

The U.S. Policy on NATO Enlargement:
How the George H.W. Bush
Administration Opened NATO's Door to
Central and Eastern European States,
1989-1993



Nikolai Johansen

MITRA4095 – Master's thesis in Modern International and
Transnational History
30 ECTS

Department of Archaeology, Conservation and History
(IAKH)
Faculty of Humanities

University of Oslo

Spring 2023

The U.S. Policy on NATO Enlargement:

*How the George H.W. Bush Administration Opened NATO's Door to
Central and Eastern European States, 1989-1993*

© 2023 Nikolai Johansen

The U.S. Policy on NATO Enlargement:

How the George H.W. Bush Administration Opened NATO's Door to Central and Eastern European States, 1989-1993

Abstract

This master thesis focuses on the U.S. policy on NATO enlargement during the George H.W. Bush administration from 1989 until the beginning of the Bill Clinton administration in 1993. This thesis analyses when the thinking on NATO eastward enlargement incorporating former allies of the Soviet Union emerged and discusses how this thinking evolved during the Bush administration. This thesis also discusses why the Bush administration wanted to enlarge NATO, arguing that there were both economic and geopolitical underlying drivers for enlarging the Atlantic Alliance. In contrast to earlier research on the topic, this thesis argues, based on recently declassified documents, that the idea of enlarging NATO eastward emerged early on in the Bush administration.

Moreover, this thesis puts forward the theoretical concept of hedging, arguing that in its NATO enlargement policy, the Bush administration was simultaneously balancing and engaging the Soviet Union/Russia. By pursuing the dualistic strategy of hedging, the Bush administration safeguarded itself in case the development in Russia would go in an undesirable direction. Furthermore, this thesis argues that the Bush administration favoured the enlargement of NATO for pragmatic and *realpolitik* reasons, seeing it as a way of preserving the U.S. dominant position in Europe and preventing other security structures from emerging in Europe.

Table of Contents

Abstract	iv
Figures and Tables	vi
Acknowledgements	vii
Abbreviations	viii
Introduction	1
Scope and Structure.....	2
Historiography.....	4
Method and Sources	6
Theoretical Concept of Hedging	9
1. The Beginning of the End of the Cold War	12
Historical Background.....	12
Maintaining U.S. Presence in Europe	14
National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Bush’s Views	16
2. Russian Strategic Culture and National Security Advisors’ Influence	19
3. The Narrative of NATO Enlargement.....	22
4. Constraining Other Alternatives to NATO	25
Baker’s Promises to Gorbachev	28
The Gorbachev Era is Effectively Over	30
A Euro-Atlantic Community from Vancouver to Vladivostok.....	31
5. The Eastern and Central European States’ Search for Security	33
6. Economic Rationale	36
7. Enlargement Put on Hold	41
8. Enter the Clinton Administration	43
Conclusion.....	46
Primary Sources	50
Archival Material	50
Digitally Published Newspaper Articles	54
Other Online Primary Sources:	55
Bibliography.....	59

Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Map of NATO Enlargement History in Europe.....	14
Table 1: U.S. Export 1994 and 2021.....	39
Figure 2: Figure of U.S. Inflation Adjusted Per Capita Export 1994 and 2021.....	40

Acknowledgements

Writing this master's thesis has, in many ways, been akin to the experience of riding a rollercoaster. It has been a long way from the inception of the idea for this project towards the end result. I am grateful for all the constructive comments and feedback I have received from my fellow students in my supervision group. Profound gratitude is well in place to my master's thesis supervisor, Sunniva Engh. Thank you for all the feedback, constructive comments, and support in writing this master thesis.

I wish to thank all my friends, family and loved ones who have supported me in writing this master's thesis. Without you, this would not have been possible.

Abbreviations

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GBPL	George H.W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum
GDR	The German Democratic Republic
KGB	Committee for State Security
Memcon	Memorandum of Conversation
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSA	National Security Archive
NSC	The United States National Security Council
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PfP	Partnership for Peace
RRPL	Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
Telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
UN	United Nations
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
U.S.	United States of America

Introduction

The question of NATO's eastward enlargement was a contentious topic both within NATO, the U.S. and in the Soviet Union/Russia in the 1990s. The Soviet Union and later the Russian Federation have been unenthusiastic and, at times, downright hostile to NATO enlargement eastwards since it was mentioned in the conversation between U.S. Foreign Secretary of State James Baker and the leader of the Soviet Union Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in 1990.¹ Later on, the continuing NATO eastward enlargement has become a significant irritant in NATO-Russia relations. For NATO and the U.S., enlargement was viewed as a way of enhancing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic.² From the view of a former senior Clinton administration official and one of the architects of NATO's enlargement policy, Ronald Asmus: "Enlargement has created more democratic stability on Russia's western border than at any time since Napoleon."³

NATO took upon itself dominant roles on the global arena within conflict prevention, crisis management and focusing on safeguarding stability and democracy in Europe post-1989. From being a traditional military alliance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty as the cornerstone of the Alliance,⁴ NATO was transformed and reshaped into a more political organisation with the ability to project force outside of NATO countries' territories. NATO began projecting force with the purpose of managing crises, preventing conflicts and protecting Allied out-of-area interests. One of the new roles of NATO was eastward enlargement, which had the purpose of projecting stability and spreading democracy in Europe.⁵

The transformation of NATO was made possible through the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The Cold War's end resulted in a security vacuum in Europe. During the early 1990s, NATO was reshaped in order to adapt to the new security situation in Europe, to remain relevant, and to remain the dominant security institution.

U.S. policymakers began to explore different ways to project U.S. influence and power in Europe around 1989-1990, and they regarded NATO as the primary security institution and tool to achieve U.S. goals. The alternatives would not be beneficial to the U.S. In addition, it

¹ National Security Archive. (Henceforth cited as NSA). 'Memorandum of conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and James Baker in Moscow.' (Henceforth cited as Memcon). February 9, 1990. Collection: NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard. Doc. 5.

² NATO. 'Study on NATO Enlargement.'

³ Asmus. 'Europe's Eastern Promise: Rethinking NATO and EU Enlargement.' p. 100.

⁴ NATO. 'The North Atlantic Treaty.' April 4, 1949.

⁵ Webber. Sperling and Smith, *NATO's Post-Cold War Trajectory Decline or Regeneration?* p. 92.

was clear to many, especially in the U.S., that an alternative to NATO was not viable or feasible in the foreseeable future.

The Bush administration was cautious in its policies towards the dissolving Soviet Union, which later became the Russian Federation. The U.S. chose to suppress initiatives by other European states and the Soviet Union to create new security structures in Europe. There were European leaders, such as French president François Marie Adrien Maurice Mitterrand that had ideas of creating alternatives to NATO in Europe, e.g. through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) or the European Community (EC). The issue for the U.S. was that the potential alternatives could bypass NATO. This would lead to the U.S. losing its influential position in Europe.

The Soviet/Russian perspective on NATO enlargement has mainly remained negative, with periods of ambiguity and hostile opposition. Additionally, a combination of events exacerbated the negative view on enlargement from the Russian perspective, which is the following: 1. The Soviet Union/Russia's loss of influence and international status that enlargement produced. 2. The Russian perception that Germany and the U.S. gave assurances during the negotiation on the reunification of Germany in 1990 that NATO would not be expanded eastwards. 3. The rejection of Soviet membership in NATO and Gorbachev's ideas of a pan-European security institution as a substitute for the Warsaw Pact and NATO failing.⁶

NATO enlargement never became the official policy of the U.S. during Bush's term. However, letters, memoranda of conversations amongst officials during Bush's tenure, and intelligence assessments, show that there were compelling arguments for the enlargement of NATO, and it appears that several officials viewed this as the long-term goal of U.S. policy in Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, this thesis analyses recently declassified archival sources to shed light on U.S. discussions on the potential for NATO enlargement during the years 1989-1993, aiming to contribute to a better understanding of U.S. views.

Scope and Structure

This master thesis focuses on the U.S. policy on NATO enlargement during the George H.W. Bush administration from 1989 until the beginning of the Bill Clinton administration in 1993. The research question of this master thesis is: "How and why did the George H.W. Bush administration open NATO's door for Central and Eastern European States, 1989-1993?"

⁶ Kriendler. 'NATO-Russia Relations Reset is Not a Four-Letter Word.' p. 89.

This master thesis will address how, when and why the U.S. thinking on NATO eastward enlargement incorporating former allies of the Soviet Union emerged and discuss how this thinking evolved during the Bush administration. It will also discuss which concerns were driving this process and analyse the impact of key policymakers, such as the impact of National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft on U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union and later Russia. It is fruitful to analyse the influence of Scowcroft as he was one of the closest advisors to Bush, and it has been argued that Scowcroft was one of the most influential individuals in developing U.S. grand strategy and foreign policy from 1989 to 1993.⁷

This master thesis will also discuss the underlying drivers for enlarging the Alliance, and it will argue that the Bush administration favoured the enlargement of NATO for pragmatic and realpolitik reasons, seeing it as a way of preserving the U.S. dominant position in Europe and preventing other challenging security structures from emerging in Europe. In addition, the economic rationale for the U.S. by enlarging NATO eastwards will also be addressed.

It is an interesting topic to look into, as much of the research by historians and policy analysts has focused primarily on the processes that led to the enlargement question, and largely on the time frame during the Clinton administration. Most of the scholarly literature has focused on the decisions made by the Clinton administration. This is due to the fact that it was the Clinton administration that formally initiated the enlargement of NATO and included former Warsaw Pact member states into the Western alliance. More recently, scholars have started to study the role of the Bush administration on the topic of enlarging NATO eastwards. It is fruitful to rethink the timeline with respect to the process leading up to NATO enlargement, as recently declassified documents illuminate the role of the Bush administration in steering the process towards NATO becoming the pre-eminent security institution in Europe. Additionally, the documents show that the idea and rationales for enlarging the alliance were established early on in the Bush administration.

The topic is relevant today because NATO's eastward enlargement has been used in recent years as part of the Kremlin's justification for aggression towards neighbouring states. U.S. and NATO relations with Russia are probably at their nadir today. The relationship between NATO and Russia has been deteriorating exponentially since Russia's military intervention in Georgia in 2008 and especially since the violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity by the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This was a flagrant breach of the treaty signed in 1994 by Russia, the US and the UK to assure Ukraine's territorial integrity if they gave up

⁷ Sparrow. 'Realism's Practitioner: Brent Scowcroft and the Making of the New World Order, 1989–1993.' p. 149.

their nuclear arsenal to Russia.⁸ After the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, all hope for improving relations in the near term have arguably been shattered. The possibility of a military escalation and war between NATO and Russia has not been this close since the Cold War.

Consequently, the rhetoric has changed at present, where both sides try to steer the narrative of what occurred in the past. Russia has accused the West of being deceitful, claiming the U.S. and NATO have reneged on their promise that NATO would not enlarge eastward.⁹ The Russian argument is not entirely without merit, as the question of a potential future enlargement of NATO was discussed, and Gorbachev clarified his opinion on the topic during the negotiations on the reunification of Germany. However, the Soviet Union did not get any formal written assurances from the U.S., nor from any other party to the negotiations. On the other hand, the U.S. and NATO deny any such assurances were given, and some scholars even put forward that the issue was not discussed at all. The archival material used in this thesis shows that this topic was indeed discussed in 1990 and onwards. However, due to the Bush Administration favouring stability, the policy was not put in place during the Bush Administration. It was the succeeding U.S. President, Bill Clinton, who carried out the policy. The Bush administration arguably viewed the eastward enlargement of NATO as a way of strengthening the U.S. position in the world, essentially being driven by realpolitik, geopolitical and economic drivers.

In contrast, the ostensible rationales for the Clinton administration appeared to be driven by idealistic liberal ideas of promoting human rights, democracy and free markets. As the focus of this master's thesis is on the early 1990s and the Bush administration, the Clinton administration will only briefly be discussed in the final part of this thesis.

Historiography

Much of the scholarship on the NATO enlargement processes that occurred in the 1990s has attributed responsibility to the Clinton administration for expanding the Alliance. Literature that focuses on this viewpoint has been written by James Goldgeier, Ronald Asmus, George W. Grayson and others.¹⁰

⁸ UN. 'Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.' UNTS Vol. 3007, No. 52241. December 5, 1994. pp. 168 -171.

⁹ Wolff. 'The Future of NATO Enlargement after the Ukraine Crisis.' pp. 1103-1106

¹⁰ Goldgeier. *Not Whether But When the U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO.* ; Asmus. *Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era.* ; Grayson. *Strange Bedfellows NATO Marches East.*

Most of the focus has been directed towards how different government officials keen on expanding the Alliance during the Clinton years, combined with the calls from Eastern European states for NATO membership, managed to commit the U.S. to expand the Alliance from the mid-1990s, in spite of significant domestic and allied opposition to this decision.

The question of NATO enlargement during the Bush administration has only recently caught the attention of historians and political scientists. More work has been done on the position of the Bush administration on NATO eastward enlargement, focusing on different drivers and rationales.¹¹

On the question of the alleged promises made by the U.S. to the Soviet Union that NATO would not be enlarged beyond the German Democratic Republic (GDR), scholars such as Mark Kramer and Philipp Zelikow have argued that there were no pledges made.¹² In contrast, the scholar Joshua Itzkowitz Shiffrinson has challenged this perspective and claimed that the U.S. was not truthful during the negotiations. According to Shiffrinson, the U.S. was duplicitous in negotiations with Gorbachev and the Soviet Union. This approach of the U.S. was, according to Shiffrinson, conducted in order to make Gorbachev believe that NATO would evolve into a new European security structure while simultaneously the U.S. were doing what they could to ensure the pre-eminence of NATO and U.S. hegemony.¹³

Historian Mary Elise Sarotte has been a central contributor to the debate, and she has also discussed whether there is historical evidence to support Moscow's claims that they were promised no NATO eastwards enlargement. In her article "Not One Inch Eastward? Bush, Baker, Kohl, Genscher, Gorbachev, and the Origin of Russian Resentment toward NATO Enlargement in February 1990", she contends that the Soviet Union officials received reassurances that NATO would not expand eastwards. However, Gorbachev failed to get these assurances in writing. Sarotte argues, based on archival material and interviews, that both the Russian and American claims are valid to an extent.¹⁴ Sarotte has also reassessed the assumptions that NATO, the U.S. and other Western European policymakers' strategic thinking

¹¹ Shiffrinson. 'Eastbound and Down: The United States, NATO Enlargement, and Suppressing the Soviet and Western European Alternatives, 1990–1992.' ; Horowitz and Götz. 'The Overlooked Importance of Economics: Why the Bush Administration Wanted NATO Enlargement.' ; Kieninger. 'Opening NATO and Engaging Russia: NATO's Two Tracks and the Establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.' ; Horowitz. 'The George H.W. Bush Administration's Policies Vis-à-Vis Central Europe: From Cautious Encouragement to Cracking Open NATO's Door.' ; Sarotte. *Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate*. ; Sayle. *Enduring Alliance a History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order*.

¹² Kramer. 'The Myth of a NO-NATO Enlargement Pledge to Russia.' ; Zelikow. 'NATO Expansion Wasn't Ruled Out.'

¹³ Shiffrinson. 'Deal or No Deal?: The End of the Cold War and the U.S. Offer to Limit NATO Expansion.'

¹⁴ Sarotte. 'Not One Inch Eastward? Bush, Baker, Kohl, Genscher, Gorbachev, and the Origin of Russian Resentment toward NATO Enlargement in February 1990.' p. 137.

for the future was limited to the former GDR.¹⁵ She has also challenged the narrative that the strategic goal of NATO and the U.S. as the cold war ended was the future integration of Russia into pan-Atlantic and pan-European institutions, as some have argued.¹⁶

Sarotte has also questioned the narrative that the expansion of NATO was not an issue and not something Western policymakers discussed. Several scholars have argued that there was no thinking or discussion within NATO or in the U.S. in 1990 on the expansion of NATO beyond its 1989 border.¹⁷

The arguments put forward by Sarotte connect in large parts with the arguments put forward by political scientist Joshua Shiffrin and historian Timothy Sayle, that the thinking on the expansion of NATO already began while the Cold War was ending.¹⁸

Method and Sources

The primary sources applied in this master thesis are memoranda of conversations, meetings, and telephone conversations between U.S., Soviet and European government officials. The sources used are primarily from the period 1989-1993. Intelligence assessments by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have also been used, as well as interviews and internal reports written by U.S. officials. The sources used in this master thesis have been retrieved from digital archives, primarily archives based in the U.S. The secondary sources used are primarily written by historians and international relations scholars, written in the style of international history and diplomatic history.

Because of the broad interest in this topic of historians and international relations scholars, a wide array of primary sources have been digitalised in the last few years. This provides the opportunity to work with these sources remotely. Much of the archival material used in this master thesis derives from declassified material from the National Security

¹⁵ Sarotte. 'Perpetuating U.S. Preeminence: The 1990 Deals to "Bribe the Soviets Out" and Move NATO In.' ; Sarotte. *Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate*.

¹⁶ Deudney and Ikenberry. 'The Unravelling of the Cold War Settlement.'

¹⁷ Literature that argues that there were essentially no thinking or discussions on NATO eastwards enlargement in 1990: Gilles. 'Answering Medvedev.' ; Deudney and Ikenberry. 'The Unravelling of the Cold War Settlement.' ; Asmus. *Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era*. ; Kramer. 'The Myth of a NO-NATO Enlargement Pledge to Russia.'

