Unpacking the politics of global public-private partnerships in global nutrition governance:

Understanding the influence of the Scaling Up Nutrition Movement (SUN)

Ann Louise Lie

Centre for Development and the Environment

&

Institute of Health and Society

University of Oslo

Acknowledgements

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Original Papers

Article 1: Lie, A.L. (2019). 'Power in Global Nutrition Governance. A Critical Analysis of the Establishment of the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Partnership', *Global Governance*, 25(2), 277–303. DOI: 10.1163/19426720-02502006

Article 2: Lie, A.L. (2020). 'We are not a partnership' – Constructing and contesting legitimacy of global public-private partnerships: the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement', *Globalizations*, *18*(2), 237-255. DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2020.1770038.

Article 3: Lie, A.L. (*submitted*). 'When the SUN Shines on Tanzania: how a global partnership influences national nutrition policy'. Submitted for publication in *Globalization and Health*.

Summary of the thesis

Since the 1990s, global public–private partnerships, promoted as inclusive and effective governance arrangements for solving transnational development issues, have proliferated – particularly in the field of health. The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development explicitly calls for partnerships to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals; and in the specific field of global nutrition governance, partnerships are increasingly promoted to reduce long-standing fragmentation and to advance collective solutions to the complex challenges of malnutrition. At the same time, the partnership model has been strongly criticised for limited external accountability towards affected populations, for giving too much power to the global food industry, and for promoting technical, quick-fix solutions rather than addressing underlying challenges, such as inadequate access to diverse and healthy diets. Despite the proliferation and promotion of nutrition partnerships, we still know little about the ways in which partnerships influence nutrition governance, globally and within the countries they seek to support.

In this thesis, I take the Scaling Up Nutrition Movement (SUN) as a case study to critically analyse the ways in which global partnerships influence nutrition governance – both at the global level and at the national level – in the case of the United Republic of Tanzania. SUN was established in 2010 to reduce undernutrition (particularly stunting) among children under 2 years of age through multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder approaches in its 65 low- and middle-income member-countries. SUN promotes itself as a country-driven and inclusive *movement* that contributes to a comprehensive approach to malnutrition challenges. To investigate the influence of SUN, I proceeded in three steps using qualitative research methods based on interviews, observations, and document analysis. First, I critically examined how and by whom influence was gained during the establishment of SUN, focusing on the underlying political processes behind its establishment (Article I). Second, I examined how SUN has sought to strengthen its ability to exercise authority in global nutrition governance, focusing on its self-legitimation processes (Article II). Third, I explored how SUN has sought to influence the national policy environment in Tanzania, focusing on policy transfer processes (Article III).

To a large extent, my results support the scholarship that has criticized global partnerships and I identify three main avenues through which SUN has influenced the field of global nutrition. First, SUN has advanced authoritative knowledge about how to address malnutrition and governance challenges, thus shaping a dominant understanding of appropriate governance and policy responses based on multi-stakeholder approaches and market-based solutions. Second, I found that important power-asymmetries underlie and condition the

governance of the partnership. This has led SUN to align with, institutionalise, and legitimise the interests and perspectives of its most powerful partners, particularly in the private sector. Third, I show how critical voices in global nutrition governance have been co-opted or marginalised by SUN, which has failed to ensure equitable inclusion of the people most affected by malnutrition.

Overall, this thesis sheds light on some of the subtle ways in which global nutrition governance, through SUN, is exercised by various actors within global and national policy spheres. Thus, my thesis contributes to a better understanding of how political outcomes are produced, by whom, and in whose interest. Further, I show how global partnerships are conditioned by, and may reinforce, broader power asymmetries and dynamics within global governance – challenging the widely held assumption that partnerships are mechanisms that necessarily contribute to more inclusive and sustainable development.

In addition to the empirical contribution of unpacking the politics of SUN and its influence in Tanzania, this thesis contributes to two strands of literature: the public health and nutrition policy literature, by drawing attention to the role of global power dynamics in shaping nutrition policy and governance; and the global governance literature, by focusing on authority and legitimacy of a hybrid global governance mechanism in the field of global nutrition governance.

Norsk sammendrag

Siden 1990-tallet, har globale partnerskap mellom offentlige og ikke-statlige aktører, som sivilsamfunnsorganisasjoner og næringslivsaktører, blitt en vanlig styringsform for internasjonalt utviklingssamarbeid, spesielt innen helse. Slike partnerskap fremmes ofte som mekanismer som kan bidra til mer inkluderende samarbeid og mer effektive løsninger på ulike utviklingsutfordringer, og som middel for å oppnå FNs bærekraftsmål. De siste femten årene har partnerskap også i økende grad blitt etablert for å løse utfordringer knyttet til ernæring og matsikkerhet. Det globale ernæringslandskapet har vært preget av manglede lederskap og fragmentering av ulike aktører fra ulike sektorer (mat, helse, jordbruk, vann og sanitær, utdanning etc.), og partnerskap har blitt fremmet som nødvendig for å styrke samarbeid og for å finne løsninger på tverrsektorielle ernæringsutfordringer. Samtidig har partnerskapsmodellen blitt sterkt kritisert for manglende ansvarliggjøring overfor berørte grupper, for å gi økt makt til den globale matindustrien, og for å fremme kortsiktige og markedsbaserte løsninger, heller enn å adressere underliggende utfordringer, som manglende tilgang til variert og næringsrikt kosthold. Til tross for utbredelsen av globale partnerskap for ernæring, vet vi fortsatt lite om hvordan slike partnerskap utøver innflytelse i det globale ernæringslandskapet, og hvilke implikasjoner dette har for ernæringspolitikken i lav – og mellominntektsland.

I denne avhandlingen undersøker jeg hvordan det globale ernæringspartnerskapet, The Scaling Up Nutrition Movement (SUN), utøver innflytelse innen globalt styresett for ernæring, og hvordan dette påvirker det nasjonale ernæringslandskapet i et av SUN's medlemsland: Tanzania. SUN ble etablert i 2010 for å redusere underernæring (spesielt veksthemming) blant barn under 2 år gjennom tverrsektorielle og offentlig-private (multistakeholder) samarbeid i sine 65 medlemsland. SUN fremmer seg selv som en land-drevet og inkluderende bevegelse som bidrar til en helhetlig tilnærming til ernæringsutfordringer. Basert på intervjuer, observasjoner og dokument analyse, undersøker jeg tre ulike prosesser som viser hvordan SUN, og ulike aktører i SUN, utøver innflytelse og er med å påvirke styresett for ernæring, globalt og i Tanzania: først undersøker jeg hvordan og hvorfor innflytelse ble utøvd for å etablere SUN og fokuserer på de bakenforliggende politiske prosessene (artikkel I); deretter undersøker jeg hvordan SUN har forsøkt å styrke sin evne til å utøve autoritet gjennom ulike legitimeringsprosesser (artikkel II); og til sist undersøker jeg hvordan SUN har påvirket det nasjonale ernæringslandskapet i Tanzania gjennom ulike uformelle mekanismer for politikkoverføring (policy transfer) (artikkel III).

Resultatene understøtter i stor grad litteraturen som kritiserer globale partnerskap og viser at SUN har utøvd innflytelse på tre ulike måter. For det første har SUN, gjennom å fremme autoritativ kunnskap om løsninger på ernærings- og styresett-utfordringer, bidratt til å forme en dominerende forståelse om at passende styresett og tiltak skal baseres på multistakeholder og markedsbaserte løsninger. For det andre har SUNs innflytelse vært påvirket og betinget av underliggende asymmetriske maktstrukturer i det globale ernæringslandskapet. Dette har ført til at SUN har understøttet, institusjonalisert og legitimert interessene og perspektivene til sine mektigste partnere, spesielt fra privat sektor. For det tredje, viser jeg hvordan kritiske stemmer og perspektiver i det globale ernæringslandskapet har blitt beslaglagt (co-opted) eller marginalisert av SUN, som i stor grad har mislyktes i å sikre inkluderende deltakelse av berørte grupper i sine medlemsland.

I avhandlingen avdekker jeg noen av de underliggende og subtile måtene globalt styresett for ernæring, gjennom SUN, utøves av ulike aktører globalt og nasjonalt, og bidrar derfor med en dypere forståelse av hvordan politiske utfall produseres, av hvem, og i hvem sin interesse. Videre viser jeg hvordan globale partnerskap er betinget av, og kan forsterke, underliggende maktasymmetrier i globalt styresett – og utfordrer dermed den utbredte antagelsen om at globale partnerskap nødvendigvis bidrar til mer inkluderende og bærekraftig utvikling.

Foruten om det empiriske bidraget med å avdekke politikken bak SUNs styresett og innflytelse bidrar avhandlingen til to ulike typer litteratur: til folkehelse- og ernærings-policy litteratur ved å sette fokus på hvordan globale maktrelasjoner former ernæringspolitikk og styresett; og til litteraturen om globalt styresett og internasjonale relasjoner ved å fokusere på autoritet og legitimitet av en hybrid styringsform innen det globale ernæringsfeltet.

List of acronyms

CSO	Civil society organisation
CFS	Committee on World Food Security
CIFF	Children's Investment Fund Foundation
ECOSOC	UN Economic and Social Council
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GAIN	Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition
GNR	Global Nutrition Report
HLPE	High-Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition
IBFAN	International Baby Food Action Network
ICN2	Second International Conference on Nutrition
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IO	International organisation
FIAN	Food First Information and Action Network
LMICs	Low- and middle-income countries
NCDs	Non-communicable diseases
NFFA	National Food Fortification Alliance
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
PANITA	Partnership for Nutrition in Tanzania
RUTFs	Ready-to-Use Therapeutic Foods
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SUN	Scaling Up Nutrition Movement
TFNC	Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSCN	United Nations System Standing Committee on Nutrition
UNSG	UN Secretary General
WB	World Bank
WHO	World Health Organization
WFP	World Food Program

Part I

1. Introduction

Since the 1990s, global public–private partnerships[1] – also called global multi-stakeholder partnerships or initiatives – have proliferated, promoted as innovative governance arrangements for solving transnational development issues within most policy fields. The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development calls for partnerships to pool resources, knowledge and expertise from a range of actors and sectors to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (UN, 2015). However, the increase in partnerships involving state-based actors as well as non-state ones (like civil society organisations (CSOs), businesses, and philanthropic foundations), has given rise to debates about authority and legitimacy in global governance, as such partnerships increasingly complement, and at times replace, the responsibilities and roles traditionally accorded to nation-states (Bull & McNeill, 2007; Andonova, 2017). While many studies have considered the role and influence of global partnerships in multilateral governance within the areas of health, sustainable development and the environment (cf. Buse & Walt, 2000; Buse & Harmer, 2004; Mert, 2013; Rushton & Williams, 2011; Storeng & Behagué, 2016; Storeng, 2014; Glasbergen et al., 2007; Pattberg et al., 2012), few have examined the influence of global partnerships within the area of *nutrition*. However, nutrition is an issue that has risen to the top of the international development agenda over the past decade, as manifested by the Sustainable Development Goal 2 (SDG2) to 'End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture', and the UN Decade of Action on Nutrition 2016–2026 (UNSCN, 2019). Malnutrition, in its various forms (including undernutrition, micronutrient deficiencies, overweight and obesity), is a global problem that affects one in three persons worldwide (HLPE, 2018, p.9), and is by far the biggest cause of ill-health and premature death globally (Swinburn et al., 2019). To advance global targets and agendas to address malnutrition, there has been a strong drive for multi-s*takeholder* and multi-*sectoral* partnerships that can reduce longstanding fragmentations in food security and nutrition governance between various policy sectors (food, agriculture, health, water and sanitation, education etc.), and types of actors (HLPE, 2018; McKeon, 2017). However, the use of partnerships to address malnutrition has not been without controversy (Fanzo et al., 2021), and various global governance challenges have been identified as impeding collective action for nutrition (Balarajan & Reich, 2016). The controversy around partnerships in nutrition, and the fragmentation of global nutrition

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[1] The term 'partnerships' is used throughout the introductory chapters of this thesis as shorthand for 'global public–private partnerships'.

governance involving a range of actors holding different interests, ideas and material resources, make it particularly interesting to explore the influence of global partnerships in this area.

This thesis contributes to the literature on global partnerships, by critically examining the influence of a global partnership for nutrition – The Scaling Up Nutrition Movement (SUN). SUN, which is one of the largest and most institutionalised partnerships for nutrition, was established in 2010 as one of several global initiatives to address dysfunctions of global food and nutrition governance following the 2007/08 global food-price crisis (McKeon, 2015; Mokoro, 2015). Originally, SUN focused on scaling up investments and interventions to reduce child undernutrition – in particular, stunting[2] during the first 1000 days.[3] Gradually, its vision has expanded to cover all forms of malnutrition (SUN, 2016). While SUN does not call itself a 'partnership', but a 'country-driven movement' (SUN, 2016), its governance structures are in line with broader understandings of what a global partnership is (Andonova, 2017; Schäferhoff, Campe & Kaan, 2009). SUN involves a large and diverse range of actors (governments, UN agencies, business, CSOs, bilateral donors and philanthropic foundations), that seek to support SUN's 65 low- and middle-income member countries in reducing stunting through multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder approaches. It provides limited funding to countries, and focuses its work on advocacy and capacity building (SUN, 2016). SUN has been commended for being 'on the frontline of political change in nutrition at the global level', and for having succeeded in putting nutrition on the agenda within its member-countries (Gillespie & van den Bold, 2017, p.7). However, its influence has not been without controversies: ever since its establishment, SUN has been criticised – *inter alia,* for including food corporations within its governance structures, for limited accountability towards affected communities, and for promoting market-based solutions, such as fortified foods, over rights-based and long-term solutions to malnutrition, including diversification of agriculture and diets (Clapp & Scrinis, 2017; McKeon, 2015, p.62; Michéle et al., 2019; Oenema, 2014; Schuftan & Greiner, 2013).

In this thesis, I take SUN as a case study to critically analysing the ways in which global partnerships influence nutrition governance – both at the global level and at the national level– in the case of the United Republic of Tanzania. By exploring the influence of a partnership across global and domestic governance spheres, the thesis contributes to the

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[2] *Stunting:* Low height-for-age, reflecting a past episode or episodes of sustained undernutrition. In children under five years of age, stunting is defined height-for-age less than -2 standard deviations below the WHO Child Growth Standards median (FAO, 2019, p. 189)

[3] – from conception until a child's second birthday

global governance literature, which has tended to focus on the role and influence of global partnerships in *multilateral* governance (Andonova, 2017; 211).

The debate on the influence of partnerships in the field of nutrition reflects broader debates on the benefits and limitations of partnerships in global governance, and their potential to contribute towards more inclusive and effective development. Some studies have seen global partnerships as a necessary response to the failures of the multinational system to deliver global public goods and provide inclusive governance, addressing the 'participatory gap' and the 'democratic deficit' of state-centred governance (Benner, Reinicke & Witte, 2004; Reinicke, 1999; Reinicke & Deng, 2000). By engaging a wider range of actors, including previously marginalised civil society organisations, through processes of deliberation and shared learning, partnerships have the potential to improve the accountability and democratic quality of global governance (Bäckstrand, 2006; Risse, 2005). They are also seen as providing more effective solutions, drawing on resources, skills and expertise from both the public and private sectors (Reinicke & Deng, 2000). Within the international development community, partnerships are often seen as offering more equitable, inclusive and effective cooperation, as contrasted with traditional donor-driven aid (Menashy, 2019), and are expected to play a crucial role in implementation of the SDGs (UN, 2015, p.10). However, the potential of partnerships to ensure more effective and inclusive global governance has also been challenged (Schäferhoff, et al., 2009). Some argue that partnerships can undermine public authority and state capacity to address development challenges (Martens, 2007; Utting and Zammit, 2009). They can increase the complexity within global governance, create work duplication and coordination challenges – as observed within the field of global health (Rushton & Williams, 2011). Furthermore, partnerships are seen as promoting technical, market-based, 'quick-fix' solutions to complex health and nutrition issues (as with supplements and vaccines), skewing resources and directing attention away from underlying structural problems, like the need to strengthen health systems or to provide equitable access to diverse and healthy diets (McKeon, 2017; Storeng, 2014). The potential of partnerships to address participatory deficits in global governance has also been challenged by studies that find actors representing the Global North dominating partnerships' governance arrangements (Menashy, 2019; Storeng & de Bengy Puyvallée, 2018). Some claim that partnerships can lead to privatization of global governance, undermining the credibility of public authorities by extending the influence of corporations into public policy spaces (Levy & Newell, 2005; Richter, 2004; Utting & Zammit, 2009). In particular, the role of the food industry within partnerships has been strongly contested, on the grounds that the actions and products of food and beverage corporations undermine public health goals (Fanzo et al., 2021).

Another criticism is that, instead of contributing to democratic deliberations, partnerships may promote a culture of consensus and non-confrontation, effectively excluding or co-opting progressive or dissenting perspectives and voices (Pouliot & Thérien, 2018; Storeng & Behagué, 2016). Studies have drawn attention to the limited attention to power asymmetries within health & nutrition partnerships, effectively limiting equality of participation (Buse & Harmer, 2004; Hawkes & Buse, 2011; McKeon, 2017; Storeng & de Bengy Puyvallée, 2018).

Such criticisms and shortcomings indicate that partnerships are not necessarily win–win global mechanisms that advance the common good, but political institutional arrangements that distribute values and resources (Biermann, Mol & Glasbergen, 2007). This is also where my interest in partnerships lies: in questions about the role of power and politics as regards partnerships. By applying concepts and theories from the disciplines of International Relations (IR), Sociology, and Public Policy, I seek to shed light on the complex and multifaceted ways in which state-based and non-state actors, through partnerships, exert influence in global nutrition governance. My thesis contributes as such to the health and nutrition policy literature which rarely applies social science theories for examining power dynamics in global and national policy processes (Gore & Parker, 2019; Nisbett et al., 2014; Harris, 2019c; Stoeva, 2016). Attention to the role of power has been particularly limited as regards nutrition policy research, and has only recently begun to emerge as an area of interest (Baker et al., 2021; Harris, 2019; Harris, Nisbett & Gillespie, 2022; Nisbett et al., 2014). Whereas some scholars have investigated the effectiveness and governance of nutrition partnerships, mainly in domestic settings (Hoddinot, Gillespie & Sivan, 2015; Kraak et al., 2011), my study makes a contribution by examining issues of global power relations and how they condition the role and influence of partnerships across global and national levels. While focusing on SUN specifically, my research seeks to shed broader light on the political nature of global partnerships, both as sources of power affecting societal change at different spatial levels, and as 'arenas for power-based conflict on the distribution of values and resources' (Biermann et al., 2007, p.298).

Aims and approach

In this thesis, my overall aim is to examine the ways in which The Scaling Up Nutrition Movement, as a specific type of global partnership, influences global nutrition governance. As an analytical concept, *global governance* helps us to understand the empirical phenomenon of a world that has become increasingly interconnected across a broad range of state-based and non-state actors, as well as across various policy levels, steering mechanisms and spheres of authority (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2006). Global governance is not only about governance *above*

the nation-state level: it includes relations and interactions across sub-national, national and international levels, and across a wide range of state and non-state actors, governed through more or less formal mechanisms – including partnerships (Weiss & Wilkinson, 2019). Thus, the concept of global governance is helpful for understanding the phenomenon of global partnerships as a new form of hybrid steering mechanism for the provision of collective goods, involving new forms of authority, from government and public actors towards non-state actors, with implications for political processes and authority relations, at various spatial levels – not only the global level (Schäferhoff et al., 2009). To understand how a partnership exerts influence in global nutrition governance, I examine SUN's influence not only above the nation-state level, but also at the national level in one of its first member-countries: Tanzania. As I seek to unpack the politics of SUN, I focus on the dynamics between various state-based and non-state actors involved in SUN across these levels, and how these dynamics shape SUN's broader influence on ideas and authority relations within global nutrition governance.

A focus on how various state and non-state actors exert influence in and through SUN at various levels of governance can contribute to our understanding of whether authority and legitimacy are assuming new forms in global governance, shedding light on how current practices are affected by, and through, global partnerships. These issues are highly pertinent, given the increasing influence of global partnerships in global governance: we need to understand the evolving roles and responsibilities between various state-based and non-state actors involved in global governance.

My research has been guided by the following overall research question:

In which ways does the Scaling Up Nutrition Movement (SUN) influence global nutrition governance?

I approach the overall research question through three sub-questions addressed with the embedded case-studies presented in the three articles of the thesis (see Table 1). Through these sub-cases, I critically analyse various processes through which power and authority is exerted and legitimated in global nutrition governance, and how this influences the national nutrition policy landscape in Tanzania. I apply a qualitative case-study method based on document analysis, interviews and observations and draw on literatures within the areas of global governance, global health, and public health and nutrition policy. The main data-collection sites

are the SUN Secretariat in Geneva, international nutrition and SUN conferences and meetings in Rome, Milan, and Geneva, and the national nutrition community in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

Table 1. Overview of sub-research questions addressed in embedded case-studies making up articles 1 – 3 of the thesis.

Case	Sub-questions	Article	Description of case-study
1	**How and by whom was influence gained during the establishment of SUN?**	Article I: Lie (2019). Power in Global Nutrition Governance. A Critical Analysis of the Establishment of the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Partnership. *Global Governance*, 25, 277–303.	Case study of the *political processes* behind SUN's establishment, 2005–2010.
2	**How has SUN sought to strengthen its ability to exercise authority in global nutrition governance?**	Article II: Lie (2020): 'We are not a partnership' – constructing and contesting legitimacy of global public–private partnerships: the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement, *Globalizations,* 18(2), 237–255.	Case study of SUN's *self-legitimation processes*, 2011–2017.
3	**How has SUN influenced the nutrition policy environment in Tanzania?**	Article III: Lie (submitted): When the SUN shines on Tanzania: how a global partnership influences national nutrition policy.	Case study of *policy transfer processes* between SUN and Tanzania, 2011–2016.

The first article analyses how state-based and non-state actors have exercised various forms of power to shape SUN's formation and its role within global nutrition governance. I ask: *How and by whom was influence gained during the establishment of SUN?* and focus on the political processes through which power, interests and normative beliefs shaped its formation. The second article concerns how SUN has sought to strengthen its influence or ability to exercise authority in global nutrition governance, examining its processes of self-legitimation and the roles of various actors within these processes. I ask: *How has SUN sought to strengthen its ability to exercise authority in global nutrition governance?* In the third article, I explore how SUN has influenced the nutrition policy environment in Tanzania, examining transnational policy transfer mechanisms through which SUN has exerted influence to shape the development of national nutrition policy and governance. I ask: *How has SUN influenced the nutrition policy environment in Tanzania?*

On the basis of these explorations, I found that SUN has influenced the field of global nutrition through three main avenues. First, SUN has been able to advance authoritative knowledge about how to address malnutrition and governance challenges, thus shaping a dominant understanding of appropriate governance and policy responses based on multi-stakeholder approaches and market-based solutions. Second, I found that important power-asymmetries underlie and condition the governance of the partnership. This led SUN to align with, institutionalise, and legitimise the interests and perspectives of its most powerful partners, particularly of the private sector. Third, I show that critical voices in global nutrition governance have been co-opted or marginalised by SUN, which has failed to ensure equitable inclusion of the people most affected by malnutrition.

Overall, the thesis shows some of the subtle ways in which global nutrition governance, through SUN, is exercised by various actors within global and national policy spheres, contributing to a better understanding of how political outcomes are produced, by whom, and in whose interest. Further, the thesis shows how global partnerships are conditioned by, and may reinforce, broader power asymmetries and dynamics within global governance, challenging the widely held assumption that partnerships are mechanisms that necessarily contribute to more inclusive and sustainable development.

Outline of the thesis

This thesis is structured in two main parts. Part 1 consists of six chapters, including this introduction. Part 2 consists of three articles, to which part 1 serves as a comprehensive introduction. In chapter 2 of this first part, I provide a conceptualisation of global governance

and global partnerships, and outline the theories I apply for understanding how influence is exerted in and through global partnerships in global governance. The third chapter provides a justification for the case study and describes the landscape of global nutrition governance, the SUN Movement and Tanzania's nutrition policy landscape prior to joining SUN. The fourth chapter describes the methods used. The fifth chapter summarises the main findings of the papers, while chapter 6 offers some overarching conclusions on the ways in which SUN has influenced global nutrition governance, discuss the broader implications of this influence, and in the end, outline some limitations and implications for future research.

2. Theoretical and conceptual framework

In this chapter, I outline different theoretical and conceptual constructs that can help us to better understand how global public-private partnerships influence global governance. To examine the ways in which SUN influences global nutrition governance, I draw on theories of how *power* is exercised in global governance, how global governance institutions seek to assert or strengthen their ability to exercise *authority* through different *legitimation* strategies and how global actors seek to influence or exert authority over domestic public policy through various *policy transfer* mechanisms. Before I explain how these theories can help us to understand the influence of global partnerships, I provide a conceptualisation of global governance and global partnerships, and locate the present study within various theoretical perspectives on the emergence and role of global partnerships in global governance.

Conceptualising global governance

The concept of 'global governance' is useful for guiding analyses of political processes beyond the state. Global governance has been conceptualised in many ways and has been used as both an analytical and a normative concept (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2006). I apply it as an analytical concept to help in explaining changes observable within world politics, particularly since the end of the 20th century. As explained by Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006, p.196), this is a period characterised by worldwide transboundary interactions involving not only a broad array of state-based and non-state actors, but also various policy levels, with a range of steering mechanisms and spheres of authority. In contrast to the study of international relations, where the nation-state is the basic unit of analysis, studies of global governance acknowledge the growing importance of non-state actors, such as NGOs, transnational corporations and philanthropic foundations, involved in governance alongside or in collaboration with nation-states. Further, studies of global governance investigate the connections and interdependencies involving various policy levels: local, national, regional and global. This also entails asking questions – as I do in this thesis – about how ideas or policies conceived in transnational forums influence and are influenced by ideas and practices in national, regional and local settings (see Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2006, p.192). Further, global governance studies operate with a broader understanding of *governance* than international relations, as they recognise a plurality of steering mechanisms that horizontally link the activities of actors in formal intergovernmental negotiations, and in informal multi-stakeholder coordination processes, as part of what governance entails. A global governance approach should thus recognise global partnerships as exercising governance even though the modes of governance differ from those found in

hierarchical domestic decision-making or intergovernmental processes. This broader understanding of governance also involves adopting a broader concept of *authority*, and its legitimation, as not being exercised solely by nation-states. Global governance studies examine how non-state actors exercise *private authority* through new steering mechanisms, such as public–private partnerships, transnational advocacy networks or private governance mechanisms, with implications for political concepts such as democracy, sovereignty and legitimacy (Cutler et al., 1999; Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2006). I thus find the concept of 'global governance' useful for understanding the phenomenon of global partnerships as representing a new form of hybrid steering mechanism that opens up for new forms of authority, with implications for political processes and authority relations at various spatial levels.

Conceptualising global public–private partnerships

As generally understood, global public–private partnerships are a hybrid form of global governance institutions where international organisations (IOs), non-state actors and states together tackle challenges with transnational dimensions. Various terms have been used to describe the range of forms and functions of joint collaboration between public and private actors in global governance, such as *public policy networks* and *multistakeholder initiatives*. This thesis is concerned with forms of public–private collaboration that are relatively institutionalised, and that involve both state-based and non-state actors who aim to provide public goods – a shift of authority within the multilateral system. Instead of influencing global governance through more traditional forms of state-nonstate interactions, such as lobbying, consultation or protests, global partnerships provide platforms through which the political authority of non-state actors is extended, as they are directly involved in steering towards shared and publicly recognised objectives – co-governing along with state-based actors[4] (Andonova, 2017, p.7).

In the IR literature, definitions of global or transnational public–private partnerships usually include three elements: participating actors, their goals, and the sharing of risk and responsibility (Schäferhoff et al., 2009, p.453). In this thesis, I adopt the definition of global public–private partnerships offered by Andonova (2017), which captures the diversity of actors and the variety of governance functions of partnerships, without taking a normative stand

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[4] This co-governance, or joint-decision making across state-based and nonstate actors in different jurisdictions in response to global problems distinguishes global partnerships from domestic PPPs whereby governments typically subcontracts public functions to private actors, such as infrastructure construction (Andonova, 2017, p. 8).

regarding their worth. Her definition is both broad and sufficiently specific to distinguish partnerships from networks based solely on non-state actors involving civil society and business, or private governance arrangements:

> Global public–private partnerships are voluntary agreements between public actors (IOs, states, or substate public authorities) and nonstate actors (nongovernmental organizations, companies, foundations etc.) on a set of governance objectives and norms, rules, practices, or implementation procedures and their attainment across multiple jurisdictions and levels of governance. (Andonova 2017, p.2)

The term 'private' thus refers to non-state actors, whether for-profit or not-for-profit. In practice, the analytical distinctions between 'public' and 'private' and for-profit/ non-profit' are often blurred. Private non-profit foundations and non-governmental organisations may be closely connected to for-profit organisations, serving both public and private interests (Bull & McNeill, 2007, p 6). In my writing, I occasionally use the term *private-sector actors* to describe private actors who primarily serve commercial interests (typically companies) – as distinct from private actors who primarily serve public interests (typically CSOs). However, in seeking to understand power dynamics and the differing interests, values and norms of actors within a particular partnership, I try, as far as possible within the boundaries of ethical considerations of confidentiality, to describe the specific type of actors that have been operating as part of SUN, rather than using vague, sweeping categories.

Andonova (2017, pp.8–11) further specifies different typical organisational attributes of global partnerships that represent a shift from traditional multilateral governance. Global partnerships are *network-based organisational structures,* not hierarchical bureaucracies; their *authority is derived from multiple sources* across various actors and jurisdictions, rather than being state-delegated; they *pool sources of expertise and resources* from the public and private spheres, rather than relying on particular spheres of competence; they are *voluntary* and nonbinding, not bound by formal-legal agreements; they enable *flexibility* and participation on the part of willing *self-selected* partners committed to a specific objective, rather than seeking universal inclusiveness.

Otherwise, institutional forms and functions vary considerably across global partnerships. Within the partnership literature, several categorisations have been developed to describe functions ranging from advocacy and awareness-raising to the development of norms and standards (see Bull & McNeill, 2007; Glasbergen et al., 2007, p.10; Pattberg et al., 2012,

p.9). As regards functions, Andonova (2017) distinguishes between partnerships involved in *policy development* (agreement on norms, standards, rules or practices); *implementation* (financing, capacity-building, markets, technology, monitoring, etc.); and *provision of information* (knowledge, consensus building, advocacy, transparency). In terms of institutional structures, she distinguishes between partnerships and partnership *platforms. Partnership platforms* involve global-level partners who develop broad goals and frameworks of collaboration, which then are implemented through partnerships in other jurisdictions – for example, within partner countries (thus focusing on enabling partnership activity by others). By contrast, *partnerships* are freestanding: they consist of actors (partners) who themselves directly contribute to the pursuit of shared governance objectives. Further, Andonova highlights how partnerships vary in terms of the extent to which they are embedded in IOs. Most partnerships, she finds, do not have their own secretariat but are managed as programmes of an IO; others may have small secretariats hosted within an IO. Her third category is partnerships that exist as separate legal entities with larger and independent secretariats, such as GAVI – the vaccine alliance (GAVI), and the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund).

While this separation is analytically useful, particularly for comparison across partnerships, it can be difficult to fit the exact functions and institutional structures of specific partnerships into these categories; partnerships often perform several different functions, constituting complex institutional structures that evolve over time as the partnership develops. SUN is a particularly clear example of a partnership whose functions and structures fall in-between the categories of the framework, and where structures and institutional belonging have evolved over time – as discussed in Chapter 3, and in Articles I and II. How and why partnerships are established also has a bearing on their governance and hence on their authority and influence within the broader global governance landscape. I now examine how different theoretical perspectives explain the emergence and institutionalisation of partnerships, and where I place my own writing.

Perspectives on the emergence of partnerships in global governance

Various theoretical perspectives grounded within established IR theories explain why global partnerships have become such an essential feature of global governance, noting their importance and effects within a multilateral system designed by and for states. The processes of establishment and institutionalisation laid the foundations for the forms and functions of partnerships – with broader implications for how authority is distributed and exercised in global

governance. One widespread view, grounded in a *liberal-pluralist understanding* of international relations, sees global partnerships as emerging as a rational and necessary response to the inability of governments and IOs to solve complex global problems and deliver global public goods (Benner, Reinicke & Witte, 2004; Reinicke, 1999; Reinicke & Deng, 2000). According to this perspective, partnerships are created to correct specific functional gaps in global governance, concerning both the failures of the market and of a state-dominated multilateral system, resulting in a *participatory gap* and a *democratic deficit* in global governance (Reinicke, 1999). However, this functionalist view of the emergence and proliferation of partnerships cannot explain 'the uneven patterns of public–private collaboration and its outcomes' across different policy fields' (Andonova, 2017, p.26).

The clustering of partnerships around some global problems, or within some policy areas and not others, is perhaps better explained by *critical political economy perspectives*. Such perspectives, grounded in neo-Gramscian theory, see global partnerships as a 'political strategy through which business aims to secure corporate hegemony' (Shäferhoff et al., 2009, p.455). Although partnerships do not operate 'outside' of state authority in the way that private self-regulation and voluntary certification partnerships do (see Cutler et al., 1999; Cashore, 2002), critical scholars view their proliferation as a symptom of the capture of the multilateral agenda and institutions by corporate interests, neoliberal ideology, and market-based practices (Levy & Newell, 2005; Utting & Zammit, 2009; Zammit, 2003). Such critical political-economy perspectives have been prominent with regard to partnerships within the field of health – a field increasingly dominated by large private philanthropic foundations like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (the Gates Foundation), which have been instrumental in the promotion and institutionalisation of a wide range of global health partnerships, arguably masking any undue influence of corporate power (Partzsch & Fuchs, 2012; Harman, 2016; Youde, 2019). According to this perspective, a further indication of the take-over by private authority within global health is the disproportionate influence of transnational private actors relative to the public authorities within many global health partnerships, which risks skewing agendas toward corporate priorities, challenging democratic accountability (Rushton & Williams, 2011). Such critical perspectives see the proliferation of partnerships as resulting from the capture of multilateral organisations by corporate interests, with a shift of authority away from nation-states into the private sphere, facilitated by the expansion of neoliberal ideas.

