. The main reason for this is the changing international climate, where donor countries pose much stricter conditions for aid. As Reno(2002) investigates, Museveni is still able to manipulate the international community and the IMF's, but he has find other strategies.

Allowing the military to engage in revenue seeking activities in the DRC has the most welcome side effect of boosting the overall economic performance of the country. Although no tax is extracted when these goods are brought into the country, Uganda still gains economically. The companies that are involved, find it more convenient to operate the export side of their business from Ugandan territory, because here they have access to insurance and safe export to third countries. This in turn inflates Ugandan official export statistics.

Uganda is a client of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC), a program to reduce the burdens of repaying debts for some of the worst affected countries. The international donors have vested interests in seeing their participants succeed according to the structural adjustment programs they advocate. Reno(2002) argues that this is one of the reasons the donor countries tend to be more lenient with countries that seem to have strong economic growth. Uganda's official spending on military and defence should according to these agreements not supersede 1.9 % of the GDP . The official government statistics alone show that Uganda exceeds this limit, and independent international institutions estimate that the figures rise as high as 3%.

7 Use of neo-patrimonial civil-military relations to secure regime survival

7.1 The ideology of the Ugandan government

The Museveni government, although somewhat of a show case for the international community when it comes to economic stability and development, is not widely renowned for its democratic qualities. There are severe democratic shortages when it comes to representation and political rights, but the interesting point in this respect is that the president does not pretend to be a great believer in democracy for the African states either. Despite a great need for international support and aid, Museveni has made it clear on many public occasions that multiparty politics in Uganda would fail to consolidate cross cutting class interests, and instead follow ethnic and social cleavages in the society. There is no doubt that the current move towards multipartyism is forced from the outside, and that Museveni and the NRM movement are playing all their cards to stay in power, which includes the advantage of sole access to state resources as political parties are still not legal, extra judiciary control over press and the electoral process itself.

The most important point for this discussion is however the unhealthy influence the incumbent government has over the military. According to the HRW(2006) Museveni reportedly appeared to suggest, at a rally in Entebbe on January 14, that only the NRM-O government could control the army: “All the past governments collapsed because they failed to control the army. . . [We have managed to tame it.”

Edward Kannyo (2004) concludes an article on the ongoing constitutional reforms in Uganda with a warning note on what could happen with the civil-military relations when Museveni finally has to step down (at least if he is

forced to leave his office after his current term); He regards an intervention by the army as a possibility in the worst case scenario, as he finds the civil-military relations to be the least institutionalized part of the governmental system in Uganda. This is partly due to the strong personal ties between Museveni and his officers who to a large degree share common ethnic ties as well as shared history and camaraderie. It is also likely that the military as a whole is fearful of a new ideology of transparency and openness that could come with a new, more democratic government.

There is no doubt that the military in Uganda has been and continues to be controlled by the government through subjective control. Propaganda, neo-patrimonial practices and ethnicity are the dominant traits of the civil-military relationship.

7.2 Electoral fraud

Human Rights Watch (2006) reports concern with the state of the civil-military relations in Uganda in the period leading up to the February 23. presidential and parliamentary elections of 2006 as well as the following local council elections. Their concern is mainly with an increasing militarization of the society, as the NRM government is fighting to improve its odds.

According to the HRW(2006), the NRM government had appointed several former and current high ranking military officers to important political position in the last months. There had also been many reports of police and military personnel intimidating and using violence against members of the opposition, as well as trying to influence the public opinion. This is clearly contributing to the sort of civil-military relations that Desch(1998) finds most destructive, namely a situation where the military's mission is both oriented internally and non-military in nature.

In preparation of the elections, the military and police forces issued a special Code of Conduct for Security Personnel during an electoral Process. In short this is instructions for military and security personnel to abstain from direct involvement in political party work or officially support political candidates. It is however doubtful how much effect this code of conduct will have as it has already been violated in practice, especially as the president himself reputedly have made contradictory statements and threats.

7.3 Silencing the political opposition

The Ugandan newspaper The Monitor(2008) published an article on how the UPDF are not subject to the same laws as the rest of the population.

A special Local War Crimes Division of the High Court was established as part of the Juba Peace Agreement between the government and the leaders of the LRA. Despite opposition from both Ugandan MP's and international organizations such as UN and HRW, these special courts are not going to try UPDF soldiers accused of committing human rights abuse during the campaign against the LRA. The government claim that the military court tribunals are capable of punishing such crimes, but human rights groups question the transparency and openness of these military courts, and are concerned for the justice of the victims of the conflict.

In his list of three essential conditions for a democratic civil-military relationship, Fitch(1998) states that military personnel must be subject to the same law as the civilian population, and not enjoy special privileges or rights. This condition would seem to work the other way as well; the Human Rights Committee has stated that civilians should only be put on trial before a military

court under very special conditions. The leading opposition member, Dr. Kizza Besigye and 22 members of the Forum for Democratic Change party, was put on trial before a military court in January 2006, although they had been released previously by the High Court. The chairman of the General Court Martial now states that the military court is independent from the High Court. This issue is now under debate in the Constitutional Court. There has previously been an uncontested precedence in the Ugandan legal system that states that the High Court is supreme.