¹⁸ Sayle. 'Patterns of Continuity in NATO's Long History.' ; Sayle. *Enduring Alliance a History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order*. ; Shiffrin. 'NATO Enlargement and US Foreign Policy: The Origins, Durability, and Impact of an Idea.' ; Shiffrin. 'Eastbound and Down: The United States, NATO Enlargement, and Suppressing the Soviet and Western European Alternatives, 1990–1992.' ; Shiffrin. 'Deal or No Deal?: The End of the Cold War and the U.S. Offer to Limit NATO Expansion.'

Archive¹⁹ and the George Bush Presidential Library and Museum digital archives.²⁰ Other primary sources used includes newspaper articles, interviews, material from the CIA digital reading room²¹, material from Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum²², and data from the World Bank²³ and the United States Census Bureau²⁴. Although this thesis primarily analyses qualitative data and the methodological approach is mainly qualitative by using textual archival material and secondary sources, some quantitative methods will also be applied when analysing the economic rationale for the enlargement of the alliance in the Bush administration.

The methodological approach of the thesis is inspired by digital history, which has been made possible by recent advances in the digitalisation of historical materials and archives.²⁵ Thus, the material of several digital archives has been explored by using search terms relevant for this thesis' research question, and going through the collections that are available digitally. For instance, when using the National Security Archive's virtual reading room, using terms such as "NATO expansion" and limiting the time period for the documents from 1989 to 1993, then 139 documents were found. By searching the archival website with the keywords "NATO expansion", 656 results were found. By searching in the archive, I found several relevant collections, which I have browsed through. The same approach of using a range of different keywords such as "Scowcroft", "Woerner", "Enlargement", and "Expansion" was also conducted in the other digital archives. Although the approach is effective, there is a potential for missing out on important documents when basing the search on selected keywords. A potential drawback of this approach may be that one could end up with less historical context and miss out on important aspects. Additionally, choosing wrong keywords, could lead to missing out on important information.

Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, much of the scholarly work was focused on whether NATO enlargement led to the decline of the relations between Russia and the West, and how different policy entrepreneurs in the Clinton administration and calls from Eastern European

¹⁹ The National Security Archive (NSA) is a non-profit, non-governmental archival and research institution and it contains a vast amount of declassified U.S. documents which are available digitally. NSA is available at: <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/>.

²⁰ The George Bush Presidential Library and Museum (GBPL) contains digitalised declassified documents, official records and personal papers from the Bush Administration. Available at: <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/>.

²¹ The CIA library electronic reading room contains documents released through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and other CIA release programs. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/home>.

²² The Ronald Reagan Presidential Library & Museum (RRPL) contains digitalised presidential records from the administration of Ronald Reagan. Available at: <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>.

²³ Population data used from the World Bank. Available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>.

²⁴ Export data used from the United States Census Bureau. Data retrieved from the Excel dataset which is available at: <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0015.html>.

²⁵ Milligan. *The Transformation of Historical Research in the Digital Age*.

states led to the expansion of NATO. However, as archival material and documents from the George H.W. Bush administration have become declassified and more accessible, there has emerged an interest in recent years for examining the Bush administration's position on NATO enlargement, the underlying drivers, and how the Bush administration carved out the road forward for the following Clinton administration.²⁶

The material used in this thesis shows that the thinking on NATO enlargement began already in the Bush administration, and that there were clear realpolitik concerns that drove these rationales. It captures that the Bush administration was concerned with keeping NATO the primary security institution in Europe and was concerned with the potential of an alternative European security institution being formed in Europe, as this would weaken U.S. influence in Europe.

Archival records show that the question of enlargement was debated already during the reunification of Germany during the Bush administration. However, the Bush administration arguably set the stage for NATO enlargement by limiting the options for creating a security structure in Europe through other organisations and structures such as the EC and the CSCE.²⁷ This master thesis expands on the research that has been conducted on the Bush administration's role with regard to NATO eastward enlargement. This master thesis puts forward a new perspective by applying the theory of hedging when analysing the Bush administration and expands on the economic rationale for NATO enlargement by using U.S. export data.

The quantitative approach will mainly be conducted in order to substantiate the sources and the arguments made for the economic rationale. The approach has been to retrieve data from the United States Census Bureau on U.S. exports to a sample of European countries in the time period 1994-2021. Population data from the World Bank has been used in order to calculate the U.S. export per capita in 1994 and 2021 to the sample countries. This data has also been adjusted for inflation. This data has been worked with in Microsoft Office Excel in order to produce a table and a bar chart. The data shows U.S. per capita percentage export growth between 1994 and 2021.

²⁶ Some scholarly work from the last four years that focus on NATO enlargement in the Bush administration: Horowitz. 'The George H.W. Bush Administration's Policies Vis-à-Vis Central Europe: From Cautious Encouragement to Cracking Open NATO's Door.'; Shiffrinson. 'Eastbound and Down: The United States, NATO Enlargement, and Suppressing the Soviet and Western European Alternatives, 1990–1992.'; Sarotte. *Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate.*; Sayle. *Enduring Alliance a History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order*; Horowitz and Götz. 'The Overlooked Importance of Economics: Why the Bush Administration Wanted NATO Enlargement.'

²⁷ Goldgeier and Shiffrinson. 'Evaluating NATO Enlargement: Scholarly Debates, Policy Implications, and Roads Not Taken.'; Shiffrinson. 'Deal or No Deal?: The End of the Cold War and the U.S. Offer to Limit NATO Expansion.' p. 38.

The economic rationale for the Bush administration to open the door for former Warsaw Pact countries to NATO is still an underexplored theme in the literature. Therefore, by going forth with the approach of using export data combined with archival material, this thesis seeks to shed light on an underexplored theme. By visually showing the increase in U.S. export to European countries, it will assist the arguments made for the economic rationale of expanding the Atlantic Alliance, by comparing U.S. export to the Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland), with three more traditional U.S. trading partners: France, the United Kingdom and Germany.

To be precise, it is important to point out that Slovakia is also a member of the Visegrad group, although Slovakia did not become a NATO member before 2004. The Visegrad group is a subregional political and cultural alliance and coordination group established after the Visegrad declaration on February 15, 1991.²⁸ It was named after the place it was signed in Visegrad, Hungary. Initially, the group consisted of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. After Czechoslovakia was divided into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993, the Visegrad group comprised four member states. One of the main goals of the Visegrad group in the early 1990s was to cooperate on moving towards a deeper economic and security policy cooperation with Western Europe by joining the European Union (EU) and NATO.²⁹ When referring to the Visegrad group in this master thesis, this thesis primarily discusses Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, which became the first new members of NATO in the post-Cold War world.

Theoretical Concept of Hedging

This thesis is grounded within the theoretical framework of international relations theories, and applies the concept of “hedging” when analysing the Bush administration’s foreign policy towards the Soviet Union/Russia. Hedging is a concept that has been transferred from finance theory to be applied in international relations. The strategy of hedging assists states in avoiding conflict by balancing their relations towards other states in order to reduce the risk of conflict. The fundamental assumption is that hedging is a strategy conducted by a state to diversify risk. Hedging is done by pursuing two opposing policies towards another state simultaneously, which is balancing and engagement.³⁰ During the Cold War, the U.S. pursued a policy of

²⁸ Visegrad Group. ‘Visegrad Declaration 1991 Declaration on Cooperation between the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Hungary in Striving for European Integration.’ February 1991. Unofficial translation.

²⁹ Asmus. *Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era*. pp. 10-11.

³⁰ Hemmings. ‘Hedging: The Real U.S. Policy Towards China? Is America Trying to Contain China? No, It Could Be Just Hedging Its Bets.’ ; Ciociari and Haacke. ‘Hedging in International Relations: An Introduction.’ p. 367.

containment towards the Soviet Union.³¹ Hedging, as opposed to containment, involves elements of both cooperation and countermeasures. The reason states choose to hedge against other states is that the intentions of the target state of hedging are unknown or opaque. The cooperation measures fall into the category of engagement, and the countermeasures are defined as balancing.

The Bush administration engaged by cooperating with the Soviet Union/Russia in a range of areas which included: disarmament of conventional weapons and nuclear weapons, establishing diplomatic liaisons, and supporting the reforms of Gorbachev and later Yeltsin. Yet another policy of engagement was the inclusion of the Soviet Union/Russia into multilateral institutions such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991.³² The creation of the NACC was an initiative designed to give the Eastern and Central European countries an opportunity for closer association with NATO and showcased the gradual approach towards giving these states potential membership in the Atlantic Alliance. The intent of the initiative was to forestall other security structures in Europe by making NATO the leading security structure in Europe.³³ Additionally, it was formally intended to be a step forward towards potentially including the Soviet Union/Russia in a future European security system.³⁴

The Bush administration balanced against the Soviet Union/Russia by maintaining a robust military presence in Europe and establishing diplomatic relations with Warsaw Pact member states in order to build and strengthen the Atlantic Alliance. Strengthening relations with the Soviet Union/Russia's alliance partners was a form of balancing. Part of a balancing strategy involves strengthening alliances against the target of hedging. The U.S. were successful in this endeavour, as the later enlargement of NATO to include former Warsaw Pact member states increased the U.S. influence in the region and deterred potential threats from Russia. Furthermore, it opened up new markets for U.S. export in Eastern Europe. By hedging, the Bush administration ensured strategic options for the U.S. irrespective of which direction the relationship with the Soviet Union/Russia was heading.

The choice of hedging as the theoretical concept for this master thesis is because of its fruitful explanation potential when analysing the underlying drivers for the Bush administration's rationale for NATO enlargement and the strategic approach of the U.S.

³¹ Ortmann and Whittaker. 'Geopolitics and Grand Strategy.' p. 315.

³² Kieninger. 'Opening NATO and Engaging Russia: NATO's Two Tracks and the Establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.' p. 57.

³³ Ibid. pp. 57-63.

³⁴ NATO. 'Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation.' Press Communiqué, S-1(91)86. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome. November 8, 1991.

towards the Soviet Union/Russia. In addition, the benefit of using this concept is that it has not previously been directly applied when analysing the question of NATO enlargement during the Bush administration in the early 1990s. Therefore, it will potentially contribute to the scholarly debate on the question of NATO enlargement and the underlying drivers for enlargement during Bush's administration in the early 1990s.

The result of U.S. aspirations for seeking ways to increase their influence and power in Europe was a two-pronged strategy in line with the hedging strategy. The U.S. presented assurances to the Soviet Union during negotiations on the reunification of Germany in 1990 that NATO would not expand eastwards, while simultaneously, the U.S. managed to ensure during the diplomatic deals of German reunification that the U.S. and NATO options in post-Cold War Europe remained open.³⁵ The negotiations resulted in the "Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany", also known as the Two Plus Four Agreement.³⁶

The desired goal of including the former Warsaw Pact into Western institutions, such as NATO and later enlarging the Alliance eastward, was to increase stability in Europe and deter potential threats in the future from Russia, should the democratisation process go wrong. The Bush administration and NATO were essentially trying to engage with the Soviet Union/Russia economically and diplomatically while simultaneously balancing by expanding the scope of the Alliance. In other words, the insistence on keeping NATO the primary security institution in Europe was the "insurance" in case of a resurgent Russia.

U.S. policymakers arguably pursued the hedging strategy because of the unclear, continuously evolving international environment in the early 1990s, and the fact that the Soviet Union had until recently been considered the prime adversary of the U.S.-led liberal world order. The utilisation of a hedging strategy can also be viewed by the fact that U.S. policymakers were not decided on how to move forward with their foreign policy towards Russia. This is evident considering that the potential enlargement of NATO was still on the table, but it was stated that it should not be discussed openly. This is clear in a document by James F. Dobbins,

³⁵ Shiffrinson. 'Deal or No Deal?: The End of the Cold War and the U.S. Offer to Limit NATO Expansion.' p. 42.

³⁶ The two plus four negotiations were the negotiations on the reunification of Germany in 1990. The negotiations resulted in the "Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany", which allowed the reunification of Germany. It was negotiated between 6 countries, the eponymous "two" being the Democratic Republic of Germany and the Federal Republic of Germany. The "four" negotiating parties were the four powers which had occupied Germany after the Second World War: the Soviet Union, France, the U.S. and United Kingdom. See: Spohr. 'Precluded or Precedent-Setting?: The "NATO Enlargement Question" in the Triangular Bonn-Washington-Moscow Diplomacy of 1990-1991.'

State Department European Bureau, Memorandum to National Security Council: NATO Strategy Review Paper for October 29, 1990 Discussion stating:

The first such topic is the expansion of NATO membership, specifically whether or not NATO should accept East European members. While we must not present NATO as a closed club, there is clearly no support for such membership now. The question is how to present the possibility. OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] wished to leave the door ajar with caveats such as no discussion at this time. State prefers simply to note that discussion of expanding membership is not on the agenda and need not be addressed in the NATO strategy review.³⁷

As Dobbins wrote to the National Security Council (NSC), the OSD wanted to leave the door to NATO expansion ajar, without making any promises, but at the same time taking care not to present the Alliance as a closed club. Thus, the concept of hedging, with its mixed approach combining engagement and balancing, may arguably assist in understanding the full complexity of U.S. policies towards the Soviet Union/Russia, and on the matter of NATO enlargement.

1. The Beginning of the End of the Cold War

Historical Background

From the moment the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April 1949, the credibility of the defence pact was rooted in American superiority. The Alliance was created with the intent of containing Soviet expansion, stabilising the European continent, and later, after the inception of the Warsaw Pact, defend North America and Western Europe from the Soviet-led political and military pact. The purpose of NATO from its inception to the end of the Cold War could be summarised by a dictum credited to the first Secretary General of NATO, Hastings Lionel Ismay: “Keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.”³⁸

The Western Alliance was a political, ideological and military framework for transatlantic cooperation, and simultaneously the Alliance was also an instrument for American influence in Europe. The U.S. was not just a power in Europe; it was a “European power”, which is evident by the fact that the U.S. had between 150,000 to 400,000 personnel stationed

³⁷ NSA. ‘James F. Dobbins, State Department European Bureau, Memorandum to National Security Council: NATO Strategy Review Paper for October 29 Discussion.’ October 25, 1990. Collection: NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard. Doc. 27.

³⁸ Ruger and Menon. ‘NATO Enlargement and US Grand Strategy: A Net Assessment.’ p. 371.

in Europe during the Cold War.³⁹ Due to the devastating consequences of the Second World War, European countries were in a precarious state economically and militarily. As historian Geir Lundestad has presented it, the U.S. became an “empire by invitation”, implying that Western Europe was essentially reduced to an American protectorate, and the U.S. took upon itself the role of a creditor through the Marshall Plan and later provider of security through NATO in Western Europe.⁴⁰

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO assumed the international peacekeeping responsibility, which was and is the main task of the United Nations (UN). The expansion of NATO’s area of interest in the 1990s can be viewed as a way of revitalising itself and creating new responsibilities for the organisations, as NATO’s primary reason to exist, the Soviet Union, had dissolved.⁴¹ Furthermore, the transformation of NATO’s role in the 1990s should be viewed in the political context it occurred in the 1990s. NATO was in the process of finding its *raison d’être*, as the threat of an invasion by the Warsaw Pact disappeared, and European member states were retrenching their spending on defence. By expanding its area of operation, NATO could remain relevant.⁴² NATO’s projection of force with the purpose of managing crises, preventing conflicts and protecting Allied out-of-area interests should also be viewed in the context of a broad international consensus that emerged after the Cold War on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The principles for the R2P grew out of the international communities’ lack of response to the mass atrocities and genocides that occurred in Yugoslavia and Rwanda.⁴³ The lack of response and failure of the UN in the early 1990s and the emergence of “new wars”⁴⁴, meaning the death of civilians as a direct war aim, is also arguably part of the explanation for NATO expanding its scope of activities.⁴⁵

³⁹ Østerud and Toje. ‘Strategy Risk and Threat Perceptions in NATO.’ p. 73.

⁴⁰ Lundestad. ‘Empire by Invitation in the American Century.’

⁴¹ Østerud and Toje. ‘Strategy Risk and Threat Perceptions in NATO.’ pp. 77-79. ; Sayle. ‘Patterns of Continuity in NATO’s Long History.’ p. 334.

⁴² Østerud and Toje. ‘Strategy Risk and Threat Perceptions in NATO.’ pp. 77-79.

⁴³ Bellamy and McLoughlin. ‘Humanitarian Intervention.’ pp. 342-343.

⁴⁴ “New wars” is a term presented by the British academic Mary Kaldor in her book: *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*.

⁴⁵ Bellamy and McLoughlin. ‘Humanitarian Intervention.’ pp. 334-337.




Figure 1: Map showing the enlargement of NATO in Europe since NATO's inception in 1949. Germany is shown as divided on the map, status prior to the reunification on October 3, 1990. Finland became a member of NATO on April 4, 2023. (Wikimedia Commons).⁴⁶

Maintaining U.S. Presence in Europe

Throughout the 1990s, The U.S. administrations pursued three different foreign policies in Europe; 1. they safeguarded the pre-eminence of NATO as the leading security architecture in Europe by ensuring no other security institution could compete with NATO, 2. They expanded NATO, and 3. They expanded the geographic scope of NATO's missions.⁴⁷

As the Cold War ended, U.S. officials under the George W. Bush administration saw the opportunity to reap the gains of victory in Europe, which was democracy, stability and free markets in the now Post-Cold War era.⁴⁸ President Bush took over the office after Ronald Reagan on January 20, 1989, and had a somewhat different perspective on the Soviet Union than what Reagan had as he was leaving office. Arguably, no other American president's

⁴⁶ Wikimedia Commons. 'Map of NATO historic enlargement in Europe.' Author: Patrickneil. Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported.