While such critical political-economy perspectives are certainly better than liberal-pluralist perspectives for explaining the strong proliferation of partnerships within health relative to other fields, the corporate-capture argument tends to undermine the agency of

multilateral organisations in the process. By contrast, institutional sociological perspectives seek to explain the dynamic processes underlying the emergence of partnerships and institutionalisation. In her systematic examination of the creation of different types of global partnerships across issue-areas and organisational fields, Andonova (2017, p.28) takes an institutional-sociological perspective, emphasising the agency of IO, and in-house 'governance entrepreneurs', as drivers behind the creation and activities of partnerships. She argues that IOs are engaged in entrepreneurial and dynamic coalition-building and experimentation, both to reinforce agency mandates and to legitimise and gain political support for new governance instruments – such as partnerships. Within the process of partnership creation, IOs then become 'mediators between intergovernmental politics, public expectations and the turbulence associated with globalisation and the rise of transnational actors' (Andonova, 2017, p.6).Her dynamic institutionalist view challenges, but also builds on, two opposing theories of institutional change within the multilateral system: a realist state-centric principal-agent perspective that sees IOs as passive managers of state-delegated authority to administer intergovernmental rules, norms and agreements (Abbott & Snidal, 1998; Hawkins et al., 2006); and a sociological perspective on international bureaucracies as agents that slow down innovation and reform, by promoting the institutional adaptation of existing solutions and procedures (Cohen et al. 1972; Barnett & Finnemore, 2004).

In this thesis, I position myself in-between an institutional sociological and a critical political economy perspective in seeking to understand the establishment and institutionalisation of SUN. The value of the institutionalist perspective is that it recognises the political agency behind the emergence of partnerships and their institutionalisation in global governance: in contrast to liberal-pluralist and critical political-economy perspectives, it offers a less deterministic view of how and why partnerships emerge. This opens up for closer scrutiny of the processes of deliberation and political contestation involved in the creation, institutionalisation and legitimation of partnerships. However, I attach greater significance to structural conditions and the role of power within partnership processes. Although Andonova (2017) accounts well for the dynamic processes of partnership creation, recognising the tension between public and private mandates and the varying degrees of contestation and negotiation across issue-areas, she offers fewer reflections on the systemic drivers and consequences on the multilateral system as regards the proliferation of partnerships. This is better discussed by Bull and McNeill (2007), who, in their study of several global partnerships, argue that the rise of partnerships does not result from a direct capture of the multilateral agenda and system by a neoliberal ideology driven by corporations, but from a tendency towards a form of 'market

multilateralism' where multilateral organisations face increasing pressure from member states to operate more like private organisations – for example through introducing result-based management (also called *financialisation* (see Stein & Sridhar, 2018)). This, coupled with funding constraints, has made multilateral organisations increasingly inclined to work with the private sector. The creation of partnerships has thus to a large extent been driven by changes in the multilateral organisations due to external pressure, and is not primarily caused by them (Bull & McNeill, 2007, p.170). They acknowledge the importance of political agency of bureaucrats in multilateral organisations, or what they term 'boundary role occupants', in shaping partnerships, but attribute a larger role to the spread and promotion of market-based norms as conditioning the proliferation of partnerships. This critical perspective builds on a Gramscian understanding of hegemony as a concept of structural power that 'shapes the self-understanding and subjective interests of actors' (Bull & McNeill, 2007, p.28). Multilateral organisations are thus seen as not only a product of the dominant world order, but also as structures that promote and legitimise the further expansion of hegemonic market-based ideas, reinforcing structural relations of domination, and co-opting and absorbing alternative and 'counter-hegemonic' perspectives (Cox, 1983, in Bull & McNeill, 2007, p.28).

Applied to partnerships, this perspective emphasises structural power, in the sense of hierarchical relationships wherein some partners are more advantaged and dominant than others, and in the sense of creating knowledge and understandings about the world. These forms of power are closely associated with what the IR scholars Barnett and Duvall (2005) term 'structural' and 'productive' power, or what Doris Fuchs (2005) has called 'structural' and 'discursive' power. These forms of power are particularly relevant for how partnerships gain, maintain and lose legitimacy – which matters for how successful partnerships will be in exerting authority and in achieving their objectives. Indeed, legitimacy can be seen as a 'means of justifying and practicing power and the key to why people obey such power' (Beetham, 1991, in Harman, 2016, p.351).

Before turning to how the legitimacy of partnerships relates to their ability to exert influence and to achieve their goals, I discuss how to understand the types of power exercised among the various actors involved in partnerships. To understand how partnerships exert influence in global governance, we must understand how power is distributed and exercised among various partners, *and* how these dynamics help to shape the legitimacy of partnerships, and their ability to influence governance outcomes.

Understanding the exercise of power in partnerships

In order to understand the emergence and influence of global partnerships, we need to inquire into actors' political agency and pay attention to issues of power in partnerships - or how some actors are able to exert influence over other actors engaged in partnerships (Bull & McNeill, 2007, p.38; Menashy, 2019). Here we can draw on recent multidimensional power frameworks within IR that build on earlier conceptualisations of power from the fields of political science and sociology (see Dahl, 1957; Lukes, 1974, Bourdieu, 1992). Contrary to more realist, state-centric perspectives on power in global governance focusing on actors' fixed possessions or properties, multidimensional power frameworks focus on relational and context-dependent power sources and on how power is exercised: 'how, why and when some actors have "power over" others' (Barnett & Duvall, 2005, p.2).[1] Power is thus not only about the capacity of actors or states to achieve their goals (power *to*), but also about the structural conditions that enable a range of actors to influence or exercise control over others (power *over*) (Barnett & Duvall, 2005; Fuchs, 2005; Fuchs & Lederer, 2007; Partzsch & Fuchs, 2012). According to these perspectives, power is drawn from a range of different sources and is exercised both directly and indirectly, in visible and invisible ways, by both state-based and non-state actors. In my analysis of SUN, I examine which actors have power over others, but also how some actors gain stronger influence, while others do not.

The diverse forms of power have been conceptualised somewhat differently in various frameworks. However, many categories overlap, as they concern largely the same ways of exercising power directly and indirectly through material or ideational resources (Moon, 2019). In Article I, I apply the framework developed by Fuchs (2005), distinguishing among instrumental, structural and discursive forms of power. Given the comprehensive application of this framework in the food and nutrition governance literature (Clapp & Fuchs, 2009; Clapp & Scrinis, 2017), I found this framework useful to analyse how different types of actors in SUN apply various forms of power to affect political processes and outcomes – and to gain influence. In this framework, ***instrumental power*** refers to the *direct* use of material resources, such as finance or technology, to influence political outcomes. A typical example is when corporations use their financial resources to lobby politicians to further their interests. However, as shown in Article I, instrumental power can also be exercised by IOs and private donors, as when they withdraw funding to certain institutions in order to influence international processes in the desired direction. In this sense, instrumental power often interacts with structural power, as the strategic use of material resources can alter actors' institutional position within global

governance, bolstering their influence over policy-making and agenda setting (Fuchs, 2005). Whereas Barnett and Duvall (2005) distinguish between structural and institutional power, Fuchs (2005) describes these as intertwined. She sees ***structural power*** as involving both the direct and the indirect ability of actors to shape policy agendas and rule-setting. In the more indirect sense of political influence, actors can wield structural power by virtue of their economic or social position vis-à-vis other actors within a structure. The increasing dependence of governments on private investments is a telling example of how corporations wield structural power, indirectly shaping government agendas. However, as shown in Article III, structural power can be traced also in the social and economic hierarchical relations between donor and recipient states. Such structural hierarchical relations are often reproduced through global partnerships when recipient countries' ability to participate on equal terms as donor countries is held back by structural dependencies. Similarly, corporations or donors may, consciously or unconsciously, tend to steer developments even within supposedly flat hierarchies, like networks and partnerships, by virtue of their economic positions vis-à-vis civil society actors or recipient countries dependent upon their support or goodwill. By influencing rules and norms that further their own positions within hierarchies, they may reproduce hegemonic asymmetric relations in global governance. According to Fuchs (2005), corporations' engagement in partnerships provide them with a more visible form of structural power by enabling them to design and implement policies, rules and regulations – furthering their influence and authority within global governance. The dividing lines between agenda-setting power derived from relations of dependency, and power derived from actors' positions within formal and informal institutions that enable them to control agendas and policy-making are thus blurred – as shown in Article I.

The last form of power within Fuch's framework is ***discursive power***, mirroring what Barnett and Duvall (2005) call *productive* power. Whereas structural power as described above works through hierarchical and institutional relationships empowering some actors over others, discursive power can be understood as a function of norms, ideas, and societal institutions as reflected in 'discourse, communicative practices and cultural values' (Fuchs & Lederer 2007, p.8). Or, put differently, productive power refers to 'the social processes and the systems of knowledge through which meaning is produced, fixed, lived, experienced and transformed' (Barnett & Duvall, 2005, p.9). This form of power enables actors to shape public perceptions of policy issues and potential solutions – for example, through discursive framing (Clapp & Scrinis, 2016) – and contributes to producing and legitimising their structural or hierarchical positions by shaping perceptions about how the world is organised, or should be (Menashy,

2019, p.9). Framing can be an important agenda-setting tool, influencing who gets involved in issues, and how solutions are agreed (Shiffman, 2007). Take, for instance, the rhetoric hailing *multi-stakeholder* partnerships as *innovative, effective, inclusive* etc. within international development discourse: that helps to legitimise partnerships, also in the private sector, as an appropriate and taken-for-granted form of governance (Menashy, 2019, p. 9). Partnership discourses can also blur the demarcation between public and private actors by hiding particularistic or conflicted interests behind the veil of shared purpose, equality, and through private-sector-friendly discourse (Menashy, 2019). How partnerships and the role of private actors are framed or legitimised within global governance affects their legitimacy and, hence their ability to exercise power effectively – which is why, in Article II, I analyse SUN's efforts at legitimation.

Authority and legitimacy are discussed in the following section, but first let me note that, although it is analytically useful to distinguish among these various forms of power, they are in fact closely related, overlapping and reinforcing each other in complex ways. For example, an actor's institutional position within a partnership may provide privileged access to framing policy issues and solutions, and such positions can be reinforced or legitimised through rhetoric and discursive practices. Similarly, financial resources can be used for financing specific types of research, in order to promote a certain type of knowledge about the world – again helping to legitimise and normalise actors and their positions. Given the confusion over different and overlapping terms of power in the literature, a good way of testing them is to apply them to an empirical case – as I do in Article I. By attending to these different but interrelated ways in which power is exercised among various actors within partnerships, not only can we unpack the internal power dynamics within partnerships, but also examine critically how roles and relations of authority and legitimacy within global governance are produced, reproduced and altered.

Understanding authority, legitimacy, and legitimation of global partnerships

One way for partnerships to expand their influence is to provide justifications for their involvement in global governance: they seek to legitimise their authority in order to strengthen their ability to achieve their goals. This makes it important to understand how authority, legitimacy and legitimation can be understood in the context of global partnerships.

Most discussions about legitimacy in global governance are normative and concerned with the extent to which institutions live up to certain pre-defined criteria, such as accountability, transparency, participation and effectiveness, providing them with the right and

authority to rule (see Archibugi et al., 2012; Buchanan & Keohane, 2006; Held, 1995; Keohane et al. 2009; Scholte, 2011). In contrast, a sociological approach understands legitimacy as a relational phenomenon that is shaped by perceptions of appropriate rule or exercise of authority at the global level (Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). This approach opens up interesting questions about how global governance institutions like partnerships, come to be seen as legitimate (or illegitimate) and how institutions themselves seek to shape perceptions of legitimacy among different communities (Bexell, 2014). In my work, I take a sociological approach based on an understanding of legitimacy as political and relational, referring to "the acceptance and justification of shared rule by a community" (Bernstein 2005 in Bernstein, 2011, p. 20). A legitimate global institution thus rules with authority for which it has gained support and acceptance. This means that, one way for partnerships to strengthen their ability to exercise authority and to achieve their goals, is to instill heightened belief in their action and authority as legitimate – as explored in article II.

This understanding of legitimacy builds on the idea that institutions that exercise a form of authority seek a form of acceptance from their immediate environment, but the nature of the authority can vary according to the type of institution in question (Scholte & Tallberg, 2018, p. 66). According to this view, authority can be understood as the 'recognition that an institution has the right to make decisions and interpretations within a particular area', while legitimacy is about the perceptions of these rights being appropriately exercised (Tallberg & Zürn, 2019, p.586). Global governance institutions cannot, like nation states, draw on coercive power or sanctions to ensure compliance, but are still widely seen to exercise authority in various forms, which they in turn need to legitimise to ensure effective exercise of authority. What type of authority global partnerships hold is not straightforward to answer given the plurality of partnerships. However, their common features relating among others to their hybrid and voluntary nature, do provide them with less formal forms of authority than for example multilateral organisations that exert more traditional forms of authority in the sense of making binding rules and decisions (Raymond & DeNardis, 2015; Zürn, 2017). Rather than exercising power through hierarchical authority relations between a 'ruler' and 'subordinates', partnerships thus rely on *pooled* authority between state-based and non-state actors and often exercise more of an epistemic form of authority, closely related to subtle forms of power, such as structural and discursive power, through policy development, implementation or provision of information that shape ideas, information and discourses, structuring social relations and political outcomes (as explored in paper III) (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Nye, 2004). While their level of authority thus generally is seen as *lower* compared to multilateral institutions,

partnerships still exert influence over political outcomes for which they seek acceptance (Andonova, 2017, p.208; Scholte & Tallberg, 2018, p.68). Before discussing how such acceptance can be sought, or challenged, I will briefly explain how I understand the connection between normative and sociological approaches to legitimacy.

Whereas a sociological understanding of legitimacy is analytically distinct from a strict normative view of legitimacy as how authority 'ought to be exercised', both conceptions of legitimacy are empirically related (Bernstein, 2011; Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). Perceptions of appropriate rule are necessarily shaped by socially constructed norms about appropriate exercise of authority in society (Beetham, 2013; Suchman, 1995; Quack, 2010). The legitimacy of global governance institutions is thus not an absolute, but varies over time, and according to the perspectives of those assessing it (Bull & McNeill, 2010, p.105). Indeed, debates about the worth of partnerships are closed linked to normative perceptions about their legitimacy. As these debates has been elaborated in the Introduction, and a comprehensive overview of the normative discussions about partnerships' legitimacy is provided in article II, I will only very briefly recapture some elements here, before moving on to discussions about how legitimacy is sought or challenged through different practices of legitimation or delegitimation.

Despite broad scholarly engagement with legitimacy in global governance, there is no agreement about what the principal sources of legitimacy in global governance are and several proposals exists (for an overview cf. Dingwerth & Witt, 2019, pp.43-48; Scholte and Tallberg, 2018, pp.57-65). In evaluations of partnerships, the overarching distinction between input and output legitimacy is frequently used, as developed by Fritz Scharpf (1999) (Bexell & Mörth, 2010, p.12; Glasbergen, 2013), but also between *performance* and *procedures* (Bäckstrand, 2006; Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2014). *Input legitimacy* is commonly associated with qualities relating to the process or procedures of governance (i.e. how decisions are made), but can also be understood to include non-procedural qualities, such as legality, expertise, moral standing, charismatic leadership and novelty (Bull & McNeill, 2010, pp. 104-108; Bexell & Morth, 2010, p. 12). *Output legitimacy* on the other hand, is commonly used to refer to performance, or the qualities of the results or solutions (substance) of governance. Performance or outputs can be evaluated narrowly in terms of goal achievement, or more broadly in terms of the ability to provide valued public goods (Dingwerth & Witt, 2019, p.44).

Global governance institutions often appeal to such different norms as they seek acceptance for their authority. These perceptions can change over time in line with broader structural changes within global governance. As judgements about which norms that matter most vary among different communities, or audiences, and over time, the task of seeking

legitimacy is complicated – and particularly so, as show in article II, for partnerships whose audiences represent a wide variety of actors holding different, and at times, conflicting perceptions about what constitutes appropriate exercise of power in global governance (Bernstein, 2011). How legitimacy in global governance is sought or challenged through various (de)legitimation processes is described next.

Legitimation of global partnerships

Strategic attempts to justify or challenge existing power and authority relations can be conceptualised as legitimation strategies or practices (Gronau & Schmidtke, 2016; Bäckstrand & Söderbaum, 2018), defined by the goal of either legitimising or de-legitimising an authority. Legitimation processes is an emergent field of research within global governance (see Bernstein, 2011: Brasset & Tsingou, 2011; Dingwerth et al., 2019; Reus-Smit, 2007; Tallberg et al., 2018; Zaum, 2013) and relatively few have looked at legitimation in the context of hybrid global governance institutions like partnerships (Andonova & Carbonnier, 2014; Bäckstrand & Kylsäter, 2014; Glasbergen, 2013; Schleifer, 2019). Demands and normative expectations of different communities or audiences in global governance have been shown to influence legitimation processes (Bernstein, 2011; Gronau & Schmidtke, 2016; Reus-Smit, 2007; Symons, 2011; Zaum, 2013). Actors supporting a global institution engage in legitimation when they seek to strengthen perceptions about the institution's legitimacy and justify its norms, identity, interests or actions. Conversely, critics of global institutions engage in de-legitimation when they aim to undermine beliefs in the legitimacy of those institutions. Processes of legitimation and de-legitimation are often interlinked, as legitimation efforts may involve responding to, or challenging, de-legitimation strategies, and vice-versa. Both types of strategies must thus be seen as part of an interdependent process (Bäckstrand & Söderbaum, 2018). In Article II, I demonstrate such interlinkage by showing how normative criticisms of SUN were a driver behind its self-legitimation strategies.

Legitimation may also be practised by the institution itself through various forms of 'self-legitimation' claims and practices. As I show in Article II, self-legitimation strategies can be expressed discursively, through communication characterised by value-laden language, or through narratives aimed at convincing audiences of the institution's normative value – to protect human rights, democracy, increase effectiveness, reduce the burden of diseases, etc. (Gronau & Schmidtke, 2016, p. 542). It can also be expressed through institutional reforms conforming with the normative expectations of audiences. This may involve administrative reorganisations, transparency initiatives, broadened participation, policy adjustment in response

to criticism, etc. Certain types of behavior can also be defined as (de)legitimation practices, such as supportive or oppositional lobbying, adherence or withdrawal of membership, campaigning or protests (Bäckstrand & Söderbaum, 2018).

The relevance of different audiences in terms of influencing the legitimation strategies of global institutions is highly debated, and varies across institutions and over time (Symons, 2011; Zaum, 2013). 'Legitimacy-granting audiences' can be understood as actors who hold or withhold beliefs regarding appropriate authority vis-à-vis a governance arrangement, including state and non-state actors that might be (or not be) bound by the authority of a governance institution (Bexell & Jönsson, 2018). As noted in Article II, contestations about the legitimacy of partnerships flourish, given the range of the audiences, with varying beliefs and degrees of power, from whom these partnerships seek legitimacy (Bernstein, 2011; Boström & Hallström, 2013; Glasbergen, 2013; Schleifer, 2019). Whereas multilateral organisations like the UN or the World Bank (WB) have traditionally appealed to member-state constituencies for recognition as legitimate institutions (Bexell, 2014), global partnerships seek recognition as 'rightful' institutions in the eyes of a broader range of audiences, or so called 'stakeholders', such as civil society, business, philanthropic foundations, bilateral donors, developing country governments, and the bureaucracies of multilateral organisations. These actors often hold different, even conflicting, beliefs regarding legitimacy. For example, whereas many CSOs place a high value on procedural criteria such as accountability, participation and transparency in assessing a global institution's right to rule, businesses and donors may emphasise performance criteria, such as delivering results (Bernstein, 2011). However, as shown in Article II, demarcating audiences and their normative views is in the end an empirical task, not without complications. Differing normative views of legitimacy may also create sharp divisions within the same group of actors, as in the case of CSOs on the question of SUN's governance.

As the normative beliefs and demands of different audiences frequently conflict, partnerships often face legitimacy dilemmas, where satisfaction of one demand may lead to non-satisfaction of another (Black, 2008). The political space within which legitimation strategies can be successfully reconciled is thus limited (Zaum, 2013, p.19). This is clearly shown in Article II: SUN has appealed to a broad range of norms, seeking to satisfy the demands of its many audiences: but, ultimately the demands of some audiences seem to take precedence over those of others.

Reconciling norms and expectations is complicated by power asymmetries between the various legitimacy-claiming and -granting actors: some actors are better than others at influencing perceptions that (de)legitimise institutions and power relationships (Beetham,

2013; Symons, 2011). IR studies on legitimation often ignore the distribution of power among legitimacy-granting audiences (Hurd, 2018). However, recent studies show that partnerships become arenas for struggles over influence and between divergent interests, resulting in a 'bargaining game' where the distribution of power determines whose interests and preferences are reflected in legitimation strategies (Schleifer, 2019, p.54). Legitimation strategies can reinforce existing power relationships when the most powerful actors manifest their influence and positions through strategic discourse or actions in defence of the status quo (Beetham, 2013, p.104; Hurd, 2018). Studying how partnerships legitimise themselves is thus an instructive way of exploring how partnerships, and the actors involved, exert power in ways that ultimately influence the distribution of authority within global governance. How this influence extends to domestic policy and governance is explored in Article III on how SUN influences the national nutrition-policy landscape in Tanzania.

Understanding how global partnerships influence domestic policy and governance

As global partnerships generally do not hold formal authority to rule or generate binding policies, their authority is often expressed through an array of interrelated direct and indirect pathways and mechanisms of influence. These include diffusion of international norms and discourse through learning in international fora and interaction in transnational networks, and direct access to policy-making processes through funding or technical assistance and capacity building (Bernstein & Cashore, 2012). Scholars have examined the role of informal transnational advocacy or action networks (see Keck & Sikkink, 1998; McDougall, 2016; Shiffman et al., 2016), epistemic communities (Haas, 1992), and more recently international NGOs (Storeng et al., 2019), in diffusing and shaping norms, interests and values across different spatial levels, by providing and framing information, knowledge and alternative policy solutions to global problems. However, less attention has been paid to the processes through which *global partnerships* exert influence on domestic policy and governance. Studies have shown how global health partnerships that provide sizable funding, such as GAVI, affect national health systems and priorities in low and middle-income countries (LMICs) (Spicer & Walsh, 2012), but there has been limited research on how non-financial partnerships exert influence through more informal mechanisms, shaping knowledge and norms, and also power relations (Kapilashrami & McPake, 2013).

To understand the processes through which SUN, which does not provide funding, has exerted influence over national nutrition-policy developments in Tanzania, I draw on the theory of *transnational policy transfer* (Evans, 2019; Stone, 2020). Policy transfer can be understood as the processes whereby policy ideas and instruments move across national borders (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). Various terms have been used to describe the processes, such as policy *diffusion* or policy *learning* (Evans, 2019), but I apply the term policy *transfer,* to emphasise the agency involved in the spread of policies. Policy transfer has been described as 'the deliberate international spread of various types of governance, knowledge, rules and standards, sometimes called 'soft law', as well as (hard) policy tools, conditional funds, laws and institutional practices' (Stone, 2020, p. 21). Several scholars have shown how public health policies in LMICs have been transferred from international actors (Ogden et al., 2003; Walt et al., 2004; Bennett et al., 2015). In nutrition, Harris (2019a) found that nutrition policy changes in Zambia were transferred to national policy through the international community's normative promotion of certain ways of understanding the issue of malnutrition, conveyed through advocacy, technical assistance, and funding. More recently, global-policy scholars have signalled the need for more research on how global hybrid networks and partnerships contribute to such transnational diffusion or transfer of policy, ideas, knowledge across state-based and non-state actors with varying norms, interests and resources, particularly in the context of international development cooperation (Stone et al., 2020). Stone et al. (2020) call for a *transnational policy transfer approach* to examine how global partnerships influence national policy by providing access to resources and expertise, and by enabling the spread of ideas, evidence and best-practices – vertically across geographic levels, and horizontally across different types of actors. My study of SUN's influence on Tanzania's nutrition policy landscape responds to this gap in the literature.

Although the term *transfer* may seem to indicate a merely *technical* transmission, this is a highly political process. Global partnerships are often promoted as inclusive spaces in which policies are translated, legitimised, designed and innovated among a vast number of actors who share a common cause (Nay, 2012, in Stone et al., 2020, p.10) – but the transfer processes are also conditioned by power relations of actors holding varying norms, ideas, interests and resources, operating across different geographies. In the context of development cooperation, the structural power of actors in the Global North (such as donors, multinational corporations and international NGOs), vis-à-vis actors in the Global South (such as national CSOs and recipient governments) is likely to condition transfer processes towards the interests of the more powerful (Menashy, 2019). Partnerships may thus function as *vehicles* through

which powerful actors exert their power, shaping ideas and policies in line with their interests, while excluding alternative perspectives or radical positions (Pouliot & Thérien, 2018; Stone et al., 2020; Storeng & Behagué, 2016). Harris (2019b) has shown how power conditions the processes of nutrition-policy transfer: through the invisible discursive power of technical language and scientific cultures in policy debates, international groups of actors shape what is seen as 'valid' knowledge – resulting in a 'largely technical and bureaucratic approach to nutrition policy at the expense of more political or inclusive framings' (Harris, 2019b, p. 127).

Although policy-transfer processes are messy and complex, involving varying degrees of coercion or external pressure (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Evans, 2019), established categories of transfer mechanisms (Bennett et al. 2015; Graham et al. 2012) can still serve as a useful analytical starting point for explaining how ideas and policies are transferred within global partnerships (as shown in Article III). ***Learning*** can be described as the processes through which knowledge about best practices, the advantages, disadvantages or effectiveness of a policy, is shared among policy-makers (or non-state actors) within different countries – as through international policy meetings or technical-capacity-building seminars. ***Competition*** may drive policy change when countries (or non-state actors) compete for donor funding and attention, where the adoption of 'donor-friendly' policies or approaches may enhance funding or influence. ***Socialisation*** concerns the processes through which actors adapt the norms and rules of a given community, potentially resulting in preference shifts and long-term policy change. For example, epistemic communities of policy experts play key roles in norm diffusion (Haas, 1992): and rhetoric can be a powerful tool for changing norms and policies. Lastly, ***coercion*** describes policy transfer resulting from various degrees of external pressure or imposition – as when an IO imposes policy change as part of a funding agreement, or when other countries impose sanctions. Although partnerships lack the authority to enforce rules or compliance, there may still be elements of coercion involved in how they exert influence. In Article III, I draw on these categories in seeking to explain the varied and diffuse mechanisms through which SUN has contributed to influencing the national nutrition-policy environment in Tanzania.

By exploring the processes through which SUN exerts influence, I also seek to uncover some of the implications for nutrition governance in Tanzania. Few studies have focused on the broader impact, and unintended side-effects, of global partnerships on domestic governance and policy development (Andonova, 2017, p.211). In part, this may be due to the focus on *measuring* the causal effects or goal achievement of partnerships within domestic settings, which is difficult given long chains of causal mechanisms and the myriad of confounding

factors (Spicer & Walsh, 2012). As a result, legitimation of partnerships' outputs or effectiveness is often based on reference to narrow goal achievement in terms of numbers of people reached, resources provided, or numbers of vaccines distributed (Roalkvam & McNeill, 2016).

However, critical studies of partnerships within development cooperation have problematised their broader political implications on domestic governance and policy in LMICs (Abrahamsen, 2004; Crawford, 2003; Fowler, 2000; McNeill, Andresen & Sandberg, 2013; Menashy, 2019). One argument in this literature is that global partnerships can be instrumental in strengthening the authority and influence of non-state actors vis-à-vis governmental actors within national and local policy development and provision. Especially in LMICs, this has resulted in international donors and corporate actors taking over many governmental functions through the institutionalisation of public–private partnerships. As international donor agencies and corporations come to be seen as 'stakeholders', and partnership policies promote their involvement in policy discussions and coordination, scholars have drawn attention to the growing foreign enmeshment in domestic policy-making, with implications for policy space in recipient countries: room to make their own decisions and promote their own preferences and interests (Hasselskog & Schierenbeck, 2017).

Global partnerships may also influence national policy by instilling *upward* rather than *downward* accountability. Through reporting requirements, member countries are held to account for measurable progress in line with partnership goals and priorities – often defined by the donors (McNeill et al., 2013; Hasselskog & Schierenbeck, 2017). Policies and programmes are frequently designed to promote an image of success for *international* actors (Abrahamsen, 2004). The growing influence of corporate interests through partnerships has led to broader claims that partnerships are vehicles of neoliberal values; they contribute to fragmenting government responsibility and capability for equitable development, re-instating private and corporate interests (Miraftab, 2004).

Moreover, partnerships have been found to reinforce, not reduce, existing power hierarchies between the Global North and Global South (Menashy, 2019). Despite built-in assumptions that multistakeholder collaboration will lead to more equitable and inclusive development that benefit the poor and marginalised, cooperative arrangements and partnerships are more likely to benefit those traditionally in power, most notably international aid agencies and donor countries, and not those who have been marginalised (Abrahamsen, 2004; Crawford, 2003; Fowler, 2000; Martens, 2007). As Menashy (2019, p.37) points out: 'although the rhetoric of partnerships often implies a change in development strategy away from conditionality-based

aid, critics question whether relationships continue to operate with the exact power hierarchies of the past, but only under a different façade'. The mismatch between the 'partnership' terminology, implying equality, inclusivity and mutual accountability, and the reality of unequal power relations and weakened state responsibility has led some authors to call partnerships a *Trojan Horse* (Fowler, 2000; Miraftab, 2004). According to Fowler (2000, p.7) partnerships represent a 'subtle form of external power imposition, less amenable to resistance', which, through the focus on reciprocity and consensus-making, 'precludes other interpretations of reality, options and choices without overtly doing so' – which in turn 'legitimizes deep penetration of foreign concerns into domestic processes.' Also here, the issues of power and legitimacy are pertinent if we seek to understand the influence of global partnerships.

Global partnerships, power, authority and legitimation: analytical framework of this thesis

My work on explaining how partnerships influence global governance through the case of SUN has been guided by an overarching theoretical approach combining a critical IR and an institutional- sociological perspective. I see global partnerships as shaped by both political agency and broader structural driving forces, and as contributing to advance certain ideas and authority relations over others in global governance.

To understand how SUN influences global nutrition governance, I explore how various forms of power are exercised by different actors to shape its institutional form and functions (Article I), how SUN seeks to further its ability to exercise authority through processes of self-legitimation (Article II), and how its authority is exercised across global and domestic policy spheres through direct and indirect mechanisms of transnational policy transfer (Article III). These inherently political processes of institutional establishment, self-legitimation and policy transfer determines the ability of partnerships to exert power and authority in global governance.

3. Case-study: SUN and Tanzania in global nutrition governance

This chapter justifies why I chose The Scaling Up Nutrition Movement as a case of a global partnership, and why I chose Tanzania as a within-case of how SUN influences on national policy and governance. The chapter also explains why global nutrition governance is a particularly interesting field for studying global power relations. Indeed, to understand in which ways SUN influences global nutrition governance, we must understand the landscape from which it emerged and within which it operates: *global nutrition governance*. Who are the actors, and what are their interests? How is power distributed within this landscape? I start by explaining my research design, before I move on to describing the field of global nutrition governance. I then present my case of the SUN Movement, and the nutrition policy landscape in Tanzania.

Explanation of case-study design

This study employs a qualitative case-study design. Definitions vary, but there is broad agreement that a *case study* scientifically investigates a real-life phenomenon in-depth and in its proper context. The case-study method involves using a range of sources, enabling insights into multiple facets of the phenomenon in question; and, as such, can meaningfully make use of and contribute to the application of theory (Baxter & Jack, 2008, p. 544; Berg, 2009, p. 318; Ridder, 2017). In contrast to experiments, the contextual conditions of the real-life phenomenon investigated in a case study are not clearly defined and/controlled, but form part of the inquiry itself. Sampling is non-random, as there is no representative sample of a larger population; the case has been selected because it is of interest, or for theory-related reasons (Ridder, 2017). The advantage of conducting a single-case study, rather than multiple case studies with cross-case analyses, is that it can provide detailed description and analysis to enhance our understanding of how and why things happen. It also enables us to open a black box, by examining deeper understandings of the phenomenon under study (Ridder, 2017; Yin, 2009). My research started out with precisely with this intention: to open up the 'black box' of SUN in terms of its governance, and hence influence – which, as is the case with many global partnerships, has remained opaque and difficult to understand from the outside.

Case selection and research question

My study of SUN is a case-study of a particular type of global organisation: a global public–private partnership. There is not *one* type of global partnership – but, broadly speaking, SUN falls within the general description of a 'global public–private partnership' (as discussed in previous chapters). According to Berg (2009, p. 331), conducting case studies of specific organisations can be very useful for researching relationships, behaviours, attitudes, motivations and stressors in organisational settings. As I was interested in the inner political workings of global partnerships and how power relations within global partnerships shape broader governance arrangements, I opted for a qualitative single case-study approach, drawing on various data sources.

