

Gender-sensitive Peace Agreements and the Improvement of Women's Political Rights

The Influences of Categorized Gender Provisions



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Abstract

Women's political empowerment is central for states to advance gender equality and to move toward peace following armed conflicts. Recent research has directed attention to the relationship between gender provisions within peace agreements and the improvement of women's political rights, finding positive and significant effects of gender provisions on post-conflict women's political empowerment. However, questions remain in this relationship when considering the specific types of gender provisions. Therefore, this thesis set out to investigate the varying impacts, if any, of the eleven categories of gender provisions on post-conflict women's political rights advancement. Particularly, the following categories were hypothesized to have more potent influences on the improvement of women's political empowerment than the other categories: gender provisions mentioning women's participation in governance and decision-making bodies, equality, and institutional reform. Ordinary Least Squares regressions with panel correlated standard errors were conducted using data from the Women Political Empowerment Index and PA-X Peace Agreement Database. The results show that only specific types of gender provisions, namely gender-sensitive equality and institutional reform provisions, significantly improve women's political rights after armed conflicts. The analyses provide strong evidence that including gender provisions within peace agreements is essential to improve women's political rights; however, the contents of gender provisions matter. Additionally, the findings serve as a powerful voice in support of the efforts of the UN and the international community for more gender-inclusive peace processes, particularly peace agreements. It can be argued that gender provisions are better treated as distinguished categories in both research and practice.

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Do-file can be provided upon request.

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1. Introduction

Approximately one-third of intrastate armed conflict peace agreements signed since 1990 are gender-sensitive, meaning they include at least one provision that reflects gender perspectives. However, most intrastate conflict peace agreements are still gender-blind, lacking gender provisions. Since women's political empowerment is central for states to advance gender equality and move toward peace, questioning whether gender-sensitive peace agreements make a difference in women's political rights situation is essential. Although an emerging body of research has found a positive impact of gender provisions within peace agreements on women's political empowerment (Bakken & Buhaug, 2021; Reid, 2021), there are unresolved questions on the relationship between gender-sensitive peace agreements and post-conflict women's political empowerment. Previous research has treated gender provisions collectively and does not distinguish them into categories in their analyses; however, it is questionable whether all kinds of gender provisions equally enhance women's political rights. Thus, this thesis questions: Do any kinds of gender provisions affect the post-conflict improvement of women's political rights to the same degree? In addition, this thesis asks what types of gender provisions particularly impact women's political rights advancement compared to other gender provisions.

Assessing the influences of gender-sensitive peace agreements is crucial for two primary reasons. First, the international community, and the United Nations in particular, have set the adoption of gender perspectives in peace processes, primarily women's inclusion and participation in peace processes and the inclusion of gender provisions within peace agreements, as a global agenda, especially after the adoption of the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) in the year of 2000 and subsequent relevant resolutions, the so-called Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda. A series of academic endeavors have supported the global promotion of gender-inclusive peace processes by

showing that women's inclusion in peace processes contributes to better outcomes (Caprioli et al., 2010; Krause et al., 2018; O'Reilly et al., 2015; Stone, 2014). Recent studies have also found that gender-sensitive peace agreements positively influence women's situations and participation in peace processes and post-conflict states' politics (Anderson & Swiss, 2014; Bakken & Buhaug, 2021; Paffenholz et al., 2016; Reid, 2021; True & Riveros-Morales, 2018). Nevertheless, the progress of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda is plodding. Second, a growing body of literature finds that the durability and quality of peace following armed conflicts hinges partly on women's political empowerment, which comprises fundamental civil liberties, women's open discussion of political issues and participation in civil society organizations, and the descriptive representation of women in formal political positions (Coppedge et al., 2022; Sundström et al., 2017). Previous research has shown that armed conflict, gender equality, and women's political empowerment are strongly interlinked. For instance, women's political inclusion is influential in reducing the incidence of conflict recurrence (Hudson, 2009; DeMerrit et al., 2014; Shair-Rosenfield & Wood, 2017). Hence, policymakers and practitioners have much to gain from examining the association between gender-sensitive peace agreements and post-conflict women's political empowerment.

The main expectation of this thesis is that different kinds of gender provisions have different effects on the improvement of women's political empowerment post-conflict, and not all but particular gender provisions significantly enhance women's political rights following armed conflicts. The overall theoretical expectations on why and how gender-sensitive peace agreements generally have positive impacts on women's political empowerment posit that peace agreements have 'legal' (Badran, 2014) and 'quasi-constitutional' (Bell & O'Rourke, 2007; 2010) functions, leading to reforms of situations surrounding women; peace agreements increase actors' commitment to policies shaped by agreement contents because peace agreements "legalize peace" (Badran, 2014, p.196); gender-sensitive peace agreements

potentially improve women's political rights by empowering women's groups and mobilization (Reid, 2021); and gender provisions potentially stimulate norms shifts within post-conflict societies (Reid, 2021). Although gender provisions are thought to generally positively affect women's political empowerment after conflicts (Reid, 2021), it is unlikely that any gender provision has a similar degree of such influence. The contents of gender provisions vary and thus: constrain actors' behaviors differently; require different commitments; empower women's mobilization to another degree; stimulate various norm shifts; and lead to different outcomes. Therefore, I presume that the contents of gender provisions matter in addition to the distinction between the presence or absence of such provisions. In particular, I expect gender-sensitive political participation, equality, and institutional reform provisions to be the ones that significantly improve women's political rights following conflicts. It is because gender provisions that directly and specifically mention women's participation and representation in the political sphere potentially influence women's political status directly; the promotion of general equality is essential to achieve better gender equality and, in turn, better women's political situation; and, institutional reform is vital to transforming women's mobilization and societal rupture into post-conflict improvements in women's rights.

In order to assess the expectations, I conducted statistical analyses using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions with panel correlated standard errors (PCSE) and data mainly derived from the Women Political Empowerment Index (Coppedge et al., 2022; Pemstein et al., 2022; Sundström et al., 2017) and PA-X Peace Agreement Database Version 6 (Bell et al., 2022). The results support those expectations that not all but only some gender provisions, which are gender-sensitive equality and institutional reform provisions in particular, significantly influence the improvement of women's political rights following armed conflicts. I argue that different types of gender provisions have different effects on the advancement of women's political empowerment post-conflict, and thus, gender provisions should be treated

not as one but as distinguished categories in both research and practice. The analyses provide strong evidence that including gender provisions within peace agreements is essential to improve women's political rights; however, the contents of gender provisions matter.

In what follows, I review the body of research on gender, peace, and conflict in Chapter 2. I place the adoption of gender lenses in peace processes, and peace agreements in particular, as a crucial perspective that overcomes the obstacles to achieving durable peace. The chapter covers previous literature on women's participation in peace processes and the inclusion of gender provisions in peace agreements, as well as the associations between armed conflicts, gender equality, and women's political empowerment. I then identify the gap in the previous discussion on gender-sensitive peace agreements and women's political empowerment. Chapter 3 presents the potential underlying theoretical mechanisms linking gender-sensitive peace agreements and women's political rights improvement. I first conceptualize and define the key terms of this thesis. I then introduce multiple theoretical frameworks on how and why gender-sensitive peace agreements may positively influence women's political rights improvement. Subsequently, I present the research questions and hypotheses based on the literature review and further theoretical considerations. I then present the research design of this thesis in Chapter 4, explaining the statistical models used, describing the datasets, and operationalizing key variables. Chapter 5, which examines the hypotheses made in Chapter 3 and demonstrates the results of the statistical analyses, follows. I first show the results of descriptive statistics and then deliver the results of causal statistics, the central part of the analyses. Lastly, I present robustness checks by conducting two additional tests. In Chapter 6, I interpret the results presented in Chapter 5. Discussions of implications, limitations, and recommendations for future research follow the interpretations. In Chapter 7, I summarize the central insights of this thesis.

The main goals of this thesis are to examine the effectiveness of gender provisions in peace agreements, to indicate the importance of paying attention to the contents of the gender provisions, and to offer concrete evidence that at least one of the components of UNSCR 1325, gender-sensitive peace agreements, is a valuable instrument to enhance women's political empowerment in post-conflict states. The findings speak to an emerging body of research on gender and conflict as well as an increasing policy emphasis on the adoption of gender perspectives and the inclusion of women in peace processes.

2. Literature Review

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a significant shift in the international environment surrounding armed conflicts. Intrastate conflicts have been prominent and dominant over interstate conflicts and have been recognized as a “major threat of international peace and security” today (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 1). Notably, the recurrence of armed conflicts has become one of the central topics in the study of peace and conflict. Since 1946, sixty percent of all armed conflicts have recurred, and 135 countries have experienced conflict recurrence (Gates et al., 2016). Most conflict onsets have recurred since the mid-1990s and post-conflict peace only lasts seven years on average (Gates et al., 2016). Hence, avoiding conflict recurrence and achieving durable peace are important themes to explore.

One of the groundworks for durable peace is peace processes and peace agreements (Gates et al., 2016). Negotiated settlement of armed conflicts has become equally or even more common than military victories since the end of the Cold War (Kreutz, 2010). Peace negotiations can both be seen as a means to end conflicts and build peace, and the goal of a peace process is often considered differently (O'Reilly et al., 2015). It tends to aim primarily at ending conflicts. However, such endeavors often fail to take the long-term perspectives into account, leading to

conflict recurrence. On the other hand, when one aims to achieve long-term peace through peace negotiations, reaching an agreement in the first place is rather challenging. Such a trade-off is one of the obstacles to peace processes resulting in durable peace (O'Reilly et al., 2015).

In order to achieve long-lasting peace, it is significant to go beyond such a dilemma of peace processes by identifying 'missing elements' which make both short and long-term success feasible (O'Reilly et al., 2015, p.5). Recent scholarly works have increasingly focused on gender, particularly women, in their study of peace and conflict, suggesting that the gender perspective would work as one of the 'missing elements' to overcome the trade-off between ending violence and building peace.

Bringing in gender perspectives in peace processes, primarily women's inclusion and their meaningful participation in peace processes, has been a prominent agenda globally, especially after the adoption of the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) and nine subsequent resolutions, the so-called Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda. It stresses the significance of recognizing women not only as victims of conflicts but also as active agents contributing to peace, from conflict prevention and resolution to peacebuilding. It calls for women's full and equal participation in all phases and levels of peace processes. In addition, paragraph 8 of the UNSCR 1325 states that peace agreements should adopt a gender perspective and call for more gender-sensitive clauses in peace agreements. The WPS has brought gender lenses essential in the field of peace and conflict, both in the practical and academic worlds.¹

¹ It is essential to recognize that women are not a heterogeneous but a diverse category (Krause & Olsson, 2022). Each woman is a political actor influenced by political agendas, various interests, and different wartime experiences. Furthermore, although the term gender in this thesis reflects women relative to men, it needs to be recognized that gender is not a binary category of men and women. However, systematic data on relevant gender-specific society-

2.1 What Makes Peace Durable: Peace Processes and Gender Perspectives

2.1.1 Studies on Women's Participation in Peace Processes

Previous research on post-conflict long-lasting peace has identified a broad range of factors that impact the durability of peace. One of the factors is the participation of women in peace processes. Women have been largely excluded from peace processes (Aggestam & Svennson, 2018; Krause et al., 2018). However, in addition to the promotion of inclusive peace processes by the UN and international community, such as WPS, a growing body of literature indicates the importance of women's inclusion in peace processes (Caprioli et al., 2010; Krause et al., 2018; O'Reilly et al., 2015; Stone, 2014). Scholars have pointed out that women's participation in peace processes has long been discussed as a normative matter of gender equality and equity (e.g., Anderson & Swiss, 2014; O'Reilly et al., 2015; Paffenholz et al., 2016). The normative literature suggests a series of arguments for women-inclusive peace processes. It posits that women have a right to be included in negotiations since they suffer disproportionately during conflict (Chinkin, 2002), constitute half of the population (Anderlini, 2007), and have a stake in peace settlement outcomes (Anderlini, 2000). Women's inclusion is often "seen as a normative obligation, rather than a beneficial or necessary feature of peace processes" (Paffenholz et al., 2016, p.55). However, it is also a matter of effectiveness, meaning that including women in peace processes positively impacts better conflict outcomes, leading to peace (Caprioli et al., 2010; Krause et al., 2018; O'Reilly et al., 2015; Stone, 2014).

There has been an emerging consensus that women's participation in peace processes contributes to better outcomes. Several studies have examined such an association. For instance, O'Reilly et al. (2015) find that the inclusion of women's groups increased the

level characteristics exceeding these categories is still lacking (Bakken & Buhaug, 2021, p.1003).

likelihood of an agreement being reached and implemented. A preliminary analysis by Caprioli et al. (2010) finds that women generally positively affect outcomes for peace duration, and their direct participation in peace negotiations makes peace agreements more durable. Stone's (2014) statistical analysis finds a "predicted probability [...] that increasing women's participation could increase the probability of violence ending within one year by 24.9 percent" (Stone, 2014, p. 28). As Stone notes, "women's participation has a statistically significant, positive impact on the duration of peace" (O'Reilly et al., 2015, p.12). Furthermore, Krause et al. (2018) statistically find that women's meaningful participation in peace negotiations increases the durability and quality of peace following conflicts.

