Affective Agency

A Study of Emotions in Hegel's *Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes*

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S.S.S.

Abstract

What is an emotion? How should we understand the relationship between sensations, feelings, emotions, and other cognitive and conceptual capacities? What role do socially conditioned habits play in the constitution of emotions and in our emotional lives as such?

The aim of the present study is to give a novel, critical reconstruction of G.W.F. Hegel's answers to these questions in *Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes*, the first part of the last volume in his *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften* (1832). It is argued that *Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes* – whose ambition it is to provide a unified, developmental, non-dualist account of human mindedness – offers what is known as a *cognitive evaluative view* of emotions. According to the cognitive evaluative view, emotions are intelligent judgments of value, or things that are important for one's flourishing, accompanied by physiological arousals and an action tendency. Hegel bakes this view into the psychological part of his account of freedom in a way that makes affectivity and action compatible. The result is a notion of *affective agency*, outlined at the very end of this thesis.

I develop my reading in dialogue with Paul Redding and Jason Howard's interpretations of Hegel's philosophy of emotion. Against Howard's critique of Hegel's philosophy of emotion as being "proto-positivistic", I suggest that Hegel sees emotions not as natural kinds, but as socio-historically developed parts of our *second nature*, and that their central component is the cognitive evaluative judgment, not their specific physiological arousal. Furthermore, I argue that Hegel's account of practical feelings [prakische Gefühle] – his term for emotions – contradicts Redding's claim that Hegel believes cognitive work must be done *on* feelings in order for them to play a determinate role in our minds. Drawing on John McDowell's perceptual conceptualism, I show that for Hegel, conceptual cognition is made operative *within*, not *on*, practical feelings.

Although I am positively inclined towards Hegel's philosophy of emotion and present it as a viable alternative to the so-called *feeling theories* of Descartes, Hume, and James, it nonetheless criticizes its *formalism charge* against the emotions, and its tendency to make them dispensable in certain judgments of value. These moves commit Hegel to a set of implausible conclusions, which proves inconsistent with his own line of argument.

The study hopes to show that Hegel's complex concept of emotion in the *Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes* can shed new light on his system as a whole, and refute the view that the late Hegel neglected the sensuous, affective, and emotional dimensions of our being, which has been circulating since the time of Feuerbach and Kierkegaard.

Notes on abbreviations and referencing

Studying Hegel's works is as much a philosophical as a philological task. To be as precise as possible, I quote his works in original, based on Suhrkamp's 1971 *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*, edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel. When quoting shorter sentences without the need for a separate indented paragraph, I foreground English translations, followed by the German original in square brackets. I do this for the sake of readability. The English translations of Hegel I have consulted are of the *Enzyklopädie* and of *Philosophie des Rechts*, where the paragraphs correspond to each other. My own translations of Hegel and German commentaries are marked with the abbreviation "t.m.".

The abbreviation of the third *Enzyklopädie* below (Enz. III) is only used in parentheses. Since the main focus of the thesis is *Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes,* I use *PsG* whenever I mention this part in the body of the text. When referring to *Zusätze* – additions in Hegel's text – I follow the convention of abbreviating it as "Zus." in parentheses.

Works by G.W.F. Hegel:

Enz. I: [1830] 2021. *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. Erster Teil. Die Wissenschaft der Logik*. Werke 8. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Enz. II: [1830] 1970. *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. Zweiter Teil. Naturphilosophie.* Werke 9. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Enz. III: [1830] 2020. *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. Dritter Teil. Die Philosophie des Geistes.* Werke 10. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 2007./ 2007. *Philosophy of Mind*. Translated by W. Wallace and A.V. Miller. Revised by M. J. Inwood. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

FS: [1793-1802] 1971. *Frühe Schriften.* Werke 1. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp

GW: [1802] **"**Glauben und Wissen oder Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjektivität in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen als Kantische, Jacobische, und Fichtesche Philosophie" in *Jenaer Schriften. Werke 2.* Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. p. 287-393.

PhG: [1807] 2020. *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Werke 3. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp

PR: [1821] 2020. *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*. Werke 7. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp/ 1991. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. Translated by H.B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

VA1: 1970. *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik I*. Werke 13. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp

VA3: 2018 *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik III.* Werke 15. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp

VPR 1: 1969. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion. I.* Werke 16. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp

WL1: [1812] 2020. *Wissenschaft der Logik I.* Werke 5. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp

WL2: [1816] 2020. *Wissenschaft der Logik II.* Werke 6. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp

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"Vielmehr wäre es an der
Philosophie, im Gegensatz von
Gefühl und Verstand
deren Einheit aufzusuchen
eben die moralische…"

- Theodor W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia* §127 (2001, 377)

Introduction

Background: The unwanted stepchildren of metaphysics?

In his book *The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life* (1977), Robert C. Solomon identified and attempted to dispel a myth he believed had shaped Western philosophy and culture for millennia. Solomon named it *the myth of the passions.* The premise of this myth is that reason and emotion[1] are separate and opposing forces; immiscible like oil and water, to borrow Antonio Damasio's well-chosen image (1994, xi). From this dualist assumption flows a host of normative statements with which most of us are familiar: Emotions are subjective, contingent, irrational, biased, and invasive forces we are passively overwhelmed by. They often lead us to make bad, selfish decisions and are to be kept at bay by reason, the true locus of rational order and spontaneity, which provides us with a reliable compass in everyday life, and whose pure, unaffected operations arrange for sound judgments, agreement with others, and genuine moral action (Cf. Salomon 1977, 9-12).