The intentions behind doing a case study may be *intrinsic* – trying to understand a particular case rather than to illustrate a particular phenomenon or problem; or *instrumental* – where a case is studied to provide insights into an issue or refinement of theory (Stake, 1994, p. 237). However, this distinction is not clear-cut: in practice, the choice of case study might derive both from an interest in that particular case and from the possibility of shedding light on a broader issue by studying one specific case in detail. I use SUN primarily as an instrumental case of a global public–private partnership, to provide broader insights into the role of various actors, structures and ideas in enabling the development and practices of global partnerships within the field of global nutrition governance. This in-depth exploration of SUN's governance was undertaken primarily because studying SUN may help in the pursuit of a broader interest: how global partnerships influence global governance. Moreover, my study has an intrinsic value, providing in-depth understanding of this particular partnership, which, when this project started, was relatively new and under-studied. Its governance was highly opaque, but was the subject of intense scrutiny and political controversy. My curiosity about SUN's governance was further sparked by its rhetoric emphasising what it was *not* (such as a 'partnership'), rather than what it *was.*

My overall research question grew out of the identification of a research gap in the literature on global partnerships, global health and nutrition policy, which, at that time, offered little in-depth empirical insight into the governance of global partnerships in the field of nutrition (Kaan & Liese, 2011). Despite the burgeoning critical literature on partnerships in global health (see Buse & Walt, 2000; Buse & Harmer, 2004; 2006; Richter, 2004; Rushton & Williams, 2011), few studies critically examined the inner politics and power of global partnerships in international and domestic settings. As I set out, I wanted to understand the governance and politics of global partnerships, in the sense of: who wields power in global

partnerships? how is this power is exercised? While the exact phrasing of the overarching research question evolved gradually as the project evolved, it was thus from the start concerned with *in which ways the Scaling Up Nutrition Movement (SUN) influences global nutrition governance.*

I eventually narrowed my research, focusing on three specific sub-cases (Articles I to III) – together making up what Yin (2009) calls an *embedded single-case design*. This was done through an iterative process of data collection and theorising based on the literature. With SUN's influence as the main unit of analysis, I focused my analysis on several sub-units, or cases, representing various political processes that together can shed light on the overarching research question. Within each of these sub-cases, I could draw on multiple data sources, offering a rich understanding of the case at hand (within-case analysis). Starting out the research, I already had some idea of what type of sub-cases I wanted to examine: this included the processes leading up to SUN's formation, and the processes or mechanisms through which SUN influences nutrition governance within a member-country. I was also curious about why the organisation was so concerned about how it projected itself, emphasising that it was a *movement*, not an 'initiative', etc. Thus, from the start I was interested in how my informants perceived SUN. Through thorough examination of my empirical material and the theoretical literature, I gradually developed my research sub-questions, methodological approaches and theoretical propositions for the sub-cases. An overview of the embedded cases including the research questions, the sub-cases, and the scope of the analysis (how I placed boundaries on the case) can be found below:

Sub-case study I: How and by whom was influence gained during establishment of SUN? *Case study of the <u>political processes</u> behind SUN's formation between 2005-2010.* (Article I).

Sub-case study II: How has SUN sought to strengthen its ability to exercise authority in global nutrition governance? *Case study of SUN's <u>self-legitimation processes</u> between 2011–2017.* (Article II).

Sub-case study III: How has SUN influenced the nutrition policy environment in Tanzania? *Case study of <u>policy transfer processes</u> between SUN and Tanzania 2010–2016.* (Article III).

While each of the sub-cases varies in terms of the units of analysis (processes), methods and theoretical perspectives (propositions), they all illustrate different facets of the governance of SUN and the ways in which its influence is exerted in global nutrition governance.

My approach has been guided by an interpretative perspective whereby knowledge about a phenomenon is inevitably affected by the observer engaging in *meaning-making* (Stake, 1994). By extending broad pre-existing concepts (such as 'power'), and theoretical frameworks (such as input and output legitimacy) to a new context (SUN), I have sought to expand or refine theory – enabling a certain level of analytic generalisation of the ways in which partnerships exert influence in global governance.

Before I move on to describe my cases of SUN and Tanzania, I explain how malnutrition – and child undernutrition in particular – has been addressed and governed, showing how and why the landscape has gradually become increasingly influenced by non-state actors, especially through the rise of partnerships

The landscape of global nutrition governance

Malnutrition: problem, and growing political commitment

Governing nutrition is a question of solving one of today's greatest societal challenges. According to the 2021 Global Nutrition Report (GNR), the world is facing a global nutrition crisis, with health, economic and environmental implications leaving no country untouched (GNR, 2021). The malnutrition crisis has important implications for health and economic development: 'people who are malnourished are more likely to die younger, suffer disability, live in poverty, have impaired physical and cognitive development and reduced performance at school and work' (Baker et al., 2021, p.1). Moreover, good nutrition is fundamental for economic and social development, driving and involving all 17 of the SGDs.

For the world's LMICs, undernutrition remains a major health problem. According to recent global estimates, 45% of all child deaths are due to various forms of undernutrition – with the highest rates found in sub-Saharan Africa (Khamis et al., 2020). Although some progress has been made in reducing child undernutrition, it remains high, especially in Africa and Asia.[5] The prevalence of stunting in children under five years of age decreased from 32.7% in 2000 to 23.2% in 2015 (SUN UNN, 2016); however, as of 2020, 22% (149.2 million) under-fives were still classified as stunted and 6.7% (45.4 million) as wasted[6] (GNR, 2021). The

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[5] Africa and Asia account for more than nine out of ten of all children with stunting, more than nine out of ten children with wasting – and more than seven out of ten children who are affected by overweight worldwide (FAO et al., 2021, p. 5).

[6] *Wasting:* Low weight-for-height, generally the result of weight loss associated with a recent period of inadequate dietary energy intake and/or disease. In children under five years of age, wasting is defined as

global nutrition situation is also becoming increasingly complex: high rates of undernutrition co-exist with overweight, obesity and diet-related non-communicable diseases (NCDs) within populations, households and individuals. In 2020, 38.9 million or 5.7% of children under the age of five were overweight; 40% of all men and women (2.2 billion) were overweight or obese[7] – of which an increasing number were in middle- and low-income countries (GNR, 2021).

The causes of child undernutrition are complex and multi-faceted, driven by conditions related to poor socio-economic conditions and poverty, food insecurity, as well as illness and inadequate feeding practices (Black et al., 2008). The 1990 UNICEF Conceptual Framework on the Determinants of Maternal and Child Undernutrition shows the complementary roles of inadequate dietary intake and disease as basic determinants of undernutrition, the underlying determinants related to food insecurity, inadequate access to care for women and children, insufficient health services and unhealthy environments. It also makes clear how these determinants are driven by the *basic* determinants of access to human, economic and social resources, influenced by political and ideological factors and economic structure – across global and sub-national levels (UNICEF 1990; Harris & Nisbett, 2021).

Nutrition is not a new concern within international development, but the past two decades have seen growing recognition of and political commitment to address the problem (Mokoro, 2015; Sundaram et al., 2015; SUN UNN, 2016). At the first Nutrition for Growth (N4G) Summit in 2013, donors committed to scale up financing to improve nutrition. The political attention and commitment to nutrition as central to development are evident in the UN Decade of Action on Nutrition (2016–2025) proclaimed by the UN General Assembly in April 2016, and the positioning of nutrition within SDG 2, on ending all forms of malnutrition by 2030. These build on the World Health Assembly's global targets concerning maternal, infant and young child nutrition adopted in 2012, and on the diet-related NCD targets from 2013 – as well as on the outcomes of the Second International Conference on Nutrition (ICN2) in 2014 (SUN UNN, 2016). To meet these global goals and agendas, a large number and broad range of actors are involved, together comprising the *landscape of global nutrition governance.*

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weight-for-height less than −2 standard deviations below the WHO Child Growth Standards median (FAO et al., 2019, p.190).

[7] Overweight and obesity: Body weight that is above normal for height as a result of an excessive accumulation of fat (FAO et al. 2019, p. 188).

Actors, ideas, interests in global nutrition governance

Global nutrition governance is made up of state-based and non-state actors working broadly to reduce malnutrition across global and sub-national policy-spheres. No agreed definition of global nutrition governance exists, but it can be understood as 'the group of actors whose mandate or primary intent is to improve nutrition, along with the formal and informal rules and norms governing their interactions' (Friel, 2017, p.4). Global nutrition governance has been described as complex, fragmented and characterised by competition and in-fighting (Balarajan & Reich, 2016; Nisbett et al., 2014; Sundaram, Rawal & Clark., 2015). This has made it particularly challenging to forge effective global partnerships for nutrition (Fanzo et al., 2021). In the following, I indicate some of the main governance challenges in global nutrition as identified in the nutrition-policy literature, and describe the main types of actors in the landscape of global nutrition governance.

A major governance challenge is that nutrition has never had a clearly defined institutional home at the global level: it has traditionally been 'everybody's business, but nobody's main responsibility' (Berg, 1973: 1, in Nisbett et al., 2014). As the issue cuts across a range of policy sectors, including health, agriculture, water and sanitation and environment, there is no single UN lead agency for nutrition: there are many UN system agencies, each playing lead roles in specific areas of nutrition. As a specialised agency within the UN System, the World Health Organization (WHO) provides technical guidance and performs normative functions of nutrition programmes from a public health perspective, while the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) provides guidance on improving nutrition through food-based and agricultural interventions. In addition to their substantial epistemic capacity and expert autonomy, WHO and FAO have strong intergovernmental identities, as they are governed by and represent their member-states. Neither agency has direct implementation functions: both WHO and FAO provide training and advice contributing to production of norms, standards and guidelines. By contrast, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP) have a more single-minded focus, and work directly on the ground to improve food security and reduce malnutrition. Focusing specifically on children, UNICEF has been at the forefront in addressing maternal and child undernutrition through advocacy and nutrition programming, with interventions to protect and promote breastfeeding, complementary feeding and reducing severe acute malnutrition through Ready-To-Use Therapeutic Foods (RUTF). UNICEF relies fully on voluntary contributions and has a long tradition of forging partnerships with the private sector (Andonova, 2017, pp. 147−163). The WFP works directly in countries to provide food and agriculture-based assistance to vulnerable

populations, including school nutrition programmes. Like UNICEF, it relies fully on voluntary contributions and has a strong tradition of private-sector collaboration (WFP, 2022). Other IOs involved in nutrition include the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), which invests in agricultural development projects aimed at improving food and nutrition security in rural areas, and the WB, which, since the 1970s, has been involved in nutrition mainly as investor in nutrition projects (Longhurst, 2010). More recently, and particularly after its reform following the 2007−2008 world food price crisis, the multi-stakeholder UN mechanism, the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), has started to focus more on nutrition (Friel, 2017).

In 1977, the United Nations System Standing Committee on Nutrition (UNSCN) was established by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to coordinate these various actors' work on nutrition and ensure harmonised nutrition policies and strategies in response to country needs (Friel, 2017). The UNSCN has focused mainly on inter-agency collaboration, but has also facilitated collaboration and deliberation between UN agencies, governments, CSOs and academia. For many years it had three constituencies: UN/intergovernmental bodies, NGO/CSO/Research institutions and bilateral donors. The UNSCN has sought to improve coherence and cohesion within global nutrition governance, but its effectiveness has often been hampered by the unwillingness of UN agencies to be held accountable, as well as infighting within the nutrition community, with competing institutional priorities and interests among the various types of actors (Longhurst, 2010; Sundaram et al., 2015). The absence of a clear institutional nutrition home at the global level has resulted in a lack of strong political leadership for nutrition, with blurred roles and responsibilities and lack of ownership of the nutrition agenda. This in turn has created obstacles to effective advocacy, development and implementation of nutrition policies – and to the forging of partnerships (Balarajan & Reich, 2016; Fanzo et al., 2020).

The lack of coherent leadership is related to another governance challenge: the fragmentation or complexity of global nutrition governance. Together with growing concern for nutrition and recognition of the intersectoral nature of nutrition challenges over the past decade, the diversity and volume of actors directly or indirectly involved in shaping nutrition governance at the global level has increased (Friel, 2017). The influx of non-state actors has been particularly significant since the global food price crisis in 2007/8, which resulted in several reforms that opened up global food security and nutrition governance processes to non-state actors (Duncan, 2015; McKeon, 2015). Since then, the global nutrition field has become increasingly crowded with a range of new non-state actors and various forms of public–private

partnerships and networks, complementing the role of UN agencies, engaging in advocacy, priority-setting, policy development and implementation to address malnutrition challenges (Friel, 2017; HLPE, 2018). A 2017 mapping of actors and networks directly influencing nutrition at the global level identified 167 different state-based and non-state actors engaged in international nutrition for development (Friel, 2017). Among the actors shaping nutrition action globally are the many public–private initiatives and partnerships engaged in specific sub-topics of nutrition and food security (most of them established after 2008), such as the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (2012), the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN)[8] (2002), Nutrition for Growth (N4G) (2013), the 1000 Days partnership (2010), and SUN (2010). GAIN is today registered as an NGO, but was originally established as a global partnership; it works to establish public–private partnerships in countries to implement programmes for food fortification, micronutrient supplements, nutritious foods for mothers and children, and improvement of nutritional content of agricultural products (Friel, 2017, p. 46). SUN's business arm was built upon the former Business Alliance of GAIN; GAIN co-hosts SUN's Business Network together with the WFP. Among the global partnerships in the area of food and nutrition, SUN has become the largest and most institutionalised with an explicit nutrition focus.

In addition, non-state actors within global nutrition governance involve *philanthropic foundations* (such as the Gates Foundation and the Children Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF); *technical assistance organisations* (such as Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance (FANTA) and the Strengthening Partnerships, Results and Innovations in Nutrition Globally (SPRING)); *international research groups* (such as the International Food Policy Research Institute IFPRI) and the Consultative Group on International Agriculture Research (CGIAR); *private companies and industry associations* (primarily multinational food, beverage and agrochemical companies); and a wide range of *CSOs* (including smaller ones, as well as large professionalised international NGOs) working across a broad range of nutrition issues and approaches. Key international NGOs with established nutrition mandates involved in practical nutrition action include Action Against Hunger, Save the Children, Bread for the World, Concern Worldwide, Helen Keller International and World Vision International. There are also civil society networks and initiatives, ranging from those advocating for the right to food and

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[8] GAIN is registered as an NGO, but was originally established as a global partnership. It works to establish public–private partnerships to implement programmes for food fortification, micronutrient supplements, nutritious foods for mothers and children, and improvement of nutritional content of agricultural products (Friel, 2017, p. 46).

nutrition (such as the International Baby Food Action Network (IBFAN) and Food First Information and Action Network (FIAN)), to those supporting emergency food relief (such as the Emergency Nutrition Network (ENN); those dedicated to promoting specific technical nutrition solutions (such as Nutrition International),[9] and those advocating attention to overweight and diet-related NCDs (such as the NCD Alliance and Obesity Worldwide).

Supporting many of these actors and much of the action on nutrition are financial donors – multilateral, bilateral and private. International assistance for nutrition increased after the 2013 Nutrition for Growth Summit (GNR, 2020). In 2014, the top five donors in nutrition were the USA, Canada, the EU, the UK, and the Gates Foundation, together providing 75% of all financing to nutrition-specific interventions (including infant and young child feeding, and vitamin supplementation) (IFPRI, 2016). The Gates Foundation has come to play an increasingly influential role in global nutrition governance. By 2017, it was the fifth largest international donor to nutrition, after the USA, Canada, the UK and the EU (with another private foundation –CIFF – in seventh place, after Germany) (GNR, 2020, p.109). In fact, the Gates Foundation holds greater financial clout to influence agricultural and nutrition policy than the member-state-governed FAO and WHO (Partzsch & Fuchs, 2012; McKeon, 2015, p.25; Harman, 2016). Most of foundations' funding goes to technical nutrition interventions, and not multi-sectoral interventions aimed at addressing underlying determinants of malnutrition (USD 144,532 and 7,289 respectively, for the Gates Foundation in 2017) (GNR, 2020, p.109). Particularly in the case of the Gates Foundation, this reflects a preference for technological innovation and market-based interventions for solving development issues and achieving measurable results (Birn, 2005; Fejerskov, 2017) – a focus with which not all actors agree.

This brings us to the next governance challenge. Conflicting narratives about *causes and solutions* to malnutrition have come to characterise global nutrition governance. Over time, various nutrition agendas have been promoted by actors belonging to a range of sectors and disciplines, leading to a plethora of approaches and discourses around malnutrition – sometimes complementary, sometimes competing (Harris, 2019c). These discussions have much in common with debates within the health sector: some emphasise prevention over cure; others focus on technical solutions rather than efforts to address underlying structural causes; and yet others promote vertical or silo-based approaches vs horizontal or multi-sectoral approaches (Storeng, 2014; Harris, 2017, p.56). One particularly strong area of contestation, and directly relevant for the case of SUN, is the question of whether nutrition problems are best dealt with

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[9] Previously called 'Micronutrient International'.

through single-sector, technical solutions – or through multi-sectoral approaches that address the underlying causes of malnutrition. Since the 1970s, the focus within the international nutrition community has shifted between silo-based technical approaches (as with agricultural interventions to reduce hunger in the 1970s, and medicalised micronutrient provision and infant feeding in the 1980s/1990s), and multi-sectoral approaches aimed at addressing the underlying determinants of malnutrition (Harris, 2019c; Jonsson, 2010). The multi-sectoral approach is based on the UNICEF conceptual framework, and is often associated with rights-based approaches aimed at addressing structural causes rooted in social inequity and poverty. This contrasts with the more technical nutritionist focus on micronutrient delivery through market-based solutions, primarily through the health sector – an approach that took hold in the 1990s, coinciding with the broader structural changes in the international political economy, expanding the reach of private-sector authority and solutions within global governance (Harris, 2017). Food corporations became increasingly involved in development programmes for nutrition, through marketing and provision of micronutrient 'products', such as 'Ready-To-Use Therapeutic Foods' (RUTFs) – in collaboration with UNICEF, the WFP and various international nutrition-focused NGOs. Another fault-line in nutrition concerns the divisions between those actors working on humanitarian or emergency nutrition issues, where the private sector plays a crucial role in the provision and delivery of food assistance, and those working on long-term nutrition development – often more critical towards private-sector involvement (Fanzo et al., 2021). Parts of the international nutrition policy community, especially groups working on rights-based approaches to nutrition within the CFS, oppose the focus on technical short-term solutions, stressing the human right to adequate food and nutrition. While the right to nutrition is not explicitly recognised in international human rights covenants (Harris & Nisbett, 2021, p. 823), these communities promote a more holistic conceptualization of the right to adequate food – a right that is recognised and legally enshrined in a range of international standards, soft-law instruments and regional agreements[10] (Michéle et al., 2019). To protect, promote and fulfil the right to adequate food and nutrition, they move away from narrow interpretations focused on access to food, and emphasise the importance of addressing

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[10] The right to adequate food is stipulated in legally binding international instruments. Most notably Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) which stipulates that "The states parties to the present covenant recognise the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food", and the General Comment No. 12 on the right to adequate food that specifies that the right to adequate food include "the availability of food, in quantity and quality, sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals, free from adverse substances, and acceptable within a given culture". Furthermore, Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) commits member states to combat malnutrition through access to adequate food and primary health care (Chiesa, 2021).

inequities across the food system (from production to consumption), and to take into account *all* forms of malnutrition by tackling the underlying determinants across sectors, and the basic determinants by reducing inequities and discrimination focusing on populations most affected by hunger and malnutrition. Participation, transparency, accountability and non-discrimination are central elements of rights-based approaches, in addition to clear divisions of various actors' roles and obligations to ensure realization of these rights (Harris & Nisbett, 2021, p.823; Michéle et al. 2019). Despite attempts at bridging the technical and broader rights-based approaches – as through SUN's promotion of nutrition-'sensitive' (multi-sectoral) and 'specific' interventions (technical), tensions continue, as I show in my articles, between different groups of actors promoting differing norms and approaches, according to their interests, mandates or beliefs. The role of evidence also plays into this debate, with promoters of technical- and market-based solutions citing scientific evidence of efficacy, effectiveness and cost-benefits, and noting the limited evidence on the effectiveness of multi-sectoral, or nutrition-sensitive interventions, such as agricultural interventions (Balarajan & Reich, 2016). As shown in Article I, whose evidence is heeded, and how evidence is collected, is a political process whereby the evidence of those most affected is often ignored, in favour of the interests of international expert communities and corporate actors (McKeon, 2015, pp. 85–88). There is also disagreement as to which forms of malnutrition to focus on. Whereas undernutrition – stunting in particular – has gained greater prominence on the international nutrition agenda, especially since the establishment of SUN, overweight, obesity and diet-related NCDs are increasingly sailing up as important priorities. Efforts at applying a more holistic approach addressing *all forms of malnutrition* are notably reflected in SDG 2 – a focus that SUN has later adapted (see Article II).

A final governance challenge concerns the contentious debates on how to engage with the private sector (Balarajan & Reich, 2016). Many actors have come to see the involvement of powerful but publicly non-accountable corporate actors and business-friendly philanthropic foundations within global public health and nutrition policy-processes as challenging the epistemic and normative authority of multilateral organisations (particularly the WHO), due to potential conflicts of interests (Andonova, 2017, p.63). In particular, opposition to engaging with the private sector in nutrition governance – or what some see as 'mistrust of the private sector' (Fanzo et al., 2021, p.6; Mokoro, 2015) – has been linked to food companies' commercial promotion of breastmilk substitutes, which undermine breastfeeding, as well as the advertising and sales of unhealthy food and beverages, especially towards children, undermining healthy diets and public health (Balarajan & Reich, 2016; Clapp & Scrinis, 2017;

Fanzo et al., 2021, p.6). According to critics, the engagement between public health authorities and corporations involved in such practices pose a particularly severe risk – not only for public health outcomes, but also for the integrity and trustworthiness of the public health authorities and their ability to uphold the right to food and nutrition. In contrast, proponents of such engagement cite the need to draw on the skills, expertise and resources of food companies in order for nutrition programmes to obtain better results – for example, through corporations' provision of nutritionally enhanced foods through reformulation, fortification and development of food that serves specific nutritional functions, such as RUTFs (Scrinis, 2016, in Clapp & Scrinis, 2017, p.2). As I argue in Articles I and II, much in these debates reflects more fundamental disagreements about what is seen as the legitimate exercise of power in global governance.

Underlying these governance challenges to effective collective action for nutrition globally is the issue of power imbalances. The domination of corporate power along the food chain, from production to consumption, is widely documented (see Clapp & Fuchs, 2009; Clapp & Scrinis, 2017; Lang & Heasman, 2015; McMichael, 2000; McKeon, 2015; Stuckler et al., 2012). Particularly powerful are a relatively small number of transnational food and beverage corporations which contribute to diet-related health problems globally. These 'Big Food' corporations are the top 10 food and beverages companies: they account for nearly 40% of the market share of the world's top 100 food companies[11] (IPES-Food, 2017, p.38). As the annual turnover of the largest food corporations exceeds the GDP of many LMICs, they have considerable influence over the making of rules and regulations intended to govern their activities (Clapp & Fuchs, 2009; McKeon, 2015, p.103). Counterbalancing this structural power has become increasingly challenging for public institutions; for example, governments have found it difficult to introduce taxes on certain unhealthy food and beverage commodities, such as soda drinks, due to corporate lobbying (Fanzo et al., 2021). The political influence of food corporations has been facilitated by relaxation of governmental regulations since the 1980s and the expansion of market-oriented governance models, such as partnerships (McMichael, 2000; Falker, 2003, in Clapp & Scrinis, 2017, p.3; McKeon, 2015, p.3). Through their access to decision-making processes through participation in partnerships, corporations not only shape policy and governance in their interest: they also shape understandings of malnutrition problems and solutions. Food corporations have been highly successful in promoting food fortification to address micronutrient deficiencies such as iron or vitamin A deficiency, often targeted to low-

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[11] exceeding the combined value of the seed, agrochemical, farm equipment, fertiliser and animal pharmaceutical sectors

income countries in the global South. However, the focus on single nutrients distracts the focus from the type and quality of ingredients in their products, which may be constituted primarily by highly refined flours, added fats, sugars and salt – all contributing to overweight and diet-related NCDs (Clapp & Scrinis, 2017).

As in health, philanthropic foundations have become increasingly influential in global nutrition governance. As the second-largest funder to the WHO for years (WHO, 2017), and a major funder of the WFP, FAO and IFAD (GRAIN, 2014), the Gates Foundation has become a highly influential agenda-setter within global health and nutrition, as well as exerting political influence through its engagement in major global health partnerships. It has been a key driver behind such global health and nutrition partnerships as GAVI and the Global Fund, GAIN, and the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) (Partzsch & Fuch, 2012). This has given the foundation a seat at various global policy-making tables, in turn reinforcing its ability to shape political priorities and agendas, particularly in the field of global health. As I show in Articles I and II, the establishment of SUN has further enhanced the influence of the Gates Foundation in global nutrition governance.

The relatively recent rise in the number of global partnerships for nutrition reflects broader structural changes within the international political economy, mirroring other policy fields, but also the relative power of certain actors over others to shape ideas, governance structures and outcomes according to their preferences. As I show in Articles I to III, whose nutrition narratives, norms and interests become dominant are tightly linked to the power and authority of the various actors within the nutrition landscape to shape agendas and to frame nutrition issues – ultimately shaping global authority relations and governance outcomes. In the following sections, I first describe SUNs governance and functions before I explain my choice of case-country and give an overview of the nutrition policy landscape in Tanzania prior to its joining SUN.

Describing the Case: The Scaling Up Nutrition Movement (SUN)

Vision and Objectives

SUN was not launched as a partnership: it originally consisted of a loose coalition of state-based and non-state actors aligned around a common Framework for Action and a Road Map for scaling up nutrition – both launched in 2010. This collective effort, which later came to be called a 'movement', was based on findings from the 2008 *Lancet Series on Maternal and Child Undernutrition* on how interventions to improve nutrition during the first 1000 days of life (from start of pregnancy until two years of age) was cost-effective *and* would 'yield high returns for cognitive development, individual adult earnings, and economic growth' (Nabarro, 2013, p. 666). SUN then came to advocate for a dual approach: a 'rapid scaling up of *specific* nutrition interventions of proven effectiveness' combined with 'implementation of sectoral strategies that are nutrition-*sensitive*' (SUN, 2012). While still focusing on stunting reduction, its vision has progressively broadened in line with the development of the international nutrition agenda: 'a world free from malnutrition in all its forms' by 2030 (SUN, 2016). In addition to an emphasis on multi-*sectoral* action for nutrition, SUN promotes multi-*stakeholder* collaboration for nutrition as necessary to achieve 'results far greater than what could have been achieved alone' (SUN, 2016). One of its key objectives is to support the development of national multi-stakeholder nutrition platforms working across sectors. Further, SUN also emphasises country leadership as necessary for effective change, and as sees itself as 'led by governments' (SUN, 2016, p.6). While its ultimate goal is to achieve improved nutrition outcomes, its strategic objectives aim at implementation of governance and policy reforms in member countries, in line with multi-stakeholder and multi-sectoral approaches. The 2012–2015 Strategy formulates SUN's four Strategic Objectives as follows (SUN, 2012):

1) Create an enabling political environment, with strong in-country leadership, and a shared space (multi-stakeholder platforms) where stakeholders align their activities and take joint responsibility for scaling up nutrition;

2) Establish best practice for scaling up proven interventions, including the adoption of effective laws and policies;

3) Align actions around high quality and well-costed country plans, with an agreed results framework and mutual accountability;

4) Increase resources directed towards coherent, aligned approaches.

Members of SUN have joined voluntarily, on the basis of their shared commitment to support countries in reaching normative global nutrition goals (such as the SDGs and the WHO global nutrition targets); and, more specifically, to achieve SUN's objectives, and to live up to its Principles of Engagement. These principles entail a set of normative rules of appropriate partnership behaviour, which include being transparent, inclusive, rights-based, willing to negotiate, mutual accountable, cost-effective, communicative, behaving ethically, respectfully and doing no harm (SUN 2016, p.9). They are held to reflect the 'common purpose, agreed behaviours and mutual accountability that form the basis of the Movement' (SUN, 2015a). Thus, from its inception, SUN has been based on the principle of *inclusiveness*, which (despite controversies) has extended to the private sector. Companies that join SUN must endorse and comply with the SUN Business Network's own Principles of Engagement and must disclose any breach of these when they join (SBN, 2019). These Principles are intended to ensure that company practices do not involve breaches of human rights or UN guidance on health and nutrition, including the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes.

What type of partnership?

While SUN calls itself a 'movement' and has explicitly stated that it is 'not a governance mechanism' (SUN, 2016, p.15), its institutional features and functions are very much in line with what in the IR literature are broadly understood as *global partnerships*. Indeed, SUN is generally mapped alongside other global partnerships for food security and nutrition (Friel, 2017; HLPE, 2018; Manahan & Kumar, 2022), and is classified as a 'partnership' under the UN Global Registry of Voluntary Commitments and Multi-stakeholder Partnerships (UN, n.d.).

As typical of partnerships, SUN has a network-based organisational structure involving international and national public actors (IOs and states) and non-state actors (NGOs/CSOs, corporations and foundations). Recalling the various conceptualisations of partnerships, SUN may be said to fall in-between several categories of functions. It provides very limited funding to countries, but engages in advocacy, information sharing and capacity building and resource mobilisation. It also develops frameworks and toolkits that contribute to norm and policy development within its member countries (further elaborated below). In terms of form, SUN's global structures (SUN Global Support System) focus on enabling nutrition partnerships within its member countries, as such resembling a *partnership platform*. However, it clearly also exhibits features of a freestanding partnership. All members (at all levels) must commit to SUN's Principles of Engagement and are expected to 'adopt, own and deliver on' SUN's

strategic objectives and to advocate for SUN's approach to tackling malnutrition (SUN, 2021, p.4). SUN has progressively become more formalised and professionalised (as shown in Articles I and II), with the establishment of global-level governance structures (or what SUN calls global *support* or *stewardship* structures). These consist of a Lead Group (and an Executive Committee since 2016), a permanent Secretariat in Geneva led by a Coordinator, and four global support networks (for donors, business, civil society and UN agencies). All structures focus on supporting national multi-stakeholder and multi-sectoral nutrition platforms, led by member-countries' SUN focal points, with country-level support networks mirroring the global ones (Mokoro, 2015, p.9). Fig.1 shows how SUN visualised the main components of its governance structures in its 2012–2015 Strategy. A fuller description of these components follows below.

Fig. 1. SUN organisational structure (2014) [12]

The SUN Movement's stakeholders

As to its intuitional placement in the multilateral system, SUN is somewhat of a hybrid, as it operates largely independently of any UN agency, but has over time become increasingly embedded into the UN system: the permanent *SUN Secretariat* is hosted by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) in Geneva (previously the UNDP); SUN is placed under

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[12] Presentation of SUN's structures as presented in the SUN Strategy 2012-2015. Since then, an Executive Committee has been placed between the Lead Group and the Secretariat, and the Task Teams have been replaced by Multistakeholder Working Groups – according to the SUN Strategy 2016-2020.

the aegis, or supervision, of the UN Secretary General (UNSG) who appoints SUN's highest decision-making body, the *Lead Group.* Members of the Lead Group include high-profile leaders from donor countries, foundations, UN agencies, businesses, CSOs and SUN country governments – appointed in their personal capacity. The Lead Group, chaired by UNICEF's Executive Director, has overall responsibility for SUN's progress and for upholding its principles, but also serves an important advocacy function (SUN, 2016, p.33). Between 2012 and 2015, its 25 members included eight donors (the WB, the European Commission, the Gates Foundation, CIFF, the Mary Robinson Foundation, the USA, Canada and France), two CSOs (BRAC Bangladesh, and CARE USA), two companies (Britannia Industries and Unilever), one partnership (GAIN), two UN agencies (UNICEF and WFP), one regional organisation (The New Partnership for African Development - NEPAD), and seven members from SUN countries, of which five held government positions, in addition to the SUN coordinator (SUN, 2013a).

SUN's *Global Coordinator* acts as Assistant UNSG and leads the secretariat. The Coordinator, who also is member of the Lead Group, oversees implementation of SUN's strategy and acts as a representative of and advocate for SUN. Since 2016, SUN has had an *Executive Committee,* which currently consists of 18 members from various stakeholder groups, serving in their own capacities, and appointed by the Lead Group Chair. It acts on behalf of the Lead Group in overseeing implementation of SUN's strategy. Between 2016 and 2019, the Executive Committee was chaired by the Gates Foundation and the WB, together with a co-chair representing Tanzania's Civil Society Network (PANITA) (SUN, n.d.(a)). The global SUN *Networks* for civil society, donors, UN agencies and business are self-organised and funded primarily by donor contributions. They coordinate the various *stakeholders* within SUN and, together with the Secretariat, support the SUN national focal points and stakeholder networks in SUN member-countries (SUN, 2016).

Functions

At the core of SUN's work is the **provision of information** through facilitation of learning and knowledge exchange across countries and stakeholder groups, and through global **advocacy**. SUN organises conference-calls, thematic country meetings, regional workshops and annual Global Gatherings, in addition to dissemination of knowledge and best-practices through its website, social media and documents such as annual Progress Reports and 'In Practice briefs', providing experience-sharing on themes related to SUN's work (SUN, 2016). SUN also plays an important role, notably through its global structures, in advocacy for the importance of

nutrition and for high-level political support to nutrition in its member-countries (Mokoro, 2015, pp. 36–37).