Women's participation in peace processes is discussed not only from the perspective of formal stages of peace processes but also from the so-called grass-roots level (Krause & Olsson, 2022). More inclusive peace processes with civil society groups (Nilsson, 2012), particularly women's organizations (Krause et al., 2018), make negotiations more likely to lead to durable peace. It is because civil society participation increases public representation, broadens population support, and brings local context-sensitive knowledge to the negotiation tables (Krause & Olsson, 2022). According to Krause et al. (2018), peace agreements with local women signatories tend to include more provisions addressing women's rights and social inequality and demonstrate higher implementation rates than agreements without women's participation, resulting in a more durable peace. It is because the representation of women broadens public support for peace processes through local women signatories and local women's groups, increases the quality and legitimacy of peace agreements, and can assist subsequent implementation processes (Krause et al., 2018).

2.1.2 Studies on Gender-Sensitive Peace Agreements

Another discussed factor for durable peace is peace agreements, which become the foundation for post-conflict transformative reforms that can influence women's empowerment and change gender hierarchies (Joshi & Olsson, 2021; Krause et al., 2018). As Gates et al. (2016) suggest, "peace agreements lay the groundwork for stable peace" (p.1). For instance, power-sharing provisions in negotiated settlements positively affect durable peace (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003), specifically when parties engage in costly concessions by implementing military and territorial provisions on power-sharing (Jarstad & Nilsson, 2008). Moreover, Joshi and his colleagues argue that the quality of peace agreement contents and following implementation progress are the most potent predictor of the durability of peace (Joshi & Quinn, 2015, 2017; Joshi et al., 2015).

Contents of peace agreement matter, as they constitute a 'roadmap' for post-conflict reform of political, constitutional, legal, economic, and social structures, as well as for future norms and practices in society (Bell, 2015; 2017; Bell & O'Rourke, 2007; Krause & Olsson, 2022). Peace agreements function as a roadmap since they have legal (Badran, 2014) and quasi-constitutional (Bell & O'Rourke, 2007; 2010) aspects. Like constitutions, peace agreements operate as 'power maps' of the post-conflict societies and provide frameworks that overhaul the political and legal structures of post-conflict states (Bell & O'Rourke, 2010).

Mainstreaming gender in peace agreements has become a prominent theme in the field of gender and conflict, both practically and academically, especially after the adoption of UNSCR 1325. Paragraph 8 of the resolution

Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia:

- (a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction;*
- (b) Measures that support local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements;*
- (c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary; ... (United Nations, 2000, p.3).*

There are relatively limited empirical studies focusing on gender-sensitive provisions in peace agreements. However, a few studies have examined the influence of gender-sensitive peace agreements on peace. Anderson and Swiss (2014) find a strong correlation between gender-sensitive peace agreements and the adoption of electoral quotas for women in post-conflict countries. The societal rupture caused by armed conflicts encourages women to organize politically, resulting in the adoption of gender quotas (Anderson & Swiss, 2014). They suggest that peace processes and agreements are “key to the link between postconflict transitions and the increased political representation of women” (Anderson & Swiss, 2014, p.57). Moreover, Reid (2021) finds that peace agreements with gender-sensitive provisions positively influence post-conflict society by improving women's political rights. Furthermore, scholars find that gender-inclusive peace agreements encourage women's inclusion in subsequent phases of peace processes (Paffenholz et al., 2016; True & Riveros-Morales, 2018). Hence, a gender-sensitive peace agreement is also a matter of women's inclusion and participation in peace processes.

2.1.3 Making Women Count, not Counting Women

Despite initiatives and promotions by the UN and the international community and several academic achievements supporting such endeavors, the progress of the WPS Agenda remains slow. For instance, women's participation in peace processes has been plodding, remaining "one of the most unfilled aspects of the women, peace and security agenda" (UN Women, 2012, p.1). Between 1992 and 2019, women constituted only 13 percent of negotiators and 6 percent of mediators and signatories in major peace processes worldwide (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022). Furthermore, the inclusion of gender-sensitive provisions in peace accords is still limited, and "[g]ender-blind peace agreements are still the norm, rather than the exception" (UN Women, 2012, p.17). According to Bell (2015), only 11 percent of peace agreements referenced women before the UNSCR 1325. It increased up to 27 percent after the adoption of the resolution; however, nearly three-quarters of peace agreements have not referenced women after more than a decade from the adoption of UNSCR 1325.

In research, many lack the perspective of distinguishing mere presence and reference of women from meaningful ones. When considering women's inclusion in peace processes, it is essential to distinguish women's meaningful participation and their influence from the mere presence of women. In other words, the mere numerical presence of women and their actual influence on peace processes are different, and the number of female participants is not a primary determinant of their actual influence (Paffenholz et al., 2016). Women are often included in a process but not heard. Thus, "making women's participation count is more important than merely counting the number of women included in peace processes" (Paffenholz et al., 2016, p.5). However, most academic studies still focus on the number of women involved rather than women's influence on peace processes (Paffenholz, 2018).

A similar argument is made in the context of gender-sensitive peace agreements. As Bell (2015) claim, references to women in peace accords are “not in-and-of-themselves sufficient to improve women’s equality and quality of life” (p.3). Gender provisions are often ambiguous and holistically referenced to women and gender with the absence of a shared understanding of substantial measures, and thus confront the difficulty of implementation (Bell, 2015). Moreover, gender-sensitive peace agreements are often drafted under high pressure from the international community and with little local buy-in, making such provisions recognized as internationally required ‘add-ons,’ leading to a situation where local elites have little incentive to implement such provisions (Bell, 2015). Also, Ellerby (2016) claims that just counting the number of times women and gender is mentioned in agreements is not substantive. Therefore, looking at mere references to women and gender is not enough when examining the influence of gender provisions.

2.2 Armed Conflict, Gender Equality, and Women’s Political Empowerment

2.2.1 Armed Conflict and Gender (In)equality

A growing body of literature on the gender-peace nexus has examined the relationship between gender (in)equality and armed conflict (Bjarnegård & Melander, 2011; Caprioli, 2000, 2005; Dahlum & Wig, 2020; DeMeritt et al., 2014; Gizelis, 2009, 2011; Hudson et al., 2008, 2012; Melander, 2005; Regan & Paskeviciute, 2003; Shair-Rosenfield & Wood, 2017). Gender equality is a matter of equal or balanced resource distribution between men and women, and it is a somewhat normative and vague concept (Forsberg & Olsson, 2016).² Some examined how gender equality is crucial in reducing the risks of armed conflict, while others questioned how

² With the ambiguity of the concept of gender equality, researchers have used various measurements to capture probable mechanisms of how gender (in)equality is associated with the outbreak of armed conflicts (Forsberg & Olsson, 2016). Therefore, the research mentioned here utilizes different factors to measure gender equality.

gender inequality is associated with an increased risk of armed conflict onsets.

There seems to be a scholarly consensus that gender equality positively reduces the risks of armed conflict. According to Caprioli (2000), gender equality has a pacifying influence on state behavior on the international level, and higher levels of gender equality are positively and significantly associated with lower levels of military action to settle international disputes, consequently reducing the risks of external conflicts. Regan and Paskeviciute (2003) suggest that a state where women have more access to political power is less likely to be engaged in militarized interstate disputes. Similar arguments have been made concerning internal conflicts. Caprioli (2005) finds that states with high gender inequality are more likely to experience internal conflicts. Melander (2005) also confirms that gender equality is positively associated with lower levels of intrastate conflict.

More generally, gender equality has positive effects on peace. For example, Hudson et al. (2008, 2012) suggest that gender equality is a strong indicator of the peacefulness of states. According to Bjarnegård and Melander (2011), gender equality is also essential for democracy to facilitate peace in states. Scholars have also examined the positive influence of gender equality on peacebuilding processes. For instance, in more gender-equal societies, United Nations-led peacebuilding operations are more likely to succeed (Gizelis, 2009, 2011). It is because women have more opportunities to express a voice in the peacebuilding process and stimulate broader domestic participation in societies where women have a relatively higher status (Gizelis, 2009). Such societies also encourage the local population to cooperate with peacebuilding policies and activities (Gizelis, 2011).

2.2.2 Armed Conflict and Women's Political Empowerment

One of the dimensions of the gender-peace nexus that previous research has explored is politics, namely, women's access to political power (Forsberg & Olsson, 2016). Primarily, women's political participation and representation are central when discussing the degree of women's access to power compared to men. Indeed, there has been a growing consensus that the stability of peace following armed conflict partly hinges on women's political rights and access to power (Dahlum & Wig, 2020; DeMeritt et al., 2014; Shair-Rosenfield & Wood, 2017).

Research has identified the positive effect of women's political participation on peace. For instance, Dahlum and Wig (2020) find a significant relationship between women's political participation and civil peace. Scholars also find women's political inclusion as influential in armed conflicts relapse less likely (DeMeritt et al., 2014; Shair-Rosenfield & Wood, 2017). DeMeritt et al. (2014) find that female political participation, measured by the percentage of women's parliamentary representation, reduces the risk of civil war recurrence. However, if women are marginalized, "[t]he resultant male-dominated environment leads to more war" (DeMeritt et al., 2014, p.362). According to Shair-Rosenfield and Wood (2017), the higher the proportion of female representatives in national legislatures, the more durable peace after a ceasefire or negotiated settlement of civil conflicts. Greater women's political representation positively alters spending priorities and shapes public perceptions of good governance and elite credibility in post-conflict societies (Shair-Rosenfield & Wood, 2017).

Consequently, women's political participation and representation positively affect peace; hence, there is much to gain from examining what improves women's political rights after civil conflicts. Focus on political rights is also crucial because they are a 'tangible starting point' for more comprehensive gender reform, and political reforms are more accelerating and detectable

than changes in women's economic and social status (Reid, 2021, p.2).

2.2.3 What Improves Women's Political Rights in a Post-conflict Society

The existing body of research suggests several different but not exclusive explanations of what improves women's political rights in post-conflict societies. First, the armed conflict itself is a transformative event due to its destructive nature. It thus changes situations surrounding women, as post-conflict societies experience a "breakdown in status quo traditions, morals, customs, and community" (DeMeritt et al., 2014, p.347). Gender hierarchy, which is highly institutionalized, entrenched in social structures, and reinforced by explicit and implicit norms, is potentially disrupted by conflicts (Webster et al., 2019). Civil war is "a transformative phenomenon" that "transforms individual preferences, choices, behavior, and identities" (Kalyvas, 2006, p.389). Additionally, subsequent peace processes generate "transformative periods of gender relations" (Reid, 2021, p.3). In the post-conflict periods, peace processes construct "opportunity structures" to revise the gender regimes, including the advancement of women's rights and the rise of women to power status (Tripp, 2015, p.19). The end of armed conflicts and the subsequent transition periods provide opportunities for significant political reforms and gendered social structure change that encourage women to achieve greater political access (Hughes, 2009; Hughes & Tripp, 2015).

Second, armed conflicts enable women to take on new roles in the private and public realm and enter political spheres that were male-dominant before conflicts (Berry, 2015; 2017; Hughes & Tripp, 2015; Tripp, 2000; Tripp et al., 2008; Wood, 2008). It is mainly due to the absence of males in society (Berry, 2015), as men tend to be "fighting, in prison, or dead" in conflict-affected zones (Pankhurst, 2002, p.123). The shifts in the division of labor also alter "perceptions of what a woman can or cannot do; when women assume these roles, it shows the

society at large that women can perform the same tasks as men” (Bakken & Buhaug, 2021, p.987).

Third, armed conflicts and their termination create space for women’s mobilization that constructs the potential for women’s political rights advancements after conflicts (Anderson & Swiss, 2014; Berry, 2015; Tripp, 2015; Webster et al., 2019). Armed conflicts encourage women to participate in and organize community-based, grassroots organizations and enter the public realm. Their activities directly improve women’s political rights by, for instance, participating in rights campaigns. Moreover, their mobilizations gradually make them perceived as legitimate political actors (Berry, 2015; 2017).

Fourth, conflict termination may introduce new political systems, such as electoral quotas for women (Anderson & Swiss, 2014), which enhance women’s political participation. Institutional reform is critical to transforming women’s mobilization and societal rupture into post-conflict improvements in women’s rights (Joshi & Olsson, 2021). The new constitutions and institutions following conflicts are more likely not already occupied by men, and therefore there are more potential spaces for women to compete (Tripp et al., 2008). Moreover, types of conflict termination matter to see better institutional reforms. Women’s political rights are more likely to improve through non-comprehensive and comprehensive peace agreements because they affect key actors’ opportunities and willingness for reform (Joshi & Olsson, 2021).

Finally, peace agreements following armed conflict affect the improvement of women’s political rights. To examine what improves women’s political rights in post-conflict societies, Reid (2021) focuses on the contents of peace agreements, particularly gender provisions, finding that peace agreements with gender provisions positively affect the improvement of women’s political rights. It is because gender-inclusive peace agreements create incentives and

constraints on international and domestic actors' behavior, empower women's groups to push for transformation, and stimulate norms shifts within societies (Reid, 2021). Bakken and Buhaug (2021) also suggest that gender-sensitive peace agreements significantly affect women's political participation improvements following severe armed conflicts.

