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Business, Politics, and Patriotism: Relationships Between Antonio López de Santa Anna and Foreign Nationals in Mexico, 1829–1847

Julio C. Farías and Jason Miklian

ABSTRACT

Antonio López de Santa Anna is one of the most well-known yet misunderstood figures in North American history. His periods of rule in the mid-nineteenth century helped bring Mexico its independence, lost Mexico nearly half of its territory, and shaped its future conceptions of what a leader is and should be. He is often remembered as a simple *caudillo*, a strongman who built relationships with foreign actors for personal gain. But how does this perception compare to the evidence of such interactions, and how can Santa Anna's relationships with foreigners help us better understand Mexican history? This article critically assesses Santa Anna's key personal and diplomatic relationships with foreigners during the formative 1829–1847 period to improve our understanding of Santa Anna's relationship to and impact upon Mexico, and explore their influence upon Mexico's international relations. We then offer a concluding assessment of the lasting implications of these relationships, incorporating how his *caudillo* leadership style carried a significant influence upon Mexico's legacy of its nation-building endeavor.

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Introduction: Mexican leaders as interlocutors for foreigners

Relations between Mexico and foreign countries at the beginning of the nineteenth century have been assiduously studied by historians and political scientists. Literature focuses on diplomatic and economic relations with Spain, the United States, Great Britain and France: with Spain due to its previous-colony relationship and attempts to reconquer; with the United States for its North American ambitions and invasion, with Great Britain for emphasis on the commercial aspect and political influence of its consuls and ministers, and France for commercial relationships and invasions. Mexico's problems with Texas carry an abundant bibliography, while Mexico's relationships with Latin America are comparatively under-explored. Broadly, the historiography of Mexico's international relations emphasizes the formal diplomacy and institutional channels that existed between countries through treaties, meetings between ministers, and official channels, focusing less on informal issues and influential figures connecting with Mexican decision-makers. Therefore, it may be valuable to investigate the social networks that foreign ministers formed in Mexico and how they served to achieve the objectives of their countries.¹

Many of the Europeans and Americans who arrived in Mexico related to Mexican politicians from an imperialist, racist perspective, considering Mexico a curious and peculiar territory and their habitants inferior. Yet, certain travelers managed to dismantle these prejudices, and many

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of those (including diplomatic reports and memories of USA, British and Spanish envoys) saw one man of particular merit as intelligent, shrewd and capable: Antonio López de Santa Anna. Envoys sought out Santa Anna to influence Mexican politics, obtain commercial perks, and/or attempt to manipulate him for their country's interests and their own. This attitude was reciprocal. Santa Anna also used stratagems in his contacts with the military and representatives of other countries to improve the negotiating conditions of his government or himself. As we will see, Santa Anna's actions went beyond his own interests in private talks in the interests of nationalism and even mutual defense.²

However, a comprehensive study has not yet been undertaken on how these relationships informed Mexico's international relations: When and why did these characters become interlocutors for foreigners? Were they doing it on their own initiative or were they approached by ministers or merchants from other countries because of their local or national influence? Did they relate directly to the representatives of other countries in the event of becoming president or did they prefer to send specialized officials? The biographies or works that have been published on Mexican leaders of the time such as Anastasio Bustamante, Manuel Gómez Pedraza, and Antonio López de Santa Anna address little on these actions; even as significant contact with European and American ministers, merchants, consuls and adventurers is known. Revisiting key documents from this perspective can provide new insights on these influences, and this article attempts a first exercise for such.³

The *Caudillo's* vision

The focus of our article is Antonio López de Santa Anna, one of the most consequential yet misunderstood figures in North American history. He was famous for his military victories, political maneuvering, freedom fighter role, and uniting factions during the decades after Mexico's independence in an attempt to bring stability and greatness to the new nation. He was Mexico's leader at six different times from 1833 to 1855. Yet his posthumous period has been characterized by disgrace and obscurity. Santa Anna's complicated, contradictory nature manifested over periods of presidential then dictatorial rule, banishment, and return – encouraging competing narratives to take shape about his legacy. In this article, we explore a formative period of Mexico's creation to show how foreign contemporaries understood Santa Anna, shaping Mexico's early foreign policy trajectory. Through previously under-explored archival material, we critically assess Santa Anna's key personal and diplomatic relationships with foreigners during the formative 1829–1847 period to improve our understanding of Santa Anna's relationship to and impact upon Mexico, and explore their influence upon Mexico's international relations.

Santa Anna was a prominent early representative of Latin American *caudillismo*. A *caudillo* refers to a figure with great political and societal influence within a region or country. These individuals emerge and persist when democratic institutions are non-existent, incipient, or weak. After the independence of many Latin American republics, in the absence of other well-organized groups, power often fell into the hands of the military and the landed gentry as consolidated by a *caudillo*. A *caudillo* regime is both personalistic and quasi-military, its center is a charismatic leader supported by his coterie of collaborators and great popular following. It's often employed interchangeably to related terms like 'strongman' or 'dictator', yet although a *caudillo* could become despotic, despotism or employing overt oppression is not a necessary characteristic. Like other Latin American countries, Mexico's history has been deeply shaped by the *caudillos* that have ruled it. Such imprints are greatest in times of disorder and institutional destruction, as in Mexico after the long war for independence and rebellions in its early years as a sovereign state. Therefore, a study of Santa Anna as *caudillo* can add nuance into how his priorities shaped the country. While *caudillo* study typically focuses upon leaders in Latin America, examples exist elsewhere. One such case is in the multi-decade rule of Singapore's Lee Kwan Yew, a 'benevolent

dictator' with a strong personal following whose personal priorities shaped Singapore's lasting legacy.⁴

While charisma or territorial conquest can lead a populace to support a *caudillo's* ascent to power, other characteristics are needed to stay in power. Here lies one characteristic of Santa Anna's repeated rises to power then falls from grace. Santa Anna possessed strong ascent characteristics: he knew how to impose his authority and make himself loved by citizens. Santa Anna knew the need to win allies, to obtain unconditional followers, and benefactors who he could leverage. However, his governance abilities were weak, punctuated in a lack of interest in the day-to-day aspects of government and a penchant for personal ostentation. Santa Anna saw military victories necessary to stay afloat, lending him a magnetic and almost supernatural aura, an individual who could achieve any task.⁵

As Santa Anna became a main figure of independent Mexico, he transcended other politicians and military figures through his bravery in critical battles, the perceived impartiality of his nationalism and patriotism, and the trust of those who wanted to use his prestige to govern through him. Important contemporaries such as José María Tornel, José María Bocanegra, Lucas Alamán, Valentín Gómez Farías, Vicente Guerrero, and Guadalupe Victoria supported Santa Anna, cementing his rise to power. Despite his limited formal education, Santa Anna carried an eloquence and sharpness in speech that encouraged comparisons to a 'gentleman' or 'philosopher'. But when military victories were not imminent, Santa Anna's interest in leadership waned, and with it his popularity. During these times, he sought out new allies to maintain and grow power.⁶

This raises a key question: how did Santa Anna's foreign allegiances and personal interactions shape what Mexico became in its formative generation? Due to a lack of primary material (American troops destroyed Santa Anna's writings when they sacked his Veracruz hacienda in 1847), few in-depth studies from such engagements exist. Independent accounts of those who interacted with Santa Anna can help fill this gap, noting that such accounts are often written *post facto* and tailored to suit the author's needs. Writings by Ramón Gamboa, Carlos María de Bustamante, José María Roa Bárcena, and Ramón Alcaraz after Santa Anna's fall in 1847 paint the picture of a self-centered and corrupt buffoon, laying the blame for country's bifurcation at his feet. Santa Anna's return to power as dictator cemented this perception, as his nationalist democratic motivations before Mexico's fall to the United States and loss of Texas and California are often analyzed through the lens of the cynical dictator that he became afterwards, not of the person he was before his greatest failure.⁷

To better decipher how Santa Anna influenced the trajectory of Mexican foreign policy during Mexico's first wave of independence, we assessed his interactions with foreign individuals who gave external assessments through direct interaction during key moments of his ascent and early rule. Many of these relationships have not been extensively explored, perhaps due to varied source languages or difficulty of triangulation. Santa Anna impressed most of these foreigners, even when their engagement was purely as an instrument of their governments' geopolitical interests and Santa Anna was a barrier to those interests. These sources, including Richar Pakenham, R. Bankhead, Ángel Calderón de la Barca, and Salvador Bermúdez de Castro, established relationships based on respect for British and Spanish interests, respectively, and possible advantages they could obtain. These interactions enable us to assess intent, motivation, and strategy, through Santa Anna's own words. By focusing on such actors and other elites (e.g. diplomats, envoys, and businessmen), we discuss the merit of Santa Anna's state-building motivations.⁸

We find that Santa Anna's actions were perceived by foreign observers to be more driven by nationalism and support of democracy than has been commonly assumed. Santa Anna's skills evolved in sophistication from 1821 to 1847, from naive relationship building to attempts to leverage and extract favors for the country and himself. However, Santa Anna's *caudillo* nature added risk to the country's foreign policy trajectory. As Santa Anna inextricably linked the country's fate with his own, he eschewed diplomatic overtures in favor of those that prioritized his interests and abilities (like military battles), or those that carried a moral component (like Santa

Anna's distaste for slavery). For example, while a more diplomatic leader might have been able to secure a smaller annexation agreement from the United States to prevent the Mexican-American War, Santa Annás perception of Mexican territory emanated from his own experiences as every part of Mexico integral to both the state and his own legacy. Although most all Mexican leaders of the time considered the territorial ambitions of the United States and the independence of Texas illegitimate, Santa Anna was one of the few who fought for these principles. Our assessment of Santa Anna's role in Mexico's early independence period encourages a more nuanced understanding of the breadth and depth of Santa Anna's motivations and degree of patriotism.