While SUN itself is not directly involved in national-level **implementation** of its objectives, the SUN Secretariat and Networks play a crucial role in brokering and facilitating access to technical assistance for implementation of policies and programmes for nutrition in member-countries (SUN, 2016). The Secretariat has developed a Capacity to Deliver (C2D) framework as a systematic approach to delivering such technical assistance – among other things, it provides tools and guidance on how to develop costed national nutrition plans and budget analyses for nutrition (SUN, n.d.(b)). To deliver technical assistance, SUN draws on the expertise of public and private partners of the UK-funded programme 'Technical Assistance for Nutrition' (TAN) (previously the 'Maximising the Quality of Scaling Up Nutrition' project (MQSUN)). SUN also supports implementation of its objectives through its Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning (MEAL) system. This system tracks and report on progress towards overall SUN objectives across 79 indicators, intended to inform better decision-making on country needs, to correct actions, reinforce accountability across members, and support learning (SUN, 2020b). Data are collected through Joint Annual Assessments by stakeholders on the national level and by global networks, national budget analyses, stakeholder and action mapping, reviews of national nutrition action-plans, as well as through capacity-building support and global datasets provided by IOs. This system has been progressively strengthened to document the extent to which SUN contributes to results and impact.

SUN also contributes to **policy development**. Its strategic objectives call for the development of national policies, plans, laws, frameworks and governance structures, in line with multi-stakeholder and multi-sectoral approaches to reduce stunting. Governments in member-countries drive these processes, but SUN clearly influences the content by providing normative guidance for policy development, such as checklists on the criteria and characteristics of 'good' national nutrition plans (or 'Common Results Frameworks') (SUN, n.d.(c)). Further, SUN promotes agreement on norms for multi-stakeholder collaboration (as through its Principles of Engagement) by drawing on specialised agencies and advisers for provision of support to behaviour change, communications and ethical advice in preventing and managing conflicts of interest, and by organising learning exchanges (SUN, n.d.(d); SUN, n.d.(e)). SUN has developed its own conflict-of-interest guidance and toolkit, which has been criticised for undermining the legal concept of conflict of interest to legitimise and protect its own principle of 'inclusiveness' (Lie & Granheim, 2017; Michéle et al., 2019; Richter, 2015).

Lastly, although SUN itself does not provide much financial resources for nutrition, it is involved in global and domestic **resource mobilisation** by supporting member-countries in gaining access to funding through a range of initiatives and financing mechanisms (SUN, n.d.(f)).

Funding

The SUN Secretariat is funded by public and private donors. In order of their share of total contributions, donors in the period 2011–2016 were as follows: the EU, Canada, Ireland, Germany, the Gates Foundation, the UK, the Netherlands, France, and the Micronutrient Initiative. In addition, the food company Unilever and France provided two staff members, and the Gates Foundation provided funding and consultants for evaluations and strategy development (SUN, 2015b). More recently, new donors have joined, among them Norway and the USA.

SUN provides limited funding to member-countries and to its networks. In 2012, a SUN Movement, the Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF), was established by UN agencies in SUN and donors, to provide 'catalytic' funding, or 'small funds of last resort', primarily to support civil society networks in SUN countries. Some funding also went to SUN's sharing and learning initiatives and its Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (Leather & Norvell, 2016). In 2017, the MPTF was replaced by a SUN Pooled Fund – a donor-funded grant programme managed by UNOPS. This programme has a broader mandate involving funding to civil society and businesses, and to enhance delivery of high-impact interventions (SUN, n.d.(g)).

SUN member-countries and Global Networks

Initially, participation in SUN was 'open to all countries whose populations experience under-nutrition' (SUN, 2010, p.17). Later, 'any country that is developing, updating or implementing policies, strategies and plans of action to scale up nutrition can participate in the SUN Movement' (SUN, n.d.(h)). SUN's country membership has grown rapidly. Already by 2011, 19 countries had joined, including Tanzania; today, 65 countries are members, in addition to four Indian States.[13] Member countries are LMICs, primarily in Africa and Asia (as well as five countries in Latin America). Member-country governments commit to abide by SUN's Principles of Engagement and are monitored in terms of the extent to which they fulfil SUN's strategic objectives. Governments nominate a SUN focal point to convene a national multi-

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[13] Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh.

stakeholder and multi-sectoral nutrition platform. Country-to-country learning exchanges take place via regular conference calls, at regional meetings and at the Global Gathering.

The SUN UN Network (UNN), established in 2013**,** is made up of FAO, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, with IFAD in an advisory capacity. The aim is to translate and achieve UN nutrition commitments in SUN member-countries, creating synergies and enhancing complementarity among UN agencies, governments and SUN networks (SUN UNN, 2016). It also supports national efforts towards the objectives of the UN Decade of Action on Nutrition. Until 2020, the secretariat of this network was co-facilitated by the UNSCN and the UN REACH Partnership (Renewed Efforts Against Hunger and Nutrition), the latter serving as UN coordinating and focal body for nutrition in SUN countries, and the former on matters of global-level nutrition policy (Mokoro, 2015, p.320).

The SUN Civil Society Network (CSN), which started in 2010, consists of national and international civil society organisations which support national SUN civil society alliances in 39 SUN member-countries – representing altogether more than 3000 organisations committing to pursuing SUN's objectives and adhering to its Principles of Engagement. The Secretariat is hosted by Save the Children in London, with an elected global Steering Group that reflects the composition of the network. The Steering Committee has been chaired by Save the Children, Care Peru and currently by Concern Worldwide. The Secretariat has been funded by SUN (MPTF), donors and member contributions (SUN CSN, n.d.).

The SUN Business Network (SBN), established in 2012, is the private-sector arm of SUN. It is co-convened by GAIN and the WFP, supported by a global secretariat in London, and has received funding from the Gates Foundation and The Netherlands. It is guided by an Advisory Group that includes multinational food companies, GAIN, WFP and the SUN Coordinator (Mokoro, 2015, p.357). The aim of SBN, as stated on its website, is to 'increase the availability and affordability of safe, nutritious foods to consumers, especially low-income consumers through activities at global and national levels' (SBN, n.d.(a)). It also advocates for the role of business in nutrition policy and supports the establishment of national business networks in SUN countries by providing advice and technical assistance (SBN, n.d.(a)). Companies that join make commitments to improve nutrition through the provision of technical assistance, and to track their progress. Food companies have, *inter alia,* pledged to provide assistance in the areas of food fortification and reformulation, agriculture and bio-fortification, education and infant and school feeding, behaviour-change activities, nutritional research, processing and packaging (SBN, 2017). Membership has grown steadily since 2013, when 25 companies of

the former GAIN Business Alliance were merged into the SBN, including multinational food corporations like Mars, PepsiCo and Unilever (Clapp & Scrinis, 2017, p.8). By 2015, more than 160 multinational and national companies had made commitments; today, 400 companies from sectors like food and nutrition, banking, telecommunications and market consulting take part (Mokoro, 2015, p.361; SBN, n.d.(b)). The first national SUN Business Networks were established in Zambia and Tanzania in 2014; 12 countries have followed suit since then.

The SUN Donor Network (SDN) involves senior officials of bilateral and multilateral donors, foundations, development banks and other institutions that fund nutrition in SUN member-countries. Its governance is less formal than the other networks; SDN has been facilitated by various donors in SUN (Canada, the USA, Germany, Switzerland, Ireland, the Gates Foundation). It aims to 'enhance donor coordination, alignment and effectiveness of policy implementation and programme delivery' in SUN member-countries, e.g. through provision of guidance and tools. It also plays an important role in ensuring the functioning and effectiveness of SUN through provision of funding to SUN's global structures, processes and events, and through involvement in strategic planning and learning exchanges (SDN, n.d.). Donors also mobilise resources for nutrition in SUN member-countries and conduct advocacy work for SUN in global and regional processes for nutrition and sustainable development (SDN, n.d.). Within SUN member-countries, donor convenors work to improve donor coordination for nutrition and to prioritise and harmonise investments for addressing identified gaps in national nutrition investment.

Case-study country: The United Republic of Tanzania

As an 'Early Riser' country, Tanzania has been a member of SUN since June 2011, when former President Jakaya Kikwete (in government 2005–2015) made commitments to the National Assembly to scale up nutrition – a commitment which was strengthened by joining the SUN Lead Group in 2012. Prime Minister Mzengo Peter Pinda launched the National Nutrition Strategy in 2011 and formed a multi-stakeholder and multi-sectoral High-Level Steering Committee on Nutrition (SUN, 2013b). The high-level political commitment to nutrition, accompanied by ongoing efforts to implement policies and governance structures in line with SUN's objectives made Tanzania a pertinent case for studying the channelling of power and influence of SUN across the global and national policy spheres.

My choice of Tanzania as a case-study country was thus made at the outset of this research project. As one of the few countries to have been part of SUN for some time, Tanzania had implemented many of SUN's objectives – in turn indicating that SUN had had an influence. Furthermore, I had the possibility of establishing contacts in Tanzania relatively easily, and there was the further advantage that most actors involved in policy-making spoke English. Here I briefly describe Tanzania's nutrition situation and the nutrition policy environment prior to SUN membership. How the landscape has changed since then, and through which processes SUN has exerted influence, are discussed in Article III.

Nutrition situation

Around the time it joined SUN, Tanzania had made important progress in reducing young child mortality rates and was on track to meet Millennium Development Goal 4 of halving infant and child mortality between by 2015. However, the absolute levels of undernutrition in the country remained unacceptably high, representing a 'silent emergency', according to national nutrition actors (Kavishe, 2014, p. 16). In 2013, Tanzania ranked as number 10 on the list of 14 countries in the world with highest number of stunted children under five (UNICEF, 2013, in Kavishe, 2014, p. 16). Whereas there had been some progress since 1992 in reducing acute undernutrition (underweight and wasting), progress in stunting reduction was deemed insignificant. In Africa, only Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo had higher proportions of stunted children than Tanzania's 42% in 2010 – well above the sub-Saharan average of 30% (Kavishe, 2014, pp. 17–18). Moreover, levels of hunger remained alarming, according to the Global Hunger Index (IFPRI et al., 2010, cited in Kavishe, 2014, p. 18).

High levels of stunting levels are due not only to insufficient food availability, but to a combination of factors, many of which are related to persistently high levels of poverty and inequality. Despite robust economic growth since the turn of the century, in 2012 some 30% of Tanzanians were estimated as poor, and around 10% as extremely poor, with the highest levels in rural areas (HBS, 2012, in Kavishe, 2014, p. 19). The highest levels of stunting were also found in rural areas, particularly in regions of Tanzania's Southern Zone (Dodoma, Iringa, Lindi and Rukwa). In contrast, regions in the North suffered more from acute undernutrition, which is associated with hunger, due to periodic droughts (TDHS, 2010, quoted in Kavishe, 2014, p. 22). Poverty and insufficient/ inequitable access to basic services such as maternal and child healthcare services, water and sanitation and household food security could partly explain the high levels of stunting, but a further key factor was inadequate nutrition education and knowledge of the importance of diet diversity, especially among mothers (Kavishe, 2014; Mokoro, 2015, p. 514). Given the high levels of child stunting in the country, it made sense for Tanzania to join SUN – and to undertake efforts as addressing the challenges.

I now turn to how Tanzania has addressed malnutrition through institutional structures, policies and programmes prior to 2011.

Nutrition policy environment prior to SUN membership

Institutional structures and policies for tackling undernutrition in Tanzania have traditionally been inter-sectoral and community-focused, alternating between being overly food- or health-sector based (TFNC, 2006; Gillespie et al., 2003). During the 1970s, both the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture and Education had set up various nutrition units. To ensure cross-ministerial coordination, the Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre (TFNC) was established by an Act of Parliament in 1973. Up until the 1990s, and primarily with support from the national government, the Swedish International Development Cooperation (SIDA) and UNICEF, TFNC played a key role in leading and coordinating national nutrition efforts among a relatively limited number of actors. In collaboration with UNICEF, WHO, national and sub-national authorities and communities, TFNC spearheaded some highly successful nutrition programmes (Iringa Joint Government UNICEF/WHO Nutrition Programme) during the 1970s and 1980s – highlighted as best-practice at the time (Mokoro, 2015, p.514; Kavishe, 2014, p.36). The programmes applied adaptive programming, fostering community ownership and sustainability, and took a holistic approach to undernutrition as rooted in individual, community and social processes with multiple determinants. This work laid the foundations for the development of the UNICEF conceptual framework on maternal and child undernutrition

(Government of Tanzania, 2016). Among the key lessons learned was the need to involve local communities in decision-making, delivery of basic services through community organisations, integration of nutrition in development programmes, and political commitment at all levels of society (Jonsson, 1997, in Kavishe, 2014; Yambi & Mlolwa, 1992). Moreover, malnutrition was to be understood as a social problem to be tackled on the basis of normative, ethical or moral arguments, such as human rights – not as a biological problem to be solved with reference to economic development (Jonsson, 1992, in Kavishe, 1993). The Iringa experience, accompanied by the development of the integrated conceptual framework, was fundamental in shaping national approaches and policies for nutrition, and served as a driving force behind the final approval of Tanzania's first National Food and Nutrition Policy in 1992 (Yambi & Mlolwa, 1992, p.41). This policy, adopted by the Ministry of Health, was shaped by the conceptual framework. Although placing strong emphasis on food and food security – and being coordinated from within the health sector – the policy was multi-sectoral, calling for better integration of food and nutrition activities across sectors, and for integrating nutrition into development plans from the national to the local level. Clear roles and responsibilities for nutrition for each ministry were laid out, with cross-ministerial supervision and coordination placed with the Prime Minister's Office. A *National Food and Nutrition Expert Committee* was established under the supervision of the Ministry of Health, with members from the TFNC, various state ministries, the Tanzania women's organisation (a CSO), national universities and the leading political party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM, Party of the Revolution) (Yambi & Mlolwa, 1992, p. 33). Primary healthcare committees, in collaboration with CSOs, oversaw and coordinated nutrition activities at sub-national levels. At the time, the private sector was not even mentioned as an actor with a special role and responsibility for improving nutrition, and was not represented in the National Food and Nutrition Expert Committee.

Despite the broad awareness of malnutrition and institutional structures and policies, attention to nutrition started to dwindle in Tanzania during the 1990s and 2000s, and a narrowing of the nutrition agenda towards micronutrients developed. This shift reflected a general change in priorities among donors, such as UNICEF and the WB, evident since the late 1980s – away from a focus on protein-energy deficiency in children caused by socio-economic and political factors, towards a more instrumental and 'less politically threatening' focus on micronutrient deficiencies (Jonsson, 2010, p. 142). This turn was driven both by new evidence of the cost-effectiveness of new technological micronutrient solutions, such as salt iodisation, and by a certain fatigue with the highly complex multi-sectoral approach, which in many countries had failed to produce desired results (Harris, 2019c, p. 108). According to some, the

micronutrient turn also coincided with the expansion of neoliberal ideas, managerial governance and the promotion of market-led development interventions, providing a role for the food industry (Kimura, 2013, cited in Harris, 2019c, p. 108).

Due to these shifting donor priorities, Tanzania missed the opportunity to draw on, and further expand, lessons from the community-based approach to integrated nutrition. Instead, during the early 2000s, external funding went to health sector-based micronutrient interventions, such as national Vitamin A supplement programmes, nutrition care for people living with HIV/AIDS, and to food-fortification programmes. The health sector underwent considerable reform due to the WB's structural adjustment programme, leading to near-total neglect of nutrition and community-based discourse and services (Gillespie et al., 2003). Under shifting donor priorities, the influence of the highly donor-dependent TFNC and its ability to lead and effectively coordinate nutrition efforts weakened. 'With operating budgets financed entirely from external sources, the Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre pursued programmes driven largely by the nutrition agenda of its donors. In the mid-1980s and increasingly in the 1990s, those agendas were dominated by the micronutrient emphasis' (Gillespie et al., 2003, p. 21).

As a result of the weakened role of the TFNC, the nutrition environment became increasingly dominated by donor interests, growing more fragmented and uncoordinated as a wider range and greater number of international actors joined, with various food fortification and vitamin/mineral supplement projects. The food industry was now invited on board through Tanzania's National Food Fortification Alliance (NFFA), which received support from GAIN and the WB in 2007/2008 to support the development of a national large-scale industrial food fortification programme. This culminated in a National Food Fortification Action Plan in 2009, in which SUN was explicitly mentioned as highlighting the importance of cost-effective interventions, such as large-scale food fortification (NFFA, 2013, p.14).

In 2011, Tanzania joined SUN, and a mandatory law on food fortification was passed. Several national public–private partnerships in the area of food fortification and vitamin/mineral supplements were also developed at that time, involving collaboration with multinational food and agrochemical companies, national food companies, bilateral donors and NGOs (NFFA, 2013; Hoddinot et al., 2015, p. 13). High-level political commitment to reducing undernutrition as part of a broader economic development agenda was also increasing, exemplified by the inclusion of specific indicators for nutrition in Tanzania's Vision 2025 on a National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA) from 2010 (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, 2010).

The ramped-up support to cost-effective micronutrient interventions in Tanzania in the years prior to its joining SUN mirrored developments at the global nutrition arena, where the economic rationale for investing in maternal and child undernutrition was increasingly recognised among donors and IOs.

As described in Article I, new scientific evidence on the cost-effectiveness of investing in undernutrition during the first 1000 days was published and strongly promoted by SUN and its partners – also in Tanzania. Tanzania was well positioned to commit, given its high levels of stunting as well as an institutional and political environment highly responsive to addressing stunting, particularly through technical interventions. Article III explores the role played by SUN and its international partners in the policy and institutional developments that unfolded between 2011 and 2016.

4. Methods

In this chapter I present my methods, including my data collection and analysis, ethical considerations and research quality, as well as the choices and changes made throughout the project.

Data collection and analysis

To address the research sub-questions, I collected data through a combination of interviews, observations and document analysis, to provide in-depth insights into SUN's global-level operations and its influence in Tanzania. Together, these sources provided pieces to the 'puzzle' of the sub-cases, offering a better understanding of how SUN influences global nutrition governance. All three articles draw on a combination of interviews, document analysis and observations, although the methodology differs somewhat between the cases. In Articles I and III, I use retrospective *process-tracing* as an analytic tool, to 'draw descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence as part of a temporal sequence of events' (Collier, 2011, p.824). This is a strategy, or 'within-case-analysis tool', often applied to reveal social and political processes, shedding light on the role of actors within such processes, and establishing common patterns of causality of political and social phenomena in their real-life context (Bennett, 2010; Collier, 2011). Whereas the understandings and definitions of process tracing are many and have evolved over time, my approach is aligned with that of George and McKeown (1985) who explain process tracing as opening up the 'black box' of policy processes, by seeking to 'trace the process – the intervening steps – by which beliefs influence behaviour' and as a means of enabling 'historical arguments about causal processes in studies of human and organisational decision-making' (cited in Trampusch & Palier, 2016, p. 2). My approach has been mainly inductive, but informed by theory, relying on a rich range of qualitative data. In the cases reported in Articles I and III, I worked retrospectively, drawing on various data sources to analyse specific events and processes as regards their meaning for informants and for SUN's development or work as a whole. Here it was important to select informants well-informed on the processes investigated, to collect various perspectives, delineate and rationale the choice of time-period investigated, to refine my research questions and decide which (historical) sources and documents should be used in addition to interviews and observations (Flick, 2009). In Article II, the aim was to describe evolving legitimation narratives and strategies and the underlying motivations and rationales: for this, I analysed

discourses in combination with interviews and observations. Table 2 provides details of how I collected and analysed the data sources.

Table 2. Methods used for the embedded case studies

Study	'unit of analysis'/case	Strategy	Data sources	Research question addressed
Article I	How power, interests and normative beliefs among various actors shaped the establishment of SUN 2005–2010.	Process tracing	Interviews, document analysis, observations	How and by whom was influence gained during the establishment of SUN?
Article II	1. How SUN's self-legitimation strategies evolved between 2010 - 2017 2. How various (internal and external) actors shaped these strategies.	Analysis of discourses and of interviews and observations.	Interviews, document analysis, observations	How has SUN sought to strengthen its ability to exercise authority in global nutrition governance?
Article III	How SUN has influenced the nutrition policy environment in Tanzania through different policy transfer mechanisms (2011–2016)	Process tracing	Interviews, document analysis, observations	How has SUN influenced the nutrition policy environment in Tanzania?

The following section offers an overview of where I conducted my interviews and observations, and outlines why and how I gained access to the field(s). While I spent considerable time on preparations, the actual process was largely iterative, in the sense that I manoeuvred the field along the way as new opportunities presented themselves and as I gradually refined the research questions, moving back and forth between theory and empirical case material.

Describing the 'field'

While I did not conduct long-term fieldwork in the sense that ethnographers do, my several visits involved spending considerable amounts of time within global-level processes related to SUN's work; I also made two trips to Dar-es-Salaam. My plan was to return to 'Dar' for a third

visit, but due to various research delays and then the onset of the Covid19 pandemic, this was eventually not feasible. While some interviews were conducted over Skype, the majority of interviews and my observations stem from various international nutrition settings in Europe and in Dar-es-Salaam between October 2014 and March 2020. My 'field' can be seen as divided into two settings: one focused on SUN's global-level work, and the other focused on understanding SUN's influence in Tanzania. These settings naturally overlapped with data collected within international settings, which helped to inform my understanding of Tanzania's relation to SUN, and data collected in Tanzania, which provided insights into the broader role and influence of SUN. Table 3 shows when and where I collected most of the qualitative data; however, I also collected data in-between the visits detailed in Table 3, through phone interviews, informal conversations, email exchanges, and analysis of documents and various internet sources, including online streaming of SUN-related events. In addition, I attended several conferences and meetings in Norway and elsewhere in Europe which contributed to shape my understanding of SUN and where I established contact with several informants. One of the data collection settings included below was not directly related to this research, but still contributed to shaping my understanding of SUN and its role within the global nutrition governance landscape: I did a brief internship (25 September–11 November 2016) at the WHO Department of Nutrition for Health and Development in Geneva. Here, I contributed to the Department's work on developing conflicts-of-interest guidelines for nutrition programmes at country level. I was offered this internship because of my research topic, with which the Department had become familiar when I participated at a WHO technical consultation on addressing and managing conflicts of interest in the planning and delivery of nutrition programmes at country level, held 8–9 October 2015 in Geneva. During the internship, I gained valuable insights about the SUN Secretariat's collaboration with WHO on issues of conflict of interests; and interviews with WHO staff helped me to gain a better understanding of their perceptions of SUN's role and influence in multilateral forums (such as the World Health Assembly) and in SUN countries where WHO staff worked on technical capacity-building for nutrition.

Table 3. Overview of main data collection settings 2014–2016

Time	Data collection setting	Type of data and insights gained
19–21 Nov. 2014	The Second International Conference on Nutrition (ICN2) organised by FAO and WHO, in Rome	Interviews, informal conversations and observations, primarily informing Articles I and II.
25–27 March 2015	Visit to London	Interviews, primarily informing Articles I and II.
7–15 April 2015	SUN Visioning strategy meeting, Dar-es-Salaam	Observations and informal conversations (some interviews), informing all three articles.
8–9 October 2015	WHO consultation on conflicts of interest in nutrition policies and programming, in Geneva	Observations and informal conversations, primarily informing Article II.
20–23 October 2015	SUN Global Gathering in Milan, Italy	Observations, interviews and informal conversations, informing all three articles
3–15 Nov. 2015	Stay at the SUN Secretariat in Geneva	Observations, interviews and informal conversations informing all three articles
15 April–16 May 2016	Visit to Dar-es-Salaam, including attendance at a SUN Joint-Assessment Exercise meeting, 5 May 2016.	Interviews, informal conversation and some observations, primarily informing Article III.
25 Sept.–11 Nov. 2016	Internship at WHO's Department of Nutrition for Health and Development, Geneva	Interviews, informal conversations, informing Articles I and II.
17–21 Oct. 2016	Committee on World Food Security (CFS) 43rd Session, Rome	Observations and informal conversations, informing Articles I and II.

Gaining access to the field(s)

As I was an outsider to the international nutrition community, gaining access was based largely on a process of 'negotiation and renegotiation throughout the research process' (Burgess, 1991, p. 43, cited in Berg, 2009, p.194), and by use of various strategies. As detailed below, I was able to access a broad range of settings and informants by using my networks to establish contacts, actively approaching 'gatekeepers', and by 'snowballing': using established contacts and relationships to gain entry into areas where I could engage with possible research participants (Vallance, 2001 in Berg, 2009, p.194). The combination of entry points helped to

reduce the risk of selection bias from over-reliance on only one point of entry to a study community (Hennink et al., 2020, p.98).

The first point of entry into the field was through my existing network of nutrition and human rights researchers and civil society actors in Oslo, all of them familiar with SUN and its history (the 'Oslo network'). This network introduced me to several relevant informants and informed me about nutrition events where I could meet nutrition *stakeholders* involved in or interested in SUN. Of particular importance was the Second International Conference on Nutrition (ICN2) which I was able to attend as a civil society representative in the Norwegian Government's delegation. During this conference, I established several central contacts, which opened the door for further data collection opportunities. Speaking with many actors and observing panel discussions on SUN, I became aware of the tensions surrounding SUN and the discrepancies among various communities of actors in terms of how they viewed SUN. As the members of my 'Oslo network' held a certain scepticism towards SUN, relying solely on their contacts could have risked biasing my data or my field towards only one segment of actors involved in SUN. I thus made special efforts to establish rapport with a broad range of informants, including those more sympathetic to SUN. Knowing that the SUN Secretariat acted as a 'gatekeeper' as regards access to many of the key actors involved in SUN's governance and networks, I focused on establishing contact with staff members within the Secretariat. This was done through email contact and through informal conversations and interviews at various conferences, such as the ICN2. These efforts proved very valuable, not only opening up access to a wide range of informants, but also enabling me to attend several exclusive SUN-member events, in Europe and in Dar es Salaam, as well as a two-week visit at the SUN Secretariat in Geneva (see discussion about my positionality and ethical considerations, below). With access to these various settings, I was able to engage with many potential research participants, in turn opening the door to new contacts and research settings.

Also in Tanzania I was also an outsider to the nutrition community, as I had visited the country only once before, and had few personal contacts. Through my supervisor, I got in touch with a key informant who opened up access to other informants. My supervisor also helped me to establish collaboration with a nutrition researcher at Sokoine University of Agriculture in Morogoro, Tanzania. She facilitated my application for a research permit through the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH) and guided me towards several relevant informants. Further, during the ICN2, I made contact with members of the Tanzanian delegation, who later facilitated my access to other key informants. Also, through my established rapport with the SUN Secretariat, I was able to attend a SUN strategy meeting in

Dar-es-Salaam in April 2015. There I met several high-level officials from the Tanzanian government and UN agencies working on nutrition, whom I was later able to interview, and who opened up the door for contact with yet other informants. Of course, some informants and settings were more difficult to reach than others. For example, I struggled to gain access to meetings in various government-led nutrition committees, as well as to certain informants and information, such as meeting minutes. In the following sections, I explain in greater detail how I conducted interviews, observations and document analysis, as well as sampling strategies, and offer some reflections on access and positionality.

In-depth interviews

Interviews represented an essential part of my data collection, helping me to understand certain events and processes, and the perspectives of key actors. I opted for in-depth, semi-structured interviews, in order to capture personal experiences – for example, as to how actors made decisions concerning SUN's governance and development, what their own beliefs and perceptions about SUN were, their motivations for engaging with SUN, and to capture narratives of how certain events or situations unfolded, as seen from the informant's perspective (see Hennink et al., 2020, p.117). As I aimed to get narratives about SUN and informants' views on its work, and not on personal issues, my interviews can be characterised as *key-informant* interviews.

Prior to interviews, I prepared general background notes and key questions for the various types of informants – using this as starting points for the interviews. Care was taken to formulate questions aimed at obtaining data that could help to answer my research questions, without making them too specific, and avoiding leading questions. However, I also took care to let the conversation guide the interview. As noted by Kvale (1996, p.17): 'interviewing is an active process where interviewer and interviewee through their relationship produce knowledge'. Sometimes the topics or questions prepared did not fit well with the course of the conversation or the actual knowledge of the informant; and sometimes interesting topics surfaced during the interviews – leading to new directions of questions and to modifications of interview guides as the project progressed, and as I moved back and forth between the field and desk research.

I conducted a total of 66 interviews (with 61 informants) between October 2014 and March 2020. As noted, some interviews were aimed at gaining insight into SUN's global-level

processes, whereas others aimed at understanding the evolution of Tanzania's nutrition landscape and SUN's influence on this.

Interviews with informants involved in SUN's global-level operations

Between November 2014 and November 2016, 35 interviews were undertaken with key actors involved in SUN's global-level structures and processes. I interviewed three respondents twice, in order to go into greater depth on certain issues, or to follow up with insights about more recent developments. Of the total number of informants (32), one was interviewed in October 2020 in order to get updates about recent developments ion SUN.

My informants had key insights into SUN's processes, representing the various types of actors involved: donors, IOs, CSOs, business, recipient-country governments, and the SUN Secretariat. In addition, I interviewed key actors who were not SUN members or staff, but who could offer special insights into the processes of SUN's establishment or development. These included external consultants hired by SUN donors to support the work of the Secretariat; representatives of CSOs not members of SUN but with key insights into the processes leading up to SUN's establishment; as well as members of the international nutrition-research community with knowledge about SUN's work and history. However, the institutional affiliation of my informants did not always remain constant over the course of research. In the case of some government officials whose positions had changed, I interviewed them on the basis of their former positions and relations to SUN. Moreover, some informants had retired at the time of interview. See Appendix 1 for details.

As detailed in Appendix 1, 25 interviews were conducted face-to-face, whereas 7 took place over Skype, due to difficulties in finding a time and place to meet in person. As I was more interested in what my interviewees said, rather than *how* they said it, the loss of non-verbal messages over Skype was not a major concern. As I had already met all interviewees during conferences etc., a certain level of trust had been established, although some of the personal contact was lost with Skype. One interview was conducted as a group interview involving three persons from the same team within the Secretariat. This was not a planned focus-group interview, but came about spontaneously as my original informant suggested including the rest of his team in the conversation. Interviews were typically held in a quiet corner at a conference or in an office, and usually lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. Most interviews were recorded (27), but in the eight cases where informants preferred to speak without a recording device, I took detailed notes by hand, which were later typed up to facilitate analysis. I transcribed most interviews myself verbatim, except parts that I deemed less relevant,

where I only took notes. Some interviews were transcribed by a professional, using verbatim transcription. In these cases, I listened to the recordings and read through the transcripts carefully.

Interviews about SUN's influence in Tanzania

I undertook 31 interviews with informants who were involved in Tanzania's nutrition-policy environment and had knowledge about SUN. Most of these interviews were conducted between 15 April and 16 May 2016 in Dar-es-Salaam; two were conducted in relation to nutrition/SUN-related conferences. As I was unable to return for a third visit, four interviews took place over Skype between December 2019 and March 2020, offering insights into more recent developments. As two informants were interviewed twice, the total number of informants was 29. As with informants involved in the global-level processes, I sought to interview persons representing the various stakeholder groups in SUN, while I also wanted to find informants who could view recent developments in nutrition policy within a historical perspective, and/or who had been closely involved with nutrition-policy developments since Tanzania joined SUN. I interviewed Tanzanian nationals from various sectors, as well as expatriates working in Tanzania for various development partners involved in nutrition (See Appendix 2 for an overview of informants).

As detailed in Appendix 2, 26 interviews were conducted face-to-face; four took place over Skype in 2019/2020. Interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. Most of the in-person interviews were conducted in the informants' offices or at a café, where I took care not to sit close to other guests, so that my respondents would feel free to speak openly. Interviews were recorded when informants agreed to this (17). Some informants did not wish to be recorded; and some interviews were interrupted several times due to the respondents' work situation. In all cases I took detailed notes by hand, and the recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim, except parts that I found less relevant, where I simply took notes. Also here, some interviews were transcribed by a professional, using verbatim transcription.

In addition to these 66 interviews in global- level spaces and in Tanzania, there were also informal conversations in the various field settings, for example over a coffee or lunch. These conversations broadened my understanding, offerings insights into the perspectives of an even broader set of actors than those whom I actually interviewed. For example, when it proved difficult to schedule interviews with some representatives of bilateral donors, I simply took care

to have conversations with these persons while I was attending international conferences and SUN events.

Sampling

My informants were chosen based on both *purposeful sampling* and *snowball sampling* techniques (Hennink et al., 2020). Before going into the field or data-collection settings, I spent considerable time thinking about what kind of information and informants would be needed to answer my research questions. To understand SUN's global-level processes, I started out with review of documents and the SUN website, mapping the organisations and types of actors involved in SUN's global governance structures. This resulted in a useful overview of the types of stakeholders involved in SUN, but it provided little information about who the key organisations and individuals involved in the process of SUN's development were. Moreover, the number of actors involved was many, and kept growing as SUN developed. To understand the political dynamics within SUN and to uncover the *behind-the-scenes* processes leading up to its establishment, I sought to identify individuals who could provide key insights into these processes, from their own experience. As noted, I applied 'snowball sampling', using my network and informants to identify other relevant persons. This form of sampling is particularly useful for identifying informants with specific types of experience who may be difficult to identify using other sampling methods (Hennink et al., 2020, p.104). Similarly, with the Tanzania study, I reviewed documents and websites to get an overview of how the national nutrition governance system was organised, and to identify key organisations and individuals involved. From there on, I used snowballing to identify informants with key insights, for example into SUN-related processes. A general problem with the snowballing technique is the risk of recruitment biases, as informants tend to introduce the researcher to like-minded individuals. However, as noted, I made deliberate efforts to ensure that my informants represented a range of views on SUN, as well as different types of actors, by continuously combining a purposive approach, identifying relevant informants on the basis of their knowledge and position, and then expanding the search through snowballing. This approach proved useful for mapping and getting access to a range of networks.

