

ARTICLE

THE MANIFESTO, THE TIMELINE, AND THE MEMORY SITE: THE 22 JULY 2011 ATTACKS IN NORWAY AND THE CHRONOPOLITICS OF GENRE

HELGE JORDHEIM

ABSTRACT

In addition to being heinous crimes, acts of terrorism are complex chronopolitical events. Perpetrators, victims, survivors, families, and authorities manage their relationship to the events by engaging with and giving shape to time, or, rather, to a plurality of times. To perform this time work, they avail themselves of different genres, which serve as chronopolitical tools. This article discusses three such genres: the manifesto, the timeline, and the memorial site. These genres belong not only to different phases of the terror attacks but also to different actors. They are used to shape temporal progression in ways that enable specific forms of action, survival, and memory. The article takes the 22 July 2011 attacks in Norway as an example to map and analyze the role of these chronopolitical genres in managing the multiple times of terror.

Keywords: 22 July 2011 attacks, chronopolitics, genre, manifesto, memory site, terror, timeline

On the lakefront of Tyrifjorden, a lake located about half an hour outside of Oslo, the capital of Norway, a recently inaugurated memorial commemorates the seventy-seven people who were killed in a terrorist attack on 22 July 2011. After having blown up the Government Quarter, killing eight people, the right-wing extremist Anders Behring Breivik made his way to Utøya, an island in Tyrifjorden where the Norwegian Social Democratic party's youth organization, the Workers' Youth League (AUF), held their summer camp, and started a killing spree, which, in the end, took sixty-nine lives. Most of the victims were in their first years of adulthood.

The discussion about how to commemorate this heinous act, the bloodiest attack on Norwegian soil since the Nazi occupation during WWII, started almost immediately. On the island itself, AUF took charge of rethinking the politics of time and memory, a process that also aimed to uphold the tradition of using the island as site for annual summer camps and other events. In a process led by the youth organization itself, parents and relatives of the victims came together with international experts on trauma and memory to think about the future of the island; these conversations secured the future of Utøya as a memory site, an educational

facility, and a camp site.¹ By contrast, the construction of a national memorial site for the victims both on Utøya and at the Government Quarter on the mainland has been a much thornier issue, in terms of both location and artistic expression.

A competition was held to select a design for such a memorial. After months of heated debate, the Norwegian government rejected the winner of the first competition, the Swedish artist Jonas Dahlberg's work titled *Memory Wound*;² the project to design the memory site was then assigned to the architectural office Manthey Kula, in cooperation with the Belgian landscape architect Bas Smets. A new site was selected at the harbor on the mainland, from where a small ferry sails across to the island. From this spot, both the victims and, later, the perpetrator—as well as, eventually, the Norwegian police force—had made their way to Utøya. This is also where frightened and desperate parents, in the company of ambulances, doctors, and neighbors, waited for the children who had been at the camp. At this spot, named Utøyakaia, or the Utøya pier, a new memory site, one that includes a large new parking area that can accommodate visitors arriving by car or bus, has been built.

The memorial itself consists of seventy-seven three-meter-tall, slightly twisted pillars, one for each of the victims. The pillars are arranged to form a twenty-six-meter-long fence-like structure in the shape of the letter *s* or a question mark. Along the pillars is a staircase with a handful of steps. Together, the seventy-seven columns make up a line, on which the movement of the sun marks the passing of time. When the design was first made public in the summer of 2019, the project director from the Norwegian state's building company Statsbygg, Mari Magnus, offered the following description to the newspaper *Aftenposten*: “The timeline is central to the events during the two attacks at the Government Quarter and on Utøya. For this reason, the architects have chosen to use the sun as a medium of time and connect this with what happened.”³ The movement of the sun along the sculpture represents the time that passed during the attacks.

My interest here is less in the success or failure of the national memorial for the victims of the 22 July attacks or the process that preceded it. Rather, I am interested in the actual design itself—the fact that something as seemingly inexpressive, affectless, and even neutral as a timeline was selected to represent the most devastating event in Norwegian history. A line designed to visualize the long or short intervals of abstract, homogenous, and quantitative time was turned into a national symbol of grief, rage, shock, and trauma. In a very precise and tangible way, the timeline-memorial represents a merger of the chronological, the measurement and division of time, with the political, the care for *res publica*, the

1. For a description of this process by the person who made it possible and directed it, see Jørgen Watne Frydnes, *Ingen mann er en øy* (Oslo: Res Publica, 2021).

2. This process is documented in Dahlberg's illuminating film *Notes on a Memorial* (2018). For a discussion of why the first memorial failed, see Ingeborg Hjorth, “Hvorfor minnsteder? En undersøkelse av den minnepolitiske håndteringen av 22.juli-terroren,” *Nordisk kulturpolitisk tidsskrift* 21, no. 2 (2018), 246–68, https://www.idunn.no/nkt/2018/02/hvorfor_minnsteder.

3. Mari Magnus, quoted in Arve Henriksen, “77 bronsesøyer skal prege minnstedet på Utøya-kaia,” *Aftenposten*, 20 June 2019, <https://www.aftenposten.no/kultur/RRaR0a/77-bronsesoyler-skal-prege-minnstedet-paa-utoeya-kaia>. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own.

common or collective things—and thus it constitutes an instance of what, in this theme issue of *History and Theory*, is referred to as “chronopolitics.” In other contexts, I have referred to this as “time work”—more specifically, “the work of synchronization.”⁴ This means that social time is shaped and reshaped for political purposes—that is, for purposes of power and social control, or, indeed, for collective action and change. The time of “time work”—that is, the *chronos* of “chronopolitics”—is not a form of intuition (Kant) or a dimension of the universe (Newton) but a way we humans organize ourselves and our surroundings. Time is a way of living together and dealing with public matters. As such, it is fundamentally social and political. The chronopolitical work involves the shaping or reshaping of the temporal fabric of society in a specific way.

In order to understand the different kinds of chronopolitics practiced in a society, and the tools by which they are performed, I will introduce a concept of genre that I have adopted from rhetoricians such as Lloyd F. Bitzer, Carolyn R. Miller, and Richard E. Vatz, who emphasize that genres are types of action rather than formal structures. This article will analyze how certain genres serve as instruments or tools for chronopolitical purposes—indeed, for performing chronopolitical acts.

My case study for this discussion will be the 22 July 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway, a set of events that completely changed the history of the country, setting it on a different path than the one defined by its postwar self-image of solidarity, trust, equality, and peace. My goal is less to come to new conclusions about the topic of terror and time in general, which has been widely discussed by a wide range of scholars in different fields,⁵ than to approach the Norwegian case in order to discuss three central chronopolitical genres: the timeline, the manifesto, and the memory site.

