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The Value of Naturalism

An Assessment of Naturalistic Readings of the Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche,
And a Complementary Interpretation of Nietzsche's Naturalism

Simon A. Nordberg

SCIENTICA POTESTAS EST

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

In the following essay I assess three naturalistic readings of Nietzsche and offer an interpretation of Nietzsche's naturalism. I argue that the three naturalistic readings confront some interpretive and philosophical issues. The main issue is that the readings beg the question as to either the intelligibility or the tenability of naturalism as an interpretation of Nietzsche. I offer a reading of Nietzsche's naturalism that is meant to supplement the readings and accommodate for some of issues identified with the readings. My interpretation differs from the other readings in two respects. (1) It does not understand naturalism within naturalism itself. (2) It argues that naturalism should be understood as secondary to Nietzsche's philosophical perspective and his values, not their supporting framework. My interpretation argues that we come to a better understanding Nietzsche's naturalism if we view naturalism as based on a valuation that is the outcome of Nietzsche's revaluation of all values. According to my interpretation, Nietzsche claims that naturalism is based on a moral valuation as to the value of existence. The reasons for endorsing naturalism are therefore normative. The moral valuations that underly naturalism Nietzsche believes is rooted in what he calls "the will to truth." This will to truth, however, is problematic for Nietzsche.

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ABBREVIATIONS OF WORKS CITED

Nietzsche's works:

MA = Menschliches, Allzumenschliches (I and II)
M = Morgenröthe
FW = Die fröhliche Wissenschaft
JGB = Jenseits von Gut und Böse
GM = Zur Genealogie der Moral
GD = Götzen-Dämmerung
AC = Der Antichrist
EH = Ecce homo

David Hume's works:

T = A Treatise of Human Nature
TA = An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature
EU = An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
NHR = The Natural History of Religion

FOREWORD

WHAT'S IN A NAME? THAT WHICH WE CALL A ROSE
BY ANY OTHER NAME WOULD SMELL AS SWEET.
Romeo and Juliet (2.2.45-7)

BEFORE WE PROCEED with the present essay, I think it will be appropriate to first clarify what this essay is *not* about. For starters, it is not about naturalism itself as a philosophical commitment. The question of what naturalism is would require a thorough investigation into its contemporary use and historical origin. Such an analysis would go well beyond the scope of this essay. We will of course have to touch on some definitions when we introduce and further consider different naturalisms in Nietzsche, but these definitions will not be given extensive argumentation on their own right, as the topic of this essay is not naturalism. The question of naturalism's philosophical merit would likewise have required a thorough investigation on its own. The merit and tenability of naturalism will only be considered in the context of Nietzsche's naturalism and its merit and tenability as an interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy. I have, however, added a short appendix to this essay (see **APPENDIX 2**) about naturalism in the philosophy of science. I advise the reader to consult the appendix for further details.

Secondly, this essay is not about how to do history of philosophy. The question of what kind of approach one should have when reading Nietzsche will not be argued for in this essay. I have my views on what such an approach should look like, but I will not spend time in this essay to argue for such an approach. It will bring us into an extensive discussion of the history of philosophy as a discipline, which is not necessary in order to say what I want to say in this essay. I have included an appendix (see **APPENDIX 3**) to this essay that is a short discussion on an approach I think is appropriate when reading Nietzsche.

Thirdly, it is not about the Nietzsche literature itself. We will consider, at great length, different interpretations forwarded by Nietzsche scholars, but the recitation and assessment of these interpretations are not meant to make a point about scholars and their interpretive practices. The intention is to understand Nietzsche, not Nietzsche scholars. It just happens that some scholars have a very good understanding of Nietzsche, and I see no reason not to draw on their works when writing an essay about Nietzsche myself. With that said, I do have views on interpretative practices and how they should be structured (see **APPENDIX 1**), but such arguments do not belong to the topic at hand.

But what, then, *is* the essay about? The essay is about naturalism in Nietzsche and is an attempt to come to a better understanding of Nietzsche's naturalism. In the first part, I introduce the topic in more details and give an in-depth presentation of three different naturalistic readings of Nietzsche. In the second part, I problematize the readings by considering some important passages in Nietzsche that might have bearing on how we should understand naturalism as a philosophical position in Nietzsche. I offer in the second part an alternative reading of Nietzsche's naturalism which emphasizes the role value commitments play in endorsing naturalism. My reading is not intended to replace the readings we consider in part I, but rather to *complement* them, by highlighting an aspect of Nietzsche's naturalism that the readings underplay or neglect. As it is formulated in this essay, my reading offers a tentative account of Nietzsche's naturalism that I believe might resolve some of the issues I identified with the other readings we considered. The crucial point I want to get across is that naturalism in Nietzsche must be understood as *a valuation* and that the reasons for endorsing naturalism are normative reasons related to the value of existence. With that said, my reading is not complete and there is much more to be done to it. The reader might therefore find the first part more comprehensive than the first part. There are problems that I did not have the time to get into, problems that require a thorough investigation on their own. For the time being, however, I must leave that for future studies. This essay might then be considered a foray, but not the whole battle.

I

TOWARDS NATURALISM

ES IST ETWAS NEUES IN DER GESCHICHTE,
DASS DIE ERKENNTNISS MEHR SEIN WILL, ALS EIN MITTEL
Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft 123

I

INTRODUCTION

The Example of David Hume and further scientific and historical preliminaries

THE TOPIC IS naturalism in Nietzsche. But, what is naturalism? Instead of trying to give some general definition of naturalism (though, see Appendix 2), I will begin by considering the example of a naturalistic interpretation[1] of the philosophy of David Hume, which is often used as a paradigmatic example of a naturalistic philosophy.[2]

Barry Stroud (2016), a leading Hume scholar, characterizing Hume's philosophical project in the *Treatise,* writes:

> [Hume's project in the *Treatise*] could be called a form of "naturalism" as that term came to be used by certain self-styled "naturalist" philosophers of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. It involves taking nothing for granted that cannot be found in nature, relying only on procedures whose reliability can be tested by their observable results, and explaining as much as possible of human life by appeal only to what can be discovered to be true of human beings and their relations to the world around them. (Stroud 2016, p.22–23)

Barry Stroud's characterization of Hume's project as a form of naturalism involves not to accept anything that cannot be observed in nature, relying on testable procedures with observable results, and explaining human life based on what can be discovered about human beings and their interactions with the world. What Hume saw as "nature" and as "the world" in which we discover what is "true of human beings," as the terms Stroud use in his characterization, was informed by his contemporary sciences. In his *Treatise* at least, David Hume emulated the methods of the sciences of his day, introducing the scientific methods of his contemporary natural

[1] The following interpretation follows a tradition of interpretation associated with Barry Stroud (my sources are his 2011 and 2016). With that said, I acknowledge that there are scholars who find issues with calling Hume a naturalist (e.g. Peter Millican 2016).

[2] For example, Brian Leiter (who we will consider in length) writes: Nietzsche belongs … in the company of naturalists like Hume and Freud" (Leiter 2015, p.2, see also p.245–246; and Peter Kail's *Hume and Nietzsche* 2014 p.275)

sciences into moral, psychological, and political discourses (Stroud 1977 p.3–4).[3] His contemporary science was influenced by Newton's newly published work *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy* (1687, henceforth *Principia*), which was published only 24 years before Hume's birth. The success of Newton's *Principia* greatly affected Hume's own method of theorizing, especially in the *Treatise*. As Yoram Hazony and Eric Schliesser write: "[Hume's] Treatise was … consciously modeled on the explanatory-reductive method put to such extraordinary effect in Newton's *Principia*" (Hazony and Schliesser 2016, p.675–676; see also Hazony 2014; and HE VI 542 for Hume's own description of Newton). Hume writes in an abstract wedded to the *Treatise:*

> [it is] worth while to try if the science of *man* will not admit of the same accuracy which several parts of natural philosophy are found susceptible of. There seems to be all the reason in the world to imagine that it may be carried to the greatest degree of exactness. If, in examining several phaenomena, we find that they resolve themselves into one common principle, and can trace this principle into another, we shall at last arrive at those few simple principles, on which all the rest depend. And tho' we can never arrive at the ultimate principles, 'tis a satisfaction to go as far as our faculties will allow us. (Hume, Ta §1, see also T 1.3.8.8)

Hume, in his *Treatise*, wanted to demonstrate how different phenomena relating to human nature could be explained with reference to few principles, principles that function as explanatory determinates in his theories. Such determinates are meant to account for patterns and causal events pertaining to human nature, analogous to how gravity functions as an explanatory causal determinate pertaining to terrestrial motion (see Smith 2041; cf. also the preface to *Principia*). One example of such explanatory method of explanation in Hume is his empiricism, which begins with defining two principles of cognition, namely, impressions and ideas (T, 1.1, p.7.), and from these principles demonstrate how all knowledge may be explain with reference to these two principles. This is reminiscent of the method of explanation in the *Principia*. "From certain selected phenomena,", Roger Cotes, the editor of the second edition of the *Principia* writes concerning Newton's method in a preface, "they [natural scientists like Newton] deduce by analysis the forces of nature and the simpler laws of those forces, from which they then give the constitution of the rest of the phenomena by synthesis" (1999, p.386). This is the approach one finds in Hume, who "from a cautious observation of human life" (T Introduction § 10, p.6),

[3] This is apparent before one even opens the book. Compare the subtitle of Hume's *Treatise*: *Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects*.

deduce principles of our human nature and from those principles explain how the constitution of our understanding, but also our passions and moral conduct, are defined by these principles.[4]

Another aspect of Hume's naturalism, hinted in Stroud's characterization quoted above, is his rejection of the explanatory value of supernatural entities or ontologies, like Descartes's metaphysical distinction between corporal and intelligible things. This follows his empiricism in that metaphysical claims are often said to be ascertained through a special faculty that transcend our senses, often the faculty of reason or divine inspiration. Said more bluntly, Hume writes:

> If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, *Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number*? No. *Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?* No. Commit it then to the flames: For it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. (*E*, sect. 12 § 34; see also § 5 of same section)

Hume, thus, committed as he is to empiricism and naturalism, rejects the explanatory value of supernatural entities, as metaphysical and theological speculations go beyond the confines of what is inferable from our experiences. Knowledge pertaining to things beyond this is thus "sophistry and illusion."

We may then call Hume a naturalist to refer to Hume's understanding of philosophy as *continuous* with the methods of natural sciences and more generally to his antisupernaturalism, the rejection of supernatural explanatory[5] entities. Furthermore, we can understand Hume's naturalism as rooted (in part) in a committed empiricism.[6] It is natural for Hume to subscribe to naturalism as the continuous relationship between natural science and philosophy, if all knowledge according to Hume, be it in physics or philosophy, is derived from the same principles of impression and ideas (see Ta §2).

Nietzsche scholars, to turn to our present topic, have asked whether Nietzsche is a naturalist, in a way similar to Hume. Does, for example, Nietzsche follow, or emulate, a scientific method

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[4] Hume also use the same explanatory approach in his account of the passions, where Hume divided passions into direct and indirect passions, and gives a taxonomy of all the passions (See T 2.1.2), Hume's sentimentalism also deduce our moral evaluations down to the explanatory determinates of pleasure and pain (see T 3.1.2).

[5] I add "explanatory" while one may believe in supernatural entities personally or by faith, but still be a naturalist in theory. Isaac Newton, Albert Einstein, and many other scientists believe in a creator God, for example, but their theories are still naturalistic, and thus they are naturalists in that they did not, nor need to, posit the existence of anything supernatural to formulate their theories. Compare some lines from the opening ode written by Edmond Halley to the *Principia* (1999 p.379):

> Behold Jove's calculation and the laws
> That the creator of all things, while he was setting the beginnings of the world,
> would not violate;
> Behold the foundations he have to his works.

[6] Another feature common to naturalism, Hume's naturalism included which I have left aside in this introduction are more substantive variants of naturalism. An example of this is physicalism, where, roughly put, it is claimed that things that exist are natural things, and all natural things are physical. We will take this up again later when we get to the different naturalistic readings of Nietzsche.

of explanation? Many believe he did, as we will see. Nietzsche, according to one prominent account (see Emden 2014), followed the trends of the explanatory practices present in the new science of biology and other cognate life sciences like physiology, cell theory, and embryology. Similar of how the life sciences of his day reduced complex biological life down to causal determinates that were meant to account for an organism's evolution, like heritability in cell theory and natural selection in evolutionary biology, Nietzsche attempted to introduce their methods of historical reasoning into moral, cultural, and psychological matters (compare Hume, T subtitle/xi). But unlike the scientific method as defined by the mechanic scientific paradigm of the late seventieth and eighteenth century, the explanatory methods of the nineteenth century life sciences were marked by the concern for explaining the evolution and organic development of biological life.[7] It was thought that a study of organisms' developments would shed light on facts of nature. "[T]he history of development" the nineteenth century German scientist Carl Ernst von Bear writes, "is the true source of light for investigation of organized bodies" (quoted in Coleman, 1971, p. 36). Cognate to this concern was the concern with the emergence of social and normative order from biological life. Telling of such a trend is Herbert Spencer's social Darwinism. Spencer, for example, at the beginning of his chapter on "The Evolution of Conduct" in his *Data of Ethics* (1879; the same year as the publication of the second part of Nietzsche's *Human All-Too-Human*) writes:

> We have become quite familiar with the idea of an evolution of structures throughout the ascending types of animals. To a considerable degree we have become familiar with the thought that an evolution of functions has gone on *pari passu* with the evolution of structures. Now, advancing a step, we have to frame a conception of the evolution of conduct, as correlated with this evolution of structures and functions. (1879, p.7)

Spencer then goes on to give an account of the development of conduct, emulated on physiological analyses of the emergences of functions in organisms. Thus, one could say, that Spencer here express a common theme in nineteenth century thought, namely that everything has a history and evolution that accounted for its present state of being. This trend or practice of looking to the historical development of different phenomena in investigations, was later called by Spencer "The Development Hypothesis" in an essay bearing the same name (1891, p. 1–7). The Development Hypothesis was the hypothesis that phenomena developed into what they now are, instead of having a "special creation" (p.2). This was typical of the intellectual milieu of

[7]As in the contention whether the individual development of embryos reiterate, or preform, more general developmental structure observable in nature (see Coleman's discussion of preformationsist and epigenesis in his 1971, ch. 3).

the late eighteenth century. "Language, human society, and the living organisms" as William Coleman writes about this period, "were conceived organically. They grew" (1971, p. 10).

In the zeitgeist of his time, Nietzsche's philosophy, one could say, was also guided by such a "Developmental Hypothesis." His philosophy was concerned with emergences of different phenomena and with how their developments inform us as to their present nature. Accordingly, as if elaborating on Spencer's Development Hypothesis, Nietzsche writes in *Human All-Too-Human* (1879):

> Mangel an historischem Sinn ist der Erbfehler aller Philosophen; manche sogar nehmen unversehens die allerjüngste Gestaltung des Menschen, wie eine solche unter dem Eindruck bestimmter Religionen, ja bestimmter politischer Ereignisse entstanden ist, als die feste Form, von der man ausgehen müsse. Sie wollen nicht lernen, dass der Mensch geworden ist, dass auch das Erkenntnissvermögen geworden ist; während Einige von ihnen sogar die ganze Welt aus diesem Erkenntnissvermögen sich herausspinnen lassen. … Alles aber ist geworden; es giebt *keine ewigen Thatsachen*: sowie es keine absoluten Wahrheiten giebt.[8] — Demnach ist das *historische Philosophiren* von jetzt ab nöthig und mit ihm die Tugend der Bescheidung. (MM 2)

As there exist no eternal nor absolute facts that can be known once and for all, we have to approach knowledge of the world with an eye to its ephemeral nature. Ephemeral in the sense that everything evolved into what it now is and is in the process of becoming something else. To understand why and how something is the way it is now, one must look to its developmental history. Facts thus become historical as what the facts are about, e.g. animals and plants themselves constantly change. That there exist dodos, for example, that dodos are a part of the family Columbidae, and that their height are around three feet, are no longer facts about *existing* dodos, seeing that there dodos have gone extinct. The facts, however, *used to be* facts about existing dodos. The facts ceased being facts. How we go about investigating into facts, then, must follow a method of explanation that accounts for the developmental character of reality. Guided, thus, by such a Developmental Hypothesis reminiscent of the scientific trends of his day, Nietzsche tried to introduce the dimension of evolution into different areas of philosophy, in order to shed light on topics which were typically understood a-historically or anachronistically.

Nietzsche, furthermore, like Hume, also rejected the explanatory value of supernatural entities like religious concepts and supernatural ontologies in our theories about nature and history. The shadows of God, Nietzsche says, are still to be found in many aspects of our knowledge; nature must be de-deified, according to Nietzsche. He writes:

> Wann werden wir die Natur ganz entgöttlicht haben! Wann werden wir anfangen dürfen, uns Menschen mit der reinen, neu gefundenen, neu erlösten Natur zu *vernatürlichen*! (FW 109).

[8] One could, in Spencer's langue say there exist no "special creations" (see 1891, p.2)

Nietzsche, in the same spirit, in *Beyond Good and Evil* 230 characterize one of his (talking in the plural "wir") tasks as that of translating humanity back to into nature ("zurückübersetzen in die Natur"). A task, furthermore, that is made possible only in our modern times, harden by the discipline of science ("hart geworden in der Zucht der Wissenschaft").