⁴⁷ Hoof. 'Land Rush: American Grand Strategy, NATO Enlargement, and European Fragmentation.' pp. 531, 532.

⁴⁸ Ibid. pp. 531, 532.

foreign policy had changed so much, from calling the Soviet Union an “evil empire”⁴⁹ to establishing a cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union. Reagan said in his Farewell Address to the Nation speech:

We must keep up our guard, but we must also continue to work together to lessen and eliminate tension and mistrust. My view is that President Gorbachev is different from previous Soviet leaders. [...] What it all boils down to is this: I want the new closeness to continue. And it will, as long as we make it clear that we will continue to act in a certain way as long as they continue to act in a helpful manner.⁵⁰

Compared to Reagan, Bush stepped into the office viewing the current U.S.-Soviet relation through the lenses of the Cold War, having a more realpolitik outlook and not so sure that this new “closeness” would continue.⁵¹ Bush stated early on in his presidency on February 15, 1989, in a National Security Review that:

Yet the USSR remains an adversary with awesome military power whose interests conflict in important ways with our own. The Soviet Union already presents a new and complicated political challenge to us in Europe and elsewhere. My own sense is that the Soviet Challenge may be even greater than before because it is more varied.⁵²

Furthermore, Bush’s National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft stated in January 1989 that “The Cold War is not over”⁵³, and when speaking about Gorbachev, Scowcroft stated:

[Gorbachev] badly needs a period of stability, if not definite improvement in the relationship so he can face the awesome problem he has at home I also think he’s [Gorbachev] interested in making trouble within the western Alliance and I think he believes the best way to do it is a peace offensive, rather than to bluster the way some of his predecessors have.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum. (Henceforth cited as RRPL.) ‘Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, FL.’ March 8, 1983.

⁵⁰ RRPL. ‘Farewell Address to the Nation.’ January 11, 1989.

⁵¹ Westad. *The Cold War a World History*. p. 581 ; Chollett and Goldgeier. *America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11: The Misunderstood Years Between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Start of the War on Terror*. pp. 30, 47, 83. ; Sparrow. ‘Realism’s Practitioner: Brent Scowcroft and the Making of the New World Order, 1989–1993.’

⁵² GBPL. ‘National Security Review 3 - Subject: Comprehensive Review of US-Soviet Relations.’ February 15, 1989.

⁵³ Hoffman. ‘Gorbachev Seen as Trying to Buy Time for Reform.’

⁵⁴ Ibid.

Arguably, Scowcroft held this view due to his realist-oriented perspective, viewing the reforms undertaken by Gorbachev as an attempt by Gorbachev to reshape the Soviet Union's competitiveness with the U.S. and the West.⁵⁵

National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Bush's Views

According to political scientist Liviu Horovitz, the Bush administration in office from 1989 consisted of many key individuals who thought they had to manage Soviet retrenchment, assist the Germans in their ambitions of reunification and preserve U.S. influence in European affairs.⁵⁶

The foreign policy staff of the Bush administration was, to a large extent, oriented towards realist pragmatism. This included foreign secretary James Baker, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and his deputy Robert Gates, and Bush himself.⁵⁷

U.S. policymakers in the State and Defense Departments, policymakers in the NSC staff, and individuals at the highest decision-making levels considered that the U.S. had to increase its presence in Europe.⁵⁸ As the Cold War was coming to an end, the Soviet Union's economy was eroding, and Gorbachev was still trying to reform his country. Government deficits increased, particularly at the federal level since taxes were embezzled or withheld. The economy was in turmoil due to Gorbachev's reform policies. Gorbachev was seeking to improve relations with the West in order to give the Soviet Union time to recover. The change of course in the Soviet Union, with perestroika and glasnost, could help improve relations with the West and possibly lead to an end to the Cold War. However, U.S. officials were still concerned that Gorbachev seeking détente could harm the unity within NATO.⁵⁹

When Gorbachev spoke about abolishing the Warsaw Pact and NATO, both Bush and Scowcroft perceived this as the Soviet Union trying to undermine the U.S. dominant position in Europe. Additionally, the rhetoric of Gorbachev, referring to the countries of the European continent belonging to the "common European home", was perceived by some American

⁵⁵ Sparrow. 'Realism's Practitioner: Brent Scowcroft and the Making of the New World Order, 1989–1993.' p. 166.

⁵⁶ Horovitz. 'The George H.W. Bush Administration's Policies Vis-à-Vis Central Europe: From Cautious Encouragement to Cracking Open NATO's Door.' p. 72.

⁵⁷ Chollett and Goldgeier. *America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11: The Misunderstood Years Between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Start of the War on Terror.* pp. 30, 47, 218, 510.

⁵⁸ Shiffrinson. 'Eastbound and Down: The United States, NATO Enlargement, and Suppressing the Soviet and Western European Alternatives, 1990–1992.' p. 822.

⁵⁹ CIA Directorate of Intelligence. 'Moscow's 1989 Agenda for US-Soviet Relations.' Intelligence Assessment by the Office of Soviet Analysis. January 3, 1989. Collection: The Princeton Collection. Document Number: 0000499112. ; Horovitz. 'The George H.W. Bush Administration's Policies Vis-à-Vis Central Europe: From Cautious Encouragement to Cracking Open NATO's Door.' p. 72.

officials that the U.S. was a guest in Europe, with an invitation that could be withdrawn at any given point.⁶⁰

In March 1989, Brent Scowcroft wrote a memorandum for Bush, outlining the premises that should guide the development of the U.S.'s overall strategy towards the Soviet Union, the subject of the document being "Getting ahead of Gorbachev."⁶¹ Scowcroft suggested several approaches to counter Soviet policy and recommendations for the U.S. strategic approach towards the Soviet Union. Scowcroft suggested the U.S. should counter Gorbachev's rhetoric of a "common European home" by "pointing out that we remain in that home as welcome guests, not as with the Soviets in Eastern Europe, as occupiers."⁶² When assessing Gorbachev and Soviet policy Scowcroft wrote that "Weakening NATO remains his [Gorbachev's] prime international objective." Furthermore, Scowcroft wrote: "One of the aims of Soviet policy is to distance us from our friends."⁶³

In the memorandum, Scowcroft emphasised that the U.S. must "send a clear signal that relations with our allies are our first priority."⁶⁴ Scowcroft recommended that Bush reaffirm America's commitment to its allies and Europe by having a "major speech dealing with Europe"⁶⁵ before the upcoming NATO summit.

It is also clear that from Scowcroft's point of view early on in the Bush administration, the U.S. being a force for stability in Europe was important. Scowcroft wrote to Bush: "As uncertainties grow, we must preserve the traditional pillars of American postwar strength: military power, economic resilience, firm alliances and skillful diplomacy."⁶⁶ Scowcroft continued: "Clearly, it would be unwise to walk away from a successful strategy, which had brought us to this point."⁶⁷ His perspective of the changes that occurred was arguably rooted in the experiences of the Second World War, just as Bush's perspective.⁶⁸ In his view, the Marshall Plan and later NATO were key in hindering further Soviet expansionism in the wake of the

⁶⁰ Sayle. *Enduring Alliance a History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order*. p. 219.

⁶¹ NSA. 'Scowcroft to Bush. "Getting Ahead of Gorbachev."' March 1, 1989. Collection: The Last Superpower Summits. Doc. 14.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Sparrow. 'Realism's Practitioner: Brent Scowcroft and the Making of the New World Order, 1989–1993.' p. 148.

Second World War.⁶⁹ Scowcroft, himself said in an oral history interview that he had a “very traditional view of the Cold War.”⁷⁰

These statements assist in understanding the rationale for keeping NATO the primary security institution. NATO was a relatively well-functioning security institution in which the U.S. had a dominant role. The alternatives were to create new security institutions in Europe, in which the U.S. would have a diminished role and influence in Europe, and the Soviet Union would possibly have a more prominent role.

On the role of the U.S. in the future, Scowcroft wrote: “Finally you [Bush] will, in due course, need to lay out a vision of American power as a global stabilizing force in its own right. Whatever the state of the U.S.-Soviet relations, America will continue to have interests abroad to defend.”⁷¹ The preference for stability and scepticism of Gorbachev’s reforms were established early on in the mind of National Security Advisor Scowcroft. An interesting recommendation from Scowcroft in this March 1989 memorandum, is when he is writing about Eastern European states:

We may wish to undertake initiatives with Eastern Europe. The East Europeans, to varying degrees, are taking advantage of Gorbachev’s invitation to exercise greater control over their own affairs. Eastern Europe is a weak link in Gorbachev’s strategy. We should exploit this but must do so in a prudent way.⁷²

This recommendation arguably indicates that Scowcroft was thinking early on about establishing new relations with Eastern European Warsaw Pact member states before the it was dissolved.

The belief within the U.S. administration that NATO should remain regardless of the changes that occurred in Europe and that NATO should handle any potential change in the existing conditions in Cold War Europe was grounded in realpolitik considerations, an assessment of the balance of power and military power in Europe. The Bush administration believed that U.S. presence on the European continent was necessary to keep stability in Europe, and NATO was crucial in this regard.⁷³ The realpolitik perspective can be exemplified

⁶⁹ University of Virginia Miller Center. ‘Brent Scowcroft Oral History Part I.’ November 12-13, 1999. Available at: <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/brent-scowcroft-oral-history-part-i>.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ NSA. ‘Scowcroft to Bush, “Getting Ahead of Gorbachev.”’ March 1, 1989.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Sparrow. ‘Realism’s Practitioner: Brent Scowcroft and the Making of the New World Order, 1989–1993.’ ; Shiffrinson. ‘Eastbound and Down: The United States, NATO Enlargement, and Suppressing the Soviet and Western European Alternatives, 1990–1992.’

by a letter from the national security advisor Brent Scowcroft on March 20 1989, writing to Bush: “Whether or not the Cold War ended, the Red Army would remain the dominant military power on the Eurasian land mass [...] geopolitical realities will endure.”⁷⁴

President Bush was thinking strategically about the future of Europe already in November 1989, two weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall, evident in a conversation between him and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher on November 24, 1989, at Camp David. Bush told Thatcher: “Leave out East Germany. What if East European countries want to leave Warsaw Pact. NATO must stay.”⁷⁵ Put differently, Bush implied that if the eastern European Warsaw Pact member states were considering an exit from their forced military Alliance with Moscow, the question would be what they would do after abandoning the Pact.

Bush viewed NATO as the primary security institution in Europe and the U.S.’s main link to the continent. Thus, NATO’s pre-eminence needed to be secured. As Thatcher and Bush discussed the future of Germany in April 1990, Bush argued that: “We need to persuade the public that NATO shall remain vital. [...] For the U.S., NATO represents our principal link to Europe. I think it is vital that the U.S. maintain itself in Europe, but without a vigorous NATO, I don’t see how this can be done.”⁷⁶

2. Russian Strategic Culture and National Security Advisors’ Influence

The Bush administration’s cautious approach towards the Soviet Union was shared by U.S. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and his Deputy Robert Gates. Both Scowcroft and Gates were aware of the importance of having a buffer zone for the Soviets and, later, the Russian Federation. Simultaneously, it is reasonable to assume that both realised the importance of keeping the U.S. engaged in Europe and making NATO the primary security institution due to their understanding of Russian history.⁷⁷ When Scowcroft was asked in an oral history interview whether he thought communist states were inherently expansionist, his answer was:

⁷⁴ Quoted in: Sayle. *Enduring Alliance a History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order*. p. 218.

⁷⁵ GBPL. ‘Memcon, Re: Meeting at Camp David. [redacted].’ Meeting Between President Bush and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. November 24, 1989.

⁷⁶ GBPL. ‘Memcon between President Bush and PM Margaret Thatcher.’ April 13, 1990.

⁷⁷ University of Virginia Miller Center. ‘Robert M. Gates Oral History.’ July 23-24, 2000. Available at: <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/robert-m-gates-deputy-director-central>.

But one of the things that I did get from my study of Russia was that here is a country, without natural boundaries and borders, open to invasion—which had happened over and over again. And I concluded that one of the ways they sought to maintain the security of their heartland was by expanding their borders and having more strategic room.⁷⁸

National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and his deputy Robert Gates were both arguably influenced by the thinking of Zbigniew Brzezinski, who had been National Security advisor during Jimmy Carter’s presidency.⁷⁹ Gates telling in an oral history interview:

I was also very much influenced by Brzezinski. Brzezinski and I had a very similar view of the Soviet Union. I suppose I should say I shared his views to an uncommon degree. And, to a considerable extent, Scowcroft’s as well because he had focused more on Russia and the Soviet Union in contrast to Kissinger who really hadn’t.⁸⁰

Brzezinski’s geopolitical thinking derived arguably from the American Political Scientist Nicholas Spykman, who had adopted British Geographer Halford Mackinder’s heartland theory. The heartland theory stipulated that Central Europe’s rimland was vital in deciding the fate of world politics.⁸¹ Spykman urged U.S. policymakers to remain engaged in Europe to counter possible Soviet dominance on the continent. In Brzezinski’s view, control of the Eurasian landmass was essential to dominate the world and possessing control in Eurasia could potentially lead to victory in the Cold War.⁸²

In order to understand Scowcroft’s and Gates’s geopolitical reasoning, it is necessary to explain Russian strategic thinking and history briefly. Russia began its territorial expansion in the middle of the sixteenth century, and this expansion was pursued due to the lack of physical barriers to protect the country from belligerent states. The expansion of Russia was directed westwards towards Europe, eastwards in Siberia, and towards the Eurasian landmass in south and south-east in Central-Asia and the Caucasus. Due to the geography of the Russian state, being a massive landmass country with no natural barriers to separate Russia from Europe and having been engaged in several conflicts with European countries, having a “buffer zone” to

⁷⁸ University of Virginia Miller Center. ‘Brent Scowcroft Oral History Part I.’ November 12-13, 1999.

⁷⁹ University of Virginia Miller Center. ‘Robert M. Gates Oral History.’ July 23-24, 2000.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Knutsen. ‘Halford J. Mackinder, Geopolitics, and the Heartland Thesis.’ p. 849. ; Ortmann and Whittaker, ‘Geopolitics and Grand Strategy.’ pp. 314-316. ; Brzezinski has later formulated his ideas and laid out his vision for the U.S. strategy in the post-Cold War in a book published in 1997: Brzezinski. *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic Imperatives*.

⁸² Ibid.

create a barrier between Russia and Europe has been a key element of Russian strategic thinking to enhance the security of the state. Just as the Russian Empire pursued territorial expansion, so did the Soviet state after the Bolsheviks consolidated their power between the 1917 revolution and 1924. The Soviets did expand their territories and regained most of the territories under the Romanov empire.⁸³ On account of knowing the history of the Russian state, Scowcroft and Gates had little faith in the statements Gorbachev made.⁸⁴ Arguably, they were right in their assessment as the restoration of safety and order in several post-soviet states became an essential objective in Russian foreign policy after 1993.

Russia's new military doctrine: "The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation", was approved by the Russian Federation Security Council and signed by President Yeltsin on November 2, 1993.⁸⁵ The military doctrine points out that one of the main external threats against the Russian Federation is: "The expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the interests of the Russian Federation's military security."⁸⁶ One of the main internal threats that was pointed out: "Illegal activity by nationalist, separatist, or other organizations which is aimed at destabilizing the situation in the Russian Federation or violating its territorial integrity and which is carried out using armed violence."⁸⁷ After Russia's new military doctrine came into effect, a series of Russian interventions took place in various conflict areas in former Soviet republics. By 1994, Russia had engaged militarily in civil wars in Tajikistan and Georgia. By the end of 1994, on December 11, Russia initiated the first Russian-Chechen, which lasted until August 1996.⁸⁸

National Security Advisor Scowcroft did have a close relationship with Bush, both having similar world views rooted in the lessons learned of the Second World War. It has been argued that Scowcroft was probably the most influential individual crafting U.S. grand strategy and foreign policy, except for the president himself during Bush's 1989-1993 period.⁸⁹ Hence, due to the unstable and unpredictable situation during Bush's term, as the Cold War was coming

⁸³ Rumer and Sokolsky. 'Etched in Stone: Russian Strategic Culture and the Future of Transatlantic Security.'

⁸⁴ University of Virginia Miller Center. 'Robert M. Gates Oral History.' July 23-24, 2000. ;

University of Virginia Miller Center. 'Brent Scowcroft Oral History Part I.' November 12-13, 1999.

⁸⁵ Электронный фонд правовых и нормативно-технических документов. 'Указ Президента Российской Федерации Об Основных положениях военной доктрины Российской Федерации.' [Electronic Fund of Legal and Regulatory Technical Documents. 'Decree of the President of the Russian Federation On the Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation'] N. 1833. November 2, 1993. Available at: <https://docs.cntd.ru/document/901111635>.

⁸⁶ Federation of American Scientists. 'The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.'

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Wallander. 'Global Challenges and Russian Foreign Policy.' p. 456. ; Lynch. 'The Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy.' p. 10.

⁸⁹ Sparrow. 'Realism's Practitioner: Brent Scowcroft and the Making of the New World Order, 1989-1993.' pp. 148-149.

to an end, the Warsaw Pact was dissolving, and the Soviet Union was disintegrating, the Bush administration's approach towards the Soviet Union was of a cautious nature. The U.S. was hedging towards the Soviet Union by engaging and balancing. It was engaging the Soviet Union by opening up for discussions on the future European security architecture for Europe through the CSCE, when the U.S. was in reality not interested in developing a new security architecture. It was balancing the Soviet Union by ensuring that Germany reunified within NATO, keeping U.S. troops stationed in Europe, and reaching out to former Warsaw Pact states as the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union collapsed. The Bush administration's primary concern was to keep stability on the continent and remain within the European continent.