7.4 Human rights violations by the UPDF

Much of the literature on civil-military relations warns against the use of official military forces in internal security operations. Such activities should instead be conducted by non-military security organizations. The military is less transparent and subject to less public accountability and scrutiny. It may therefore be difficult to hold soldiers who commit human right abuses or engage in criminal activity responsible and punish them. Such internal missions will also compromise the professionalism of the military, because of the confusion of roles.

In the northern parts of the country, where the conflict between The LRA and UPDF has put more than two million people in the dire need of military protection, the HRW has received reports that official military personnel have threatened to withdraw their protection if the people cast their vote for the opposition parties. These threats are not regarded as confirmed by the HRW, but it gives an indication of how the people feel treated by the official military forces.

The UPDF has a long history of involvement in internal security operations. Human Rights Watch(2007) reports more than fifty eyewitness reports of human rights abuse by members of the UPDF in the northern region of

Karamoja from September 2006 through January 2007. The UPDF was assigned to disarm bandits operating in the area, but the methods they employed included beating and torturing civilians, firing at children and burning down homesteads. The UPDF officials denied many of these accusations, and most of the crimes went unpunished.

During the Ugandan intervention of the DRC, HRW reported many accounts of the UPDF attacking civilians, often not making any difference between Mai Mai fighters and the civilian population. The Ugandan soldiers also engaged in looting, and as a result the civilians feared them equally much as the other groups fighting in the areas.

8 Conclusion

8.1 The assessment of traditional theories

Uganda is currently recognized as being on the path towards democratization. This means that there exists some formal separation between the state and society, and also that the military is constitutionally brought under civilian control. Some of the key concepts of traditional theories are useful to the extent that they define how civil-military relations should be structured in democracies, and under what circumstances they are likely to improve or deteriorate.

Bringing the military firmly under civilian control is an important step towards achieving a stable, consolidated democracy. The main features of a democratic civil-military relationship are according to Fitch(1998) :1. Civilian control over the military, but allowing for some military autonomy according to it's professional expertise. 2. Complete civilian control over policy making. 3. The military must be subject to the same rule of law as every member of the society.

Huntington (1994) distinguishes between two different strategies the civilian government can use in order to ensure civilian control over the military; objective and subjective control mechanisms. Desch (1999) brings further important theoretical dimensions to the subject of studying civil-military relations by investigating the implications of the orientations and missions assigned to the military.

Following only these concepts and theories, we do not gain any real insight into the rationale behind today's civil-military relations in Uganda. They would

seem to be in a disastrous state, with a complete lack of military professionalism, lack of sanctions towards soldiers who have committed crimes, total reliance on subjective control mechanism and an internal role and mission assignment of the military. Why would this situation be allowed to continue in a new democratic system?

The main argument of this analysis was that it is possible to study how the civil-military relations in today's Uganda are actually rational and logical for the actors involved. The neo-patrimonial networks of the leaders granting favours and resources in return for political support are still more important than the formal state structures.

8.2 Allowing for context specific analysis

The focus of this paper is the problems that arise when one tries to apply these theories to the empirical situation in non-western societies, and especially in situations where the formal democratic institutions may hide an all together different political reality. To grasp the realities of politics under such circumstances, the initial hypothesis of this analysis was that it is necessary to find analytical strategies that are able to incorporate a broader spectrum of dimensions than the above mentioned theories allows for. Chabal and Daloz provide such alternative and more context sensitive analytical strategies in their works "Africa Works"(1999) and "Cultural Troubles"(2006). They propose the necessity for understanding the rationale behind seemingly irrational (political) behaviour. Instead of trying to apply theories constructed on the western, legal-rational political system, it is more fruitful to investigate how politics are actually played out in societies that have a more collective-oriented

perspective, and which operates on different assumptions of what is considered legitimate and proper in politics.

This analysis has sought to answer the initial research question of how the civil-military relations of Uganda can be explained by using a cultural approach such as Chabal and Daloz (1999) apply to their work on understanding the realities of Africa politics.

It has become very clear that this approach is crucially necessary to grasp the reasons and rationales behind the strategies the Ugandan leaders have chosen to legitimize their governments and ultimately secure the survival of their regimes. It is not enough to note that ethnic and regional tensions have been manipulated by the leaders, it is also necessary to understand that these tensions have their root both in the political culture and in the historical experiences of the colonial rule. Western rationality has more or less moved away from a collective thinking, the focus point of everything in the society is the individual, and the individual in relation to the state which operates almost like an impersonal entity of it's own. African politics must be understood on different premises, as the orientation is much more about the collective fate and good of the clan, the tribe and the ethnic group. National leaders are not *national* leaders in the sense that they represent the country as a whole, rather the perception is that they will favour their own ethnic support base. This is why ethnicity continues to play an important role in the political culture of Uganda, and also specifically in the civil-military relations. The impact of ethnic tension also reflects the two sides of the civil-military relationship; in the role and mission assignment the civilian-government accords the military, and in the problems with unprofessionalism within the army.