With that said, some scholars do contest whether Nietzsche is in fact a naturalist. For example scholars disagree about whether Nietzsche emulated his contemporary scientific practices, and argue that Nietzsche did not emulate scientific practices at all (see for example Rowe 2013, Schacht 2015a-b; 2012; 2023). Others point out that Nietzsche's contemporary sciences did not have a unified methodology, as arguably sciences at the time of Hume did (see Emden 2014, ch. 4 in particular), which would go against the idea that there was a single scientific method that Nietzsche could adopt. These contentions, however, are more about the extent to which Nietzsche emulated the scientific practices of his day, in what way, and to what degree, than an outright rejection of Nietzsche's naturalism (though see Rowe 2012 for such a rejection). Most scholars, in the anglophone literature at any rate, agree that Nietzsche did take cues from his acquaintance with different sciences that informed him as to the emergence and development of different moral, psychological, and cultural phenomena, even if he did not, as is obvious, emulate empirical methods like conducting experiments (for more about Nietzsche's acquaintance with nineteenth century life science see Emden 2014).

What scholars do disagree about, however, that has serious consequences for the prospect of a coherent naturalistic reading of Nietzsche, is whether naturalism indeed makes sense within Nietzsche's philosophy. In the case of Hume, naturalism accorded with his empiricism in a way that provided the philosophical backbone of a kind of naturalism. And the question is whether there is an equivalent kind of support in Nietzsche for naturalism. If not, that might go against a naturalistic reading of Nietzsche on pains on inconsistency. In that case, the symptoms of naturalism we indeed find in Nietzsche's philosophy, as alluded to above, should be explain with reference to something else than naturalism, naturalism being in tension with other parts of his philosophy. Does it, then, make sense that Nietzsche's philosophy is naturalistic? Some believe it does and some believe it does not.

Of those who believe it does, three scholars stand out in particular. Brian Leiter, to begin with, believes that it makes perfect sense to understand Nietzsche's philosophy as a naturalistic philosophy analogous to Hume (e.g., Leiter 2015; 2019; and 2022). This has, in part, to do with Leiter's understanding of Nietzsche as fundamentally committed to a scientific-like empiricism. Richard Schacht (see, e.g. his 2012; 2015; and 2023) also believes that it makes sense to understand Nietzsche as a naturalist, but believes that this has not necessarily to do with empiricism

per se, nor any epistemological or ontological doctrine one can ascribe to Nietzsche. Rather, according to Schacht, naturalism for Nietzsche has to do with the sense-making power of naturalism as a guiding idea, a guiding idea that, however, is not confined by a scientific image of the world. Christian Emden, lastly, also believes that it makes sense to understand Nietzsche's philosophy naturalistically, but that this has to do with Nietzsche's substantive views on ontology, not primarily his views on epistemology or methodology (see 2014; 2019). For Emden Nietzsche endorses a radical naturalistic ontology, that conceives knowledge and normativity as embedded in nature. I think these three naturalistic readings – Leiter's, Schacht's, and Emden's – to compose a representative core of naturalistic readings more generally, at least to a degree that might warrant them some considerable attention in wanting to understand the consensus surrounding Nietzsche's naturalism. One may call the three *Enlightenment Naturalism*,[9] *Extended Naturalism*[10] and *Radical Naturalism*.[11]

Enlightenment Naturalism, which is commonly associated with scholars such as Walter Kaufmann (1956), Maudemarie Clark (1990), and Brian Leiter (2015). These scholars take Nietzsche to endorse an enlightenment-like ideal of science, which consists of an optimism about the explanatory power of scientific methodology. According to this reading, Nietzsche fundamentally subscribes to a scientific perspective as the true perspective on the world. We will get a detailed account of such an enlightenment naturalism later, when we will consider Brian Leiter's naturalistic reading.

Extended Naturalism is the naturalism associated with Richard Schacht, and other scholars (e.g., Cox 1999 and Andresen 2013). The basic idea of Extended Naturalism is that naturalism is extended so as to include non-scientific kinds of explanations and theories, playing down the indispensability of science. The essential explanatory feature of extended naturalism is the exclusion of anything supernatural in our theorizing. This is also a feature of Enlightenment Naturalism, but according to the Extended Naturalism, within what qualifies as natural there might include phenomena that exempt scientific analysis. Scholars who advocate this kind of naturalism in Nietzsche usually read him as endorsing naturalism as a guiding idea or heuristic principle that is meant to account for knowledge and truth in a post-metaphysical and post-modern world.[12]

[9] I take this label from from Sedwick's (2016). Sedwick also uses Extended Naturalism to describe Richard Schacht and Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, but this is not a new term with Sedwick (see Cox 1999, ch.4).
[10] See Cox 1999 chapter 4 for a concise account of this naturalism.
[11] See also Sedwick (2016) for an alternative naturalism, called Hyperbolic Naturalism.
[12] For a more concrete application of such a reading see Joshua Andresen's article *Nietzsche contra Dennett* (2015), where Nietzsche's naturalism is used to criticize Daniel Dennett's book *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* (1995) as not

Radical Naturalism[13] is the idea that absolute everything, including Radical Naturalism, should be understood naturalistically. And to be understood naturalistically simply means that everything should be understood as analogous (and not just analogous) to how we understand natural phenomena, for example as analogues to biological organisms. According to this naturalism, which is advocated for by Christian Emden in his *Nietzsche's Naturalism* (2014), Nietzsche believes that traditional conceptions of reason, knowledge, and normativity, should be understood not as distinct from nature and evolution. And this would the previous naturalisms we considered also agree to, but radical naturalism goes further (hence radical). Radical Naturalism posits also the idea that we must also naturalize naturalism; we must understand the reasons for endorsing naturalism as a product of processes entirely describable as analogous to, e.g., biological organism or chemical formations. The reasons for naturalism are not epistemological, but ontological, and ontological not in the sense that it is a doctrine, but in the sense that naturalism itself exist and has its own ontology. The reasons, one could say, why we are naturalists are not in theory different from the reasons why we have a certain skin pigment.

Many other scholars play on similar themes when arguing for their naturalistic readings of Nietzsche, but few have argued for their position as extensively as the scholars mentioned[14]. Other scholars usually elaborate on the same themes and arguments as these three scholars. Peter Kail, for example, follows Leiter in interpreting Nietzsche's endorsement of naturalism as having to do with Nietzsche's scientific perspective (see Kail 2015). Christopher Cox who also provided the first modern book-length account of Nietzsche's naturalism (Cox 1999), followed Richard Schacht, elaborates on Schacht's idea that Nietzsche's naturalism is a heuristic principle that serves the function of making sense of knowledge and truth in a post-metaphysical and post-Christian world. Vanessa Lemm (2016), like Emden's focus on ontology, argues that Nietzsche's naturalism is more tied to the biology of knowledge and how developments in knowledge are analogous to developments in biology. Other scholars, again, take one of the three naturalisms as a point of departure for their own inquiries into other aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy (e.g., Andresen 2013).

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being naturalistic enough. See also his *Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Falsification* (2013) for a theoretical exposition of the role of naturalism as a heuristic principle in Nietzsche, according to Joshua.

[13] Although I do give wink at Joseph Rouse's Radical Naturalism (see Rouse 2002 and 2023), and Christian Emden takes Rouse's naturalism as a point of departure for his own reading of Nietzsche, Radical Naturalism as here described is not about Rouse's naturalism in particular.

[14] Of course Christopher Cox in his *Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation* (1999), being one of the first *modern* book-length accounts of Nietzsche's naturalism, is also someone who has written extensively on the topic. The naturalism advocated in that book, however, continues the Extended Naturalism reading described above and Cox, in his work, makes it clear that he takes Richard Schacht's naturalistic reading as a point of departure for his own reading. This is the reason why I don't give Cox a separate discussion in this text. Instead, I focus on Schacht and so, at least for our purposes, will account for two readings with one stone.

I think therefore that it can be fruitful when assessing and understanding naturalistic readings in the literature to give special attention to these three scholars (Brian Leiter[15], Richard Schacht, and Christian Emden), though I of course acknowledge that they cannot be representative of all the different naturalistic readings in the literature (cf. Sedwick 2016, Heit 2016, and Pearson 2016). The point is not so much to give an exhaustive account of all naturalistic interpretations of Nietzsche's philosophy in the literature, as it is to assess some of the most extensive readings, understand the issue at hand, identify some answers, consider the merit of the answers, and take that as a point of departure for an informed discussion on the prospect of naturalistic interpretations of Nietzsche's philosophy. I also believe these three readings do give a strong case for Nietzsche's naturalism, each in their own right, and so provide a valuable context in which to define my own views on Nietzsche's naturalism.

The following sections (2–4) will consider the three different naturalisms through the lenses of the three exemplifying scholars (Brian Leiter, Richard Schacht, and Christian Emden). These sections compose separate wholes, and I begin each section by taking up the perspective of the exemplifying scholar.

II

NIETZSCHE'S ENLIGHTENMENT NATURALISM AS READ BY BRIAN LEITER

BRIAN LEITER outlines (2015, p.2–5) two basic variants of naturalism as a point of departure for his reading of Nietzsche's naturalism: Methodological Naturalism (M-Naturalism) and Substantive Naturalism (S-Naturalism). M-Naturalism is about the explanatory practices and methodology characteristic of successful empirical natural sciences, or simply "science" as Leiter usually calls them. The M-Naturalist argues that all good theories should be continuous with scientific research. This applies to all possible intellectual pursuits, philosophy included. "[P]hilosophical inquiry," accordingly, "should be continuous with empirical inquiry in the sciences" (2015, p.2). And there are two ways to be continuous in this sense: Result Continuous and Method Continuous. A philosophical inquiry is Result Continuous if it is "supported or justified by the results of the sciences" (ibid. p.3). Philosophical explanations, accordingly, that are either confirmed or in line with the facts discovered in the sciences are good ones, while theories that are not confirmed nor in line are bad. In contrast, Method Continuous M-

[15] I take Brian Leiter as a paradigmatic example of an enlightenment naturalism reading, though this primacy is not chronologically correct.

Naturalism "demands only that philosophical theories emulate the 'methods' of inquiry of successful sciences." And by "emulate the 'methods'" Leiter means adopting a very general "style of explanation and understanding" which is a style of explanation consisting not only of empirically verifiable statements, but also identifies "causal patterns that explain the particular phenomena we observe" (ibid. p.3). M-Naturalism may be qualified even further in being either speculative or not. An M-Naturalistic explanation is speculative in the sense that it isn't intended, nor requires, to be confirmed by science in its initial formulation. The speculative explanations are, however, formulated so as to be open for, and may urge, further correction, which requires, first and foremost, that they "take over the idea that natural phenomena have deterministic causes" (ibid. p.4). In other words, they are like rough sketches of how one could explain a phenomenon scientifically, which proper scientific research has not assessed *yet*. But they could and should be assessed, and they also need to, in order to have bearing on whether they are preferable to other alternative theories.

S-Naturalism, on the other hand, can be divided into two types, either the claim that the only things that exist are natural things (Ontological S-Naturalism) or that our concepts should be amenable to empirical correction and verification (Semantic S-Naturalism). Physicalism is one example Leiter gives of an Ontological S-Naturalism. Physicalism claims, among other things, that only physical things exist. To be a S-Naturalist in this sense, one must not only endorse the methodology and procedures supporting physicalism, as the M-Naturalist may, but *also* endorse the substantive ontological claim about the status of existing things, namely that they are physical. *Semantic* S-Naturalism, in contrast, is instead about the semantic meaning of our concepts. Meaningful concepts should be amendable to empirical corrections. An example Leiter gives of a Semantic S-Naturalistic argument would be to claim that the concept "morally good" should be rendered into "maximizing human well-being" because, if "well-being" can be identified with a psychophysical state, "morally good" may be subject to further investigation by empirical psychology or physiology – thus rendering it a meaningful concept according to the Semantic S-Naturalist.

Leiter argues that Nietzsche is a naturalist in the sense that he indeed "endorses a *scientific* perspective as the correct or true one" (ibid. p.17) and that he is of the *methodological* kind in believing the knowledge science affords us is wrought by their methods. Nietzsche is also a speculative naturalist, whose theories and explanations have not been confirmed directly by his contemporary science. This then makes his explanations mostly Method Continuous. Thus,

much in the same spirit as David Hume[16], Nietzsche attempts to *introduce* empirical and science-like explanations, in a speculative way, into different subject matters, matters pertaining primarily to human nature, that have not yet been given sufficient scientific scrutiny, but which could and he believes should.

Tellingly in *Beyond Good and Evil* 230 Nietzsche describes the task of translating humanity back into nature ("Den Menschen … zurückübersetzen in die Natur"). The task, a task Nietzsche himself identifies with (talking in the plural "wir"), is that of cleaning the text "*homo natura"* of the fawning paint and over-paint of human vanity. Harden, as we are, by the discipline of science ("hart geworden in der Zucht der Wissenschaft") we may one day stand before humanity as we stand before anything else in nature, and turn a deaf ear to the siren of metaphysical bird catchers who sing in our ears "you are more! you are higher! you have a different origin!" („du bist mehr! du bist höher! du bist anderer Herkunft!"). This is the task Nietzsche and the rest of modern humanity are confronted with. A tremendous task, no doubt. But why, Nietzsche asks, perform such a task? "Oder anders gefragt: "warum überhapt Erkenntiss?"[17]

"Alle Voraussetzungen zu einer gelehrten Cultur," he writes, in the same spirit, in *Antichrist* about the educated, *scientific*, culture of the Greeks and Romans, "alle wissenschaftlichen *Methoden* waren bereits da" and,

> diese Voraussetzung zur Tradition der Cultur, zur Einheit der Wissenschaft; die Naturwissenschaft, im Bunde mit Mathematik und Mechanik, war auf dem allerbesten Wege, — der *Thatsachen-Sinn*, der letzte und werthvollste aller Sinne, hatte seine Schulen, seine bereits Jahrhunderte alte Tradition! Versteht man das? Alles *Wesentliche* war gefunden, um an die Arbeit gehn zu können: — die Methoden, man muss es zehnmal sagen, *sind* das Wesentliche, auch das Schwierigste, auch das, was am längsten die Gewohnheiten und Faulheiten gegen sich hat. (AC 59; 13; see also HH 629–637)

The communion of natural sciences with mathematics and mechanics and the unification of science, requires the proper methods and a sense for facts ("Thatsachen-Sinn"), which are the rudiments for an educated culture ("gelehrten Cultur"). A culture towards which the Greeks and Romans were heading, but never reached. What stop them? Nietzsche, of course, puts the blame on the advent of Christianity, which is not surprising, but his reasons further evince of his naturalism. It was, roughly put, because Christianity went against everything *real* and *natural* ("Die Natur hat sie vernachlässigt")[18]. Christianity doesn't have a sense for *facts*, and thus

[16] See the subtitle of *A Treatise of Hume Nature* where it states: *An attempt at Introducing the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects.*

[17] Compare this with aphorism *The Gay Science* 355 where Nietzsche describes the origin of our concept of knowledge ("Der Ursprung unsres Begriffs „Erkenntniss"") as the process of tying something unknown back to something known ("etwas Fremdes soll auf etwas Bekanntes zurückgeführt").

[18] Compare *Antichrist* 15, where Nietzsche writes: " Weder die Moral noch die Religion berührt sich im Christenthum mit irgend einem Punkte der Wirklichkeit."

neglect the scientific methods requisite for an educated culture. But in modern times, with self-discipline ("Selbstbezwingung") we are beginning to bring back a *Thatsachen-Sinn*, a liberated perspective on reality ("freien Blick vor der Realität"), and the care, patience, and seriousness required for appropriate knowledge ("Rechtschaffenheit der Erkenntniss").

And so, confronted with the task of translating humanity back to nature, hardened by science, and with a sense for facts, Nietzsche "aims to offer theories that explain various important human phenomena" – primarily moral, cultural, and religious – "that do so in ways that not only draw on actual scientific results …, but are also modeled on science in the sense that they seek to reveal the causal determinates of these phenomena" (Leiter 2015, p.6). An example Leiter gives of such causal determinates are what Leiter calls "type-facts." Type-facts are facts about our "psycho-physiological constitution" (ibid. p.6) that, for Nietzsche, account for the particular type of person we are. The components that make up our psychophysiological constitution are the different factual traits such as drives, instincts, genetics, brain neurons, etc. – all the traits that play a causal role in shaping the type of person we are.

An example Leiter cites (ibid. p. 7) of a naturalistic explanation in Nietzsche that exhibit the explanatory method of reducing a complex phenomenon down to casual determines related to our psychophysical constitution is *Beyond Good and Evil* 6. In this paragraph Nietzsche argues that all great philosophies have hitherto been the self-confession of its author and a unconscious memoire („das Selbstbekenntnis ihres Urhebers und eine Art ungewollter und unvermerkter mémoires") and that moral (or immoral) intentions are the seeds ("Lebenskeim") from which great philosophies always ("jedesmal") grow out of. In order to understand a philosophy, even of most sophisticated metaphysical kinds one must ask what morality a philosophy is supporting, which is to say what morality *he* (the philosopher) is supporting. Philosophies are not products of a drive for knowledge ("Trieb der Erkenntniss") – but of something very personal, someone's moral inclination. Furthermore, the particular morality a philosopher espouses is a sign of *who he really is*. Who the philosopher really is – in Leiter's terms, what type of person – is comprised of a hierarchy of drives ("Rangordnung die innersten Triebe"). Thus, Nietzsche takes something that human beings have been proud of, that has been taken as a sign of their unique status vis-à-vis the rest of nature, the *vita contemplativa philosophia*, and reduces it to psycho-physiological facts about persons, their constellation of drives. And such a reduction is presented as an explanation that *sheds light on* what great philosophies *really* are and that help us *understand* their *true* meaning.