One does not have to look long before encountering examples of how deeply rooted these assumptions about the relationship between emotion and reason are in contemporary society.[2] Their force is, at least *prima facie*, psychologically understandable. Certain emotions do tend to subvert or make us deviate from what we know to be the rational, correct, or even good thing to do in a given circumstance. Experiencing this happening to oneself or to others can be terrifying and add fuel to negative attitudes toward emotions, like those cited above.

In addition to the psychological and sociological factors that may have contributed to the influence of the myth of the passions, philosophy itself has had a hand in its development. As Agnes Heller puts it: "Feelings, emotions and sentiments have been like the stepchildren of metaphysical philosophy … The degrading of feelings and emotions to a low status is not just a byproduct of metaphysics; it belongs to metaphysics' essential constitution." (2009, 1).

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[1] In this subsection I use "emotions" as a "catch-all"-term for feelings, affects, and passions. The reader will recognize when I start using it more technically, to refer to a distinguishable mental capacity.

[2] There are philosophers who have proposed the opposite diagnosis and lamented the allegedly sorry state of our "emotivist" culture. The most influential among these contributions from the last decades is MacIntyre's *After Virtue* (1981). Whatever the merits of this work, it suffers from a failure to detect how the emotivist position it criticizes reproduces the basic assumption of the myth of the passions in a new disguise. This is especially evident when MacIntyre attacks the notion – attributed to Moore and Stevenson – that all evaluative and moral judgments are expressions of "nothing but" particular feelings or attitudes (1981, 11-12). By abstaining from discussing how such a view operates with a strict separation between reason and emotion, MacIntyre misses what would have been a good opportunity for his own project of articulating the psycho-logical presuppositions of what kind of moral knowledge we allegedly have lost – to show, like his leading figure Aristotle, that emotions have a kind of intelligence to them which is indispensable for practical agency. Mark Fisher's critique of so-called *emo-politics* in New-Labour UK is philosophically more balanced, since it is grounded in a Spinozist view of the unity between reason and emotions (Cf. 2018, 524).

According to Heller, philosophy's unfair treatment of emotions stems from two factors ubiquitous in most metaphysics: an urge to demonstrate the primacy of the *eternal* over the *changeable, necessity* over *contingency*, *form* over *matter*, *spirit* over *body*, and the *universal* over the *particular*, as well as to make a formulated worldview cohere. To do so, emotions have been expelled from rational metaphysical procedures (which are supposed to be unconditioned and pure) and relegated to the right side of the above dichotomies (Ibid.). In this way, philosophy has helped to promote the myth of the passions.

Like Solomon (1977), Damasio (1994), Nussbaum (2001), Lyons (1980), and other figures whose works I will draw upon in this thesis, I am convinced that the myth of the passions should be treated as only a myth. Its basic premises are as false as the strategy of the (in Heller's sense) metaphysical philosophy is undialectical and likely to reproduce them. Not only have empirical psychology and neuroscience provided good evidence disputing that "reason in cold blood" is desirable. (Studies suggest that pathological absence of emotions impairs the ability for long-term planning, social functioning, and moral performance) (Cf. Damasio 1994). The underlying message of the myth of the passions is also at odds with the fact that emotions, despite their disruptive tendencies, make our lives meaningful, and that they are indispensable for our bonds with fellow creatures and, thus, for our identity.

Research question

Today, in the era of post-metaphysical thinking, these points will likely come off as less controversial than they once were. The same description does not apply to the following claim: that it is possible to reconstruct a compelling account of the emotions, which avoids the pitfalls of the myth of the passions, based on G.W.F. Hegel's *Philosophie des Subjektiven Geistes* (*PsG*), a part of a self-entitled encyclopedic philosophical system whose architect is by many regarded as the last great rationalist metaphysician.

Heller knew that Hegel's philosophy can be read as an exception to the metaphysics discussed above. But she only mentions it in passing, maintaining that Hegel remained in a "limbo" regarding emotions, due to his notion of absolute spirit (Ibid., 4). Similarly, Solomon notes that Hegel had positive things to say about emotions, but that he (like Kant) was a "dualist" about the relationship between emotions and reason (1977, 44). I think the *PsG*, Hegel's developmental account of subjective human mindedness, can prove these reservations wrong. But what, then, is Hegel's stance on emotions in this work, and is it possible to glean a unified account from it? The present study seeks to answer this two-fold research question.

Hegel's ambivalence

On the face of it, Hegel's attitude towards the emotions seems indeed an ambiguous one. The common historical portrayal of his system as a grand synthesis between enlightenment thought and romantic expressivism is perhaps already an indication that clear-cut labels like *emotivism* or *intellectualism* will not fit (Pippin 2009, 134-15). However, it is arguably in the latter category most people would be inclined to situate Hegel's philosophy, especially since the criticisms of Feuerbach and Kierkegaard.[3] The story often goes that although Hegel in his youth was deeply inspired by figures like Rousseau and Herder (Henrich 1971, 16; 68), that he wrote fragments arguing for the indispensability of emotions in *Volksreligion* and for how *love* could solve the internal fragmentation of the modern individual (cf. FS, 9-104; 239-255), there are hardly any traces left of these convictions in his later systematic works. The following quote from *Phänomenologie des Geistes (PhG)* testifies to this shift in his thinking:

> Indem jener sich auf das Gefühl, sein inwendiges Orakel, beruft, ist er gegen den, der nicht übereinstimmt, fertig; er muß erklären, daß er dem weiter nichts zu sagen habe, der nicht dasselbe in sich finde und fühle;- mit andern Worten, er tritt die Wurzel der Humanität mit Füßen. Denn die Natur dieser ist, auf die Übereinkunft mit andern zu dringen, und ihre Existenz nur in der zu Stande gebrachten Gemeinsamkeit der Bewußtsein. Das Widermenschliche, das Tierische besteht darin, im Gefühle stehen zu bleiben und nur durch dieses sich mitteilen zu können (PhG, 51)

Examples such as these loom large in Hegel's later works. In numerous passages he describes emotions in a way highly reminiscent of the myth of the passions; as animalistic, passive, contingent, subjectivistic "dull weaving of spirit" [dumpfes Weben des Geistes] (cf. Enz. III §405. Zus.; PhG, 252). For many readers, these claims are enough to discourage us from seeking affirmative, insightful accounts of emotions in Hegel's work. Why should they not?