3. The Narrative of NATO Enlargement

The men who arguably initiated the fight over NATO enlargement, former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and former United States Secretary of State James Baker, have both, in more recent years, attempted to change the narrative of what happened in the formative years of 1990-1991. In a 2014 interview in "Russia Beyond the Headlines", a Russian publication founded by Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Gorbachev was asked about NATO expansion and the alleged promises made by James Baker in 1990. Gorbachev told the interviewer:

The topic of "NATO expansion" was not discussed at all, and it wasn't brought up in those years. I say this with full responsibility. Not a single [sic] Eastern European country raised the issue, not even after the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist in 1991. Western leaders didn't bring it up, either.⁹⁰

Speaking of himself in third person and deflecting the blame on the subsequent administration, telling that the decision by the U.S. and NATO to expand the Alliance eastwards occurred in 1993 (after Gorbachev was out of office), Gorbachev went on to instruct the interviewer to "don't portray Gorbachev and the then-Soviet authorities as naïve people who were wrapped around the West's finger. If there was naïveté, it was later, when the issue arose."⁹¹

However, Gorbachev's own statements that he made in 2014 do not match the historical record. In a conversation between French President Mitterrand and Gorbachev on May 25, 1990, Gorbachev shared his concerns about the U.S. efforts in attracting the East-European states and the attempts of pulling these states towards NATO; Gorbachev said in the conversation: "I told Baker: we are aware of your favourable attitude towards the intention

⁹⁰ Kórshunov. 'Mikhail Gorbachev: I am against all walls.'

⁹¹ Ibid.

expressed by a number of representatives of Eastern European countries to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and subsequently join NATO”⁹². Furthermore, Gorbachev also stated his concerns about U.S. efforts in trying to perpetuate NATO: “The Americans’ persistence in defending the idea of NATO’s necessity and usefulness makes me wonder: are the Americans thinking to use NATO to create some sort of mechanism, an institution, a kind of directory for managing world affairs?”.⁹³ Gorbachev’s suspicion was later justified, as NATO was later transformed throughout the 1990s into a more political organisation. NATO took upon itself different roles, such as peacekeeping roles in Yugoslavia during Bill Clinton’s tenure and later engaging in numerous conflict areas throughout the world.⁹⁴

It is clear from archival documents that the future of NATO and NATO enlargement was discussed. In a conversation between Gorbachev and Baker on February 9, 1990, Baker said: “We understand the need for assurances to the countries in the East. If we maintain a presence in a Germany that is a part of NATO, there would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east”.⁹⁵ Further on in the conversation, Baker posed the question:

Let’s assume for the moment that unification is going to take place. Assuming that, would you prefer a united Germany outside of NATO that is independent and has no U.S. forces or would you prefer a united Germany with ties to NATO and assurances that there would be no extension of NATO’s current jurisdiction eastward?⁹⁶

In the memorandum of the conversation, Gorbachev’s answer has been redacted by U.S. Classification officers. However, in a letter sent to Chancellor of Germany Helmut Kohl from Baker the proceeding day, Baker mentions the question he asked Gorbachev the previous day, stating that Gorbachev’s response to Baker’s question about the potential extension of NATO beyond Germany was: “Certainly any extension of the zone of NATO would be unacceptable.”⁹⁷ However, Gorbachev did not attain any written agreement from Baker on the statements made. Later, Baker backtracked and refined his statements, arguing that his

⁹² NSA. ‘From the One-on-One Conversation of M.S. Gorbachev with F. Mitterrand.’ Record of conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Francois Mitterrand (excerpts) May 25, 1990. Collection: NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard. Doc. 19.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Greitens. ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations.’ pp. 284-286. ; Østerud and Toje. ‘Strategy Risk and Threat Perceptions in NATO.’ pp. 77-81.

⁹⁵ NSA. ‘Memcon between Mikhail Gorbachev and James Baker in Moscow.’ February 9, 1990.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ NSA. ‘Letter from James Baker to Helmut Kohl.’ February 10, 1990. Collection: NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard. Doc. 8.

comments were on whether NATO troops would be deployed in East Germany, not on whether East German territory would be in NATO.⁹⁸

A number of analysts, scholars and former government officials have gone on repeating the statements made by Gorbachev that NATO enlargement was not discussed during Gorbachev's time and in the case it was discussed, it was only limited to the question of German reunification, and did not apply to the Eastern and Central Europe. This includes scholars of political science such as James Goldgeier and Mark Kramer. More recently, on March 16, 2022, the former Under Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs during the Bush administration, Robert Zoellick, said in an interview that there were no promises made not to enlarge NATO. Zoellick said: "I was in those meetings, and Gorbachev has [also] said there was no promise not to enlarge NATO."⁹⁹ NATO has also argued that "The idea of NATO expansion beyond a united Germany was not on the agenda in 1989", referencing the 2014 interview with Gorbachev.¹⁰⁰

Political scientist Goldgeier stated in the article "Promises Made, Promises Broken? What Yeltsin was Told about NATO in 1993 and why it Matters" that: "the 1990 conversation was limited to discussion about unified Germany's status in NATO. There was no promise or even a discussion about countries like Poland and Hungary."¹⁰¹ Furthermore, in his article "NATO Enlargement and the Problem of Value Complexity", Goldgeier promotes the statement made by Gorbachev in an interview with Maxim Korshunov in 2014 for the Russian news outlet *Russia Beyond the Headlines*. Goldgeier wrote in the article: "Gorbachev himself said later that the conversations they held in 1990 were solely about Germany rather than all of Eastern Europe."¹⁰² Goldgeier acknowledges that Gorbachev made the statement in discussions with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker that: "Certainly any extension of the zone of NATO would be unacceptable".¹⁰³ However, Goldgeier has interpreted this statement to be pertaining solely to the unification of Germany, by inserting his own interpretation in square brackets []. Goldgeier writes: "Certainly any extension of the zone of NATO [into GDR territory] would be unacceptable". Arguably, it is questionable to interpret Gorbachev's statement: "any extension of the zone of NATO would be unacceptable" to solely pertain to East and West Germany. Mark Kramer has claimed that "the issue [of NATO expansion] never came up during

⁹⁸ Sayle. *Enduring Alliance a History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order*. p. 225.

⁹⁹ Neal. 'There was no promise to enlarge NATO.'

¹⁰⁰ NATO. 'NATO-Russia Setting the Record Straight.'

¹⁰¹ Goldgeier. 'Promises Made, Promise Broken? What Yeltsin was Told about NATO in 1993 and why it Matters.'

¹⁰² Goldgeier. 'NATO Enlargement and the Problem of Value Complexity.' p. 154.

¹⁰³ NSA. 'Letter from James Baker to Helmut Kohl.' February 10, 1990.

the negotiations on German reunification”.¹⁰⁴ Historians Kristina Spohr and Christopher Clark have claimed that “the Russians never raised the question of NATO enlargement, other than in respect of the former East Germany”.¹⁰⁵

Taking a strictly formalistic point of view, it is correct that there were no written guarantees or assurances in the form of a treaty or any legal document prohibiting NATO from expanding eastwards. However, it is only partly true historically speaking, as archival material shows that the topic was indeed discussed during the negotiations process on the reunification of Germany.

4. Constraining Other Alternatives to NATO

Moscow’s desire to establish a new security architecture through the CSCE was perceived by the Bush administration as potentially harming U.S. influence in Europe. The CIA Office of Soviet Analysis assessed in June 1990 that the Soviet Union’s desire to construct new institutions and mechanisms through the CSCE was a way of enhancing and keeping Soviet influence in Europe and preventing the Soviet Union from becoming a small actor in Europe. The CIA assessed Soviet aspirations of reducing the role of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and the Soviet desire for a new Europe: “cuts at the very heart of NATO’s raison d’être: it would reduce US influence by entangling Washington’s security input in an unwieldy 35- nation process”.¹⁰⁶ When Gorbachev spoke of a European continent belonging to a “common European home”, American officials interpreted this as Gorbachev implying that the U.S. does not belong to the European continent. The concept of a “Common European home” and other peace-enhancing détente policies by Gorbachev was perceived as attempts by the Soviets to gain influence in Europe and strengthen the Soviet position in Europe.¹⁰⁷

Both Bush and Scowcroft were cautious and suspicious of the rhetoric of Gorbachev, both his prospects and his motives. Scowcroft believed that Gorbachev was aiming to restore a new socialist economic and political system, with the goal of rejuvenating the Soviet Union to compete with the West. They had little faith in the reforms of Gorbachev and were wary of his motives; they viewed Gorbachev’s attempts to reform the Soviet Union as a way of competing with the West and undermining the U.S. position in Europe.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ Kramer. ‘The Myth of a NO-NATO Enlargement Pledge to Russia.’ p. 41.

¹⁰⁵ Clark and Spohr. ‘Moscow’s Account of NATO Expansion is a Case of False Memory Syndrome.’

¹⁰⁶ CIA Directorate of Intelligence. ‘Moscow’s Push for a New European Order.’ Intelligence Assessment by the Office of Soviet Analysis. May 5, 1990. Collection: The Princeton Collection. Document number: 0000499602.

¹⁰⁷ Sayle. *Enduring Alliance a History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order*. p. 219.

¹⁰⁸ Bush and Scowcroft. *A World Transformed*. pp. 12-14.

The CIA intelligence assessment from June 1990 concluded that Soviet efforts to create a new Pan-European forum would “present major challenges to the United States’ ability to maintain its current level of influence on the Continent.”¹⁰⁹ Moreover, the report ends with: “In the near term, the United States must contend with initiatives designed to put the Pan-European process on a fast track.”¹¹⁰

Fundamentally, U.S. leaders in the post-Cold War era were interested in preserving NATO as a way for the U.S. to exert its power, and therefore turned their attention eastwards in order to hedge against a future re-emerging Russia. A challenge the U.S. faced in the formative years of 1991-1992 was how to ensure the pre-eminence of NATO as the key security structure in Europe, as any alternative European security structures would threaten NATO’s dominance and consequently the U.S. influence in Europe.¹¹¹ In this regard, the development of the CSCE into a potential new security structure for Europe was viewed as damaging to U.S. strategic interests. Furthermore, Western European states such as France and Germany began by 1991 to investigate ways to speed up the EC integration, increase involvement in foreign policy and defence matters, and advocate for the creation of a unified EC security policy as a possible alternative to NATO. French President Mitterrand was especially interested in the possibilities for the EC/EU to take upon itself the role of ensuring stability on the continent by expanding the responsibilities of the EC/EU through European integration.¹¹² The contours of this vision can be seen to a degree after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, when the EU decided to define and implement a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).¹¹³

By Mid-1992, the French ideas of creating any other alternative security structure in Europe were losing traction. There was a consensus in the U.S. administration on the future of security structures in Europe. Although French President Mitterrand still had hopes for developing European security arrangements, telling in a meeting with Bush: “At the same time the threat of war is receding, it seems you want NATO’s mission to expand. [...] What does the U.S. want more than it had before?”. Moreover, Mitterrand began speaking of the future of the Franco-German Corps, referring to it as an “embryo” and saying that it would take “25 years or longer” for the Europeans to develop their own security on the continent. Foreign Secretary Baker responded, saying that the U.S. concern is that the “embryo will grow into a rooster and

¹⁰⁹ CIA Directorate of Intelligence. ‘Moscow’s Push for a New European Order.’

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Shifrinson. ‘Eastbound and Down: The United States, NATO Enlargement, and Suppressing the Soviet and Western European Alternatives, 1990–1992.’ p. 841.

¹¹² Bozo. ‘Mitterrand’s France, the End of the Cold War, and German Unification: A Reappraisal.’ pp. 467-68.

¹¹³ McCormick, *European Union Politics*. p. 432.

be duplicative of NATO.”¹¹⁴ Further on, Baker stated: “We have no problem with the European defense identity if it complements NATO, but doesn’t duplicate it”¹¹⁵

The U.S. was not interested in replacing NATO with the CSCE, as there was a belief within the Bush administration that it would potentially lead to American troops having to withdraw from the European continent, which would weaken U.S. influence in Europe.¹¹⁶ In the view of foreign secretary James Baker, the CSCE was “an extremely unwieldy and frustrating organization.”¹¹⁷ The preoccupation with keeping NATO the primary security institution in Europe in the post-Cold War era was arguably also connected to the realist, pragmatic-oriented approach of the Bush administration.¹¹⁸ Firstly, Bush’s perspective of the U.S.’s role in the world and Europe was rooted in the first half of the 20th century. The U.S. was a “European power”, not just a power in Europe. Secondly, Bush’s focus was on managing great power relations and keeping stability in the region. Innovative, bold ideas and new solutions for a new era were not the focus of Bush.¹¹⁹

From Bush’s point of view, the Atlantic Alliance structure and the containment strategy were successful, and he did not see the need to change something that had worked. The success of the American strategy provided the Bush administration with a framework for the path forward in the post-Cold War world. Instead of developing or enacting a new strategy for a new international order, Bush planned to lead the transatlantic order that the U.S. had sought to establish throughout the Cold War.¹²⁰

As historian Mary Sarotte has argued, the U.S. used the “prefab model”; the prefabricated institutions. Meaning that the U.S. pushed for keeping the institutions that were already in place as the cold war ended, for military and international cooperation, and for domestic order; and that these institutions were simply just extended eastward. The benefits of the prefab model were that it was an easy, quick solution and that both NATO and the EC had proven to be structurally capable of expanding responsibilities and submitting new members. The Western institutions had proven themselves to be successful and durable. Expanding Cold War structures such as NATO was the simple solution. The issue was that the rationale for NATO was to deter and counter the Soviet threat, and it made it difficult to accommodate for

¹¹⁴ GBPL. ‘Memcon, meeting between POTUS and President Mitterrand.’ July 5, 1992.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Snyder. ‘Beyond Containment? The First Bush Administration’s Sceptical Approach to the CSCE.’ p. 477.

¹¹⁷ Baker and DeFrank. *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992*. p. 173.

¹¹⁸ Chollet and Goldgeier. *America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11: The Misunderstood Years Between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Start of the War on Terror*. pp. 47, 510.

¹¹⁹ Ibid. p. 47.

¹²⁰ Snyder. ‘Beyond Containment? The First Bush Administration’s Sceptical Approach to the CSCE.’ p. 484.

the former enemy, as the purpose of the Alliance had been to resist that enemy for more than 40 years.¹²¹

Baker's Promises to Gorbachev

The U.S. was hedging by engaging the Soviet Union in 1990 as U.S. officials signalled that they were interested in developing a new security structure through the CSCE, when in reality, this was not the case. Foreign Secretary Baker did present the U.S. position on the question of developing the CSCE as positive, writing in a memorandum for Bush summarising a four-hour meeting with the Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Bonn on May 4, 1990:

I also used your [Bush] speech and your recognition the need to adapt NATO, politically and militarily, and to develop CSCE to reassure Shevardnadze that the process would not yield winners and loser. Instead, it would produce a new legitimate European structure -- one that would be inclusive, not exclusive.¹²²

Baker did also signal the position of the U.S. on May 18, 1990, in a conversation with Gorbachev. He presented 9 points of assurances to prove that the U.S. was taking the Soviet Union's security concerns into account. In the eighth point, Baker said:

We have emphasized the importance of developing CSCE. CSCE can be a new institution in Europe. It can be developed into an institution. It can create a sense of inclusion not exclusion in Europe. It could create a role for both the Soviet Union and the Eastern Europeans. We know that if you are going to develop a unified Europe based on common values there has to be a vehicle to get us there. Institutionalizing CSCE is one possible vehicle and I see it as being a cornerstone over time in the development of a new Europe.¹²³

However, in the conversation, Baker also reveals the U.S.'s true position when he says: "It's great to talk about a Pan-European security structure and CSCE -- but CSCE today and that structure are a wonderful dream but today they are only a dream."¹²⁴ It appears that Baker realised that this was a slip of the tongue as later in the conversation, he corrects himself by

¹²¹ Sarotte. 1989: *The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe*. p. 8.

¹²² NSA. 'James A. Baker III, Memorandum for the President, "My meeting with Shevardnadze."' May 4, 1990. Collection: NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard. Doc. 17.

¹²³ NSA. 'Memcon, Secretary Baker and Mikhail Gorbachev.' [With cover note and underlining in President Bush's handwriting.] May 18, 1990. Collection: The Washington/Camp David Summit 30 Years Ago. Doc. 7.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

saying: “When I say CSCE is a dream I mean it is a dream right now.”¹²⁵ This seems to suggest that Baker wanted to indicate that there were still possibilities for developing this idea in the future. Bush also signalled his administration’s willingness to develop the CSCE, telling Gorbachev in a telephone conversation that in the context of the NATO London 1990 Summit: “We conveyed the idea of an expanded, stronger CSCE with new institutions in which the USSR can share and be part of the new Europe.”¹²⁶

The outcome of the 5-6 July 1990 NATO London Summit was a communique named the “London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance.” In the London Declaration, NATO allies and the U.S. outlined a set of policies revising the Alliance’s military strategy and invited the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact republics to “establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO.”¹²⁷ The London Declaration also proposed to the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization a non-aggression pact, and it also stated that the Alliance’s use of nuclear weapons would become weapons of “last resort.”¹²⁸ Furthermore, the London Declaration proposed strengthening the CSCE processes and the institutionalisation of the CSCE.¹²⁹

By offering to establish liaison missions with former adversaries, NATO was assisting the Soviet leadership in arguing to their hard-liners back home that NATO was truly transforming and no longer a threat to the Soviet Union. By issuing this statement, the U.S. and NATO were trying to smoothen the process of the German reunification. Both Shevardnadze and Gorbachev have later stated that the London Declaration was a significant impetus for the Soviet Union being able to accept the reunification of Germany within NATO.¹³⁰ The London Declaration also assisted them in quelling the internal opposition by showing that the Alliance was in a transformation phase and no longer an enemy of the Soviet Union, as it invited them to establish liaison missions.¹³¹ Gorbachev did himself state in a telephone conversation between him and Bush on July 17, 1990, that:

¹²⁵ NSA. ‘Memcon, Secretary Baker and Mikhail Gorbachev.’ 18 May 1990.