THREE CHRONOPOLITICAL GENRES: THE MANIFESTO, THE TIMELINE, AND THE MEMORY SITE

Genres can be said to constitute what the German theorist of history Reinhart Koselleck refers to as *Wiederholungsstrukturen*, or “structures of repetition” that exist “in language”: “linguistic structures of repetition, within which all . . . repetitions or repeatabilities were generated and recognized, and within which

4. For the concept of “time work” used in a social science setting, see Carmen Leccardi, “Afterword: A ‘Temporal Novel’ Inspired by the Concept of Time Work,” in *Time Work: Studies of Temporal Agency*, ed. Michael G. Flaherty, Lotte Meinert, and Anne Line Dalsgård (New York: Berghahn Books, 2020), 209–20. See also Helge Jordheim, “Multiple Times and the Work of Synchronization,” *History and Theory* 53, no. 4 (2014), 498–518.

5. See, for example, Anne Fuchs, *After the Dresden Bombing: Pathways of Memory, 1945 to the Present* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Claudia Verhoeven, “‘Now Is the Time for Helter Skelter’: Terror, Temporality, and the Manson Family,” in *Power and Time: Temporalities in Conflict and the Making of History*, ed. Dan Edelstein, Stefanos Geroulanos, and Natasha Wheatley (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020), 270–91; Claudia Verhoeven, “Time Bombs: Terrorism as a Political Modernism in Russia and Europe,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Terrorism*, ed. Carola Dietze and Claudia Verhoeven (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 214–32; and Aleida Assmann, “Impact and Resonance—Towards a Theory of Emotions in Cultural Memory,” in *The Formative Past and the Formation of the Future: Collective Remembering and Identity Formation*, ed. Terje Stordalen and Saphinaz-Amal Naguib (Oslo: Novus Press, 2015), 41–70.

they are still generated and discovered.”⁶ Genres organize communication and its locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary functions⁷ according to certain recognizable patterns. Analogous to Koselleck’s *Begriffe*, or “concepts,” to which he has famously dedicated most of his work, genres tie together pasts (that is, contexts in which similar speech acts have been performed by the same means) and futures (that is, the possibilities of henceforth reusing the same genres to achieve similar goals). Furthermore, chronopolitical acts, like all other political actions, are performed under the temporal “constraints” (to use a term from Bitzer⁸) of the moment, the now.

In the terms of rhetoricians Bitzer and Miller, genres are “social actions” that are employed in repeatable “rhetorical situations” in order to respond to and alleviate a specific “exigence.”⁹ Responding to Bitzer’s reuse of the Sophist theory of *kairos*, Vatz asks whether the rhetorical situation is always just given or whether it can be brought about by the very same actor who will later respond to it.¹⁰ This will be a key question in the following analysis of the 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway.

The “new rhetorical,” originally Sophist, theory of “exigence” (in classic Greek, *kairos*), to which uses of language respond, is also linked to a specific view of politics—that is, a view of politics not as a field or a discipline but as a “concept of action,” *einen Handlungsbegriff*, to use Kari Palonen’s term.¹¹ In other words, chronopolitics means to act in time, or even with time. Time, on the other hand, might be short or long, accelerating or decelerating, the urgency of crisis or the deep time of climate change, but it is always defined by an element of contingency, of eventfulness, of something unforeseeable, or—in one way or another—of something new. Politics, J. G. A. Pocock famously states in his book *The Machiavellian Moment*, means “dealing with the contingent event.”¹² Political actions and events always take place in now-time, even though this “now”—be it kairic, critical, or messianic¹³—involves chronopolitical stakes that might take us far into the past and the future.

The three chronopolitical genres that are discussed in this article are the manifesto, the timeline, and the memory site. They are examples of genres that take on explicit chronopolitical aims. Other examples are white papers, utopian

6. Reinhart Koselleck, “Structures of Repetition in Language and History,” in *Sediments of Time: On Possible Histories*, transl. and ed. Sean Franzel and Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018), 162.

7. See J. L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, 2nd ed., ed. J. O. Ursom and Marina Sbisa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).

8. Lloyd F. Bitzer, “The Rhetorical Situation,” *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 1, no. 1 (1968), 1–14.

9. Bitzer, “The Rhetorical Situation”; Carolyn R. Miller, “Genre as Social Action,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 70, no. 2 (1984), 151–67.

10. Richard E. Vatz, “The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation,” *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 6, no. 3 (1973), 154–61.

11. Kari Palonen, *Politik als Handlungsbegriff: Horizontwandel des Politikbegriffs in Deutschland 1890–1933* (Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1985).

12. J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 156.

13. See, for example, Kia Lindroos, *Now-Time/Image-Space: Temporalization of Politics in Walter Benjamin’s Philosophy of History and Art* (Jyväskylä: SoPhi, 1998).

or dystopian novels, tax returns, climate reports, historiography (both cultural and natural), and wills. The choice of the manifesto, the timeline, and the memory site is due to the nature of the event I am interested in understanding. All three regularly form part of what we have become used to calling “acts of terrorism”; they involve perpetrators, victims, survivors, families, and authorities, and they come into use in the preparations before the attacks, during the attacks themselves, and in the aftermath of the attacks. In other words, these genres shape events, actions, and counteractions, which, together, make up an “act of terrorism” as a “rhetorical situation” (to use Bitzer’s term), in which people are maimed and murdered.

Furthermore, the manifesto, the timeline, and the memory site differ from each other in what I consider to be nontrivial ways: a text, a diagram, and a landscape with a work of art. Manifestos are written by terrorists themselves prior to the terrorist attacks and aim to prepare, bring about, give shape to, and justify events that, in violent and brutal ways, disrupt the flow of everyday time. Timelines, on the other hand, are used to map and manage the flow of time during terrorist attacks by documenting the successions of events and their connections in terms of cause and effect, synchronicities and nonsynchronicities, durations and temporal distances. To stay with the Greek terms, manifestos engage with *kairos* and timelines engage with *chronos*.¹⁴ If we were to organize the genres according to a past-present-future structure, we could argue that, when written, manifestos are usually created prior to attacks and thus might contain elements of anticipation and planning. In most cases, however, such documents do not reach their intended audiences until after the acts of terrorism have called attention to them, and thus they are read more as *post festum* justifications. By contrast, timelines document each event in terms of its own present—that is, as a singular moment of action and decision in which the relationship to the past and the future is yet to be decided. Finally, from the perspective of the event, acts of memorialization, in the form of memorials or memory sites, are, by necessity, placed in the future—that is, at a point after the end of the event itself. Their time work, however, consists in linking the traumatic events of the past to the lives of future generations, who will base parts of their identities on this event. In the same way that the manifesto is part of the prelude to the terrorist attack, and is actualized during the act itself, the memory site belongs to the aftermath, opening up to a long-term future.