The answer is partly related to the above-indicated fact that Hegel became an ardent critic of romantic sentimentalist philosophy; in particular that of contemporary figures like the Schlegel-brothers, Schleiermacher, Görres, and Schelling.[4] As Katrin Pahl argues in *Tropes of Transport* (a study of emotions in *PhG*), Hegel took the romantic sentimentalists to task for two things: First, for operating with too sharp a distinction between rationality and emotionality, and thus failing, or avoiding, to reconcile them. Second, for perceiving emotions as private, non-expressible, and available only through inner intuition (2013, 19).

[3] Cf. Feuerbach's attempt to lump Hegel together with Kant and Fichte regarding sensuousness in *Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft* (1983, §22) and Kierkegaard's critique on behalf of subjective, passionate truth in *Postscript* (1992, 189-251). According to Wood, the British idealist's Fichtean ethics have also contributed to the one-sided view that Hegel "… identif[ies] freedom with the triumph of the active or rational self over the supine, empirical, irrational self" (1990, 44).

[4] Yet as Pippin points out discussing the *Differenzschrift,* Hegel always regarded romanticism as "a symptom rather than a solution" (1989, 65). For a detailed discussion of Hegel's criticisms of the different romantic philosophers, see (Pöggeler 1999). For a more recent treatment of Hegel and romantic irony: (Reid 2014).

These objections are related to Hegel's critique of ethics of *conscience* – what Laurentiis calls *feeling-based ethics* – where an action or attitude is justified solely with reference to an exclusive "subjectivistic moral cognition", detached from objective ethical laws (2021, 149).

It was Jacobi – Hegel thought – who paved the way for this kind of thinking about the emotions, by refashioning the Kantian notion of faith into an unscientific, non-conceptual, and immediate knowledge (Pöggeler 1999, 32; Enz. I §62). Hegel saw this style of thinking as something much more pervasive than a mere trend in small circles of philosophers. In the *Encyclopedia Logic*, he describes the separation of emotions from thinking as a "prejudice of the time" [Vorurteil jetziger Zeit] and argues that this prejudice has turned them into hostile opposites (Enz. I §2). As anyone familiar with the *PhG's* discussion of *stoicism*, *unhappy consciousness*, *the law of the heart*, and *morality* would know, Hegel not only regarded such a hostile opposition as undesirable, but also as a sign of mental illness.[5] Echoing this, Hegel in *PsG* argues that a "heartless understanding" and a "non-understanding heart" are representative of "bad" and "untrue" existences, and suggests that it is an important task for philosophy to unite the two (Enz. III §445; §471). Thus, the target of his harshest complaints about emotions is not so much this capacity per se. Rather, the target is the romantic sentimentalist construal of it, which, in its attempt to turn the Kantian framework upside down, elevates emotions over reason and objectivity by shielding the former from the latter.

The argument of this thesis: Hegel's cognitive evaluative view of emotions

Based on these remarks, it is safe to say that Hegel's stance on the emotions is committed to overcome the one-sidedness of Kantian ascetic morality and romantic sentimentalism. While Hegel would agree with the first part of Pascal's dictum that "the heart has its reasons", he would strongly disagree with the second part of it, which declares that reason cannot know them (Pascal 1999, 158). But there is nothing novel about this interpretation[6] and it does not take our understanding of emotions very far. Fortunately, Hegel's analysis in the *PsG* gives more concrete answers, which can be reconstructed into a distinct and coherent philosophy of

[5] This diagnostic is most explicit in *PhG's* section *the law of the heart*, whose very subtitle is "madness of self-conceit" [*Wahnsinn des Eigendünkels*]. The shape of consciousness defending the law of the heart only wants to follow laws based on its inner immediate hunches; unmediated by and in strict opposition to the impersonal, burdensome rational order outside of itself. Hegel's point against the law of the heart is that all laws seek realization and validity for other individuals. Hence, when the figure of consciousness actualizes the law of its heart, it will quickly recognize that it neither was as personal nor immediate as it first believed, and become alienated from it (PhG, 275-283). There are interesting similarities between the madness Hegel believes this principle gives rise to, and his discussion of madness in *PsG.* I only briefly touch on this similarity in chapter 3.

[6] Even a critically inclined Hegel-reader as Adorno pointed out that the essence of Hegel's dialectics is: […] daß sie versucht, durch den Gedanken selbst jene Trennung der Sphären, wie sie in dem Wald- und Wiesensklischee von Denken, Fühlen, und Wollen vor allem sich ausdrückt, eben rückgängig zu machen (1958, 68)

emotions. The main argument of this thesis is that Hegel's account of emotions in the *PsG* falls under and expands on what is usually called the *cognitive-evaluative* tradition. A brief sketch of this tradition, Hegel's place in it, and its main adversary, is in order.