¹²⁶ GBPL. ‘Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush.’ (Henceforth cited as “Telcon.”) July 17, 1990.

¹²⁷ NATO. ‘Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (“The London Declaration”).’ July 5-6, 1990.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Spohr. ‘Precluded or Precedent-Setting? The “NATO Enlargement Question” in the Triangular Bonn-Washington-Moscow Diplomacy of 1990–1991.’ p. 46.

¹³¹ Ibid. p. 46.

I believe that without the meeting in Washington and at Camp David, without the results of the NATO Summit and the London Declaration, without the major work in my conversation with Kohl and your talks with Kohl, without the activities of our foreign economic agencies, without this real political action it would have been difficult to arrive at the proximity in our points of view.¹³²

Although Gorbachev confirmed that through closer communication and political discussions between himself, Kohl and Bush, they had achieved an understanding of each other's points of view, his wording by using "proximity" indicates that there were still outstanding disagreements left to resolve. Arguably, these outstanding disagreements had to be addressed at some point in the future by further discussions. Gorbachev was essential to the continuation of improving relations and understanding between the parties.

The Gorbachev Era is Effectively Over

It became more and more clear by the spring of 1991 that the Soviet Union was heading in a downward spiral. On April 10, 1991, the NSC staff requested an analysis by the CIA of the Gorbachev succession.¹³³ The analysis presented on April 29, 1991, was quite stark. The report initiates by stating: "The Gorbachev era is effectively over."¹³⁴ The assessment by the CIA points out that: "The traditionalists on whom Gorbachev has been politically dependent are openly distancing themselves from him. Many traditionalists at lower levels are actively organizing against Gorbachev."¹³⁵ Furthermore, assessing that the traditionalists would try to oust Gorbachev with a "legal veneer" or most likely "present Gorbachev with an ultimatum to comply or face arrest or death."¹³⁶ It ends the analysis by stating: "No matter what happens, the current political system in the Soviet Union is doomed."¹³⁷

The CIA assessment lists a number of Soviet officials, who they deem to be part of the traditionalist faction in the government and assesses the likelihood of each individual participating in a coup. Interestingly, a number of those listed participated in the failed August 19-21 1991, Soviet coup d'état attempt. Some of the potential conspirators that later participated in the August coup included: the premier of the Soviet Union Valentin Sergeevich Pavlov; the

¹³² GBPL. 'Telcon between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush.' July 17, 1990.

¹³³ NSA. 'Memorandum for John Helgerson, DCCI. From David C. Gompert/Ed A. Hewett. The Gorbachev Succession.' April 10, 1991. Collection: In Memoriam: Mikhail Gorbachev 1931-2022. Doc. 13.

¹³⁴ NSA. 'Directorate of Intelligence The Gorbachev Succession.' April 29, 1991. Collection: In Memoriam: Mikhail Gorbachev 1931-2022. Doc. 13.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

central control commission chairman Boris Karlovich Pugo; the defence minister Dmitry Timofeyevich Yazov; the chief of the Committee for State Security (KGB) Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov; and vice president of the Soviet Union Gennady Ivanovich Yanayev.¹³⁸

The ideas of Mitterrand of a pan-European confederation became increasingly unrealistic, due to how unstable the political situation had become in Moscow.¹³⁹ The unsuccessful coup accelerated the disintegration process of the Soviet Union and gave a significant push to Central and Eastern European states to seek membership in NATO.¹⁴⁰

Until August 1991, only two republics had declared independence: Georgia and Lithuania. After the failed coup, nine more republics declared independence. Ukraine was one of them, declaring independence on August 24, only days after the attempted coup in Moscow had occurred. Although the referendum vote on Ukrainian independence did not take place until December 1, 1991, Ukrainian leader Leonid Makarovych Kravchuk told Bush on September 25, 1991, that “We want direct, diplomatic relations with the U.S.”¹⁴¹ Kravchuk was fairly direct with Bush, telling Bush that: “The [Soviet] Union cannot exist in any serious form.”¹⁴² He went on to recommend Bush to begin initiating direct ties with the republics.¹⁴³

A Euro-Atlantic Community from Vancouver to Vladivostok

The Bush administration began establishing contact with the Soviet republics by the autumn of 1991, while still supporting Gorbachev. Before the upcoming NATO Rome Summit, which took place in November 1991, Bush discussed the goals of the summit with NATO General Secretary Manfred Wörner. Wörner told Bush on October 11, 1991, that a “new picture of NATO” was needed. Not a military alliance confronting the Soviet Union, but rather “a military alliance confronting instability and uncertainty, and as a political alliance gaining in importance for establishing and carrying out this new European and world order.”¹⁴⁴ Wörner continues,

¹³⁸ NSA. ‘Directorate of Intelligence The Gorbachev Succession.’ April 29, 1991.

¹³⁹ Sarotte. *Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate*. p. 119.

¹⁴⁰ Asmus. *Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era*. pp. 15-16.

¹⁴¹ GBPL. ‘Memcon Meeting between Bush and Leonid Kravchuk, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman.’ September 25, 1991. ; Solchanyk. ‘Ukraine, The (Former) Center, Russia, and “Russia.”’ p. 31.

¹⁴² GBPL. ‘Memcon Meeting between Bush and Leonid Kravchuk, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman.’ September 25, 1991.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ GBPL. ‘Memcon, The President’s Meeting with Secretary General of NATO Manfred Woerner.’ October 11, 1991.

saying that all the foreign ministers of the Visegrad countries, and Václav Havel and Lech Wałęsa, have turned to NATO and were expecting answers.¹⁴⁵

Eleven days later, Bush told Czechoslovakian leader Václav Havel on October 22, 1991: “We have now developed a vision of a Euro-Atlantic community, of which the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic is, of course, a member.”¹⁴⁶ Bush continues by saying: “We think it is in Czechoslovakia’s security interests that we stay”, before asking for input from Scowcroft. Scowcroft responded, saying: “We are interested in close relations, but there is a debate over how to expand and how fast.”¹⁴⁷

The NATO Rome Summit in November 1991 saw the birth of the NACC. The establishment of the NACC was a manifestation of the invitation given during the London Summit, to “establish regular diplomatic liaisons with NATO.”¹⁴⁸

The U.S. had already started rhetorically adjusting itself before the creation of the NACC. In a speech to the Aspen Institute on June 18 1991, Baker spoke about the ideas for the new architecture for a “New Europe” and a “New Atlanticism.” On the future of this architecture, Baker said: “We must begin to extend the transatlantic community to Central and Eastern Europe and to the Soviet Union.”¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, Baker said in the speech: “Our objective is both a Europe whole and free and a Euro-Atlantic community that extends east from Vancouver to Vladivostok.”¹⁵⁰ Arguably, these statements can be viewed as a way of reassuring the Soviet Union that they would be included in the future security architecture of Europe.

The declaration from the Rome Summit in November 1991 accentuated the fact that the security of NATO member states had become closely connected with the rest of Europe.¹⁵¹ Furthermore, a range of former Warsaw Pact member states, including the Soviet Union, were invited to join the NACC. The initiative made good sense, due to being so ambiguous with respect to the potential for future full NATO membership. By inviting a range of Warsaw Pact states, including the Soviet Union, the initiative was intended to be inclusive and nondifferential.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁵ GBPL. ‘Memcon, The President’s Meeting with Secretary General of NATO Manfred Woerner.’ October 11, 1991.

¹⁴⁶ GBPL. ‘Memcon, Meeting with Vaclav Havel, President of Czechoslovakia and Bush.’ October 22, 1991.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ NATO. ‘The London Declaration.’ July 5-6, 1990.

¹⁴⁹ Baker. ‘The Euro-Atlantic Architecture: From West to East.’ Secretary of State Baker’s Speech to the Aspen Institute. June 18, 1991.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ NATO. ‘Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation.’ November 8, 1991.

¹⁵² Ibid.

It is worth mentioning that Ukraine was not mentioned as one of the invited parties in the November Rome Summit Declaration.¹⁵³ This was arguably due to the contentious political relationship between Moscow and Kiev. The risk of internal conflicts arising in pro-Russian populated areas of Ukraine was significant, combined with both Russia and Ukraine being nuclear powers, led to Ukraine's invitation being postponed in November. It became, however, a founding member in December 1991.¹⁵⁴

Applications to join NACC were non-differentiated. This created further opaqueness, which was valuable for the U.S. and NATO as they sought to avoid clarifying the roles intended for NATO, the EC and CSCE. It was desirable at this point to obscure how the membership in NACC would influence the prospect for any of the NACC members to obtain full NATO membership.¹⁵⁵ By promoting this initiative and the mechanisms within, NATO and the U.S. were arguably hedging towards the Soviet Union. It was engaging by inviting the Soviet Union to join the NACC, while simultaneously balancing by tying former Central and Eastern European states closer to the Western alliance. The NACC opened the doors for Central and Eastern European states to initiate political cooperation on defence and security issues with NATO, while not alienating Moscow, due to the ambiguous nature of the NACC.

Essentially, the NACC initiative kept doors open for Central and Eastern European states' potential future further integration, or even full NATO membership, without specifying a timeframe for when and how. The NACC can be viewed as the predecessor to the Partnership for Peace (PfP), which was launched in 1994. The PfP offered the NACC members individual practical cooperation on their own terms.¹⁵⁶ By March 10, 1992, all the former Soviet Republics were officially NACC members, with the exception of Georgia, which was admitted a month later.¹⁵⁷

5. The Eastern and Central European States' Search for Security

The disintegration of the Soviet Union had a profound impact on the Warsaw Pact, upending the internal dynamic of security reassurance granted to each and every member of the Warsaw Pact. In this new situation, many member states found it necessary to reassess their national

¹⁵³ NATO. 'Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation.' November 8, 1991.

¹⁵⁴ NATO. 'Relations with Ukraine.' May 25, 2023. ; Sarotte. *Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate*. pp. 126-127.

¹⁵⁵ Sarotte. *Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate*. p. 126.

¹⁵⁶ NATO. 'The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991-1997).' September 9, 2022.

¹⁵⁷ Sarotte. *Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate*. p. 140.

security policy. The idea of NATO enlargement emerged partly as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, and the window of opportunity these events provided for NATO. European countries, as well as the U.S., were also interested in keeping political and military stability in the region and avoiding a balkanisation of Eastern and Central Europe.¹⁵⁸

A large part of the population of many Warsaw Pact member states were deeply unhappy with the political system in their countries. The Visegrad states had an active popular resistance to the Soviet political domination and command economy. There had been several attempts to break free from the communist system, which was suppressed every time by Soviet forces intervening in the various revolts. Notably, the anti-Soviet revolts in Hungary in 1956, and the Prague Spring in 1968. In Poland, the *Solidarność* (Solidarity) movement had a strong following in the 1980s. *Solidarność* was founded after the strikes in the summer of 1980 and led by later Polish president Lech Wałęsa.¹⁵⁹

As the Berlin wall crumbled, suddenly, the threat of Soviet intervention seemed less likely. Leaders of former Warsaw Pact member states realised that the threat of Soviet intervention was less realistic, and it prompted them to seek out alternative security arrangements for themselves. This paved the way for discussions involving potential future NATO membership. Initially, the Warsaw Pact member states saw towards the CSCE, EC and later EU in order to move towards the West. The issue was that the EC and CSCE were not developed well enough to provide any hard security such as NATO could.¹⁶⁰ In November 1990, the last president of Czechoslovakia, Václav Havel, told Bush:

With the collapse of communism in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and other countries, we may be facing a temporary vacuum as all the old links cease to exist. It could be breeding ground for chaos and instability. Our democracies are just emerging. To fill this vacuum is not just our problem; it is also an obligation of the West.¹⁶¹

The rhetoric from the Visegrad leaders became sharper a few months later. The Warsaw Pact had been in the process of disintegration since the summer of 1990, and it was only a question of when it would fall apart. By January 1991, only some officers from the member nations remained in the Moscow Staff of the Joint Armed Forces. At the start of 1991, only four of the

¹⁵⁸ Asmus. *Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era*. pp. 7-8.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.* p. 7.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.* pp. 11-12.

¹⁶¹ GBPL. 'Memcon between Bush and Havel.' November 18, 1990.

40-50 Czechoslovak officers who were stationed there in the late 1980s were still there. On February 25, 1991, the Warsaw Pact was declared disbanded. It was, however, not until July 1, 1991 that it was formally disbanded.¹⁶² In the context of this, Central and Eastern European leaders began seeking to establish closer ties with the West as the demise of communism was clear. On March 20, 1991, Polish president Lech Wałęsa told Bush in a conversation that: “We resolutely desire to join Western Europe and the United States in political, economic and military terms.” Furthermore, Wałęsa continued: “We are ready to do deals in every area, including the military area.”¹⁶³ Five months later, communist hardliners attempted a coup against Gorbachev by holding him captive from August 19 to August 21, 1991. Although the coup failed, it severely weakened Gorbachev’s position in favour of Boris Yeltsin. It became clearer that the Soviet Union failed to stabilise. On December 25, 1991, the new first president of the Russian Federation ordered the Soviet sickle and hammer flag flying over the Kremlin to be replaced with the Russian tricolour flag. As the Soviet Union disappeared, seventy years of geopolitical legacy came abruptly to an end.¹⁶⁴

Some Warsaw Pact member states, who had concerns about their national security in this new situation, viewed closer integration with the West as a viable solution for these concerns. On the other hand, one of the U.S. rationales for expanding the Atlantic Alliance eastwards was the American fear of the growing apathy towards NATO in populations of many member states.¹⁶⁵ The concern for future U.S. access to bases in Europe was already raised in March 1989 in a Review of National Defense Strategy. Additionally, the potential for widespread pacifism and environmental concern in Western Europe was also raised.¹⁶⁶

The U.S. realised that the antinuclear sentiment, especially among the younger European voters, was strong in several of the allied countries. Furthermore, Washington was worried that the unification of Germany could lead to increased public support among the United German public to remove American presence and weapons from German soil. The issue for the Americans was that most of the alliance members in Europe did not feel “threatened enough” to host American bases. As the Soviet Union disintegrated, the threat embodied in the Warsaw Pact more or less vanished, as the threat of Soviet expansion became quite unlikely. On the other hand, the former Warsaw Pact member states were eagerly motivated to contribute to the Atlantic Alliance and support the U.S. in their foreign policy endeavours. The Central

¹⁶² Matějka. ‘How the Warsaw Pact Was Dissolved.’ pp. 62-63.

¹⁶³ GBPL. ‘Memcon between Walesa and Bush.’ March 20, 1991.

¹⁶⁴ Tsygankov. ‘Mastering Space in Eurasia: Russia’s Geopolitical Thinking After the Soviet Break-up.’ p. 104.

¹⁶⁵ Sayle. *Enduring Alliance a History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order*. p. 239.

¹⁶⁶ GBPL. ‘National Security Review 12, Subject: Review of National Defense Strategy.’ March 3, 1989.

European and Eastern European states had real security concerns considering the fact that they had recently broken with an empire that was facing a disbandment process.¹⁶⁷ By April 1992, Tom Niles, the Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs at the U.S. State Department, wrote to Robert Zoellick, then Undersecretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs: “Whether a given U.S. army brigade would be more welcome in Germany or in Poland in 1995, we’d put money on the latter.”¹⁶⁸ Furthermore, he expressed his evaluation that army bases in Poland would be possible to acquire at a lower cost. Niles continued his reasoning by stating that if NATO was going to continue: “we need more real estate.”¹⁶⁹

6. Economic Rationale

Economic considerations for expanding the Atlantic Alliance were also arguably taken into account by the Bush administration. Although the Bush administration did not oppose closer European integration, the administration still feared that more integration could lead to protectionism.¹⁷⁰

An interesting transition note from the departing Secretary of State Lawrence Sidney Eagleburger to his successor from the Clinton administration, Warren Christopher, sheds light on the economic rationale for expanding the Atlantic Alliance. In this transition note, Eagleburger repeatedly emphasises the importance of U.S. economic interests and how they relate to national security. Eagleburger recommends restructuring the NSC: “The basic challenge is to adapt to a world in which economic interests are more central to national security than they were forty-five years ago.” Eagleburger continues: “NSC staff will need to reflect the reality that it is hard to separate ‘economic security’ from ‘national security.’”¹⁷¹ In the view of the departing Secretary of State, the U.S. needs to “employ the broadest definition of security, viewing pursuit of economic growth, democratic political values, conflict resolution, and military arrangements increasingly as parts of an integrated whole.”¹⁷² Eagleburger wrote to Christopher:

¹⁶⁷ Sayle. *Enduring Alliance a History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order*. p. 239.

¹⁶⁸ Quoted in Sayle. *Enduring Alliance a History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order*. p. 239. ; Also referenced in Sarotte. *Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate*. pp. 141-142.