2.3 Gap

A growing body of research discusses how the destructive nature of wars and armed conflicts paradoxically open a window of opportunity for women to strengthen their status (Anderson & Swiss, 2014; DeMeritt et al., 2014; Hughes, 2009; Hughes & Tripp, 2015; Webster et al., 2019). However, it is crucial to focus on the effects of not only armed conflicts themselves but also subsequent peace processes, including peace agreements. As many conflicts terminate with negotiated settlements with agreement documents, especially after the end of the Cold War (Kreutz, 2010), the influence of peace processes and agreements should not be ignored when discussing what empowers women's political positions post-conflict. Moreover, there is a significant variation in women's political rights developments within countries that experienced armed conflicts (Joshi & Olsson, 2021). Therefore, the destructive nature of conflict does not fully explain the improvement of women's political rights. Hence, there is a potential space to explore the role of peace processes, particularly peace agreements, in improving women's political rights.

Nevertheless, only limited work has assessed the effect of peace agreements on women's political empowerment following armed conflicts (Bakken & Buhaug, 2021), especially gender-sensitive peace agreements (Reid, 2021). Moreover, the discussion has contested arguments on the relationship between gender provisions and post-conflict women's political empowerment. On the one hand, Reid (2021) found that gender provisions in peace agreements

have a positive and statistically significant effect on improving women's political rights following armed conflicts. On the other hand, Joshi & Olsson (2021) did not find such an association: their statistical analyses on the relationship between the types of war termination and post-conflict women's political rights improvement found no statistically significant association between gender provisions and the advancement of women's political rights when limiting the focus to comprehensive peace agreements. It is questionable why the result is such a discrepancy, while Reid (2021) and Joshi and Olsson (2021) refer to the same dataset for the dependent variable. One of the potential reasons is that Joshi and Olsson (2021) focus on and control the types of conflict termination and control only for the inclusion of gender provisions in a CPA, while Reid (2021) does not. Also, Joshi and Olsson (2021) only take into account gender provisions specific to women's political rights, while Reid (2021) accounts for whether gender and/or women are referenced within the agreement, which is a broader operationalization. The utilized statistical models are also different. I assume that such differences resulted in the discrepancy in the findings. It is thus still in question what relationship lies, if any, between the inclusion of gender provisions in peace agreements and the improvement of women's political rights after conflicts. Therefore, it is valuable to focus on and reevaluate the relationship.

Additionally, gender provisions are operationalized differently in literature and are often superficially examined. Many counts reference the words "women" or "gender" to extract gender provisions (Bell & O'Rourke, 2010; Bell, 2015; Reid, 2021; True & Riveros-Morales, 2019). However, such operationalization may be misleading as there is a variety of gender provisions, and their contents and specificity vary from one another. As mentioned above, a mere reference to women and gender may not bring actual change in a post-conflict society. Ellerby (2016) also claims that just counting the number of times women and gender is mentioned in agreements is not substantive. Therefore, it is necessary to categorize gender

provisions in peace agreements by their contents and specificity to better assess the degree to which such provisions articulate post-conflict situations surrounding women. Reid (2021) also recognizes the importance of looking closely at the types of gender provisions, stating that “attention must be given to whether the specificity of gender provisions affects the extent to which women’s rights improve [to bring] a better understanding of which types of provisions are most likely to yield tangible progress for women” (Reid, 2021, p.13).

Nevertheless, no research to date has categorized and taken the difference among gender provisions into account when examining whether and how gender provisions influence the improvement of women’s political rights following conflicts. Therefore, I intend to examine whether different kinds of gender provisions affect the improvement of women’s political empowerment after conflict differently, in addition to investigating what relationship lies between gender provisions and women’s political empowerment in the first place. I mainly focus on the contents of peace agreements and leave the specificity for future research due to data availability. Furthermore, I analyze what types of gender provisions positively impact the improvement of women’s political rights compared to other gender provisions by looking closely at the categorized gender provisions within peace agreements.

3. Concepts and Theory

In this chapter, I theorize how and why gender-sensitive peace agreements may influence women’s political rights improvement. I first conceptualize and define the key terms of this thesis. Subsequently, I introduce theoretical frameworks on how and why gender-sensitive peace agreements may positively influence women’s political rights improvement. I then present research questions and hypotheses for this thesis based on the literature review and the theoretical discussions.

3.1 Definitions of Concepts and Terms

Several concepts and terms need to be defined to move on to the analyses. First, a peace process is “an attempt to bring political and/or military elites involved in [an armed] conflict to some sort of mutual agreement as to how to end the conflict” (Bell, 2015: p.5). An armed conflict here is defined as resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year, the definition given by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP, 2022). Second, a peace agreement is a “formal, publicly available document, produced after discussion with conflict protagonists and mutually agreed to by some or all of them,” which addresses armed conflict intending to end that violence (Bell et al., 2022, p.3). Third, gender provisions are peace agreement provisions that reflect gender perspectives. I refer to the definition from Bell et al. (2022), which include references to ‘gender,’ ‘women,’ or other equivalent female words such as girls, widows, and mothers. References such as sexual violence, gender-based violence, and UNSCR 1325 are also included. Fourth, gender-sensitive peace agreements are peace agreements that include any gender provisions. Finally, women’s political empowerment is “a process of increasing capacity for women, leading to greater choice, agency, and participation in societal decision-making” (Coppedge et al., 2022, p.302; Sundström et al., 2017, p.19). It comprises three dimensions: fundamental civil liberties, women’s open discussion of political issues and participation in civil society organizations, and the descriptive representation of women in formal political positions (Coppedge et al., 2022; Sundström et al., 2017). The word women’s political rights is equally used.

3.2 Theoretical Framework

A growing body of research has indicated the potential of gender-sensitive peace agreements as the ‘missing element’ that overcomes the trade-off between peace agreements ending violence and achieving durable peace through women’s political empowerment after conflicts

(Bakken & Buhaug, 2021; Reid, 2021). The contents of peace agreements affect the post-conflict society because they constitute a ‘roadmap’ for post-conflict reform of political, constitutional, legal, and economic structure, as well as for future norms and practices in society (Bell, 2015; 2018; Bell & O’Rourke 2007, 2010; Krause & Olsson, 2022). In this context, the inclusion of gender provisions is an “important starting point” to achieve women’s political, legal, and social gains (Bell & O’Rourke, 2010, p.946). As True and Riveros-Morales (2019) indicates, “the presence or absence of gender provisions in peace agreements affects women’s post-conflict participation and the chances that a post-conflict society will move towards gender equality” (p.24).

This thesis theorizes four potential mechanisms that lay on the effect of gender provisions on the improvements of women’s political status. First, peace agreements have ‘legal’ (Badran, 2014) and ‘quasi-constitutional’ (Bell & O’Rourke, 2007; 2010) functions, leading to reforms of situations surrounding women. Like constitutions, peace agreements operate as ‘power maps’ of the post-conflict societies and provide frameworks that overhaul the political and legal structures of post-conflict states (Bell & O’Rourke, 2010). Moreover, peace agreements “institutionalize peace” as they establish rules that guide the activities of critical actors, incentivizing and constraining the behavior of agreement signatories after conflicts (Badran, 2014, p.196). The reform of legal institutions is viewed as a necessary tool to facilitate broader political, economic, and social change (Haynes et al., 2011), and gender-sensitive peace agreements have the potential to influence such reforms and, accordingly, create conditions that enhance women’s political empowerment.

Second, peace agreements increase actors’ commitment to policies shaped by agreement contents because peace agreements “legalize peace” (Badran, 2014, p.196). The explicit and legal nature of agreements increases the reputation costs of violating the peace agreement,

making the actors more compliant (Abbott & Snidal, 2000; Bell, 2006; Badran, 2014). In this sense, one can assume that peace agreements increase actors' commitment to new policies guided by the agreements' contents. Thus, gender provisions within peace agreements are more likely to be realized and achieved, subsequently improving women's status. The costs of non-compliance are not always promising. However, agreements "constrain imperfectly but perceptibly" (Simmons, 2009, p.13). As Reid (2021) argues, peace agreements are imperfect, like human rights treaties discussed by Simmons (2009), but their legal nature makes their effects perceptible. Moreover, crucial actors are likely to comply with gender provisions for several reasons. Gender issues may be relatively less costly compared to other reforms for political actors (Reid, 2021). As Simmons (2009) notes, "most governments [...] are far less likely to have a crucial political stake in assuring or withholding rights for women and children than they are to have the uninhibited freedom to oppress political opposition" (p.16). Furthermore, negotiated settlements often contain international actors like peacekeepers, which may provide additional constraints on actors' behavior by monitoring compliance with agreement provisions (Reid, 2021).

Third, gender-sensitive peace agreements potentially improve women's political rights by empowering women's groups and mobilization (Reid, 2021), which is rather an indirect mechanism compared to the discussion of compliance and constraints. Existing research recognizes the critical role of women's mobilization in improving women's political status (Anderson & Swiss, 2014; Berry, 2015; Tripp, 2015; Webster et al., 2019). The destructive nature of armed conflicts and conflicts' ends lead to increased women's mobilization, and gender provisions substantially generate positive externalities for such acts. Gender provisions empower women's groups and their domestic and international supporters and provide legal backing to their activities, as "gender-inclusive agreements legitimize women as political actors and legalize advocates' demands for greater political rights" (Reid, 2021, p.5).

Lastly, gender provisions potentially stimulate norm shifts within post-conflict societies (Reid, 2021). Legitimizing gender issues through codifying gender provisions subsequently signals to the post-conflict society that women are relevant and capable political actors (Reid, 2021). People's perception of gender attitudes, particularly about women's status in politics, is one of the strongest predictors of the degree of women's representation in formal politics (Paxton & Kunovich, 2003). It is because ideological beliefs on the propriety of women in politics influence women's decision to stand for political office and the likelihood of voters accepting and party elites supporting women candidates (Paxton & Kunovich, 2003). Post-conflict women's movements also help reshape the perception of women as legitimate political actors (Berry, 2015). As Haynes et al. (2011, p.525) argue, "[w]hat makes constitutional negotiations and peace agreements so important for women is that they provide a meaningful political and legal tool to [...] entrench new social and legal understandings affirming the equality, autonomy, and agency."

Because of these potential mechanisms, gender provisions within peace agreements are expected to improve women's political rights in post-conflict societies.

3.3 Research Questions and Hypotheses

Although gender provisions are thought to generally have a positive effect on women's political empowerment after conflicts (Reid, 2021), it is improbable that any gender provision has a similar degree of such influence. For instance, provisions mentioning the introduction of gender quotas in the national parliament and provisions addressing gender-based violence have assumably different consequences on women's political rights. It leads to my first research question: Do any gender provisions affect the post-conflict improvement of women's political rights to the same degree? The contents of gender provisions vary and thus: constrain actors'

behaviors differently; require different commitments; empower women's mobilization to a different degree; stimulate different norm shifts; and lead to different outcomes. Therefore, I assume that the categories of gender provisions matter in addition to the distinction between the presence or absence of such provisions. Therefore, my first hypothesis is:

H1: Different types of gender provisions have different effects on the improvement of women's political empowerment post-conflict.

Since I expect that the categories of gender provisions matter, my second research question is: What types of gender provisions positively impact the improvement of women's political rights compared to other gender-sensitive provisions? Firstly, it is assumed that gender provisions that directly and specifically mention women's participation and representation in the political sphere significantly influence women's political rights improvement compared to other types of gender provisions. It is because such provisions potentially influence women's political status directly. The end of armed conflicts and the subsequent transition periods provide opportunities for significant political reforms to encourage women to achieve greater political access (Hughes, 2009; Hughes & Tripp, 2015), and gender-sensitive political participation provisions may promote such a shift. Hence, my second hypothesis is:

H2: Gender provisions mentioning women's participation in governance and decision-making bodies have more significant influences on the improvement of women's political empowerment following armed conflicts than other gender provisions.

Secondly, I suppose that gender provisions regarding the promotion of general equality are adequate to improve women's political rights following conflicts. It is rather broad and indirect compared to the previous hypothesis; however, I assume that provisions that encourage not

only political but also legal and social equality are essential to achieve better gender equality and, in turn, better women's political status. As the literature review indicated, armed conflict, gender (in)equality, and women's political empowerment are strongly interrelated. Gender equality is a matter of equal or balanced resource distribution between men and women (Forsberg & Olsson, 2016). In the context of political empowerment, it is about how women have equal or balanced access and rights in the political sphere compared to men. It is assumed that if gender-sensitive equality provisions are included, a state is more likely to achieve better gender equality. It then leads to the assumption that women will likely have more access to political power in such a state. Therefore, my third hypothesis is:

H3: Gender provisions mentioning equality have more significant influences on the improvement of women's political empowerment following armed conflicts than other gender provisions.