I focused on richness of data and achieving a diversity of perspectives, rather than on the number of informants as such. Through an inductive process of data collection and review, I evaluated the extent to which new interviews could provide new insights, or whether saturation had been reached in the sense that data started to repeat itself or no further insights were gained (Hennink et al., 2020, p.108). However, the choice of how many informants to

interview was also based on practical or pragmatic matters. As my research questions developed over time and my questions to informants were not always the same, there were always *some* new insights that could be gained, which in the end would lead to a very large number of interviews to be conducted and analysed within the relatively short time-span of the project. I could have interviewed an even broader range of informants, but again, I chose to stop when I felt that I had enough insights. This evaluation was also based on the insights gained from observations, informal conversations and document reviews. For example, while I probably could have interviewed more representatives of SUN member-countries representing low-and-middle income governments, other data sources had indicated that these governments had been minimally involved in the processes leading up to SUN's establishment. I could note their involvement (or lack thereof) in SUN's governance processes through observations in the various SUN settings, where I was also able to speak informally with many of these government representatives. Lastly, as I wanted to focus specifically on SUN's influence on Tanzania, I emphasised selecting informants from Tanzania who also were involved in SUN's global-level processes.

Observation

Observation became an important part of my data collection, helping me to understand issues from various perspectives and the context within which my informants operated. In social science research, observations can be particularly useful – for exploring new topics, understanding or explaining people's actions in context, discovering unspoken norms and values, and providing a contextual understanding to findings obtained through other research methods, such as in-depth interviews (Hennink et al., 2020, p.171). Although limited in time and divided into different contexts, my observations helped to improve my understanding of how various actors had helped to influence and shape SUN's development. Further, they made me aware of unstated tensions and hidden norms, and provided a very useful context to my interviews and document analysis. Importantly, they helped me to establish rapport, which I felt improved their level of trust in me. As noted, my observations were conducted within various settings, ranging from nutrition-related and specific SUN-events in Europe and Tanzania, to within the SUN Secretariat. During my internship in WHO, I did not really make observations relevant for my study, but gained access to relevant informants.

As an outsider to the nutrition community, I conducted a form of 'non-participant observation': I observed but did not take part in the activities in question (Hennink, 2020, p.185). For example, at large conferences I could observe, listen and take notes freely, without

influencing the course of events or the people I observed. However, as I gradually established closer contact with individuals, particularly with SUN Secretariat staff, I was invited into processes and situations where my presence was more in line with traditional participant observation: 'the process of learning through exposure to or involvement in day-to-day or routine activities of participants in the research setting' (Schensul et al. 1991, p. 91, quoted in Hennink et al. 2020, p.180). The level of participation varied, dependent on the context and nature of observation. As my rapport with members of the SUN Secretariat developed, I was gradually invited into their work, and was also asked to help with certain activities, such as taking notes during internal board meetings and during plenary sessions at conferences (during the SUN Strategy meeting in Dar-es-Salaam and at the Global Gathering in Milano). This enabled me to listen in, take notes and observe interactions in settings to which I otherwise would not have had access, offering unique insights into interactions, contentious issues and positions regarding these issues, and the relative influence of the stakeholders involved. This was particularly the case during my stay at the SUN Secretariat in November 2015, as I shared office with senior staff members, took part in formal and informal meetings, and was able to listen in and observe much of the strategic work going on behind closed doors.

In Tanzania, my access to observation settings was more restricted, given my limited time to establish rapport with members of the Tanzanian nutrition community, and due to government officials' sensitivity about involving outsiders in governmental affairs. However, I was invited by government officials to take part in a SUN joint self-assessment meeting, where various types of stakeholders evaluated progress against SUN's objectives. Here I could observe the dynamics between Tanzanian government officials and various development partners; I listened in on discussions about how the various actors perceived developments in Tanzanian nutrition policy and the role of SUN, and thus gained a better awareness of otherwise elusive key issues.

My level of participation thus shifted between moderate and active participation. With the latter, I was more of an insider than an outsider, performing a specific role for the Secretariat. However, my close interaction with informants, especially within the Secretariat, did posed certain ethical dilemmas regarding my positionality, to which I will return.

Field notes

To gather data for analysis, I always took detailed notes during meetings – mostly about what I heard, but also observations of how people interacted and the location setting. At the

Secretariat, I took notes when attending meetings and when I had the opportunity to sit alone. Every evening, I would write up in my field diaries reflections from the day, noting down issues for further exploration and the names of people I wanted to talk with more; and I would try to make sense of my observations in terms of theory and analytical concepts. Here I also reflected critically on my own positionality and interpretations, to refine my own rapport and interaction with the study community. For instance, I would note down if I felt that certain people were sceptical to my presence; then, at the next opportunity, I would make extra efforts to establish better rapport.

In fact, I did not use much of my observational data in my articles, so it might be argued the time and effort had limited value. However, the observations improved my rapport with informants; I gained a better understanding of the context of SUN's work, and the dynamics among various actors; and I became aware of issues that guided the direction of my research and further case-work. This also increased the reliability of my interview interpretations, as I could analyse my field notes and contrast them with interview data. The practice of writing field notes and keeping field diaries strengthened my inductive reasoning and reflexivity throughout the entire period.

Documents

Published academic and grey literature became an important source of information throughout my research. The SUN Secretariat and its networks, UN agencies, donor agencies, international and Tanzanian NGOs, and the Tanzanian Government produce large amounts of documentation, including strategy documents, guidelines, policy briefs, project reports, background analyses, website information, meeting minutes etc. When analysing these documents, I kept in mind that they represented projections of reality according to the author – or, as Bryman (2012, p.555) points out: 'documents need to be recognised for what they are – namely texts written with distinctive purposes in mind, and not as simply reflecting reality.' The various documents thus helped me to understand the development and functioning of SUN, the role of different actors within SUN and within the Tanzanian nutrition policy landscape, but also to understand relationships and positions of different actors. To identify relevant documents, I used several strategies: online database searches (e.g., *Web of knowledge* for academic literature and *Factiva* for news articles), consulting the reference lists of relevant documents, searching websites of SUN and other relevant organisations, and by asking informants for relevant documents. Informants became particularly important for locating hard-

to-assess documents, such as unpublished reports and meeting minutes. These were often provided directly during interviews – especially in Tanzania, where many documents were available only in hard-copy (NGO reports in particular), or via email following up after interviews. As some documents were given in confidentiality (such as email correspondence), I could not reference these in my writing, but they helped to deepen my understanding of relationships within SUN and within its broader network of actors.

For Article I, on the establishment of SUN, the minutes from meetings, as well as reports and email exchanges, were particularly important for establishing the sequence of events, the actors involved and the decisions taken during the years leading up to SUN's establishment, providing important complementary knowledge to interviews. For Article II, on how SUN has sought to strengthen its ability to exercise authority through strategies of self-legitimation, SUN progress reports, online promotional material, external SUN evaluations, as well as speeches made by SUN representatives between 2011 and 2017 were important sources. Here I also consulted a broad range of documents to understand criticisms of SUN, often put forth by civil society organisations through published reports and opinion papers, CSO websites, and also through advocacy letters and newspaper articles. For Article III on SUN's influence on Tanzania's nutrition-policy landscape, project evaluations, donor and NGO reports, meeting reports and various government policy documents (strategies, action plans, policies) were particularly useful. Many of these documents would have been difficult to locate without the help of informants. These documents, including a mapping of national nutrition actors conducted by UN REACH on behalf of the Government of Tanzania (UNREACH, 2015), helped me to identify relevant actors and their relationships, and to understand the sequence of events and policy developments that following Tanzania's joining SUN.

Data analysis

In data analysis, my approach was inductive, but informed by theory as I juggled between developing codes based on interview topics and theoretical concepts, and by delving into the data, letting it 'speak for itself', ensuring I did not impose codes that did not have a strong presence in my data (Hennink et al., 2020, p.220). My analysis was also shaped by new insights gained through observations and through continuous consultation with documents. Such an iterative process whereby the researcher moves back and forth between ideas, theory and data is helpful when seeking to trace the causal links within processes – putting together the different pieces of the puzzle. As noted by Trampusch and Palier (2016, p.13): 'whether more inductive

or more deductive, process tracing in practice is always an iterative process, a back and forth movement between theory and empirical within case(s) evidences.'

For the analysis of interview data, I imported transcribed interviews and notes (typed up in the case of handwritten notes), and coded using NVivo software. To get an overview and to sort the data, I first analysed the data looking for recurring topics and contrasted the answers of the various interviewees. I sorted the data into broad organisational categories that related to interview topics, such as *governance, historical development, challenges, achievements, influence* etc. Next, I did a thematic analysis, informed by both theory and the broader set of data from observations and documents, to identify patterns and to capture important concepts within the data-set. The materials for Articles I and III were guided by a process-tracing strategy; for Article II, I undertook a form of discourse analysis of SUN's self-legitimation strategies, combined with analysis of interviews and observations.

For first case study (reported in Article I), I wanted to explain how actors' beliefs, power and interests had influenced SUN's institutional development. By comparing and contrasting informants' accounts of and perspectives of historical events with documents such as evaluation reports and meeting minutes, I reconstructed the historical trajectory of SUN's establishment and the influence of various actors and ideas upon the process. Using theoretical perspectives on how global partnerships emerge and theories of how power is exercised in global governance, I could disentangle the preferences and interests of the actors involved in creating SUN and the coalitions they formed to advance their interests. Throughout the analysis, patterns gradually emerged, in line with the theoretical categories of instrumental, structural and discursive power.

For the second case study (reported in Article II), the analysis was guided by my interest in understanding how SUN sought to influence perceptions about its governance, and the role of various actors in these processes. Interviews and observations were particularly useful for understanding how these various actors had perceived SUN's governance, how they had sought to influence the views of others, and their motivations for doing so. Consulting the literature alongside the analysis, I gradually came to see how the ideas and motivations could be explained through the concept of legitimacy and (de)legitimation strategies. Documents were then analysed to shed light on how SUN described and justified itself over time, and how it appealed to normative justifications related to input and output legitimacy. Regarding input legitimacy, I looked for justifications about SUN's added value based on the quality of its governance processes – *participatory, accountability, transparency, expertise, novelty* etc. Concerning output legitimacy, I looked for justifications relating to its effectiveness and quality

of outcomes – *results*, *impact, nutrition outcomes, human rights, equity* etc. My analysis was thus guided by theoretical frameworks on how IOs legitimise themselves through different normative narratives (see Zürn, 2017; Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). The broad categories of input and output legitimacy still allowed for a certain openness or flexibility for deriving codes from the data – important for capturing narratives that did not fit into the more traditional legitimation discourses of intergovernmental organisations, but capturing features particular for global partnerships, and SUN in particular, such as *multistakeholder, country-driven, movement* and *mutual accountability*. Thus, in addition to undertaking systematic word searches (using root form of words) and made tables analysing SUN's progress reports 2011–2017 to see how narratives changed over time, I complemented this approach with a more open-ended analysis, including a broader set of documents (such as speeches), paying special attention was paid to how SUN described and justified itself. In addition to analysing discursive legitimation narratives, I also analysed documents to identify SUN's institutional developments, including new policies, guidelines and governance reforms, that might serve to shape perceptions of SUN's legitimacy. Justifications for institutional changes and developments were often provided in documents. In addition, interviews and observations were crucial for understanding the broader context of narratives and reforms, and for capturing the underlying motivations and interests.

For the third case (Article III), my analysis was guided by the wish to understand how the nutrition policy landscape in Tanzania had evolved since joining SUN, and what role SUN and various\ actors within SUN had played in the process. The rich data material helped me to understand the context of Tanzania's nutrition policy and governance (historical development, actors involved, approaches to malnutrition), how the landscape had changed following SUN membership (structures, policies, financing, actors and nutrition discourses), how SUN's agenda was reflected in policy documents, and the role of various actors in policy development and in SUN-related activities (such as technical capacity-building seminars and strategy development). My analysis was initially guided by the literature review, identifying the various ways in which global partnerships exert influence. Moving back and forth between the literature and the broad set of data, I gradually came to see how the influence of SUN could be understood through the lenses of various policy transfer mechanisms, which helped me to sort data according to themes, such as *advocacy, funding, technical assistance*, *reporting, learning etc.* Interviews and observations proved particularly valuable here, for understanding the role of the actors involved and for capture various perceptions of SUN's influence.

Ethical considerations

Throughout the research process, and particularly during fieldwork, several ethical challenges and dilemmas will arise. Ethical principles should inform all stages of the research process, including planning, accessing the field, collecting, analysing and communicating data and findings. Researchers are responsible for ensuring that participants are not harmed; that anonymity and confidentiality are maintained, and that participants have provided informed consent. But ethical practice must also guide the interpretation of data, and interactions with participants. To a considerable extent, qualitative researchers must exercise their own judgement as to what constitutes an ethical challenge, and on how to prepare for and deal with ethical challenges encountered in their research (Lichtman, 2014). To this point I now turn.

Informed consent

Informants should be informed about the nature of the study and have the opportunity to choose whether or not to participate. While this may seem straightforward, in reality it is not unproblematic. Informants may feel pressured to participate – for example, by peers or superiors. The extent to which consent is really 'informed' is also challenged by the dynamic form of research, as research questions continue to evolve throughout the research process (Lichtman, 2014, p.59). In accordance with the ethical clearance obtained from the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD), I made sure all my informants received, via email, an informed consent form with information about my research and their rights, before the start of interviews. For informants in Tanzania, I also sent a copy of my research permit from COSTECH. At the start of interviews, I asked whether they had received the form, explained my research and asked orally if they consented to be interviewed. I did not use written forms for consent. This was a deliberate strategy, based on the assumption that asking someone to sign a document might make informants feel uncomfortable, uneasy about sharing information and thus have a negative effect on rapport. Particularly in Tanzania informants were quite wary of being critical of the government or of donors.

Given the prolongation of my research period and use of data, I sent updated informed consent notes (also approved by NSD) to all informants in 2019. In this context, consent was interpreted as confirmed if I received a confirmative reply or no reply. To be sure that the forms reached the right informants, I made efforts to update my email lists with any new email addresses. Even with such efforts to obtain informed consent, it can be challenging to ensure that informants are fully informed about the nature of the research, particularly in dynamic qualitative research where the research questions may evolve in directions that cause informants

to become uncomfortable or even unwilling to continue (Lichtman, 2014, p.59). As the focus of my research developed over time, I occasionally felt that some informants gradually became less comfortable about my research and less willing to speak with me again, particularly after publication of research findings. However, I received no withdrawals of consent.

Another challenge was to seek informed consent in observation settings – which is not always feasible. I sought as far as possible to provide information about my role and research prior to observation settings. Before arriving at the SUN Secretariat, I sent informed consent notes and information about my research to all staff members, informing them about the reason for my stay and how I would use information. Prior to attending in meetings where I took notes for the Secretariat, I presented my role and intentions as a researcher. Despite these efforts, there might of course have been times where participants felt that they had no choice but to take part (e.g., as they had to attend those meetings). Therefore, I took particular care to ensure confidentiality regarding informants in these settings – as further explained below.

Confidentiality

In connection with qualitative research, participants should be able to expect that the information they provide to the researcher will be kept confidential, and they can always to determine to what extent they wish to be identified in the study (Lichtman, 2014). I did not collect sensitive personal information, but as the topic of my research involved discussions around politically sensitive issues, I took care to keep the identities of my informants confidential. To establish trust and make them feel they could speak freely, I assured all informants prior to interviews and observations (where possible) that I would not reveal their personal identifies, unless they gave explicit permission for this at a later point. Thus, although many of my informants held public positions, I have not used the names of any individuals in my research outputs, nor have I stated the names of organisations in cases where the identities of individuals could easily be established by persons familiar with the nutrition-governance landscape. When citing individuals in publications, I have not used identifiable information unless explicit approval was given during interviews or after quotation checks. Of course, there is always a chance that the identifies of some informants could be established by people deeply familiar with SUN and/or Tanzania's nutrition policy landscape. However, this is difficult to avoid; I believe I have taken as much care as possible to ensure confidentiality, without omitting information that is necessary to understand the role of various actors in the context of SUN's governance.

Data interpretation and management

I also sought to protect informants' identities by storing interview transcripts without any personally identifiable information other than a number connected to their names. Lists matching the number with informants' names were stored separately from the data. Handwritten field notes were stored in a locked cabinet in my office, and electronic data were stored on the University of Oslo's server space. Upon project completion, all data material was completely anonymised. Professional transcribers signed a confidentiality agreement `receiving any recordings to be transcribed.

A researcher is also expected to analyse data in a manner that avoids misstatements, misinterpretations or that present a picture not in line with data and evidence. While it is not possible to discard one's own subjective lens and strive for objectivity (Lichtman, 2014), throughout my research I focused on drawing on a range of data sources to challenge my interpretations, and I made sure my interpretations and presentations later could be evaluated later, which brings us over to discussions about reliability and validity.

Reliability and validity

How best to assess quality in qualitative research is a disputed topic. While 'validity' and 'reliability' are common concepts for evaluating quality of quantitative research, these concepts have long been a matter of debate concerning the legitimacy of qualitative research (Denzin, 2009; Kvale, 1996; Maxwell, 1992; Seale, 1999; Stenbacka, 2001; Winter, 2000). Winter (2000) describes validity within quantitative research as a criterion for evaluating whether the method used actually measures what it was intended to measure, and whether it gives a correct or accurate result. For reliability, the main criterion is that the research method can be replicated to achieve the same result. Would other researchers studying the same or similar settings arrive at the same results? However, such understandings of 'valid' and 'reliable' research are difficult to apply to qualitative research, which does not seek to explain an objective reality, but is fundamentally interpretative, seeking to generate understanding of social phenomena in context-specific settings (Kvale, 1996; Golafshani, 2003). Other terms are often used to describe quality within qualitative research, such as 'credibility', 'rigorous' and 'trustworthiness' (Reynolds et al., 2011). Rather than seeking causal explanations, with prediction and statistical generalisations based on representative samples of the studied population, qualitative research aims to shed light on and offer a deeper understanding of a

social phenomenon, in turn enabling analytical generalisations (Yin, 1989 in Stenbacka, 2001, p.552).

Furthermore, whereas it is an ideal within positivist approaches to separate the researcher's subjectivities from the research process, the involvement and role of the researcher in qualitative research are inescapable and irreducible (Kvale, 1996, p.60; Winter, 2000). For example, in the context of in-depth interviews, knowledge is socially constructed through the conversation between interviewer and respondent (Kvale, 1996). Validity here cannot be understood in the positivist sense of finding the one and only truth. Rather, it must be understood in relation to the purpose of what the research is intended to do: to present, in a credible manner, the social realities of interview subjects in order to generate a better understanding of the social phenomenon studied. In this context, *reliability* is more explicitly about how the interview data are systematised and interpreted (Yin 1989, in Andersen 2006, p. 292), whereas the question of *validity* concerns the relevance of the data gathered for the purpose of the study, and how credible and convincing the researcher's interpretations of these data are. Here, validity is closely related to the role of the researcher and how he or she conducts research. Indeed, one of the most important ways to ensure truly qualitative research is for the researcher to take a critical and reflexive role vis-à-vis her own research throughout the process, ensuring *methodological awareness* (Seale, 1999). To enhance validity, research should be opened up to external scrutiny, through description of the research process, the researcher's position, environment and interpretations.

Moreover, how the researcher understands a field is influenced by that researcher's values and perspectives, where factors such as gender, theoretical background, ideology, culture and personal characteristics are involved. Altogether, these create a form of *researcher's bias* – towards which a reflexive stand is necessary, to enhance validity (Maxwell, 1996). The empirical data presented are never simply a reflection of reality, but are always subject to interpretation. This is why in this chapter I have described in detail how I undertook my research (the why's and what's), to be open about my methodological choices. While this has not been a complete description, I hope to have provided readers with chance to evaluate the 'trustworthiness' of my research.

Many quality criteria and techniques for evaluating qualitative research have been developed (including triangulation, member checking, deviant-case analysis, multiple coders of data, etc.). However, too much attention to such techniques may lead to uncritical use of methods (Reynolds et al., 2011, p.5). In the following, I describe how I used some of these

techniques to strengthen the quality of my research, and offer some reflections on how my positionality within the field may have shaped the research process.

Combining different data sources for gaining additional knowledge (triangulation)

Although I did not use triangulation systematically as a strategy for ensuring the validity of my data and interpretations, the combined insights gained from interviews, observations and document analysis gave a rich understanding of how SUN and its members exerted influence to shape the global governance of nutrition. Throughout the data collection phase, I continuously sought to understand the issues, using various perspectives by drawing on a range of data sources. I compared insights from informants with literature on the topic, and with insights from other informants, trying to minimise the interference of recall bias and gain additional perspectives. Similarly, insights gained from interviews and observations helped to me to evaluate documents critically, as representations of particular viewpoints, not necessarily exact depictions of reality. Through observations, I was also able to compare what informants did to what they said, in interviews and other settings, such as panel debates or informal conversations.

Communicative validity

Kvale (1994) discusses 'communicative validity' as a way to test the validity of knowledge claims through dialogue. This can be done through active engagement with members of the 'interpretative community validating an interpretation', including interviewees or scholars with competence in the specific area of study (Kvale, 1994, p.8). In order to test the validity of my interpretations and to gain additional perspectives, I discussed my findings with key informants – either directly, over the phone, or by requesting their input to draft manuscripts. This helped me to refine my interpretations and also seek additional insights, always bearing in mind that the informants' judgements might be biased. Further, my interpretations and theoretical analyses were refined through peer-review processes of the three articles, as well as through feedback from other researchers at conferences, academic courses and research groups.

Positionality

Another related quality issue is how the researcher and her positionality within the field influence the behaviour and answers of informants (Maxwell, 1996). In all social research involving human interaction, there is always the risk that informants behave or reply in ways that they believe the researcher wants to hear. Although this is difficult to avoid, I continually

reflected on my role and position, and used various strategies to improve the validity of my findings. Writing about issues of power, and particularly the dominance of actors from the Global North, I was particularly conscious of my own role as a privileged, highly-educated white female researcher from Norway. The power that this entails was particularly relevant in the context of Tanzania, where my position sometimes meant that I would be given access to high-level informants and processes – access perhaps not available to less-privileged individuals. On the other hand, at other times my position as a researcher could be a barrier to gaining access, particularly as regards the private sector or government officials. My being a relatively young female researcher in encounters with elites or high-level men (as well as some women) could also be problematic: informants 'lectured' me, or chose to keep information to themselves by avoiding topics or giving superficial answers. Regarding such situations, Andersen (2006) and Johnson (2001) have stressed the importance of advance knowledge about the topic in question, to make it easier for the researcher to avoid misinterpretations and to recognise the layered meanings of informants' answers. Indeed, I often felt that my advance knowledge of the topic made it possible for me to apply several tactics for evaluating the trustworthiness of my informants, and to gain the type of information I was seeking. For example, in order to get informants to reflect or comment on controversial issues, I often mentioned evaluations and criticisms put forth by others, to solicit my informants' views on these. Here, I had to maintain a fine balance between steering the conversation in the directions I wanted, while ensuring that I did not ask leading questions. In other cases, I would take advantage of what I assumed to be informants' views of me as a novice: I would deliberately ask very simple, basic questions, in hopes of getting informants to relax their guard, and clarify or further explain situations, their perceptions and views (Andersen, 2006, p.280). Employing such deliberate strategies in interview situations is in fact a part of being an active, involved researcher.

I also spent considerable time reflecting upon my relation to the SUN Secretariat and to critical communities, including certain CSOs and UN agencies. Having gained privileged access to the SUN Secretariat, at times performing minor 'work' for them in public settings (primarily note-taking), I was highly aware that this could be perceived as if I were representing SUN, or were highly favourable to SUN. To minimise the risk of informants trying to 'please' me by talking more favourably about SUN than they otherwise might have, I made sure to underscore my independence from SUN before the start of interviews. I would explain my position as an independent researcher, and underline the confidentiality of our contact. This issue was pertinent in meetings with certain government officials in Tanzania, whom I

(particularly at the start of an interview) felt were very concerned about praising SUN and boasting about all the 'right' things Tanzania had done to 'please' SUN. However, as I established deeper trust in the course of interviewing, I generally felt that my informants opened up and provided more honest answers to my questions.

Conversely, and particularly at the start of the research process, I was also seen as associated with those who were critical to SUN, as my first entry into the field of nutrition was through the human rights community and with actors who had opposed the creation of SUN. While I was personally sympathetic to many of the views of these actors, I was also highly aware of my own biases, and made deliberate efforts to seek insights into other perspectives and to meet all informants and observation settings with an as open mind as possible. This proved valuable, as I was invited into the SUN Secretariat and gained access to high-level advocates of SUN – despite their stated scepticism towards many researchers they felt were intent on criticising them.

Regarding my observations during meetings, especially in meetings with few participants, my presence might have influenced the course of conversations and the willingness to speak openly about sensitive issues. Also here, I took care to explain my role before the start of meetings, and ensured all participants of confidentiality. Although it occasionally became evident that some persons did not wish to talk about certain issues in my presence, I generally felt that during the course of the meetings, and particularly as staff members of the Secretariat got to know me better, our conversations were open and honest, also around sensitive issues. It also helped to seek out the more sceptical persons informally, before and after meetings, to gain their trust.

Generalisability (external validity)

A key issue in case-study research is the extent to which one can generalise from single-case studies. Statistical generalisation as such is rarely the purpose of qualitative case studies: the goal should rather be analytical or theoretical generalisability. Depending on the specific approach chosen, single-case studies can contribute to building, developing or testing theory (Ridder, 2017). The findings presented in this thesis are, first and foremost, relevant to SUN and Tanzania's nutrition governance. However, by drawing on pre-existing concepts and theoretical frameworks to analyse my cases, I hope that my work can enable some analytical generalisations that may help to enhance our understanding of how global partnerships influence global governance more broadly.

5. Summary of the articles

This chapter provides a summary of the three articles that comprise this thesis. All three have been published or submitted for publication in peer-reviewed interdisciplinary academic journals that focus on global governance and/or global health. The summaries below present the main findings and conclusions of the three articles.

Article 1: 'Power in Global Nutrition Governance. A Critical Analysis of the Establishment of the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Partnership', *Global Governance*, 25: 277–303.

Global public–private partnerships in the field of health have proliferated since the 1990s. This trend gives rise to important questions about authority and legitimacy in global governance – however, in the fields of international relations and public health there has been only limited empirical research into the global politics and power dynamics behind such partnerships.

The article critically examines the underlying political processes behind the establishment of the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) partnership, focusing on developments from 2005 until 2010. Applying a process-tracing methodology that relies on interviews, observations, SUN-related documents, and academic publications, I ask: Which kinds of power, interests and normative beliefs drove SUN's formation? How were these distributed and contested among the actors involved? Further, how did these process shape what SUN is today and its role within global nutrition governance? In exploring these questions, I apply a multi-dimensional power framework to explain how public and private, state and non-state actors shaped SUN's development through the exercise of instrumental, structural and discursive power. Thereby, this article contributes to the global health and nutrition literature, which has otherwise shown limited explicit engagement with theories of power in exploring the emergence of global partnerships.

My findings show that SUN's rhetoric of collaboration and country leadership masks normative disagreements and power asymmetries between the two competing coalitions of actors that have shaped its development. The instrumental power of the financially strongest coalition, dominated by private and multilateral donors, was effectively translated into structural and discursive power, serving to establish SUN as a global public–private nutrition partnership with substantial private-sector involvement. Developing-country governments were minimally involved here; moreover, instead of reducing fragmentation, the establishment of SUN arguably led to increased fragmentation of global nutrition governance through the establishment of several global coordination mechanisms for nutrition with partly overlapping

mandates. Corporations were not the main drivers of SUN's creation – but multilateral and private donors, supporting the expansion of private sector involvement in global governance, were.

The establishment of SUN mirrors developments in other global health partnerships. It shows how global partnerships may reinforce the interests of private-sector actors, while challenging democratic ideals as the norm of global governance. With its explicit focus on different types of power, this article sheds light on the complexity and multifaceted ways in which global actors seek to influence global policy processes, thereby shaping norms and institutions at the global level.

Article 2: 'We are not a partnership' – Constructing and contesting legitimacy of global public-private partnerships: the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement. Published in *Globalizations*. DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2020.1770038.

Despite their popularity and prevalence in global governance, the legitimacy of global partnerships remains contested, particularly in the field of nutrition. Due to the inclusion of various state and non-state actors, global partnerships often encounter dilemmas in seeking to reconcile differing and occasionally conflicting perceptions of legitimacy. Although legitimation strategies influence perceptions of global institutions' authority to govern, and hence their power and effectiveness in global governance, there has been inadequate attention to the legitimation of global partnerships within the field of nutrition.

This article discusses how, through various strategies and normative justifications, the Scaling Up Nutrition Movement (SUN) gradually legitimised itself from 2011 to 2017, through different strategies and normative justifications, and explores the influence of various audiences in shaping SUN's legitimation strategies. This article contributes to the literature on legitimation in global governance by exploring the legitimation processes of a global partnership within the complex field of nutrition; by scrutinizing interactions between different types of normative justifications and strategies among internal and external audiences; and by paying attention to the power dynamics and political processes that condition legitimation strategies. This study is based on document analyses, interviews and observations.

The article finds that SUN has carefully navigated between the differing, at times conflicting, legitimacy demands of its various audiences and shifting normative agendas. Whereas the demands of critical civil-society actors for more democratic and fair procedures and rights-based approaches have been dealt with primarily through institutional 'window

dressing' and discursive 'lip service', demands made by donors, private-sector actors and certain multilateral agencies for internal accountability and results have been met by institutional measures that have effectively strengthened and formalized SUN's top–down structures.

The article shows that the legitimation strategies of partnerships are dynamic, and that the distribution of power among audiences determines whose preferences are reflected in the various legitimation strategies. However, this article argues, that in order for global partnerships to succeed in improving legitimacy perceptions and remain effective, they will need to adopt legitimation strategies that effectively take into account the legitimacy concerns of all audiences – not simply favouring those of the more powerful.

Article 3: When the SUN Shines on Tanzania: how a global partnership influences national nutrition policy. Submitted for publication in *Globalization and Health*.

Global public–private partnerships, networks and initiatives (partnerships) have become key players within global governance – and are promoted as inclusive and effective mechanisms to improve food security and nutrition. Such partnerships, involving both state-based and non-state actors, complement the formal authority of intergovernmental organisations and often rely on less formal, indirect mechanisms to shape policy-making. Beyond funding, however, little is known about the ways in which partnerships influence national policy in low- and middle-income countries – particularly in the field of nutrition. Using a process-tracing approach drawing on qualitative data and policy transfer theory, this article examines the mechanisms through which a global nutrition partnership – the Scaling Up Nutrition Movement (SUN) – influenced the national nutrition policy environment in one of its member-countries, the United Republic of Tanzania, between 2011 and 2016.

SUN provides only limited funding and claims to be country-driven. However, this study finds that SUN, directly and indirectly through its international partners, has played an important role in shaping Tanzania's nutrition-policy environment in line with a global investment-in-nutrition agenda focused on stunting reduction through multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder approaches and technical interventions. The influence resulted from external pressure through high-level advocacy and funding expectations; learning and socialization through multi-stakeholder spaces and technical assistance, and competition through voluntary reporting. As a result of SUN's influence, the authority of private-sector and international actors

within Tanzania's nutrition policy processes became institutionalised; and technical interventions aimed at reducing stunting seem to have taken precedence over efforts to address the underlying causes of all forms of malnutrition.

This article shows how global partnerships may influence national nutrition policy, beyond funding, through subtle and indirect policy-transfer mechanisms, underpinned by structural relations of dependency. This enables the creation, dissemination and reinforcement of international ideas, paradigms and values that help to legitimise specific actions and actors within national policy processes. Although such influence may be subtle and indirect, it challenges common assumptions that see global partnerships as imbuing country-led policy processes and inclusive development – instead, furthering existing power asymmetries in international development cooperation. More critical social science research is needed on the role of power in nutrition policy and governance.

6. Discussion and conclusions

This thesis has examined the ways in which SUN, as a specific type of global partnership, has influenced global nutrition governance. To answer my overall research question, I have examined three different processes that help to explain how power and authority is exercised and legitimised in global nutrition governance and how this influences national nutrition policy-making in Tanzania: first, I examined how and by whom influence was gained during the establishment of SUN, focusing on the political processes behind its establishment (Article I); second, I examined how SUN has sought to strengthen its ability to exercise authority in global nutrition governance through self-legitimation processes (Article II); and third, I examined how SUN has influenced the nutrition policy environment in Tanzania through various policy transfer processes (Article III). As I have been particularly interested in better understanding the power and politics of, and within, global partnerships, special attention has been paid to how a range of actors, with differing values, interests and resources, have shaped these processes of institutionalisation, self-legitimation and policy transfer.

In this concluding section, drawing on the empirical material underlying the articles, I first offer three overall conclusions about *the ways in which* SUN has influenced global nutrition governance. I then discuss how my findings provide insights into the broader implications of SUN's influence on global nutrition governance. Finally, I present some overarching conclusions about the contributions of my work, discuss its limitations, and indicate possible future directions of research emerging from the findings of this thesis.

The ways in which SUN has influenced global nutrition governance

Influence by shaping knowledge and ideas

SUN is an example of a hybrid global governance institution – a global partnership – that holds diffuse authority and exerts subtle forms of influence, yet with important implications for authority and legitimacy in global nutrition governance. Much of this influence is based on SUN's capacity to shape knowledge and understanding of problems and solutions to malnutrition, and how authority should be appropriately exercised. This influence is exerted through discourses and fairly informal channels of influence, and, as discussed below, is underpinned by structural relations that condition all its activities, from advocacy to capacity-

building. SUN exerts this influence directly, through its activities and communication, and indirectly, through its members who propagate SUN's narratives and approaches.