As mentioned, I consider these differences to be nontrivial, meaningful, even important—but they are also simplifications. One of the aims of this article is to question some of these presumptions about time and genre in the context of the most brutal and devastating event in Norwegian postwar history. In the following, I will first discuss the chronopolitics of the manifesto, through which the perpetrator brought about the rhetorical situation and the historical moment in which he committed this mass murder. Then, I turn to the chronopolitics of the timeline, through which Norwegian society, the institutions of the state, civil society, and the press, have tried to make sense of the attacks and their own responses, and lack

14. For a discussion of some of these aspects, see Helge Jordheim, “Conceptual History between *Chronos* and *Kairos*: The Case of ‘Empire,’” *Redescriptions* 11, no. 1 (2007), 115–45.

thereof. Finally, I discuss the chronopolitics of the memory site, which represents an attempt to bring Norwegian society back on track after experiencing the most violent disruption of everyday life since the German occupation during WWII.

CHRONOPOLITICS OF THE MANIFESTO

On 22 July 2011, a little after two o'clock in the afternoon, Anders Behring Breivik left his mother's flat in Skøyen, outside of Oslo, and drove into the center of the city, where he parked his white van at the foot of the government building. The car contained a 2,100-pound bomb made with fertilizer. Before he left the flat, Breivik had uploaded a document to *Stormfront*, an internet forum that is used by right-wing extremists, and sent it as an email attachment to 1,003 people, whom he perceived to be good patriots. He had also made a twelve-minute-long video, in which he summed up the contents of the document, and uploaded it to YouTube.¹⁵

The day after, even before the full extent of the attacks was known to most people, journalists became aware that Breivik had published a document in which he discussed and explained his actions. Initially, there were certain doubts in the press about whether it was ethically justifiable to discuss the document before the police had made a public statement about it—especially since they could not be sure that it was actually authored by Breivik. Some journalists also expressed discomfort that, by addressing it, they were acting out the terrorist's playbook even after he had been apprehended and jailed, giving him exactly the kind of attention he was seeking. What they were not in doubt about, however, was what kind of genre the text should be attributed to. From the moment it was discovered, the document was referred to as Breivik's "manifesto"—a decision that was made according to historical conventions about what kind of texts are usually associated with terrorist attacks.¹⁶ Examples of manifestos abound—from the numerous addresses by the German Rote Armee Fraktion to the text produced by the Unabomber Ted Kaczynski, who famously made *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* publish his manifesto against civilization and technology in exchange for him ending his campaign of letter bombs. Kaczynski's manifesto is one of the texts excerpted and copied by Breivik.

In the eyes of Norwegian and international journalists, the genre label of "manifesto" clearly offered the best fit for the "rhetorical situation," to use Bitzer's

15. For the events of the 22 July terror attacks, I have mainly used three books published by Norwegian journalists. Two of the books have been translated into English: Aage Borchgrevink, *A Norwegian Tragedy: Anders Behring Breivik and the Massacre on Utøya*, transl. Guy Puzey (London: Polity, 2013) and Åsne Seierstad, *One of Us: The Story of a Massacre and Its Aftermath*, transl. Sarah Death (London: Virago, 2016). The third book follows the events more closely, from minute to minute, and was also the first to be published: Kjetil Stormark, *Da terroren rammet Norge: 189 minutter som rystet verden* (Oslo: Kagge, 2012).

16. The coverage in the Norwegian newspapers *Aftenposten* and *VG* is representative. See, for instance, Atle Brunvoll et al., "Drapsmannen la ut detaljert 'terrordagbok,'" *Aftenposten*, 23 July 2011, <https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/0n5KG/drapsmannen-la-ut-detaljert-laquoterrordagbokkraquo>, and Lucas H. Weldeghebriel, "Kopierte Una-bomberens manifest," *VG*, 26 September 2011, <https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/Aevnj/kopierte-una-bomberens-manifest>.

and Miller's term.¹⁷ Text and action formed a unity, in keeping with the *Oxford English Dictionary's* definition of a manifesto: "A public declaration or proclamation, written or spoken; *esp.* a printed declaration, explanation, or justification of policy issued by a head of state, government, or political party or candidate, or any other individual or body of individuals of public relevance, as a school or movement in the Arts."¹⁸ In this case, the "individual . . . of public relevance" is a terrorist who sought to achieve "public relevance" through his brutal actions.

However, if we approach this "social action" by way of its illocutionary, rather than its perlocutionary, force, as expressed in the text itself and in the way it is labeled by its author, the unity of text and action is less obvious. The question of genre attribution goes directly to the chronopolitical stakes of the text, the kind of time work it is set to perform, and how we can understand it. In the document itself, Breivik never labels his work a "manifesto"; by contrast, he reserves this term for another publication—namely, *The Communist Manifesto*, which, according to Breivik, is to blame for the "cultural Marxism" that is about to destroy Western civilization. Furthermore, at the beginning of the text, he explicitly introduces another label: the "compendium,"¹⁹ which comes from Latin and means "handbook," or "textbook," but which, today, is used mostly to describe an assemblage of excerpts from other texts, often for educational purposes. In most respects, this is quite a precise genre label for this piece of writing. Most of the text—probably as much as two thirds of it—was not written by Breivik but was copied from different sources on the internet; among them, 350 pages were written by the blogger Fjordman and published on the Gates of Vienna website.

The text that Breivik uploaded comprises 1,516 pages and is organized into three parts, with sections and subsections. It is written in English and carries the title *2083: A European Declaration of Independence*. From the beginning, a variety of genre markers are at play. The numerical system ordering the sections from 1.1 to 3.29 is a staple in academic dissertations. The first part of the title (the part featuring a future date) reminds of a utopian novel—for instance, Louis-Sébastien Mercier's *L'An 2440, rêve s'il en fut jamais* (1771). The second part of the title alludes to the American Declaration of Independence. Other important paratexts are the name of the author, Andrew Berwick, an anglicized version of the terrorist's birth name, and the place of publication, London. Finally, there is a Latin subtitle that is, at the same time, a dedication: *De Laude Novae Militiae Pauperes commilitones Christi Templi Solomonici* (In praise of the new poor knights of Christ and the Temple of Solomon), which in part quotes another text, Bernard of Clairvaux's *Liber ad milites templi de laude novae militiae*, a sermon

17. For a discussion of the manifesto as a genre, see Stevens Russell Amidon, "Manifestoes: A Study in Genre" (PhD diss., University of Rhode Island, 2003), https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/oa_diss/682. For a more literary take, see the beautiful book by Martin Puchner, *Poetry of the Revolution: Marx, Manifestos, and the Avant-Garde* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

18. *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. "manifesto (*n.*)," accessed 6 September 2023, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/manifesto_n?tab=meaning_and_use.