Finally, I assume that gender provisions referring to institutional reform have prominent effects on women's political empowerment. According to Joshi and Olsson (2021), institutional reform is key to transforming women's mobilization and societal rupture into post-conflict improvements in women's rights. The constitutions and institutions following post-conflict reforms are more likely not already occupied by males, and thus there are more potential spaces to compete for women (Tripp et al., 2008). As peace agreements have legal (Badran, 2014) and quasi-constitutional (Bell & O'Rourke, 2007; 2010) aspects, peace agreements provide frameworks that overhaul the political and legal structures of post-conflict states (Bell & O'Rourke, 2010). Also, the reform of legal institutions is viewed as a necessary tool to facilitate broader political, economic, and social change (Haynes et al., 2011). Based on these aspects, I suppose that specific gender-sensitive provisions on institutional reform promote broader institutional reform, encouraging women's political empowerment. Therefore, my fourth

hypothesis is:

H4: Gender provisions mentioning institutional reform have more significant influences on the improvement of women's political empowerment following armed conflicts than other gender provisions.

4. Research Design

4.1 Models

To test the hypotheses, I employ statistical methods. In addition to descriptive statistics, the main models presented below are estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE).³ The OLS PCSE model accounts for problems related to heteroskedastic residuals and autocorrelation (Beck, 2001; Beck & Katz, 1995). As this thesis utilizes time-series cross-section data and such data potentially causes heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, the introduction of panel correlated standard errors is essential.⁴

4.2 Datasets

The unit of analysis is peace agreements of intrastate conflicts reached after the end of the Cold War. A peace agreement is a "formal, publicly available document, produced after discussion with conflict protagonists and mutually agreed to by some or all of them, addressing conflict with a view to ending it," as defined in the PA-X Peace Agreement Database (PA-X) (Bell et al., 2022, p.3). I employ data from the PA-X Version 6 (Bell et al., 2022), which limits the

³ To test the robustness, I also estimate OLS with robust standard errors, which account for heteroskedasticity but not autocorrelation. The results are in the Appendix.

⁴ Time-series cross-section (TSCS) data consist of repeated observations on a series of the same fixed units (Beck, 2001). According to Beck (2001), when treating TSCS issues as an estimation, OLS with PCSE should be used rather than generalized least squares (p.271).

universe of cases reached between 1990 and 2021. The cases are also limited to intrastate conflicts, as of the prevalence of such conflicts since the 1990s and their unique characteristics compared to the ‘traditional’ interstate conflicts (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009; Gates et al., 2016). Both major and minor conflicts are included.⁵ Moreover, the cases are restricted by their status: peace agreements stated as “multiparty signed/agreed” in the status variable of PA-X are only included. In addition, I limit my universe of cases to those in which the conflict ended prior to 2021, according to UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Version 22.1 (Davies et al., 2022; Gleditsch et al., 2002). I code whether the conflict ended by looking at the end date of the conflict and only if there is no following conflict event that occurred within the conflict id until 2021. As a result, the dataset covers 794 peace agreements in total.

The selected OLS PCSE model requires the original dataset to be edited. As the PA-X includes a series of peace agreements within the same peace process, it leads to a situation in which several peace agreements are reached for the same conflict in the same state in the same year. However, such overlapping state-peace agreement year combinations are identified as contradictions in Stata, a statistical software that does not allow conducting OLS PCSE. Hence, the dataset must exclude those overlaps and leave only one pair of state-peace agreement year combinations. Therefore, I created an edited version of the dataset by excluding such overlapped cases in the following way. When a peace process includes a series of peace agreements reached in a state in the same year, I aggregated such peace agreements into one. In order to aggregate the overlapped peace agreements, I extracted peace agreements with the same state-peace agreement year combinations and make one new aggregated case per such combination. When creating a new case, I mainly referred to the data of the latest reached

⁵ Minor conflicts refer to conflicts with less than 1,000 battle-related deaths, and major conflicts reflect conflicts with at least 1,000 battle related-deaths (Bakken & Buhaug, 2021).

agreement within the combination. For the independent variables, which are gender provision variables, I referred to all the gender provisions in a given state-peace agreement year combinations and included all in the combined case. As a result, the edited dataset includes only one pair of state-peace agreement year combinations each.⁶ In total, 513 cases were aggregated, and the edited dataset covers 281 peace agreements. Both of the datasets, the original and the edited, are used in the analyses in Chapter 5.

4.2.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the improvement of women's political empowerment post-conflict. The dependent variable is derived from the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem) Version 12 dataset's Women Political Empowerment Index (Coppedge et al., 2022; Pemstein et al., 2022; Sundström et al., 2017).⁷ Women's political empowerment is "a process of increasing capacity for women, leading to greater choice, agency, and participation in societal decision-making" (Coppedge et al., 2022, p.302; Sundström et al., 2017, p.19). It incorporates three equally weighted dimensions: fundamental civil liberties, women's open discussion of political issues and participation in civil society organizations, and the descriptive representation of women in formal political positions (Coppedge et al., 2022, p.302; Sundström et al., 2017).

Since the theory expects that gender provisions bring positive changes in women's political rights, I measure the changes by subtracting the index value of the pre-conflict year from the post-conflict year value. Pre-conflict year accounts for a year before the conflict started.⁸ Post-

⁶ In order to check the potential of the arbitrary editing of the dataset and its effect on the outcomes, I also estimate OLS models with robust standard errors with the original dataset. The results are presented in the Appendix.

⁷ The index value's interval is from 0 to 1.

⁸ The pre-year of Bosnia and Herzegovina is set as 1992, although it is supposed to be 1991, as the state was established in 1992, and 1991 cannot be coded.

conflict year accounts for the five years after either the conflict ended or the latest peace agreement was reached, whichever the later.⁹ If an armed conflict ended or a peace agreement was reached in 2018 or later, five-year post-conflict data is unavailable as the dataset covers only until the year 2021. In such cases, the latest data from the year 2021 is used as the post-conflict value.

4.2.2 Independent Variables

The key independent variable is the inclusion of gender provisions in peace agreements. As mentioned in Chapter 3, gender provisions are peace agreement provisions that reflect gender perspectives. Such provisions are specifically addressing women, their inclusion, and their rights, including “references to girls, widows, mothers, sexual violence (or forms thereof), gender violence, UNSCR 1325 or CEDAW, lactating women” (Bell et al., 2022, p.27).¹⁰ It is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if a given peace agreement includes any gender provisions and 0 otherwise. Data are taken from PA-X Dataset Version 6 (Bell et al., 2022) and PA-X Gender Dataset Version 4 (Bell et al., 2020). The former codes whether an agreement includes any gender provisions, and the latter goes in-depth and categorizes those gender provisions into 11 different variables.¹¹ I refer to both datasets and code not only whether an agreement includes gender provisions but also what kind of gender provisions those are.

The 11 gender provision categories are Participation, Equality, Particular Groups of Women, International Law, New Institutions, Violence Against Women, Transitional Justice, Institutional Reform, Development, Implementation, and Other. The Participation variable

⁹ It follows Reid's (2021) operationalization (p.7).

¹⁰ CEDAW stands for the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. It provides various provisions to support women's public participation and equality (Bell, 2017).

¹¹ The 11 categories are more finely classified, and there are 42 sub-categories in the dataset.

accounts for whether a peace agreement mentions any form of women's participation in politics, such as gender quotas in electoral or other bodies, effective participation for women in governance, and citizenship (Bell et al., 2020). The Equality variable considers political or legal equality provisions or provisions discussing non-discrimination on the grounds of sex or gender (Bell et al., 2020). The Particular Groups of Women variable takes into account whether an agreement mentions any particular groups of women, such as indigenous and nomadic women, refugee and displaced women, pregnancy, and maternity (Bell et al., 2020). The International Law variable accounts for whether an agreement mentions any reference to international law, such as international human rights law, international humanitarian law, international human rights standards, and UNSCR 1325, with regard to women (Bell et al., 2020). The New Institutions variable considers whether an agreement mentions any reference to new institutions concerning women, such as specific institutions for women established by the agreement like women's ministries, commissions, or other forums, promotion of women's organizations, and women's infrastructure, women's role in reconciliation and promoting the peace process (Bell et al., 2020). The Violence Against Women variable accounts for whether an agreement refers to violence against women, such as sexual violence, gender-based violence, and protection from such violence (Bell et al., 2020). The Transitional Justice variable focuses on any reference to transitional justice, such as past-focused mechanism, transitional justice mechanism, or international criminal court reference relating to women; any mention of women with relation to prisoners, prisons, or prisoner release (Bell et al., 2020). The Institutional Reform variable considers any reference to institutional reform in relation to women. They include constitution-making and constitutional reform; emergency provisions, domestic criminal law and justice sector reforms, or measures to combat corruption; judiciary or judicial reform; police or other forces, or women-centered police reform; Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), armies, parastatal or rebel forces; and gender-based reform or gender sensitivity of public administration/civil service (Bell et al., 2020). The

Development variable accounts for general provisions concerning women and development, such as the rehabilitation and reconstruction programs with special provisions for women, reference to education, women's health, and reproductive rights and restrictions (Bell et al., 2020). Lastly, the Implementation variable considers whether an agreement mentions any reference to the manner of implementation with regard to women (Bell et al., 2020).

4.2.3 Control Variables

Eight control variables are included in the models as alternative drivers of women's political empowerment. The first two variables are conflict-related: conflict duration and intensity, derived from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Version 22.1 (Davies et al., 2022; Gleditsch et al., 2002). The conflict duration variable counts the number of years from the beginning of the armed conflict until the end of the conflict.¹² Conflict intensity is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 when the cumulative battle-related deaths of a conflict exceed 1,000 from the conflict onset to the end, 0 otherwise. These variables both demonstrate the severity of conflicts, which can cause a demographic shift that might result in positive changes in women's political rights (Webster et al., 2019). Moreover, more prolonged conflicts likely generate more significant openings for women by dramatically destabilizing the status quo (Hughes, 2009; Hughes & Tripp, 2015). Bakken and Buhaug (2021) also suggest that conflict intensity is significantly related to a more pronounced effect on women's subsequent political empowerment.

The third control variable is the UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) deployment. It is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the UN-led PKO was deployed and 0 otherwise.¹³ PKO is

¹² The latest end year is treated as the end year for conflicts with several end years.

¹³ The information is available on the UN website: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en>.

central to achieving gender-balancing reforms post-conflict (Huber & Karim, 2018). Moreover, it may provide international pressure that inhibits gross violations of women's rights, represents international attention that may further bind actors' hands to peace agreements, and contribute to improving women's situation, such as promoting women's participation and protection (Joshi & Olsson, 2021; Reid, 2021).

The fourth control variable accounts for whether the agreement is a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA). It is also a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the agreement is coded as comprehensive in the agreement stage variable in the PA-X dataset (Bell et al., 2022) and 0 otherwise. Negotiated settlements of armed conflicts tend to improve women's post-conflict political empowerment (Bakken & Buhaug, 2021), especially CPAs (Joshi & Olsson, 2021). It is because CPAs address the incompatibilities of critical actors and affect their opportunities and willingness for post-conflict reforms required to improve women's rights (Joshi & Olsson, 2021). Moreover, CPAs influence the chance of substantive international influence on the implementation of agreements (Joshi & Olsson, 2021).

The fifth and sixth control variables reflect the conflict-affected states' situation of gender equality: economic development and fertility rates. The level of economic development is measured using the log-transformed Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in the constant 2005 US dollar.¹⁴ Economic development, armed conflict, and gender equality are strongly linked. The more developed economy tends to be more gender equal through improvements in education, job opportunities, and welfare (Dollar, 2005; Kabeer & Natali, 2013). Moreover, society would likely adopt more gender-inclusive policies and encourage women to participate in the labor market as a response to labor market demands and the economy expands (Joshi &

¹⁴ The data is from World Development Indicators available on World Bank's Data Bank: <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators>.

Olsson, 2021). To minimize the influence of reverse causality, GDP per capita is specified with a one-year lag. The fertility rate variable is also a gender-relevant metric of development and gender equality that gauge women's access to economic and social capital (Reid, 2021).¹⁵ According to Rosen (2013), higher fertility rates tend to be related to fewer women in parliament in developed and developing countries, and the reverse is confirmed in least-developed countries.

The seventh control variable is international gender norm diffusion. With the adoption of UNSCR 1325 on WPS, there has been a considerable normative shift regarding women's rights and security in the context of armed conflict and its termination (Tripp, 2015). Therefore, it is essential to take into account the potential influence of such a global normative change. Therefore, I include a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the agreement was reached after the adoption of UNSCR1325 and 0 otherwise.

The last control variable is the presence of female signatories. Based on PA-X Dataset (Bell et al., 2022) and UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset version 22.1 (Davis et al., 2022), I checked the names of signatories and their sex. I coded 1 only when the female name of the signatories was clearly found from either of the datasets and 0 otherwise. Recent scholarly works suggest the influence of female signatories on peace agreement outcomes (Bell, 2015; Krause et al., 2018). I coded three types of female signatories variables; local, third-party, and aggregated, as Krause et al. (2018) suggest the importance of distinguishing local female representatives, meaning government or rebel group representatives and civil society representatives, from third-party representatives and focusing on the former. As Krause et al. (2018) indicate the significant influence of local women signatories on post-conflict situations, I include the local female

¹⁵ The data is from World Development Indicators available on World Bank's Data Bank: <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators>.

signatories variable in the main models.