This study started with a literature review and source search, beginning with the British Foreign Office document set. Our analysis of Mexican archives (e.g. Archivo General de la Nación, Centro de Estudios Historia de México Fundación Carlos Slim, Capilla Alfonsina de la Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León, Patrimonio Cultural del Tecnológico de Monterrey, Hemeroteca Nacional de México) unearthed hundreds of documents that discussed relationships between Santa Anna and foreigners. Given difficult access to certain primary sources in their original repositories (e.g. archives in Spain and Cuba), we prioritized documents on nineteenth century Spain-Mexico relations. These publications contain many documents that have not been used previously to our knowledge for analysis of Santa Anna's political trajectory or foreign relations. Valuable data was also sourced from personal accounts, for example the little-known diary of Ambassador Ángel Calderón de la Barca, husband of the more famous Fanny Calderón de la Barca, and the diplomatic correspondence of Salvador Bermúdez de Castro.

Some books from that era, for example those by statesman and historian Carlos María de Bustamante, also mention episodes in which Santa Anna encounters English or Spanish individuals. These provide fragmented information that we complement with other sources, constituting our primary triangulation efforts. The importance of Santa Anna is corroborated by his appearance in almost all the testimonies of travelers, merchants, diplomats, and foreign invaders of his time. Thus, we reviewed diaries, letters, and travel accounts from a large number of individuals who visited Mexico, many of which are translated into Spanish or English. Undoubtedly, there remain many undiscovered or unused documents across Latin America and Europe that may further refine our understanding of his character.

We also assessed a wide range of diplomatic reports, autobiographies, historical accounts, institutional archives, travelogues, and military reports. We drew on sources from the United States and Britain housed at national archives and libraries specializing in Mexico materials from the early to mid nineteenth century, such as the Bancroft Library (UC Berkeley) and Texas State Archives. We also examined correspondence and dispatches from Spanish plenipotenciary ministers in Mexico, as well as letters from Prussian commercial envoys. The Spanish diplomatic correspondence gave us insights into previously unknown details, both direct and indirect, of Santa Anna's actions at critical moments in Mexican history.

We present our findings with a focus on four time periods: (1) the 1821–1823 period of first substantial contact between Santa Anna and foreign figures; (2) the 1828–1833 period where Santa Anna learned how to establish diplomatic relationships with foreigners; (3) the 1839–1842 period when such relationships were tested and expanded; and (4) the 1845–1847 period when Santa Anna leveraged these relationships politically in the midst of an existential war. These periods were selected as they represented key engagements with Santa Anna at points of national importance and strategic shift. We then offer a brief concluding assessment of the lasting implications of these relationships, and how *caudillo* leadership influenced Mexico's legacy of its nation building endeavor.

Searching for a space: Santa Anna and the Spanish world: 1821–1823

Santa Anna came from a typical background for a Mexican political leader from the first half of the nineteenth century. Without large family fortunes or lineage surnames, dozens of *criollos* took advantage of their military positions to gain experience and influence, quickly rising to important

military and political roles upon the departure of thousands of Spanish officials from Mexico. Santa Anna had a simple middle-class upbringing in the bustling port town of Veracruz, with a nondescript childhood that displayed little promise. Santa Anna's father didn't think his son capable of anything more than taking over the family grocery store. Santa Anna rebelled at the thought, and at fourteen years old he left home and enlisted under the local command of General José García Dávila in 1811. Dávila saw that Santa Anna's passion and natural instincts could be molded into an exceptional soldier.⁹

Two months later, unrest sent Santa Anna to the frontier territory of Texas. He spent a decade fighting threats to the Spanish Crown including Comanches, Anglos, Mexican insurgents, and French gangs. Santa Anna foiled Texas' first independence attempt; his subordinates started his legend with tales of him killing three men with a gun in one hand, riding horseback as an arrow pierced his other. He built houses and churches as citizens became loyal to neither Spain nor the insurgency, but to Santa Anna as he led a counter-insurgency to reclaim New Spain's dominion. He developed an affinity for the northern province, saying that its beauty 'surpasses all description. one of the loveliest arrays that can be observed in the heavens'.¹⁰

But Santa Anna, and *criollos* in general, had a 'paradoxical and paradigmatic hostile affection' towards Spain. Santa Anna's affinities related to his family's social class contrasted with the ceiling that Spain imposed to prevent his social ascent, as only soldiers born in Spain could ascend to the army's upper echelons. Establishing friendly ties with Spaniards depended on their attitude towards Spanish rule, so Santa Anna married Inés de la Paz García, the daughter of wealthy Spaniards, to prove his loyalty. Navigating these overlapping worlds taught Santa Anna a sense of opportunity. He understood that alliances allowed for the consolidation of personal ascension, and relationships with external agents (diplomats, military officials, traders, scientists, travelers) could bring wealth and prestige, and perhaps help external recognition of Mexico as an independent nation.¹¹

In December 1822, Santa Anna rose up in arms against Spanish Emperor of Mexico Iturbide, with whom he already had a strained relationship. He exploited the arrival of a Spanish negotiation commission and in his first diplomatic act emerged as the Mexican government interlocutor. Unlike other insurgents, Santa Anna did not revolt because of 'Hispanophobia'. Santa Anna explained that he rebelled against Iturbide for his tyranny and to re-establish the Mexican Congress. He made generous offers to the commission, including an alliance with Spain and respect of Spanish people and property. Santa Anna also exploited the economic benefits offered by such circumstances. He Santa Anna sought to win the sympathy of both 'paisanos and Peninsulares' (Mexican-born and Spanish-born individuals) by allowing trade, while Iturbide prohibited it. Santa Anna played a profitable middle-man in these transitions, funding what became his hacienda in Veracruz.¹²

Santa Anna learned that treating allegiances as fluid had personal and political benefits, as when humoring foreigners. For example, in 1823 English naturalist William Bullock docked in Veracruz. Bullock saw Santa Anna 'on horseback, in splendid military costume, and well mounted, but the troops they were reviewing did not make a very military appearance, being...most of them Indians or of Indian extraction'. Expecting friendly New Spain royalists but landing in hostile now-independent Mexico, Bullock asked Santa Anna for an audience. While deportation would have been standard practice, Santa Anna secured Bullock safe passage and passports to Jalapa. Santa Anna saw the benefits of Bullock's friendship, even if it didn't bring immediate advantages. A good impression would show the British that Santa Anna could play the role of statesman, and encourage other foreigners to turn to him for favors.¹³

While Santa Anna's interactions with foreigners were limited during this period, there is consistency in his engagements with Europeans that passed through his domain, marked by a willingness to work with friends and enemies, to consider future value in working diplomatically with influential persons, and in expanding beyond a solid persona by acting not like a tactician but in how he thought a diplomat might approach a situation. The success of these overtures in terms of financial and prestige gains made an indelible mark on Santa Anna's forward strategies.