19. Andrew Berwick, *2083: A European Declaration of Independence* (London, 2011), 3, <https://archive.org/details/2083-a-european-declaration-of-independence/>. The document is unpaginated, so any page numbers listed in the notes refer to the pages in the cited PDF.

or treatise written sometime between 1120 and 1136 in order to boost the morale of the newly founded order of the Knights Templar in preparation for the Second Crusade to the Holy Land.

The document Breivik uploaded to the internet before he planted the bomb and went on his killing spree was an assemblage—in his own words, a “compendium”—of intertexts and paratexts; the Norwegian and international press coined the term “Breivik’s manifesto” to refer to this document, since this was the label that fit the rhetorical and political situation.²⁰ More than ten years later, it is still referred to by that term, not least by his admirers in the extreme right-wing blogosphere. Both David Sonboly, who killed nine and wounded thirty-six people in a Munich mall on the fifth anniversary of the Breivik attack, and Dylann Roof, who gunned down nine African Americans in a church in Charleston in 2015, had written similar manifestos to explain and defend their actions.

In the following, I will make an attempt at understanding the chronopolitical work performed by this compendium-manifesto. I will stay mostly at a structural level, since my interest here is less in the details of right-wing extremist ideology and more in the way it organizes and shapes time—more precisely, how it works to bring about a convergence of word and action, in the form of an “impact event,” as Anne Fuchs calls it, by narrative and chronological means.²¹ Several times during the trial, Breivik stated that his most important contribution to the liberation of Western civilization from socialism, multiculturalism, and, most importantly, Islam was his “compendium,” whereas the attacks that killed seventy-seven people were merely a way of drawing attention to it.²²

Breivik’s “compendium” has three parts, which operate in three different timescales. The first tells the long-term history of Islamic imperialism, including such topics as Muhammad’s march on Mecca in 626, the Ottoman Empire, and modern jihadism. The second part focuses on the present, the current political situation in Europe, whereas the third looks to the future, in terms of planning, risk assessment, alliances, enemies, and so on. The problem with this past-present-future structure, however, is that it constructs a narrative, a universal, world historical drama, based on the myth of a clash of civilization, and not least a clash of religions—which does not really afford much agency to a young man, albeit a reborn Templar knight, from Norway. Thus, for the last twenty pages of the compendium, Breivik changes genre again in order to make space—and, crucially, time—for his own life, his own thought and actions, and his own day-to-day activities, the everyday life of a terrorist, as it were. The genre that offers itself best to this change of temporal scale and rhythm is that of the diary.

20. Later, during the court case, one of the investigators, Dag Uppheim from the Norwegian Police Security Service, stated that they use the term “manifesto,” rather than Breivik’s term “compendium,” because “this name caught on quickly and both in the police and in the media.” See the court transcripts: “Ord for ord, dag 27, del 1: Politiet gjennomgikk ti måneder med etterforskning,” *VG*, 30 May 2012, <https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/59EPz/ord-for-ord-dag-27-del-1-politiet-gjennomgikk-ti-maaneder-med-etterforskning>.

21. Both Fuchs and Assmann use this term; see Fuchs, *After the Dresden Bombing*, 11.

22. In the court record published by the newspaper *Dagbladet*, he made this statement on 19 April 2012 at 13:05. For a copy of this text, visit the *Dagbladet* website: <https://live.dagbladet.no/22julirettsaken/173/>.

The final part of the compendium is organized by date, from 2 May to 22 July 2011, and by numbering the eighty-two days Breivik spent making the final preparations for his attacks. Most of the activities described are practical, even technical. The years and centuries of the *longue durée* history of the rise of Islam imperialism are replaced with the months, weeks, and days in the life of a young Norwegian man who is in the process of becoming a terrorist, planning and preparing his actions. In the final entry in the diary, which is also the final entry in the compendium as a whole, yet another timescale, another temporal interval or rhythm, is added, one according to which the attacks themselves will unfold. Time is accelerating. We are now down to minutes: “I believe this will be my last entry. It is now Fri July 22nd, 12.51.”

Less than 2.5 hours later, the bomb in the Government Quarter went off. Below, as a signature, he adds his anglicized name as well as the title he had given himself as founding member of the order of the Knights Templar. This is also the sentence that turns the compendium into a manifesto, the moment when the gap between words and actions is finally bridged—or, rather, that is the effect that Breivik himself wants to achieve. The last sentence of the compendium shall serve as the pivot whereby words are no longer just words but become actions. The sentence is also a juncture of multiple timescales. It gives the exact time, down to the minute, and thus introduces the timescale of the attacks into the temporal configuration of the compendium. At the same time, it activates other time layers—the *longue durée* of Islamic imperialism and the Knights Templar, the contemporary history of immigration and multiculturalism, and the “impact event” itself. In this way, as discussed by Vatz, Breivik creates his own *kairos* moment, the moment when he himself can seize the opportunity and act.

As we also know from other examples of terrorist attacks, a crucial part of the chronopolitics of terrorism involves the creation of a destructive, violent now that is brought about not only by means of guns and bombs but also by words and texts. In Breivik’s case, this “now” represents the coming-together of long-term universal history, affective immediacy, and glorious futures, all of which converge in the same textual-historical moment, which has been brought about by the compendium turned diary turned manifesto.

As part of the 22 July attacks, the manifesto (or, rather, the compendium that the press relabeled a manifesto *post festum*) represents one way of giving shape to time—that is, by collapsing multiple timescales, and multiple temporal dimensions, into one single, kairic moment in which only one person has agency and can act. That one person is the perpetrator, the terrorist. In this moment, it is no longer possible to separate the past from the present or the future—just as it is impossible to separate words from actions. Everything gets sucked into the black hole or the maelstrom of the event itself.