I do not include a control variable for democracy in the main models, following Bakken and Buhaug (2021). It is because “conflict resolution and peacebuilding sometimes imply democratic reforms that both affect the likelihood of a lasting peace and have direct implications for formal gender roles in society, controlling for democracy may lead to biased estimates” (Bakken & Buhaug, 2021, p.993). It is also because the data I refer to from Polity5 Dataset (Marshall, 2020) is available only until 2018 and generates several missing values that potentially affect the results. Furthermore, I test the inclusion of democracy in sensitivity tests in Chapter 5, and controlling for democracy does not substantively challenge the conclusions drawn here.

5. Results

This chapter presents the empirical analyses of this thesis. Its objective is to test the hypotheses made in Chapter 3. In the previous chapter, I formulated hypotheses regarding the effect of gender provisions in peace agreements on women's political rights improvement. I made four hypotheses about the nature of such a relationship. Hypothesis 1 predicted that different types of gender provisions have different effects on the improvement of women's political empowerment post-conflict. Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 indicated what types of gender provisions are particularly influential on the outcome compared to others. I assumed that gender provisions mentioning women's participation in governance and decision-making bodies (Hypothesis 2), equality (Hypothesis 3), and institutional reform (Hypothesis 4) have more significant influences on improving women's political rights after armed conflicts compared to other gender provisions. This chapter first shows the results of descriptive statistics. It then delivers the results of causal statistics, the central part of the analyses. Lastly, it presents

robustness checks by conducting two sensitivity tests.

5.1 Descriptive Analyses

5.1.1 Armed Conflicts Terminated by Agreements and Women's Political Rights

Before testing the formulated hypotheses, I illustrate the relationship between the armed conflicts terminated by peace agreements and the improvement of women's political empowerment. Based on the original dataset's descriptive statistics and graphs, the dependent variable, the change in women's political empowerment between pre- and post-conflict, is relatively normally distributed (see Figure 1). The mean of the change is 0.23, and the standard deviation is 0.16. According to Figure 2, there are several outliers. Those are peace agreements in South Africa (1990, 1994) and Spain (1998, 2000). Nevertheless, I leave these cases in the following analyses since they are not too extreme. The edited versions of the dataset and its descriptive statistics show similar outcomes to the original but are relatively more straightforward. The dependent variable's distribution is closer to the normal distribution (see Figure 3), and no outlier exists (see Figure 4). The mean of the change is 0.24, and the standard deviation is 0.17, also close to the original dataset.

Both datasets' box plots show that over 75 percent of armed conflicts terminated with peace agreements improved women's political empowerment index values from pre- to post-conflict (see Figures 2 and 4). Therefore, it is likely that armed conflicts terminated with peace agreements tend to improve women's political rights overall. Consequently, peace agreements tend to positively impact women's political rights after conflicts, although it is not always the case. The finding aligns with Bakken and Buhaug (2021), arguing that armed conflicts ended with peace agreements are more likely to see better improvements in women's political situations post-conflict.

5.1.2 Gender-Sensitive Peace Agreements

Next, Table 1 illustrates the number of gender provisions in the original and edited datasets. In the original dataset, less than 20 percent of peace agreements include at least one gender provision. The percentage increases for the edited dataset due to the operationalization indicated in Chapter 4. Nevertheless, only 35.6% of peace agreements contain gender provisions. In other words, nearly two-thirds of peace agreements include no gender provisions at all. Table 1 also shows the number of categorized gender provisions. The frequency of the Participation and Equality provisions is higher than in other categories. Provisions mentioning Violence against Women, Institutional Reform, and Development come in the middle, and the number of other provisions is less frequent.¹⁶

Furthermore, Table 2 displays the frequency and percentile of gender provisions before and after the adoption of UNSCR1325.¹⁷ As it shows, the percentage of gender provisions increased from around 15 percent to 25 percent after the adoption of UNSCR1325; however, it is still only one-fourth within all peace agreements. Thus, gender-blind peace agreements are yet “the norm, rather than the exception” (UN Women, 2012, p.17).

¹⁶ What each category represents is described in Chapter 4.

¹⁷ The data is from the original dataset.

Figure 1. Distribution of the Change (Original)




Figure 2. Box Plot of the Change (Original)




Figure 3. Distribution of the Change (Edited)




Figure 4. Box Plot of the Change (Edited)




Table 1: Number of Gender Provisions

	Original Dataset	Edited Dataset
Gender provisions	154	100
	19,40%	35,59%
Participation	52	42
	6,55%	14,95%
Equality	57	43
	7,18%	15,30%
Particular groups of women	22	17
	2,77%	6,05%
International law	39	30
	4,91%	10,68%
New institutions	30	26
	3,78%	9,25%
Violence against women	45	38
	5,67%	13,52%
Transitional justice	23	20
	2,90%	7,12%
Institutional reform	44	35
	5,54%	12,46%
Development	47	35
	5,92%	12,46%
Implementation	22	19
	2,77%	6,76%
Other	4	4
	0,50%	1,42%
Observations	794	281

Note: Frequency with percentile.

Table 2: Gender Provisions Before and After the Adoption of UNSCR1315 (Original Dataset)

	w/o Gender provisions	w/ Gender provisions	Total
Before UNSCR1325	372	65	437
	85,13%	14,87%	100,00%
After UNSCR1325	267	89	356
	75,00%	25,00%	100,00%
Total	637	154	793
	80,58%	19,42%	100,00%

Note: Frequency with percentile.

5.1.3 Comparison between Gender-sensitive and Non-sensitive Peace Agreements

Before moving on to causal analyses, I lastly compare peace agreements with and without gender provisions and their effects on the change of women's political empowerment. Figure 5 illustrates the distributions of the changes in women's political empowerment compared to the presence and absence of gender provisions. The distribution of gender-sensitive peace agreements is shown on the right, and the distribution of gender-non-sensitive peace agreements is shown on the left. The mean of the distribution of gender-non-sensitive peace agreements is around 0.22, and the standard deviation is about 0.16. In comparison, the mean of the distribution of peace agreements with gender provisions is around 0.26, and the standard deviation is about 0.15. The results suggest that even peace agreements without gender provisions are likely to improve women's political empowerment post-conflict; however, peace agreements with gender provisions are more likely to see such a positive change.

Table 3 further supports the finding. The table displays the frequency and percentage of peace agreements with and without gender provisions, distinguished by the degree of change in

women's political empowerment post-conflict. When comparing the percentage of peace agreements that saw a decrease in women's political empowerment, 4.38 percent of gender-blind peace agreements saw a decrease in the change. In comparison, less than 1 percent of peace agreements with gender provisions saw such a decrease. Therefore, it is evident that peace agreements without gender provisions are more likely to see such negative outcomes. In addition, for peace agreements without gender provisions, the change from 0 to 0.2 is the most frequent (46.25 percent), while for peace agreements with peace agreements, the change from 0.2 to 0.4 is the most frequent (49.35 percent). The results suggest that peace agreements with gender provisions are more likely to see better improvements in women's political empowerment, although it is not always the case.

Figure 5. Comparison between Peace Agreements with and without Gender Provisions




Table 3. Comparison between Peace Agreements with and without Gender Provisions

	Change of WPE after conflict					Total
	-.2	0	.2	.4	.6	
w/o Gender Provisions	9	87	46	34	5	181
	4,97%	48,07%	25,41%	18,78%	2,76%	100,00%
w/ Gender provisions	1	40	47	10	2	100
	1,00%	40,00%	47,00%	10,00%	2,00%	100,00%
Total	10	127	93	44	7	281
	3,56%	45,20%	33,10%	15,66%	2,49%	100,00%

Note: Frequency with percentile.

5.2 Causal Analyses: Gender Provisions and Women's Political Rights

Next, I assess the relationship between gender-sensitive peace agreements and the improvement of women's political empowerment, the main focus of this thesis. Since the original dataset does not allow conducting OLS with PCSE due to the data overlapping, the following main models are with the edited dataset.

Model 1 in Table 4 shows the causal statistics of the effect of gender-sensitive peace agreements treated collectively on improving women's political rights. Unexpectedly, the result does not find a statistically significant association between gender-sensitive peace agreements and post-conflict women's political rights improvement. The result thus does not support the previous research (Reid, 2021), although the relationship is positive. The coefficient is 0.0131, the z-score is 0.0202, and the p-value is 0.518.

Model 1 indicates that conflict intensity has positive and statistically significant effects on the improvement of women's political empowerment post-conflict at the 1-percent level. If an armed conflict caused over 1,000 battle-related deaths, women's political rights are more likely to improve in the conflict-affected state. The coefficient for the conflict intensity implies an

average increase of around 0.1 standard deviations in women's political empowerment post-conflict, holding other variables constant. The result aligns with Bakken and Buhaug (2021), suggesting that more intense conflicts tend to improve women's political empowerment post-conflict. In addition, CPA and fertility rates are statistically significant at the 10-percent and 5-percent levels, respectively, and the associations are both positive. A peace agreement that is CPA or agreed for a state with a higher fertility rate tends to result in better improvement of women's political empowerment when controlling for the inclusion of gender provisions and holding other variables constant. Contrarily, the deployment of PKO and the presence of local female signatories are also statistically significant at the 1-percent levels when controlling for the inclusion of gender provisions and holding other variables equal, but the influences are negative. Therefore, these two variables do not positively affect women's political empowerment but result in an average decrease of around 0.08 standard deviations in women's political rights post-conflict.

The result questions the presumption that gender provisions collectively improve women's political rights post-conflict (Reid, 2021). Instead, together with the following findings, the results support Hypothesis 1, that not all gender provisions positively affect women's political empowerment. Instead, different gender provisions affect women's political empowerment post-conflict differently, and only some types of gender provisions improve women's political status post-conflict.

Table 4. Gender-sensitive Peace Agreement and Change in Female Empowerment

VARIABLES	Model 1
Gender provisions	0.0131 (0.0202)
Conflict duration	0.000696 (0.000864)
Conflict intensity	0.0992*** (0.0266)
PKO	-0.0770*** (0.0153)
CPA	0.0486* (0.0254)
UNSCR 1325	-0.0141 (0.0209)
Fertility rates	0.0162** (0.00646)
GDP per capita (log, lag)	0.0203 (0.0211)
Female signatories (local)	-0.0805*** (0.0241)
Constant	0.0644 (0.0851)
Observations	254
R-squared	0.170

Note: OLS coefficients with z-scores based on panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

I now turn to the evaluation of the influences of different types of gender provisions on the improvement of women's political empowerment after conflict. The results are shown in Table 5. As expected, different gender provisions affect the post-conflict women's political rights situation differently, supporting Hypothesis 1. Only two out of 11 categories statistically significantly affect women's political rights improvement following conflicts. Those categories are Equality provisions (Model 3) and Institutional Reform provisions (Model 9). The Equality variable considers political or legal equality provisions or provisions discussing non-discrimination on sex or gender (Bell et al., 2020). The variable also considers social equality, property rights, health, financial, or worker's rights regarding women (Bell et al., 2020). The Institutional Reform variable accounts for six types of institutional reform concerning women: constitution-making and reform; emergency, criminal law, and corruption reform; judiciary and judicial reform; police or other forces, or women-centered police reform; Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), armies, parastatal, or rebel forces; and gender-based reform or gender sensitivity of public administration and civil service (Bell et al., 2020).

These two variables are statistically significant at the 5-percent level and 10-percent level, respectively, and positively associated with women's political rights improvement. The coefficients imply that the inclusion of gender-sensitive Equality provisions or Institutional Reform provisions results in around 0.05 standard deviations increase in the women's political rights improvement, holding other variables in the models constant. By comparing the results with Model 1 in Table 4, which treats gender provisions collectively, the coefficients indicate that the inclusion of Equality or Institutional Reform provisions is around five times as important as the evaluating collective gender provisions in predicting the improvement of women's political rights post-conflict. Based on the results, Hypotheses 3 and 4, which expect gender provisions mentioning equality and institutional reform to have more significant influences on improving women's political rights after armed conflicts compared to other

gender provisions, are confirmed.

On the contrary, Hypothesis 2, which expects gender provisions mentioning any form of women's participation in politics, such as gender quotas in electoral or other bodies, effective participation for women in governance, and citizenship, to have more significant influences on the improvement of women's political rights following armed conflicts, is not confirmed. It is because the Participation variable (Model 2) is not statistically significant, although the association is positive.

Similar to Model 1 in Table 4, conflict intensity has positive and statistically significant effects on the improvement of women's political empowerment post-conflict at the 1-percent level for both Model 3 and Model 9. The coefficient for the conflict intensity implies an average increase of around 0.05 standard deviation in women's political empowerment post-conflict, holding all other variables equal. In addition, fertility rates are statistically significant at the 5-percent level for some and the 1-percent level for others. The statistical significance of CPA is weaker; for some models, it is statistically significant at the 5- or 10-percent levels and not statistically significant for others. Unexpectedly, like Model 1, the influence of the deployment of PKO and the presence of local female signatories are also statistically significant at the 1-percent level when controlling for gender-sensitive provisions and holding other variables constant; however, the associations are negative.