Rebuilding acquaintances: Santa Anna and the Spaniards 1827–1830

By the late 1820s, hostility towards foreigners of all kinds grew in Mexico, in both elite circles and popular sentiment. Santa Anna, and *criollos* in general, had a ‘paradoxical and paradigmatic hostile affection’ towards Spain particularly.¹⁴ An 1827 law expelling all Spaniards typified this groundswell, exacerbated by overtures that European powers made to claim the fragile country. Santa Anna, now governor of Veracruz, cautiously applied this law, at times deporting those he cultivated relationships with, such as major merchants. While Santa Anna’s uprising in 1828 to place Vicente Guerrero as rightful president was not anti-foreigner in nature, many of his followers adopted anti-foreign sentiments to gain support. Although Santa Anna’s Perote pronouncement contained a clause requesting Congress to expel Spaniards from the country as the source of Mexican evils, Santa Anna applied this clause judiciously to gain greater support.¹⁵

Santa Anna’s ambiguous relationship with the Spaniards swung between great shows of confidence, friendship, and loyalty, to deceit and extortion. For example, he defended the crown’s cause against the insurgents; defended Spanish friends and acquaintances when they promulgated the expulsion laws against that community; expressed courtesy towards Barradas’ invading army; and developed close relationships with plenipotentiary ministers Pedro Pascual and Bermúdez de Castro. However, Barradas’ attempt to reconquer Mexico in 1829 ruptured Spain’s reputation in Santa Anna’s eyes. The invaders landed in Tampico and faced Santa Anna’s army. During the campaign, the parties exchanged messages and negotiated ceasefires. José Miguel Salomón, a Spanish colonel defending the port of Tampico, narrates a meeting with Santa Anna:

Accompanied by D. Eugenio Aviraneta, political secretary of the division, we had an interview with the dissident general D. Antonio López de Santana (sic). My demand was limited to requesting a suspension of hostilities for a few hours with the objective indicated above (which was to care for the sick and wounded and wait for the arrival of Isidro Barradas). Santa Anna wanted us to capitulate on the basis that we would be taken to Havana at the government’s expense with weapons and luggage. He was answered with arrogance that we had enough strength and provisions to resist his forces for twenty days and that first we would follow the example of Sagunto and Numancia, burying ourselves under the ruins rather than surrendering our weapons. Seeing this constancy, the enemy general evaded the question and tried another one on political points, and a greater plan that was reduced to having an interview with Your Honor, for which the political secretary would go with an assistant from Santa Anna to the General Headquarters of Altamira, suspending himself, meanwhile all hostility until the resolution of Your Honor (Barradas).¹⁶

According to Salomón’s testimony, Santa Anna behaved with arrogance towards the invaders and with a blind confidence in achieving victory, typical of military commanders. When they met, Barradas found Santa Anna ‘so satisfied that he boasted about my destruction and that of the entire division,’ but ‘succumbed to the detriment of his opinion and prestige’ when he left and crossed a river at full speed to escape. From the Spanish side, the contents of the conference between Santa Anna and Barradas were unknown, only that Santa Anna ‘crossed the river again and then entered into negotiations,’ as Spanish witness Francisco Mancha mentioned in an interrogation. The promise was a stratagem to escape from Barradas and buy time illustrated by Barradas expecting Santa Anna to provide details on how Mexican soldiers would join the Spaniards, while Santa Anna’s subsequent letter only questioned Barradas’ military honor. Santa Anna later revealed that Barradas’ forces were much larger than his, so Barradas’ call for a truce unimaginably benefited his situation.¹⁷ Such a strategy of deceitful ambiguity served Santa Anna throughout his political and military career. We must reflect carefully, since military reports typically show the good performance of whoever writes them. Regardless, Santa Anna sought to be a direct interlocutor with enemy representatives, even at risk of capture.¹⁸

Over time, the invading army’s losses due to disease became too great to bear, so Barradas requested a truce. Santa Anna wrote back with a luster intended to please Mexico City and show superiority to the Spanish, using patriotic rhetoric to threaten Barradas with an elegantly stated but nonetheless unequivocal destruction should he continue to resist:¹⁹

...and I, General, have had the great honor that my government has placed me at the head of numerous legions of brave men, to avenge in a single day so many outrages, making victims of those who daringly committed such an unjust aggression. Fulfilling such dear and precise duties, I have blockaded Your Excellency on all sides, cut off all assistance, covered the coasts from any new attempt, and can barely contain the ardor of my numerous divisions, which will hurl themselves upon your camp without giving quarter to any, if Your Excellency does not surrender unconditionally to avoid such evident misfortune...²⁰

When Barradas replied proposing to find a solution that would not degrade Spanish pride, Santa Anna positioned himself as the only thing stopping his annihilation:

If it were not for the strict orders from my government that I have received, which do not allow any other alternative but to completely destroy Your Lordship with the forces of my arms, leaving not a single individual, or to force you to surrender under a strict deadline, submitting to Mexican generosity.²¹

The Spanish realized that Santa Anna's army was superior and left Tampico. By securing Spain's complete withdrawal without massacre, Santa Anna showed his strategic acumen and nationalistic bona fides while avoiding violent actions that would sever future ties with the Spanish. The public cheered Santa Anna as Mexico's savior, as he succeeded within military rules, minimum expenditure of resources, and maximizing the patriotism of himself and his troops, adding needed military weight to the legitimacy of infant Mexico.²²

The victory fomented other positive relationships, as Santa Anna was now considered a rising player in North American politics. In his account of his time in Mexico, Prussia Consul General Carl Wilhelm Koppe was convinced that 'the great skill, performance and daring' of Santa Anna defeated Barradas. He also noted how Santa Anna's charisma drew not just Mexicans but foreigners to fight for him, signaling out a 'Rhenish compatriot' from Bonn who defected and became a lieutenant for Santa Anna. He met Santa Anna and 'this general moved him to the point that he decided to offer his services, which were immediately accepted'. For Santa Anna, hiring an officer with education and technical knowledge from the military giant Prussia constituted a major stamp of international legitimacy.²³

Santa Anna also cultivated elite business networks. One was C.C. Becher, subdirector of the Renano-Indooccidental Company. He was captivated by Santa Anna's manners: 'his whole being has something of softness and seduction'. During their meeting in 1832, at the start of Santa Anna's rebellion against Bustamante, he charmed Becher with European affairs knowledge, then offered an escort to the frontlines. Becker noted how Santa Anna allied himself with national and foreign advisors, including a 'Rhenish compatriot' who was now a 'personal friend' of Santa Anna and in charge of an artillery brigade. Becher observed that foreigners who served Santa Anna 'come from all nations', including French artillery and engineering officers of great ability.²⁴

As Santa Anna expanded his understandings of worldly engagements, a natural diplomat within grew. He employed foreigners in his battles, business dealings, and as host of Mexico. He joined the Yorkino sect of the Freemasons, a powerful organization including most North American business leaders and politicians as members. He carried a pragmatism befitting a benevolent interpretation of a *caudillo*: the Prussians and Frenchmen he hired had knowledge that could decide a battle for Mexico: artillery. It also illuminates a little explored theme in Mexican historiography: the role that foreigners (including but in addition to John Riley) played in the Mexican armies of the first half of the nineteenth century.²⁵

Santa Anna testes new relationships: 1836–1842

Propelled into leadership in 1833, Santa Anna tired quickly of politics and became an absentee president. Anglo insurgents in Texas seized upon this and published a Declaration of Independence, proclaiming: 'The legislature shall have no power to pass laws for the emancipation of slaves; (n) or shall Congress have power to emancipate slaves; nor shall any slave-holder be allowed to emancipate his or her slave or slaves'. Texian leader Stephen F. Austin then captured Santa Anna's

close relative in early 1836 at a small fort outside Bexar called the Alamo. Provoked by these events, Santa Anna laid siege to the Alamo and Goliad, executed the insurgents for being illegally armed, and freed their slaves and his brother. Santa Anna believed the anglos incapable of respecting Mexican law, a lesson he drew upon often as his *caudillo* nature grew.²⁶

I threw up my cap for liberty with great ardor and perfect sincerity, but soon found the folly of it. For 100 years to come (Texan insurgents) will not be fit for liberty. Despotism is the proper government for them, but there is no reason why it should not be a wise and virtuous one.²⁷

Santa Anna cornered insurgent leader Sam Houston in a marsh after the Alamo, yet he was so confident that he neglected to post sentries during a pre-battle nap. Houston, a man who occupied the grey area between domestic and foreign adversary, overran the Mexican forces in 18 min. Santa Anna fled wearing a Texan army private's uniform, but was recognized and captured. Upon fear of execution, Santa Anna shared his Yorkino bonafides with Houston, a fellow mason, then handed Houston an apron he was wearing under the uniform. They were both Freemasons, and the apron was Santa Anna's proof. Houston quickly moved his captured relative to better quarters and wrote to his superiors attempting to justify why he spared him: 'Santa Anna living, can be of incalculable benefit to Texas; Santa Anna dead, would just be another dead Mexican.'²⁸