This leaves us with the important critical and chronopolitical task of deconstructing this moment, of pulling the different times, intentions, plans, actions, and words apart and pointing at the gaps and the absences—absences of meaning, of historicity, of empathy, of humanity. We need to confront the textual-historical *kairos*, to which the terrorist believes himself to be responding with the actual historical now, which was reconstructed in large detail during the court case that

resulted in Anders Behring Breivik being convicted of seventy-seven counts of murder. To perform this task, we need to understand more about the times of terror, and this is where the timelines—the next genre that I will engage with here—come in. In many ways, the timeline serves as a counterpoint to the manifesto, in which all of time is reduced to one single point, the window through which the perpetrator steps into history, his moment of opportunity, of *kairos*. The time of the timeline, as we will see, does not in itself represent any meaning or presence; rather, timelines are comprised mostly of absences into which singular moments are placed and distributed. The time of the timeline is quantitative, durational, diachronic; compared to the *kairos* of manifesto, the time of the timeline is *chronos*-time. Moreover, there is never only one timeline; rather, there are always many timelines, all of which represent the same set of events, historically speaking, but with different actors, material circumstances, experiences, and technologies. Shifting our attention from the manifesto to the timeline, we also shift from a chronopolitics of singularity to a chronopolitics of multiplicity.

CHRONOPOLITICS OF TIMELINES

As we have seen, Breivik's manifesto contained its own timeline in the form of a diary of the eighty-two days that passed between when he began his preparations and when he uploaded the document and left his mother's flat to put his deadly plan into action. All the other timelines I will deal with here, however, were produced in the aftermath. Looking through the innumerable reports and evaluations that, in various ways, attempt to make sense of the events of 22 July, there is no way to ignore the omnipresence of timelines. Press coverage, governmental evaluations, and scientific analyses alike feature visualizations of the events as points on a line, or several lines, in terms of discrete successive moments. One such visualization is the timeline of police response in the report from the 22 July Commission, which was appointed by the Norwegian government to evaluate how police and health authorities responded to the attacks.²³ Other timelines can be found in the self-evaluation of the Norwegian police forces, who, at both a national and a local level, tried to explain their late arrival to the scene and the delayed arrest of the killer, who, in the meantime, continued his killing spree. Another timeline is mounted on the wall in the 22 July Centre, the information facility that is located close to the site where the first attacks took place and that serves both to explain the events to new audiences, particularly new generations of Norwegians, and to remember the victims. In addition, there are the numerous timelines produced by the press, including the Norwegian Public Broadcasting Company (NRK) and the tabloid newspaper *Verdens Gang* (VG). And there are also many more.

That these lines give shape to time needs no further explanation. Lines like these have dominated Western perception and management of time since antiquity, as recently argued by Daniel Rosenberg and Anthony Grafton in their book

23. For full references to all timelines, as well as visual examples, see Helge Jordheim, "Mending Shattered Time: 22 July in Norwegian Collective Memory," in *Heritage Ecologies*, ed. Torgeir Rinke Bangstad and Þóra Pétursdóttir (London: Routledge, 2021), 185–207.

about the history of timelines.²⁴ As Rosenberg and Grafton illustrate, timelines do not necessarily look like lines in the geometrical sense but can take different shapes; some look more like tables and others look like trees. All of them, however, visualize beginnings, endings, and intervals, which have been plotted onto a unilinear or multilinear diagram that represents the flow of time itself.

In the aftermath of the 22 July attacks, the timeline has emerged as probably the most important chronopolitical genre in Norwegian memory politics. Whereas the manifesto was the format of the perpetrator, the timeline is the format of the victims and of the Norwegian state and public. Whereas the manifesto brought about rupture, the time work of the timeline consists in reconnecting pasts and futures into viable continuities that can serve as the basis for reestablishing life on both the individual and the collective level. In a previous article, I have focused on how these timelines can be said to “mend shattered time,” reconnecting the events of 22 July with the larger temporal fabric of Norwegian society, which is held together not only by institutions such as the government, the police, and the health system but also by narratives about freedom, progress, solidarity, and even love.²⁵ Timelines put together diachronic series of events that link causes to effects and explain failures and delays—particularly why the police were not able to stop the perpetrator earlier or why the Government Quarter did not have better security. Moreover, timelines also work synchronically to help integrate the terrorist attacks on Utøya and at the Government Quarter with the lives of those who were not there but who still lived through those moments, simultaneously and in parallel, thus bringing about new collective times in which a future is also possible.

By taking a broader chronopolitical view of the work performed by the timeline—however, a view that is focused less on illocutionary force and more on perlocutionary effect—another kind of analysis is also possible. In large parts, this analysis takes its cues from the analysis of the compendium-manifesto, which seeks to bring all historical and social times, from the history to jihadism to the procurement of several tons of fertilizer, together in a moment of violence, an act of terrorism. In a sense, when different sets of events are mapped onto timelines in order to create some kind of institutional and collective continuity and uniformity, the timeline performs a similar work of synchronization, only with the purpose of mending rather than disrupting. As we have seen, bringing about a kairic moment of brutal violence and death is key to the time work performed by the terrorist. In other words, an important critical task involves countering this romantic occasionalism and event metaphysics by deconstructing this moment of temporal “fullness,” bridging the gap between word and action. In the following, I will argue that timelines might have a role to play in this work of temporal deconstruction.

Ever since timelines became much-loved tools of European historical imagination in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they have had a dual function: on

24. Daniel Rosenberg and Anthony Grafton, *Cartographies of Time: A History of the Timeline* (Princeton: Princeton Architectural Press, 2013).

25. Jordheim, “Mending Shattered Time.”

the one hand, aligning events, lives, and chronologies into a synchronized whole; on the other hand, exposing the multitudes of nonsynchronous times that are inherent in different forms of life that unfold at different speeds and scales.²⁶ That also happens here: at the same time that timelines work at “mending” the fabric of time, they come to unravel it even more. They force us to confront the fact that there is no one singular homogenous time that can be shattered and mended; rather, there are always many times, which are held together by the ongoing work of synchronization. This work might involve aligning events and processes that cannot really be aligned, since they embody times that, due to the material and social realities, are inherently nonsynchronous.