Conclusively, the main statistical models confirm three out of four hypotheses: Hypotheses 1, 3, and 4. Based on the results illustrated here, I question the presumption that gender provisions as a whole improve women's political rights post-conflict. Instead, the results suggest that different types of gender provisions impact the post-conflict women's political situation differently. Therefore, when examining the effect of gender provisions on the improvement of

women's political rights post-conflict, gender provisions should be treated not as one but as distinguished categories. Furthermore, the results show that peace agreements that include gender-sensitive Equality and Institutional Reform provisions are particularly influential for women's political rights improvement compared to agreements with other types of gender provisions. It should also be noted that the inclusion of gender-sensitive Participation provisions that accounts for women's participation in governance and decision-making bodies, which seems the most direct and relevant to women's political empowerment, does not significantly affect the outcomes.

Table 5. Categorized Gender Provisions and Change in Women's Political Empowerment

VARIABLES	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Participation	0.00465 (0.0228)										
Equality		0.0508** (0.0250)									
Particular groups of women			0.0349 (0.0290)								
International law				-0.00404 (0.0250)							
New institutions					0.00410 (0.0287)						
Violence against women						0.0156 (0.0193)					
Transitional justice							0.0126 (0.0417)				
Institutional reform								0.0505* (0.0282)			
Development									0.0188 (0.0245)		
Implementation										0.0151 (0.0297)	
Other											0.0157 (0.0314)
Conflict duration	0.000696 (0.000868)	0.000695 (0.000864)	0.000673 (0.000851)	0.000699 (0.000872)	0.000695 (0.000869)	0.000688 (0.000861)	0.000698 (0.000870)	0.000660 (0.000848)	0.000690 (0.000864)	0.000693 (0.000866)	0.000696 (0.000869)
Conflict intensity	0.101*** (0.0267)	0.0972*** (0.0274)	0.101*** (0.0262)	0.101*** (0.0268)	0.101*** (0.0268)	0.0996*** (0.0266)	0.100*** (0.0262)	0.0975*** (0.0264)	0.0986*** (0.0266)	0.100*** (0.0269)	0.101*** (0.0266)
PKO	-0.0776*** (0.0152)	-0.0770*** (0.0155)	-0.0794*** (0.0155)	-0.0776*** (0.0151)	-0.0776*** (0.0151)	-0.0786*** (0.0155)	-0.0779*** (0.0154)	-0.0757*** (0.0149)	-0.0770*** (0.0153)	-0.0779*** (0.0154)	-0.0783*** (0.0155)
CPA	0.0524** (0.0263)	0.0369 (0.0256)	0.0515* (0.0274)	0.0552** (0.0260)	0.0535** (0.0247)	0.0514* (0.0267)	0.0537** (0.0272)	0.0391 (0.0282)	0.0491* (0.0291)	0.0517* (0.0275)	0.0538* (0.0275)
UNSCR 1325	-0.0135 (0.0215)	-0.0148 (0.0209)	-0.0125 (0.0213)	-0.0128 (0.0204)	-0.0131 (0.0211)	-0.0146 (0.0207)	-0.0129 (0.0208)	-0.0133 (0.0205)	-0.0138 (0.0207)	-0.0134 (0.0210)	-0.0132 (0.0211)
Fertility rates	0.0164** (0.00647)	0.0160** (0.00649)	0.0165** (0.00663)	0.0164** (0.00658)	0.0164** (0.00651)	0.0163** (0.00652)	0.0162*** (0.00627)	0.0163*** (0.00633)	0.0162** (0.00649)	0.0163** (0.00650)	0.0163** (0.00652)
GDP per capita (log, lag)	0.0202 (0.0208)	0.0177 (0.0205)	0.0211 (0.0212)	0.0200 (0.0209)	0.0201 (0.0209)	0.0207 (0.0211)	0.0201 (0.0209)	0.0238 (0.0215)	0.0190 (0.0210)	0.0209 (0.0209)	0.0197 (0.0210)
Female signatories (local)	-0.0783*** (0.0248)	-0.0798*** (0.0235)	-0.0798*** (0.0240)	-0.0773*** (0.0245)	-0.0779*** (0.0249)	-0.0796*** (0.0242)	-0.0777*** (0.0241)	-0.0802*** (0.0237)	-0.0796*** (0.0238)	-0.0791*** (0.0238)	-0.0776*** (0.0243)
Constant	0.0651 (0.0839)	0.0740 (0.0833)	0.0619 (0.0853)	0.0656 (0.0838)	0.0655 (0.0839)	0.0651 (0.0843)	0.0664 (0.0843)	0.0537 (0.0865)	0.0709 (0.0842)	0.0642 (0.0837)	0.0671 (0.0845)
Observations	254	254	254	254	254	254	254	254	254	254	254
R-squared	0.169	0.179	0.171	0.169	0.169	0.169	0.169	0.177	0.170	0.169	0.169

Note: OLS coefficients with z-scores based on panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

5.3 Robustness

In order to assess the robustness of the results, the models have been subjected to two sensitivity tests.¹⁸ First, I implemented a complementation test of the dependent variable. For the dependent variable, I referred to the change in the Women Political Empowerment Index scores between the pre-conflict year to five years after the conflict ended or the latest peace agreement was reached, whichever the later. In the main models, the values were compensated and referred to the data of 2021 if the five years after the end of the conflict or the latest peace agreement reached were more recent than 2021, and the data were unavailable. However, I did not conduct such treatments in the sensitivity test, leaving the value missing if the five-year data is inaccessible. The results are shown in Table 6. As displayed in the table, the results support my conclusion that not gender provisions as a whole (Model 13) but only gender-sensitive Equality provisions (Model 15) and gender-sensitive Institutional Reform provisions (Model 21) improve women's political empowerment post-conflict. Although the significance level is lower for the Equality variable, the trends are the same from the main models: gender provisions treated collectively have no statistically significant effects on improving women's political empowerment; however, the gender-sensitive Equality and Institutional Reform variables are statistically significant at the 10-percent levels, respectively.

Second, I included the democracy variable in the models to see whether it affects the outcomes.¹⁹ As shown in Table 7, controlling for the level of democracy does not substantively

¹⁸ In the Appendix, I implemented an additional sensitivity test by conducting OLS with Robust Standard Errors, using the original dataset instead of the edited dataset (see Appendix).

¹⁹ I refer to the POLITY2 variable in the dataset, which is the Revised Combined Polity Score. It is "a modified version of the POLITY variable added to facilitate the use of the POLITY regime measure in time-series analyses. It modifies the combined annual POLITY score by applying a simple treatment, or "fix," to convert instances of "standardized authority scores" (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10)" (Marshall, 2020, p.17). The data is available until 2018. It is lagged by one year to avoid the endogeneity problem.

contest the conclusions drawn here. Gender provisions treated collectively (Model 25) do not have a statistically significant effect on the improvement of women's political empowerment; however, gender-sensitive Equality (Model 27) and Institutional Reform (Model 33) variables improve women's political rights following conflicts. These two models' significance levels do not differ from the main models. Including gender-sensitive Equality provisions or Institutional Reform provisions results in a 0.05 standard deviations increase in the women's political rights improvement, holding other variables in the models constant. In sum, the two tests confirm the findings from the main models.

Table 6. Categorized Gender Provisions and Change in Women's Political Empowerment, without the Treatment on the Dependent Variable

VARIABLES	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20	Model 21	Model 22	Model 23	Model 24
Gender provisions	0.0186 (0.0274)											
Participation		-0.00106 (0.0305)										
Equality			0.0679* (0.0350)									
Particular groups of women				0.0382 (0.0362)								
International law					-0.0106 (0.0292)							
New institutions						0.00231 (0.0415)						
Violence against women							0.0166 (0.0268)					
Transitional justice								0.0106 (0.0638)				
Institutional reform									0.0726* (0.0401)			
Development										0.0264 (0.0370)		
Implementation											0.00403 (0.0414)	
Other												0.0145 (0.0377)
Conflict duration	0.000666 (0.000890)	0.000673 (0.000899)	0.000675 (0.000899)	0.000646 (0.000878)	0.000675 (0.000905)	0.000670 (0.000905)	0.000661 (0.000889)	0.000671 (0.000903)	0.000628 (0.000868)	0.000663 (0.000893)	0.000671 (0.000900)	0.000672 (0.000900)
Conflict intensity	0.106*** (0.0277)	0.109*** (0.0276)	0.103*** (0.0284)	0.109*** (0.0271)	0.110*** (0.0280)	0.109*** (0.0281)	0.107*** (0.0277)	0.108*** (0.0270)	0.103*** (0.0275)	0.105*** (0.0276)	0.109*** (0.0279)	0.109*** (0.0275)
PKO	-0.0836*** (0.0177)	-0.0857*** (0.0173)	-0.0814*** (0.0168)	-0.0866*** (0.0173)	-0.0855*** (0.0173)	-0.0855*** (0.0171)	-0.0863*** (0.0173)	-0.0854*** (0.0172)	-0.0797*** (0.0169)	-0.0833*** (0.0177)	-0.0856*** (0.0175)	-0.0861*** (0.0176)
CPA	0.0486* (0.0284)	0.0570* (0.0301)	0.0321 (0.0291)	0.0525* (0.0314)	0.0588** (0.0299)	0.0562** (0.0284)	0.0528* (0.0314)	0.0559* (0.0311)	0.0328 (0.0327)	0.0486 (0.0348)	0.0558* (0.0326)	0.0558* (0.0323)
UNSCR 1325	-0.0138 (0.0246)	-0.0114 (0.0253)	-0.0146 (0.0247)	-0.0105 (0.0254)	-0.0110 (0.0239)	-0.0116 (0.0249)	-0.0135 (0.0244)	-0.0115 (0.0245)	-0.0110 (0.0240)	-0.0125 (0.0244)	-0.0116 (0.0247)	-0.0117 (0.0248)
Fertility rates	0.0171*** (0.00645)	0.0172*** (0.00654)	0.0175*** (0.00655)	0.0174*** (0.00664)	0.0174*** (0.00664)	0.0172*** (0.00655)	0.0172*** (0.00654)	0.0171*** (0.00635)	0.0173*** (0.00624)	0.0172*** (0.00651)	0.0172*** (0.00651)	0.0172*** (0.00654)
GDP per capita (log, lag)	0.0282 (0.0268)	0.0269 (0.0258)	0.0259 (0.0253)	0.0284 (0.0261)	0.0265 (0.0259)	0.0270 (0.0263)	0.0282 (0.0261)	0.0273 (0.0267)	0.0342 (0.0269)	0.0263 (0.0258)	0.0271 (0.0259)	0.0266 (0.0260)
Female signatories (local)	-0.0520* (0.0286)	-0.0465 (0.0285)	-0.0522* (0.0267)	-0.0506* (0.0277)	-0.0455 (0.0285)	-0.0470* (0.0284)	-0.0497* (0.0283)	-0.0474* (0.0270)	-0.0526* (0.0269)	-0.0514* (0.0276)	-0.0473* (0.0278)	-0.0469* (0.0276)
Constant	0.0269 (0.103)	0.0323 (0.0994)	0.0337 (0.0983)	0.0267 (0.101)	0.0327 (0.0992)	0.0319 (0.0997)	0.0297 (0.0996)	0.0312 (0.101)	0.00702 (0.103)	0.0360 (0.0991)	0.0318 (0.0992)	0.0336 (0.100)
Observations	201	201	201	201	201	201	201	201	201	201	201	201
R-squared	0.155	0.153	0.168	0.156	0.154	0.153	0.154	0.154	0.167	0.155	0.153	0.153

Note: OLS coefficients with z-scores based on panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7. Categorized Gender Provisions and Change in Women’s Political Empowerment, with Democracy Variable