The cognitive evaluative tradition

The cognitive evaluative tradition has its roots in the works of Aristotle, the Stoics, and Aquinas, but it first gained traction in the second half of the last century through contributions of Magda Arnold, William Lyons, George Pitcher, Robert Solomon, and Martha Nussbaum. Although it comprises diverging positions, the unifying idea is that the essential component of an emotion is an intelligent, evaluative judgment of a *formal* and a *particular* content. We can think of the formal content of an emotion, such as fear, as an *evaluative category*, like "danger", under which the particular content, "this wasp", is subsumed (Cf. Lyons 2009, 99-114). The value that partakes in the emotional judgment must be related to the person's *flourishing* (Nussbaum 2011, 4). A key point in this tradition is that what distinguishes emotions from each other is the cognitive evaluation, not the specific physiological arousal or feeling, although the latter, and often a certain *action tendency*, follow from the emotion.

Feeling theory

The evaluative view is often contrasted with *feeling theory*. Feeling theory was the most widespread theory of emotions between the seventeenth and the nineteenth century (Lyons 2009, 2). Although it comes in different forms, it is usually traced back to Descartes' *On the Passions of the Soul*, before it was refashioned by figures like Locke, Hume, and James (cf. Power & Dalgleish 2008, 21; 26; Lyons 1980).

According to feeling theory, an emotion is an awareness of bodily arousals, such as a feeling. These bodily arousals can be excited through sensations or perceptions of something outside oneself, such as a wasp. Upon becoming aware of the feelings or bodily movements thus excited – heightened pulse or even the fact that we have started to run away from the wasp – we enter the emotional state of fear (Cf. Descartes 1985, 342; James 1983, 1065).

Although feeling theory posits a connection between a perception of something, the ensuing bodily movements (feeling), and the awareness of these bodily movements (the emotion), it does not count the initial perception as *part of the emotion* (cf. Lyons 1980, 10). The perception, the mental event, or the belief, partakes in the causal chain *leading up to* the emotion, but it is inherently neutral, non-emotional, and non-evaluative. Consequently, feeling theory must deny emotions causal power in their own constitution (Power & Dalgleish

2008, 23). Fear does not result from an emotive evaluation of the wasp, which thereafter gives rise to a specific feeling in my body. Instead, it is the other way around. Emotions are purely epiphenomenal. As James put it: "we feel afraid … because we tremble" (James in Power & Dalgleish 2008, 27). Taken together, these points imply that the *object* of my emotion is not the wasp, but my bodily movements (Ibid., 24). Furthermore, emotions are to be distinguished in terms of bodily movements, not the cognitive evaluation. As I later argue, this construal of emotions makes them easy prey for the myth of the passions.

Hegel's place in the cognitive evaluative tradition

It is not obvious that Hegel belongs to the first tradition, nor that his framework in the *PsG* helps us spot the shortcomings of the second. For instance, although Hegel terminologically distinguishes between "sensations" [Empfindungen] and feelings [Gefühle], he does not do so with feelings and "emotions" *qua* cognitive evaluations. One never encounters the word "Emotion" in Hegel's German texts, and related terms like "affects" [Affekte] or "temper" [Gemüt] is only loosely used. This terminological observation can lead one to believe that Hegel advocated for feeling theory. However, the term "emotion"[7] first started to refer to mental states worthy of their own scientific investigations in the Anglophone world around 1850 (Dixon in Scarantina & De Sousa, 2021), and it never became as prevalent in German (cf. Frank 2002, 11-14). Thus, Hegel cannot be blamed for his terminological choice here.

Having said that, the real reason why Hegel's preference for the term "feeling" does not threaten to undermine my interpretation has less to do with etymology than what he means by the term. Hegel, I claim, operated with at least three distinguishable categories of Gefühle: one belonging to the *soul* [die Seele] (Enz. III §403-411), one belonging to *consciousness* [Bewußtsein] (Cf. Enz. III §446. Zus), and one belonging to *spirit* (Enz. III § 446; §471-472). These Gefühl-categories must be understood from within his *developmental* account of human mindedness.[8] Instead of presenting and analyzing human capacities in an arbitrary manner, Hegel begins with what he conceives of as the most rudimentary and immediate stage [Stufe] and determination [Bestimmung] of spirit. He further demonstrates

[7] "Emotion" stems from the Latin "emovare", "movement out", and came into English via the French" émotion", "excitement" (Online Etymology Dictionary s.v. "Emotion"). The original meaning rhymes well with Hegel's account of the expressive aspects of emotions.

[8] For a critique of the developmental reading of *PsG*, see: (Ikäheimo 2017). It would take me too far to discuss this issue here. My reservation against the developmental reading is not, like Ikäheimo, that the stages in the subjective spirit develop and should be read in parallel. Rather, it is that subjective spirit presupposes objective spirit – development of the individual presupposes its embeddedness in a social and historically situated community. This is implicit in Hegel's discussion in *PsG*, and so in my discussion of it.

how they dialectically lead to and become mediated by more intelligent and advanced ones.[9] The dialectic then eventually (re-)establishes a new and richer *mediated immediacy.*

For Hegel, the logical "method" is not externally *applied* to the human organism, – so as to render it intelligible – but tracks the real development of human mindedness itself (Cf. preface: Enz. I, 11). As expected, the development of human *mindedness* entails development of human *feelings*. The latter development is mapped in the three categories of Gefühle.

My wager is that while the first category – the feelings of the soul – resembles the definition of emotions we find in feeling theory, it is only the last of the three categories which can be called emotions qua cognitive evaluative judgments. Hegel's name for it is *practical feelings* [praktische Gefühle], but I will treat it as synonymous with human emotions (Enz. III §471-472). I base this reading on the fact that Hegel defines practical feelings and their species (like shame and joy) in terms of evaluative *reflective judgments* of formal contents (Enz. III §472 Zus.). Furthermore, he conceives of these evaluations as products of social habituation, and as mediated by conceptual, cognitive capacities that are passively made operative in our sensibility, to speak with John McDowell, another thinker I draw upon in this thesis. These points leave no doubt that the cognitive evaluative judgment, for Hegel, is the distinguishing feature and essential component of an emotion in most adult human beings.