In addition to creating diachronic series of seemingly homogenous events, timelines offer cross sections of the flow of time, which cut through and thus align multiple, and often very different, trajectories or narratives. Any moment on any of the 22 July timelines contains endless lives and lifetimes, multiple diachronic trajectories, from the past, through the present, and into the future, that are aligned by the reference to universal, chronological time. There is the time of the police, the time of victims, the time of the perpetrator, the times of helicopters and inflatable boats, the time of national warning procedures, and response times. Not all of these lifetimes are embodied primarily by humans. Some are assemblages of human and nonhuman actors, such as helicopters, boats, and cars, as well as emergency warning procedures, such as the “national alarm” (*riksalarm*). In these temporal assemblages, human intentions are often thwarted by material and administrative shortcomings. In the report by the so-called Sønderland Committee, which sought to acquit the Norwegian police force of any blame whatsoever, the process required to get the military helicopters from the 720 Squadron at Rygge airfield into the air is afforded its own timeline. In the work to come to terms with the event, different durations inherent to processes and materials are disengaged from each other; they contradict and come into conflict with each other, offer different versions of reality, even different ontologies. In response to the terrorist attack, our shared temporal frameworks, the times we live by and coproduce, split up into diverging timelines that document different causalities and produce conflicting narratives. In the attempt to create one singular, credible, coherent, and true temporal ontology, an onto-chronology, the timelines risk breaking time up into separate incommensurable worlds, each of which contains different people, things, technologies, and forms of politics. Mostly, these differences can be summed up in three features of each timeline: beginning, end, and intervals.

The seventeen-meter-long timeline at the 22 July Centre begins with the explosion—or, rather, with the moment the terrorist parked his car outside the Government Quarter—and ends with a picture taken of the island of Utøya from the mainland at 22:23. In other words, it presents the terrorist attacks from the temporal perspective of the victims, which coincides catastrophically with the perspective of the perpetrator. No attempts are made to explain the attacks by showing the events that led up to them, such as the terrorist’s preparations or

26. See Helge Jordheim, “Synchronizing the World: Synchronism as Historiographical Practice, Then and Now,” *History of the Present* 7, no. 1 (2017), 59–95.

the lack of security at the Government Quarter and on Utøya. According to the historian Tor Einar Fagerland, who was academically responsible for the contents of the exhibition at the Centre, the intention was “to take people back to the moment when Norway was hit by terror.”²⁷ He does not comment on the specific use of a timeline to achieve this effect, but the choice of time period seems to fit precisely with this intention. In this way, “the moment when Norway was hit by terror” is defined and delimited.

By contrast, the 22 July Commission, the newspaper *VG*, and the national broadcasting company NRK made timelines documenting periods that preceded and succeeded the event itself, documenting the prehistory and the aftermath, respectively. Included in the 22 July Commission report is a timeline for the so-called “security project,” which was tasked with assessing and improving the security of the Government Quarter by closing the road that the terrorist entered with his van. According to the timeline, this project started in the fall of 2003 and ended when the bomb went off on 22 July 2011.²⁸ Between these dates, the timeline lists a series of reports, plans, and decisions that were not carried out or were delayed. Based on this timeline, the Commission concluded that it was not the planning or the financing but the “implementation” that failed.²⁹

Another prehistory is told in a timeline produced by the newspaper *VG*; that timeline recounts, in detail and with many private photos, the life of the terrorist Anders Behring Breivik from his birth on 13 January 1979 until he committed these extremely brutal and ruthless acts of terrorism on 22 July 2011, at the age of 32.³⁰ A similar biographical trajectory is mapped out in NRK’s timeline.³¹ Whereas both timelines recount the prehistory of the event by means of Breivik’s biography, the *VG* timeline is clearly more private and personal, especially in the use of photos. The NRK timeline instead systematically documents the material surroundings of Breivik’s life—the houses he lived in, the public institutions he visited, and the receipts for ammunition, fertilizers, and other things he needed to carry out the attacks. Both timelines document his parents’ divorce, the encounters with child welfare services, the lack of contact with his father, and so on. In this sense, these two timelines seem to argue that the causes of the attacks can be found in the perpetrator’s childhood and youth, and they thus opt for a psychological, rather than a political, explanation of the act. This explanation corresponds to the explanation given by the first of two psychiatric evaluations that were produced in connection with the trial by court-appointed psychiatrists; this first evaluation was later rejected and replaced with a new one that turned his crimes into the

27. Tor Einar Fagerland, “Kronikk av faglig ansvarlig ved 22. juli-senteret: Vi tas tilbake til øyeblikket da terroreren rammet Norge,” *Aftenposten*, 15 July 2015, <https://www.aftenposten.no/mening/kronikk/i/8VeE/Kronikk-av-faglig-ansvarlig-ved-22-juli-senteret-Vi-tas-tilbake-til-oyeblikket-da-terroreren-rammet-Norge>.

28. NOU, *Rapport fra 22. juli-kommisjonen*, report 2012:14 (Oslo: Departementenes servicesenter Informasjonsforvaltning, 2012), 445, <https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/bb3dc76229c64735b4f6eb4dfc9bfe8/no/pdfs/nou201220120014000dddpdfs.pdf>.

29. *Ibid.*, 444.

30. The *VG* timeline can be viewed here: <https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/22-juli/tidslinjeabb>.

31. NRK’s multi-stranded timeline for the terror attack can be viewed here: <https://www.nrk.no/227/fakta/tidslinje/tidenetter/>.

political act of a right-wing extremist.³² As in the 22 July Commission report, it is clear that timelines are not just pieces of objective documentation but actually arguments in a struggle to understand and explain the single most brutal terrorist attack carried out on Norwegian soil.

What also separates the timelines of the prehistory from the timelines of the event itself are the temporal intervals. Whereas the timelines of the terrorist's life and of the "security project" extend over years, even decades, the timelines of the attacks span only a few hours. Time seems to be accelerating so that more and more fateful events "stack up." Every minute becomes significant, especially when measured against the loss of life on Utøya. On several occasions, the minute rhythm of the police timelines is still not fine-grained enough to separate the different incidents and organize them in relation to one another—that is, in terms of before and after. Instead, we are confronted with a form of radical simultaneity of events that, in reality, find themselves in a causal relationship to one another, which the timeline is unable to represent. At 17:29, the head of operations at Northern Buskerud police district received orders to distribute weapons to his officers (*bevæpningsordre*), but at the same time, the emergency response center received yet another report from a civilian about shots having been fired on Utøya. In this way, timelines illustrate how there are moments when time is pulled together and events "stack up" in a way that complicates decision-making. For understanding the event, the latter aspect is just as important as the former. A crisis is a moment in history when time accelerates, things happen at the same time (rather than in succession), and the normal procedures for planning and deciding are suspended.³³

Based on these findings, we can safely say that timelines have various functions that, in part, contradict one another. On the one hand, they enable us to logically reconstruct the succession of events, highlighting relations of cause and effect, planning and implementation, attempt and failure; on the other hand, they return us to the opacity, ambiguity, and confusion of specific moments, moments when the future represented by the timeline still had not emerged on the horizon of the historical actors. These functions warrant very different forms of chronopolitics: whereas the first kind distributes blame, identifies intentions and reasons, attributes causes to effects, and thus holds people in the leading positions in Norwegian society accountable, the second adopts less of a *post festum*, and more of an *in medias res*, perspective, according to which futures are opaque, decisions are all split-second, and contingencies disrupt the link between cause and effect.