By examining the political processes that led up to the establishment of SUN, I have shown how certain ideas about the problem of undernutrition and how the field of nutrition should be governed were promoted, and not others. Noting various forms of power exercised by the actors involved in SUN's establishment, I have revealed how already-powerful donors and IOs translated their financial resources into discursive power by shaping knowledge and understandings – about how the alarming levels of child undernutrition should best be addressed, and how the 'international nutrition system' should be reformed. SUN's discursive power was most clearly expressed through the creation and dissemination of knowledge through epistemic authorities, like the influential medical journal *The Lancet*, underpinning an instrumental and technical approach to reducing stunting through cost-effective interventions, and the need to reform global nutrition governance in ways that empowered private-sector actors relative to state-based actors, UN agencies in particular (promoting the norm of *multistakeholderism* over *multilateralism*) (see Article I). Although actors in the competing 'Human right to nutrition' coalition challenged the legitimacy of such evidence and approaches (and thereby the epistemic authority of SUN), their limited instrumental power to shape discourses and structures restricted their influence. These findings coincide broadly with those of other studies that show how the interlinkage between the production of scientific knowledge and grant-giving agencies/corporations shapes policy agendas and priorities, unpacking the politics behind scientific evidence and the asymmetric distribution of power in global health and nutrition governance (Nestlé, 2018; Shiffman, 2014; Shiffman & Shawar, 2020; Storeng et al., 2019). More generally, my findings reveal how structural conditions enable certain actors in partnerships to influence or exert power *over* others by influencing how meaning is produced and experienced (Barnett & Duvall, 2005), and how policy issues and potential solutions are perceived (Clapp & Scrinis, 2017). I also show how various forms of power in global governance can reinforce each other, as the promotion of a certain type of knowledge about how the field of nutrition should be governed has helped to legitimise, and even enhance, the authority of already-powerful donors and corporations in global nutrition governance.

My analysis of SUN's self-legitimation processes also showed how SUN has sought to exert influence and strengthen its ability to exercise authority in global nutrition governance through shaping ideas and perceptions about what constitutes appropriate global governance for nutrition. By presenting itself as a country-driven, inclusive and multi-stakeholder movement driven by scientific evidence and expert knowledge, SUN has sought to frame itself

in line with input-based values of legitimacy grounded in principles such as efficiency, impartiality, participation and external accountability. As Menashy (2019, p.9) has argued, such positive rhetoric or framing of global development partnerships as inclusive and efficient helps to legitimise private-sector authority and multistakeholder partnerships as appropriate, taken-for-granted forms of global governance. Such discursive legitimation constitutes a form of discursive or productive power (as described in chapter 2), that effectively influences the distribution of authority in global governance – again illustrating how interrelated forms of power in global governance operate through partnerships. My research further adds to the findings of Menashy (2019), by showing that such legitimation of multi-stakeholder governance and private authority is expressed not only through discourses, but also through institutional policies and structures (as with SUN's conflict-of-interest policy and its involvement of civil society and lower- and middle-income countries (LMICs) within its decision-making bodies).

Further, I show how, despite lack of formal authority to ensure compliance, global partnerships can influence *national* policy and governance by providing access to resources and expertise, and by enabling the spread of ideas, norms, evidence and best-practices, through various subtle and indirect mechanisms or channels of influence (Bernstein & Cashore, 2012; Stone et al., 2020). Although SUN provides only limited direct financial assistance to its LMIC member-countries, I show, through the Tanzania case study, that SUN played a key role in shaping the direction and content of the Tanzanian nutrition policy environment between 2011 and 2016. My aim was not to trace the causal links between SUN's influence and national policy change, which is difficult to do; however, from my empirical material and other evaluations of SUN's influence in Tanzania (Mokoro, 2015), it seems fair to say that SUN, with its international partners, helped to create an 'enabling political environment' for nutrition, in line with SUN's agenda. As a result, multistakeholder governance structures for nutrition were institutionalised at national and sub-national levels, and various nutrition policies, closely aligned with an investment-in-nutrition agenda focused on child-stunting reduction, were adopted. I show how this 'transfer' of international ideas and norms about what constitute 'appropriate' nutrition problems to address, and in what ways, took place through largely informal and indirect mechanisms – for example, through shared-learning through SUN's multistakeholder meeting platforms, representing global 'ideational spaces' with the aim to forge consensus on 'the right ways of doing things' (Stone et al., 2020, p.9), or through international advocacy and technical assistance to facilitate the uptake of SUN's agenda. As discussed further in the following section, SUN's influence was not exerted through imposition

from above: the processes were underpinned by structural relations of dependency between donors and recipients in Tanzania – again illustrating how discursive forms of power can be reinforced by underlying power structures in global governance.

Influence through underlying asymmetrical power structures

SUN's ability to exert influence in global nutrition governance has also been driven more indirectly, through structural relations of dependency among various actors within the partnership, and within the broader global nutrition governance landscape. My three articles show how certain actors were more influential than others in shaping SUN's and Tanzania's narratives and governance in line with their own preferences – together contributing to reinforce pre-existing power asymmetries within global nutrition governance.

The processes of establishment and self-legitimation of SUN mirror Andonova's findings that global partnerships grow out of 'processes of experimentation, contestation, and subsequent institutionalization' and that so-called 'governance entrepreneurs' play crucial roles in mediating the influence of various actors (Andonova, 2017, pp.5 & 21). However, in line with political economy perspectives, I show how unequal structural relations have conditioned these processes, making some actors more influential than others, despite efforts at mediation. During its establishment, SUN's first coordinator, together with UNSCN Secretariat staff, assumed the role of governance entrepreneurs seeking to forge consensus between two competing political coalitions of actors that held differing norms, interests and resources. Although a certain compromise was reached, for example by combining nutrition 'specific' and 'sensitive' interventions, and, in the eyes of some, by 'lending' legitimacy from the UN by anchoring it within the UN system, this compromise was constrained by the influence of financially powerful actors who used their resources to shape developments in their preferred direction. Powerful philanthropic foundations and corporations had previously been excluded from nutrition-policy deliberations (within the UNSCN), but the process of SUN's establishment effectively institutionalised their ability to weigh in on decision-making through their positions within SUN's governance – enhancing the influence of private-sector actors in global nutrition governance.

Similarly, although the SUN Secretariat sought to broker or mediate between competing views on SUN's legitimacy, resulting in wide-ranging and contradictory self-legitimation strategies, my findings show how global governance institutions view some audiences as more important than others; and that, by catering more to the demands of audiences rich in resources and influence, legitimation strategies may reinforce underlying power structures (see also

Bexell & Jönsson, 2018; Bexell et al., 2020; Dingwerth et al., 2019). I have also showed that the *ways in which* normative legitimacy demands are met do matter in terms of governance implications. Demands for more democratic and fair procedures and rights-based approaches – put forward by external CSOs and some internal UN agencies and CSOs – were addressed through weak institutional measures (window-dressing) and discourse (lip-service). In contrast, normative demands for internal accountability and results, posed by financially resourceful donors, private-sector actors, and IOs holding influential positions in SUN's governance, brought real institutional reforms, effectively widening the gap between SUN's top–down structures and its rhetoric of being 'country-driven'. This shows that legitimation processes are highly political, involving bargaining between competing interests and values – particularly within partnerships that must cater to the demands of a broad range of actors holding differing beliefs, inside and outside their institutional boundaries (Bernstein, 2011; Schleifer, 2019). Based on my findings, I argue that SUN's rhetoric is misleading, as its institutional structures contribute to reinforce hierarchical donor–recipient relations and to strengthen the authority of private-sector actors, donors and IOs in global nutrition governance vis-à-vis governments and communities affected malnutrition in LMICs.

Although SUN may be seen as an example of how partnerships can facilitate the promotion of corporate agendas and interests, my findings show that the increased institutionalisation of private-sector interests through SUN was not driven primarily by corporations themselves, but by donor governments, IOs and philanthropic foundations that supported the move towards multi-stakeholder governance and market-based solutions. Like Andonova (2017), I hold that the 'corporate take-over' thesis undermines the agency not only of multilateral organisations, but also of donor governments and private foundations, in driving the establishment and development of partnerships. I see this drive as conditioned by the spread of market logic and the increased financialisation of the multilateral system (Bull & McNeill, 2007). This financialisation, leading to private-sector-inspired management reforms (such as multi-stakeholderism and New Public Management), has been driven by the diminishing willingness of governments to fund multilateral organisations (most notably WHO) – which in turn have become increasingly dependent on voluntary contributions from non-state actors and governments that promote multi-stakeholder governance and market-friendly agendas (see e.g. McKeon, 2017). My findings also highlight the significant role of the Gates Foundation in establishing global partnerships for health and nutrition, in turn considerably enhancing its own structural and institutional power within global health and nutrition governance (McNeill & Sandberg, 2014; Harman, 2016; Partzsch, & Fuchs, 2012).

Underlying power structures also served to drive SUN's ability to exert influence over the nutrition policy and governance landscape of Tanzania. This influence was exerted through subtle and informal channels of influence like learning and advocacy; the uptake of SUN's agenda into policies and institutional structures was driven by Tanzanian actors' dependence on and expectations of donor funding, and the desire for international recognition. This dependence was further reinforced through upward reporting mechanisms that instilled a form of 'competition' among SUN member-countries. Further, although the active participation of Tanzanian actors in SUN-convened global multi-stakeholder spaces shows that SUN has been not only a mechanism for 'sending pre-formed policy ideals and instruments' to the national level (Stone et al., 2020, p.10), their ability to shape SUN's global strategies and priorities in the desired direction remained restricted by the hierarchical power structures in its own governance. As Hasselskog and Schierenbeck (2017, p.328) argue, tacit practices of getting recipient states to embrace agendas or policies already set by donors are not an uncommon way for donors to retain power and influence through partnerships. The Tanzania case study thus demonstrates that processes of transnational policy transfer do not involve merely technical transfer of knowledge: they are political processes through which actors can leverage their power and authority (be it expertise or financial resources) to reinforce their preferred policy paradigms or legitimise certain actors, policies or forms of governance (Abrahamsen, 2004; Stone et al., 2020).

Overall, these findings show how entrenched power asymmetries in global governance can be reproduced, even reinforced, through processes of partnership establishment, legitimation and policy transfer. Power imbalances may be rooted not only in actors' financial resources (and hence their instrumental power to affect governance outcomes), but also in their institutional or structural positions within the system to shape nutrition agendas and authority relations, and their ability to shape perceptions of reality and meaning through discourse and social practices.

Influence through co-optation and marginalisation of dissenting voices and perspectives

Although partnerships are often seen as advancing democratic deliberations in global governance and providing inclusive spaces for 'multi-scalar' and 'multi-actor' transfer of knowledge and ideas (Stone et al., 2020), my thesis has shown that inherent power imbalances between involved actors can lead to the co-optation of progressive discourses, normative homogeneity, and effective exclusion of dissenting perspectives – as also noted by other scholars (Pouliot & Thérien, 2018, p.9; Storeng & Behagué, 2016).

In articles I and II, I show that alternative voices and opposing views emphasising human rights-based approaches and limited private-sector involvement, coming mainly from human rights-based civil society movements, but also from staff members of the multilateral organisations WHO and FAO, have been constrained and partly co-opted through the dominance of donors (Gates Foundation, WB, USAID), and also UN funds and programmes (UNICEF and WFP), promoting the interests of market actors in questions about SUN's governance and how to reduce malnutrition. In the course of SUN's establishment, rights-based perspectives and critics were effectively side-lined – strengthening divisions within the civil society community for nutrition. While actors in the latter group – rights-based civil society organisations and academics – were not formally excluded from joining SUN and its civil society network, the failure to address their demands, and their fears of being co-opted, resulted in their self-exclusion and shift towards the Civil Society Mechanism of the Committee of World Food Security (CFS) – an example of behavioural de-legitimation (Bäckstrand & Söderbaum, 2018). Furthermore, the perspectives and demands of LMIC governments were marginalised during the establishment of SUN, with few countries minimally involved in the process. Later, during SUN's institutionalisation and development, its discursive and institutional self-legitimation strategies served to temper and effectively 'hide' conflicts over norms and interests by symbolically addressing criticisms related to human rights, equity and conflicts of interest through 'window-dressing' reforms and 'lip-service' discourses, thus serving as 'institutionalized co-option' (Godsäter, 2016, p.123, quoted in Bäckstrand & Söderbaum, 2018, p.111). In line with Michéle et al. (2019), I argue that, through such glossing-over of differences in opinions about governance and how to address malnutrition, and by making decisions based on consensus among like-minded or less-critical actors within SUN, progressive and human rights-based agendas that challenge the structural power relations underlying issues of malnutrition get ignored.

The case study of Tanzania also showed how SUN's influence was exerted through processes through which voices in LMICs were marginalised. Despite their country's high-level political involvement in SUN's governance structures, national actors in Tanzania did not feel sufficiently included in global strategy-development processes, and strongly challenged SUN's country-driven rhetoric. This country-driven rhetoric was also challenged by actors involved in the SUN secretariat, who claimed that instead of actually reflecting member-country needs and demands, SUN's development was driven by the Secretariat staff's *interpretations* of these needs (Article II). This shows how marginalisation of certain voices can occur through supposedly inclusive processes, reflecting the discursive and structural power of certain actors

over others. My findings thus question the inclusive rhetoric of partnerships by showing how SUN has encouraged the co-optation and exclusion of dissenting perspectives or alternative positions. Further, my findings of the limited influence of LMICs in SUN's establishment and governance, and perceptions of SUN as being led from above through donor-driven strategy development and reporting requirements by governmental actors in Tanzania, all challenge SUN's claim to be driven by its member-countries, and its ability to strengthen the agency and voice of the marginalised groups most affected by malnutrition.

Thus, my thesis has demonstrated that global governance is not only about how states or multilateral organisations ensure compliance with rules or regulations to achieve societal change: it also concerns how an increasingly complex web of state-based and non-state actors, operating at different policy levels, has influenced norms, ideas and structures through various direct and indirect mechanisms that *induce* societal change – rather than imposing command (Bernstein & Cashore, 2012). Unlike multilateral organisations, global partnerships like SUN do not exercise formal authority to make binding rules or regulations based on state consent. Rather, they exert more subtle forms of authority, pooled from various actors, particularly through their epistemic capacity to shape belief systems, interests, and preferences (Zürn, 2017); and they actively seek legitimacy to ensure the cooperation and support of their various audiences to achieve their goals and maintain their influence (Andonova, 2017, p.208).

Whereas SUN itself claims that it is 'not a governance mechanism' but a *movement* and merely a 'collaborative platform' to scale up nutrition, through country-driven processes, enabling 'experience sharing, guided by agreed norms and standards' (SUN, 2020a, p.15), I argue that this framing stands in sharp contrast to the actual way in which SUN operates, and to the governance it indeed exercises. As I have shown, SUN's authority and ability to exert influence are not based on any 'right to rule', nor on provision of funding, but on the ability of its members to shape knowledge and understandings of problems and solutions to malnutrition, and of how authority within nutrition governance should be appropriately exercised. Partnerships are often promoted as value-free win–win mechanisms built on shared goals and scientific consensus, but my research shows that SUN is *not* a neutral platform that simply brings actors together around scientific *evidence* of how to reduce stunting: rather, SUN serves as a political space through which competing forms of knowledge, ideas and norms about how issues of malnutrition should be understood and addressed are created, shaped and disseminated. Within this political space, some actors are more influential than others in shaping SUN's governance in their desired direction by means of various forms of power.

Through the processes of SUN's establishment, self-legitimation and policy transfer, already-powerful private actors (particularly corporations and foundations) were able to enhance their ability to shape nutrition agendas and outcomes – by being promoted as legitimate nutrition-policy actors through SUN's advocacy for multi-stakeholder governance, and through the actual participation of private actors in these mechanisms, within global and national policy spaces. Moreover, despite SUN's claim to be 'country-driven', its governance has in many ways reinforced existing hierarchical donor–recipient relations. I thus argue that SUN has not contributed to shifting authority relations in favour of actors in the Global South or towards those suffering from malnutrition: no, it has reproduced, and to some extent reinforced, existing power asymmetries in global nutrition governance, calling into doubt its ability to provide inclusive governance and sustainable solutions to issues of malnutrition. In the next section, I discuss in further detail the broader implications of SUN's influence in global nutrition governance, especially in terms of legitimacy and authority relations.

Implications for global nutrition governance

Reproducing existing participatory qualities

In line with the debates about the benefits and limitations of global partnerships in global governance, global partnerships have been hailed as mechanisms that can provide more inclusive governance and engage a wider range of actors through processes of deliberation and shared learning, thus addressing some of the shortcomings of the state-centred multinational system (Benner et al. 2004; Reinicke, 1999; Risse, 2005). Indeed, part of the rationale for establishing SUN was the call for a new global governance structure that could better represent the entire range of actors involved in global nutrition governance (including the private sector), while enhancing dialogue with heavily-burdened LMICS (Morris et al., 2008). SUN has indeed mobilised a large number and broad range of actors in deliberations about nutrition – within its global multi-stakeholder policy spaces, such as the Global Gathering; within its governance structures; and within SUN member-countries through national multi-stakeholder and multi-sectoral nutrition platforms. Many CSOs are involved in SUN, and the number of LMICs countries committed to reducing malnutrition through SUN's approaches keeps growing. Corporations and private foundations are now firmly established as key policy-partners in nutrition, in global as well as national nutrition-policy spaces. Thus, SUN has opened up the global nutrition policy space to a broader range of interests, ideas and expertise, coalescing

around a common agenda for reducing undernutrition through technical and multi-sectoral approaches. While some perspectives hold that this shows that SUN has enhanced the input legitimacy of global nutrition governance through increased functional representation (Meadowcroft, 2007), my thesis questions the democratic quality of SUN's governance. Although the plurality of participation has increased, I have shown that the *quality* of participation has remained constrained by the imbalance of power and voice between different actors and by governance structures dominated by actors from the Global North. Rather than improving democratic qualities in global nutrition governance, SUN has contributed to the reproduction of existing participatory inequalities – a finding in line with much research on partnerships in other policy areas (Bexell & Mörth, 2010, p.14; Menashy, 2019; Storeng & de Bengy Puyvallée, 2018). This inability of SUN to enhance the quality of participation may negatively affect perceptions of its legitimacy, and, by extension, perhaps affect its ability to achieve its goals in the long run. Indeed, to judge from its latest strategic review (SUN, 2020a), signs of a legitimacy crisis in SUN are looming. The review draws attention to power imbalances within SUN's governance and the disjuncture between SUN's governance and its claims to be country-driven. On these grounds, the evaluation warns of the 'risk of the Movement being stunted by mistrust and competing institutional agendas' (SUN, 2020a, pp. 22 & 36).

Creating fragmentations and complexity

Partnerships are also widely seen as fostering synergies and coherence in global governance by pooling skills and resources from a broad range of actors. As shown in Article I, SUN was intended to foster greater coherence within a global nutrition landscape deemed 'fragmented and dysfunctional' (Morris et al., 2008, p.82). It was initially set up as a 'time-limited endeavour' to 'catalyse coordinated action for better nutrition', and not as a permanent institution that would add to the complexity of global nutrition governance (Mokoro, 2015, p. 7). Although SUN has in some ways managed to break down certain 'silos' within the international nutrition community, bringing together different types of actors and sectors around a common nutrition agenda, it has also created new fragmentations and made global nutrition governance more complex. As I show in Articles I and II, SUN has become increasingly formalised over time, and today constitutes an institution in its own right within the international nutrition landscape. SUN's establishment also resulted in several global coordination mechanisms for nutrition (SUN UN network, UNREACH, UNSCN) operating side-by-side, and with partly overlapping functions. In 2020, when a merger of the SUN UN

Network and UNSCN, into UN Nutrition, was announced, it was explicitly recognised that these mechanisms created inefficiencies and fragmentation in the global nutrition landscape (UNSCN, 2020). Furthermore, despite SUN's efforts at consensus, fundamental contestations about how malnutrition should be addressed in terms of policy and governance still divide the international nutrition and food security community (Fanzo et al., 2021; McKeon, 2021). A split within the civil society community for nutrition emerged during SUN's establishment., when the critical human-rights-based CSOs shifted towards the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), rather than joining SUN's Civil Society Network. From CFS, these CSOs have continued to challenge the legitimacy of SUN and the multi-stakeholder model as means for improving food security and nutrition. Instead, they advocate the strengthening of multilateral forums – particularly the CFS. After its reform in 2009, the CFS has been widely seen as one of the most inclusive and participatory forums in global food and nutrition governance. In contrast to SUN, it gives priority voice to those most affected by the policies under discussion, while governments retain final decision-making power to maintain their accountability (McKeon, 2021, p.51; Duncan, 2015).

Enhancing and legitimising the authority of private-sector actors in global nutrition governance

Partnerships have also been criticised for undermining the authority and credibility of public institutions, and for capturing multilateral agendas by corporate interests and market-based practices (Levy & Newell, 2005; Utting & Zammit, 2006; 2009; Newell, 2012). Such criticisms were also voiced by many civil society representatives during SUN's establishment and have been used as arguments to de-legitimise SUN (see Articles I and II). As I argue throughout this thesis, SUN has opened up the global nutrition-policy space to corporate interests through the inclusion of commercial food and other corporations in its governance structures – and through its active promotion of multi-stakeholder approaches, viewing business as a legitimate nutrition-policy actor. Further, although corporations found to have violated UN guidelines on health and nutrition, or undermine breastfeeding practices, are excluded from SUN, it still allows the participation of commercial food and beverage companies whose products and marketing practices add to the rising burdens of overweight and obesity, or who have strong interests in promoting market-based solutions to undernutrition, such as food fortification and micronutrient powders. To what extent their participation undermines the public credibility and the epistemic and normative authority of multilateral organisations whose mandate it is to protect and promote public health, nutrition and food security (like WHO and FAO) is difficult

to ascertain, and depends partly on one's view of what constitutes legitimate global governance. Regardless, these companies' participation in SUN, where they share authority with states and multilateral organisations, has clearly enhanced their already-significant structural power to influence agendas and priorities in global nutrition governance – even more so as SUN has become increasingly embedded in the UN system (Manahan & Kumar, 2021: 36).

Advancing technical solutions and the enmeshment of foreign and private interests in national policy spaces

Partnerships are also promoted as effective mechanisms that offer solutions that multilateral organisations have not been able to provide (Peters & Pierre, 2010). Indeed, the ensuing and growing contestation around SUN, as shown in my three articles, was not only related to its governance qualities, but also to the resulting solutions – or the implications of its governance in terms of nutrition outcomes. For some, the greater influence of private-sector actors in nutrition policy processes through partnerships like SUN may not represent a problem, if it leads to enhanced nutrition outcomes. For example, it could be argued that Tanzania's success in reducing its prevalence of child stunting shows the benefits of multi-stakeholder collaboration for nutrition. However, it is difficult to trace the causal link between global initiatives and health outcomes. The question also remains whether the solutions applied are considered sustainable, just and equitable, or whether they favour existing inequities in the distribution of health and economic resources – concerns continuously raised within a global health field heavily dominated by global health partnerships and private actors (Birn, 2005; Storeng et al., 2021). As regards governance and policy implications, we may note findings from case studies that indicate that national governments in SUN member-countries struggle to hold business actors accountable for actions that contradict healthy diets and nutrition improvement (SUN 2020a, p.10); further, that SUN's influence has skewed policies towards more technical interventions to reduce child stunting, and away from efforts to address structural causes of all forms of malnutrition (Michéle et al., 2019). Similar tendencies were found in Tanzania, where frustrations were voiced over the over-focus on 'silver bullet' technical interventions, including food fortification, that failed to address the *structural* causes of malnutrition experienced by local communities, such as equitable access to and availability of healthy and sustainable diets (Article III). In terms of governance, the inclusion of private-sector actors in national policy processes through multistakeholder structures (like those promoted by SUN in Tanzania), does not directly undermine the authority of national governments which remain sovereign (unlike at the global level). However, the enhanced

agenda-setting and decision-making power of private-sector and foreign actors through these platforms increase the risks of undue influence, particularly in LMICs where multinational corporations and Northern private donors hold considerable economic sway vis-à-vis the public authorities. This has also been argued by development scholars who find that the involvement of international donors and corporations as 'stakeholders' in national policy discussions and coordination have led to a growing foreign enmeshment in domestic policy-making, with implications for policy space in recipient countries, limiting the room to make their own decisions and promote their own preferences and interests (Hasselskog & Schierenbeck, 2017). In the case of SUN and its influence, this might result not only in prioritisation of nutrition issues and solutions in the interests of donors and private actors, but also in governments being dissuaded from more progressive public nutrition policy-making, such as regulations to restrict the marketing of unhealthy foods and beverages to combat the growing prevalence of overweight and obesity (Clapp & Scrinis, 2017; Hawkes et al., 2019). In Tanzania, where the prevalence of overweight, obesity and diet-related non-communicable diseases is increasing rapidly (GNR, 2020), it is particularly important to ensure that the national policy space for progressive policies to address malnutrition remains protected from undue influence.

Diverting government accountability 'upwards'

SUN's influence on its member-countries also gives rise to questions about accountability. As discussed, the extent to which SUN has helped to fill a 'participatory gap' in global governance by including civil society actors in its governance structures remains questionable as long as alternative perspectives and voices of the affected still remain marginalised. One way for partnerships to strengthen their accountability is to devise internal accountability measures (Steets & Blattner, 2010), but it is challenging to ensure external accountability towards affected populations – particularly in the case of non-financial partnerships, whose influence is more difficult to trace than with grant-giving partnerships (Bexell & Mörth, 2010, p.16). This is clearly the case when it comes to SUN, whose influence, as shown in the case of Tanzania, is exerted through indirect and diffuse mechanisms – making it hard to attribute responsibility. SUN has put in place internal systems of accountability to strengthen what it calls 'mutual accountability'. This might have enabled better oversight over how the various actors in SUN contribute towards SUN's strategy – although the effects have been contested (SUN, 2020a) – but it has not ensured external accountability towards those who are ultimately affected by its approaches. Instead, as I also argue in Articles II and III, it has gradually strengthened its control of the performance of member-countries, reinforcing hierarchical donor–recipient relations and

feelings of upward accountability from governments to SUN's governing boards – rather than downwards, towards the affected populations (SUN, 2020a). As Michéle et al. (2019, p.65) point out, this gives SUN's member-governments the opportunity to dodge responsibility if nutrition policies prove to have negative implications, by saying they were simply following SUN's requirements – while SUN's multi-stakeholder governance and subtle mechanisms of influence make it difficult to attribute responsibility towards members of its global governance structures.

Reflections on SUN's failed ambitions, and the way forward

Whether or not SUN has enhanced the legitimacy in global nutrition governance is in the end a question that depends on the relative weight accorded to different normative criteria for appropriate exercise of authority in global governance. However, calling itself an inclusive 'country-driven movement' whose objectives are framed in the human-rights language, SUN seems to have fallen short of its own ambitions. By promoting top–down, internationally-driven measures and ideas, and by allowing corporate interests to weigh in on agenda-setting and policy-decisions in low- and middle-income countries, SUN runs the risk, as others have noted (see Clapp & Scrinis, 2017; McKeon, 2017, p.391; Michéle et al., 2019), that nutrition policies will be directed towards supplements and other short-term medicalised, cost-effective solutions. Such solutions increase dependency on international support, without addressing the more fundamental nutrition challenges that require long-term solutions – such as more diversified local food production, and equitable, consistent access to and availability of healthy diets. Achieving this will require moving away from understanding nutrition as simply an issue of food availability that involves increased (industrial) food production, or as a disease requiring medicalised, product-based interventions targeting specific nutrients. Harris and Nisbett (2021) build on a large body of literature on how to ensure equitable development (in the areas of food, health and gender) when they argue that sustained, concrete action is needed to address the structural drivers, or basic determinants, of malnutrition – indeed, as laid out in the UNICEF framework. This would require context-specific short-term measures to reduce inequitable access to resources (such as social safety nets, secure land rights and education); and longer-term measures to ensure more equitable and accountable institutions, policy designs that address structural drivers, and more general efforts to address the marginalisation and inequity that underpin power disparities.

Debates about how to improve global governance for food security and nutrition are nothing new. However, they have intensified in recent years, not least with the impacts of the

Covid19 pandemic and the onset of the current global food and nutrition crisis (Baker et al., 2021; FAO, 2022; HLPE, 2020; McKeon, 2021; UNGA, 2022). Increasingly, calls are being made for addressing nutrition as part of a broader approach to developing more sustainable food systems, underpinned by the human right to adequate food for all (HLPE, 2020). According to the High-Level Panel of Experts (HLPE) of the CFS, a more holistic and sustainable food systems approach to address food security and nutrition should focus not on only one form of malnutrition or hunger, but all; on ensuring the availability of and access to sufficient, healthy and nutritious food for all people – as through more nutrition-driven, diversified, and local food production; on enhancing the agency and voice of the affected people, particularly the most vulnerable and marginalised groups; on integrating food systems with other sectors; and on developing context-specific solutions that take local conditions and knowledge into account, not simply 'scientific' evidence (HLPE, 2020; McKeon, 2021). To enable such shifts, many argue for strengthening the multilateral bodies mandated to advance the governance of nutrition, such as FAO, WHO and the CFS. This, they maintain, could reduce fragmentation and advance global cooperation, and better protect the public policy space, public interests and human rights (HLPE, 2020; McKeon, 2021; Michéle et al. 2019; UNGA, 2021; 2022). By contrast, the *multi-stakeholder* model is continuously challenged, particularly by human rights advocates and civil society groups, for undermining government accountability and its responsibility to regulate in the public interest, and for advancing corporate discourses and interests instead (Manahan & Kumar, 2021). The legitimacy of the UN system has also increasingly come under fire for its close collaboration with food corporations. This was exemplified by the civil society boycott of the 2021 UN Food System Summit, which was seen as heavily influenced by corporate interests and as marginalising the views of small-scale food producers (IPC, 2020; Baker et al. 2021). As noted in a report to the UN General Assembly by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food:

> The Summit's multi-stakeholder approach, driven by the private sector, has fallen short of multilateral inclusiveness and has led to the marginalization of some countries. In a break from past practice, the Summit process has not provided an autonomous and meaningful space for participation by communities and civil society, with the risk of leaving behind the very population critical for the Summit's success (UNGA, 2021)

Amidst these ongoing debates about the value of multi-stakeholder versus multilateral governance to address food security and nutrition, and in response to evaluations and growing

internal unrest within the partnership, SUN has made changes to its governance and strategy. Improved representation by SUN-member countries on its governance boards; a stronger focus on country-identified solutions; on food-, health-, and social protection system approaches and on gender and economic equity (SUN, 2021): these are all positive signs of recognition of the need for SUN to address demands for living up to its claims of country-driven governance and for more holistic approaches to malnutrition. It remains to be seen how this will play out in practice, however. Such positive developments should be coupled with stronger efforts to counter-balance the interests of powerful coalitions, to ensure meaningful participation by affected communities, and to better safeguard the independence and authority of public authorities to make decisions that are in the public interest.

Contributions, Limitations, and Implications for Future Research

My thesis has provided an in-depth and critical examination of how a global partnership influences global nutrition governance – a field which has received little attention within the global governance literature, while global power dynamics have remained relatively ignored in studies of public nutrition policy. By showing how political science theory can enable a better understanding of how power and knowledge influence nutrition policy and governance, often seen as guided solely by scientific evidence and medical knowledge, I hope to make the nutrition policy community more aware of the complexity of global political interactions and their implications for public health and nutrition issues of national and international relevance. I also hope to inform global governance scholars about nutrition politics and how the fragmentation within this field has made it particularly relevant to the study of global power relations.

Empirically, this thesis contributes to a better understanding of the politics behind and within SUN, helping to open the 'black box' of its previously convoluted governance, and providing unique insights into the perceptions of various actors concerning the governance of SUN. I also offer new insights into the role of SUN and its members in shaping the governance of nutrition in a specific member-country – the Republic of Tanzania.

In terms of theory, this thesis contributes to a better understanding of how global hybrid organisations seek to manifest their influence in global governance through various, sometimes contradictory, strategies of discursive and institutional legitimation. The thesis highlights the political nature of such processes by exploring the motives and relative influence of different actors involved. It also explores the multifaceted and overlapping ways in which various forms

of power are exercised in global governance and how this conditions the processes of institutional establishment, legitimation, and policy transfer – processes that I show are inherently political and fundamental to the ability of partnerships to exert influence. Further, whereas theoretical concepts of various forms of power and policy-transfer mechanisms served as useful analytical starting points for my research, I go on to show how such categories are blurred in practice, complementing, and reinforcing each other. I also show how legitimacy perceptions cut across established categories of actors and hierarchical relationships in global governance – further complicating the self-legitimation processes of partnerships.

As regards methodology, my study demonstrates how rich contextual qualitative data, collected through a combination of document analysis, interviews, and observations in several policy-sites, can provide in-depth insights into the politics and legitimation of global governance institutions.

These contributions and observations open up new lines of enquiry for research. Some of the suggestions for new research arise from limitations of this thesis. One such limitation is the limited amount of data on actors that are excluded or play limited, or less visible, roles within SUN – such as indigenous people's organisations, small-scale farmers, women, gender- and faith-based groups, bringing perspectives from local communities affected by malnutrition. These actors are ultimately affected by SUN's influence but have little say in its governance. Investigations of local communities' perceptions and experiences related to the implications of SUN's influence (e.g., in terms of changing priorities as to the type of nutrition interventions) may provide important insights for improving SUN's governance in ways that could enhance perceptions of its legitimacy, and, potentially, its effectiveness.