¹⁶⁹ Quoted in Sayle. *Enduring Alliance a History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order*. p. 239.

¹⁷⁰ GBPL. ‘Memcon, ‘Meeting between President Bush and Jacques Delors, President of the European Economic Community.’ April 24, 1990.

¹⁷¹ NSA. ‘Memorandum for Secretary of State-Designate Warren Christopher from Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Parting Thoughts: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Years Ahead.’ January 5, 1993. Collection: Launching the Clinton Administration Russia Policy in 1993. Doc. 1.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

Second, in the absence of a global military threat, the most important global challenge we face is the emergence of an increasingly interdependent and competitive international economy. Creating and sustaining jobs at home depends more and more on exports, which in turn depend upon both renewed growth in the world economy and improved American competitiveness. We face stiffer and stiffer competition from our closest allies, continued obstacles in protected markets in Europe and Asia, as well as the danger of a collapse of order in the global trading system.¹⁷³

The US was experiencing trade obstacles when exporting to Europe, because of EU trade policy and protection of the European common market. By pursuing a policy of inviting former Warsaw Pact member states into NATO, one could surmise that ulterior motives might have been twofold: Firstly, to expand the alliance with new member states assumed to be more supportive of US viewpoints within NATO and thus diminish the relative influence of existing member states less enthusiastic about US positions. Secondly, to gain access to new markets in Europe and develop trade relations with potential future member states in the EU, thus creating friendly alliances with future EU member states that were assumed to take U.S. interests into consideration when it comes to international trade.¹⁷⁴

The fear of EU trade protectionism had lingered for some years already in the Bush administration. Especially the protectionist Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which had been one of the main topics of U.S. and Western Europe's trade disputes.¹⁷⁵ The Bush administration had outlined its objectives and goals in the 1990 National Security Strategy Report. The report states that U.S. interests and objectives in the 1990s were to "promote an open and expanding international economic system with minimal distortions to trade and investment."¹⁷⁶ In 1990, Bush was pleading with Jacques Delors, President of the European Economic Community: "I would therefore ask you to use your personal influence with the EC member states in order to ensure that we work together towards the successful termination of the Uruguay Round."¹⁷⁷ The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay Round

¹⁷³ NSA. 'Memorandum for Secretary of State-Designate Warren Christopher from Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Parting Thoughts: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Years Ahead.' January 5, 1993.

¹⁷⁴ Horowitz and Götz. 'The Overlooked Importance of Economics: Why the Bush Administration Wanted NATO Enlargement.' pp. 861-862.

¹⁷⁵ CIA Directorate of Intelligence. 'EC Agricultural policy: Impact of German Unification and East European Reforms.' August 1, 1990. Collection: FOIA Collection. Document Number: 06296175. Case Number: F-2017-01874.

¹⁷⁶ GBPL. 'The National Security Strategy of the United States.' March, 1990.

¹⁷⁷ GBPL. 'Memcon. Meeting between President Bush and Jacques Delors, President of the European Economic Community.' April 24, 1990.

was still not completed in 1993, mainly due to hesitancy among EU member states, France in particular.¹⁷⁸

Arguably, the U.S. was aiming at establishing trade relations with former communist countries in Europe to open up new markets for the U.S. industry. In the transition memo from Secretary of State Eagleburger to his successor, Eagleburger emphasises that creating and sustaining jobs in the U.S. depend increasingly more on exports.¹⁷⁹ By assessing U.S. export statistics in the period 1994-2021, it appears that the U.S. has succeeded in increasing trade relations with the Visegrad countries, which became the first former Warsaw Pact member states to join NATO in 1999. Table 1 is a table of U.S. export statistics for a sample of countries in Europe. The sample consists of: Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, France, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK).

The starting point of 1994 was chosen to avoid any distortion of statistics, as the Czech Republic separated from Czechoslovakia in January 1993. In order to get comparable statistics, the table shows per capita U.S. export to adjust for different sizes of populations. The endpoint of 2021 was chosen because the latest available population data from the World Bank was for 2021. The Visegrad countries were chosen because they were seeking NATO membership early on. France, Germany and the UK were chosen for reasons of comparison. Another variable that influences U.S. export to each country is the relative purchasing power of the population in each country. Furthermore, U.S. export data to several European countries for the year 2022 arguably contains statistical outliers, due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, 2022. To illustrate this point, the U.S. export data for 2022 seems to be particularly skewed by an uptick in export to the countries most active in supporting Ukraine's defence against invasion forces from Russia. The year-on-year increase in export from the U.S. to Poland was 93,8% from 2021 to 2022. For France, the year-on-year increase was 54,9% from 2021 to 2022.¹⁸⁰ These growth rates over the course of just one year can arguably be defined as statistical anomalies, or outliers. Therefore, the reason for choosing the year 2021 as the endpoint, is to avoid anomalies in trade statistics.

¹⁷⁸ NSA. 'Memorandum for Secretary of State-Designate Warren Christopher from Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Parting Thoughts: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Years Ahead.' January 5, 1993.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ United States Census Bureau. 'Trade in Goods with Poland.' ; United States Census Bureau. 'Trade in Goods with France.'

Year	U.S. export M\$	M\$ Export	2021 Value	Population	USD PC export
1994	Poland	625,3	1144,3	38 363 667	29,83
1994	Hungary	309,1	565,7	10 369 341	54,55
1994	Czech Republic	296,9	543,3	10 319 341	52,65
1994	France	13618,6	24922,0	58 849 943	423,48
1994	Germany	21248,5	38884,8	80 624 598	482,29
1994	UK	26899,5	49226,1	57 580 402	854,91

Year	U.S. export M\$	M\$ Export	2021 Value	Population	USD PC export	US PC Export growth 1994-2021
2021	Poland	5843,1	5843,1	37 747 124	154,80	419 %
2021	Hungary	2908,3	2908,3	9 709 891	299,52	449 %
2021	Czech Republic	3661,0	3661,0	10 505 772	348,47	562 %
2021	France	29893,3	29893,3	67 749 632	441,23	4 %
2021	Germany	65332,5	65332,5	83 196 078	785,28	63 %
2021	UK	61425,1	61425,1	67 326 569	912,35	7 %

Table 1: U.S. export 1994 and 2021, inflation adjusted to 2021 value, million USD (M\$) and US \$ Per Capita (PC) export. Data retrieved from export data published by the United States Census Bureau and population data published by the World Bank. The inflation adjustment applied for 1994 to 2021 value is 1,83.¹⁸¹

The U.S. has had trade relations with France, Germany and the UK since the late 18th century (Germany then being Prussia).¹⁸² The data in table 1 illustrates the sharp increase in exports to the Visegrad countries from 1994 to 2021 in comparison to three of the U.S.'s more traditional trading partners, France, Germany and the UK. Notably, table 1 indicates that when converting US export to per capita (PC), the U.S. export data show a massive increase to the Visegrad countries, while U.S. export to France, Germany and the UK have had a more modest development. This is, however, reasonable due to the fact that the Visegrad countries had a much bigger potential for U.S. export, as U.S. trade relations with the Visegrad countries were underdeveloped compared to the more traditional trading partners. The 63% PC export growth for Germany from 1994 to 2021, which stands out compared to France and the UK, is most likely due to the fact that Germany reunified on October 3, 1990. It is then reasonable to draw the inference that this 63% PC export increase to Germany is due to the incorporation of Eastern Germany having a vastly underdeveloped export market for the U.S. Interestingly, when viewing U.S. PC export growth to the Visegrad countries from 1994 to 2021, there has been a 419% increase for Poland, 449% increase for Hungary and a 562% increase for the Czech Republic.

¹⁸¹ United States Census Bureau. 'Trade in Goods with Poland.' ; 'Trade in Goods with Hungary.' ; 'Trade in Goods with Czech Republic.' ; 'Trade in Goods with Germany.' ; 'Trade in Goods with France.' ; 'Trade in Goods with United Kingdom.' ; The World Bank. 'Population, total – Poland.' ; 'Population, total – Hungary.' ; 'Population, total – Czechia.' ; 'Population, total – France.' ; 'Population, total – Germany.' ; 'Population, total - United Kingdom.' ; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 'CPI Inflation Calculator.'

¹⁸² Lint. 'The American Revolution and the Law of Nations, 1776-1789.' p. 30.

Increasing the U.S. economic influence in Europe was arguably part of the motivation for the Bush administration to open the door of NATO to former Warsaw Pact member states. The motivation to ensure that U.S. economic interests were best served was by getting access to new emerging export markets in Eastern and Central Europe. Acquiring access to more foreign markets and “promote a strong, prosperous, and competitive U.S. economy”¹⁸³, were one of the objectives outlined in the National Security Strategy Report from 1990.

The presented data confirm that the desired outcome has been achieved to some degree. Figure 2 visually depicts the data presented in Table 1. It is clear that the U.S. has succeeded in opening up new export markets for the U.S. industry.




Figure 2: The bar chart shows the increase in U.S. export per capita adjusted for inflation for each country from the sample in the year 1994 and 2021. Data retrieved from export data published by the United States Census Bureau and population data published by the World Bank. The inflation adjustment applied for 1994 to 2021 value is 1,83.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸³ GBPL. ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States.’ March, 1990.

¹⁸⁴ United States Census Bureau. ‘Trade in Goods with Poland.’ ; ‘Trade in Goods with Hungary.’ ; ‘Trade in Goods with Czech Republic.’ ; ‘Trade in Goods with Germany.’ ; ‘Trade in Goods with France.’ ; ‘Trade in Goods with United Kingdom.’ ; The World Bank. ‘Population, total – Poland.’ ; ‘Population, total – Hungary.’ ; ‘Population, total – Czechia.’ ; ‘Population, total – France.’ ; ‘Population, total – Germany.’ ; ‘Population, total - United Kingdom.’ ; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. ‘CPI Inflation Calculator.’

7. Enlargement Put on Hold

Throughout 1992, a range of political developments internally in the U.S. and globally made the question of NATO eastward enlargement seem premature. The Russian Federation was in dire need of economic support, having been left with the obligation to pay the Soviet Union's sovereign debt, amounting to \$65 billion in 1991.¹⁸⁵ Simultaneously, the Yeltsin administration implemented "shock therapy" to the Russian economy in order to transition from a communist command economy to a free market economy. At this point, the Russian economy experienced hyperinflation and a significant reduction in the living standard for the Russian population.¹⁸⁶

The newly instated President of the Russian Federation, Yeltsin, was quite eager to further relationships with the U.S. In a letter to Bush from January 27, 1992, Yeltsin wrote very enthusiastically about reducing nuclear arsenals and proposed further denuclearisation possibilities in the U.S. and Russia, which went beyond earlier proposals from the U.S. In the letter to Bush, Yeltsin reached the conclusion that: "Russian-American relations have everything it takes from the very beginning to become relations of deep mutual trust and alliance."¹⁸⁷ Yeltsin continues: "I reject the concept of a 'potential adversary' with respect to the U.S."¹⁸⁸

Yeltsin's desire to further strengthen relations with the U.S. early on was still evident a few days later, on February 1, 1992, in a meeting between Bush and Yeltsin. In this meeting, Yeltsin repeatedly asked for aid from the U.S. to Russia and the other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and how to denuclearise the former Soviet republics was the main focus of the conversation.¹⁸⁹ Interestingly, Yeltsin asked at the end of the conversation whether Russia and the U.S. are adversaries.¹⁹⁰ Bush tells Yeltsin they are not adversaries and commences to read from a joint statement that will be presented at a press conference. Yeltsin presses the issue and says: "You have nothing here which says that we are no longer adversaries and are moving to be allies."¹⁹¹ Baker replies: "It says friendship."¹⁹² This is clearly not good enough for Yeltsin. He answered: "No, no. We

¹⁸⁵ Sarotte. *Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate*. p. 139.

¹⁸⁶ Legvold. 'Russian Foreign Policy During Periods of Great State Transformation.' p. 91.

¹⁸⁷ NSA. 'Letter from Yeltsin to Bush. (Unofficial Embassy Translation).' January 27, 1992. Collection: The First Months of U.S. Relations with the New Russia, 1992. Doc. 2.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ NSA. 'Memcon, subject: Meeting with Boris Yeltsin, President of Russia.' February 1, 1992. Collection: The First Months of U.S. Relations with the New Russia, 1992. Doc. 8.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid.

should say that we are moving from a stage of adversaries to allies. This gives a new quality.”¹⁹³ Bush then replied to Yeltsin, telling him: “We are using this transitional language because we don’t want to act like all our problems are solved.”¹⁹⁴ Bush’s reply to Yeltsin can be interpreted as an attempt to distance himself from Yeltsin and underscore the point that Bush was still uneasy of problems which were still unresolved.

The denuclearisation of the former Soviet Republics was the most pressing issue for the Bush administration. This is arguably one of the main reasons why the decision to begin the enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance was postponed in 1992. Nuclear weapons were located in several former Soviet Republics. This represented a grave risk and a significant cause of uncertainty for the Bush administration. Consequently, the question of enlarging NATO eastwards became a topic of less importance.¹⁹⁵ Apparently, Bush was supposed to address the question of the eastward enlargement of NATO during a speech he held in Warsaw on July 5, 1992. However, Bush’s closest aides could not decide whether or not to include this topic in the speech, so it was left out.¹⁹⁶

Although the question of NATO’s eastward enlargement began entering into the strategy debate by the spring and summer of 1992, among NATO members, the Bush administration took a cautious approach.¹⁹⁷ In June 1992, during the NATO ministerial meeting in Oslo, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger confirmed the importance of NATO enlargement. However, at this point, the U.S. position was still one of caution. Eagleburger told the assembly that the U.S. position was “signalling to the new democracies that we do not rule out extending membership to them at some point in the future.”¹⁹⁸

Clearly, the decision by the Bush administration to postpone the initialisation of the NATO enlargement question was quite understandable. As argued earlier, the Bush administration’s main objective in Europe was its desire for stability. The Russian state was in a state of chaos with a leader who had quite questionable drinking habits. There was already a rumour in January 1992, that Yeltsin had substantial alcohol problems.¹⁹⁹ Nuclear weapons were spread around the former Soviet Union, and to make matters worse, there were ongoing

¹⁹³ NSA. ‘Memcon, subject: Meeting with Boris Yeltsin, President of Russia.’ February 1, 1992. Collection: The First Months of U.S. Relations with the New Russia, 1992. Doc. 8.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Sarotte. *Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate*. pp. 142-143.

¹⁹⁶ Asmus. *Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era*. p. 17.

¹⁹⁷ Kieninger. ‘Opening NATO and Engaging Russia: NATO’s Two Tracks and the Establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council’. p. 91.

¹⁹⁸ Quoted in: Shiffrinson. ‘Eastbound and Down: The United States, NATO Enlargement, and Suppressing the Soviet and Western European Alternatives, 1990–1992.’ p. 838.

¹⁹⁹ NSA. ‘Cable from U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Strauss. Subject: The Mysterious Yel’tsin Speech that Never Was.’ January 28, 1992. Collection: The First Months of U.S. Relations with the New Russia, 1992. Doc. 3.

hostilities in the Balkans. By July 1992, NATO commenced monitoring operations in the Adriatic Sea with ships belonging to NATO's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean which were supported by NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft. These operations were conducted in support of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 713 and UNSCR 757. NATO Aerial monitoring operations commenced by October 1992 in support of the UNSCR 781, which imposed a no-fly zone over Bosnia Herzegovina.²⁰⁰

By the autumn of 1992, Bush was turning his focus towards the new presidential election in the U.S. Other international policy issues were arguably de-prioritised. During the U.S. presidential campaign, internal topics such as the U.S. economy and winning the election became more urgent. Bush was criticised for focusing too much on U.S. foreign policy and neglecting the U.S. economy.²⁰¹ This contributed to the contentious topic of the eastward enlargement of NATO becoming less important. The Bush administration had managed to steer the process towards NATO eastwards enlargement at some point in the future. Although the rationale for enlargement had emerged and was relatively clear in the Bush administration, the actual official enlargement of NATO was deemed premature. This was due to the issue of nuclear arms proliferation in former Warsaw Pact countries, the conflict in Yugoslavia, the political instability in Russia, the potential for emerging conflicts between post-communist countries and finally, the upcoming U.S. presidential election in late 1992. Thus, the question of NATO's eastward enlargement was left to the next U.S. administration.

8. Enter the Clinton Administration

The Clinton administration's policy towards Russia started off by focusing on helping the Russian state with economic aid and democratic reform, in contrast to the Bush administration, which had been more restrictive in assisting with economic aid.²⁰² In the first phone call from Clinton to Yeltsin on January 23, 1993, Clinton emphasised his wish to support the democratisation of Russia and the economic reforms, telling Yeltsin: "I want you to know that we are determined to do whatever we can to help Russia's democratic reforms to succeed. We will try to make our economic aid as beneficial as possible."²⁰³ Furthermore, Clinton told

²⁰⁰ NATO. 'Peace support operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-2004).' April 11, 2023. ; NATO. 'NATO's Role in Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia.' Press Info, July 4, 1997.

²⁰¹ Sarotte. *Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate*. p. 143.

²⁰² *Ibid.* p. 119.

²⁰³ NSA. 'Subject: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia.' January 23, 1993. Collection: Launching the Clinton Administration Russia Policy in 1993. Doc. 2.