Another analytical perspective concerns the multitude of times emerging from this multitude of timelines, operating on different scales and with their own intervals and rhythms, and featuring a wide range of actors, procedures, processes, technologies, and even life forms—from police officers and their weapons,

32. Ingrid Melle, "The Breivik Case and What Psychiatrists Can Learn from It," *World Psychiatry* 12, no. 1 (2013), 16–21.

33. Helge Jordheim and Einar Wigen, "Conceptual Synchronisation: From *Progress* to *Crisis*," *Millennium* 46, no. 3 (2018), 421–39.

and doctors and their surgical instruments, to family relations and friendships expressed in text and Twitter messages. These multiple times become entangled through dialectics of synchronization and desynchronization: on the one hand, they are brought into sync by the actions of the terrorist, forming a timeline of destruction and death; on the other hand, they deviate from one another due to procedures and actions that resist synchronization and cause time-lags that are followed by sudden bursts of acceleration, moments of too early and too late, and so on.

CHRONOPOLITICS OF MEMORY SITES

In the case of both the manifesto and the timeline, we follow how forms of “social action” come up against the multitemporality of all social and political relations, both in the document produced by the perpetrator and those produced by the institutions that were impacted by the attacks. Most striking in this chronopolitics of multiple times is the absence of a “supersynchronizer,” to use a term from the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann.³⁴ In the early modern period, Luhmann argues, one of the concepts that filled this role was the concept of fate or destiny. Exposed to the processes of secularization and differentiation that characterize the modern age, however, destiny lost its grip and time split up. In an earlier article, I have suggested that one of the concepts that serves to replace destiny as a “supersynchronizer” is “progress,” which, according to Koselleck, is a key concept, a *Grundbegriff*, of the modern world and a “collective singular,” which covers the whole of mankind but can be used only in the singular.³⁵ Breivik’s attacks were an attempt to confer upon his global audience a medieval, crusader-inspired feeling of destiny that would prompt them to act against the Islamist takeover that he saw taking place around him. Although this narrative lives on among right-wing extremist groups, to whom Breivik is a hero, it has not caught on among the larger parts of Norwegian or Western society. Thus, neither destiny nor progress can mend the social and historical time that was shattered when Breivik committed his mass murder.

So far, the attempts to produce effective counternarratives have also failed. Among the narratives that could have filled this function of synchronization and temporal alignment are those related to the development of the relatively young Norwegian nation, the history of social democracy (more specifically, the history of the Norwegian Social Democratic party, and particularly the history of their youth organization, which suffered the brunt of the attack), and the history of Islamophobia and right-wing extremism in Europe and the Western world. So far, all attempts to integrate the 22 July events into any of these grand narratives have not had the desired effect, at least on a national level. Instead, Norwegians

34. Niklas Luhmann, “Gleichzeitigkeit und Synchronisation,” in *Soziologische Aufklärung*, vol. 5, *Konstruktivistische Perspektiven* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag der Sozialwissenschaften, 1990), 110.

35. Luhmann, “Gleichzeitigkeit und Synchronisation,” 110; Reinhart Koselleck, “Historia Magistra Vitae: The Dissolution of the Topos into the Perspective of a Modernized Historical Process,” in *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, transl. Keith Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 33–34.

and other people continue to tell their own stories, depending on how the events played out in their lives, across multiple lifetimes.

The most recent state-sanctioned attempt to bring together and align the multiple timelines and temporal experiences that were disrupted by the 22 July terrorist attacks has been constructed at the Utøya pier and takes the form of a timeline. After all the havoc caused by Dahlberg's winning design, the response to the opening of the memory site at Utøyakaia in June 2022 has been muted, spanning from tepid support to tepid disappointment.³⁶ However, the lack of enthusiasm does not change the fact that the inauguration of the memory site at the Utøya pier has brought about a provisional conclusion to the most cataclysmic chronopolitical process in Norwegian postwar history—which, indeed, I dare remind readers who lack any prior knowledge of the country does not say all that much, since Norway, compared to most other countries in the world, has had an extremely peaceful last half-century.

Considering the omnipresence of timelines in the chronopolitical work performed by Norwegian media and public institutions in the wake of the attacks, the choice of design for the memorial should not surprise us. Magnus from Statsbygg explains: “The first arch symbolizes the time when the bomb exploded. When the attacks began on Utøya, the sun had moved, symbolized by the other arch in the s-shape.”³⁷ Indeed, there is something deterministic and fatal about the way the sun moves unstopably from one column to the next, just as the perpetrator caught up with his victims before killing or maiming them. In her review of the memory site, art critic Mona Pahle Bjerke points out that this symbolism is rather esoteric and will be lost on most visitors, leaving the whole memorial bereft of meaning and emotions.³⁸ As long as the visitors are able to muster that meaning and those emotions themselves, this might not be a problem, but the more time passes from the attacks, the more the memory site needs to be able to make visitors feel and think via its own devices.

However, we are now also aware that there are innumerable times coming together in the events of 22 July, times that all have their own pasts and futures, even their own catastrophic presents, that are in part documented in this same ubiquity of timelines. This was part of the reason why the work to build a permanent national memorial for the victims of the 22 July terrorist attacks was left in limbo for several years. Survivors, parents of victims, neighbors on Utøya (who in part risked their lives to pick young people up out of the water), Social Democrats (especially members of the youth organization), members of other political parties, victims of the Government Quarter bombing, immigrants, and others had their own stories of the events, stories that could not easily be aligned in the same material and symbolic shape. Some of these stories had been mapped onto their own separate timelines, each with its own beginning, ending, and rhythms, and others were given shape in other ways. In this light, the fact

36. For instance, the Norwegian Public Broadcasting Company called it “a sad compromise”; see Mona Pahle Bjerke, “Et sørgelig kompromiss,” *NRK*, 20 June 2022, https://www.nrk.no/anmeldelser/anmeldelse_-22.-juli-minnstedet-pa-utoyakaia-1.16003341.