An explanation *of such a kind*, one may imagine, could further be informed by physiology and psychology – not only could, it should. For Nietzsche forwards empirically contingent

claims about, for example, the function of drives, the affect drives have on our moral inclinations, and the influence moral inclinations have on our beliefs. The causal determinates the explanation consists of – our drives, our moral inclination, and the beliefs that follow – are all amenable to further psychological and physiological research. Though it is not obvious how such research might be conducted, it is not in principle excluded. Imagine, for example, that a paper in *Cell* was published tomorrow outlining the statistically significant correlation between secretion of testosterone and forebrain function. Another paper, in some other journal, shows that forebrain function to have impact on our moral and practical reasoning. And then a psychology paper shows how our moral inclinations make our judgements biased and make us reluctant to accepts certain facts that weigh against our moral outlook. Wouldn't such papers support Nietzsche's thesis that it is the psychophysiological make up of a philosopher that play a causally significant role in the formation of their philosophies?

Beyond Good and Evil 6 is not the only examples of an explanation in Nietzsche's corpus that exhibit naturalistic-scientific traits. One can, however, also find examples of *non*-naturalistic tendencies. It is important to say before anything else is said that according to Leiter, naturalism in Nietzsche is *not* meant to characterize *all* aspects of his philosophy. It is a means to an end. It is "not, ultimately, presented by Nietzsche as an end-in-itself. Rather … naturalism is enlisted in the service of what Nietzsche calls his 'revaluations of all values'" (2015 p.2, but see also Leiter 2019 section 3.1 p.100–103 and section 3.3 p.107–111). But why is naturalism enlisted in the service of this revaluation? Without going into details about what Nietzsche means by "revaluations of all values," the answer is that he utilizes naturalism to undermine traditional, first and foremost Christian, values and their metaphysical and religious foundations, which Nietzsche believes are *false*.[19] And thus most of the arguments, as Leiter points out (2015, p.11), of Nietzsche's critiques are based on facts, the truth of which his opponents, e.g., Christians, philosophers, moralists, have no knowledge of, neglect, or don't want to accept. Nietzsche on the other hand, with his naturalistic commitments, has a sense for such facts. And not only a sense but a sure confidence. His confidence was, in a hyperbolic manner, expressed in *Ecco homo* IV: 1, where its states:

> *Umwerthung aller Werthe:* das ist meine Formel für einen Akt höchster Selbstbesinnung der Menschheit, der in mir Fleisch und Genie geworden ist. Mein Loos will, dass ich der erste *anständige* Mensch sein muss, dass ich mich gegen die Verlogenheit von Jahrtausenden im Gegensatz weiss… Ich erst habe die Wahrheit *entdeckt*, dadurch dass ich zuerst die Lüge als Lüge empfand — *roch*… (EC IV: I)

[19] Compare, as an example, aphorism 103 of *Morgenröthe* where it says:" Ich leugne auch die Unsittlichkeit: nicht, dass zahllose Menschen sich unsittlich fühlen, sondern dass es einen Grund in der Wahrheit giebt, sich so zu fühlen."

Here Nietzsche assures us that he knows something – the truth in fact! – and that based on such knowledge he was the first to take the lies as lies ("die Lüge als Lüge empfand") and that the *mendacity* ("Verlogenheit") of centuries is against him on this front. But in order to claim to know that lies are lies and of having uncovered the truth ("die Wahrheit entdeckt"), he cannot at the same time deny the existence of a truth to lie about, nor can he deny the ability to really know, by some accessible means, such a truth. Now, if this was the only example where Nietzsche exhibit such confidence, it could be explain away as an example of his, at times hyperbolic, rhetorical tendencies. But there are more examples.

A more sober example Leiter cites is the section of *Twilight of the Idols* titled "Die vier grossen Irrthümer" which is about errors in our reasoning. The first error – the error of confusing causes with effects and effects with causes – is described as the most dangerous error and as the corruption of reason ("Verderbniss der Vernuft"). Nietzsche gives the example of the 15th century nobleman Luigi Cornaro. In *Discourses on a Sober and Temperate Life* Cornaro advocates for his temperate and restrictive diet, restricting himself to a diet of "bread, meat, the yolk of an egg, and soup" (Cornaro 1776, p.19). He believed that his diet was the cause of his health and longevity. He therefore recommended that other people should adopt a similar kind of diet if they wanted to have healthy and long lives. Nietzsche, revaluating Cornaro's health-values as it were, insists, on the other hand, that his slow metabolism, not his diet, was the cause for his longevity. And he adopted, unconscious of the underlying mechanism, the diet as a consequence of the real cause of his longevity, namely his metabolism. Thus if Cornaro was more informed about physiology, as Nietzsche, he would be in a better position to judge the role his diet had, and understand its true value for his health. Cornaro's diet might in fact, despite its purported universal health-value by Cornaro himself, accordingly be detrimental for someone with a different physiology.

Without going through each error in detail, the other errors that are considered in the same section further evince of Nietzsche's factual confidence. The rest of the errors are the belief in "spiritual causes" ("geistigen Ursachen"), the error of imaginary causal interpretations, and lastly the belief in the freedom of the will. Not only does Nietzsche present these errors as errors pertaining to ignorance and having a confused understanding of causality, they are also argued to be product of underlying and unconscious psychological and physiological motivations and mechanisms. Thus, after having presented the three first errors, Nietzsche gives them a psychological explanation (GD VII 5). One psychological reason is that we have a drive, or instinct, to bring something unknown and foreign back to something known and familiar ("Etwas Unbekanntes auf etwas Bekanntes zurückführen"). This gives us relief, comfort, satisfaction, and

a feeling of power ("erleichtert, beruhigt, befriedigt, giebt ausserdem ein Gefühl von Macht"). Such feelings make us more likely to accept erroneous reasoning, taking pleasure, power, as a criteria for truth ("der Lust („der Kraft") als Criterium der Wahrheit"). He continues and explains that our causal-drive ("Ursachen-Trieb") is conditioned by a feeling of fear ("Furchtgefühl"), which make us hesitant and reluctant to understand something new and foreign, and this prevents us for making investigations into the real causes in the world ("eine Erforschung der Ursache hemmt und selbst ausschliesst").

In the aphorism following the psychological explanation, Nietzsche further elaborates on the relation between our psychophysiology and morality, religion, and their confused understanding of causality. Morality and religion belong to the psychology of errors ("die Psychologie des Irrthums"). He mentions for example the error of taking the feeling of sin as the effect of being sinful, while sin actually is an interpretation laid on top of, and a consequence of, a physiological feeling of discomfort ("einem physiologischen Missbehagen"). He continues and explains that to be in a state of hope is also a physiological feeling of the return of strength and abundance ("das physiologische Grundgefühl wieder stark und reich ist") and not the cause of these feelings themselves. And the trust ("vertraut") we may have in God, in a similar vein, is a consequence of *being* (already) in a state of fullness and strength, which brings with it a feeling that expresses itself in a trust.

In this manner, the Speculative Method Continuous Methodological Naturalist Nietzsche (say that ten times fast) introduces, as the examples illustrate, explanations that are based on knowledge of facts about our psychophysiology – about drives, instincts, feelings, states of relief, comfort, satisfaction, fear, power, pleasure – facts the truth of which account for the causal-interpretative errors we make. And the explanatory method employed is the method of reducing complex phenomena down to certain causal determinates, like drives, instincts, feelings, etc. that are amendable to further empirical inquiry. Nietzsche evidently, then, endorses certain *epistemic* values, values like *true*, *false, error, real, unreal,* etc.[20] But, as Leiter rightly points out, "a class of claims can only be *epistemically* privileged if it is possible for there to be *objective* truths about them and for us to have *objective* knowledge of those truths." (p.11–12). This class of claims for Nietzsche is "those based on, or inferable from, sense experience" (p.11), i.e., empirical claims. Nietzsche on Leiter's account is a committed empiricist. His empiricism is for example expressed in aphorism *Beyond Good and Evil* 134, where Nietzsche claims that

[20] So, for example, in *Antichrist* 15, Nietzsche says: " Weder die Moral noch die Religion berührt sich im Christenthume mit irgend einem Punkte der Wirklichkeit." And in *Twilight of the Idols* III: 3 Nietzsche criticizes not-yet-sciences ("Noch-nicht-Wissenshaft"), and says of them: "[i]n ihnen kommt die Wirklichkeit gar nicht vor."

it is from our senses that all trustworthy, all good conscious and the appearance of truth ("Augenschein der Wahrheit") comes from. Aphorisms like *Beyond Good and Evil* 134 supports the interpretation that Nietzsche endorsed a kind of empiricism. An empiricism that goes against more skeptical readings of Nietzsche, that interpret his so-called "perspectivism" as implying the non-existence of objective truth. His perspectivism does not exclude the ability to acquire objective knowledge nor does it reject the existence of some objective truth. It is intelligible to talk about such a truth, a truth in relation to which we may, through empirical means, be informed. Perspectivism is rather the claim – compatible with empiricism – that knowledge is always biased, or filtered, by our affects and interest. "Knowing is like seeing, according to Nietzsche, in that knowing, like seeing, is dependent (in some sense to be specified) on a perspective (an interest or affect)" (2019, p.90, see also 2015 p. 217–218). Leiter calls this the "Busy World Thesis" (2019, p.90). The thesis is that our affects and interest filter out the information we may receive so that we are left with information that is relevant and important. Knowledge is indeed always biased and incomplete, but not in a relativist, arbitrary, or radical constructivist sense, that may have bearing on the intelligibility of objectivity, as some skeptical readings would have it. If knowledge was arbitrary, then Nietzsche's critique of our causal reasoning, as the example mentioned above, would also be arbitrary, which is clearly not the way he presents his criticism. A skeptical reading would also be hard-pressed to account for how Nietzsche characterized himself not only in *Ecce homo* IV: 3 quoted above, but throughout his mature works. The view, then, that Nietzsche's perspectivism is a rejection of objective knowledge and the intelligibility of epistemically privileged claims, regardless of the dubious status of such skepticism as a philosophical position, is ruled out on Leiter's account, on pains of making nonsense out of Nietzsche's own argumentation and the characterization of his own philosophy.

Nietzsche clearly believes that it is meaningful and intelligible to talk about truth – he often does it. But, then, the questions that follows from this are what this truth is and how we should conceptualize it. Leiter argues that Nietzsche is agnostic about the metaphysical, non-perspectival status of truth (i.e. we cannot know what metaphysically is the case) and that Nietzsche forwards a kind of pragmatist reason against the relevance of such knowledge. And so Nietzsche does leave open "the possibility that there is a non-perspectival truth about the world" and that it is the "pragmatic dismissal[21] of the noumenal [i.e. mind-independent] world … [that] explain[s] why Nietzsche thinks such a truth would be irrelevant if it transcended all possible

[21] Leiter is here referring to *Twilight of the idols* IV where it says:

> Die „wahre Welt" — eine Idee, die zu Nichts mehr nütz ist, nicht einmal mehr verpflichtend, — eine unnütz, eine überflüssig gewordene Idee, *folglich* eine widerlegte Idee: schaffen wir sie ab!

perspectives creatures like us (our species) could adopt" (Leiter 2019, p.90). So, Nietzsche is agnostic about the mind-independent status of truth, but does not believe it is relevant for us mind-dependent knowers to be in the clear about this anyways – it is, after all, impossible to know anything mind-independently. The best we can do is to try to make sense of the plurality of different, partial, and incomplete perspectives on reality and revise our conception of the objective world as we go along, without ever arriving at some final and definite conception.[22]

But such an as-we-go-along attitude is the same kind of attitude one finds in the naturalist Quine. For Quine, one of the ways philosophy is – or should be at any rate – continuous with science is its procedure of *working within* the body of knowledge we have, improving and modifying it as we go along. Quine writes, referring to Otto Neurath's famous simile: "Neurath has likened science to a boat which, if we are to rebuild it, we must rebuild plank by plank while staying afloat in it. The philosopher and the scientist are in the same boat" (Quine 1960, p.3). Though, Quine's wrote this in the context of language and conceptualizations, one could say that Nietzsche the naturalist tried to replace the different moral and religious planks that, as far as he saw it, will not hold us afloat for much longer. What he replaces these planks with – informed by his fellow seafarer the scientist – are psychological, physiological, and biological explanations that he thinks do a better explanatory job than traditional moral and religious ones do.

Such a continuous understanding of philosophy and science is given perhaps it most unambiguous and naturalistic form in the *Remark* at the end of the first treatise of the *Genealogy*. Here Nietzsche calls for the different sciences (indeed, including history, linguistics, and philology) to help enlighten us about different value questions that are meant to serve the philosopher in solving the problem of value ("das Problem vom Werhe zu lösen") and determining the rank ordering of values ("die Rangordnung der Werthe zu bestimmen"). For example, all tables of goods, he explains, first *need* ("bedürfen") a physiological, psychological and medical analysis, which may inform the philosopher about the nature of these goods, which again will inform his task of solving the problem of value. Nietzsche clearly presents the different sciences here as *epistemically valuable* for philosophy.

But not epistemically valuable in and of themselves. Leiter also argues that Nietzsche's naturalism implies an anti-realism about values, *including epistemic ones*. Leiter argued, as we have seen, that Nietzsche must assume that there are certain privileged epistemic claims,

[22] The idea that we should strive for some definite and final claim about reality is in fact one of the critiques Nietzsche makes of the ascetic's will to truth, because of the life-denying nature of such a prospect, as Leiter rightly points out (2019 p.223).

namely empirically amendable ones, but, because he reads Nietzsche as an anti-realist about values, he had to concede that these privileged claims are not objectively privileged, i.e. not based on objective epistemic value. As it is absurd for Nietzsche that there are objective goods in of themselves, so too objective epistemic virtues, virtues like parsimony, coherence, compensability, are for Nietzsche absurd. The emergence of epistemic values is practical and evolutionary. Explanations are not justified by the inherent truth of their propositions, but also by *us*, the knowers, and our practical interest as creatures with wants and needs. This applies also to endorsing naturalism itself. And so Leiter points out that " 'reasons for being a naturalist' really means 'what explains why creatures like us are affectively disposed to take naturalistic epistemic criteria seriously' " (2019 p.102). Thus, the claim is not only that we should endorse different epistemic norms because such norms work, and if they do not work then we should not believe in them, but that we *end up believing*, because they *do* work, that we should endorse different epistemic norms. Conversely, if naturalism does not work, we simply end up believing that we should not believe in them. Such epistemic norms "work" in that they "facilitate successful navigation of the world and prediction of the future course of experience" (ibid. p.110). Our endorsement of naturalism, that we cannot help but make, is a consequence of the fact that its epistemic norms have and continue to resonate with our practical interest. Thus, naturalism ultimately rests on the "practical interests" the naturalist has in endorsing naturalism. And "we should be naturalists because naturalism works, not because it is "true" or "justified" in some sense either independent of or dependent upon naturalistic criteria" (ibid. p.101).

III

Nietzsche's Extended Naturalism as Read by Richard Schacht

Richard Schacht takes the death of God as the point of departure for his understanding of Nietzsche's naturalism. It is in light of the newly de-deified nature in which Nietzsche found himself that we should see his naturalism. It is a this-worldliness: an understanding of the world we live in, a world we call nature, as the only world there is. And "everything that goes on and comes to be in this world is the outcome of developments occurring within it that are owing entirely to its internal dynamics and the contingencies to which they give rise" (Schacht 2012, p.193). There exists no supernatural world in Nietzsche, and so our understanding and explanation of whatever we may encounter, be it in practice or in theory, can and should be accounted

for by reference to this world as we know it – we need not postulate anything supernatural *to understand* what is going on. But such this-worldly explanations need not be scientific ones, though they make up, in our repertoire of naturalistic explanations, an important part of the different perspectives we may afford ourselves in our quest for making sense of the world and our experience of it.

Scientific explanations, in the eyes of Schacht and he argues in Nietzsche's eyes too, do not have an all-encompassing explanatory power, as some scientific minded naturalists may have it. Science cannot exhaust all viable explanations of the world. It is *a* perspective on the world, a very important and powerful perspective no doubt, but *not* the only perspective, or set of perspectives, that may be meaningful or informative to have. There are many other non-scientific perspectives that grasp diverse and complex phenomena, phenomena that would evaporate in the causal-deterministic empirical air of science. Science is "meaning-blind" (ibid. p.198), as Schacht points out. The causal-deterministic kinds of explanations we find in science are blind to the meaning and significance some phenomena engender in our experience. Thus it is a great threat to naturalism as an alternative among many other non-naturalistic philosophical positions, to restrict it to only include science-like causal-deterministic theorizing. Such a reduction discounts the meaning of our social and cultural reality that are important to us and to which we should be attentive.

Schacht distances himself from Leiter's naturalistic reading in that he de-emphasize the centrality of science in understanding Nietzsche's naturalism. As Leiter's tried to show how Nietzsche endorsed a scientific perspective as the true perspective on the world, Schacht tires to formulate an alternative understanding of naturalism that accommodates for issues he identifies with such a science-oriented understanding of naturalism in Nietzsche. In offsetting the centrality of science, Schacht hopes to account for Nietzsche's critique of science while at arguing that Nietzsche endorse a fundamentally naturalistic perspective.