8.3 Main results

The first parts of the analysis focused on the importance of the tensions between the Bantu south and the Nilotic north. To put it very simply, Ugandan politics can be seen almost like a thug of war between these two, where political supremacy and military power have been replaced with political inferiority and violent repercussions.

The Southern kingdom of Buganda was historically more developed in terms of political and social institutions. That was partly the reason why the British colonial powers chose to recruit soldiers to the colonial army from the northern tribes. These tribes also had a reputation of being of a more “martial” nature, and thus more fitted to be the loyal and unquestioning foot soldiers the British desired. The analysis has shown how the ethnic composition of the army continued to be manipulated by every government since independence. The result is today’s situation where the conflict between Museveni’s NRM and the LRA is proving almost impossible to resolve either politically or by military means. The deep mistrust the northern population holds against the government is reflected in the strong support of the political opposition, as well in the belief that the government is allowing it’s army to commit violence and crime against them.

Next the analysis explored the rationale behind the Ugandan intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Reno(2002) explains the underlying motivation of Museveni’s government, and the most important reasons for this intervention seems to be the president’s need to sustain his patron-client relations with the military by giving officers access to loot the natural resources in the DRC.

Due to Museveni's need to at least nominally comply with the structural adjustment programs of the IMF's, he is forced to reduce public spending on the defence sector. Creating an illusion that the whole region's stability is in danger means that the international community and donors will accept larger budget allocations to the military, as well as be more lenient towards accepting other undemocratic practices to continue in other areas of the administration.

In order to maintain his personal control over the military forces to secure his own regime and to be able to deter the opposition, Museveni has also allowed for extensive corruption to take place when it comes to procurement of military materiel. Tangri and Mwenda (2003) show the enormous scale of this kind of corruption, and that the main benefactors are the president's own family and those in his closes circle. The move is quite dramatic from the initial stress on the NRM as being a movement that was supposed to be a broad based organization towards a more personalistic rule.

This trend of collecting political and military power into the hands of the president is also evident in the increasing exclusion of opposition voices, even as the country is formally moving towards allowing multi-party elections. Again the international community is being appeased by the formal move towards allowing political parties to form and compete in elections. But as Human Rights Watch(2006) reported of clear cases of the military being used to manipulate the 2006 elections in Museveni's favour, it seems that the military will continue to be used in unconstitutional ways which will further compromise it's professionalism.

8.4 The civil-military relations as part of the wider political culture

A regime that bases its political legitimacy on neo-patrimonialism is not likely to produce democratic civil-military relations. The introduction of formal state institutions does not automatically mean that the underlying rationale of client support in exchange for resource distribution will change. Corruption, appointments to government positions based on ethnic ties or personal relations, and use of force and coercion will take place within the new state structures, and they may not be easily detected if only the official picture of the government and state is analyzed by outsiders. Substantial change in civil-military relations seems only possible if democratic values are sufficiently internalized to allow for political legitimacy based on representation instead of crude military power.

Museveni's personal hold over the UPDF and the ways he chooses to employ its military capabilities can only be fully understood by taking into consideration how militarization of the entire society and the logic of neo-patrimonialism have shaped the political culture in Uganda.

Uganda scores high on all the characteristics of a militarised society listed by Otunnu(1998), and the government of Museveni is not showing signs of moving away from its dependency on military power in order to secure its survival. Rubongoya(2007p 147) finds promising signs of democratic values taking root in the civic society, especially during the first term of Museveni's presidency. Political opposition parties and various interest groups trained people in democratic values and practices. But Rubongoya(2007 p 195) questions if this is enough to cause a change in the political culture, as the majority of the Ugandan people are simply too poor to afford to sever the neo-patrimonial ties that ensures distribution of goods from the government to its clients. This was evident from the results of the 2005 Afrobarometer survey,

where a majority of the rural population was in favour of lifting the limits on presidential terms to allow Museveni to run for office again, whereas the urban population voted against it.

As the true nature of the civil-military relations often reveals itself during times of great change, the scheduled elections of 2011 will prove if Museveni will allow for the potential peaceful turn over of office, or if he will again use his strong personal grip of the military forces to manipulate the electoral process. Rubongoya(2007 pp195) is sceptical about Uganda's chances to evolve into a stable democracy where free and fair elections can take place. He is mostly concerned with the curtailment of constitutionalism, as Museveni has removed the limits on presidential terms, and the move towards presidentialism, where more and more power is being concentrated in the executive office of the president, at the expense of the other institutions of the democratic system. Museveni has relied heavily on the military forces at his disposal to make this happen, and at the same time caused even greater damage to the professionalism of the Ugandan army.

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