VARIABLES	Model 25	Model 26	Model 27	Model 28	Model 29	Model 30	Model 31	Model 32	Model 33	Model 34	Model 35	Model 36
Gender provisions	0.0101 (0.0213)											
Participation		0.00726 (0.0232)										
Equality			0.0563** (0.0267)									
Particular groups of women				0.0318 (0.0288)								
International law					-0.00101 (0.0269)							
New institutions						0.00921 (0.0301)						
Violence against women							0.0167 (0.0206)					
Transitional justice								0.0149 (0.0399)				
Institutional reform									0.0508* (0.0295)			
Development										0.0211 (0.0256)		
Implementation											0.0210 (0.0327)	
Other												0.0258 (0.0342)
Conflict duration	0.000638 (0.000916)	0.000637 (0.000918)	0.000630 (0.000907)	0.000616 (0.000900)	0.000642 (0.000920)	0.000635 (0.000916)	0.000629 (0.000907)	0.000641 (0.000918)	0.000596 (0.000897)	0.000628 (0.000910)	0.000633 (0.000913)	0.000638 (0.000918)
Conflict intensity	0.0974*** (0.0278)	0.0987*** (0.0278)	0.0945*** (0.0283)	0.0991*** (0.0274)	0.0989*** (0.0280)	0.0985*** (0.0279)	0.0974*** (0.0278)	0.0978*** (0.0272)	0.0952*** (0.0271)	0.0961*** (0.0277)	0.0980*** (0.0281)	0.0986*** (0.0277)
PKO	-0.0786*** (0.0165)	-0.0790*** (0.0162)	-0.0784*** (0.0167)	-0.0805*** (0.0164)	-0.0792*** (0.0162)	-0.0788*** (0.0162)	-0.0803*** (0.0165)	-0.0794*** (0.0165)	-0.0762*** (0.0161)	-0.0782*** (0.0163)	-0.0793*** (0.0166)	-0.0801*** (0.0165)
CPA	0.0505** (0.0257)	0.0519** (0.0261)	0.0361 (0.0251)	0.0521* (0.0276)	0.0551** (0.0261)	0.0527** (0.0245)	0.0520* (0.0267)	0.0541** (0.0272)	0.0390 (0.0286)	0.0493* (0.0289)	0.0511* (0.0277)	0.0538* (0.0275)
UNSCR 1325	-0.0144 (0.0224)	-0.0144 (0.0230)	-0.0151 (0.0224)	-0.0134 (0.0227)	-0.0134 (0.0219)	-0.0138 (0.0227)	-0.0150 (0.0221)	-0.0135 (0.0223)	-0.0147 (0.0221)	-0.0144 (0.0221)	-0.0144 (0.0226)	-0.0139 (0.0227)
Fertility rates	0.0194** (0.00882)	0.0198** (0.00892)	0.0192** (0.00887)	0.0195** (0.00891)	0.0197** (0.00898)	0.0196** (0.00893)	0.0195** (0.00894)	0.0193** (0.00865)	0.0193** (0.00873)	0.0194** (0.00893)	0.0195** (0.00892)	0.0196** (0.00894)
GDP per capita (log, lag)	0.0176 (0.0221)	0.0178 (0.0221)	0.0144 (0.0215)	0.0182 (0.0221)	0.0176 (0.0222)	0.0176 (0.0220)	0.0186 (0.0223)	0.0175 (0.0220)	0.0199 (0.0224)	0.0162 (0.0224)	0.0184 (0.0219)	0.0169 (0.0223)
Polity2 score (lag)	0.00218 (0.00267)	0.00225 (0.00266)	0.00236 (0.00269)	0.00222 (0.00265)	0.00224 (0.00265)	0.00230 (0.00267)	0.00216 (0.00267)	0.00223 (0.00265)	0.00234 (0.00268)	0.00220 (0.00266)	0.00234 (0.00270)	0.00229 (0.00267)
Female signatories (local)	-0.0803*** (0.0228)	-0.0792*** (0.0233)	-0.0805*** (0.0221)	-0.0803*** (0.0227)	-0.0780*** (0.0229)	-0.0789*** (0.0235)	-0.0803*** (0.0228)	-0.0781*** (0.0228)	-0.0805*** (0.0224)	-0.0800*** (0.0224)	-0.0804*** (0.0223)	-0.0781*** (0.0229)
Constant	0.0561 (0.0990)	0.0546 (0.0993)	0.0660 (0.0975)	0.0545 (0.0991)	0.0555 (0.0990)	0.0555 (0.0991)	0.0546 (0.0994)	0.0572 (0.0992)	0.0496 (0.101)	0.0624 (0.1000)	0.0546 (0.0988)	0.0586 (0.0998)
Observations	232	232	232	232	232	232	232	232	232	232	232	232
R-squared	0.167	0.167	0.180	0.169	0.167	0.167	0.168	0.167	0.175	0.168	0.168	0.167

Note: OLS coefficients with z-scores based on panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

6. Discussion and Limitations

This thesis examined the research questions: Do any kinds of gender provisions affect the post-conflict improvement of women's political empowerment to the same degree, and; What types of gender provisions positively impact women's political empowerment compared to other gender-sensitive provisions? In order to answer the questions, I formulated four hypotheses: different types of gender provisions have different effects on the improvement of women's political empowerment post-conflict; gender provisions mentioning women's participation in governance and decision-making bodies have more significant influences on the improvement of women's political empowerment following armed conflicts than other gender provisions; gender provisions mentioning equality have more significant influences on improving women's political empowerment after armed conflicts compared to other gender provisions; gender provisions mentioning institutional reform have more significant influences on improving women's political empowerment after armed conflicts than other gender provisions. Chapter 5 statistically tested the hypotheses, and I now turn to interpret the results. The implications, limitations, and recommendations for future research follow the interpretations.

6.1 Interpretation of the Results

6.1.1 Armed Conflicts Terminated by Agreements and Women's Political Rights

As the descriptive statistics and Figures 1 to 4 indicate, armed conflicts terminated with peace agreements tend to improve women's political rights overall. More than 75% of armed conflicts which ended with peace agreements saw improvements in women's political empowerment from pre- to post-conflict. This finding aligns with Bakken and Buhaug (2021), as they find that "civil conflicts terminating in peace agreements produce better outcomes for women than conflicts terminating in other ways" (p.1000). In general, states with conflict termination by

peace agreements tended to see around 0.2 points increase in the index value, and some saw more increase up to over 0.6 points, whether the agreements were gender-sensitive or not. In comparison, some cases saw no change or even decreased outcomes. It should also be noted that other factors that may affect women's political situations following conflict vary, and a peace agreement is not the only one. Nevertheless, peace agreements generally positively impact women's political rights improvement after conflicts.

6.1.2 Gender-Sensitive Peace Agreements

As Tables 1 and 2 display, gender-blind peace agreements are “the norm, rather than the exception” (UN Women, 2012, p.17), even over 20 years after the adoption of UNSCR 1325. Even within the edited dataset that maximizes the frequency of peace agreements with gender provisions due to its operationalization, around two-thirds of peace agreements include no gender provisions. However, the percentage of gender provisions increased from around 15 percent to 25 percent after the adoption of UNSCR1325, and thus, there are some signs of progress taking place.

When looking closely at the categorized gender provisions, the frequency of the Participation and Equality provisions is the most frequent compared to other categories. Provisions mentioning Violence against Women, Institutional Reform, and Development come in the middle, and the number of other provisions, such as Particular groups of women and Implementation provisions, is less frequent. The frequency levels assumingly indicate a difference in the degree of importance of those categorized gender provisions when peace agreements were reached. Nevertheless, the later section implies that the frequencies may not correlate to the actual influences of these provisions.

6.1.3 Comparison between Gender-sensitive and Non-sensitive Peace Agreements

By comparing peace agreements with and without gender provisions and their effects on the change of women's political empowerment, it is evident that although peace agreements without gender provisions even tend to see improvements in women's political empowerment post-conflict, peace agreements with gender provisions are more likely to see such improvements to a greater extent. The presented descriptive statistics and Figure 5 indicate that the normal distribution of change in women's political empowerment with gender-sensitive peace agreements is located on more right on the X-axis and narrower compared to non-gender sensitive peace agreements. As the mean is the central tendency of the normal distribution and the standard deviation is a measure of variability, the higher the mean and the lower the standard deviation, the better the probability of the degree of the change. Thus, gender-sensitive peace agreements are more likely to result in better improvements in women's political rights. Additionally, Table 3 further supports such a relationship, as gender-blind peace agreements are more likely to see a negative change in women's political empowerment compared to gender-sensitive peace agreements, and the latter tend to see better improvement at a higher probability. Consequently, gender-sensitive peace agreements are more likely to see better advancements in women's political situation, although peace agreements without gender provisions also tend to see such an improvement.

6.1.4 Gender Provisions and the Improvement of Women's Political Rights

I now turn to the main discussion: the relationship between gender provisions and women's political rights post-conflict improvement. As Tables 4 and 5 indicate, the results question the presumption that gender provisions as a whole improve women's political rights post-conflict, argued by Reid (2021). It is because the gender provision variable shown in Model 1, which is not distinguished by categories but treated collectively, did not see a statistically significant

influence on the improvement of women's political rights, although the association was positive. Instead, together with the next paragraph, the results support Hypothesis 1, that different gender provisions have different effects on improving women's political empowerment post-conflict. Not all gender provisions significantly influence post-conflict women's political empowerment. Accordingly, I argue that gender provisions should be treated not as one but as distinguished categories because different types of gender provisions affect the post-conflict women's political situation differently. The discrepancy in the results between this thesis and Reid's (2021) may be because the referred data of the dependent variable are different. Also, my dataset includes more recent cases than Reid's (2021).²⁰ Nevertheless, the result challenges Reid's (2021) finding suggesting that gender provisions as a whole do improve women's political rights post-conflict.

Looking at the effect of categorized gender provisions on women's political rights improvement, only two out of 11 categories statistically significantly influence women's political rights improvement following conflicts. Those two are Equality provisions (Model 3) and Institutional Reform provisions (Model 9). Hence, Hypotheses 3 and 4, which expect gender provisions mentioning equality and institutional reform to have more significant impacts on improving women's political rights after armed conflicts compared to other gender provisions, are confirmed. Specifically, gender provisions that consider political or legal equality; discuss non-discrimination on sex or gender; and account for social equality, property rights, health, financial, or worker's rights regarding women (Bell et al., 2020) particularly enhance post-conflict women's political situation. Additionally, gender provisions that refer to institutional reform, including constitution-making and reform; emergency, criminal law, and corruption reform; judiciary and judicial reform; police or other forces, or women-centered

²⁰ Reid (2021) uses the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset (CIRI) and refers to cases from 1981 to 2011.

police reform; Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), armies, parastatal, or label forces; and gender-based reform or gender sensitivity of public administration and civil service are also particularly influential on the improvement of women's political rights.

The positive effect of gender provisions, particularly gender-sensitive equality and institutional reform provisions, is consistent and robust to alternative model specifications, supporting claims that some specific gender provisions, but not all kinds, open a window of opportunity for women to improve their political status in society. Conclusively, Hypotheses 1, 3, and 4 are confirmed, suggesting that different gender provisions have different consequences for women's political empowerment post-conflict. Equality and Institutional Reform provisions are particularly influential in improving women's political rights post-conflict.

On the contrary, Hypothesis 2, which expects gender provisions mentioning women's participation in governance and decision-making bodies to have more significant influences on the improvement of women's political rights following armed conflicts, is not confirmed, as the Participation variable (Model 2) is not statistically significant, although the association is positive. Assumably, one of the reasons is the commitment problem: the Participation provisions are more likely to meet resistance to implementation due to their highly demanding characteristics, requiring dynamic forms of political change and giving a strong impression that men elites' status quo is threatened, which makes implementation less of a priority. Provisions directly related to women's rights are ranked as a lower priority in the first place and may confront the implementation problem, as different categories of provisions in peace agreements are prioritized differently, and gender provisions tend to be the ones that are deprioritized over security, for instance (Gindele et al., 2018; Joshi & Olsson, 2021; Krause & Olsson, 2022). Also, the implementation rate of women's rights is lower than other provisions such as constitutional reform, economic and social development, and even human rights (Krause et al.,

2018). In addition to such characteristics of women's rights provisions, women's direct political participation is likely to meet more severe commitment problems compared to other, more general provisions like Equality and Institutional Reform.

Furthermore, a more plausible factor is thought to be that the women's political rights situation in post-conflict countries can only be institutionalized in the context of broader societal and institutional reform processes, as indicated by Joshi and Olsson (2021). Their research suggests the significance of the broader social, political, and economic reforms to be implemented in order to improve women's political situations. Therefore, I argue that the inclusion of Equality and Institutional Reform provisions that foster grounds for such societal and institutional reform processes are more influential than Participation provisions.

The findings reported here support previous studies that find that female political empowerment improves more when peace agreements are gender-sensitive (Bakken & Buhaug, 2021; Reid, 2021). What this study brings in addition is that different types of gender provisions affect the post-conflict women's political situation differently. Therefore gender provisions should be treated not collectively but distinguished into categories by looking closely at the contents of gender provisions because different types of gender provisions affect the post-conflict women's political empowerment differently. Notably, in line with expectations, I find that gender-sensitive Equality and Institutional Reform provisions effectively improve women's post-conflict political situation.

6.2 Implications

The findings bring significant implications to both academia and practice. In a nutshell, "the contents of peace agreements matter" (Reid, 2021, p.11), and so the contents of gender

provisions do. Researchers better consider what kind of gender provisions they are discussing and distinguish gender provisions by their contents when considering gender-sensitive peace agreements as a variable. In practice, practitioners should consider including not only women's political participation provisions but also gender-sensitive equality and institutional reform provisions when aiming to improve women's political status following conflict termination.

More broadly, the arguments made here further carry policy relevance. The findings reinforce the argument that including women and gender lenses in peace processes is the right thing to do not only from an equality and equity perspective (Anderlini, 2000; 2007; Chinkin, 2002) but also in a matter of effectiveness (Caprioli et al., 2010; Krause et al., 2018; O'Reilly et al., 2015; Reid, 2021; Stone, 2014). The findings show that the content of peace agreements has implications beyond conflict termination; "agreements shape post-conflict environments" (Reid, 2021, p.13). Hence, related actors should be aware of the languages in peace agreements that hold the potential to shape new political, economic, and social structures.

Furthermore, the findings provide compelling evidence that mainstreaming gender in all aspects of peace processes is essential, as called for by the WPS Agenda. The UN has encouraged women's inclusion in all stages of conflict resolution and peacebuilding to a great extent. The findings of this thesis speak to one component of the peace processes: peace agreements. The results presented here indicate that a gendered approach to peace agreements prompts positive benefits for women in post-conflict situations and lead to one of the concrete pathways that can harness the improvement of gender equality. Contents of agreement provisions matter, and gender provisions are valuable tools to inspire women's political rights improvements and, in turn, gender equality that prevents a state from going through armed conflicts. The findings should serve as a powerful voice in support of the efforts of the UN and the international community's push for more gender-inclusive peace processes.