An objection against the cognitive-evaluative theory of emotions is that it neglects the physiological arousals we feel when undergoing emotions, and that it renders emotions too similar to other non-emotional intelligent capacities. Hegel steers clear of these pitfalls. Regarding bodily arousals, he does so by stating that emotions usually embody themselves in particular ways in our *sphere of sensations* [Empfindungssphäre] (Enz. III §401 Zus.). With regards to distinguishing emotions *qua* cognitive judgments of value from other cognitive abilities, we not only have the bodily aspect to account for it. We also have the fact that most emotions, in Hegel's framework, have *action tendencies*,[10] that they always relate to one's personal flourishing, that of another person, or a social community, and that they expose us to our vulnerability and incompleteness. Moreover, there is also the fact that emotions are more immediate and involuntary than other mental states and tend to narrow the possibility of

[9] Both Kant (*Anthropologie*) and Fichte (*Wissenschaftslehre*) begin on the opposite end, deducing human capacities from the most advanced ones. Hegel's bottom-up progressive approach is inspired by Aristotle's *De Anima* (Enz. III §378), but also, it seems, Schelling's *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*.

[10] It has been suggested that some emotions, like nostalgia, have a lesser degree of action tendencies than others (Rorty 1980, 2). This sounds true and holds equally well for Hegel's account of contentment (Enz. III §472 Zus.). But to go from there to argue that it is not a common characteristic of emotions that they lead to certain actions or behavior, is misguided, especially when compared to other mental states. Furthermore, it is not unthinkable that contentment may lead to actions aimed at its continuation.

theoretically grasping the content one is appraising. These qualities are not to the detriment of the emotions. Rather, I claim, they make emotions valuable.

Immanent critique of Hegel's *formalism charge*

In addition to this, Hegel repeatedly states that emotions, especially social, religious, and aesthetic ones, are purely *formal* (Enz. III §471; 472). This characterization (aimed at Jacobi's *Gefühlsphilosophie* but also deployed in Hegel's critique of Kant's moral law) means that emotions lack determinate criteria for what particular content they can respond to, and thus, that they can stamp their form onto *any content* (Cf. Inwood 1992, 105). Hegel couples this *formalism charge* with the claim that if an emotion is truthful (say, one has the true feeling that "x" is good), then it owes its truthfulness not to its form, but to its *content*. And whatever true content we have in mind, it is generated by other forces than the emotion itself; for emotions are purely formal (Enz. III §471). Hence, Hegel concluded that emotions do not partake in the constitution of the content they respond to, and that there is nothing in the content calling for a specific emotional response. He even uses this as a reason for arguing against in-depth studies of the nature of the various types of emotions (Enz. III §471).

I will contest Hegel's formalism charge, not only because it is implausible, but also because it breaks the chain of consistency in the *PsG*. In general, the particular content or material of our emotions – be that the suffering of another person or a scene in a comedy – are usually emotionally charged and call for a certain emotional response for us to be able to respond to it properly. There is an inseparability between the emotions and their objects (Salomon 1977, 177). Otherwise, an emotional response could not be judged as truthful or untruthful (Cf. De Sousa 1980). As indicated, Hegel *did* believe that emotions can have truth-value. But his emphasis that it is other capacities (thinking) and social factors (Sittlichkeit) that arrange for it, led him to downplay how emotions themselves are actively at work here.

As Hegel knew, genuine critique should be *immanent* (Cf. Adorno 1966, 102). One way of doing immanent critique – the one this thesis strives to carry out – is to show how the premises an author is working from entails something else than the conclusions he/she draws from them. Although it can seem as if I mobilize the above counterclaims against Hegel from a philosophical perspective external to his, this is not the case. The stages in the *PsG* point in their direction and contain enough details about the "pathological structure of representation" (Gabriel's term cf. 2011, 48-60) to refute Hegel's formalism charge on his own terms. And regarding criteria for deciding the adequacy/non-adequacy of emotional responses, there are plenty of these in the sections on subjective, objective, and absolute spirit. I focus on Hegel's

view that our emotional lives must be made compatible with having freedom as our ultimate concern, which I map onto his formula of *being with oneself in an other* [beisichsein in einem Anderen]. These points make up what I call *affective agency*. Inspired by Rahel Jaeggi's notion of non-alienated life as a relation of *appropriation*, affective agency refers to the ability to be present to oneself and one's ultimate concerns in one's emotions (Cf. 2014, 63). One's ultimate concerns must be compatible with freedom. Since one's own freedom, for Hegel, depends on the freedom of others in a norm-based, concrete ethical life whose institutions facilitate recognition, affective agency is necessarily *other-directed*.

The state of the art

In recent decades there have been made attempts to identify the role emotions play in Hegel's philosophy. In *Tropes on Transport: Hegel and Emotions* (2012), Katrin Pahl reconstructs Hegel's understanding of emotions based on the *PhG.* While Pahl's work has been informative for the present study in many respects, her interpretative toolbox comes from literary analysis rather than philosophy. Moreover, the *PhG* differs significantly from the work I focus on (*PsG*), especially in terms of its narrative technique and the fact that Hegel conceived of it as an introduction to his system (2012, 42). Another thing worth mentioning is that the *PhG* has been the locus classicus for studies of Hegel's concept of *desire*, from Kojeve's lectures to Butler's *Subjects of Desire* (1997). While desire is closely related to emotions and drives [Triebe], one should be careful not to conflate them; something Hegel makes perfectly clear in the *PsG* (Enz. III §473 Zus.), but which is hard to avoid if one bases one's analysis of Hegel's notion of emotion on the *PhG* alone. These factors limit the degree to which I will draw on Pahl's book. Nonetheless, I still believe I am justified in drawing on the rich examples from *PhG* to illustrate Hegel's understanding of emotions.