Instead of a science-oriented naturalism, Schacht argues that Nietzsche endorses a more broad kind of naturalism. It is more a heuristic or guiding idea, than a full-blown epistemological commitment or doctrine. A guiding idea that does not restrict itself to scientific kinds of explanations, nor insist that all theorizing should – nor can for that matter – emulate and be continuous with the sciences. It is a kind of naturalism that embraces an array of different historical, philosophical, cultural, literary, and also indeed psychological, biological, physical, chemical, and mathematical kinds of explanations. Science is important, but the reason why it is important is because of its this-worldly outlook and framework, not because it is more privileged or special than other forms of inquiry. And so, "Nietzsche's kind of naturalism is one that

allies itself but does not *identify* itself with the sciences" (2012, p.162). The important part – and selling point – is that science, like all naturalistic explanations, rejects the idea that it is necessary, or desirable, to postulate some supernatural realm, or being, in order to understand what is going on in the world.

Schacht's naturalistic Nietzsche puts less focus on the indispensability of science. Nietzsche "is by no means wedded to the view that everything that happens in human life and in the development and unfolding of human reality and experience can be adequately explained and fully comprehended in terms of natural-scientific or naturalscientifically modeled concepts and processes—'causality' first and foremost among them" (2012, p.195). And "causality" here refers to causal explanations in general. Nietzsche thinks that there are aspects of reality that are not explicable in causal terms, for example music, but more generally speaking *meaning*. The aphorism Schacht refers to in this context is *The Gay Science* 373, where the last few sentences are telling:

> Eine „wissenschaftliche" Welt-Interpretation … könnte folglich immer noch eine der *dümmsten*, das heisst sinnärmsten aller möglichen Welt-Interpretationen sein: dies den Herrn Mechanikern in's Ohr und Gewissen gesagt, die heute gern unter die Philosophen laufen und durchaus vermeinen, Mechanik sei die Lehre von den ersten und letzten Gesetzen, auf denen wie auf einem Grundstocke alles Dasein aufgebaut sein müsse. Aber eine essentiell mechanische Welt wäre eine essentiell *sinnlose* Welt! Gesetzt, man schätzte den *Werth* einer Musik darnach ab, wie viel von ihr gezählt, berechnet, in Formeln gebracht werden könne — wie absurd wäre eine solche „wissenschaftliche" Abschätzung der Musik! Was hätte man von ihr begriffen, verstanden, erkannt! Nichts, geradezu Nichts von dem, was eigentlich an ihr „Musik" ist!… (FW 373)

In this passages we see that for Nietzsche a mechanistic interpretation of the world – a so-called "wissenschaftliche" Welt-Interpretation –, that explains different phenomena in quantifiable, mathematical, cause-effect terms leave out the value and meaning from the world, music being an example meant to illustrate a more general point. And not an aesthetic point, but an epistemological one about the type of knowledge, "*sinnlose*" knowledge he calls it, afforded by mechanistic interpretations. And the point, moreover, is also that some phenomena are essentially meaning-constituted, i.e. some phenomena are inseparable from the meaning they engender, and mechanic world-interpretations, because they sieve out meaning, can thus not give us *knowledge* of them. For what music really is in the end, what about music makes it music and not just pattern sound vibrations, is the aesthetic meaning, or value, music has. Thus, to understand *music* is to understand this *meaning*, and any interpretation that exclude meaning is in principle incapable of accounting for what music is. But mechanistic causal world-interpretations are exactly that, incapable of accounting for meaning.

Another aphorism Schacht mentions is *The Gay Science* 112, where Nietzsche expresses significant doubts about the role of causality in our explanations. Nietzsche claims that what we call "explanations" ("Erklärung") are really descriptions ("Beschreibung"), which is to say, we think, falsely, that when we give explanations of some phenomenon, that we actually explain it, what we are really doing is to give a description of it. Our modern scientific theories give not better explanations, but better descriptions. We are not better at explaining things then people in the past („Wir beschreiben besser … wir erklären ebenso wenig wie alle Früheren"). This has to do with the shortcoming of cause-effect kinds of explanations. *Causality* does not explain phenomena, it only describes them. This is because our causality never is about any phenomenon directly, but always mediated by our picture of the becoming ("Bild des Werdens"), viz. mediated by our simplified representational concepts of changes. We are only talking about the pictures of change and not the changes themselves, and so we are only giving the changes new names and presenting a way the changes can be talked about, but never about the changes themselves. We cannot explain change, only describe and picture it. Thus when we say, x caused y, the push (as it were) from *x* to *y* is not accounted for. "Niemand hat den Stoss 'erklärt'" as Nietzsche puts it later in the same aphorism.

Such skepticism about the role of causality is in stark opposition to Leiter's characterization of Nietzsche (see above), where Nietzsche was thought to employ science-like methods, where "'Methods' should be construed broadly here to encompass not only, say, the experimental method … but also the styles of explanation and understanding employed in the sciences, for example, *explanation by appeal to causes*, and an attempt to find the *general causal* patterns that *explain* the particular phenomena we observe" (2015, p. 3 emphasis added). But Nietzsche, here (FW 373 and 112), denies that causal explanations are really explanations, they are only descriptions that do not help us in grasping ("begriffen") something. *The Gay Science* 373 and 112, and not only they, then, go against Leiter's characterization – or at least against Leiter's formulations – that the kind of explanations we find in Nietzsche are essentially causal.

On Schacht's account, this does not give us reason to worry. For his claim is more modest, claiming only that Nietzsche acknowledges the value of science, but not to such an extend as to claim that science is in principle superior to other intellectual institutions. Indeed, a big part of Nietzsche's philosophy is to criticize his contemporary sciences, and to criticize it on non-scientific philosophical grounds (a complete reversal of the traditional naturalistic attitude).[23] And one of the things Nietzsche criticized, exemplified by the two aphorisms quoted, is this

[23] Nietzsche writes in Ecce homo: "Dies Buch [Jenseits von Gut und Böse] ist in allem Wesentlichen eine Kritik der Modernität, die modernen Wissenschaften …" (E JBG 2); see also *The Birth of Tradegy* Preface 2

idea that the sciences make up some special and unique perspective vis-à-vis other perspectives. There are certain things science can explain but there are other things, indeed all that has *value* and *meaning* in our lives, it cannot explain.

Schacht wants Nietzsche's naturalism to include the explanation of phenomena like normativity, values, culture, art, persons, etc. without losing their "manifest image" as De Caro called it – their meaning-constituted reality (De Caro, 2022 p.2). But, what is it about non-causal non-scientific explanations that may conserve such realities? One thing that non-causal non-scientific explanations can help us with, or at least do not exclude, is to give us insight into how we should relate to our own *autonomy* in meaningful and creative ways. Non-causal non-scientific theories and explanations can be *normative* in a sense that science excludes, in that they are meant to affect and deepen our understanding of what we *should* do and how to live our lives. Such theories can help us come to grips with our own autonomy and the real possibilities that confront us. And so Schacht observes that,

> Knowledge of "everything law-like and necessary in the world" will not suffice to enable one actually to live one's life autonomously and creatively, and certainly will not suffice to determine what someone doing so should actually do or create. Nietzsche clearly thinks that it [i.e. knowledge of everything law-like and necessary in the world] can and will be importantly helpful. … Both require a larger set of eyes and strategies of acquaintance and interpretation, more comprehensively attuned to all that human reality has become—and has become capable of becoming. (2023, ch.II[24])

So, non-scientific non-causal kinds of explanations are for Schacht essential for understanding the normative possibilities that lay open for us. These possibilities are, indeed, informed by what is the case and what was the case, which we can have a scientific understanding of, but they are also informed, and ultimately defined, by what Nietzsche calls our sensibilities (German: Sensibilitäten). Nietzsche's analysis of sensibilities is the paradigmatic example Schacht gives of a non-natural-scientific and non-causal kind of analysis in Nietzsche. Sensiblities are "complex configurations of dispositions, attitudes, beliefs, valuations, and interpretive tendencies" (2023, ch.II). Schacht believes this is a key concept for understanding Nietzsche's non-scientific naturalism. He claims for example that Nietzsche's "naturalism must be conceived in a manner that takes account of his concern to do justice to, and make sense of, this phenomenon—which for him is central to human life and to the character of our attained human reality" (ibid.). Our sensibilities are important in that they play a significant role in shaping our autonomous agency, and they are exempt from causal-scientific analysis. This is because they, for example, exist in dynamic and complex human languages, languages inseparable from the

[24] My online copy of Schacht's book newly published book does not include pages numbering, therefore I had to cite the chapter when referring to passages in this work.

concepts, norms, and values that they are anchored in. Human beings are furthermore not determined in a strict sense, which is to say human beings respond to cultural formations in unforeseeable and nonidentical ways, which means that the effects our sensibilities may have are also not per se foreseeable or predictable. Our dispositions, our attitudes, beliefs, valuations, and interpretative tendencies, define and shapes the open-ended nature of our future, in ways not amenable to scientific analysis.

Having now presented Schacht naturalistic reading of Nietzsche, I will mention some problems with the reading that is peculiar to Schacht's reading vis-à-vis the other readings we will consider. I will consider two problems in particular: One about the intelligibility of Schacht's naturalism with the rest of Nietzsche's philosophy, and another about Schacht's reading of Nietzsche's critique of causality.

For although all of what Schacht says about Nietzsche's naturalism may be true, it still leaves us with the question: *Why* does Nietzsche endorse *naturalism* in particular? Schacht's answer to this question is not entirely clear. He seems to believe that there are epistemological reasons for Nietzsche's endorsement of naturalism as a regulative hypothesis. And so Schacht writes,

> "I suggest that for Nietzsche naturalism, so described, is both a 'regulative hypothesis' and a 'heuristic principle'. As a 'regulative hypothesis,' it is the hypothesis that taking this principle as a guiding idea in philosophical interpretation and reinterpretation will hold up well (*in terms of continuing plausibility, viability, and sense-making*) as inquiry and reflection proceed. As a 'heuristic,' it is the idea that approaching things in this way will be helpful to interpretive and re-interpretive inquiry." (2012b p.170 emphasis added)

So, the reason why Nietzsche endorses the kind of naturalism Schacht proposes is that such naturalism helps our interpretations and reinterpretations "hold up well," and that means they continue to be plausible, viable, and make sense. But why? In Leiter's naturalistic reading, on the other hand, the reason why is, first and foremost, that Nietzsche fundamentally endorses a kind of *empiricism* and *pragmatism* with regards to knowledge. That is, according to Leiter, *why* Nietzsche endorses naturalism and why it to "holds up well." But Schacht nowhere gives us an equivalent kind of reason for Nietzsche's naturalism, and it makes the reader wonder what about naturalism in particular makes it such a plausible, viable, and sense-making guiding idea. All we get, in the end, is a convincing case *that* Nietzsche most likely had the kind of naturalism Schacht espouses, but not *why*.

Schacht might, however, mention the death of God and argue that naturalism was Nietzsche's response to the disintegration of traditional Christian and metaphysical frameworks. But this would not explain why Nietzsche endorses *naturalism* in particular – there are many

other post-Christian, post-metaphysical frameworks to choose from. Is it because knowledge according to Nietzsche always must refer back to verifiable and testable empirical inquiry? And so things like religious and metaphysical frameworks are excluded because they cannot be verified and tested in that sense? Are there another reasons? At least as far as Schacht's reading goes, we don't get an answer to such concrete epistemological questions, which is unfortunate, for, as said, Schacht's reading is more textually tenable as to Nietzsche's corpus than Leiter's account.

To sum up, Schacht's more modest and liberal naturalistic reading of Nietzsche might explain aphorisms that Leiter's reading would have problems of accounting for, but Schacht's reading is fundamentally incomplete in not accounting for the epistemological reasons behind Nietzsche's endorsement of naturalism as a heuristic principle. The problem, in the end, is that Schacht might be right about his naturalistic reading, but his reading does not explicitly state the reasons and the philosophical backbone Nietzsche have for endorsing the kind of naturalism Schacht ascribes to him.

Furthermore, to turn to the second problem we will consider, Schacht's critique of causal explanation is also philosophically wanting. As we saw above, according to Schacht's reading of *The Gay Science* 373 and 112, Nietzsche argues that causal explanations cannot account for meaning-constituted phenomena, like music, and that mechanistic world-interpretation thus have not an all-encompassing explanatory potential; certain things are excluded. And as it stands, this is correct, but Schacht goes further. Schacht believes that we then should not understand Nietzsche's explanations as causal, believing that there exist non-causal kinds of explanations. This is where I believe he goes wrong.

The example Schacht gives of a non-natural-scientific and *non-causal* kind of analysis in Nietzsche is sensibilities (Sensibilitäten). Schacht believes this is a key concept for understanding Nietzsche's non-scientific naturalism, sensibilities is a paradigmatic example of his naturalism and exemplify the non-scientific *non-causal* yet naturalistic kind of explanation.

But what are sensibilities? Schacht writes:

> Sensibilities, of the sort I take Nietzsche to have in mind, are complex configurations of dispositions, attitudes, beliefs, valuations, and interpretive tendencies. They are powered (as it were) by affective resources, and may be channeled at least to some extent by inherited but humanly variable traits; but they are also strongly scripted culturally, reflecting elements of cultural formations to which one has been exposed and that one has internalized. Sensibilities thus are typically bound up with Lebensformen and their associated formations (such as practices, traditions, institutions, artifacts, symbols, art forms, and texts), of which sensibilities are the internalization, and in which they are anchored—and yet which also are their expressions and elaborations, each informing and sustaining the other. (2023, ch.11)

Which is to say, "sensibilities" is a word that refers to complex configurations of dispositions, attitudes, beliefs, valuations, and interpretive tendencies, the formation of which are powered by our affects that can be channeled by inherited but changeable human traits. These configurations are also to a great degree scripted or affected by the culture we are a part of, the culture that we have internalized. This internalization of culture which affect the dispositions, attitude, beliefs, valuations, and interpretative tendencies we may have, i.e. affect our sensibilities, is bound up with, i.e. influenced by, the life styles (Lebensformen) that we cultivate. Such lifestyles usually consist of the practices, traditions, institutions, artifacts, symbols, art forms, and texts that we either engage in or expose ourselves to. This relationship, between lifestyles and sensibilities, is a reciprocal relationship, each informing and sustaining the other.

Now let me reformulate what I just said using a different language, a causal language: "Sensibilities" is a word that refers to complex configurations of dispositions, attitudes, beliefs, valuations, and interpretive tendencies that are in part *caused* by our affects and also by the way in which these affects are channeled. The way affects are channeled is primarily *caused* by inherited but changeable human traits. These configurations are also to a great degree *caused* by the culture we are a part of, the culture that we have internalized. This internalization of culture which affect the dispositions, attitude, beliefs, valuations, and interpretative tendencies we may have, i.e. affect our sensibilities, is *caused* by the life styles (Lebensformen) that we cultivate. Such lifestyles are usually the *effects* of the practices, traditions, institutions, artifacts, symbols, art forms, and texts that we either engage in or expose ourselves to. This relationship, between lifestyles and sensibilities, is a reciprocal *cause-effect* relationship, each informing and sustaining the other.

What is the difference between these two formulations? We might get a clue if we first consider what a causal explanation is.

A causal explanation is an explanation that, primarily, does two things: (1) it isolates or identifies a cause and tracks its effect, and (2) explains how and why the effects associated with a cause occurred. So in medicine or physiology a common practice is to first stabilize all variables associated with the health of a patient, for example by giving the patient a fixed diet, fixed exercise routine, etc. over a significant period of time, which create a relatively stable condition, and then adding in a new variable, for example the addition of a drug or medicine, which, compared to the antecedent stable condition, then can show its effects on the patient. This is to isolate the counterfactual cause that explain the emergence of changes, i.e. of effects. And after one has identified the counterfactual cause and tracked its effect in the manner roughly described, one must then account for how the cause, be it a drug or medicine, fits into a theory of,

for example, the function of our immune system or the liver, that then explain what about the drug or medicine that most likely gave rise to the effects it indeed gave rise to, for example the drug having so and so amounts of magnesium, etc. This then in rough outlines is what makes up a causal explanation.

But isn't this the same kind of explanation we find in Schacht's account of sensibilities in Nietzsche? Here Nietzsche also identifies many causes that if not present would not have given rise to the phenomena that they did, for example the lifestyles we cultivate and the sensibilities we have, and then explains what it is about these causes (lifestyles) that account for their effects (different sensibilities). The explanation is that, if we changed this important inherited but changeable human trait (our lifestyles), then the complex configuration of dispositions, attitudes, beliefs, valuations, and interpretive tendencies will change, because, according to Schacht's causal explanation, inherited but humanly variable traits is a cause of the sensibilities we end up having (like taking a drug or medicine will change our immune system). It is fundamentally a causal explanation, indeed very general and imprecise, and perhaps that is appropriate when talking about such a general and complex concept like sensibilities, but it is still a causal explanation nonetheless – and could, in principle, become more concrete and more precise.