37. Magnus, quoted in Henriksen, “77 bronsesøyer skal prege minnstedet på Utøya-kaia.”

38. Bjerke, “Et sørgelig kompromiss.”

that the recently inaugurated national memorial at Utøyakaia takes the shape of a timeline, which is supposed to represent and care for the entire multiplicity of lifetimes affected by the terrorist attacks, feels more like an instance of irony. The ambition of the timeline-memorial to become a “supersynchronizer” that is finally able to integrate the events of 22 July into Norwegian history and other histories appears, at best, as naïve and utopian and, at worst, as an encroachment on the histories of the victims. In this perspective, the memorial and memory site emerge as a third chronopolitical genre, alongside the manifesto and the timeline, and present another “social action,” a third attempt to bring together past, present, and future in a durable form and in the name of future politics. It serves the “identity formations of the survivors,” as Koselleck once put it.³⁹

In parallel with the work to agree on a site and a form for the national memorial, another kind of memory work has taken place, an endeavor that engages with one of the other chronopolitical genres that I have analyzed in this article. The document known as Breivik’s “manifesto” has been turned into a *lieu de mémoire*, a “site of memory,” in Pierre Nora’s sense.⁴⁰ The afterlives of this textual assemblage, which its author labeled a “compendium,” includes the court case where it served as evidence first of Breivik’s insanity and then, according to the second set of court-appointed psychiatrists, of his sanity, as well as its status as a model for other extreme right-wing terrorists. I mentioned Dyllann Roof and David Sonboly above, but others continue to follow. In February 2019, Christopher Hasson, a former US Coast Guard lieutenant, was arrested while planning a terrorist attack according to the instructions offered by Breivik.

A more surprising, though less destructive, turn of events occurred when the manifesto made its way onto the theater stage. In the fall of 2012, a play entitled *Manifest 2083*, which was written and directed by the Danish playwright Christian Lollike and which starred the actor Olaf Højgaard, was performed in Denmark. The play depicts an actor who is going through a process of radicalization, and most of the lines are from the manifesto. Although it received a considerable amount of criticism, the play had numerous performances in Denmark and Norway, and in 2013, Lollike was named playwright of the year in Denmark. Almost simultaneously, the Deutsche Nationaltheater in Weimar was planning the premiere of the Swiss director Milo Rau’s play entitled *Breiviks Erklarung* (*Breivik’s Declaration* or *Breivik’s Explanation*—the German term can mean both). Unlike Lollike’s play, Rau’s play was not based directly on the manifesto but was a reenactment of Breivik’s 17 April 2012 address at the courthouse in Oslo, where he outlined what he referred to as “the framework for my defense.”⁴¹ In large part, this address was again based on his manifesto. At the last minute, however,

39. Reinhart Koselleck, “War Memorials: Identity Formations of the Survivors,” transl. Todd Presner, in *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 285–326.

40. Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: *Les Lieux de Memoire*,” transl. Marc Roudebush, *Representations* 26 (Spring 1989), 7–24.

41. The phrase appears in a transcript published in the newspaper *Aftenposten* on 17 April 2012. The transcript can be accessed here: <https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/lakLA/dette-sa-breivik-ord-for-ord>.

the Weimar theater withdrew from the project and refused to allow the play to be staged there. Somewhat later, it was performed at the Theaterdiscounter in Berlin.

In this way, the manifesto has made Breivik's mass murder into something like an "immutable mobile" (to use Bruno Latour's term⁴²), which can travel in both time and place and give rise to both copy-cat attacks and theatrical performances. The traumas of the past reemerge in the present as ghosts on the stage—the stage of terror and the stage of theater, respectively. Like the ghost in Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, they bring time out of joint, as repetition and remembrance.⁴³ Indeed, this appears to be the future of the memory of the 22 July terrorist attacks in Norway as well: not a continuous, shared, and stable narrative but sudden, often unexpected, moments of recollection that will continue to haunt Norwegian society and politics.

CONCLUSION: CHRONOPOLITICS OF MULTIPLE TIMES

In addition to analyzing the 22 July 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway, the aim of this article has been to offer an example of how chronopolitics can be linked to specific events, actions, and genres rather than to concepts, systems, and long-term historical processes. Together, these elements form "situations" that are both rhetorical and material, situations in which times emerge from, or are produced by, convergences, entanglements, and assemblages of lives, things, texts, and diagrams in various constellations and at various scales. Far from bracketing human intentions and actions, the analysis demonstrates how one man's decision to commit mass murder was formed and put into practice through time work, as documented in the text Breivik called his "compendium" but that the public came to know as his "manifesto." Thus, a genre became a means of "social action" in the most brutal sense imaginable. In a similar way, the other genre in question, the timeline, has been used by Norwegian authorities and the press to respond to the attacks. Like the manifesto, the timelines also highlight the human factor, including possible human errors that had fatal consequences, before, during, and after the attacks. However, they also map how, when lined up and placed at various intervals along a timeline, human reactions, decisions, and efforts become entangled with nonhuman factors, such as communications systems, transportation technologies, and bureaucratic procedures. Timelines branch out and pluralize into multiple incommensurable ontologies that can no longer be synchronized and aligned. Nevertheless, this was what the most recent memory site, the one established at the Utøya pier in 2022, tried to do by turning the diagram of the timeline into a memorial for all the victims of the 22 July attacks. The timeline has thus shifted from a tool for documenting and ordering the events of the attacks (and also the prelude and the aftermath of the attacks) to a representation of trauma and loss, hence acquiring a very different chronopolitical role. Ten years after the terrorist attacks, both the manifesto and the timeline

42. Bruno Latour, "Visualization and Cognition: Thinking with Eyes and Hands," *Knowledge and Society* 6 (1986), 7–14.

43. Ethan Kleinberg, *Haunting History: For a Deconstructive Approach to the Past* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017).

have become sites of memory that will carry the memory of the attacks into the future but that mobilize, and are mobilized by, very different collectives, ranging from right-wing extremist and potential terrorists to art institutions, from relatives and friends of the victims to Norwegian school children born after the event itself.

Although the chronopolitical genres discussed in this article—the manifesto, the timeline, and the memory site—have been and are used by the perpetrator, by Norwegian authorities and institutions, and by the press to achieve specific goals, their functions continue to exceed—and even contradict—their purposes, their effects pluralize and change, and the times they give rise to continue to multiply, transform, and collapse. Analyzed in terms of rhetorical actions and material constraints and effects, chronopolitics remains a highly risky and unpredictable activity, one that cannot be contained materially or theoretically in a stable and static structure—be it a theory of historical time or a memorial on a pier in Norway.

University of Oslo