As several scholars have noted, the *PsG* has not even remotely generated the same amount of interest as Hegel's other works (Hösle 1987b, 339; Malabou 2005, 23; Ferrarin 2007, 235). This is unfortunate. Not only is the *PsG* Hegel's definitive positive statement on philosophical psychology and mental abilities such as perception, representation, and thinking, and a work he himself regarded as one of his major *realphilosophische* achievements (Henrich 1979, 9). It also contains insights whose value go way beyond mere Hegel-scholarship. This includes his account of madness (Berthold-Bond 1995), his notion of *plasticity* (Malabou 2005), his idea that *consciousness* is non-discursive and hence not be identified with *mind as such* (Winfield 2010), his idea that all forms of representations have a pathological core (Gabriel 2011, 48-60) and, obviously, his account of emotions.

Despite the general neglect of the *PsG*, it has never been entirely forgotten in the Hegel-literature. I have benefitted from commentaries like Iring Fetscher's *Hegels Lehre vom Menschen* (1970), Willem DeVries *Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity* (1988), Richard Dien Winfield's *Hegel and Mind* (2010), and Allegra di Laurentiis *Hegel's Anthropology* (2021). None of these books, however, analyze the *PsG* with special focus on how Hegel's conceives of emotions. There have been some attempts at this in shorter formats: Notable mentions are Paul Redding's chapter on Hegel in *The Logic of Affects* (1999) and Jason J. Howard's article "Hegel on the Emotions" (2013). Although both these texts are to some degree insightful and valuable contributions, they miss out on important details in Hegel's understanding of the emotions and end up drawing false conclusions. Since Redding's interpretation only suffers from a slightly misguided construal of how Hegel sees the sublative relationship between intelligence and emotions, I will save the details for chapter 2. Howard's misinterpretation and critique of Hegel are graver, more dismissive, and call for an introductory addressing.

Howard rightly remarks that Gefühle become *emotive* in the section on practical spirit (2013, 76; cf. also Winfield 2014, 112). Yet – so goes his claim – although Hegel comes close to formulating a viable cognitive evaluative theory of the emotions, he puts too much emphasis on physiology when distinguishing between them. The *PsG* allegedly gives the impression that that which enables us to tell one emotion, like anger, from another, like grief, is its particular, localizable embodiment (its *Verleiblichung*) and not the subject's cognitive evaluation (Ibid., 80). Howard (again rightly) argues that such a view is wrong, but finds it astonishing that someone like Hegel, "the consummate philosopher of intersubjectivity" (Ibid., 83), could underestimate the role of socialization when it comes to the determinate form of specific emotions, and lapse into what seems like a proto-positivistic way of framing them as if they were natural kinds (Ibid.).

Howard's rendition of Hegel as a kind of *feeling-theorist* is misplaced. What Howard is missing in Hegel's framework is – so I will argue – already there. My response to Howard centers around Hegel's strong emphasis on habits ("the mechanism of self-feeling") and how their socio-culturally conditioned sign-making-function establishes the preconditions for intelligent, evaluative comportment to the world. What particular content we respond emotionally to, and how, is culturally mediated all the way down. And although Hegel – as an ardent anti-dualist – may say that an emotion such as *anger* embodies itself in the blood-system,[11] this does not imply that it is the only or best way of distinguishing between

[11] *PsG* is modelled on Aristotle's *De Anima* (Enz. III §378) In that work, Aristotle discusses the "dialectician's'" and "physician's" definition of anger, favoring a combination of the two (DA: 403b). Hegel follows suit.

emotions. For one thing, Hegel makes it clear that the arrival of a proper *psychical physiology* is still pending (Enz. III §401). More importantly, Hegel in the discussion of the emotive practical feelings barely mentions their physiological embodiment, concentrating instead on evaluative formal content (Enz. III §472 +Zus.). Furthermore, he stresses the close affinity between practical feelings and *action*, the latter of which – like language – is a more refined vehicle for the expression of emotions than the *involuntary ones*, such as quivering or crying (Enz. III §411 Zus.). This conviction can already be found in the critique of phrenology and empirical psychology in the *PhG* (PhG 244). Therefore, I will claim that on this point, Hegel's project is less riddled with inconsistencies than Howard thinks.

The structure, scope, and historiographical method of this thesis

Writing on Hegel poses philological difficulties and interpretative dilemmas. Few philosophers take more pain in justifying the steps they make, demanding the logical necessity of each of them, the necessity of locating them within the whole, and of following them closely, as Hegel. Are readers allowed to fixate on particular aspects and alter the original order of presentation, or should one stay faithful to it? I believe that for studies like the one at hand, crucial parts of Hegel's argument are lost if one chooses to radically depart from his deduction of categories or mental capacities.