One way it could become more precise is if we *emulate* what medicine and physiology have a practice of doing. We could have had, first, stabilized all the variables that make up our life styles, so first and foremost the practices, traditions, institutions, artifacts, symbols, art forms, and texts, we engage or expose ourselves to, and then, after a significant period of time, add or change a variable into our life styles, for example the addition of Buddhist books in the literature we read, and see how that changes our dispositions, attitudes, beliefs, valuations, and interpretive tendencies, i.e., change our sensibilities. To track the dispositions, we could track the activities a person engages in, to track the attitudes we could compare opinions about open-ended topics (like politics), to track the beliefs and valuations we make a questionnaire, and we can track the interpretive tendencies by giving a philosophy assignment. Even though such an endeavor would be very difficult and perhaps practically impossible to complete, I don't see how it is in principle excluded from what Schacht's explanations. We are, after all, talking about the principles that make an explanation an explanation. We could emulate the sciences in this case, it is not in principle impossible, and it would give us a better and more precise understanding of what exactly about lifestyles (what variables) affect our sensibilities, which is what we want to know, seeing that some lifestyles may corrupt our sensibilities while other may make them

flourish in healthy and productive ways. But why then are sensibilities exempt for scientific analysis, according to Schacht?

Schacht gives us a few reasons:

> Sensibilities exist in the dynamic and highly differentiated medium of human languages, and so might usefully be thought of as involving distinctive "language games" within which their characterizing concepts, norms, and values are anchored. Because much of their content and configuration further has a historical character, it has the contingency of all things historical. Moreover, human beings are not simply passively and uniformly programmed by the cultural formations that provide them with basic scripting. They rather are actively responsive in nonidentical ways even as they internalize cultural constructions. For all of these reasons, sensibilities are resistant to natural-scientifically modeled causal analysis. (2023, ch.11)

Which is to say, sensibilities resist natural-scientifically modeled causal analysis (for example the hypothetical procedure I suggested) because

1. They exist in dynamic and complex human languages and are inseparable from the concepts, norms, and values of distinctive language games.
2. They are historical, and thus contingent like all things historical.
3. Human beings are not determined in a strict sense by what they internalize from their culture.
4. Human beings respond to cultural formations in unforeseeable and nonidentical ways.

But from these four considerations it does not follow that natural-scientifically modeled causal analysis (henceforth NSM) cannot be emulated.

Point 1 – that sensibilities exist in dynamic and complex human languages and are inseparable from the concepts, norms, and values of distinctive language games – must first be made more precise. For what does "dynamic and complex" here refer to? Given that sensibilities is an example of something complex, we can guess that what Schacht has in mind is that something complex is complex because it is made up of many different components, and by dynamic we might guess that he means reciprocal. Something is complex and dynamic, then, if it consists of many components that are in a reciprocal causal relationship to each other or to something external. But the fact that something consists of many components and causes things to change and is caused to change by something else, does not mean that it is exempt from NSM. What phenomena in physics are not complex and dynamic in this sense? An atom, for example, consist of different components, a central nucleus and one or more negatively charged electrons, and then the nucleus and electron are further made up of more components. They, the nucleus and electrons, interact with each other (dynamic) and, of course, interact with other

configurations of nucleuses and electrons (other atoms). The fact that atoms are complex and dynamic has not stopped scientist for making (at times successful) investigations modeled on NSM. And concepts, norms, and values are new variables.

Point 2 – that sensibilities are historical, and thus contingent like all things historical – must also first be made more precise. By "historical" I take him to mean that sensibilities are historical because they are affected by things like the traditions we grow up in and that the traditions themselves have a long history. But in what way this makes sensibilities themselves historically contingent is more unclear. For the tradition, as it now is, is as it is, of course in constant change, but what the tradition was in the past has no direct impact any longer on us (it is in the past after all). Yes, the traditions we have are historically contingent, but our sensibilities are not, they are contingent on our tradition and how we internalize the (current) tradition. For example: Every year most Christian cultures celebrate Christmas, that is a tradition. It is a tradition that is a part of our lifestyle and affect our sensibilities surrounding celebrations in general. Celebrations should be like Christmas, there should be good food, people should dress up in nice clothes, sing songs, etc. And when celebrations lack these things, then we deem (i.e. valuate, one component that make up our sensibilities) such celebrations bad or wanting. Now, the question is, what has this to do with the history that precede the tradition of Christmas? The history, of course, explain why Christmas is a tradition at all, explain why we engage in the activities at Christmas, and it might also inform us about other historical facts about the emergence of this tradition. But does such historical facts and information exclude sensibilities being understood in light of NSM? Not really. It only situates our analysis within a historical context, the analysis itself, to identify causes, track their effects and explain why, is about the present tradition, how it affects us, and how we might change the causal variables that make up our traditions so that we can change our sensibilities too. Indeed, a historical analysis of the emergence of our traditions may help us to pin-point what leverage points we ought to utilize, when we want to analyze our traditions, but then the historical analysis would also profit from NSM.

Point 3 and Point 4 – human beings are not determined in a strict sense by what they internalize from their culture; and human beings respond to cultural formations in unforeseeable and nonidentical ways – must be made more precise. What he here may mean is either one of two things: (1) is that human beings are so complex and intricate that we can't know whether they are determined even if they were. Or (2) he can mean that human behavior is either, (a) to a degree random, (b) caused by an autonomous free will, or (c) a combination of (a) and (b), to a certain degree random and to a certain degree autonomous. Now (1) is, as we have seen, not in contradiction to NSM, the fact that something is complex actually weighs in favor of NSM,

evinced by the example of physics. But (2) is the more important point. So, if (2) is meant in the sense of (a), then that would actually go against the value of NSM, for then the inductive conclusions we make would be very unfruitful. But conversely, it would also go against Schacht's account of sensibilities, for then our lifestyles would be random, and our sensibilities too. And so (b) or (c) are the only options left. But both of these interpretations of Nietzsche, seeing that Nietzsche throughout his writing is critical towards the notion of a free will (e.g. MM I 39, 102; M 120, 124, 128; FW 310, 360; JGB 19, 21; GM I 13, GD *Irrthümer* 3 and 7; AC 15; with that said, see also MM I *Vorrede* 3; GM II 2, III 10).

IV

NIETZSCHE'S RADICAL NATURALISM AS READ BY CHRISTIAN EMDEN

CHRISTIAN EMDEN, dissatisfied with much of analytical reconstructions of Nietzsche, tries to counterbalance the overly intellectualized discussion of naturalism by situating the concept within Nietzsche's intellectual milieu. The danger, as Emden sees it, is that we bring with us oversimplified and contemporary conceptions of science and naturalism that do not belong to the historically situated philosophy of Nietzsche. The discussion, as should by now be apparent, is much concentrated on the status of science and its relation to philosophy and whether this relationship is continuous (by way of empiricism in the case of Leiter or by way of a heuristic principle in the case of Schacht). But these intellectual institutions evolve by the centuries, science especially in the last two hundred years. It is therefore important to have a historically appropriate understanding of science, as it was conceptualized and practiced at the end of the nineteenth century, with a focus on the kind Nietzsche was most acquainted with, namely the life sciences, and how it influenced his understanding of nature, science, and scientific knowledge.

One historical facet of Nietzsche's life sciences that has bearing on how we should understand his naturalism is the fact that the life sciences did not compose a unity. Instead, there was a pluralism of different approaches and methodologies in the life sciences. This goes against the idea that there was a single scientific method or way of doing things that Nietzsche could extract from his knowledge of different sciences. There was, for example, not a consensus as to whether Darwinism would prevail as the leading theory of evolutionary biology. The danger, then, is to believe that there existed a unified scientific method at Nietzsche's time that he could emulate and extract from his scientific environment. Emden believes for example Leiter's reading

suffers from such historical negligence. Leiter's reading, according to Emden, "has a fairly unreflected notion of what constitutes "science" that implicitly stipulates a unity of method across all scientific disciplines" (Emden 2014, p.64). And this has to do with the fact that "[s]uch an approach neither reflects the often confusing complexity of Nietzsche's reception of the natural sciences, nor does it accurately grasp the nature of the experimental sciences in the nineteenth century" (ibid. p. 64). We should be careful about a caviler characterization of science that anachronistically stipulate a unity where there is none.

Emden further outlines some problem with Leiter's account that I think will give a good impression of the value of Emden's contribution. There are mainly three points Emden considers (ibid. p.64–66). The points are the following:

1. Leiter is incorrect in ascribing to Nietzsche an empiricism, claiming that "if this should be the case, it would be impossible to offer a coherent account of Nietzsche's epistemological and moral skepticism" (ibid. p. 65).
2. Leiter's de-emphasis of the will to power in Nietzsche's later writings, which "can only be successful on the basis of a highly selective reading of Nietzsche's writings" (ibid. p.65).
3. And finally, Leiter's account cannot account for creativity and normativity in Nietzsche, it account answer "the question as to how different, or new, normative commitments can be made to emerge" (ibid. p.65).

I will not assess nor elaborate further on Emden's characterization of Leiter (though see Leiter 2017 for Leiter's responds), the point is simply to situate where Emden departs from Leiter's naturalism, so as to understand what Emden's reading brings to the discussion. Emden's reading attempts to accommodate for (1) a Nietzsche's epistemological and moral skepticism, (2) to account for the will to power in Nietzsche, and (3) to account for the emergence of normativity in nature. I will focus in this section on the third point about normativity, as this will play a critical role in our understanding of the kind of naturalism Emden thinks Nietzsche resonates with.

Emden's naturalistic reading distances itself from other readings by arguing for a different – esoteric no doubt – understanding of naturalism. It relies heavily on the naturalism one finds in the philosopher of science Joseph Rouse, as it is formulated in one of his early works *Why Scientific Practice Matter* (2002). This different understanding of naturalism is what makes Emden's reading interesting for the present inquiry; we will therefore set the historical dimension of his analysis aside. However, before anything else is said, Rouse's views on naturalism are controversial and it is not obvious that he provides a philosophically sound alternative to the

traditional conceptions or to the conceptions put forward by Leiter or Schacht. Emden has therefore received critique for not giving enough philosophical support for the naturalism he advocates (Kail, 2017) and his arguments against other naturalistic readings of Nietzsche has also received critical backlash (Leiter 2017, Schacht 2016). For, it must be said, it does not matter whether a concept is historically appropriate or not, for if the concept is unintelligible or absurd it will not be helpful in trying to make sense of Nietzsche. Some do indeed believe Rouse's naturalism is exactly that, unintelligible and absurd. Nevertheless, despite Emden's perhaps incomplete presentation of Rouse, his Rousean inspired naturalism still brings to the discussion an important and interesting perspective, to which any naturalistic reading of Nietzsche should be attentive.

As Emden believes Rouse's understanding of naturalism is a more attractive varient of naturalism for understanding Nietzsche, it will be helpful to first consider Rouse's views on naturalism. The most crucial aspect, relevant for our purposes, of Rouse's naturalism is his focus on what Heidegger would call *belongingness*. How we conceptualize, talk about, interact with, respond to, and ultimately know about the world is *within* and *as* part of this world. There is no real difference between the scientist and the object of his inquiries. Scientists are not, as we usually say, observers, experimenters, inquirers, knowers of, and thus separate from, the world. They are instead inseparable from it and is for that reason subject to the influences and dynamics everything is subject. Knowledge and its origin are also not in essence different from, say, species and plants and their origins. This embedded understanding of knowledge changes how we come to grips with what we ought to do and think and how we conceptualize all ought's of such kinds, i.e. such an understanding changes how we conceptualize normativity. Normativity is something interactive and dynamic and arise out our engagement with the world and the phenomena that make up that world. Thus, Rouse talking about normativity writes: "its source and ground is the world, *this* world, the open-ended and ongoing patterns of causal intra-action in which we always find ourselves, or perhaps better, our *belonging* to the world intra-actively." (2002, p.355) Elaborating further on the point Rouse says,

> Normativity arises from practical involvement in a situation whose subsequent development is not yet determined: there are real possibilities for making a (significant) difference in how things *subsequently* turn out. The difference those possibilities can make transform the situation, thereby changing what is at stake in responsiveness to it. … [T]he binding normativity (the normative force) of what is at stake in practices comes from always already belonging to patterns of *ongoing* causal intra-action. The world already has a (normative) grip upon us, through our belonging to a situation, understood as a field of real possibilities. (ibid. p.26)

Thus, very similar to Heidegger's idea of thrownness, we find ourselves thrown into the world and it demands of us that we involve ourselves in the unfolding of different, already ongoing, processes. We find ourselves in a tradition, with a certain language, a culture, a body, an environment, etc. all given to us, and these aspects of our situation demand of us different responses. These demands change how we understand our future and the possibilities we may pursue. Or, to put it more in absolutist terms, all the demands put on us and the totality of all the ways we may respond to these demands is the totality of our possibilities. *Normativity* is our conceptualization of this totality as being bounded. And so we say such and such reasons are justified and we ought to believe in them, or we say so and so action is reprehensible and we ought not pursue it – what determines these ought's and ought not's is our understanding of the "field of real possibilities" we find ourselves in.

According to Rouse's naturalism, knowledge is acquired in the conflict between demands put on nature and nature's reaction to these demands. Over time, we refine our demands, how and what we demand. We thus improve our demands by continually updating our methods, and we then gain a more and more precise understanding of what works and what does not. The success and failure of our methods gives us further information about how nature itself works. What informs such a procedure is a humble understanding of the human's capacities to acquire knowledge. We as knowers are not outside of nature, we do not have some special unnatural faculty we use to penetrate nature's innermost secrets. We are organism and so are our minds. And like organisms our minds and the knowledge in it emerge in organism-like fashion.

This might sound very convoluted and opaque, and so I will try to translate some of the ways Rouse formulates his ideas – which, let's just say it this way, are not exactly continuous with the sciences – into more simpler terms. This is in simple terms, the emergence of normativity:

We are a part of the world, a piece of life you could say. We live in the world, and try to navigate our way through it. Insofar as this is true of us humans, we are not different from the rest of the world. There exist many other things, human and non-human alike, that also live in the world, things that also try to navigate their way through it. Where we want to go and what we want to do is influenced by what we want and what we can get. What we want is defined by our body, our community, our culture, and our environment; what we can get is also defined by these facts. What we should do in this world, then, is to get what we want and discern between what is possible and what is not. *Knowledge* arises out of this. Thus, what we ought to believe is defined by what we want and what the world affords us of possibilities. And normativity is this dynamic relation between want and can. And the problem with traditional conception of ought's of different kinds, epistemic or moral, is that they operate with a detached notion of our

want's and our can's and the interplay of these two. What we want and what we can, are not up to us. What we want has a history and we simply find ourselves given many want's from birth onwards. Our want's, for example, have partly arisen out of different demands put on our species over our evolutionary history. Our want's have also been given different cultural forms, which further define their character. But not only have our want's change through the ages, also our can's have changed too. We can do things in modern times that for a few hundred years ago was thought impossible. This changes what we now see as possible and opens up new expressions of want's that previously wasn't there. This has partly to do with our increased knowledge, i.e., it as to do with the fact that we successfully changed and utilized ourselves and our environment according to our want's. Our want's have changed our can's, but our can's now also define our want's. Thus, a reciprocal relation emerge; in fact, *normativity* emerge.

This is, as said, an oversimplification of Rouse's point. But it is a way of accounting for normativity within naturalism itself and without assuming some external objective normative standard. "My more radical naturalism understands normativity as a natural, biological phenomenon" he says (2022, p. 182). For, as roughly outlined, normativity arise out of our engagement with the world, arise out of our want's and can's and these again are understood with reference to our body, community, environment, *nature,* etc. Normativity is not some self-sufficient entity, roaming around in the space of reasons, having causal efficiency on our actions and beliefs whenever necessary. Normativity is instead a very concrete and practical process. Normativity is something practical and can only thus only be grasped practically. In theorizing about it, like in my little account, we can only *describe* its emergence, but we cannot understand it or grasp it with concepts.

This is what Emden sees as the benefit of Rouse's naturalism in reading Nietzsche. For naturalism has a tendency to step out of its own bounds when it tries to justify its claims. For, as Leiter's point was a methodological one, claiming that there are methods in the sciences that work, and that these methods can be characterized and justified with reference to *epistemological considerations*, for example their empirical nature, and as Schacht's point about heuristic principles and guiding ideas was also about the *epistemological premises*, that if taken to be true, can help us interpret and reinterpret phenomena in plausible, viable and sense-making ways, Emden's point is something different. Emden's point is to claim that we need to stop having a highly abstract and idealized conception of epistemology and knowledge acquisition, and instead try to treat knowledge as a natural phenomenon, arising out of the practical interactions we engage in as living organisms.

So, Leiter, as we saw, had to take recourse to a pragmatism with regards to normativity when he was pushed to account for epistemic values, values that are the cornerstone of Nietzsche's, and ours, endorsement of naturalism. And this was shown to be problematic because Nietzsche was very critical towards pragmatism. Emden wants to stay within naturalism all the way through. And, one could say, to sum the way Emden does this, he manages to stay within its bounds by making normativity something organic that cannot be grasped in theory, which then excuse naturalistic accounts of not providing a satisfying and illuminating theory of normativity, for normativity relates to how we engage with the world, not how we theorize about it. Nor can we infer from our theorizing alone, Hume would say from our many *is*'s alone, how we ought to believe or act. Thus, naturalism cannot explain normativity; it can only describe its non-theoretical reality – it can account for why normativity has nothing to do with naturalism as a theory but as a practice and way of doing things.