Santa Anna signed a treaty with the Texans to keep Mexican forces south of the Rio Grande, but the validity of a treaty signed by a prisoner was doubtful, so Houston asked U.S. President Andrew Jackson for assistance. Jackson knew the rumors about Santa Anna's reputation for dealing (and self-dealing), so he ordered Santa Anna to Washington DC. After Santa Anna completed the three month journey, Jackson invited him to the White House. When Jackson realized Santa Anna was a fellow Freemason, they made a secret deal grounded by their newly recognized brotherhood. Santa Anna would part with Texas for \$50 million in cash. Santa Anna had one condition: 'There is a considerable number of slaves in Texas also, who according to our laws should be free. Shall we permit those wretches to moan in chains any longer in a country whose kind laws protect the liberty of man without distinction of cast or color?' Jackson made a counter-offer: He'd secure passage for Santa Anna to Mexico City and help restore his honor and title. Santa Anna accepted. Jackson gave Santa Anna two chests of gold and a warship for safe passage home.²⁹

While Santa Anna found new allies to the north, Mexico normalized relations with their former colonizer. It took seven years from Santa Anna's defeat of Barradas for Spain to formally recognize Mexico's independence. When the Santa María Calatrava treaty was signed in 1836, Spain considered Mexico as a barrier against American expansionism. Spanish moderates warned that if United States defeated Mexico they would expand to Cuba and the Caribbean, at Spanish expense. Santa Anna agreed, and used Spanish diplomacy as a counterbalance to British and French influence due to their historical ties and shared interests. Both the Mexican and Spanish governments saw the United States as a formidable adversary that sought to extend its dominion and influence across North America.³⁰

In 1839, Spanish Ambassador Ángel Calderón de la Barca and his wife Fanny arrived in Mexico. They had come from the United States, where Ángel had served as Plenipotentiary Minister, and where he met his spouse, who belonged to a declining Scottish noble family. Calderón de la Barca found a widespread opinion about federalism and democracy in Mexico, and that Santa Anna was the only one that most citizens thought capable of leading the country. General Gabriel Valencia, spokesman for the Mexican political class, told him:³¹

--A strong government is necessary. This cannot be a federation because each state would be a vassal state; it cannot be a central Republic due to its vast extent; "Santa Anna is the only man who can save us" and I have heard this repeated *ad nauseam*, even by people employed in the government, predicting a pronouncement that, although possible, may take some time to materialize because it is so close.³²

Meanwhile, Calderón de la Barca negotiated for Spanish subjects to be able to acquire real estate, for the mercury brought by Spain on ships to have a tax discount, and to waive the 15% increase in import duties on goods entering Mexico. Calderón de la Barca aimed to equalize the conditions of Spanish subjects with those of the British, and he unsuccessfully attempted to ally with his British counterpart Richard Pakenham to achieve this.³³

Although Santa Anna ‘was always more Hispanophile than Hispanophobe’, and although he did regale the Calderóns with a splendid meal, their relationship was not as close as with his predecessors. Calderón de la Barca did not like Santa Anna, calling him a ‘tirano ranchero’ in his diary. Their relationship was a rare case when Santa Anna held a foreigner at arms length, often refusing to meet. Yet, his wife Fanny was enthralled by Santa Anna, offering a comprehensive outsider assessment in her diary illustrating Santa Anna’s charisma, *caudillo* tendencies, and influence from outside Mexico:³⁴

A gentlemanly, good-looking, quietly-dressed, rather melancholy-looking person...and to us the most interesting person in the group. (K)noting nothing of his past history, one would have said a philosopher, living in dignified retirement—one who had tried the world, and found that all was vanity. (However) it is strange, how frequently this expression of philosophic resignation, of placid sadness, is to be remarked on the countenances of the deepest, most ambitious, and most designing men...Otherwise, he made himself very agreeable, spoke a great deal of the United States, and of the persons he had known there, and in his manners was quiet and gentlemanlike, and altogether a more polished hero than I had expected to see... Yet here sat with this air de philosophy perhaps one of the worst men in the world—ambitious of power—greedy of money—and unprincipled—having *feathered his nest* at the expense of the republic—and waiting in a dignified retreat on till the moment comes for putting himself at the head of another revolution.³⁵

Amidst economic hardship, Santa Anna’s goal to be seen as Mexico’s destiny began to take root. To wit, the Calderóns went to the theatre for a celebration in honor of Santa Anna:

The ridiculousness of introducing horses and triumphal carriages into such a small space. Some shouted long live Santa Anna when he entered, but he was received very coldly. As he climbed the stairs, he recognized and greeted me and my wife affably, (yet) now he seemed to me a more ignorant and vain man. Without a doubt, he has plans for domination; for that reason, I believe him capable of carrying them out.³⁶

The Spanish government removed Calderón in 1841 for belonging to a rival political faction. He was replaced by Pedro Pascual de Oliver, a progressive member of the Spanish Senate from 1837 to 1838. He was closer to Santa Anna, as they met on several occasions and advised Santa Anna after his rise to power in October 1841 after defeating and deposing Anastasio Bustamante.³⁷ Oliver mentioned a conversation regarding Texas:

So the General (Santa Anna), whose character is impetuous and proud, told me that he had formed the firm resolution of not being the toy of foreigners or factions, and of making the greatest sacrifices in defense of the honor and interests of his country, for which purpose he was actively working to raise an army of fifty thousand men.³⁸

Oliver acknowledged the ‘decorum with which General Santa Anna has conducted himself’ regarding a proposal by the Texan government to pay five million pesos for ceding Texan territory.³⁹ Santa Anna told Oliver he would resume the reconquest of Texas, as it was:

a vital issue for the Republic, as (Santa Anna) considers the usurpation of that territory, carried out by the Anglo-American settlers that the Mexican Government allowed to establish there, as a prelude to further dismemberment in favor of the United States whose policy since the time of President Monroe tends to extend its dominions towards the beautiful regions that produce gold and silver, so coveted by those greedy Republicans.⁴⁰

Furthermore, U.S. President John Tyler, a Jackson acolyte, expanded the vision of Manifest Destiny to include more of Mexico, so Santa Anna felt it necessary to defend Texas before catastrophe. He entered negotiations with American minister Waddy Thompson, who offered to reintegrate Texas into Mexico.⁴¹ Oliver relates that Santa Anna wanted:

Texas to recognize the sovereignty of Mexico and obey its laws, in which case he promised not to send Mexican troops to that department and to entrust its government to the same Samuel Houston who is its current president. I cannot predict the outcome of this negotiation, but the fact is that it exists, hitherto unknown outside the palace, as I presume.⁴²

An armistice was agreed between Mexico and Texas. Oliver claims that British consul Percy Doyle convinced Santa Anna and Houston to accept it. However, Oliver asserted that the Texans were not sincere and only sought a pause. Drawing upon these experiences, Santa Anna learned the art of projecting a pleasing narrative on Texas to foreigners with many different opinions and aims, while holding his own intentions close to the chest.⁴³

In addition, recent research on the Mexico-UK relationship suggests new ways of understanding their ties, as deals between Santa Anna, UK envoys and English businessmen favored the British. In particular, Mexican silver allowed 'the operation of (England's) empire and trade' while not benefiting Mexico. The relationship was not solely of economic exploitation but also of political leverage as the British tried to 'directly or indirectly determine Mexico's internal policies', and many tried to profit. One was Richard Pakenham; his long stay in the country and British Crown ties made him a formidable negotiator, and he supported the Texan cause.⁴⁴ Carlos María de Bustamante narrates:

Mr. Pakenham presented Santa Anna with a sealed letter that had come by the first large and fast English steamship that arrived from Havana in Veracruz in three days, touching at New Orleans called the Fort, and said that he did not know its contents. Santa Anna read it and saw that General Hamilton was offering him five million pesos for the recognition of Texas' independence, and two hundred thousand for the minister who managed this affair. Santa Anna replied with another letter, which was quite polite but reproached him for the insult, supposing that (he) was venal and that he was able of selling the interests of the homeland.⁴⁵

Pakenham, with his knowledge of Mexican culture, and Consul Ewen Mackintosh, with his rent-seeking schemes, aimed to re-shape Mexican policies, working alongside British officials stationed in Mexico who conducted illegal trade to compensate for their low salaries. Pakenham conceived his mission as a defender of British interests but also as a civilizing enterprise, as when he obtained a refusal from Finance Minister Juan de Dios Cañedo to suspend the 15% import tax. Pakenham told Angel Calderón de la Barca that although the Crown had not yet ordered him to apply a hostile response to the Mexican government, 'he advises his government to do so because he is convinced that coercion and hostile demonstrations are the only means of bringing these people to their senses'. In addition to his educational mission, between October 1842 and April 1844, Pakenham obtained the signing of conventions to guarantee the payment of claims by several British lending houses, as with claims from Spain and France.⁴⁶