Yeltsin: “I have appointed a very close friend and expert on Russia, Strobe Talbott, to oversee all of our assistance programs in Russia and in Eastern Europe.”²⁰⁴

A month later, on February 6, 1993, Strobe Talbott, who was then Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser to the Secretary of State on the New Independent States, wrote a briefing for Secretary of State Christopher. This briefing was intended for Christopher’s meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev. The briefing illuminates both Clinton’s and Talbott’s commitment to helping Russia succeed with the economic reforms and democratising process that was ongoing. Talbott writes that there are three ongoing revolutions happening simultaneously: “[...] they are transforming themselves from a totalitarian system to a democracy, from a command economy to a market, and from a multinational empire to a national state.”²⁰⁵ On these ongoing processes, Talbott writes: “[...] these three simultaneous transformations, however fragile, constitute nothing less than a miracle, the greatest political miracle of our era and of the greatest in human history.”²⁰⁶ At the end of the briefing, he emphasises that the U.S. should “keep that miracle going. That means helping Russia build democracy and a market economy.”²⁰⁷

It did not take long before the Clinton administration picked up on the idea of NATO enlargement that had emerged during the Bush administration. By September 1993, Stephen Flanagan, who had been Associate Director of the Policy Planning Staff during the Bush administration, had drafted a memo for Secretary of State Christopher, named “Strategy for NATO’s Expansion and Transformation”. This document presents a strategy for how NATO should enlarge through four phases: “I. By 1996: the EFTA states that join the EC. II. By 1998: the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and possibly Bulgaria and Slovenia. III. By 2000: Romania, Albania, and the Baltics. IV. By 2005: Ukraine, Byelorussia [sic], and Russia.”²⁰⁸ However, it was not until January 1994 that NATO collectively announced its willingness to enlarge the Alliance at the NATO Brussels Summit. There, the North Atlantic Council opted to conduct a study on enlargement, and they launched the PfP, where states already in the NACC and CSCE states were invited to join the partnership.²⁰⁹ These decisions did reinforce Russia’s negative view of NATO. However, throughout 1994, Clinton had promised his three “noes”

²⁰⁴ NSA. ‘Subject: Telcon with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia.’ January 23, 1993.

²⁰⁵ NSA. ‘Strobe Talbott Briefing for Secretary of State Warren Christopher: Russia.’ February 6, 1993. Collection: Launching the Clinton Administration Russia Policy in 1993. Doc. 3.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ NSA. ‘Strategy for NATO’s Expansion and Transformation.’ Sep 7, 1993. Collection: NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard. Doc. 2.

²⁰⁹ NATO. ‘Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (“The Brussels Summit Declaration”).’ Press Release M-1(94) 003. Issued on January 11, 1994.

when speaking of the enlargement of NATO, which were no exclusion, no hurry and no surprises.²¹⁰ These “noes” from Clinton were an attempt to calm Russia and Yeltsin’s worries about NATO enlargement in order to keep the partnership with Russia and simultaneously enlarge NATO.²¹¹

At the CSCE Summit Meeting in Budapest on December 5, 1994, Yeltsin held an erupting speech, where he accused the U.S. of splitting the continent through NATO enlargement and that Europe “risks plunging into cold peace”.²¹² The statements made in the speech should be viewed in the context of what occurred throughout 1994 and the few days before the summit. A communique was issued to the public after the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on December 1, 1994, which stated: “We expect and would welcome NATO enlargement that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.”²¹³ This communique opened the door for formal full-guarantee expansion and went beyond the PfP. Yeltsin heard reports from world news that NATO had announced expansion, which made him furious.²¹⁴ These events led to Yeltsin’s erupting speech during the Budapest summit.

The goal of the Budapest Summit was to recreate the CSCE into the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), making it more than just a conference for security. Russia had for a long time attempted to promote the organisation, as it gave Russia the opportunity to be an equal actor with the U.S. Yeltsin’s speech in front of fifty heads of state, Clinton included, made the front page of the New York Times the next day with the headline “Yeltsin says NATO is trying to split continent again.”²¹⁵ Despite the tensions that arose after the speech, Clinton did manage to sign a number of accords, which have become known as the Budapest Memorandum. The memorandum states that the United Kingdom, the U.S. and Russia are obliged to respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and existing

²¹⁰ Document declassified in 2021, where Clinton reaffirms his three “noes” in a conversation with Yeltsin: NSA. ‘Memcon between Clinton and Yeltsin.’ September 28, 1994. Collection: NATO Expansion – The Budapest Blow Up 1994. Doc. 4.

²¹¹ Sarotte. *Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate*. p. 202.

²¹² Президентский центр Б.Н. Ельцина. ‘Выступление Президента Российской Федерации Б.Н.Ельцина в Будапеште на пленарном Совещании по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе (СБСЕ).’ [Presidential Center Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. ‘Speech by President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin in Budapest at the plenary Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).’] December 5, 1994. ; Also transcribed and translated in: Kupiecki and Menkiszak. *Documents Talk: NATO–Russia Relations after the Cold War*. p. 191

²¹³ NATO. ‘Final Communiqué’ Communiqué NATO M-NAC- 2(94) 116, Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council NATO Headquarters, Brussels 1 Dec. 1994

²¹⁴ Sarotte. *Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate*. p. 202.

²¹⁵ Savranskaya and Blanton. ‘NATO Expansion – The Budapest Blow Up 1994.’

borders and refrain from using force and economic leverage against Ukraine's territorial integrity (which Russia breached in 2014 and 2022).²¹⁶ In return for security assurances from the signing parties, Ukraine committed to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and abandon its nuclear arsenal to Russia.²¹⁷

The Senior Director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia Affairs, Robert Nicholas Burns, sent a memorandum to the United States Deputy Secretary of State, Nelson Strobridge Talbott, the day after Yeltsin's speech. In this memorandum, declassified in 2021, which was sent by courier, Burns wrote that Clinton reacted strongly to Yeltsin's speech and that "he was really pissed off and his anger grew when we returned to Washington to see how the evening news treated it."²¹⁸ President Clinton has recently publicly expressed regrets about contributing to Ukraine abandoning its nuclear arsenal to Russia. Clinton said in April 2023: "I feel a personal stake because I got them [Ukraine] to agree to give up their nuclear weapons".²¹⁹

The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were eventually invited to join NATO after the Madrid Summit in 1997 and became formal members in 1999. Since then, NATO has been enlarged in 2004, 2009, 2017, and 2020, having incorporated twelve new member states. Fifteen new states have joined NATO if the three Visegrad countries from 1999 are included. The last enlargement occurred on April 4 2023, when Finland was admitted as a member. As of now, four partner states have declared their ambitions to become full-fledged Article 5 NATO members: Georgia, Sweden, Ukraine and Bosnia and Herzegovina.²²⁰

Conclusion

Although the enlargement of NATO never became official policy during George H.W. Bush's presidency, the idea of enlarging NATO and the rationales behind enlargement emerged early on in the administration. The Bush administration's main concerns in their policies towards Europe were to keep stability and maintain U.S. influence on the European continent. NATO was then regarded as the institution fit for this task, as it had functioned and served this purpose since its inception in 1949, and the U.S. had a significant role in the organisation.

²¹⁶ UN. 'Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.' UNTS Vol. 3007, No. 52241. December 5, 1994. p. 168 -171.

²¹⁷ Sarotte. *Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate*. p. 203.

²¹⁸ NSA. 'Nick Burns Memorandum to Strobe Talbott: Letter to Yeltsin on Budapest and other items.' Dec 6, 1994. Collection: NATO Expansion – The Budapest Blow Up 1994. Doc. 12.

²¹⁹ Haroun and Snodgrass. 'Bill Clinton says he feels "terrible" for pushing a 1994 agreement with Russia that resulted in Ukraine giving up its nuclear weapons.'

²²⁰ NATO. 'Enlargement and Article 10.' April 12, 2023.

The U.S. had its “unipolar” moment in the 1990s and onwards. Instead of grasping the opportunity to develop new post-Cold War security structures, the U.S. chose the safe path by maintaining the Cold War structure of NATO and giving it a new reason to exist by expanding it and starting out of area operations. The U.S. chose later to engage in fruitless conflicts in remote parts of the world. In hindsight, the U.S.’s later invasions of countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq have only diminished the position the U.S. had after the end of the Cold War. Consequentially, the U.S. position as a hegemon has slowly diminished, and it has become less prepared to face the future challenges of the multipolar world, such as the rise of India, China and Russia.

As hindsight is 20/20, political events and developments are often easier to understand with the benefit of hindsight. Politicians and officials rarely possess a complete overview of all relevant contemporaneous facts, let alone insights into or guarantees for what the future may hold. Politicians and officials of the time were arguably influenced by their perceptions of the immediate past and viewed the rapidly changing geopolitical realities through the blurry lenses of the Cold War. The uncertainties surrounding the dramatic events during the end of the Cold War, with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, arguably precipitated the need for robust deterrence against any potential armed conflict arising anywhere on the European continent. The decisions made by the Bush administration that steered the path to NATO becoming the primary security institution in Europe were arguably rational, when taking into account the threat perception the Bush administration had at the time. Strengthening the security structure that already was in place and had proved to function was viewed as the safest option.

This thesis has put forward a new perspective on U.S. policy and strategy towards the Soviet Union/Russia in the years 1989-1993 by arguing that the Bush administration was pursuing a strategy of hedging, mixing elements of cooperation and countermeasures. The U.S. engaged the Soviet Union/Russia through cooperative measures and rhetoric. This rhetoric gave the impression that the U.S. was keeping the door open for creating new alternative security institutions in Europe in which the Soviet Union/Russia would have a central role. The U.S. was engaging by increasing diplomatic contact and initiating new multilateral frameworks for cooperation. Simultaneously the Bush administration was also balancing by keeping a strong military presence in Europe, seeking to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance by initiating cooperative frameworks, which led to the inclusion of former Warsaw Pact member states. By pursuing this dualistic policy of hedging, the U.S. had an insurance in case the development in Russia would go in an undesirable direction, which it arguably did after the announcement of the new military doctrine in 1993.

This thesis has explored when the idea of NATO enlargement emerged and when it was first discussed, showing that it emerged early on in the Bush administration and that it was already discussed during the negotiations talks on the reunification of Germany. Furthermore, this thesis has analysed the role of National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. This thesis has argued that the views of Scowcroft and Bush coincided, as both held the view that the U.S. should remain committed in Europe through NATO, and consequentially, the Bush administration steered the path towards the enlargement of NATO. Additionally, this thesis has illuminated the economic rationales for enlarging the alliance, which is an understudied topic.

The rationales and drivers for enlarging the Atlantic Alliance that emerged in the Bush administration were rooted in realist pragmatic concerns. This thesis has shown that there were both geopolitical drivers and economic drivers for enlarging the Alliance. By enlarging NATO eastward, the U.S. would maintain its position and its presence in Europe as an “European power”, not just a power in Europe. The eagerness of the Visegrad countries to join NATO was beneficial to the U.S., as they were likely to support U.S. interests internally in Europe and possibly side with the U.S. in economic and trade affairs when these states presumably became EU members later on. Additionally, the Bush administration surmised that the Visegrad countries would take a more positive view of NATO bases on their territories, and thus provide “real estate” for NATO at a relatively low cost. The economic rationale for NATO enlargement eastwards was based on the assumption that the new allies would ostensibly represent new market opportunities for the U.S. industry. The U.S. export data presented in this thesis illustrates this point, as the growth rate of U.S. export to the Visegrad countries between 1994 and 2021 was significantly higher compared to the growth rate of export to France, Germany and the UK in the same period.

Due to the pragmatism of the Bush administration, the question of enlarging NATO was put on hold in 1992. At the time, the topic was considered to be too contentious. The time was not ripe due to the unstable political situation in Russia, the spread of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union and the ongoing conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Additionally, Bush became preoccupied with the presidential election that took place in November 1992, which put a hold on contentious foreign policy issues. Bush lost the presidential election. However, the idea and rationales for enlarging the Atlantic Alliance emerged during his presidency, and the choices made during the Bush administration led to NATO becoming the primary security institution in Europe. The issue of how to enlarge NATO eastwards was passed on to the Clinton administration, who acted on it from 1997 onwards, admitting several former Warsaw Pact

countries. Whether the Clinton administration also followed a strategy of hedging towards Russia, is a possible topic for future research.

Primary Sources

Archival Material

George H.W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum

Memoranda of Meetings and Telephone Conversations (Memcons/Telcons)

Accessed May 16, 2023. <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/memcons-telcons>

GBPL. 'Memorandum of Conversation Between Bush and Havel.' November 18, 1990.

Accessed 13 May, 2023. <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-11-18--Havel.pdf>.

GBPL. 'Memorandum of Conversation Between President Bush and PM Margaret Thatcher.'

April 13, 1990. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-04-13--Thatcher.pdf>.

GBPL. 'Memorandum of Conversation Between Walesa and Bush.' March 20, 1991.

Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1991-03-20--Walesa.pdf>.

GBPL. 'Memorandum of Conversation Meeting Between Bush and Leonid Kravchuk,

Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman.' September 25, 1991. Accessed May 14, 2023. <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1991-09-25--Kravchuk.pdf>.

GBPL. 'Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting Between POTUS and President Mitterrand.'

July 5, 1992. Accessed 13 May, 2023. <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1992-07-05--Mitterrand.pdf>.

GBPL. 'Memorandum of Conversation. Meeting Between President Bush and Jacques Delors,

President of the European Economic Community.' April 24, 1990. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-04-24--Delors.pdf>.

GBPL. 'Memorandum of Conversation Meeting with Vaclav Havel, President of

Czechoslovakia and Bush.' October 22, 1991. Accessed May 13, 2023.

<https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1991-10-22--Havel.pdf>.

GBPL. 'Memorandum of Conversation, Re: Meeting at Camp David. [redacted].'

November 24, 1989. Meeting Between President Bush and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Accessed

May 13, 2023. <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1989-11-24--Thatcher.pdf>.

GBPL. 'Memorandum of Conversation. The President's Meeting with Secretary General of NATO Manfred Woerner.' October 11, 1991. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1991-10-11--Woerner.pdf>.

GBPL. 'Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush.' July 17, 1990. Accessed 13 May, 2023. <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-07-17--Gorbachev.pdf>.

National Security Reviews. Accessed May 16, 2023.

<https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/nsr>

GBPL. 'National Security Review 3 - Subject: Comprehensive Review of US-Soviet Relations.' February 15, 1989. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/nsr/nsr3.pdf>.

GBPL. 'National Security Review 12, Subject: Review of National Defense Strategy.' March 3, 1989. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/nsr/nsr12.pdf>.

National Security Strategy Reports. Accessed May 16, 2023.

<https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/>

GBPL. 'The National Security Strategy of the United States.' March, 1990. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/select-documents/National%20Security%20Strategy%20Report%201990.pdf>.

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum

RRPL. 'Farewell Address to the Nation.' January 11, 1989. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/farewell-address-nation>.

RRPL. 'Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, FL.' March 8, 1983. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/remarks-annual-convention-national-association-evangelicals-orlando-fl>.

Presidential Center Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin

Президентский центр Б.Н. Ельцина. ‘Выступление Президента Российской Федерации Б.Н.Ельцина в Будапеште на пленарном Совещании по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе (СБСЕ).’ [Presidential Center Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. ‘Speech by President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin in Budapest at the plenary Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).’] December 5, 1994. Accessed May 13, 2023.

<https://yeltsin.ru/archive/audio/9035/>.

National Security Archive Online

Blanton, Thomas and Svetlana Savranskaya, ed. ‘NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard.’ Electronic Briefing Book #613. December 12, 2017. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early>

Documents used, numbers: 5, 8, 17, 19, 27.

Blanton, Thomas and Svetlana Savranskaya, ed. ‘NATO Expansion – The Budapest Blow Up 1994.’ Electronic Briefing Book #780. November 24, 2021. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2021-11-24/nato-expansion-budapest-blow-1994>

Documents used, numbers: 4, 12.

Blanton, Thomas and Svetlana Savranskaya, ed. ‘The Last Superpower Summits.’ Electronic Briefing Book #578. January 23, 2017. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-01-23/last-superpower-summits>

Document used, number: 14.

Savranskaya Svetlana, ed. ‘Launching the Clinton Administration Russia Policy in 1993.’ Electronic Briefing Book #820. February 7, 2023. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2023-02-07/launching-clinton-administration-russia-policy-1993>

Documents used, numbers: 1, 2, 3.

Blanton, Thomas and Svetlana Savranskaya, ed. 'In Memoriam: Mikhail Gorbachev 1931-2022.' Electronic Briefing Book #802. August 30, 2022. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2022-08-30/memoriam-mikhail-gorbachev-1931-2022>

Document used, number: 13.

Blanton, Thomas and Svetlana Savranskaya, ed. 'The Washington/Camp David Summit 30 Years Ago.' Electronic Briefing Book #707. June 2, 2020. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2020-06-02/washington-camp-david-summit-30-years-ago>

Document used, number: 7.

Blanton, Thomas and Svetlana Savranskaya, ed. 'NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard.' Electronic Briefing Book #621. March 16, 2018. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2018-03-16/nato-expansion-what-yeltsin-heard>

Document used, number: 2.

Blanton, Thomas and Svetlana Savranskaya, ed. 'The First Months of U.S. Relations with the New Russia, 1992.' Electronic Briefing Book #819. January 20, 2023. Accessed May 18, 2023. <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2023-01-30/first-months-us-relations-new-russia-1992>

Documents used, numbers: 2, 3, 8.

CIA Digital Reading Room

Princeton collection:

CIA Directorate of Intelligence. 'Moscow's 1989 Agenda for US-Soviet Relations' Intelligence Assessment by the Office of Soviet Analysis. January 3, 1989. Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0000499112. Collection: The Princeton Collection. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0000499112>.