V

CONCLUSION

BY WAY OF conclusion, I will summarize the different readings we have considered. Let us begin with Leiter's reading. According to Leiter, Nietzsche is said to be a Speculative Method Continuous Methodological Naturalist. *Some parts of* Nietzsche's philosophy, like Hume's, is speculative in that Nietzsche's theories are not empirically confirmed even though they rely on empirically contingent claims. But though Nietzsche's theories are speculative, the way Nietzsche understands phenomena and how he explains them are continuous with a thoroughly scientific perspective on the world, which means that Nietzsche's theories could be disconfirmed or confirmed by further investigations into e.g. psychology or physiology. The reason why it is continuous in this sense is because of Nietzsche's method of approaching different questions. Like how Hume's contemporary intellectual milieu usually employed the "method" of asking whether it is possible to formulate a mechanical or mathematical taxonomy of causal determinates, and from few simple principles explain phenomena like motion and knowledge formation, so too Nietzsche had a historically situated understanding of how to approach different topics. In Nietzsche's case, he followed the trend of approach different topics with an eye to its history and development. Such an emulation is finally naturalistic in that it is informed by Nietzsche's acquaintance with the sciences of his day.

According to Schacht's reading of Nietzsche, the picture is somewhat different. Instead of reading Nietzsche as a speculative semi-scientist, Schacht takes Nietzsche's different theories and explanations as not trying to explain phenomena in merely descriptive terms, but as having a normative intention. Nietzsche's naturalism is thus for Schacht not a commitment to approaching topics in a naturalscientifically continuous way, but more broadly a guiding idea. A guiding idea that helps us make sense of the world and our situation in it after the disintegration of traditional religious and metaphysical frameworks. As a guiding idea it does not hinder Nietzsche to go beyond his scientific understanding and speculate on phenomena in non-scientific yet naturalistic terms. Naturalism for Nietzsche is just the recognition of the fact that there exists only one world in which something can exist, the world we live in. Naturalism so conceived has nothing in principle to do with science.

According to Emden's Rousean reading of Nietzsche, his commitments, be it a commitment to a method or a guiding idea, must commit Nietzsche to something substantive as to what there is. Naturalism as a commitment naturally leads to views about nature and ontology. Nietzsche's naturalism, consequently, leads Nietzsche to substantive views about nature and ontology. To understand Nietzsche's naturalism, therefore, we must understand Nietzsche's views about nature and ontology. In order to understand Nietzsche's views on ontology, one must understand how nature and ontology was conceived in his historical context, analogous to how it is important to understand that seventeenth century scientists had a belief in a creator God who design the universe rationally, so as to be knowable and facilitate salvation. But Nietzsche's views on ontology, as it is informed by his knowledge of life science, leads Nietzsche to a Rouseanesque radical naturalism where everything is explained as an organic phenomenon, analogous to how organisms is understood in biology. Such a radical naturalism, then, implies that Nietzsche's reasons for endorsing naturalism are themselves also embedded in this organic ontology.

II

THE VALUE OF NATURALISM

ALTHOUGH SHE HAS A NAME,
HER PERSON IS NEVER THE SAME;
AND THOUGH SHE HAS A NATURE,
IT'S OF HERSELF; HERSELF HER OWN CREATOR.

I

INTRODUCTION

Problematizing Naturalism

IN THE FIRST part of this essay, I accounted for three different naturalistic readings. I mentioned some issues with one of the readings (Schacht), including textual and philosophical problems. I will now discuss some more general problems with the different readings. As far as I see it there is a confusion in how Leiter, Schacht, and Emden, situate naturalism in Nietzsche. They approach the issue by presenting naturalism as a framework or heuristic principle that is meant to account for Nietzsche's argumentations and theories. They suggest that naturalism, for Nietzsche, thus serves as a means to an end. Leiter for example claims "naturalism is enlisted in the service of what Nietzsche calls his 'revaluation of all values'" (Leiter, 2015, p.2). And Schacht claims that "As a 'heuristic,' [naturalism] is the idea that approaching things in this way will be *helpful* to interpretive and re-interpretive inquiry." (2012b p.170 emphasis added). However, I find this line of thinking to be misguided. I think this line of thinking also is in tension with a few significant passages in Nietzsche.

I will now by way of introduction first explain what lead me to doubt the different naturalistic readings we have considered so far. I will do this by considering some different passages in Nietzsche that are exemplary of a general tension in his writings, a tension that has fuel my ever-present doubt as to the rationale forwarded by different scholars as to his naturalism. To convey this doubt to the reader I will go through paragraph 6 from the first part of *Beyond Good and Evil*.

We consider this paragraph in the context of Leiter's reading of Nietzsche (see Leiter's take on the paragraph in section II of the previous part). Leiter cites this passage as an example of Nietzsche's naturalism. As we saw earlier when we considered Leiter, in it Nietzsche claims that every great philosophies ("jede grosse Philosophie") has hitherto been the self-confession

and unconscious memoire of its author. The moral or immoral intention of a philosophers are the real seeds of philosophies. Nietzsche recommends that if we want to understand, and explain ("Erklärung"), the origin of a philosophy, we should always ask what morality the philosophy is supporting, which is to say what morality the philosopher is supporting. Even the most intricate metaphysical claims ("metaphysischen Behauptungen") are not exempt from such suspicion. The drive for knowledge does not beget philosophies. Why a philosophy contains the conclusions and arguments that it does, is in some way indicative of the author's moral or immoral inclination (cf. FW 348). The moral or immoral inclinations of a philosopher, however, are themselves indicative of something more fundamental, which is who the philosopher really is ("seine Moral ein entschiedenes und entscheidendes Zeugniss dafür ab, wer er ist"), and this is determined by the rank order of the philosopher's inner drives ("Rangordnung die innersten Triebe seiner Natur").

Now, by itself, there is nothing problematic about this passage in light of the context in which it is written. The first part of *Beyond Good and Evil* is about the "Prejudices of Philosophers" ("von den Vorurtheilen der Philosophen") and this paragraph is criticising the prejudice that philosopher have an inner drive for knowledge that is disinterested and impartial. Instead, the real drive is a moral one relating to who the philosophers are as creatures with drives. The connection between philosopher, their philosophy, and the philosopher's moral values is something Nietzsche underwrites many places in his writings (e.g., cf. GD IV stage 1). Therefore, a philosophy with its conclusions, premises, and arguments should be understood with reference to the philosopher's moral inclinations and that should again be a sign of who the philosopher really is, i.e., the rank order of his drives.

I find this naturalistic account of the origin of philosophies problematic for understanding Nietzsche naturalistically. On the one hand, Nietzsche insist that all great philosophies and their metaphysical theories are indicative of their author's moral or immoral inclinations, and on the other hand Nietzsche – *a philosopher* – explains why by making a *metaphysical claim*, that there exist a rank order of drives and that this rank order determine how philosophers subsequently construct their philosophies. Should, however, *Nietzsche's* philosophy be exempt from his own analysis of great philosophies? Isn't it a bit problematic for Nietzsche to argue that philosophers' metaphysical claims are indicative of their moral inclinations by himself making a metaphysical claim (that there exist drives and a rank order of drives)? Shouldn't we do with Nietzsche what he advises us to do with other philosophers, namely, to ask what moral or immoral inclination he has, which is the true seed of his philosophy? Why should we prima facie accept Nietzsche's claims about the rank order of drives without first asking which morality (or

immorality) he is supporting? Assuming this to be the case, shouldn't we ask what morality naturalism is supporting and whether it aligns with Nietzsche's values?

Another set of passages that lead be to be skeptical towards reading Nietzsche's reasons for endorsing naturalism as epistemological reasons, like empiricism and pragmatism in Leiter and like a heuristic principle in Schacht, is his skepticism with regards to objective truth. In order to understand his skepticism about truth, we must first be in the clear about what "truth" can refer to in Nietzsche. For "truth" can mean different things in different contexts, and Nietzsche does not reject all conceptions of truth. For example, he is not critical of truth as conceived as the opposite of *lying*. Nietzsche is not skeptical towards truth as the opposite of lying, as when purporting to others what one believes in a truthful way and with the intention of purporting what one believe. He is, however, skeptical towards meaning of truth as opposite to false, and this in the sense of our knowledge comporting to some mind-independent reality. Again, I am referring here to truth as opposite to false, not truth as opposite to lying. Truth contra lying is intelligible even if truth contra false isn't. Nietzsche rejects truth as opposite to false. For Nietzsche does not believe that there is a thing or set of things by virtue of which our knowledge is accurate or inaccurate.

Nietzsche rejects the notion of a true world, this is the message of the section in *Twilight of the Idols*, titled *How the "true world" finally became a fable* ("Wie die "wahre Welt" endlich zur Fable wurde"), with the subtitle *History of an error* ("Geschichte eines Irrthums"). The section is composed of six stages, each outlining the development of the concept of a "true world" in, what it seems the history of philosophy starting with Plato and ending with Nietzsche. I think it will be illuminating to briefly go through this section in each of its six stages. In the first stage Nietzsche writes:

> Die wahre Welt erreichbar für den Weisen, den Frommen, den Tugendhaften, — er lebt in ihr, *er ist sie*.
>
> (Älteste Form der Idee, relativ klug, simpel, überzeugend. Umschreibung des Satzes „ich, Plato, bin die Wahrheit".)

The true world had its origins in a Platonic notion of the true world as only accessible for the wise, pious, and the virtuous. A way to understand the connection between Plato and the first stage, is that Nietzsche believed that the idea of a true world was motivated by Plato's wish to justify the existence of the philosopher, by arguing that the philosopher is one who has access to this true world, because of his wisdom, being pious, and having virtue (cf. FW 110 where Nietzsche outlines the role truth plays for philosopher in more detail). The point here is to

connect the idea of the true world back to a motivation for making a lie, which is here hinted at as being motivated by the self-justification of a class of people (the wise, the pious, the virtuous).

The second stage it states:

> Die wahre Welt, unerreichbar für jetzt, aber versprochen für den Weisen, den Frommen, den Tugendhaften („für den Sünder, der Busse thut").
>
> (Fortschritt der Idee: sie wird feiner, verfänglicher, unfasslicher, — sie wird Weib, sie wird christlich…)

The second stage tells of how the idea of the true world became sublimated into a Christian notion of redemption. Now instead of talking about the wise, pious, and virtuous actually having access to the true world, it is sublimated into the Christian notion of redemption, which is only said to be a promise. This further safeguards the idea from being disproven, seeing that it is a promise of some future union with the true world. The true world here serves as the metaphysical foundation that vindicate a particular moral.

The third stage continues thus:

> Die wahre Welt, unerreichbar, unbeweisbar, unversprechbar, aber schon als gedacht ein Trost, eine Verpflichtung, ein Imperativ.
>
> (Die alte Sonne im Grunde, aber durch Nebel und Skepsis hindurch; die Idee sublim geworden, bleich, nordisch, königsbergisch.)

This is the Kantian stage of the idea (hence the mention of "königsbergish"). It has become something unknowable, unprovable, and not something that can be promised, yet as a thought or idea is something that is comforting, binding, and an imperative. In Kantian terms, we cannot know the thing in itself, but as a postulate it assures us, it binds us, and act as an imperative, and thus may serve as a guiding idea in making sense of our experience.

The fourth stage, it states:

> Die wahre Welt — unerreichbar? Jedenfalls unerreicht. Und als unerreicht auch *unbekannt*. Folglich auch nicht tröstend, erlösend, verpflichtend: wozu könnte uns etwas Unbekanntes verpflichten?…
>
> (Grauer Morgen. Erstes Gähnen der Vernunft. Hahnenschrei des Positivismus.)

The notion of a true world at this stage has now become an unknown something, which no longer bind us, no longer comfort us, and can no longer redeem us. At this stage, the true world becomes irrelevant for our knowledge about it, and we are left alone to make sense of this true world. What we see may as well be how it is (hence the "Hahnenschrei des Positivismus").

The next stage goes as follows:

> Die „wahre Welt“ — eine Idee, die zu Nichts mehr nütz ist, nicht einmal mehr verpflichtend, — eine unnütz, eine überflüssig gewordene Idee, *folglich* eine widerlegte Idee: schaffen wir sie ab!
>
> (Heller Tag; Frühstück; Rückkehr des bon sens und der Heiterkeit; Schamröthe Plato’s; Teufelslärm aller freien Geister.)

The true world has now become the “true word” (in scare quotes), which is to say, it is taken *only* as an idea, an idea that no longer is of any use. As an idea, however, that no longer is of any use and no longer is binding, it is an idea we shouldn’t have. We therefore remove the idea.

The section ends with the last stage:

> Die wahre Welt haben wir abgeschafft: welche Welt blieb übrig? die scheinbare vielleicht?… Aber nein! mit der wahren Welt haben wir auch die scheinbare abgeschafft!
>
> (Mittag; Augenblick des kürzesten Schattens; Ende des längsten Irrthums; Höhepunkt der Menschheit; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.)

After the idea of the true world in stage five was abdicated on pains of being useless and not binding, stage six is Nietzsche’s conclusion that stage five implies that we shouldn’t believe in existence of a true world itself (hence referred to without scare quotes). The only thing that held us back was the idea of the true world as something binding, but seeing that this idea is superfluous, we have no real reason to continue to believe in a true world. The distinction between what appears to be the case and what is the case then collapses, being a distinction based on the idea of a true world. However, this means that something true about the world is no longer opposite to something false about it, as we (or Nietzsche at least) no longer believe that there exists a world in relation to which something true or false can be said.

What then happens to our knowledge? How then does Nietzsche understand objectivity? This is where his perspectivism comes in. Nietzsche believes that all knowing is perspectival, and that objective knowledge is *not* objective, it is “objective,” which is to say, it is not really objective but it functions or appears as something objective. Nietzsche accordingly writes:

> Seien wir zuletzt, gerade als Erkennende, nicht undankbar gegen solche resolute Umkehrungen der gewohnten Perspektiven und Werthungen, mit denen der Geist allzulange scheinbar freventlich und nutzlos gegen sich selbst gewüthet hat: dergestalt einmal anders sehn, anders-sehn-wollen ist keine kleine Zucht und Vorbereitung des Intellekts zu seiner einstmaligen „Objektivität“, — letztere nicht als „interesselose Anschauung“ verstanden (als welche ein Unbegriff und Widersinn ist), sondern als das Vermögen, sein Für und Wider in der Gewalt zu haben und aus- und einzuhängen: so dass man sich gerade die Verschiedenheit der Perspektiven und der Affekt-Interpretationen für die Erkenntniss nutzbar zu machen weiss. … Es giebt nur ein perspektivisches Sehen, nur ein perspektivisches „Erkennen“; und je mehr Affekte wir über eine Sache zu Worte kommen lassen, je mehr Augen, verschiedne Augen wir uns für dieselbe

> Sache einzusetzen wissen, um so vollständiger wird unser „Begriff“ dieser Sache, unsre „Objektivität“ sein. (GM III: 12)

Objective knowledge is a collection of different perspectives, a unification that is wrought by our pros and cons, i.e. what we value. The collection of perspectives is a hierarchy, where certain perspectives are deemed better than others (the “Für und Wider” part). The codification of such a structure is called “objective” knowledge, which, in the context of the paragraph is referring to the justifications of philosophies, justifications that philosophers have an interest in sustaining, else they parish or end with a suboptimal condition. Philosophers, in order to exert influence and secure their existence, have had to believe in and convince other of having objective knowledge about some true world, so as to justify their existence. Luckily for philosophers, objectivity resonates with the widely held ascetic ideal that only acknowledges something to be of any worth if it transcend the current state of affair with reference to something other-worldly more truer, more valuable realm or state of being. Philosophers utilized such a valuation by saying that there is some other world, called “the true world” or “the objective world,” which only is reached if one overcomes oneself, e.g. being impartial or being nonbiased. But, as Nietzsche points out all knowing is perspectival, and this postulated world, the objective world, is really just a collection of different perspectives in the service of some good.

But if Nietzsche rejects truth as opposed to false, is it then not possible to talk about a thing or set of things by virtue of which our knowledge is accurate or inaccurate? Nietzsche does not believe that reality somehow disappear if you don’t believe in a thing in itself, and there is something that exists. The point is rather that this “something” is not a “thing” yet a becoming or continuum, and it is because this becoming or continuum is never of any definite character that we cannot be said to have knowledge of something accurately or inaccurately.

The last passage I will consider is *The Gay Science* 109, and I will only briefly mention one point to emphasis from this passage that is in tension with Emden’s reading of Nietzsche’s naturalism. The point is that in this passage Nietzsche claims that reality is eternal chaos (“ewige Kaos”, see FW 109). And chaos is really chaos, meaning that it has *no order* and *structure* exist in reality. There exists no pattern of change (order) in a reality that is chaotic. There exists no continuity (order) in a chaotic reality. There exists no reliability (order) in a chaotic reality. And so on. Yes, there exist “something” but this “something” must always bear the shackles of scare quotes, referring to “something” that our grammar and vocabulary cannot capture (a reference without a referendum).

This last point about the eternal chaos of reality is also the reason why Nietzsche cannot be said to have ontological or biological reasons for endorsing naturalism a la Emden. As reality

itself for Nietzsche does not engender causal patterns nor a normative order, all such order being a projection onto reality, we cannot understand the justification of our theories according to an interaction with casual patterns or the normative order in reality. Theories do not emerge from a structure or patterns in reality, as reality is an eternal chaos (FW 109). The "order" and the "patterns" that we engage with, are projection and falsification of an undefined chaotic text, called nature.