The British style of doing diplomatic business through cash 'gifts' influenced Santa Anna's philosophy on corruption. In 1841, English merchants financed Mexican generals, including Santa Anna, to establish a commercially-oriented dictatorship and end the 15% import tax, a product of the 1839 war with France. The tax was rooted in precarity: the government fell into disarray whenever there was an uprising, and a solution lay in increased taxes. This levy was unpopular among foreign merchants, and Pakenham first pressed for a six-month grace period before its implementation, then asked for the return of taxes that merchants paid when the decree took effect. Although Bustamante noticed the discontent that the measure caused, he failed to convince Congress to remove it, and it became the cause of his downfall. Santa Anna, Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, and Gabriel Valencia colluded with the merchants to gain power by making a deal with the English to promote a measure by which 'foreigners could acquire real estate', albeit under Mexican jurisdiction.⁴⁷

Despite Santa Anna's attempts to present himself as incorruptible, financier Manuel Julián Lizardi claimed to have bribed Santa Anna and his ministers with a large sum of money to obtain a better rate on the Mexican bonds he was negotiating. Yet, Santa Anna continued to refuse to

recognize Texas' independence in exchange for cash even as the offers (and rebellions) grew. In fact, he took the opposite tack. On 25 August 1842, Santa Anna decreed the death penalty for any soldier who deserted on a large march to the border to re-secure Texas. Not even Lord Palmerston's proposal, which offered Santa Anna the guarantee of a fixed border between Mexico and Texas supported by France and England in 1844, made him change his mind. To Santa Anna, the time neared when the relationships he carefully cultivated with European and North American foreigners would need to be leveraged for the sake of his country's survival—and perhaps his own.⁴⁸

Santa Anna as a foreign policy vessel: executing leverage 1845–1847

Santa Anna planned to re-capture Texas in 1845 to prove he wasn't 'a toy of foreigners or factionists, and to make the greatest sacrifices in defense of the honor and interests of his country'. But fighting the United States would require significant international allies. Spanish Minister Pascual Oliver became Santa Anna's trusted foreign intermediary. Oliver claimed that Santa Anna planned to occupy Texas in the spring of 1845 with an army of '15,000 men and 40 pieces of artillery'. He then stated that Santa Anna's Texas plan consisted of dividing it into portions that he would offer 'to the friendly nations of Mexico to colonize, provided that they guarantee the integrity of that border'.⁴⁹ As the conflict worsened, Santa Anna approached the envoys of England and Spain. In August 1844, the British envoy explained the impossibility of reintegrating Texas into Mexico. He lamented that the advice 'has not yet produced any effect on the mind of General Santa Anna, but England will insist, and the bad luck of this country may want him to listen (before he) will end up ruining the nation'.

Santa Anna's stubbornness seemed to lead towards an inevitable clash, but he would not be responsible for the start of hostilities, as a pronouncement in November 1844 forced him to go into exile in Havana.⁵⁰ Oliver became Santa Anna's important interlocutor in Cuba, listening to concerns about the situation in Texas and the fear of American invasion. Oliver and the British envoy tried to influence Santa Anna to no success on such a personal and controversial matter. Santa Anna's hurt pride from his responsibility for the Texan victory, the political cost of accepting the independence of that territory, and his blind faith in achieving its reincorporation through a military campaign all contributed.

After a year in exile, Mexican federalist politicians agreed that Santa Anna should become the leader of the resistance against US invasion. During the time he was in Havana, Santa Anna also established communications with US President James Polk. In these months, the US army established positions in the north of Mexico and blocked the port of Veracruz. Through Polk's envoy, Alexander Slidell Mackenzie, Santa Anna convinced Polk to allow him passage to Mexican soil. Once in power, Santa Anna promised to sign an agreement to peacefully cede Texas. However, upon arriving home, Santa Anna instead organized an army to repel the invaders. For the remainder of the conflict Santa Anna fought the United States and refused negotiations, even those to his personal benefit, unlike other Mexican politicians who profited when Mexico City was conquered and they negotiated peace.⁵¹

When Santa Anna began his participation in the Mexican-American War, he was more compassionate towards American prisoners compared to his previous treatment of Texans, whom he executed as traitors. He did this to secure release of Mexicans in U.S. custody, and to avoid retaliation against populations that were in enemy hands. This attitude carried over in a cordial relationship with General Zachary Taylor. Their correspondence was kind and respectful, even as Santa Anna repeatedly demanded U.S. withdrawal: 'I reduce myself to saying, that by the spirit and determination shown by all Mexicans, Your Excellency should dismiss any idea of peace as long as a single American armed man sets foot on the territory of this Republic, and the squadrons that harass our ports remain in front of them'.⁵²

Spanish plenipotentiary minister Salvador Bermúdez de Castro's correspondence is essential to understanding Santa Anna's mindset in the face of the American invasion. Santa Anna tried to convince Bermúdez de Castro to obtain a guarantee from Spain to intervene in the War with the United States in favor of Mexico by any means possible. The minister explains their relationship: 'Pretending or having the greatest deference and confidence in me, he consults me, attends to me, and does not miss an opportunity to express affection and sympathy for Spain'. The American invasion provoked a xenophobic sentiment in the population that not only targeted Americans, but also Europeans. Austrian Carl Bartholomaeus Heller, who was visiting the country at that time, shared his feelings:⁵³

All the troops that Mexico had left in the cities for the security of property are sent against the enemy, and while I write this letter, Santa Anna, with some divisions of infantry and cavalry, unexpectedly goes to San Luis Potosí, without my understanding what damage he thinks he can cause there to the enemy, since it is much further north. Now the goods and properties of foreigners and natives are in the hands of the lowest of the people, and if it was already bad before, now the most cynical thieves and murderers swarm the streets. Also, hatred towards foreigners, which seemed to be asleep, is growing stronger every day. Last night, near the Plaza del Volador, a cry was heard: "Death to the invading foreigners", so no sympathy for America can be shown if one wants to have a safe life.⁵⁴

Santa Anna asked Bermúdez whether it was possible for France and England to join the conflict, to which he replied that they wouldn't take an active part, but would intervene to the extent possible to restore peace. The plenipotentiary minister received with incredulity Santa Anna's flattery and offers towards Spain, given his reputation 'whose bravery is always suspicious in a man who passes for a model of falsehood and dissimulation'. By end May 1847, with several defeats and a failed rebellion attempt, Santa Anna confessed that 'he knew the difficulty of continuing the war with any hope of advantage', but the accusations of treason forced him to reject any peace proposal, at enormous personal risk. Bermúdez acknowledged that no politician or military man of the time had Santa Anna's gifts, not to mention that they were 'more ignorant and inept than him'.⁵⁵

Shortly before the Americans attacked Mexico City, Santa Anna shared with the Spanish plenipotentiary minister his plans to end the Federation, placing loyal military men in command of all the country's generals, and then becoming a dictator. He added that in the event of a quick defeat of the Mexican army, he wouldn't mind ceding Alta California, but he would defend a limit established at the Colorado River or the Nueces River, asking France, England, and Spain to guarantee those limits.⁵⁶ We cannot know if Santa Anna's words were sincere, or if it was to sound out support on a dictatorship from European powers. One can sense his desperation due to his defeats, lack of national unity, and the precariousness of how failing to build a victorious force damaged his image. After the defeats at Padierna and Churubusco, Santa Anna negotiated an armistice with Winfield Scott on 21 August 1847. As Santa Anna considered Bermúdez an impartial advisor, he asked which path he should follow. Bermúdez was decisive: he fell 'in favor of ending the war'. The response did not resonate with Santa Anna, who continued the campaign until Mexico City fell and he absconded.⁵⁷

The defeat had a lasting impression on Santa Anna's belief in the value of democracy. Bermúdez explains: 'After these detailed explanations that I listened to with the deepest attention, General Santa Anna asked me if I judged the country's opinion disposed for a change that would end the federation. 'This cannot subsist', he said to me, 'the states do not obey the federal government; they deny it all kinds of resources, oppress the people with unbearable exactions, and waste their time fighting amongst themselves...instead of repelling the invaders'. But what do you put in place of the federation? I asked him, the dictatorship? 'This is the only remedy for now', he replied, 'a strong government is indispensable, a purely military government that reorganizes the country, that blinds the sources of demoralization, that restores order in this nation that is falling apart, and then we will see what needs to be done for its stability, because all these plans are precarious and ephemeral'.⁵⁸

The war against the United States meant the most difficult test in Santa Anna's career. He knew the precarious conditions of his army and lack of support from the population and from the states of the Mexican federation. The military, political and economic obstacles forced him to seek help from allies abroad to end the conflagration without more losses of life and with a way out other than the acquisition of the northern territories by the United States. The closeness with the Spanish plenipotentiary minister Bermúdez de Castro, who served as a moral and support and confidant, expresses such a need. Santa Anna waffled between unsuccessful plans for European countries to intervene in his favor, and the establishment of an authoritarian regime that would give him the capacity for power to compensate for the disunity among Mexicans. The war ended badly for Santa Anna as his reputation took the main responsibility for the defeat, even though he resisted as long as he could and did not sign the agreements that cut off Mexican territory.