Moreover, this study of SUN's establishment and institutionalisation shows some similarities with how other global partnerships have been established and governed, especially in the field of health (McNeill & Sandberg, 2014; Sandberg et al. 2010; Shiffman et al. 2016; Storeng & Béhague, 2016; Storeng et al. 2021), but it was not possible to undertake such comparisons in this study. Future studies could compare and contrast SUN's governance with that of other global partnerships, to offer a better understanding of how research on SUN has bearings on other areas of global governance. Similarly, while my case study of Tanzania provides important insights into how SUN has contributed to shaping nutrition policy within a specific country context, cross-comparative studies of the processes through which SUN exerts influence over nutrition policy in other member-countries could yield a better understanding of its influence over national nutrition policy more broadly.

Finally, this thesis has noted the need for future research on the politics of partnership and their (self-)legitimation processes – important for understanding the tensions between differing norms and the broader dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in global governance (see Bexell et al., 2020).

In conclusion, then, this thesis has indicated some of the subtle ways in which global nutrition governance, through SUN, is exercised by various actors within global and national policy spheres, contributing to a better understanding of how political nutrition outcomes are produced, by whom, and in whose interest. Further, I have shown how global partnerships are conditioned by, and may reinforce, broader power asymmetries and dynamics within global governance – challenging the widely-held assumption that partnerships are mechanisms that necessarily contribute to more inclusive and sustainable development.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Overview of informants involved in SUN's global level processes

	Organisational affiliation	Date of interview(s)	Current or former position	Details of interview
	SUN Secretariat			
1	SUN Secretariat	20.11.2014	Policy adviser	In person. Not recorded.
2	SUN Secretariat	02.12.2014	Policy adviser	In person. Not recorded.
3	SUN Secretariat	17.11.2015	Policy/coordination	In person. Recorded.
4	SUN Secretariat (donor country)	11.11.2015	Country liaison team	In person. Recorded.
5	SUN Secretariat	12.11.15 and 07.10.20	Country liaison team	First in person and recorded, second via Skype and not recorded.
6	SUN Secretariat	11.11.15	Policy adviser	In person. Recorded.
7	SUN Secretariat	Nov. 2015	Finance and administration	In person. Not recorded.
8	SUN Secretariat	11.11.15	Three staff members of SUN's communication team.	In person. Recorded.
9	SUN Secretariat	09.11.2015	Technical officer	In person. Recorded.
	Donors			
10	World Bank	20.10.15	Involved in the establishment and global governance of SUN.	In person. Not recorded.
11	Gates Foundation	21.10.15	Involved in the establishment and global governance of SUN.	In person. Recorded.
12	Gates Foundation	06.11.15	Involved in SUN's global governance	Skype. Recorded.
	Private sector			
13	GAIN/SUN Business Network	27.03.2015	SUN Business network Secretariat	In person. Recorded.
14	Royal DSM	22.10.15	Member of SUN Business network and involved in SUN's global governance	In person. Recorded.
15	GAIN	19.11.15	Member SUN Business Network	In person. Recorded.

16	GAIN	17.11.2016	Involved in the establishment of SUN	Skype. Recorded.
	Civil Society			
17	Save the Children/SUN Civil Society Network	25.03.2015	SUN Civil Society Network	In person. Recorded.
18	International Baby Foods Action Network (IBFAN)	26.03.2015	Not member of SUN. Involved in SUN's establishment.	In person. Recorded.
19	Concern Worldwide	29.10.15	Member of SUN Civil society network. Involved in SUN's establishment.	Skype. Recorded.
20	FIAN International	15.12.15	Not member of SUN. Involved in SUN's establishment.	In person. Recorded.
	UN agencies			
21	UNSCN Secretariat	01.12.2014 and 17.11.2015	Involved in the establishment and ongoing work of SUN.	In person. Recorded.
22	WHO	03.12.2014	Familiar with SUN's work at country level.	In person. Not recorded.
23	WHO	02.12.2014 and 16.09.15	Involved in SUN's global governance	In person. Not recorded.
24	Retired (FAO)	02.11.15	Involved in SUN's establishment.	Skype. Recorded.
25	UN (SUN Secretariat)	12.11.2015	Involved in the establishment of SUN.	In person. Recorded.
26	Independent consultant (UNSCN Secretariat)	16.11.15	Involved in the establishment of SUN.	Skype. Recorded.
27	WHO	04.10.2016	Observer of SUN's influence on WHO consultations.	In person. Recorded.
28	UNSCN Secretariat	27.10.2016	Involved in work on SUN UN Network.	In person. Recorded.
	Others			
29	International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)	17.03.2015	Insight into processes of SUN's establishment	Skype. Recorded.
30	University of Oslo	19.03.2015	Involved in processes leading up to SUN's establishment	In person. Recorded.
31	External Consultant	20.11.15	Contracted by Gates Foundation to assist the SUN Secretariat's policy work	Skype. Recorded.
32	External Consultant	13.11.2015	Contracted by Gates Foundation to assist the SUN Secretariat's policy work	In person. Recorded.

Appendix 2. Overview of informants involved in Tanzania's nutrition policy landscape

	Organisational affiliation	Date of interview(s)	Details of interview
	National Government		
1	Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre (TFNC)	27.04.2016	In person. Recorded.
2	Ministry of Health and Social Welfare	02.05.2016	In person. Not recorded.
3	Prime Minister's Office	10.05.2016	In person. Recorded.
4	Retired / The President's Office	01.05.2016	In person. Recorded.
5	Tanzania Food and Drug Authority (TFDA)	11.05.2016	In person. Recorded.
6	Independent / Prime Minister's Office	09.03.2020	Skype. Recorded.
	Donors		
7	Irish Aid	26.04.2016	In person. Recorded.
8	USAID	29.04.2016	In person. Not recorded.
9	UK Department for International Development (DFID)	05.05.2016	In person. Not recorded.
10	World Bank	03.05.2016	In person. Not recorded.
	The private sector		
11	SUN Business Network/GAIN	02.05.2016	In person. Recorded.
12	National Food and Fortification Alliance	07.05.2016	In person. Not recorded.
13	Bakhresa (Large scale national milling company)	12.05.2016	In person. Not recorded.
14	Tanzania Private Sector Foundation	04.05.2016	In person. Not recorded.
	Civil society		
15	Helen Keller International	20.04.2016	In person. Recorded.
16	Partnership for Nutrition in Tanzania (PANITA)	25.04.2016	In person. Recorded.
17	The Centre for Counselling, Nutrition and Health Care (COUNSENUTH)	10.05.2016	In person. Recorded.
18	World Vision International	13.05.2016	In person. Recorded.
19	Social Liberation and Empowerment Organisation (SOLEO)	10.05.2016	In person. Not recorded.
20	The Resources Mobilization for Community Development (REMCOD)	24.01.2020	Skype. Recorded.
21	FHI360	04.03.2020	Skype. Recorded.
	UN agencies/programmes		
22	UNICEF	27.04.2016 and 02.05.2016	In person. Recorded.

23	UNREACH	03.05.2016	In person. Not recorded.
24	World Health Organization (WHO)	11.05.2016	In person. Recorded.
25	World Food Program (WFP)	03.05.2016	In person. Recorded
26	FAO	12.05.2016	In person. Not recorded.
	Others		
27	Sokoine University of Agriculture	18.04.2016	In person. Not recorded.
28	Independent nutrition consultant	13.04.2015 and 12.12.2019	First interview in person and not recorded. Second interview Skype and recorded.
29	Independent nutrition researcher	30.10.2014	In person. Recorded.

Part II

Papers

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I

Article 1: 'Power in Global Nutrition Governance. A Critical Analysis of the Establishment of the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Partnership'

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II

'We are not a partnership' – constructing and contesting legitimacy of global public–private partnerships: the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement

Ann Louise Lie

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'We are not a partnership' – constructing and contesting legitimacy of global public–private partnerships: the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement

Ann Louise Lie

Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

ABSTRACT

While the legitimacy of global public–private partnerships (partnerships) remains contested, particularly within the fields of health and nutrition, they continue to proliferate. How do partnerships gain and maintain support and recognition in the face of opposition and conflicting perceptions about their legitimacy? Drawing on interviews, observations and document analysis, this article discusses how a nutrition partnership, the Scaling Up Nutrition Movement (SUN), has legitimized itself over time through different strategies and normative justifications – and explores the influence of various audiences in shaping its legitimation strategies. As SUN struggles to reconcile conflicting demands among its various audiences through discursive and institutional strategies, an increasing mismatch between SUN's rhetoric as a country-driven movement and its formalized global governance structures has developed. The article shows how the study of legitimation of partnerships can reveal underlying political struggles that ultimately shape the distribution of power within global governance.

1. Introduction

The 'Scaling Up Nutrition Movement' (SUN) was established in 2010 as a multistakeholder and multi-sectoral initiative promoting nutrition action globally. It involves civil society, business, UN agencies, bilateral and private donors – working together to support efforts in 61 low- and middle-income member countries[1] to reduce malnutrition, particularly chronic malnutrition (stunting) among young children. While SUN has been celebrated for raising global attention to the issue of child malnutrition across policy sectors, it has from its very establishment encountered extensive criticism, especially for allowing too much power to the food industry, promoting market-based nutrition interventions, and for weak accountability towards affected communities. SUN is classified as a partnership under the UN Global registry of voluntary commitments and multi-stakeholder partnerships (UN, n.d.), and its structures and functions correspond to what in the International Relations (IR) literature is called 'global public–private partnerships'[2] (partnership). Nevertheless, SUN insists on calling itself a 'country-driven movement,' and has actively resisted being called a 'partnership'.

The resistance against the 'partnership' term illustrates that, despite their popularity and prevalence in global governance, the legitimacy of partnerships remains contested. This reflects broader

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normative debates about the rearrangement of roles and authority in global governance, and the underlying power structures (Andonova, 2017).

This study discusses how SUN has legitimized itself over time through different strategies and normative justifications, and explores the influence of various audiences in shaping its legitimation strategies. It shows how legitimation efforts have evolved to ensure social approval and acceptance of partnerships' authority to govern. Partnerships often encounter legitimacy dilemmas in seeking to reconcile differing and occasionally conflicting legitimacy perceptions among their audiences of various state and nonstate actors (Black, 2008). These dilemmas may lead to difficult trade-offs and internal contestations regarding choices of legitimation strategies (Schleifer, 2019). Since the first explorations of how nonstate actors achieve legitimacy in global governance (Cashore, 2002), research on legitimation of hybrid global governance mechanisms has expanded within the field of IR (cf. Andonova & Carbonnier, 2014; Bäckstrand & Kylsäter, 2014; Glasbergen, 2013). However, few scholars have explored such processes within the institutionally complex field of nutrition, where the proliferation of partnerships is highly contested (Hoddinot et al., 2015). Contestations have been particularly strong regarding the inclusion of the food industry within public nutrition policy-making. Nutrition does not have one institutional home at the global level, but is governed by a variety of state and nonstate actors from different sectors, such as health and agriculture. Such plurality of actors with divergent interests and norms substantiates a broader variety of legitimation strategies and narratives than within more state-based fields (Bäckstrand & Söderbaum, 2018, p. 115).

The article contributes to the literature on legitimation in global governance in several ways. First, it studies a partnership within the complex field of nutrition. Second, it scrutinizes the interaction between different types of normative justifications and strategies (discursive and institutional) and how these are shaped through legitimation contests with various internal and external audiences. Third, it illustrates how politics and power relations condition the very processes of what gets legitimized – responding to calls from IR scholars for greater attention to the politics of legitimation in global governance (Bernstein, 2018; Hurd, 2018). The study is based on document analysis, interviews and observations from 2010 until 2017.

The findings show that SUN has carefully navigated between different and at times conflicting legitimacy demands of its various audiences and to shifting global normative agendas. The study illustrates that partnerships' legitimation strategies are dynamic, but it also shows how the distribution of power among audiences determines whose preferences are reflected in different legitimation strategies. While critical civil society actors' demands for more democratic and fair procedures, and rights-based approaches were met primarily through institutional 'window-dressing' and discursive 'lip-service', demands by donors, private sector actors and certain multilateral agencies for internal accountability and results, were in contrast met by institutional measures effectively strengthening and formalizing SUN's top-down structures. Growing discontent within SUN illustrates the need for partnerships to effectively balance legitimation strategies, taking into account legitimacy concerns of all audiences in order to successfully improve legitimacy perceptions.

2. Conceptual framework

2.1. Legitimacy and legitimation strategies of global partnerships

Legitimacy can be studied as a normative or a sociological phenomenon (Buchanan & Keohane, 2006). Much research on the legitimacy of partnerships is normative, examining what *should* be considered legitimate forms of authority, evaluating whether partnerships live up to predefined criteria

of appropriate rule (like accountability, participation, and effectiveness) (Bäckstrand, 2006; Bexell & Mörth, 2010; Pattberg et al., 2012; Schäferhoff et al., 2009). In contrast, a sociological approach understands legitimacy, in line with the thinking of Max Weber (1978), as a dynamic process of change where legitimacy is an outcome of peoples' beliefs in an authority's right to rule (Bernstein, 2011). While some sociologically-oriented scholars have studied legitimacy purely as an empirical phenomenon (e.g. by surveying public confidence in an institution) (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2015), this study views the normative and sociological as intertwined. Beliefs in legitimacy are shaped by norms regarding the exercise of power, and such norms reflect prevailing perceptions in a society (Beetham, 2013; Quack, 2010; Reus-Smit, 2007). The legitimacy of partnerships is as such not absolute, but varies over time and in according to the perspectives of those assessing it (Bull & McNeill, 2010, p. 105).

In line with the globalization of economic and social relations since the 1990s, global partnerships have proliferated and become an integral part of global governance. Nevertheless, their legitimacy remains contested and in response, efforts at legitimation have evolved. Legitimation of partnerships can be conceptualized as 'the process of seeking and/or gaining social approval and acceptance of authority to govern' (Andonova, 2017, p. 208). Unlike state-based global governance institutions (global institutions), voluntary partnerships generally do not hold formal authority to govern in the sense of ruling and generating binding policies, and they do not derive formal-legal legitimacy from states' consent. Rather, partnerships exert more diffuse forms of authority, particularly through their epistemic capacity to shape belief systems, interests, and preferences (Zürn, 2017), and will actively seek legitimacy to ensure cooperation and support of their various audiences to achieve their goals and maintain their influence (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Suchman, 1995).

Global institutions generally seek to legitimize themselves through discursive or institutional strategies (Gronau & Schmidtke, 2016). *Discursive legitimation* is communicated through language and the use of argument and reason about why an authority has the right to rule or exercise power. Through rhetoric and narrative construction in a wide range of public text and speech acts, an institution can justify and give a positive impression of its activities. *Institutional legitimation*, which more recently has come under scholars' attention, is expressed through institutional reform conforming with normative expectations of audiences. This may involve administrative reorganizations, transparency initiatives, broadened participation, policy adjustment in response to critiques, etc.[3] (Bäckstrand & Söderbaum, 2018).

2.2. Normative contestations of partnerships' input and output legitimacy

While legitimation practices necessarily are context-dependent and related to partnerships' particular functions, they also reflect prevailing social norms about appropriate exercise of power at the global level (Reus-Smit, 2007, p. 167). Reference to norms of appropriate rule is particularly relevant to partnerships operating in the institutionalized global public domains, and within fields such as health and nutrition, constituted by norms related to the intrinsic worth of human life and expectations of improved human welfare. In such cases, partnerships become arenas for negotiation and contestation of public and private purposes (Andonova & Carbonnier, 2014). Often, these legitimacy contestations reflect different perceptions about the appropriateness of partnerships' 'outputs', referring to the capacity to solve problems requiring collective action, and of their 'inputs', referring to the qualities of procedures or other institutional features such as expertise (Bexell & Mörth, 2010; Glasbergen, 2013) .[4] Evaluations of global institutions' *input legitimacy* generally refer to whether global governance processes comply with principles of procedural fairness and democratic

standards, such as accountability, transparency, participation and representation[5] (Scholte & Tallberg, 2018). Despite involvement of nonstate actors non-accountable towards affected populations, enhanced scope and quality of participation can arguably strengthen partnerships' input legitimacy (Dingwerth, 2007). This may be done through functional rather than electoral representation (Meadowcroft, 2007); deliberation and shared learning for better decision-making (Bäckstrand, 2006; Risse, 2005); strengthened internal accountability mechanisms (e.g. peer, public, reputational, market, financial accountability) (Steets & Blattner, 2010); and by ensuring procedural fairness. For these reasons, 'inclusiveness' and 'multi-stakeholderism' have become key terms in the legitimation of partnerships' 'inputs' (Schleifer, 2019).

Claims about other institutional features or qualities transcending governance processes can also influence beliefs in partnerships' input legitimacy. Expertise in terms of technical or scientific knowledge has for example for long been recognized as a source of private authority (Cutler et al., 1999) and has become a key feature in the legitimation of partnerships (Bull & McNeill, 2010). Partnerships can also gain moral authority through their adoption of progressive social agendas and may hold some formal-legal legitimacy if endorsed by the UN General Assembly or in virtue of working to achieve member-state based goals and commitments. The special 'image', or organizational identity of partnerships as something 'novel', flexible and informal also shape perceptions of their input legitimacy (Andonova, 2017, p. 9; Bull & McNeill, 2010). Emerging at a time of growing dissatisfaction with inefficiencies of multilateral negotiations, partnerships have notably been hailed as the new way to achieve what governments and the UN could not manage alone (Bull & McNeill, 2007). They are seen as *more* pragmatic, solution-oriented, flexible, efficient and un-bureaucratic than intergovernmental processes, and as creating win–win situations for state and market actors, providing collective goods by pooling resources, skills and expertise (Reinicke & Deng, 2000).

However, while partnerships may reduce participation gaps and power asymmetries in global governance by challenging state-centered authority (Cashore, 2002), scholars have challenged the input legitimacy of many partnerships. They point to dominance of Western donors and corporations in partnerships' decision-making processes, underrepresentation of affected actors, undemocratic selection processes, conflicts-of-interest, and inattention to power asymmetries between participants, effectively limiting equality of participation (Buse & Harmer, 2004; Hawkes & Buse, 2011; Martens, 2007; McKeon, 2017; Richter, 2004; Utting & Zammit, 2009; Zammit, 2003). Faced by such criticisms, the way in which partnerships frame themselves is changing. Increasingly, the distinction between 'public and private' and the term 'partnership' signifying shared authority among actors, are replaced by other terms, such as 'multistakeholder' and 'initiatives'. This 're-framing' of partnerships could be viewed critically as a legitimation strategy as it effectively blurs the contrast between public and private actors and removes attention from contentious procedural qualities, towards a stronger focus on performance (Bartsch, 2011: Bäckstrand & Kylsäter, 2014).

In the absence of conventional democratic input legitimacy, performance or *outputs* is more commonly underpinning legitimation of partnerships (Bäckstrand & Kylsäter, 2014; Dingwerth, 2017). Partnerships are promoted as 'the modern strategy of problem-solving', offering a solution to complex global challenges requiring collaboration across various types of actors and sectors (Peters & Pierre, 2010, p. 42). Their performance depends however on their specific functions, which vary greatly – from advocacy and awareness-raising, to standard-setting and implementation (Bull & McNeill, 2007). Nevertheless, studies showing limited effectiveness, especially regarding broader outcomes and social impact, increasingly challenge perceptions of partnerships' output legitimacy (Pattberg et al., 2012, p. 241; Schäferhoff et al., 2009, p. 461). Legitimacy perceptions may also be challenged by negative unintended consequences as partnerships may reduce state-willingness to

regulate, thus challenge intergovernmental organizations' authority (Utting & Zammit, 2009), and increase fragmentation of global governance, creating work duplication and coordination challenges (Rushton & Williams, 2011). Dingwerth and Witt (2019) also note how global institutions' output legitimacy is challenged in terms of the moral acceptability of the values underlying their work (p. 44). As many partnerships emphasize economic growth, and market competition over civic visions like human rights, justice and equity, they are criticized for promoting technical, market-based 'quick-fix' solutions to single issues, skewing resources and attention away from underlying causes of complex structural problems (McKeon, 2017; Storeng, 2014).

2.3. Audiences and politics of legitimation

While global institutions' legitimation strategies are shaped in response to broader normative and institutional pressures prevailing in the relevant issue-area, several scholars have shown how demands and normative expectations of legitimacy-granting audiences influence legitimation processes (Bernstein, 2011; Gronau & Schmidtke, 2016: Reus-Smit, 2007; Symons, 2011; Zaum, 2013). In line with Bexell and Jönsson (2018), legitimacy-granting audiences can generally be understood as actors who hold or withhold beliefs of appropriate authority vis-à-vis a governance arrangement, including both state and nonstate actors that might be, or not be, bound by the authority of a governance institution. The relevance of different audiences in terms of influencing global institutions' legitimation strategies is however a matter of much debate, and varies across institutions and over time (Symons, 2011; Zaum, 2013). Scholars have shown how the legitimation challenge is particularly complex for hybrid institutions seeking to affect both state and nonstate actors inside and outside their institutional boundaries, and which generally depend upon the support and recognition from a diversity of actors (Bernstein, 2011; Boström & Hallström, 2013; Glasbergen, 2013; Schleifer, 2019).

As the different audiences' normative beliefs and demands may be conflicting, partnerships face 'legitimacy dilemmas' whereby satisfaction of one demand may lead to non-satisfaction of another (Black, 2008). Partnerships may respond by 'window dressing,' enacting institutional changes that do not bring the expected organizational change, or by 'empty promises' where discourse is not reflected in institutional change (Fransen, 2012). Often ignored in IR studies on legitimation, the distribution of power among legitimacy-granting audiences plays a crucial role within legitimation processes (Symons, 2011). Partnerships become 'political arenas in which struggles over influence and divergent interests take place,' resulting in a 'bargaining game' where the distribution of power determines whose preferences are reflected in legitimation strategies (Schleifer, 2019, p. 54). Legitimation strategies can thus reinforce existing power relationships as the most powerful actors manifest their positions through strategic discourse or actions in defense of the status quo (Beetham, 2013, p. 104; Hurd, 2018). To reveal *who matters* in terms of shaping legitimation strategies, one must identify the audiences for legitimacy claims, their norms and expectations, their relative power and authority vis-à-vis each other and in relation to the legitimacy-claiming institution (Bernstein, 2018).

3. Methodology

Rich context-specific empirical material is necessary when seeking to uncover the political dynamics behind legitimation processes. Case studies can also reveal limitations of strict analytical distinctions of audiences by showing how norms, values and interests do not in all contexts vary in line with actor type and hierarchical relationships (Bexell & Jönsson, 2018). This empirical study of SUN's

legitimation practices rests on a qualitative within-case analysis, drawing on data from a variety of primary and secondary sources. The relevant audiences of SUN's legitimation, their beliefs and expectations and the relations between them, were determined empirically, as outlined in the following section about SUN. The case exemplifies that partnerships' legitimacy can be challenged both from *within* by internal audiences, and by external actors, and that legitimacy beliefs are not necessarily related to actor-type. Different UN agencies have for example held conflicting views regarding SUN's appropriate form of governance. This shows the limitations of strict analytical audience categories, and supports Bernstein's point that establishing the boundaries of relevant political communities or audiences is an empirical and interpretive task unlikely to be without controversy (Bernstein, 2011, p. 28).

SUN's discursive legitimation practices were identified through analysis of speeches by SUN representatives, online promotional material, progress reports, evaluations, strategies and policy documents from 2011–2017. The material was analysed with particular attention to how SUN described and justified itself and how it appealed to normative justifications related to input and output legitimacy. With attention to the broad legitimacy dimensions of input and output legitimacy, the study grounds the analysis of SUN's legitimation within broader normative debates about partnership legitimacy, while at the same time allowing for empirical exploration of legitimation particular to the case of SUN. Institutional legitimation practices were identified by a combination of document analysis, interviews and observations to clarify intentions and drivers behind reforms or new policies. The interviews and observations also provided insight into the motivations behind SUN's different legitimation practices, who they were targeted at, and the bargaining involved in efforts to satisfy different demands.

Thirty-two in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted between 2014 and 2016, with actors then currently or formerly representing SUN's global governance structures (secretariat, governing boards, stakeholder networks (UN, donor, business, civil society)), and SUN countries, as well as with civil society actors and academics outside of SUN. Observation was carried out through a two-week visit to the SUN Secretariat in Geneva, participation at SUN events and meetings (e.g. a strategy meeting in Dar-es-Salaam and the SUN Global Gathering in 2015), and at nutrition conferences (e.g. the 2014 Second International Conference on Nutrition (ICN2), and a 2015 World Health Organization (WHO) technical consultation on conflicts-of-interest in nutrition programmes).

4. The SUN Movement

SUN has no legal status but is placed under the aegis of the UN Secretary-General (UNSG). The UNSG appoints SUN's highest decision-making body, the Lead Group whose members include public and private donors, UN agencies, businesses, civil society organizations and SUN country governments. SUN's Global Coordinator acts as Assistant UNSG and the SUN Secretariat is hosted by UNOPS in Geneva. Global self-organized and self-funded stakeholder networks (business, civil society, UN, donors) support, together with the Secretariat, the 61 member countries' national efforts to improve nutrition in line with SUN's strategy and principles and with global normative commitments to reduce malnutrition[6] (SUN, 2016a).

While SUN does not have the authority to enforce compliance with policies or practices, it exerts 'soft' authority through the diffusion of ideas and norms about how and why malnutrition should be understood and addressed. The uptake of these ideas in SUN member countries is facilitated by the fact that members of SUN's leadership structures represent economic, political and epistemological powerful state and nonstate actors, upon whose support SUN member countries depend (Harris,

2017). SUN does not support member countries directly with financial resources, although some financial donor assistance can be received by nonstate actors through a 'Pooled Fund' (SUN, 2018a). Rather, the main form of support is provided as technical capacity building. This is partly provided by the Secretariat and SUN's global networks, but primarily through the 'Maximizing the Quality of Scaling Up Nutrition project' (MQSUN), funded by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development. Through this project, public and private actors provide technical expertise to SUN countries 'on the design, implementation and evaluation of evidence-based, nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive programming and policies' (MQSUN+, 2020). The Secretariat also facilitates learning exchanges among countries and stakeholders through platforms such as teleconferences, webinars and the in-person 'Global Gathering' (SUN, 2018a). The Secretariat itself depends on donor funding, received in 2011–2016 from the European Union, Canada, Ireland, the Gates Foundation, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, France and the Micronutrient Initiative.[7] Business, private and bilateral donors also provide 'in-kind' contributions to the Secretariat, such as seconded staff and evaluation funding (SUN, 2014, p. 17). SUN's *internal* audiences consist thus of governments and nonstate actors within its member countries whose practices SUN seeks to affect, in addition to the multilateral agencies, public and private donors, businesses and civil society organizations making up SUN's global structures and upon whose support SUN depends. The task of reconciling the views and demands of these various actors through legitimation practices rests primarily with the Secretariat, acting as an *agent* of legitimation.

SUN's legitimation strategies must be understood within the context of its establishment revealing conflicting interests and legitimacy beliefs among various state and nonstate actors involved in global nutrition governance. During the years prior to SUN's establishment, nutrition had gained increased prominence at the global arena. A number of politically and economically powerful actors, such as the World Bank, the Gates Foundation, USA and Canada, and multinational food corporations, became involved with an interest in investing in cost-effective, evidence-based technical micronutrient interventions to reduce child undernutrition (Lie, 2019). Together with the World Food Program (WFP), UNICEF and a number of international NGOs, these actors were key in driving forward the establishment of a multistakeholder initiative (SUN) to address a seemingly 'fragmented and dysfunctional' international nutrition system (Morris et al., 2008, p. 82). Along the way, support to an existing global harmonizing platform for nutrition (the UN Standing Committee on Nutrition (UNSCN)), excluding the private sector, was reduced (Michéle et al., 2019). Eventually, the powerful actors behind SUN' creation, came to occupy leadership positions within SUN's global governance structures and play important roles in the legitimation of SUN.

The criticisms that have been put forth of SUN mirror broader and longstanding normative debates within global nutrition governance. In terms of input legitimacy, SUN has been criticized for creating conflicts-of-interest due to its inclusion of food corporations within governance boards, ignorance of power asymmetries among SUN members, and limited accountability towards affected communities (Oenema, 2014; Schuftan & Greiner, 2013). Debates about its output legitimacy have been related to concerns that SUN would skew resources away from sustainable rights-and food-based approaches to address the underlying causes of all forms of malnutrition, towards technical quick-fix solutions to address the narrow issue of child stunting (Clapp & Scrinis, 2017). The brunt of this criticism has come from external issue specific civil society actors promoting the right to food and nutrition. These actors have explicitly opted out from joining SUN and represent an important *external* legitimacy granting audience, challenging SUN's legitimation through publications and oppositional campaigning (Gupta et al., 2017; Times of India, 2017). Their voices have among others made resonance within the (former) Brazilian and Indian Governments, who so far

have decided against joining SUN.[8] SUN's legitimacy has also to some extent been challenged *from within* by actors with similar concerns, most notably by civil society organizations, and by representatives of the UNSCN Secretariat, the WHO and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) who initially were critical to the establishment of SUN.

5. Legitimation of the SUN Movement

5.1. Claiming input legitimacy through discourse and institutional 'window dressing'

Both in response to and in anticipation of criticisms and conflicting demands from its various audiences, SUN has from the very start legitimized itself by appealing to input-based governance norms. This legitimation has primarily been discursive, coupled with institutional 'window-dressing' to please critical external audiences, without compromising the demands of powerful internal audiences.

In terms of *discursive legitimation strategies*, progress reports 2011–2014 framed SUN as neutral and independent, stressing its reliance on evidence and expert-knowledge, with statements such as: 'SUN is also pragmatic: its members are not motivated by rhetorical statements or political positioning, but by producing evidence and demonstrating results.' (SUN, 2012, p. 13). To justify its approach to malnutrition criticized during its establishment, SUN frequently referred to authoritative epistemic sources, the scientific evidence base, and the economic advantages of investing in mainly technical nutrition interventions (SUN, 2012, 2013). SUN was also initially legitimizing itself by emphasizing its innovative and informal structure relative to existing institutions. It described itself as 'a different kind of organization designed for an evolving world,' not just 'another institution, fund or programme' (SUN, 2012, p. 10), or 'an initiative, project, or programme' (Nabarro, 2013, p. 666). SUN's inclusiveness relative to existing institutions excluding the private sector was emphasized; it was described as a 'big tent' (Mokoro, 2015, p. 353), and as an 'entity *giving space* (…), rather than taking space' (MDF, 2013, p. 14). By portraying itself as more informal and inclusive than existing governance structures, SUN responded to expectations of it to reduce fragmentation and dysfunctions within global nutrition governance. Several informants confirmed this effort on the part of the SUN Secretariat staff. As a member of SUN's UN Network noted: 'They [the SUN Secretariat] don't want to be accused of creating a more complex governance landscape. Not another institution. But it is making things more complex.'[9] A former Secretariat staff-member explained: 'SUN is only a coordination hub for countries. (…). We just want to see better-functioning global governance.'[10]

To underscore its informality and to deflect input-related criticisms, SUN was also from the start deliberately avoiding calling itself a 'partnership'. The term never appears in SUN's official communications material, and informants from the Secretariat described their efforts to ensure that SUN was not seen as a partnership. One informant even mentioned an 'internal [Secretariat] policy' of *not* calling SUN a partnership,[11] and another explicitly stated that SUN was not a partnership, like critical civil society actors claimed, but only facilitated that different actors 'sit around the same table and talk'.[12]

This active avoidance of using the 'partnership' term can be seen both as a reaction to the broader normative critique of partnership input legitimacy, as well as to the specific criticisms of nutrition partnerships, and to SUN's input legitimacy in particular, as expressed by external civil society actors and some critical internal audiences. Thus, in response to criticisms of conflicts-of-interest, power asymmetries and limited external accountability, SUN rather decided to call itself a *country-led movement*: 'The SUN Movement is driven by its member countries' (SUN, 2019), clearly shaping

beliefs in itself as an informal and bottom-up initiative. Speaking at SUN's Global Gathering in 2014, the former director of the WFP and co-chair of the SUN Business Network explicitly emphasized the importance of the term 'movement':

> (…) if anyone asked you what a movement looks like, this is what a movement looks like. (…) Waltz's dictionary defines a movement as a series of organized activities working toward an objective. Also as an organized effort to promote or attain an end, for example the US civil rights movement, or the women's movement. By bringing people together, putting policies in place and mobilizing support for country level action, SUN has truly created an ever more effective movement.[13]

Comparison of SUN with grassroot-initiated anti-Establishment social movements seems at odds with SUN's form of governance, set up by powerful Western donors and UN agencies, involving some of the most influential private actors in global health. An external evaluation of SUN scrutinized this mismatch, stating: 'The terminology of SUN as a movement that is country-driven is used as a way of emphasizing that it seeks to avoid imposing top–down solutions on countries (…),' serving as 'a powerful metaphor, and a simplified perspective on the complex dynamics of how SUN operates in practice' (Mokoro, 2015, p. 22). Interviews with informants involved in establishing SUN confirmed that the term was deliberately chosen to shape perceptions of SUN as 'bottom–up,' not driven by powerful interests, but by its member-countries. As stated by a former senior member of the SUN Secretariat:

> We started to work on the idea of what initially was called the "initiative for scaling up nutrition." But then we started to call it a *movement* for scaling up nutrition. (…). And the reason was to try to move away from it being controlled and owned by different interests, to try to make it something that was only owned by and serving the interests of countries.[14]

A member of the SUN UN Network also closely involved in SUN's establishment confirmed this strategy: 'I remember we discussed the term "movement". (…). And how important it was to put countries in the driving seat.'[15]

Thus, by emphasizing member-country influence, SUN seeked to be perceived as representative of, and accountable to the needs of its member-countries, and ultimately to affected communities. SUN has clearly tried to enhance perceptions of its input legitimacy by gradually increasing the share of member-country representatives on its governance boards. However, while member-countries clearly have some influence on SUN's governance and operations, to claim that countries themselves actually *lead* SUN, seems like an overstatement. Member countries were minimally involved in establishing SUN and most of its work is funded by Western private and bilateral donors. SUN's Lead Group is chaired by UNICEF and its Executive Committee by the World Bank (previously the Gates Foundation)[16] and representatives of SUN member countries are still in a minority compared to other state and nonstate actors.[17] While the Secretariat consults member countries on matters related to SUN's governance, there is no denying that the actors upon whose support SUN depends exert considerable influence. Observations from within the Secretariat confirmed that the demands and expectations of donors and multilateral agencies often take precedence, despite staff efforts. This dynamic was also described by a former consultant to the Secretariat:

> What have countries driven? (…). I think there's a fairly strong perspective from them [the SUN Secretariat] about what it is that countries need, and the sense that they have to protect that against the donors, and to a certain extent against the UN. So "country-driven" may be better framed as: "a couple of peoples' interpretation of what countries need, driving what they are determining as the direction".[18]

By framing itself, not as a partnership, but as a country-driven movement, SUN not only diverts attention away from its inclusion of the private sector and its formal top–down donor/UN-led structure, it also creates connotations to democratic qualities of participation and external accountability – input legitimacy standards called for by SUN's critical audiences. At the same time, SUN seeks input legitimacy as it claims functional representation of different interests and expertise by emphasizing its inclusive multistakeholder approach, aligning itself with the normative expectations of supportive internal audiences. The somewhat 'eclectic' discursive legitimation during SUN's first years, thus illustrates how partnerships seek to reconcile different and at times conflicting demands among their various audiences and in line with the broader normative environment.