Therefore, the three chapters of this thesis are dedicated to corresponding parts of the *PsG,* in virtually the same developmental order as Hegel presents them. Hence, chapter one deals with the first part of the *PsG*, namely the *Anthropology*, where the development of pre-intentional, corporeal feelings is discussed, alongside topics such as mental illness, habit, and emotional expression. Chapter two first touches on the *Phenomenology* and the development of intentional, pre-discursive feelings, before it advances to the *Theoretical Spirit* part of the *Psychology*, where feelings are mediated by cognitive, discursive, and conceptual capacities. Finally, chapter three is dedicated to the *practical spirit* part of the *Psychology* and what I regard as Hegel's conception of emotions – *practical feelings* –, which is connected to the psychological enabling conditions of freedom, and culminates in what I call *affective agency*. I have deliberately chosen to spend the least time on the *Phenomenology*, due to its lack of relevancy and rather odd place in the *PsG*. This is also why I have merged it with the chapter on *theoretical spirit*, and given the most important part, on *practical spirit*, its own chapter.

Given what was said about the role of the "whole" in Hegel's thought, and that I am offering an interpretation emphasizing the *social* nature of human emotions, some may find it odd that I leave out a discussion of objective (and absolute) spirit. Besides the fact that such a

discussion would require a lot more space, I regard it as justifiable from a philosophical point of view. If my arguments are sound, the deep structure of emotions in the *PsG* will be seen to require the institutions and recognitive practices laid out in the *PoG* and *PR.* It can also shed new light on Hegel's social philosophy. Discussing how is the topic for another text.

Historiographically, my procedure is *rational reconstruction* (cf. Rorty 1984 49). The questions I ask Hegel's *PsG* are what it can tell us about the emotions today, and what it says about his philosophy. It is true that Hegel emphasizes that we should not get bogged down in the particular determinations and capacities of spirit but rather strive to grasp its overall structural logic, which for him is more faithful to the Delphian imperative of self-knowledge (Hösle 1987b, 339; Enz. III §377). Yet in my view, self-knowing also consists in singling out aspects that have been neglected by philosophy, relating them back to the whole in which they initially were a part, and considering whether the whole has been altered. If there is a second point on which I am thinking against Hegel, this is it. Although these methodological points may sound anachronistic (Rorty 1984, 49-50), I believe running the risk of anachronism is necessary when reading a historically minded philosopher such as Hegel, who saw philosophy as a constant dialogue between the old and the new.

Why Hegel – why *philosophy* of the emotions?

If what we really want to understand is the nature of human emotions, why bother going back to a philosopher from the late 18th century, who did not live to see the scientific revolutions of our time? In *Alchemies of the Mind* (1999), Jon Elster makes some interesting points about the value of studying authors and philosophers who wrote about emotions prior to the rise of modern experimental psychology. Elster argues that the widespread experimental studies of animals cannot provide us with explanations of the specific relationship between emotions and cognition characteristic of human emotions. Humans can form beliefs about mental states, animals cannot (1999, 49). For Elster as for Hegel, this ability plays a crucial role in the emotional lives of human beings, especially when it comes to more complex emotions such as shame. But why is this a problem, considering that we can simply study humans themselves? As Elster points out, there are just as many financial as ethical problems pertaining to the study of human emotions. Paying human beings to be placed in situations designed to provoke strong emotions such as shame, guilt, or grief, would not only be expensive, but ethically questionable (Ibid., 50). A consequence of these restrictions is that we are left with constructing situations where much less is at stake for the subject. Hence, the emotion we are seeking to understand will not unfold with the same intensity and complexity as in real life.

And while one can always draw on self-reports, these tend to be unreliable (Ibid.)

The upshot is that "prescientific" investigations of emotions have not been rendered superfluous by modern psychology (Ibid.). Quite the opposite: "Some men and women in the past have been superb students of human nature, with more wide-ranging personal experience, better powers of observation, and deeper intuitions than almost any psychologist I can think of" (Ibid.). Elster's favored choice here is Aristotle, and he justifies his choice with reference to Aristotle's keen eye for the social and not merely individual antecedents of emotions (Ibid.). Although Hegel's discussion of the emotions is not as detailed nor as compressed within single chapters of his works as Aristotle's, I believe he still has a lot to say about both the individual and social dimensions of our emotions.

What do psychologists themselves say about this division of labor? Consider the following description: "Philosophy is primarily concerned with the construction of a coherent conceptual framework within which to understand emotion, whereas psychology is also concerned with how such a framework might be instantiated in the human mind" (Power & Dagleish 2008, 50). This description of the task of philosophy squares neatly with the way Hegel conceived of his own systematic approach. Although the *PsG* sometimes ventures into discussions on the physiology of emotions, Hegel is primarily occupied with *conceptually* situating human emotions within a framework that encompasses the notional connection between everything from inorganic nature, animals, human beings, society, art, religion, and philosophy. The foundation of this conceptual approach is, of course, the *Logic.* Although I must leave out a longer discussion about the complex relationship between the Logic, *Philosophy of Nature* (*PN*)*,* and *PG*, I hope to unearth how the conceptual fine structure of Hegel's understanding of human emotions – mediated by the categories of the *Logic* and situated within a larger framework – lives up to the task ascribed by Power and Dalgleish.

On the use of Zusätze in this thesis

The reader will notice my reliance on the *Zusätze* – additions – in the *PsG*, transcribed and added to the text by Hegel's students based on their lecturer's oral remarks. Such reliance is not as exegetically controversial as it once was. DeVries (1988, xiii), Berthold-Bond, Winfield (2010), and Laurentiis (2021) all make extensive use of the Zusätze. This tendency is not surprising, given that Hegel wrote his *Enzyklopädie* as a compendium for his students, whose paragraphs were to be elaborated on in the lectures; paragraphs that make little sense on their own, as Hegel acknowledges in two of his prefaces (Enz I, 11; 32). Because of this, I have decided to draw on them in my reconstruction of Hegel's philosophy of emotion.