Conclusion: a patriotic *caudillo*?

The existence of a *caudillo* in a country with weak institutions does not imply that Santa Anna had total control of the government or society. His power was based on charisma, popular support, his ability to ally with key international actors, and military success. Santa Anna strengthened his position by becoming a middleman for foreign governments, travelers and merchants; and for defeating a European power. The fascination that Santa Anna aroused in foreigners did not always produce bargaining power or favors, but it legitimized his preponderant place within the army and public, be it as president or dictator. The triumph against Barradas in 1829 and his fight against the French in 1838 in the so-called 'Guerra de los Pasteles' catapulted his figure to a national hero called upon to solve the country's problems. During the 1840s, Santa Anna did not obtain overt support from Europe against the United States or solve the problem of Texas, but he did use English financing to overthrow Anastasio Bustamante in 1841 and become president. In this way, we gathered small pieces that reveal how Santa Anna blended his personal interests with those of his homeland as he rose through the military and to President. In this process he projected a symbiotic promise to Mexican citizens: if Santa Anna won, Mexico would win too. Few other Mexican generals or politicians placed themselves in the first line of defense against foreign aggression, yet Santa Anna often did so, even when to the detriment of his finances and his physical integrity.

In this article we aimed to link Santa Anna's role as *caudillo* with a less studied perspective: the relationship he maintained with foreigners as part of his political strategy. Our insights aimed to build on previous works that employed other perspectives on documents already published and available in compilations as sources for the study of Santa Anna, in addition to incorporating new material. The way in which we relate, gather and analyze Spanish, Cuban and Prussian subjects documents, allowed us to understand that Santa Anna used, in addition to war, diplomacy, deceit and alliances as means to achieve his political and personal objectives. During the period of study, perhaps our most interesting findings were that his personal desires overlapped or coincided with the interests of the country to a much greater degree than has been commonly assumed or articulated.

Notes

1. In the case of Spain see for example: Manuel Suárez Cortina, *El águila y el toro. España y México en el siglo XIX ensayos de historia comparada* (Castelló de la Plana, 2010); Agustín Sánchez Andrés y Raúl Figueroa Esquer (coords.), *México y España en el siglo XIX: diplomacia, relaciones triangulares e imaginarios nacionales* (Morelia, 2003); Antonia Pu-Suñer Llorens y Agustín Sánchez Andrés, *Una historia de encuentros y desencuentros: México y España en el siglo XIX* (México, 2001); Jaime Delgado, *España y México en el siglo XIX*, 3 volúmenes (Madrid, 1950–1953); Raúl Figueroa Esquer, *Entre la intervención oculta y la neutralidad estricta. España ante la guerra*

- entre México y Estados Unidos, 1845–1848 (México, 1999). For Mexico-USA relations some examples are David Clary, *Eagles and Empire: The United States, Mexico, and the Struggle for a Continent* (New York, 2009); David Stephen Heidler, *The Mexican War* (Westport, 2006); Ángela Moyano Pahissa, *México y Estados Unidos: orígenes de una relación, 1819–1861* (México, 2002); Alejandro Sobarzo, *Deber y conciencia: Nicolás Trist, el negociador norteamericano en la guerra del 47*, 3a. edición (México, 2000); Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, *La intervención norteamericana, 1846–1848* (México, 1997). Josefina Zoraida Vázquez (estudio introductorio y compilación), *La Gran Bretaña frente al México amenazado 1835–1848* (México, 2002); Will Fowler y Marcela Terrazas y Basante (coordinación y edición), *Diplomacia, negocios y política. Ensayos sobre la relación entre México y el Reino Unido en el siglo XIX* (México, 2018); Silvestre Villegas Revueltas, *Deuda y diplomacia: la relación México-Gran Bretaña 1824–1884* (México, 2005); Michael P. Costeloe, *Deuda externa de México: bonos y tenedores de bonos, 1824–1888* (México, 2007); Paul Garner, 'El "Imperio informal" británico en América Latina: ¿realidad o ficción?', *Historia Mexicana*, LXV (2015), 541–59. The studies on the relations between Mexico and France are also extensive; see Eric Taladoire, *Les Contre-Guérillas françaises dans les Terres Chaudes du Mexique (1862–1867): des forces spéciales au XIXe siècle* (Paris, 2016); Nancy Nichols Barker, *The French Experience in Mexico, 1821–1861* (Chapell Hill, 1979); Jacques Penot, *Les relations entre la France & le Mexique de 1808 a 1840: un chapitre d'histoire écrit par les marins et diplomates français* (Lille, 1976); José Bravo Ugarte, 'El conflicto con Francia de 1829-1839', *Historia Mexicana*, II, (1953), 477–502. For Texas check David Pletcher, *La diplomacia de la anexión: Texas, Oregon y la Guerra de 1847* (Xalapa, 1999); Gabriel Martínez Carmona, 'Deuda externa y reconocimiento. Triangulación de intereses en el conflicto México-Texas, 1837-1844', *Historia Mexicana*, LXXII (2022), 7–42; Miguel Ángel González Quiroga, *War and Peace on the Rio Grande Frontier, 1830-1880* (Norman, 2020); Lorena Careaga Viliesid, *De llaves y cerrojos: Yucatán, Texas y Estados Unidos a mediados del siglo XIX* (México, 2000). A good example of the study of relations between Mexico and Latin America in the nineteenth century is the book by Venegas Delgado: Hernán Venegas Delgado, *La Gran Colombia, México y la independencia de las Antillas hispanas (1820–1827): hispanoamericanismo e injerencia extranjera* (Saltillo, 2010). An attempt to cover the study of the international relations of Mexico are the 7 volumes published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico in 2011. Mercedes de Vega (coordinación general), *Historia de las relaciones internacionales de México, 1821-2010*, 7 volúmenes (México, 2011).
2. See the books of George Ruxton and Waddy Thompson, George Ruxton, *Adventures in Mexico and the Rocky Mountains* (New York, 1848.); Waddy Thompson, *Recollections of Mexico* (New York & London, 1846). Brantz Mayer, *Mexico as It Was and as It Is* (New York, 1844), 73.
 3. Catherine Andrews, *Entre la espada y la Constitución. El general Anastasio Bustamante 1780–1853* (México, 2008); Laura Solares Robles, *Una Revolución Pacífica. Biografía política de Manuel Gómez Pedraza 1789–1851* (México, 1996); Laura Solares Robles (investigación, compilación y selección), *La obra política de Manuel Gómez Pedraza, 1813-1851, tomo II* (México, 2002); Will Fowler, *Santa Anna ¿héroe o villano? La biografía que rompe el mito* (México, 2018). Only in the case of Guadalupe Victoria, an insurgent Creole, have documents been compiled about her participation as a Mexican representative before a Spanish delegation in 1823, together with Lucas Alamán. See: *Guadalupe Victoria: Correspondencia diplomática* (México, 1986).
 4. The famous historian John Lynch has described the Latin American caudillos of the early nineteenth century very well, stressing that they could govern with or without state authority, with or without constitution, and the inhabitants of his country recognized 'a genuine caudillo' through of his own acts. John Lynch, *Caudillos en Hispanoamérica 1800–1850* (Bilbao, 1993), 18–23. Magnus Mörner, 'Caudillos y militares en la evolución hispanoamericana', *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, II (1960), 299. Pedro Castro, 'El caudillismo en América Latina, ayer y hoy', *Política y Cultura*, (2007), 10–12.
 5. *Ibid.*, 14.
 6. In his book *Tornel and Santa Anna*, Will Fowler analyzes the life of Jose María Tornel and his relationship with the Veracruz caudillo. Will Fowler, *Tornel and Santa Anna: the writer and the caudillo, Mexico 1795–1853* (Westport, 2000). Will Fowler, 'The Repeated Rise of General Antonio López de Santa Anna in the So-Called Age of Chaos (Mexico, 1821-1855)' in Will Fowler (ed), *Authoritarianism in Latin America since independence* (Westport, 1996), 7–8.
 7. In August 1847, Deputy Ramón Gamboa accused Santa Anna of treason. Ramón Gamboa, *Impugnación al informe del señor general Santa-Anna, y constancias en que se apoyan las ampliaciones de la acusación* (México, 1849); Carlos María de Bustamante, *El nuevo Bernal Díaz del castillo o sea historia de la invasión de los anglo-americanos en México*, Tomo segundo (México, 1847); Ramón Alcaraz et al., *Apuntes para la historia de la guerra de México y los Estados Unidos* (México, 1848); José María Roa Bárcena, *Recuerdos de la invasión norte-americana 1846-1848 por un joven de entonces* (México, 1883); The historian María del Carmen Vázquez Mantecón analyzed the role played by Santa Anna in the war against the United States and the versions of Santa Annás performance written by his contemporaries. Vázquez Mantecón considers that although it is not possible to know if Santa Anna acted out of love for his country or selfishness, his defeat brought him a perennial bad reputation to this day. María del Carmen Vázquez Mantecón, 'Santa Anna y su guerra con los angloamericanos: las versiones de una larga polémica', *Estudios de Historia Moderna y Contemporánea de México*, XXII, (2001), 23–52. Araceli Medina wrote her Master's thesis on the representation of Santa Anna in the historical works of Lucas Alamán, Carlos María de Bustamante, Manuel Payno and Guillermo Prieto. Her conclusion: in general his contemporaries did not believe that Santa Anna was a traitor; only Bustamante thought that, due to personal conflicts with the caudillo. Araceli Medina, 'Antonio López de Santa Anna de 1836 a 1855 en la trama histórica de algunos de sus contemporáneos' (México, 2008).
 8. Studies relating leadership personality to foreign policy decision making are rich in political science, international relations, and political psychology. See e.g. Margaret G. Hermann, 'Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior

- Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders', *International Studies Quarterly*, XXIV, (1980), 7–46; Thomas Preston, *The President and His Inner Circle: Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in Foreign Policy Making* (Columbia, 2001); Juliet Kaarbo, 'Prime Minister Leadership Styles in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Framework for Research', *Political Psychology*, XVIII (2002), 553–81; Paul Kowert & Margaret Hermann, 'Who Takes Risks?: Daring and Caution in Foreign Policy Making', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XLI (1997), 611–37.
9. Wilfrid Hardy Calcott, *Santa Anna. The Story of an Enigma Who Once Was Mexico*, Hamden, 1964, 4; Fowler, *Santa Anna*, 12–13.
 10. Manuel de Mier y Terán, *Texas by Terán. The Diary Kept by General Manuel de Mier y Terán on his 1828 Inspection of Texas* (Austin, 2000), 45, 50, 66. Also in Fowler, *Santa Anna...*, 29.
 11. Will Fowler, 'La hispanofóbica hispanofilia de Antonio López de Santa Anna (México, 1794-1876)', in Agustín Sánchez Andrés, Tomás Pérez Vejo and Marco Antonio Landavazo, *Imágenes e imaginarios sobre España en México: siglos XIX y XX* (México, 2007), 8, 11, 25.
 12. Will Fowler explains that José María Tornel, José Joaquín de Herrera, and a promotion within the army were responsible for Santa Anna's change of sides. Will Fowler, *Santa Anna*, 92–3. Blas Osés, 'Acta de la entrevista habida entre los comisionados del gobierno español cerca del gobierno mexicano y los oficiales del ejército de México que fueron a cumplimentarlos en representación del Jefe Militar de Veracruz', San Juan de Ulúa, January 18, 1823, José María Miquel I Verges, *La diplomacia española en México (1822–1823)* (México, 1956), 114–6. Alexandro de Arana to Excelentísimo Señor Don Francisco Dionisio Vives Capitán General de la Ysla de Cuba, La Habana, July 9, 1824. Archivo Nacional de Cuba, Asuntos Políticos, File 125, number 49. José L. Franco (Compilador), *Documentos para la historia de México* (La Habana, 1961), 280.
 13. William Bullock, *Six Months' Residence and Travels in Mexico Contained Remarks on the Present State of New Spain, it's Natural Productions, State of Society, Manufactures, Trade, Agriculture, and Antiquities, etc, with Plates and Maps* (London, 1824), 16–7. Later, the Santa Anna's colonel Barbabosa provided support to Bullock to travel to Puebla. *Ibid.*, 27–29. Apparently, William Bullock's book is the first written by a foreigner that mentions Santa Anna. The military leader came out well in the description given of him, as we mentioned in the paragraphs above.
 14. Will Fowler, 'La hispanofóbica hispanofilia de Antonio López de Santa Anna (México, 1794-1876)', in Agustín Sánchez Andrés, Tomás Pérez Vejo and Marco Antonio Landavazo, *Imágenes e imaginarios sobre España en México: siglos XIX y XX* (México: Editorial Porrúa-Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo, 2007), 8.
 15. Harold D. Sims, *La expulsión de los españoles de México (1821–1828)* (México, 1974), 202. In western Mexico, the English were the target of mistrust, and in the north, US Americans were not well received. Sims, *Descolonización en México. El conflicto entre mexicanos y españoles (1821–1831)*, México, 1982, 64–6.
 16. José Miguel Salomón to Sr. Brigadier Isidro Barradas, Tampico de Tamaulipas, August 22, 1829. Archivo Nacional de Cuba, Asuntos Políticos, File 34, Record 10, report 349. Jesús Ruiz de Gordejuela Urquijo, *Barradas: El último conquistador español. La invasión a México de 1829* (México, 2019), 227.
 17. Antonio López de Santa Anna al Señor Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de Guerra y Marina, cuartel General en Pueblo Viejo de Tampico, 24 de agosto de 1829. Archivo Histórico de la Defensa Nacional, Expediente 665, fojas 38–41.
 18. Eugenio de Aviraneta agrees with Salomon's testimony, however, he positions himself as the character who negotiated the cessation of hostilities when Salomon was already morally defeated. Eugenio de Aviraneta e Ibagoyen, *Mis memorias íntimas 1825–1829* (México, 1906), 218–219. Isidro Barradas to Capitán General de Cuba, Cuartel General de Tampico, August 24, 1829, Archivo Nacional de Cuba, Asuntos Político, File 34, Record 10, Report 338. Jesús Ruiz de Gordejuela, *Barradas*, 81, 232. Antonio López de Santa Anna to Isidro Barradas, Cuartel General en Pueblo Viejo de Tampico, August 22, agosto de 1829, *Ibid.*, 239.
 19. Ruiz Gordejuelo, *Barradas*, 261.
 20. Antonio López de Santa Anna a Isidro Barradas, Cuartel General en Pueblo Viejo de Tampico, 8 de septiembre de 1829, 8 am. Archivo Histórico del Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, Boletín Oficial del Gobierno Mexicano, number 18. *Ibid.*, 265.
 21. *Ibid.*, 266.
 22. Fowler, *Santa Anna...*, 205.
 23. Carlos Guillermo Koppe, *Cartas a la patria. Dos cartas alemanas sobre el México de 1830* (México, 1955), 69, 100, 101.
 24. Letter XIII, México, January 9, 1832. C.C. Becher, *Cartas sobre México. La República Mexicana durante los años decisivos de 1832 y 1833* (México, 1959), 65. Becher contrasted Santa Anna with Anastasio Bustamante; of the latter he said: 'I believe he does not possess the necessary qualities to be the head of the state, although he must be a good general', *Ibid.*, 65, 69, 100. Letter XX, Mexico, March 21, 1832, Becher, *Cartas*, 92.
 25. One example is Douglas Taylor's article on foreign volunteers in liberal armies, but there are no articles on the subject for the first three decades of Mexico's independent life. Lawrence Douglas Taylor Hanson, 'Voluntarios extranjeros en los ejércitos liberales mexicanos, 1854-1867', *Historia Mexicana*, 37, número 2, (146) (octubre-diciembre de 1987), 205–237.
 26. We note that material from the following three paragraphs is extracted from upcoming monograph by the authors (publisher TBD), sources and quotes of particular importance are articulated in subsequent notes. There is debate on if this relative was Santa Anna's brother, brother-in-law (Martin p. Cos) or cousin, so we use 'close relative' in this instance. See Calcott, *Santa Anna*, 122–34.
 27. Santa Anna in reply to former American envoy to Mexico Joel Poinsett after his capture by Texians, 1836. Also see Randall Miller, 'After San Jacinto: Santa Anna's Role in Texas Independence.' *East Texas Historical Journal* IX (1971), 1–24.