In addition to discursive legitimation, SUN also responded to criticisms of its input legitimacy through certain *institutional legitimation strategies*; by including civil society actors and member-country representatives within its Lead Group and by establishing a Civil Society Network. While membership of this network is open to all national and international civil society organizations committed to SUN's objectives and principles, in practice it remains largely dominated by major international Non-Governmental Organizations, such as Save the Children, supportive of SUN from the start (Michéle et al., 2019).

SUN has also made institutional efforts to address the issue of conflicts-of-interest. Firstly, its Principles of Engagement explicitly state that 'both personal and institutional conflicts of interest must be managed with the highest degree of integrity' (SUN, 2015a), and companies that would like to join the SUN Business Network must comply with UN guidance on health and nutrition and the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes[19] (SBN, 2019). Secondly, after a request from the Lead Group, SUN commissioned in 2013/ 2014, development of guidelines for preventing and managing conflicts-of-interest within SUN multi-stakeholder platforms (SUN, 2015b). While these institutional measures indicate willingness to address issues raised by critics, they seem more like 'window dressing' in terms of actual effects. While SUN's Business Network restricts membership of breast-milk-substitute companies, other multinational food and beverage corporations whose products conflict with public health nutrition, such as PepsiCo and Mars, are members (SBN, 2020). Further, SUN's conflicts-of-interest guidelines have been deemed weak, focusing more on protecting the principle of inclusiveness than actually preventing conflicts-of-interest (Lie & Granheim, 2017; Michéle et al., 2019, pp. 59–60). During interviews and observations, business and private donors within SUN's governance boards and networks, seemed particularly reluctant to address conflicts-of-interest. When confronted about the issue at the ICN2 by an external civil-society actor, the former chair of the Executive Committee and representative of the Gates Foundation responded for example: 'I don't even call it conflicts of interest. Everyone around the table has interests. It's about how we manage those interests.'[20] In a recent SUN review, it becomes clear that conflicts-of-interest is an ongoing and growing concern among SUN's civil society members and member countries (SUN, 2020).

Including civil society within its global governance structures and implementing efforts to address conflict-of-interest show SUN as responsive to criticisms by external and internal audiences. However, as found in earlier studies, these institutional measures represent narrow interpretation of critics' normative demands, not to conflict with the demands of more powerful audiences (Schleifer, 2019). The resolution of legitimacy dilemmas within partnerships is hence conditioned by political positioning and power divergences across different legitimacy-granting audiences.

5.2. Claiming output legitimacy through institutional reform and discursive 'lip service'

While the input-related discursive legitimation continued as SUN developed, SUN gradually became more concerned with improving perceptions of its *output* legitimacy. As stated in its new strategy 'From inspiration to impact' (2016–2020); 'focusing on impact and results at scale must now be the focus moving forward, this time with increased coordination, improved accountability and communication of what is and isn't working to scale up nutrition' (SUN, 2016a, p. 17). Speaking at the strategy launch, the former UNICEF chair of the Lead Group stated: 'Success is built not just around creating a structure and process, success is creating results'.[21]

However, SUN's new strategy did not only put a stronger emphasis on outputs, it also shifted focus as regards the *types* of outputs promoted and the values underpinning performance. This discursive shift aligned with normative and institutional developments within the area of nutrition and development. Notably, following the ICN2 and the UN Decade of Nutrition (2016–2025), governments made new commitments to combating *all forms* of malnutrition. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development also marked a shift towards a more holistic developmental focus anchored in principles of equity, human rights and justice (UNSCN, 2019). SUN had always claimed to be rights-based, but its discourse now shifted from a strong focus on the economic benefits of reduced child stunting, towards more explicit expressions of how SUN's multistakeholder approach represented the only way to realize the right to adequate food and 'nutrition justice'.[22] It also shifted its focus to address all forms of malnutrition, not just stunting (SUN, 2016a).

This discursive legitimation was also in line with long standing demands by civil society and other critical audiences, for more attention to human rights, equity, and all forms of malnutrition. Observations from within the Secretariat and interviews confirmed that there were serious tensions among internal audiences around the type of rhetoric SUN should adapt in the new strategy.[23] The meaning of the term 'nutrition justice' was for example debated among UN agencies' staff, civil society actors and the Secretariat, eventually leading to the term being discarded in the adopted strategy as no definition could be agreed upon. The Secretariat was particularly sensitive to the reluctance of certain donors to support a human-rights-based agenda, noting how they would take care to phrase human-rights issues 'as obscurely as possible.'[24]

This discursive shift thus seemed to be a strategy to stay attuned with broader normative developments while balancing the normative demands of different audiences. Recent research on the actual effects of SUN's work within member countries suggest that the rights-based discourse is not reflected in practice as SUN has done little to promote action to generate demands for good nutrition as a right. SUN is also found to contribute to promote technical nutrition interventions still focusing on stunting, rather than addressing structural causes of malnutrition in all its forms in a sustainable manner (Harris, 2017; Michéle et al., 2019).

In terms of *institutional legitimation strategies*, a stronger focus on outputs and on improving performance of SUN countries was also strongly mirrored in a number of institutional reforms within SUN's new strategy period. The push for results came primarily by donors, following an evaluation assessing SUN's effectiveness and efficiency (Mokoro, 2015, p. 1). The evaluation found that SUN had produced limited results in terms of country-level nutrition actions; very few SUN countries had result frameworks and plans for how to achieve SUN's objectives; and nutrition resource mobilization had been slow (Mokoro, 2015, pp. 86–87). To improve performance, the evaluation recommended strengthening SUN's global governance arrangements, including 'the creation of a senior body that can exercise effective supervision of the implementation of SUN's strategy' (Mokoro, 2015, p. xviii). Despite initial resistance from some UN agencies, internal civil society

actors, and the Secretariat that felt they had to 'protect' countries from more top-down governance and donor influence,[25] it was decided to establish a new accountability framework and a more 'hands-on' Executive Committee to 'oversee the development and implementation of the Movement's strategy and its operating modalities' (SUN, 2016b). Secretariat staff clearly noted how donors and private sector actors were driving the reforms to improve results, saying: 'donors won't touch it if not [results are produced]. And we need donor money.'[26] And: 'the private sector is very impatient. They think things aren't moving fast enough. They get very bored with process talk.'[27] One of them even feared the push for results over process would hurt SUN in the long run:

> (…) things go wrong if it [SUN] is seen as an imposed program. (…) We (…) are expected to create results all the time. And if you're expected to create results, that means calling people to account (…). I'd prefer the movement not to be so pushy on results.[28]

Certain donors, especially the Gates Foundation, played a particularly influential role in the new institutional developments as they funded the evaluation, hired consultants actively preparing and participating in strategy development, and participated actively in an interim steering committee tasked with taking the findings of the evaluation forward. Other influential members of this committee included the WB, UNICEF, the WFP, USA, Canada, the European Commission and Unilever, and only one representative of a SUN member country.[29]

An accountability framework was also developed at the time, to better monitor and evaluate different members' contributions towards SUN's strategy. The 'Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning (MEAL) System' however mainly contributes to improve internal accountability upwards from countries towards SUN's global structures, being based on countries' self-assessments and other data sources, enabling comparison of country performances evaluated against 79 indicators (SUN, n.d.). This system allows for comparisons and evaluations of member-countries' performance against global goals and SUN's objectives – contributing to direct donor and private sector funding and investments.

The institutional reforms aimed at improving perceptions of SUN's output legitimacy thus resulted in more formalized and 'top–down' governance structures, actually moving SUN further away from its proclaimed form as an informal, country-driven movement. As noted in a recent review of SUN: 'there is a deficit in mutual accountability among the various actors in the SUN Movement. In practice, SUN members who are significantly dependent on international assistance are more rigorously assessed than are the funding providers' (SUN, 2018b, p. viii).

Thus, in contrast to the discursive "lip-service" and institutional "window dressing" meeting critics' demands, the demands for internal accounability and results by influential internal donors, private sector actors and multilateral agencies, were met by effectful institutional reforms. This illustrates the role of power in conditioning legitimation processes, where some audiences are more influential in manifesting their positions than others.

6. Discussion and conclusion

This case study of SUN's legitimation processes shows that partnerships face a variety of legitimacy dilemmas in seeking recognition and support from their diverse legitimacy-granting audiences. Operating within the crowded field of global nutrition governance, where tensions surrounding partnerships and the role of the food industry is particularly contested, SUN was from the start confronted by legitimacy dilemmas. Could it: be inclusive of the food industry while at the same time prevent conflicts-of-interest?; be 'country-driven' and 'multistakeholder'?; be effective without

imposing top-down solutions?; be human-rights-based without ensuring participation by rights-holders? The dilemmas reflected real political and normative contestations across its various legitimacy-granting audiences, mirroring broader normative debates about partnership input and output legitimacy, and cutting across actor-types and hierarchical relationships. For SUN, the most significant conflict was between external civil society actors critical to SUN's business inclusion and technical nutrition approaches, and internal donors, private sector actors and certain multilateral agencies supportive of such. As these demands pulled in opposite directions, the Secretariat faced considerable legitimation challenges, resulting in somewhat eclectic and at times contradictory legitimation strategies.

During the early years, SUN legitimized itself mainly through discourse grounded in input-based values. It focused on framing itself in line with expectations of being more efficient than UN-led processes, expert-driven, inclusive, multistakeholder and accountable towards affected communities. In response to criticisms of conflicts-of-interest and broader normative critiques of input legitimacy of partnerships, SUN resisted the 'partnership' term and rather called itself a *country-driven movement* – with associations to democratic standards of participation and external accountability. It also put in place certain institutional measures in response to criticisms, but mainly as 'window dressing.' Over time as the pressure for results, particularly from donors and private sector actors, increased, SUN's legitimation shifted towards greater emphasis on outputs. This shift was evident through its discourse, but more importantly through institutional reforms strengthening its top-down and internal accountability structures – leading to a growing mismatch between its rhetoric and institutional structures. This mismatch is also evident in its adoption of a human-rights and equity discourse, paying 'lip-service' to critics demanding rights-based approaches to address all forms of malnutrition.

The analysis thus showed how normative demands for more democratic and fair procedures and rights-based approaches, primarily put forth by external civil-society actors, were addressed through weak institutional measures and discourse. By contrast, normative demands for internal accountability and results, put forth by donors, private sector actors and multilateral agencies holding influential positions in SUN brought real institutional reforms. As shown by other studies, such differentiated responses are not uncommon when partnerships respond to conflicting legitimacy beliefs; reflecting the relative power of different audiences in shaping legitimation strategies.

By focusing on the political dynamics behind SUN's legitimation, the study illustrates Bernstein's point that 'Power is implicated in any form of governance and what its legitimation requires' (Bernstein, 2011, p. 42). Legitimacy contestations are indeed grounded in substantive grievances over how power and wealth are distributed within global governance, and within global nutrition governance more specifically. The fact that SUN legitimizes itself as something it is *not*, is misleading and arguably contributes to reinforce existing power asymmetries within nutrition governance. Not only does SUN gloss over the fact that its governance remains dominated by powerful Western donors and UN agencies, it also diverts attention away from how it has contributed to opening up national and global nutrition governance to private sector actors – whose interests are not necessarily in line with public nutrition goals or broader societal values like human rights and equity. In terms of implications for its effectiveness, SUN seems to fall victim to its own failure to effectively address critics demands and countries' interests as internal discontent and mistrust is growing (SUN, 2020, p. 36). This highlights the importance of partnerships to balance legitimation strategies, taking into account legitimacy concerns of all audiences in order to successfully improve legitimacy perceptions.

Notes

1. And the Indian States Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh.
2. Multiple definitions of global public–private partnerships exist. This study adheres to a definition by Andonova (2017, p. 2) aligned with common understanding of the phenomenon in IR:

   > Global public-private partnerships are voluntary agreements between public actors (IOs, states, or substate public authorities) and nonstate actors (nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], companies, foundations, etc.) on a set of governance objectives and norms, rules, practices, or implementation procedures and their attainment across multiple jurisdictions and levels of governance.

3. Some authors describe institutional efforts to (de)legitimise an institution as 'behavioural' (Tallberg & Zürn, 2019), while others again distinguish between 'institutional' and 'behavioural' practices (Bäckstrand & Söderbaum, 2018). This study adapts the notion of institutional practices as the focus is on institutional and policy changes intended to legitimise a partnership, not on behavioural practices, such as protest, to delegitimise an institution.
4. The distinction between input and output legitimacy was originally defined by Fritz Scharpf (1999) to distinguish between process and substance of governance (in Scholte & Tallberg, 2018, p. 59). Since, the terms have been used, as here, to distinguish more broadly between partnerships' performance and their features related to procedures and other governance qualities, such as expertise and moral authority (Bull & McNeill, 2010).
5. The concept of 'throughput' legitimacy was later developed by Vivien Schmidt, referring to the procedural fairness of decision-making processes (Scholte & Tallberg, 2018, p. 59).
6. Including the World Health Assembly's targets for maternal and young child nutrition and its Non-Communicable Diseases Global Monitoring Framework, and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SUN, 2016a).
7. Now Nutrition International. Donors listed according to size of contributions.
8. Although some Indian States have joined.
9. Interview, representative of the SUN UN Network, Geneva, 1 December, 2014.
10. Interview, former staff member of the SUN secretariat (1), Rome, 20 November, 2014.
11. Informal conversation, former consultant to the SUN secretariat (1), Geneva, 8 October, 2015.
12. Interview, former staff member of the SUN secretariat (1), Rome, 20 November, 2014.
13. Transcript, speech by Erthrin Cousin, the SUN Global Gathering, Rome, 16 November 2014. (https://scalingupnutrition.org/about-sun/sun-movement-global-gathering/sun-movement-global-gathering-2014/).
14. Interview, former senior staff member of the SUN Secretariat (2), Geneva, 12 November, 2015.
15. Interview, representative of the SUN UN Network, Geneva, 1 December, 2014.
16. The Lead Group is chaired by UNICEF. The Executive Board was chaired by the Gates Foundation until January 2019 when replaced by the World Bank. (https://scalingupnutrition.org/sun-supporters/sun-movement-executive-committee/).
17. 5 out of 27 Lead Group members were representatives of SUN countries in 2019 (https://scalingupnutrition.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/SUN-Lead-Group-2019.pdf), and 8 out of 17 Executive Committee members (https://scalingupnutrition.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/SUN-Movement-Executive-Committee-BIOS.pdf).
18. Interview, former consultant to the SUN secretariat (2), via phone, 20 November 2015.
19. 'The Code is designed to prevent companies from promoting infant formula, other milk formulas and food that fully or partly replace breast milk' (Save the Children, 2018, p. vi).
20. Observation, panel debate: 'Improving policy coherence for nutrition: nutrition in all sectors', ICN2, Rome, 20 November, 2014.
21. Speech by Anthony Lake, former director, UNICEF, launch of SUN strategy 2016–2020, New York, 2016.
22. Welcome speech by David Nabarro at the SUN Global Gathering, 2015. Day 1. 20 Oct. 2015. (42–43:33 min) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kYERFN38DQA&feature=emb_title
23. Observations, the SUN secretariat, Geneva, November, 2015.

24. Interview, former staff member of the SUN secretariat (3), Geneva, 2 December 2014.
25. Observations, the SUN secretariat, November 2015, and the SUN Visioning meeting, Dar es Salaam, April, 2015.
26. Interview, former senior staff member of the SUN Secretariat (2), Geneva, 12 November 2015.
27. Interview, former staff member of the SUN secretariat (3), Geneva, 2 December 2014.
28. Interview, former senior staff member of the SUN Secretariat (2), Geneva, 12 November 2015.
29. See Mokoro (2015, p. 460) for an overview of the Visioning sub-group's members.

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Disclosure statement

Notes on contributor

Ann Louise Lie is a PhD student at the Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo. Her research interests lie in the area of global health and nutrition governance and international political economy. Her publications include articles in *Global Governance* and *The Lancet*.

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Article 3: '*When the SUN Shines on Tanzania*: how a global partnership influences national nutrition policy'

III

Attachments

UiO : Centre for Development and the Environment
University of Oslo

Consent to Participate in Research

The Influence of Public-Private Partnerships in Global Nutrition Governance.
A case study of the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement.

This is a question to you if you would like to participate in a research project that aims to explore the governance and political dynamics of global public-private partnerships for nutrition, and of the Scaling Up Nutrition Movement in particular. In this information sheet, I provide information about the aims of the project and what your participation will involve.

Purpose

The aim of the project is to investigate, through a case study of the SUN Movement, how global public-private partnerships within the field of nutrition, contributes to shape policies, politics and power dynamics within nutrition governance globally and in Tanzania. It looks particularly on the role of different types of actors (civil society, business, UN agencies, public and private donors, governments) operating within the global structures of SUN, and within nutrition policy making in Tanzania. Some of the questions I will investigate involve questions about the history of SUN's establishment, its current functioning and role within the broader landscape of global nutrition governance and Tanzanias national nutrition governance. The research is a PhD study.

Who is responsible for the research project?

The research is carried out by the undersigned (Ann Louise Lie). I am a PhD student at the Centre for Development and the Environment at the University of Oslo. I am also affiliated with the Institute of Health and Society at the Medical Faculty at the University of Oslo. My supervisors are Professor Desmond McNeill at the Centre for Development and the Environment, and Professor Christoph Gradmann at the Medical Faculty.

The research is fully funded by the University of Oslo.

Why are you asked to participate?

The selection of the participants of this project is done through purposive sampling. I have identified persons relevant to the workings of SUN, who either were involved in its establishment, or in its current operations, representing SUN's management or different stakeholder groups of SUN (civil society, UN agencies, business, donors, government officials). The identification of participants were done through my own network, background research and through "snowballing technique" (asking participants to suggest other relevant participants).

Implications of your participation

If you agree to participate in my research, I will conduct an interview with you at a time and location of your choice. The interview will involve questions relating to your work related to nutrition, and/or your role within SUN, and your own perceptions about the functioning and role of SUN. It should last about one hour. With your permission, I will audiotape and take notes during the interview. The recording is to accurately record the information you provide, and will be used for transcription purposes, and given your permission, for quotations in the final study (see information about confidentiality below). If you choose not to be audiotaped, I will take notes instead. If you agree to being audiotaped but feel uncomfortable at any time during the interview, I can turn off the recorder at your request. Or if you don't wish to continue, you can stop the interview at any time.

I expect to conduct only one interview; however, follow-ups may be needed for added clarification. If so, I will contact you by mail/phone to request this.

Participation in research is voluntary.

Your participation in the research project is voluntary. If you chose to participate, you may at any time withdraw your consent without giving any particular reason. In this case, all information about you will be anonymized. It will not have any negative consequences for you if you chose to withdraw your consent.

All participants will be asked for oral consent.

Confidentiality – how I store and use your information

All the information you provide will only be used for the purpose of the project as described in this document. I will treat your information in confidence and in line with Norwegian privacy regulations. Only myself and my supervisors will have access to the information you provide. In case interviews are transcribed by a third person, the transcriber will sign a confidentiality agreement developed by the Norwegian Social Science Data Service.

When storing data, I will replace your name and your contact details with a code stored on a separate name-list stored in a separate location. All electronic files (recordings, notes, transcripts) will only be stored on my personal University of Oslo computers, protected by my personal password. Hard copy notes will be stored in a locked locker in my office.

If results of this study are published or presented, individual names and other personally identifiable information will not be used, unless you give explicit permission for this orally or by writing at a later point.

What happens to the information you provide when the project ends?

The project is stipulated to end by 31.12.2020. Upon completion of the project, all data will be anonymized.

Your rights

As long as you can be identified in the data, you have the right to:
- Get access to what kind of personally identifiable data that is registered about you
- Correct personally identifiable information about you
- Delete personally identifiable information about you
- Get a copy of your personally identifiable information, and
- Send a complaint to the Data Protection Official for Research at the Norwegian Social Science Data Service.

What gives me the right to treat personally identifiable data about you?

I treat the data about you based on your consent.

By request of the Centre for Development and the Environment at the University of Oslo, The Norwegian Social Science Data Service (NSD), has appraised the treatment of personally identifiable information in this project to be in line with Norwegian privacy regulations.

How can I get more information?

If you have questions about the project, or wants to use any of your rights, please contact:

- The Centre of Development and the Environment, University of Oslo by Ann Louise Lie (email: a.l.lie@sum.uio.no, or phone: +47 40084303).
- Data protection officer at the University of Oslo: Roger Markgraf-Bye (email: personvernombud@uio.no).
- NSD - Norwegian Social Science Data Service, by email (personverntjenester@nsd.no) or phone: +47 55582117.

****

Consent

If you agree to participate, please say so. You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your own records.

Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste AS
NORWEGIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA SERVICES

Ann Louise Lie
Institutt for helse og samfunn Universitetet i Oslo
Postboks 1130 Blindern
0318 OSLO

Vår dato: 14.11.2014   Vår ref: 40637 / 3 / JSL   Deres dato: Deres ref:

TILBAKEMELDING PÅ MELDING OM BEHANDLING AV PERSONOPPLYSNINGER

Vi viser til melding om behandling av personopplysninger, mottatt 06.11.2014. Meldingen gjelder prosjektet:

40637	Global multi-stakeholder partnerships in food and nutrition governance. A Critical analysis of the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) initiative
Behandlingsansvarlig	Universitetet i Oslo, ved institusjonens øverste leder
Daglig ansvarlig	Ann Louise Lie

Personvernombudet har vurdert prosjektet, og finner at behandlingen av personopplysninger vil være regulert av § 7-27 i personopplysningsforskriften. Personvernombudet tilrår at prosjektet gjennomføres.

Personvernombudets tilråding forutsetter at prosjektet gjennomføres i tråd med opplysningene gitt i meldeskjemaet, korrespondanse med ombudet, ombudets kommentarer samt personopplysningsloven og helseregisterloven med forskrifter. Behandlingen av personopplysninger kan settes i gang.

Det gjøres oppmerksom på at det skal gis ny melding dersom behandlingen endres i forhold til de opplysninger som ligger til grunn for personvernombudets vurdering. Endringsmeldinger gis via et eget skjema, http://www.nsd.uib.no/personvern/meldeplikt/skjema.html. Det skal også gis melding etter tre år dersom prosjektet fortsatt pågår. Meldinger skal skje skriftlig til ombudet.

Personvernombudet har lagt ut opplysninger om prosjektet i en offentlig database, http://pvo.nsd.no/prosjekt.

Personvernombudet vil ved prosjektets avslutning, 31.12.2017, rette en henvendelse angående status for behandlingen av personopplysninger.

Vennlig hilsen

Katrine Utaaker Segadal

Juni Skjold Lexau

Kontaktperson: Juni Skjold Lexau tlf: 55 58 36 01
Vedlegg: Prosjektvurdering

Personvernombudet for forskning

Prosjektvurdering - Kommentar

Ifølge prosjektmeldingen skal utvalget informeres muntlig om prosjektet og samtykke muntlig til deltakelse. Det er imidlertid sendt inn et informasjonsskriv som i stor grad tilfredsstiller kravene i personopplysningsloven. Vi legger derfor til grunn at dette skrivet benyttes, eller at tilsvarende muntlig informasjon gis før potensielle deltakere samtykker. Det forutsettes at følgende setning legges til i skrivet/malen:
- Datamaterialet kan senere bli benyttet til oppfølgingsstudier av forskere som ønsker å se nærmere på Scaling Up Nutrition Movement. Materialet vil derfor lagres videre på ubestemt tid i personidentifiserbar form. (Skriv f.eks. dette. Eventuelt juster det i samsvar med intensjonen).
- Så snart det ikke lenger er nødvendig å oppbevare materialet videre i identifiserbar form, skal materialet anonymiseres ved at navn og lydopptak slettes og stilling og arbeidssted eventuelt grovkategoriseres (om nødvendig).

Revidert informasjonsskriv skal sendes til personvernombudet@nsd.uib.no før utvalget kontaktes.

Vi legger til grunn at det kun registreres personopplysninger under observasjonsdelen av studien, om personer som på forhånd har samtykket til det.

Det tas høyde for at det behandles sensitive personopplysninger om helseforhold.

Det behandles enkelte opplysninger om tredjeperson (andre relevante aktører). Det skal kun registreres opplysninger som er nødvendig for formålet med prosjektet. Opplysningene skal være av mindre omfang og ikke sensitive, og skal anonymiseres i publikasjon. Så fremt personvernulempen for tredjeperson reduseres på denne måten, kan prosjektleder unntas fra informasjonsplikten overfor tredjeperson, fordi det anses uforholdsmessig vanskelig å informere.

Personvernombudet legger til grunn at forsker etterfølger Universitetet i Oslo sine interne rutiner for datasikkerhet. Dersom personopplysninger skal lagres på privat pc/mobile enheter, bør opplysningene krypteres tilstrekkelig.

Transkriberingsassistent vil regnes som en databehandler for prosjektet, hvis vedkommende ikke er ansatt ved UiO. Universitetet i Oslo skal inngå skriftlig avtale med med vedkommende om hvordan personopplysninger skal behandles, jf. personopplysningsloven § 15. For råd om hva databehandleravtalen bør inneholde, se Datatilsynets veileder: http://www.datatilsynet.no/Sikkerhet-internkontroll/Databehandleravtale/. Personvernombudet ber om kopi av avtalen for arkivering (sendes: personvernombudet@nsd.uib.no).

Forventet prosjektslutt er 31.12.2017. Ifølge prosjektmeldingen skal innsamlede opplysninger oppbevares videre på ubestemt tid (kanskje hos NSD) til eventuelle oppfølgingsstudier av The Scaling Up Nutrition Movement. Vi legger til grunn at materialet anonymiseres så snart det ikke lenger er bruk for at det oppbevares i identifiserbar form videre.

Vi legger til grunn at eventuell transkriberingsassistent sletter opplysningene etter at oppdraget er ferdig utført.

Meldeskjema / The influence of public-private partnerships in global nutrition governa… / Vurdering

Vurdering

Dato
28.11.2019

Type
Standard

Referansenummer
414859

Prosjekttittel
The influence of public-private partnerships in global nutrition governance. A case study of the "Scaling Up Nutrition Movement" (SUN)

Behandlingsansvarlig institusjon
Universitetet i Oslo / Universitetsstyret / Senter for utvikling og miljø

Prosjektansvarlig
Ann Louise Lie

Prosjektperiode
01.04.2014 - 31.12.2020

Meldeskjema ↗

Kommentar
BAKGRUNN
Behandlingen av personopplysninger ble opprinnelig meldt inn til NSD 6.11.2014 (NSD sin ref: 40637) og vurdert under personopplysningsloven som var gjeldende på det tidspunktet.
26.11.2019 meldte prosjektleder inn en endring av prosjektet. Endringen innebærer en utsettelse av prosjektslutt fra 31.12.2018 til 31.12.2020.

Det er vår vurdering at behandlingen av personopplysninger i prosjektet vil være i samsvar med personvernlovgivningen så fremt den gjennomføres i tråd med det som er dokumentert i meldeskjemaet den med vedlegg, samt i meldingsdialogen mellom innmelder og NSD. Behandlingen kan starte.

MELD VESENTLIGE ENDRINGER
Dersom det skjer vesentlige endringer i behandlingen av personopplysninger, kan det være nødvendig å melde dette til NSD ved å oppdatere meldeskjemaet. Før du melder inn en endring, oppfordrer vi deg til å lese om hvilke type endringer det er nødvendig å melde: https://nsd.no/personvernombud/meld_prosjekt/meld_endringer.html
Du må vente på svar fra NSD før endringen gjennomføres.

TYPE OPPLYSNINGER OG VARIGHET
Prosjektet vil behandle særlige kategorier av personopplysninger om politisk oppfatning og alminnelige kategorier av personopplysninger frem til 31.12.2020.

LOVLIG GRUNNLAG
Prosjektet har innhentet samtykke fra de registrerte til behandlingen av personopplysninger. Ettersom informasjonen som er gitt til deltakerne er gitt under gammelt lovverk, oppfylles nødvendigvis ikke nye krav i personvernforordningen, som trådte i kraft 20.7.2018.

Ikke alle samtykkene som opprinnelig ble innhentet kan dokumenteres nå. Det skal derimot sendes ny informasjon til deltakerne, og vår vurdering er derfor at prosjektet likevel legger opp til et samtykke i samsvar med kravene i art. 4 nr. 11 og art. 7, ved at det er en frivillig, spesifikk, informert og utvetydig bekreftelse, og som den registrerte kan trekke tilbake.

Lovlig grunnlag for behandlingen vil dermed være den registrertes uttrykkelige samtykke, jf. personvernforordningen art. 6 nr. 1 bokstav a, jf. art. 9 nr. 2 bokstav a, jf. personopplysningsloven § 10, jf. § 9 (2).

Det har også blitt gjennomført observasjon i prosjektet. Vår vurdering er at denne behandlingen oppfyller vilkåret om vitenskapelig forskning, jf. personopplysningsloven § 8, og dermed utfører en oppgave i allmennhetens interesse. Lovlig grunnlag for behandlingen vil dermed være utførelse av en oppgave i allmennhetens interesse, jf. personvernforordningen art. 6 nr. 1 bokstav e), jf. art. 6 nr. 3 bokstav b), jf. personopplysningsloven § 8.

PERSONVERNPRINSIPPER

NSD vurderer at den planlagte behandlingen av personopplysninger vil følge prinsippene i personvernforordningen om:

- lovlighet, rettferdighet og åpenhet (art. 5.1 a), ved at de registrerte får tilfredsstillende informasjon om og samtykker til behandlingen
- formålsbegrensning (art. 5.1 b), ved at personopplysninger samles inn for spesifikke, uttrykkelig angitte og berettigede formål, og ikke viderebehandles til nye uforenlige formål
- dataminimering (art. 5.1 c), ved at det kun behandles opplysninger som er adekvate, relevante og nødvendige for formålet med prosjektet
- lagringsbegrensning (art. 5.1 e), ved at personopplysningene ikke lagres lengre enn nødvendig for å oppfylle formålet

DE REGISTRERTES RETTIGHETER
Så lenge de registrerte kan identifiseres i datamaterialet vil de ha følgende rettigheter: åpenhet (art. 12), informasjon (art. 13), innsyn (art. 15), retting (art. 16), sletting (art. 17), begrensning (art. 18), underretning (art. 19), dataportabilitet (art. 20).

NSD vurderer at informasjonen som de registrerte vil motta oppfyller lovens krav til form og innhold, jf. art. 12.1 og art. 13.

Vi minner om at hvis en registrert tar kontakt om sine rettigheter, har behandlingsansvarlig institusjon plikt til å svare innen en måned.

FØLG DIN INSTITUSJONS RETNINGSLINJER
NSD legger til grunn at behandlingen oppfyller kravene i personvernforordningen om riktighet (art. 5.1 d), integritet og konfidensialitet (art. 5.1. f) og sikkerhet (art. 32).

For å forsikre dere om at kravene oppfylles, må dere følge interne retningslinjer og eventuelt rådføre dere med behandlingsansvarlig institusjon.

OPPFØLGING AV PROSJEKTET
NSD vil følge opp ved planlagt avslutning for å avklare om behandlingen av personopplysningene er avsluttet.

Lykke til med prosjektet!

Kontaktperson hos NSD: Håkon J. Tranvåg

Tlf. Personverntjenester: 55 58 21 17 (tast 1)

Vurdering

Dato
15.01.2021

Type
Standard

Referansenummer
414859

Prosjekttittel
The influence of public-private partnerships in global nutrition governance. A case study of the "Scaling Up Nutrition Movement" (SUN)

Behandlingsansvarlig institusjon
Universitetet i Oslo / Universitetsstyret / Senter for utvikling og miljø

Prosjektansvarlig
Ann Louise Lie

Prosjektperiode
01.04.2014 - 30.06.2021

Meldeskjema 🗗

Kommentar
NSD har vurdert endringen registrert 6.1.2021.

Vi har nå registrert 30.6.2021 som ny sluttdato for behandling av personopplysninger.

NSD vil følge opp ved ny planlagt avslutning for å avklare om behandlingen av personopplysningene er avsluttet.

Lykke til videre med prosjektet!

Kontaktperson hos NSD: Håkon J. Tranvåg

Tlf. Personverntjenester: 55 58 21 17 (tast 1)