CIA Directorate of Intelligence. 'Moscow's Push for a New European Order.' Intelligence Assessment by the Office of Soviet Analysis. May 5, 1990. Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0000499602. Collection: The Princeton Collection. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0000499602>.

FOIA Collection:

CIA Directorate of Intelligence. 'EC Agricultural policy: Impact of German Unification and East European Reforms.' August 1, 1990. Collection: FOIA Collection. Document Number: 06296175. Case Number: F-2017-01874. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/06296175>.

Digitally Published Newspaper Articles

Clark, Christopher. Spohr, Kristina, "Moscow's Account of NATO Expansion is a Case of False Memory Syndrome". *The Guardian*, May 24, 2015. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/24/russia-nato-expansion-memory-grievances>.

Haroun, Azmi. Snodgrass, Erin. 'Bill Clinton says he feels "terrible" for pushing a 1994 agreement with Russia that resulted in Ukraine giving up its nuclear weapons'. *Business Insider*. April 5, 2023. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://www.businessinsider.com/bill-clinton-feels-terrible-convincing-ukraine-to-give-up-nukes-2023-4?r=US&IR=T>.

Hoffman, David. 'Gorbachev Seen as Trying to Buy Time for Reform.' *The Washington Post*, January 23, 1989. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/01/23/gorbachev-seen-as-trying-to-buy-time-for-reform/584a53d6-3c4f-4dda-b171-a590c9e43007/>.

Kórshunov, Maxim. 'Mikhail Gorbachev: I am against all walls.' *Russia Beyond the Headlines*, October 16, 2014. Accessed May 13, 2023. https://www.rbth.com/international/2014/10/16/mikhail_gorbachev_i_am_against_all_walls_40673.html.

Zelikow, Philip. 'NATO Expansion Wasn't Ruled Out' *The New York Times*. August 10, 1995. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/10/opinion/IHT-nato-expansion-wasnt-ruled-out.html>.

Other Online Primary Sources:

Baker, James A. 'The Euro-Atlantic Architecture: From West to East.' Secretary of State Baker's speech to the Aspen Institute, Berlin, June 18, 1991. *Foreign Policy Bulletin* 2, no. 1 (July/August 1991): 61-80 Accessed May 17, 2023.

<https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/fnpbt2&i=63>.

Federation of American Scientists. 'The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.' Accessed May 13, 2023.

<https://nuke.fas.org/guide/russia/doctrine/russia-mil-doc.html>.

NATO. 'Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council ("The Brussels Summit Declaration")' Press Release M-1(94) 003. Issued on January 11, 1994. Accessed May 13, 2023.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24470.htm?mode=pressrelease.

NATO. 'Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council ("The London Declaration")'. July 5-6, 1990. Accessed May 13, 2023.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23693.htm.

NATO. 'Enlargement and Article 10.' April 12, 2023. Accessed May 13, 2023.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49212.htm?

NATO. 'Final Communiqué' Communiqué NATO M-NAC- 2(94)116. Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council NATO Headquarters, Brussels, December 1, 1994. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c941201a.htm>.

NATO. 'NATO-Russia Setting the Record Straight.' September 21, 2022. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/115204.htm>.

NATO. 'NATO's Role in Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia.' Press Info, July 4, 1997. Accessed May 24, 2023. <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1997/970708/infopres/e-bpfy.htm>.

NATO. 'Peace support operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-2004).' April 11, 2023. Accessed May 24, 2023. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52122.htm.

NATO. 'Relations with Ukraine.' May 25, 2023. Accessed May 30, 2023.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm.

NATO. 'Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation'. Press Communiqué, S-1(91)86.

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome. November 8, 1991. Accessed May 13, 2023.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23846.htm?mode=pressrelease.

NATO. 'Study on NATO Enlargement.' September 3, 1995. Accessed May 22, 2023.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24733.htm.

NATO. 'The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991-1997).' September 9, 2022. Accessed

May 22, 2023. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69344.htm.

NATO. 'The North Atlantic Treaty'. Washington D.C., April 4 1949. Accessed May 13,

2023. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.

Neal, Jeff. 'There was no promise to enlarge NATO.' Harvard Law school. March 16, 2022.

Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://hls.harvard.edu/today/there-was-no-promise-not-to-enlarge-nato/>.

Savranskaya, Svetlana. Blanton, Tom. 'NATO Expansion – The Budapest Blow Up 1994.'

Electronic Briefing Book #780, National Security Archive online, The George Washington University, Washington, DC. Nov 24, 2021. Accessed May 13, 2023.

<https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2021-11-24/nato-expansion-budapest-blow-1994>.

University of Virginia, Miller Center. 'Brent Scowcroft Oral History Part I'. November 12-

13, 1999. Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/brent-scowcroft-oral-history-part-i>.

University of Virginia, Miller Center. 'Robert M. Gates Oral History'. July 23-24, 2000.

Accessed May 13, 2023. <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/robert-m-gates-deputy-director-central>.

UN. 'Memorandum on Security assurances in Connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'. United Nations Treaty Series Vol. 3007, No. 52241. pp. 167-182. December 5, 1994. Accessed May 13, 2023.
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280401fbb>.

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 'CPI Inflation Calculator'. Accessed May 2, 2023.
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.

Visegrad Group. 'Visegrad Declaration 1991 Declaration on Cooperation between the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Hungary in Striving for European Integration'. February 1991. Unofficial translation. Accessed May 13, 2023.
<https://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/visegrad-declarations/visegrad-declaration-110412>.

Wikimedia Commons. 'Map of NATO historic enlargement in Europe.' Author: Patrickneil. Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported. Accessed April 11, 2023.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:History_of_NATO_enlargement.svg.

Электронный фонд правовых и нормативно-технических документов. 'Указ Президента Российской Федерации Об Основных положениях военной доктрины Российской Федерации' [Electronic Fund of Legal and Regulatory Technical Documents. 'Decree of the President of the Russian Federation On the Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation'] N. 1833. November 2, 1993. Accessed May 22, 2023.
<https://docs.cntd.ru/document/901111635>.

The World Bank – Population Data

The World Bank. 'Population, total – Czechia'. Accessed April 28, 2023.
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=CZ>.

The World Bank. 'Population, total – France'. Accessed April 28, 2023.
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=2021&locations=FR&start=1960>.

The World Bank. 'Population, total – Germany'. Accessed April 28, 2023
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=DE>.

The World Bank. 'Population, total – Hungary'. Accessed April 28, 2023.
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=HU>.

The World Bank. 'Population, total – Poland'. Accessed April 28, 2023.

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=PL>.

The World Bank. 'Population, total - United Kingdom'. Accessed April 28, 2023.

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=GB>.

United States Census Bureau – Trade Data

United States Census Bureau. 'Trade in Goods with Czech Republic'. Accessed April 28, 2023. <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4351.html>.

United States Census Bureau. 'Trade in Goods with France'. Accessed April 28, 2023.

<https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4279.html>.

United States Census Bureau. 'Trade in Goods with Germany'. Accessed April 28, 2023.

<https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4280.html#1990>.

United States Census Bureau. 'Trade in Goods with Hungary'. Accessed April 28, 2023.

<https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4370.html>.

United States Census Bureau. 'Trade in Goods with Poland'. Accessed April 28, 2023.

<https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4550.html#1990>.

United States Census Bureau. 'Trade in Goods with United Kingdom'. Accessed April 28,

2023. <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4120.html>.

Bibliography

- Asmus, Ronald D. 'Europe's Eastern Promise: Rethinking NATO and EU Enlargement.' *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 1 (2008): 95–106. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20020270>.
- Asmus, Ronald D. *Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.
- Baker, James Addison, and Thomas M. DeFrank. *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992*. New York: Putnam, 1995.
- Bellamy, Alex J, and Stephen McLoughlin. 'Humanitarian Intervention.' In: *Contemporary Security Studies*. Collins, Alan. (ed). 5th edition. 334–349. Glasgow: Oxford University Press, 2019.
- Bozo, Frédéric. 'Mitterrand's France, the End of the Cold War, and German Unification: A Reappraisal.' *Cold War History* 7, no. 4 (2007): 455–478. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740701621689>.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic Imperatives*. United States of America: Basic Books, 1997.
- Bush, George H.W. and Brent Scowcroft. *A World Transformed*. United States of America: Vintage Books, 1999.
- Chollett, Derek, and James Goldgeier. *America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11: The Misunderstood Years Between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Start of the War on Terror*. United States of America: Public Affairs, 2009.
- Ciociari, John D., and Jürgen Haacke. 'Hedging in International Relations: An Introduction.' *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 19 (2019): 367–374. <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz017>.
- Deudney, Daniel, and John G. Ikenberry. 'The Unravelling of the Cold War Settlement'. *Survival* 51, no. 6 (2009): 39–62. DOI: 10.1080/00396330903461666.
- Gilles, Andréani. 'Answering Medvedev'. *Survival* 52, no. 1 (2010): 236–244. DOI: 10.1080/00396331003612570.

Goldgeier, James, and Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shiffrin. 'Evaluating NATO Enlargement: Scholarly Debates, Policy Implications, and Roads Not Taken.' *International Politics* 57 (2020): 291–321. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00243-7>.

Goldgeier, James. 'NATO Enlargement and the Problem of Value Complexity'. *Journal of Cold War Studies* 22, no. 4 (2020): 146–174. <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/776962>.

Goldgeier, James. *Not Whether But When the U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999.

Goldgeier, James. 'Promises Made, Promise Broken? What Yeltsin was Told about NATO in 1993 and why it Matters.' *War on the Rocks*, July 12, 2016. Accessed May 21, 2023. <https://warontherocks.com/2016/07/promises-made-promises-broken-what-yeltsin-was-told-about-nato-in-1993-and-why-it-matters/>.

Grayson, George W. *Strange Bedfellows NATO Marches East*. Boston: University Press of America, 1999.

Greitens, Sheena Chestnut. 'Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations'. In: *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. Baylis, John. Wirtz, James J. and Colin S. Gray. (ed). 6th edition. 273–290. Glasgow: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Hemmings, John. 'Hedging: The Real U.S. Policy Towards China? Is America Trying to Contain China? No, It Could Be Just Hedging Its Bets.' *The Diplomat*, 13 May 2013. Accessed June 2, 2023. <https://thediplomat.com/2013/05/hedging-the-real-u-s-policy-towards-china/>

Hoof, Paul Van. 'Land Rush: American Grand Strategy, NATO Enlargement, and European Fragmentation.' *International Politics* 57 (2020): 530–553. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00227-7>.

Horowitz, Liviu, and Elias Götz. 'The Overlooked Importance of Economics: Why the Bush Administration Wanted NATO Enlargement'. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 43, no. 6–7 (2020): 847–868. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1819799>.

Horowitz, Liviu. 'The George H.W. Bush Administration's Policies Vis-à-Vis Central Europe: From Cautious Encouragement to Cracking Open NATO's Door'. In: *Open Door: NATO and*

Euro-Atlantic Security After the Cold War. Hamilton, Daniel S. and Kristina Spohr. (ed). 71–92. Washington, DC: Foreign Policy Institute, 2019.

Kaldor, Mary. *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999.

Kieninger, Stephan. ‘Opening NATO and Engaging Russia: NATO’s Two Tracks and the Establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council’. In: *Open Door: NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security After the Cold War*. Hamilton, Daniel S. and Kristina Spohr. (ed). 57–69. Washington, DC: Foreign Policy Institute, 2019.

Knutsen, Torbjørn L. ‘Halford J. Mackinder, Geopolitics, and the Heartland Thesis.’ *The International History Review* 36, no. 5 (2014): 835–857.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2014.941904>.

Kramer, Mark. ‘The Myth of a NO-NATO Enlargement Pledge to Russia’. *The Washington Quarterly* 32, no. 2 (2009): 39–61. DOI: 10.1080/01636600902773248.

Kriendler, John. ‘NATO-Russia Relations Reset is Not a Four-Letter Word.’ In: *Understanding NATO in the 21st Century Alliance Strategies, Security and Global Governance*. Herd, Graeme P. and John Kriendler. (ed). 85–101. Cornwall: Routledge, 2013.

Kupiecki, Robert. Menkiszak, Marek. *Documents Talk : NATO-Russia Relations after the Cold War*. Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych. [Polish Institute of International Affairs]. (PISM), 2020.

Legvold, Robert. ‘Russian Foreign Policy During Periods of Great State Transformation.’ In: *Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century and the Shadow of the Past*. Legvold, Robert (ed.) 77–143. United States of America: Columbia University Press, 2007.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/legv14122.6>.

Lint, Gregg L. ‘The American Revolution and the Law of Nations, 1776–1789.’ *Diplomatic History* 1, no. 1 (1977): 20–34. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24910233>.

Lundestad, Geir. ‘Empire by Invitation in the American Century.’ *Diplomatic History* 23, no. 2 (1999): 189–217. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24913738>.

- Lynch, Allen C. 'The Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy.' *Europe-Asia Studies* 53, no. 1 (2001): 7–31. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/826237>.
- Matějka, Zdeněk. 'How the Warsaw Pact Was Dissolved.' *Perspectives*, no. 8 (1997): 55–65. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44732826>.
- McCormick, John. *European Union Politics*. 3rd Edition. London: Red Globe Press, 2020.
- Milligan, Ian. *The Transformation of Historical Research in the Digital Age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. doi:10.1017/9781009026055.
- Ortmann, Stefanie, and Nick Whittaker. 'Geopolitics and Grand Strategy'. In: *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. Baylis, John. Wirtz, James J. and Colin S. Gray. (ed). 6th edition. 308–326. Glasgow: Oxford University Press, 2016.
- Østerud, Øyvind, and Asle Toje. 'Strategy Risk and Threat Perceptions in NATO'. In: *NATO's European Allies Military Capability and Political Will*. Haaland, Janne Matlary, and Magnus Petersson. (ed). 71–94. Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
- Ruger, William, and Rajan Menon. 'NATO Enlargement and US Grand Strategy: A Net Assessment'. *International Politics* 57 (2020): 371–400. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00235-7>.
- Rumer, Eugene. Sokolsky, Richard. 'Etched in Stone: Russian Strategic Culture and the Future of Transatlantic Security'. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. September, 2020. Accessed May 29, 2023. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/08/etched-in-stone-russian-strategic-culture-and-future-of-transatlantic-security-pub-82657>.
- Sarotte, Mary Elise. *1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe*. United States of America: Princeton University Press, 2014.
- Sarotte, Mary Elise. *Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate*. United States of America: Yale University Press, 2021.
- Sarotte, Mary Elise. 'Not One Inch Eastward? Bush, Baker, Kohl, Genscher, Gorbachev and the Origin of Russian Resentment toward NATO Enlargement February 1990.' *Diplomatic History* 34, no. 1 (2010): 119–140. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2009.00835.x>.

Sarotte, Mary Elise. 'Perpetuating U.S. Preeminence: The 1990 Deals to "Bribe the Soviets Out" and Move NATO In.' *International Security* 35, no. 1 (2010): 110–137.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/40784649>.

Sayle, Timothy Andrews. *Enduring Alliance a History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019.

Sayle, Timothy Andrews. 'Patterns of Continuity in NATO's Long History'. *International Politics* 57 (2020): 322–341. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00237-5>.

Shiffrinson, Joshua R. Itzkowitz. 'Deal or No Deal?: The End of the Cold War and the U.S. Offer to Limit NATO Expansion'. *International Security* 40, no. 4 (2016): 7–44.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/43828313>.

Shiffrinson, Joshua R. Itzkowitz. 'Eastbound and Down: The United States, NATO Enlargement, and Suppressing the Soviet and Western European Alternatives, 1990–1992.' *Journal of Strategic Studies* 43, no. 6–7 (2020): 816–846.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1737931>.

Shiffrinson, Joshua R. Itzkowitz. 'NATO Enlargement and US Foreign Policy: The Origins, Durability, and Impact of an Idea'. *International Politics* 57 (2020): 342–370.

<https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00224-w>.

Snyder, Sarah B. 'Beyond Containment? The First Bush Administration's Sceptical Approach to the CSCE'. *Cold War History* 13, no. 4 (2013): 463–484.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2012.758104>.

Solchanyk, Roman. 'Ukraine, The (Former) Center, Russia, and "Russia."' *Studies in Comparative Communism* 25, no. 1 (1992): 31–45. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45367127>.

Sparrow, Bartholomew H. 'Realism's Practitioner: Brent Scowcroft and the Making of the New World Order, 1989–1993.' *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 1 (2010): 141–175.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2009.00836.x>.

Spoehr, Kristina. 'Precluded or Precedent-Setting? The "NATO Enlargement Question" in the Triangular Bonn-Washington-Moscow Diplomacy of 1990–1991.' *Journal of Cold War Studies* 14, no. 4 (2012): 4–54. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26924149>.

Tsygankov, Andrei. 'Mastering Space in Eurasia: Russia's Geopolitical Thinking after the Soviet Break-Up.' *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 36, no. 1 (2003): 101–127.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/48609456>.

Wallander, Celeste A. 'Global Challenges and Russian Foreign Policy.' In: *Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century and the Shadow of the Past*. Legvold, Robert. (ed). 443–498. United States of America: Columbia University Press, 2007.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/legv14122.12>.

Webber, Mark, James Sperling, and Martin A. Smith. *NATO's Post-Cold War Trajectory Decline or Regeneration? New Security Challenges*. Chippenham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Westad, Odd Arne. *The Cold War a World History*. Great Britain: Penguin Books, 2017.

Wolff, Andrew T. 'The Future of NATO Enlargement after the Ukraine Crisis.' *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 91, no. 5 (2015): 1103–1121.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/24539021>.