6.3 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research

There are some limitations to this thesis. Firstly, it does not take into account the implementation progress of peace agreements and gender provisions in particular. The implementation progress is crucial to assess the influence of peace agreement provisions on post-conflict societies because peace agreement provisions first need to be implemented to be turned into reforms and bring actual influence subsequently (Duque-Salazar et al., 2022; Joshi et al., 2015; Krause et al., 2018). While gender provisions provide the foundation for post-conflict transformation and improvements in women's empowerment, it is not a given that such provisions are to be included in the process of turning the agreement into actual legally binding reforms (Duque-Salazar et al., 2022). Despite the importance of implementation, no accessible and comprehensive dataset that evaluates peace agreement implementation progress with recent data is available to date.²¹ Therefore, I suggest future research producing comprehensive data on the progress of peace agreement implementation, including the implementation of gender provisions. Such a dataset would benefit research in various directions assessing the durability and quality of peace processes and agreements. Recently, such an endeavor has taken, and the Implementing Gender Provisions Dataset has been developed.²² Although it is not publicly accessible yet, I expect that it will encourage research on gender and peace to a great degree once it is published. Moreover, a qualitative approach

²¹ Peace Accord Matrix (PAM) dataset provides data on implementation rates, but the universe of cases is limited to CPAs until 2007 (Joshi et al., 2015). Thus, it is unable to use the dataset to assess the implementation rates of peace agreements in this thesis.

²² According to Duque-Salazar et al. (2022), a paper "Implementation of Gender Provisions in Peace Agreements: Introducing the IGP Dataset" by Erika Forsberg, Louise Olsson, Christine Nicoson, and Karen Brounéus was presented in 2020 at the National Conference on Peace and Conflict Research held in Sweden on 15-16 of October. However, the paper and the dataset are not publicly available to date.

has been taken to evaluate the gender provision implementation process (Duque-Salazar et al., 2022). Such academic contributions will be required more to build a body of collective knowledge on the inclusion and implementation of gender provisions.

Furthermore, this thesis does not account for the precision of gender provisions, while precision is a crucial source of agreements' legal force and essential to commitments (Reid, 2021). It is one of the three components of legalization, which define what the agreement language requires, authorizes, or proscribes (Abbott et al., 2000). Contrary, unambiguous language narrows the scope for interpretation (Abbott et al., 2000). Precision facilitates compliance by imparting clarity regarding implementation and violation of agreement provisions, enhancing its normative "compliance pull," while imprecise language can diminish such an effect (Abbott & Snidal, 2000, p.428). As Bell (2015) suggests, clarity and specificity of gender provisions are essential because gender provisions that are ambiguous and holistically reference to women and gender, with the absence of a shared understanding of substantial measures, often confront the difficulty of implementation. Accordingly, precision is a strong predictor for higher implementation and, in turn, peace agreements' effects on post-conflict societies. Thus, I suggest future research to look at categorized gender provisions more closely and assess their precision to evaluate further what kinds of gender provisions are particularly influential in women's political empowerment following armed conflicts.

In addition, future research should examine the causal mechanisms linking gender-sensitive peace agreements and the improvement of post-conflict women's political rights, which is not investigated here. Such work will likely require a different analytical framework than the generalized and aggregated approach taken in this thesis. Qualitative research will help examine the sources of gender-sensitive peace agreements and how such agreements lead to post-conflict women's political empowerment.

7. Conclusion

This thesis addressed the unresolved questions on the relationship between gender-sensitive peace agreements and post-conflict women's political empowerment. An emerging body of research has found a positive influence of gender provisions within peace agreements on women's political empowerment (Bakken & Buhaug, 2021; Reid, 2021). I complemented the previous research on the topic by looking into how categorized gender provisions each influences the advancement of women's political status following armed conflicts. In particular, I set two research questions: Do any kinds of gender provisions affect the post-conflict improvement of women's political rights to the same degree, and in particular; What types of gender provisions positively impact the advancement of women's political rights compared to other gender provisions? In order to answer the research questions, I proposed four hypotheses and statistically analyzed peace agreements reached for post-Cold War intrastate conflicts.

In my statistical analyses, I found support for my first hypothesis, addressing the former research question, that different types of gender provisions have different effects on the improvement of women's political empowerment post-conflict. By using the PA-X datasets and the OLS with PCSE models, the findings suggested that not all gender provisions positively influence women's political rights improvement. The results revealed that gender provisions treated collectively have no statistically significant effect on women's political empowerment, partly challenging the argument made in previous research (Reid, 2021). Instead, consistent with my theoretical arguments, I found that only some particular types of gender provisions within peace agreements positively and significantly empower women's political situations. Those were gender-sensitive equality provisions and institutional reform provisions, supporting my third and fourth hypotheses that gender provisions mentioning equality and institutional reform have more significant influences on improving women's political rights

after armed conflicts than other gender provisions. The results were robust in a selection of sensitivity tests. Based on the findings, I argue that gender provisions should be treated not collectively but as distinguished by categorizing their contents.

It is important to note that the analyses saw no significant relationship between provisions on women's political participation and the post-conflict improvement of women's political rights, rejecting my second hypothesis. Although the association was positive, it was not statistically significant. The finding was unexpected as it seemed the most relevant and direct provision that may affect women's political situations. Assumably, it may be because such provisions are more likely to confront commitment problems due to their highly demanding characteristics than more general provisions addressing issues such as equality and institutional reform. Another potential factor is that women's political rights in post-conflict societies can only be institutionalized in light of broader societal and institutional reform processes.

These findings have significant policy implications. Most importantly, the contents of gender provisions matter. Therefore, researchers should consider what types of gender provisions they are focusing on and distinguish gender provisions by their contents when using gender provisions as a variable. In line with that, practitioners better pay attention to the languages of peace agreements and consider including not only gender-sensitive political provisions but also equality and institutional reform provisions to improve women's political rights and, in turn, enhance gender equality in post-conflict states. More broadly, this thesis reinforces the argument that the inclusion of women and gender perspectives in peace processes, including peace agreements, is essential and effective in achieving peace. Thus, this thesis serves as a powerful voice supporting the efforts of the UN and the international community's push for more gender-inclusive peace processes, such as the WPS Agenda.

The destructive nature of armed conflicts causes massive suffering; however, subsequent peace processes can bring positive consequences for both men and women by making conflict-affected states more gender-equal through empowering women's political status. One of the factors that realize women's political rights improvement is the contents of peace agreements, particularly gender-sensitive equality and institutional reform provisions. The nexus between peace agreements, post-conflict women's empowerment, and the durability of peace deserves further exploration. Future research into this field, and this topic in particular, can help researchers and policymakers understand: what kinds of provisions within peace agreements particularly advance gender equality and women's political rights in conflict-affected states; how peace agreements, and gender provisions in particular, change women's political rights situations following conflicts; and how peace agreements may be a valuable tool to achieve durable peace.

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A. Appendix

As an additional sensitivity test, I conducted Ordinary Least Squares regressions with Robust Standard Errors with the original dataset instead of the edited dataset, as the edited dataset may have dropped data arbitrarily and may not reflect the original data correctly.²³ Table 8 displays the results, showing somewhat different but not inconsistent outcomes to the original analyses.

Table 8 demonstrates that gender provisions treated collectively have a statistically significant effect on women's political empowerment at the 5-percent level (Model 37). The result differs from the primary analyses and aligns with Reid's (2021) findings instead. Nevertheless, Table 8 does not contest the arguments drawn in the main analyses: it does not deny the conclusion that gender provisions should be treated not as one but as categorized. It is because Model 38 to Model 48 show that different types of gender provisions have different influences on the outcomes, supporting Hypothesis 1. Like the main models, gender-sensitive Equality provisions (Model 39) and Institutional reform provisions (Model 45) have statistically significant effects on the improvement of women's political rights at the 1-percent level, supporting Hypotheses 3 and 4. In addition, Development provisions (Model 46) also have a statistically significant impact on the outcome at the 10-percent level, distinct from the main analyses. However, the results again do not reject the argument that different gender provisions influence women's political rights improvement differently. Specifically, equality- and institutional reform-related gender provisions are more significant and influential than other gender provisions.

²³ Since the data is time-series cross-section data, there may be problems related to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Although the adoption of robust standard errors accounts for heteroskedasticity, it does not account for potential autocorrelation. Thus, the model is misspecified. Nevertheless, I conduct the regressions in order to clarify the possibility of arbitrary data editions.

Table 8. Categorized Gender Provisions and Change in Women's Political Empowerment, OLS with Robust Standard Errors

VARIABLES	Model 37	Model 38	Model 39	Model 40	Model 41	Model 42	Model 43	Model 44	Model 45	Model 46	Model 47	Model 48
Gender provisions	0.0332** (0.0129)											
Participation		0.0300 (0.0189)										
Equality			0.0673*** (0.0219)									
Particular groups of women				0.0210 (0.0256)								
International law					0.0124 (0.0188)							
New institutions						0.0209 (0.0283)						
Violence against women							0.0257 (0.0169)					
Transitional justice								0.0346 (0.0361)				
Institutional reform									0.0629*** (0.0215)			
Development										0.0368* (0.0207)		
Implementation											0.0270 (0.0283)	
Other												0.0112 (0.0215)
Constant	0.0125 (0.0592)	0.0104 (0.0596)	0.0190 (0.0592)	0.00902 (0.0591)	0.00703 (0.0593)	0.00822 (0.0596)	0.00700 (0.0593)	0.00928 (0.0597)	0.00294 (0.0592)	0.0153 (0.0598)	0.00798 (0.0594)	0.00771 (0.0595)
Conflict duration	0.000842 (0.000756)	0.000851 (0.000767)	0.000839 (0.000759)	0.000840 (0.000764)	0.000849 (0.000764)	0.000851 (0.000766)	0.000846 (0.000762)	0.000857 (0.000765)	0.000814 (0.000745)	0.000846 (0.000764)	0.000850 (0.000764)	0.000852 (0.000767)
Conflict intensity	0.0906*** (0.0263)	0.0910*** (0.0266)	0.0921*** (0.0263)	0.0919*** (0.0267)	0.0910*** (0.0265)	0.0907*** (0.0266)	0.0903*** (0.0265)	0.0900*** (0.0265)	0.0898*** (0.0261)	0.0896*** (0.0265)	0.0906*** (0.0265)	0.0910*** (0.0266)
PKO	-0.0874*** (0.0154)	-0.0873*** (0.0155)	-0.0858*** (0.0153)	-0.0871*** (0.0154)	-0.0874*** (0.0156)	-0.0867*** (0.0155)	-0.0876*** (0.0155)	-0.0872*** (0.0155)	-0.0875*** (0.0153)	-0.0866*** (0.0154)	-0.0873*** (0.0155)	-0.0870*** (0.0156)
CPA	0.0474** (0.0232)	0.0510** (0.0234)	0.0428* (0.0240)	0.0628*** (0.0235)	0.0613** (0.0239)	0.0597*** (0.0231)	0.0603*** (0.0233)	0.0614*** (0.0236)	0.0496** (0.0235)	0.0542** (0.0239)	0.0599** (0.0238)	0.0637*** (0.0239)
UNSCR 1325	-0.00680 (0.0122)	-0.00630 (0.0123)	-0.00539 (0.0122)	-0.00420 (0.0123)	-0.00471 (0.0122)	-0.00481 (0.0123)	-0.00621 (0.0122)	-0.00453 (0.0122)	-0.00523 (0.0121)	-0.00548 (0.0122)	-0.00522 (0.0122)	-0.00456 (0.0122)
Fertility rates	0.0223*** (0.00558)	0.0228*** (0.00565)	0.0222*** (0.00557)	0.0227*** (0.00562)	0.0227*** (0.00563)	0.0227*** (0.00565)	0.0227*** (0.00562)	0.0225*** (0.00564)	0.0227*** (0.00553)	0.0225*** (0.00563)	0.0226*** (0.00564)	0.0228*** (0.00565)
GDP per capita (log, lag)	0.0281* (0.0155)	0.0294* (0.0156)	0.0257* (0.0155)	0.0295* (0.0157)	0.0304* (0.0156)	0.0301* (0.0156)	0.0308** (0.0156)	0.0300* (0.0156)	0.0317** (0.0156)	0.0282* (0.0158)	0.0305* (0.0156)	0.0302* (0.0156)
Female signatories (local)	-0.0879*** (0.0159)	-0.0890*** (0.0161)	-0.0853*** (0.0159)	-0.0869*** (0.0160)	-0.0871*** (0.0160)	-0.0877*** (0.0160)	-0.0878*** (0.0160)	-0.0870*** (0.0159)	-0.0868*** (0.0158)	-0.0880*** (0.0159)	-0.0877*** (0.0159)	-0.0869*** (0.0160)
Observations	685	685	685	685	685	685	685	685	685	685	685	685
R-squared	0.192	0.187	0.197	0.186	0.186	0.186	0.187	0.187	0.194	0.188	0.186	0.185

Note: OLS coefficients with t-scores based on robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1