In the next section I try to give an account of Nietzsche's naturalism that deemphasizes the role of ontology, pragmatics, and epistemology in our understanding of naturalism. I instead focus on the role valuations play in our understanding of naturalism. As we will see, Nietzsche was critical towards the conception of science as objective and impartial, worrying that the ideal of objectivity might serve as a placeholder for old values and ideals, values and ideals that then is solidified in science. He was also critical towards the idea that antisupernaturalism or antimetaphysics somehow are more justified or more true than its opposites, claiming that antisupernturalism and antimetaphysics are continuations of a distinct valuation, a valuation which antisupernaturalism and antimetaphysics cannot do without. This valuation, however, for Nietzsche is seen as something potentially dangerous and destructive, and as the valuation was the source of and foundation of naturalism, this leaves me with the impression that he did not endorse naturalism for the reasons Leiter, Schacht, and Emden ascribes to him. Instead, I suggest that naturalism for Nietzsche is a part of what he calls the "self-resolution of morality" (M *Vorrede*). I mention in this context the modern problem of climate change and atomic weapons as examples of a *pathology of knowledge*, as I call it, and speculate whether such problems are telling of Nietzsche's critique of naturalism. My reading ends with doubts as to the status of Nietzsche's naturalism and concludes that there needs to be more emphasis added on Nietzsche's value analysis of naturalism and to what degree this has bearing on our understanding of Nietzsche's naturalistic project. My reading as it now stands, however, is not complete and I mention at the end that there is further work to be done in understanding what Nietzsche calls "the Problem of Socrates" (GD II), which is to what extent Socrates and the scientific optimism he is a symbol of is a sign of a degeneration or corruption of life.

II

THE STORY OF NIETZSCHE'S NATURALISM[25]

The Problem of Science

THE STORY BEGINS with the problem of science. Nietzsche was not uncritically compliant towards his contemporary science.[26] The danger, as Nietzsche saw it, was that modern science would serve as a new guise of old values and ideals, values and ideals that may be dangerously destructive.[27] Nietzsche believed that he saw this happening in some of the sciences. The two most frequent examples he gives of a sublimation of old (Christian) value into objective sciences, were laws of nature in physics (JGB 14, 21–22) and Darwinism in biology (JGB 13, 14; GD IX 14; see also FW 1, which I take as saying that Darwinism [and Nietzsche's own philosophy] is the continuation of the need to find purpose, which means that Darwinism is indicative and in part defined by this need). The idea of laws of nature is an interpretation of nature, Nietzsche points out. But as an interpretation, it is not the only interpretation. Nietzsche claims (JGB 22) that nature could be interpreted differently, as without laws and defined by a will to power. Both interpretation would be equally warranted by the same evidence, the same "text" as Nietzsche puts it. The choice between the two interpretation is not a question of facts. Scientific theories suffer the problem of underdeterminacy, they need something extrascientific to determine which interpretation to choice from. Nietzsche writes:

> jene „Gesetzmässigkeit der Natur", von der ihr Physiker so stolz redet, wie als ob — — besteht nur Dank eurer Ausdeutung und schlechten „Philologie", — sie ist kein Thatbestand, kein „Text", vielmehr nur eine naiv-humanitäre Zurechtmachung und Sinnverdrehung, mit der ihr den demokratischen Instinkten der modernen Seele sattsam entgegenkommt! „Überall Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz, — die Natur hat es darin nicht anders und nicht besser als wir": ein artiger Hintergedanke, in dem noch einmal die pöbelmännische

[25] The meaning of naturalism I use in the following interpretation Nietzsche's naturalism is meant to encompass all the different meanings of naturalism we have considered. My interpretation is not meant to argue against the different meanings of naturalism as it tries to highlight aspects of Nietzsche's naturalism that I think the readings have neglected or not given enough emphasis. The crucial question my interpretation is an attempt at answer is what does it mean for Nietzsche to endorse, e.g., a scientific perspective as the true perspective, or the heuristic of antisupernaturalism, or a peculiar ontology. My reading is mainly based on my own close reading of Nietzsche, but I have taken some clues from the secondary literature (e.g., Fillon 2019).

[26] Compare Nietzsche characterization of *Beyond Good and Evil* in *Ecce homo:* Dies Buch (1886) ist in allem Wesentlichen eine *Kritik der Modernität,* die modernen Wissenschaften, die modernen Künste, selbst die moderne Politik nicht ausgeschlossen, nebst Fingerzeigen zu einem Gegensatz-Typus, der so wenig modern als möglich ist, einem vornehmen, einem jasagenden Typus. (EC JGB 2)

[27] E.g., JGB 228: Es hat sich nämlich auch in diese Moralisten (welche man durchaus mit Nebengedanken lesen muss, falls man sie lesen muss —), jenes alte englische Laster eingeschlichen, das cant heisst und moralische Tartüfferie ist, dies Mal unter die neue Form der Wissenschaftlichkeit versteckt

> Feindschaft gegen alles Bevorrechtete und Selbstherrliche, insgleichen ein zweiter und feinerer Atheismus verkleidet liegt. (JGB 22)

Accordingly, Nietzsche believes that the decision to interpret nature as lawlike, where it is claimed that everything must follow these laws of nature necessarily, is indicative of our democratic sensibilities more than it is warranted by evidence. Physics thus becomes an "objective" and "impartial" placeholder for the democratic value that ever citizen is equal before the law, but this is not a fact of the matter. Nature could also be interpreted differently. Nietzsche continues:

> „Ni dieu, ni maître" — so wollt auch ihr's: und darum „hoch das Naturgesetz"! — nicht wahr? Aber, wie gesagt, das ist Interpretation, nicht Text; und es könnte Jemand kommen, der, mit der entgegengesetzten Absicht und Interpretationskunst, aus der gleichen Natur und im Hinblick auf die gleichen Erscheinungen, gerade die tyrannisch-rücksichtenlose und unerbittliche Durchsetzung von Machtansprüchen herauszulesen verstünde, — ein Interpret, der die Ausnahmslosigkeit und Unbedingtheit in allem „Willen zur Macht" dermaassen euch vor Augen stellte, dass fast jedes Wort und selbst das Wort „Tyrannei" schliesslich unbrauchbar oder schon als schwächende und mildernde Metapher — als zu menschlich — erschiene; und der dennoch damit endete, das Gleiche von dieser Welt zu behaupten, was ihr behauptet, nämlich dass sie einen „nothwendigen" und „berechenbaren" Verlauf habe, aber nicht, weil Gesetze in ihr herrschen, sondern weil absolut die Gesetze fehlen, und jede Macht in jedem Augenblicke ihre letzte Consequenz zieht. (JGB 22)

Nature and the patterns we discern in it, could be interpreted as lawless tyrannical power formations. All necessity and all predictability could be explain without posting the existence of laws, in fact actually because there does not exist laws is it possible to talk about necessities and predictability. Nature does not evolve in accordance with laws, but evolve actually because of its lawlessness and tyrannical caprice. Such an explanation could be as warranted as the explanation that there exist laws of nature. This goes both way. Accorindly Nietzshce points out at the end of the paragraph:

> Gesetzt, dass auch dies nur Interpretation ist — und ihr werdet eifrig genug sein, dies einzuwenden? — nun, um so besser. — (JGB 22)

Nietzsche's suggestions that nature could be explained as will to power is also just an interpretation. The point, however, is that both are just interpretations, and so the reasons for adopting one interpretation of the other is not question about warrant or evidence, but instead a question of one's values.

The other frequently mentioned example of how values are codified into sciences, is Darwinism's idea of life as a struggle for existence, where necessity and deprivation push developments and adaptations. Nietzsche writes about Darwin:

> Anti-Darwin. — Was den berühmten Kampf um's Leben" betrifft, so scheint er mir einstweilen mehr behauptet als bewiesen. Er kommt vor, aber als Ausnahme; der Gesammt-Aspekt des Lebens ist nicht die Nothlage, die Hungerlage, vielmehr der Reichthum, die Üppigkeit, selbst die absurde Verschwendung, — wo gekämpft wird, kämpft man um Macht… Man soll nicht Malthus mit der Natur verwechseln. — Gesetzt aber, es giebt diesen Kampf — und in der That, er kommt vor —, so läuft er leider umgekehrt aus als die Schule Darwin's wünscht, als man vielleicht mit ihr wünschen dürfte: nämlich zu Ungunsten der Starken, der Bevorrechtigten, der glücklichen Ausnahmen. (GD IX 14)

As in physics where nature could be interpreted either as being lawlike or lawless and both interpretations would lend equal credence from our evidence, from the "text," so too is Darwinism's interpretation of life underdetermined. Life can be interpreted as will to power. As will to power, developments of life forms (species for example) do not occur because of necessity or having to adapt to external pressures (passive adaptation) but instead developments might be explained as an overflowing and concentration of power in organisms. Organisms develop as a consequence of lavishing their power over others or themselves in a superfluous and uneconomic manner. Which is to say, life can either be read as driven by necessity (passive) or by caprice (active). What makes the difference in our choice, as in the case of physics, is our sensibilities and values. Nietzsche accordingly claims that Darwin's interpretation of adaptation as struggle for existence is telling of the overpopulated England at Darwin's time ("englische Uebervölkerungs-Stickluft" see FW 349) and also a continuation of Spinozaian dogma, that is indicate of people in deprivation ("Ausdruck einer Nothlage" see FW 349, and also FW 357 and JGB 25). Darwinism thus codify values of a particular a type of person into "objective" biology (see also FW 1, where the idea of the preservation of the species is hinted at as a continuation of a need for purpose).

Now, what does these two examples tell us about science? Does this mean that the claim that life is a struggle for existence is false? Does it mean that physicists' belief in laws of nature is also false? Yes and No. The point is these claims are not susceptible of analysis in terms of "true" or "false" claims about facts, and here we get the first clue as to the problem of science. The problem of science is its *underdeterminacy* (see JGB 211, 253). No experience, no experiment, no observation, no text, in sum, no *fact* speaks for itself, *nor speaks for an interpretation*. There must be something external to an interpretation or theory that evaluates the interpretation or theory as true or false. Being contingent in this way on an evaluation, however, theories are contingent on the values inherent to *our evaluations*. If our evaluation are democratic, we interpret nature as lawlike, if our evaluation as antidemocratic (as Nietzsche) we may believe nature to be a lawless interplay of tyrannical power-forces. Both are as true to the facts, but neither are true *of* the facts.

The problem of science is to think that science should adjudicate all warrant on truth. But as science is underdetermined, and need external valuations to ascertain their interpretations, to think that science should decide what is true and what is false, is de facto a vindication of the valuations inherent to scientific interpretations. The problem of science can be, in Nietzsche's way of speaking, be called the problem of Socrates, Socrates being a symbol, and not only a symbol, of a scientific optimism (GD II). The problem of Socrates is the problem of the valuation of reason and knowledge as the highest values and whether this is a sign of a degenerating and destructive lifeform. The problem is whether there exists such a thing as a *pathology of knowledge*.

In order to give the problem of science a more familiar context than Nietzsche's example of Socrates, one need only bring to mind the problem of *global warming* in our modern times. Global warming is one illustrative example of the destructive effects of an unmediated valuation of knowledge as objective and as an end in itself, the effects of a pathology of science one could say. The pursuit of objective knowledge as an end in itself becomes a playroom for unmediated valuations that can have destructive consequences, for example the pursuit of happiness and the creation of superfluous, but energy consuming, technologies. Another example is the pursuit of power and the creation of nuclear weapons. The claim here is not that we create fact out of our pursuit for power and happiness, the issue is more that we call our interpretation true and objective, while actually being disguised valuations projected top of facts. Objectivity and truth only serve to solidify one interpretation or set of interpretations of facts in a way that makes it seem as if the interpretations are not contingent on the valuations that are more fundamental to them.

Knowledge is always a means and never an end; if we conceive knowledge as an end we in fact still use it as a means, but now we are more unconscious of what end we are pursuing. The problem of science is the problem of valuing knowledge, truth, objectivity as an end in itself, which is in fact only gives leeway to unmediated valuations (for example hate, resentment, suicidal nihilism). A hammer is defined by its end and so too is knowledge. In Nietzschean terms, there exist only perspectival knowing. But does this mean that we shouldn't pursue knowledge? We should still pursue knowledge, but knowledge is first and foremost a tool that by itself cannot be an end. We shouldn't pursue knowledge that is meant to speak for itself, but knowledge that always is defined in relation to a goal, a goal that has nothing to do with the pursuit of knowledge or truth, which are *de terminis* empty pursuits that are unconsciously filled with unmediated and possibly dangerous valuations. In other words, we shouldn't *pursue* objective knowledge, nor knowledge of the truth. Instead, we should pursue relative knowledge,

i.e. knowledge relative to a goal. When we communicate the knowledge, the authority of science is legitimize with reference to a goal (if you want x then do/believe z).

The Morality in Science

AS SCIENCE RESTS on a valuation of existence, the natural question which follows from this is what this valuation is. We might get a clue as to the value of this valuation if we take a closer look at the role this valuation plays in scientific research itself. This brings us to aphorism 344 in *The Gay Science*, though this is not the only place where Nietzsche talks about the values behind science (see also FW 37). In this aphorism, Nietzsche mainly focuses on science and the role of convictions ("Ueberzeugungen") in science. Convictions, Nietzsche begins, have no civil right ("Bürgerrecht") in science. Only as hypothesis, tentative attempt-perspectives ("Versuchs-Standpunktes") or regulative fictions may convictions have any worth in the realm of knowledge ("Reichs der Erkenntniss"), always under police supervision, the police of doubt ("Polizei des Misstrauens"). Convictions, thus, Nietzsche points out, really must cease being convictions in order to have any value for science. Only when convictions have ceased can the discipline of the scientific spirit ("die Zucht des wissenschaftlichen Geistes") begin. Nietzsche, however, then turns the tables, saying,

> So steht es wahrscheinlich: nur bleibt übrig zu fragen, ob nicht, *damit diese Zucht anfangen könne*, schon eine Ueberzeugung da sein müsse, und zwar eine so gebieterische und bedingungslose, dass sie alle andren Ueberzeugungen sich zum Opfer bringt. Man sieht, auch die Wissenschaft ruht auf einem Glauben, es giebt gar keine „voraussetzungslose" Wissenschaft. Die Frage, ob *Wahrheit* noth thue, muss nicht nur schon vorher bejaht, sondern in dem Grade bejaht sein, dass der Satz, der Glaube, die Ueberzeugung darin zum Ausdruck kommt „es thut nichts mehr noth als Wahrheit, und im Verhältniss zu ihr hat alles Uebrige nur einen Werth zweiten Rangs". (FW 344)

It is most likely true that convictions must cease being convictions and be reduced to hypotheses, tentative attempts-perspectives, or regulative fictions, but, as Nietzsche here points out, in order for such a reduction to begin one must have a conviction, namely the conviction that truth is necessary and that everything else is second rate compared to truth. Thus, science cannot begin without certain preconditions and there exist no condition-free science. Science needs an unconditional will to truth ("Wille zur Wahrheit"). Nietzsche continues saying,

> Dieser unbedingte Wille zur Wahrheit: was ist er? Ist es der Wille, *sich nicht täuschen zu lassen*? Ist es der Wille, *nicht zu täuschen*? (FW 344)

Which is to say that this will to truth is either the will not to let oneself be deceived or the will not to deceive. In the first case – that this will to truth is a will not be deceived – science is like

a long prudence, a caution, something useful ("eine lange Klugheit, eine Vorsicht, eine Nützlichkeit"). Nietzsche however, then goes on to argue that it is not this will not to be deceived that explain science's unconditional will to truth, because that would assume that we are convinced some way that it is practical or advantageous not to be deceived, this Nietzsche claims is not the case. It is not the case that people are convinced that it is advantageous never to let oneself be deceived. It is also at times advantageous to be deceived, so this will not to be deceived cannot be the unconditional will to truth that science depends on. It must therefore be the other alternative, namely the will not to deceive. Accordingly Nietzsche writes:

> Folglich bedeutet „Wille zur Wahrheit" *nicht* „ich will mich nicht täuschen lassen", sondern — es bleibt keine Wahl — „ich will nicht täuschen, auch mich selbst nicht": — *und hiermit sind wir auf dem Boden der Moral.* (FW 344)

If it is not the will to not let oneself be deceived that explain for science's unconditional will to truth, then it must be the will to not deceive others or ourselves, but this is a moral decision. But is this will not to deceive unconditionally true? If not, then our unconditional conviction in the will to truth will cease being unconditional, and we will be able to begin the discipline of science. This will is, alas, also not unconditional. Whether this will to deceive is unconditional is a moral question. Nietzsche writes:

> Denn man frage sich nur gründlich: „warum willst du nicht täuschen?" namentlich wenn es den Anschein haben sollte, — und es hat den Anschein! — als wenn das Leben auf Anschein, ich meine auf Irrthum, Betrug, Verstellung, Blendung, Selbstverblendung angelegt wäre, und wenn andrerseits thatsächlich die grosse Form des Lebens sich immer auf der Seite der unbedenklichsten πολύτροποι gezeigt hat. Es könnte ein solcher Vorsatz vielleicht, mild ausgelegt, eine Don-Quixoterie, ein kleiner schwärmerischer Aberwitz sein; er könnte aber auch noch etwas Schlimmeres sein, nämlich ein lebensfeindliches zerstörerisches Princip… „Wille zur Wahrheit" — das könnte ein versteckter Wille zum Tode sein. (FW 344)

Here Nietzsche claims that it is *not necessarily* true (remember, we are talking about whether we can be *unconditionally* convinced of the primacy of truth) that not to decisive others or oneself is morally good. This will-not-to-decisive might go against what is essential to life, as life depends on error, deception, imaginings, conflation, and self-conflation, and thus *in effect* might be dangerous. Nietzsche continues,