28. Author discussion with senior Mason leaders in the United States. Authors were presented evidence upon agreement to keep said evidence anonymous until a later date TBD. Letter from Sam Houston to Thomas Jefferson Green. See e.g. 'Sam Houston to the General Commanding the Army of Texas', July 26, 1836. Memoir, 166; James, Marquis, *The Raven: A Biography of Sam Houston* (Austin, 1988), 264.
29. Santa Anna, letter to Ministry of War, February 16, 1836. Paul Lack, 'Slavery and the Texas Revolution', *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, LXXXIX (1985), 181–202.
30. Almudena Delgado Larios, 'La 'cuestión de México' y las relaciones internacionales de España en la época de Isabel II (1844-1856)', in Agustín Sánchez Andrés y Juan Carlos Pereira Castañares (Coordinadores), *España y México: Doscientos años de relaciones, 1810–2010* (México, 2010), 171.
31. Miguel Soto, 'Introducción', in *Diario de Ángel Calderón de la Barca, primer ministro de España en México: incluye sus escalas en Cuba* (México, 2012), 27–9.
32. Despacho número 16 de Don Ángel Calderón de la Barca al Excelentísimo Sr. Primer Secretario de Estado y del Despacho, México, July 3rd, 1840, Archivo Histórico Nacional de España, Estado, File 5867, quote in Jaime Delgado, *España y México en el siglo XIX III. Apéndice documental 1820–1845* (Madrid, 1950), 456.
33. Despacho número 59 de Don Ángel Calderón de la Barca al Excelentísimo Sr. Primer Secretario de Estado y del Despacho, México, February 6, 1840, Archivo Histórico Nacional de España, Estado, File 5867, *Ibid.*, 437–9. Despacho número 59 de Don Ángel Calderón de la Barca, July 3rd., 1840, *Ibid.*, 455, 458. Despacho número 16 de Don Ángel Calderón de la Barca, 6 de febrero de 1840, 438.
34. Fowler, 'La hispanofóbica hispanofilia...'; 15. October 13th and 14th, 1841. *Diario de Ángel Calderón de la Barca*, 249. Between October 15th and 17th, 1841, Angel wrote: 'I went to pay a visit to Santa Anna who did not receive me and I promised to return'. While on the 31st of the same month, he mentioned: 'In the afternoon, I went to see Santa Anna for the second time, but he did not receive us because he was taking a nap.' *Ibid.*, pp. 249 and 52.
35. Fanny, 'Life in Mexico', Fanny diary, and the Fisher book.
36. November 1st., 1841, *Diario de Ángel Calderón de la Barca*, 253.
37. Raúl Figueroa Esquer, *Correspondencia diplomática*, 34. Abdón Mateos, 'Demasiado moderado para progresista. La evolución de un diplomático liberal cortesano en la España decimonónica', *Pasado y Memoria*, XXV (2022), 151. Will Fowler, *Santa Anna*, 326, 327. 'Pedro Pascual Oliver', in <https://www.senado.es/web/conocersenado/senadohistoria/senado18341923/senadores/fichasenador/index.html?id1=2063>, reviewed March 5, 2023.
38. Despacho número 72 de Don Pedro Pascual Oliver al Excelentísimo Sr. Don Antonio González, Primer Secretario de Estado y del Despacho, México, March 15, 1842, Archivo Histórico Nacional de España, Estado, File 5868, Delgado, *España y México en el siglo XIX III*, 538.
39. *Ibid.*, 538, 9.
40. *Ibid.*, 537.
41. *Ibid.*, 537–8.
42. Despacho número 234 de Don Pedro Pascual Oliver al Excelentísimo Sr. Conde de Almodover, Primer Secretario de Estado y del Despacho, México, March 13, 1843, Archivo Histórico Nacional de España, Estado, File 5868, Delgado, *España y México en el siglo XIX III*, 552.
43. Despacho número 300 de Don Pedro Pascual Oliver al Excelentísimo Sr. Don Antonio González, Primer Secretario de Estado y del Despacho, México, July 12, 1843, Archivo Histórico Nacional de España, Estado, File 5868, *Ibid.*, 557, 558.
44. Will Fowler, 'La historia de la relación entre México y Reino Unido en el siglo XIX y la polémica sobre el imperio informal británico', in Fowler and Terrazas, *Diplomacia, negocios y política* (México, 2018), 28, 29, 43. Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, 'México, Gran Bretaña y los problemas con Estados Unidos, 1821-1848', in *Ibid.*, 143.
45. Bustamante, *El nuevo Bernal Díaz del castillo*, 42.
46. Vázquez, 'México, Gran Bretaña...'; 148–9. Despacho número 151 de Don Ángel Calderón de la Barca al Excelentísimo Sr. Primer Secretario de Estado y del Despacho, México, June 17, 1841, Archivo Histórico Nacional de España, Estado, File 5867, Delgado, *España y México en el siglo XIX III*, 462. Antonia Pi-Suñer, Paolo Riguzzi and Lorena Ruano, *Historia de las relaciones internacionales de México, 1821–2010. Volumen 5 Europa* (México, 2011), 72–3.
47. According to Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, it was more a commercial than a political objective. Santa Anna would take care of the economic interests of the British, which Anastasio Bustamante did not do. Vázquez, 'México, Gran Bretaña...'; 149. Vázquez, *México y el mundo*, 142, 3. Bustamante, *El nuevo Bernal Díaz del castillo*, 36.
48. Michael P. Costeloe, *Deuda externa de México*, 81. In communications between Eduardo Gorostiza, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Mexico, and Pakenham, the latter expressed his agreement with the proposal but considered that the measure was unpopular and if Santa Anna accepted it, he would be seen as fulfilling the Treaties of Velasco. Bustamante *El nuevo Bernal Díaz del castillo*, 49. Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, *México y el mundo: historia de sus relaciones exteriores. Tomo II. México, Gran Bretaña y otros países (1821-1848)* (México, 2011), 164, 5.
49. Despacho número 72 de Don Pedro Pascual Oliver al Excelentísimo Sr. Don Antonio González, Primer Secretario de Estado y del Despacho, México, March 15, 1842, Archivo Histórico Nacional de España, Estado, File 5868, Delgado, *España y México en el siglo XIX III*, 538. Despacho número 434 de Don Pedro Pascual Oliver al Excelentísimo Sr. Marqués de Viluma, Primer Secretario de Estado y del Despacho, México, July 30, 1844, Archivo Histórico Nacional de España, Estado, File 5868, *Ibid.*, 607.
50. Despacho número 452 de Don Pedro Pascual Oliver al Excelentísimo Sr. Marqués de Viluma, Primer Secretario de Estado y del Despacho, México, August 24, 1844, Archivo Histórico Nacional de España, Estado, File 5868, *Ibid.*, 612. Fowler, *Santa Anna*, 364–78.

51. Fowler, *Santa Anna*, 384–8.
52. To a letter from Taylor inquiring about American prisoners, Santa Anna responded: ‘Regarding American prisoners, I will tell Your Honor that there are only 7 in this headquarters, which I have included in a nominal list. And trusting what Your Honor informs me about having released several Mexicans, I have decided, to correspond to your generosity, to do the same with the 7 mentioned, and for the commissary of this army to help them with 70 pesos for their food on the way’. Letter from Antonio López de Santa Anna to Zachary Taylor, November 10, 1846, Roa Bárcena, *Recuerdos de la invasión norte-americana*, 73–74 note 1.
53. Del Enviado Extraordinario y Ministro Plenipotenciario, Salvador Bermúdez de Castro, al Primer Secretario del Despacho de Estado, México, July 27, 1847, Archivo General del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, España, File 1650, Report 530, Raúl Figueroa Esquer (edición, compilación, prólogo y notas), *Correspondencia diplomática de Salvador Bermúdez de Castro, Ministro de España en México*, Tomo IV (de agosto a diciembre de 1846) (México, 2013), 2690.
54. Heller, *Viajes por México*, 178, 9.
55. Del Enviado Extraordinario y Ministro Plenipotenciario, Salvador Bermúdez de Castro, al Primer Secretario del Despacho de Estado, México, September 27, 1846, Archivo General del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, España, File 1649, Report 333, Figueroa Esquer, *Correspondencia diplomática*, Tomo IV, 1797. Del Enviado Extraordinario y Ministro Plenipotenciario, Salvador Bermúdez de Castro, al Primer Secretario del Despacho de Estado, México, May 29, 1847, Archivo General del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, España, File 1650, Report 499, *Ibid.*, 2577, 8.
56. Del Enviado Extraordinario y Ministro Plenipotenciario, Salvador Bermúdez de Castro, al Primer Secretario del Despacho de Estado, México, July 27, 1847, Archivo General del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, España, File 1650, Report 530, *Ibid.*, 2689, 90.
57. Fowler, *Santa Anna*, 417, 418, 419–24. Del Enviado Extraordinario y Ministro Plenipotenciario, Salvador Bermúdez de Castro, al Primer Secretario del Despacho de Estado, México, August 21, 1847, Archivo General del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, España, File 1650, Report 550, Figueroa Esquer, *Correspondencia diplomática*, 2768.
58. Del Enviado Extraordinario y Ministro Plenipotenciario, Salvador Bermúdez de Castro, al Primer Secretario del Despacho de Estado, México, July 27, 1847, Archivo General del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, España, File 1650, Report 530, *Ibid.*, 2689.

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