> Dergestalt führt die Frage: warum Wissenschaft? zurück auf das moralische Problem: *wozu überhaupt Moral*, wenn Leben, Natur, Geschichte „unmoralisch" sind? Es ist kein Zweifel, der Wahrhaftige, in jenem verwegenen und letzten Sinne, wie ihn der Glaube an die Wissenschaft voraussetzt, *bejaht damit eine andre Welt* als die des Lebens, der Natur und der Geschichte; und insofern er diese „andre Welt" bejaht, wie? muss er nicht ebendamit ihr Gegenstück, diese Welt, unsre Welt — verneinen?… Doch man wird es begriffen haben, worauf ich hinaus will, nämlich dass es immer noch ein *metaphysischer Glaube* ist, auf dem unser Glaube an die Wissenschaft ruht, — dass auch wir Erkennenden von heute, wir Gottlosen und Antimetaphysiker, auch unser Feuer noch von dem Brande nehmen, den ein Jahrtausende alter

> Glaube entzündet hat, jener Christen-Glaube, der auch der Glaube Plato's war, dass Gott die Wahrheit ist, dass die Wahrheit göttlich ist… (FW 344)

The will to truth must be unconditional, as said before, or else science cannot get off the ground. This will to truth was shown to be a will not to decisive. Thus, if the will to truth is to be unconditional, which it must be, then this will not to decisive must also be unconditional. The question whether this will not to deceive is unconditional, is, however, a moral question. The question, then, "Why science?" is reduced to the question why be moral when life, nature, and history isn't? The answer is that we believe in morality only to the extent that we affirm another world than this world and deny this world. The belief in morality depends on a metaphysical belief in another world than the natural. This means that science also depends on a metaphysical belief in another world than the natural one, because, as we saw, science's was dependent on the will to truth and this will to truth was dependent on the moral standing of deception. Thus, in conclusion, science stands or falls with the belief in some metaphysical conviction about the moral status of truth, which Nietzsche believes we have inherited from the Platonic/Christian belief in God as truth. The aphorism ends with a question,

> Aber wie, wenn dies gerade immer mehr unglaubwürdig wird, wenn Nichts sich mehr als göttlich erweist, es sei denn der Irrthum, die Blindheit, die Lüge, — wenn Gott selbst sich als unsre längste Lüge erweist? — (FW 344)

This last question is a variant on an idea one often finds in Nietzsche about the self-resolution of the will to truth (see e.g., M *Vorrede*). The idea is something like this: Beginning with Plato and continuing with Christianity, there has been a belief in the Western tradition that we should strive for truth at any price. This will to truth was justified only with reference to a religious belief in God (Christianity) or the metaphysical belief in a Good in itself (Plato). But what happens when this will to truth leads us to doubt the very foundation on which it rests? What happens when we doubt whether God or the Good exist? What happens when morality itself is taken as something problematic, as without foundation, as a threat?

What this aphorism shows, among many things, is that the question of science as valuation, for Nietzsche, and also the question of supernaturalism (the belief in another world than the natural one) is *not* a question of knowledge or facts, seeing that science and supernaturalism are contingent on a metaphysical belief that has its roots in a valuation of existence. Instead the question "why science?" or the question "why supernaturalism?" are questions as to the *value* of the morality that is inherent to science and supernaturalism. But what does such a value question involve?

We get a clue in the aphorism immediately proceeding *The Gay Science* 344, titled "*moral als problem.*" I will not go through the whole aphorism in detail, but highlight a important conclusion to draw from the aphorism. The conclusion is that the question of *Why morality?* is *not* a factual question as to its foundation or origin of that morality, but about its value. Facts about morality, for example the genealogical origin of different moralities, do not by themselves constitute a critique or rebuttal of the value of the morality itself. Instead, such factual knowledge, may only specify *what* morality is, its origin and development, and decide on its value. The last sentences sums it up:

> Eine Moral könnte selbst aus einem Irrthum gewachsen sein: auch mit dieser Einsicht wäre das Problem ihres Werthes noch nicht einmal berührt. — Niemand also hat bisher den *Werth* jener berühmtesten aller Medizinen, genannt Moral, geprüft: wozu zuallererst gehört, dass man ihn einmal — *in Frage stellt.* Wohlan! Dies eben ist unser Werk. — (FW 345)

The question *why morality?*, and by extension the question *why science?*, must be decided on another level of analysis than a factual level of analysis. It must be decided on the level of values, the value of morality irrespectively of what morality is or where it came from. Only once we have decided on the value of morality can we decide on the value of science, and only when we have decided on the value of science can we meaningfully ask whether we should endorse science. This is also the case with supernaturalism.

III

CONCLUSION: THE MORAL OF THE STORY

I HAVE IN this part highlighted an aspect of Nietzsche's naturalism, namely its root in a valuation of existence. The crucial difference between my reading and the ones we have considered, is the role naturalism plays in Nietzsche's philosophy. I disagree with Leiter and Schacht when they give naturalism the role as a method or heuristic principle. Naturalism is not a framework or method that gives us a better understanding of Nietzsche's scientific perspective and his rejection of supernaturalism. The reasons for a scientific perspective and antinaturalism are not motivated by epistemological considerations as to the status of knowledge and truth. Instead the reasons rest on a valuation of existence. The question of *why science?* is not a factual question as to how to acquire knowledge, but a question as to the value of morality inherent to science, the last question left to consider is *why morality?*

THE VALUE OF NATURALISM

As the philosophical backbone for endorsing a scientific perspective and rejecting supernaturalism, Nietzsche's naturalism, according to my reading, is based on a *valuation*. Naturalism is not a methodology (*sec.* Leiter), nor a heuristic principle (*sec.* Schacht), nor is it related to ontology (*sec.* Emden). Instead, naturalism is based a valuation, and the reasons for endorsing naturalism are normative. The normative reasons for naturalism relate to Nietzsche's understanding of the value of science and antisupernaturalism as themselves based on a valuation of existence, a valuation as to the value of existence.

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APPENDIX 1: HOW TO ASCRIBE AN -ISM

HOW DO WE ascribe an -ism to a philosopher? I demonstrate it in four steps:

1. Define naturalism
2. Define the minimal qualifications for endorsing naturalism
3. Define the contingencies prerequisite for qualification
4. Judge whether philosopher fits qualifications if contingencies hold

Here is an example of how one might, roughly, go through these steps, using SO-Naturalism and David Hume as examples (I am of course oversimplifying Hume for the sake of illustration):

Question: is Hume a naturalist?

1. Definition: A Science-Oriented Naturalism (SO-Naturalism) is the direct or indirect supports or allowance for the claim that the natural sciences enjoy a special status vis-à-vis other intellectual institutions like philosophy, history, sociology, etc.
2. Qualification: To be a SO-Naturalist one must either have ontological or methodological commitments that supports or makes allowance for the claim that the natural science enjoy this special status.
3. Contingency: We can only judge whether David Hume has one or both of these commitments by making a comparative analysis of all the different claims he makes about either ontology and epistemology
4. Application: David Hume's claims about empiricism indirectly supports the claim that the natural sciences enjoys a special status.

Conclusion: David Hume is a naturalist

What this four-step procedure helps an interpreter is to make his interpretative project more concrete. One could for example make a focus a whole inquiry on exclusively one of these points and with reference to the four-step procedure specify how one's inquiry is relevant for the more overarching interpretative project.

One may, furthermore, only ascribe a thinker an -ism on the conditions 1) that there is textual support for the -ism, 2) that the -ism can unite as many passages that one finds in the

philosopher's corpus as possible, and 3) that the -ism is in line with the goal and intention of the philosopher. The reason for granting such premises, besides seeming reasonable in themselves, is that if any of these conditions are not met, the interpreter might be suspected of being biased or incomplete in his interpretation.

If one breaks the first condition — to have textual support for the characterization — then they have no evidence that the interpretation of the philosopher is likely. In addition, it makes no sense in the context of an interpretive project, for if one does not need to abide by the constraints set up by the corpus of the philosopher, then one can just as well do philosophy without the philosopher. This is the fallacy that is often directed towards the continental interpretive tradition of Nietzsche. With that said, there is nothing wrong with doing philosophy based on or inspired by the philosophy of Nietzsche, but one is not, therefore, in a position to say anything authoritative about the philosophy itself, let alone ascribe an –ism.

If one breaks the second condition — to unite as many different passages in the corpus of the philosopher as possible — then one falls into the fallacy of cherry-picking passages that confirm a characterization, but which is most likely contingent on the cherry-picking itself and not on the text itself. The problem with such cherry-picking is the same as the reason for breaking the first condition, namely that it makes the interpretive project seem arbitrary. If it depends on the interpreter in the end and not on the philosopher, then why not do away with the philosopher and leave the interpreter for himself? Any authoritative reading must have the capacity to account for *the whole* of a philosopher's corpus. Such a reading can, if need be, excuse contradictions across works on the assumption or likelihood that the philosopher may have changed their opinions during their lifetime, but only if it is absolutely necessary. If the philosopher contradicts themselves to such a degree that it is impossible to claim something about that which they contradict themselves, then, and only then, must one take recourse and say that the philosopher probably changed their mind. One may also take recourse to such an interpretive route if the philosopher himself has made it clear, in written or oral form, that they have changed their opinion on a matter (this is, for example, the case with the early writings of Nietzsche). But other than that, one is not allowed to break the second condition.

If one breaks the third condition—that one's reading is in line with the goal and intention of the philosopher himself—then one commits the fallacy, not often acknowledged, of taking the meaning of the philosopher's different claims out of context. The reason for this needs a bit of elaboration. One cannot make sense of a statement without understanding the context in which it is made. One important contextual consideration is the intention of the philosopher; it is perhaps the most important contextual consideration. For example, if I wanted to make an ironic

philosophy, the claims I make when forwarding such a philosophy should not be taken seriously. This is true even for claims that, in isolation, would have had serious ramifications if the context was different. But such is the situation with all philosophy. A philosopher has “no right to be isolated about anything" (GM, preface 2). If Kant, for example, wants to talk about epistemology, then you do not go on reading his talk of the Ding an sich as a metaphysical claim, at least not in the traditional sense of the word. In isolation, it appears to be a metaphysical claim about the status of reality—he is saying that there exist things in themselves—but once one knows the context in which he makes such a claim, then one will realize that it is an assumption made on epistemological grounds, i.e. an assumption that is meant to make sense of our *cognition* and *knowledge* of our sense perceptions. Thus, on an imposed and construed reading of Kant, one not only misunderstands Kant's claim but also does not really get the message of Kant's claim. This is dangerous because it ruins the whole point and value of reading a philosopher.

APPENDIX 2: NATURALISM ITSELF

WHAT IS NATURALISM? It is, first and foremost, a disputed term. There is no agreement about its precise definition. It is a term that arose from the late nineteenth to mid-twenteth century by … At the same time it is a widely shared and praised philosophical position. This was humorously illustrated by the title of an article written by Lawrence Sklar, where it says *I'd Love to Be a Naturalist—if Only I Knew What Naturalism Was* (2010). In the first sentence of Sklar's article it states: "What is there in the world? And what is it like? 'Let science be your guide.' Let's call this 'naturalism'" (2010, p. 1121). And this is not so far from the received understanding of naturalism. In its most general meaning, naturalism is a positive stance towards, or belief in the explanatory power of science, in particular the natural sciences. Thus as a philosophical position is a kind of defense of science, having sympathy for the all-knowing potential of scientific practice. Accordingly, in the Oxford's *A Dictionary of Philosophy* in the entry on naturalism Simon Blackburn writes: "[naturalism is] most generally, a sympathy with the view that ultimately nothing resists explanation by the methods characteristic of the natural sciences" (2016). Naturalism can also take a more extreme form in a kind of scientism, which can be summed up in the hyperbolic statement: "science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not" (Sellars 1967, p. 173).

In contrast to the orthodox naturalism, another variant of naturalism prevalent in the literature is Liberal Naturalism (see De Caro, 2022). Liberal Naturalism tries instead to widen the concept and de-emphasize the role of science. Liberal naturalism is an attempt to accommodate a scientific-oriented naturalism with what Mario de Caro calls "the manifest image," and by that he means phenomena that traditionally have been thought to exclude scientific explanation, for example artworks and persons (2022 p.1). Liberal naturalism, then, does not imply a commitment to the all-encompassing explanatory potential of the natural sciences. It is more modest. "The "naturalism" in liberal naturalism is," De Caro writes (ibid. p.2), "… [a] commitment to anti-supernaturalism." And by an anti-supernatural commitment he means "the plausible idea that the meanings of our terms and the scope of our inquiries are in various ways based on, or conditioned by, human experience." Thus, a naturalist is someone who believes that all phenomena that we encounter in the universe, be it in the laboratory, at the observatory, or at home, are best understood as natural phenomena and that our understanding of the natural should be anchored to the human experience, and not science exclusively.

APPENDIX 3: READING NIETZSCHE

DER WILLE ZUM SYSTEM IST EIN MANGEL AN RECHTSCHAFFENHEIT
(GD Sprüche und Pfeile 26).

THE VIRTUE OF understanding someone with a benevolent eye to future change of opinions that inevitability occur across a lifetime should no less be esteemed of an interpret of Nietzsche. We all change and our thoughts also. Our words don't. This has most likely more to do with our psychology than the opinions themselves. A philosopher also can change his mind about something, as his intuition change, or his convictions might slowly dissolve into the all-devouring doubt called *why?* Words on paper, however, have no mind, they don't intuit nor doubt. But sentences, once written, give an impression of being factual – they are statements, propositions, claims. This too is where language may misguide our thinking.

The question as to how Nietzsche's corpus should be interpreted is a complicated issue. I will in this appendix not give an extensive argument for a particular approach but will describe the approach I find reasonable and give a few reasons why one would adopt such an approach.

I believe that Nietzsche changed his views on many things, but that that fact shouldn't prevent us from trying to make his thoughts comprehensive for us, which usually consists in bringing his thoughts into a unified (fiction) narrative. We cannot know Nietzsche more personally than what we can infer from the writings he left us with, his biography, and what others have said about him. Moreover, Nietzsche probably didn't understand himself (who does, after all?).

I have always understood the history of philosopher never to be about the history, but about the philosophy that is in history. "Nietzsche" thus becomes a label for a collection of philosophical writings, and the subject matter "Nietzsche's philosophy" is not about Friedrich (often called Fritz for short). The history of philosophy is about thoughts that different persons in the past was the soil of. Thus, interpreting Nietzsche is about interpreting the thoughts (in writing) that Fritz helped to bring into existence. This is of course not true, but this is the regulative fiction that is necessary in order to make sense of the history of philosophy as something distinct from the history of ideas or simply history. We have to interpret Nietzsche's thoughts *as if* they had nothing to do with Fritz, at least insofar as these thoughts are about philosophical topic, like the nature of knowledge or the nature of truth. Even Nietzsche's metaphilosophical claims about the psychology of philosophers, must itself be assessed not as an expression of Fritz's idiosyncratic taste or an arbitrary opinion, but as itself indicative of a philosophical commitment about the nature of knowledge, for example the rejection of a priori knowledge, or for example

naturalism as to the origin of knowledge. Such examples, however, have nothing to do with Fritz himself, but are philosophical positions that in principle could be endorsed by someone else. The particular biography of Fritz, of course, do account in part for how he came to endorse such a philosophical position, and so might serve as clues when interpreting Nietzsche, but that is about Fritz and not about the philosophical position qua philosophical position.

Fritz and Nietzsche are not the same person. Therefore, the fact that Fritz changed his mind does not imply that Nietzsche did. For all we know, Fritz could have, seconds before his mental breakdown, convert to Christianity, and fearing punishment in the afterlife. If that was the case, and let us image that we came to know that, would that give us reason to change our understanding of Nietzsche's philosophy (that is, the thoughts about philosophical matters born out of Fritz)? I don't believe so.

Thus, insofar as we are talking philosophy, it is not in principle wrong to try to understand Nietzsche's systematically, though I would argue that such an approach is very difficult, perhaps impossible, and not the most fruitful approach when reading Nietzsche's philosophy. Instead, I read Nietzsche's philosophy as composing of different narratives, narratives that tell different philosophical stories. The common narrative structure (though not the only one) of Nietzsche's different philosophical stories is that things emerge from their opposite. Our different concepts, ideas, values, thoughts, may have an origin entirely contrary to their nature. Something good might come from something bad, a virtue from a sin, a sin from a virtue, something true might come from something false, a fact from a value, a value from a fact, etc. And from these different story it is possible to extract different morals. The moral of one story might for example be that there exist no true opposites. Another might be that things *become* what they are, instead of *being* what they are. Yet another might be that the meaning of things and the things themselves are not one-to-one, our interpretations give form to things whilst the things by themselves exclude any form. A good *philosophical* reading of Nietzsche, accordingly, extracts the moral of different stories in interesting and illuminating ways, in ways that have bearing on our understanding of fundamental philosophical questions. I believe we should expose Nietzsche to as many different perspectives and affective interpretations as possible and understand these different eyes in relation to our philosophical pro and cons; only as a regulative fiction, or measurement, should be talk about a final and objective interpretation. There exist no final and objective interpretation of Nietzsche's writings and neither is such an interpretation desirable. This, however, should not give the impression that any interpretation is as good as any other, to the contrary. Only interpretations that are interesting and illuminating in ways that

have bearing on our understanding of fundamental philosophical question – that leaves us with few good interpretations!

FINIS.

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