Chapter 1
Embodied Spirit: Sentience, feeling, and habit in the *Anthropology*

1. Hegel's Anthropology and the structure of *Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes*

As I noted in the introduction, *Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes* (*PsG*) is Hegel's official, systematic statement on individual human mindedness. The first part of this work, which the present chapter is dedicated to, is entitled *Anthropology*. Hegel does not elaborate extensively on the reasons behind the choice of this title, other than remarking that *Anthropology* deals with the very foundation of human beings ["die Grundlage des Menschen"] (Enz. III §387 Zus.). According to Wiehl's accurate description of the "Erkenntnisproblem" in the *Anthropology*, it seeks to uncover how "…living, animal nature is connected to spirit [Geist] so that the human being in its uniqueness can be grasped as this connection" (1979, 83 t.m.). Unlike Kant's *Pragmatic Anthropology*, which begins with human self-consciousness before proceeding to our emotional and sentient capacities, Hegel flips it the other way around. The *Anthropology* is solely dedicated to the bodily, sentient, pre-intentional capacities of human beings, some of which we share with other animals (Cf. Enz. II §350-376; Enz. III §388-412).

For Hegel to begin the *PsG* at this foundational level is fully in line with his standard procedure. As already pointed out, the categories from the *Logic* (both ontological categories and categories of thought) structure the *PsG* as a whole (Eldridge 2014, 496). The *Logic* is Hegel's most cogent demonstration of why it is imperative for philosophy to have a presuppositionless, immediate starting point, such as the category of *pure being* (cf. WL1, 65-81). Likewise, the capacities Hegel studies in the *Anthropology* are only implicit, not actualized, and without any preceding *spiritual* presuppositions (Ibid.). (Otherwise, Hegel would have had to give an account of these as well). The only *realphilosophical* presuppositions of *PsG* are those discussed in the *PN*. In short, Hegel's *PsG* strives to uncover the immanent development of spiritual capacities in a way that is faithful to the conceptual dialectic in the *Logic*. Hence, the subsequent parts of *PsG* – the *Phenomenology* and *Psychology* – conceptually correspond to *the Logic of Essence* and the *Logic of the Concept*, respectively.[12]

As these observations indicate, I side with commentators who read the approach in the *PsG* – and the *Realphilosophie* as a whole – *developmentally*. What does that mean? Hegel conceives of spirit, or mind, as *activity*. As Karen Ng puts it: "the activity of mind continually

[12] I will not attempt to map any further the intricate correspondences between the categories of the *Logic* and Hegel's *Realphilosophie.* For a critical study of these correspondences: (Hösle 1987a, 60-145)

constitutes and transforms what mind is. Geist, then, is a kind of self-referential activity, one for which being and doing are inseparably bound together" (2018, 25). According to the developmental reading, the *PsG* tracks how spirit, through its activity, becomes more *self-determining* and *knowing* (for Hegel two sides of the same coin) (Enz. III §442). While the developmental interpretation has been contested on the grounds of the *PsG's* questionable linearity,[13] I see it as the best way to make Hegel's project intelligible and hope to show that it is particularly suited for a study of his philosophy of emotions. The adequacy of this reading is evinced not only in the text as a whole, but also specific paragraphs, such as when Hegel contrasts his approach from rational and empirical psychology (Enz. III §378 + Zus.).[14]

1.1. The soul

Hegel's name for the capacity being studied in the *Anthropology* is *the soul* [*die Seele*]. He also characterizes it as *nature spirit* [Naturgeist], adding that spirit at this rudimentary stage is by and large "entrapped in nature ["in der Natur befangen"] (Enz. III §387 + Zus.; WL2, 494). These formulations already indicate that Hegel's notion of the soul must not be understood in terms of a Cartesian *res cogitans* (Enz. III §389 Zus.). Hegel is perfectly aware of how easy it is to fall into the traps of "Verstandsphilosophie" when it comes to definitions of the soul. When philosophers define the soul as something immaterial, he argues, they tend to do so by distinguishing it from *nature as something material*. This demarcation ends up reifying the soul; making it into a "thing", and thus, we have drifted back to untenable dualisms (Cf. WL2, 494). As is evident in the following quote, Hegel's alternative understanding of the soul relies on Aristotle's different definitions of *psuchê* in *De Anima* (cf. II.I. 412a20; II.I. 412a28):

> Die Seele ist nicht für sich immateriell, sondern die allgemeine Immaterialität der Natur, deren einfaches ideelles Leben. Sie ist die Substanz, die absolute Grundlage aller Besonderung und Vereinzelnung des Geistes, so daß er in ihr allen Stoff seiner Bestimmung hat, und sie die durchdringende identische Idealität derselben bleibt. Aber in dieser noch abstrakten Bestimmung ist sie nur der Schlaf der Geistes; – der passive nous des Aristoteles, welcher der Möglichkeit nach Alles ist (Enz. III. §389)

Properly understood, then, the soul is not a self-sufficient entity. Rather, as in Aristotle, it is a hylomorphic principle that can only exist in living bodies; as the body's immaterial

[13] Again, the claim that the *PsG* lacks linearity is central in Ikäheimo's reading. See: (Ikäheimo 2017, 427-28).
[14] Whereas *rational psychology*, in Wolff's sense, sought to uncover the essence of mind through pure thinking, empirical psychology based itself on induction from observation. Hegel criticizes the former approach for applying categories of understanding on mind, treating it as an inert thing instead of something manifesting its essence through activity, and the latter for cutting bonds to speculative thinking, which results in an uncritical use of metaphysical categories, a failure to grasp the unity between the different faculties it postulates, and a representation of the human being as a mere aggregate of forces (cf. Enz. I §34 + Zus.; Enz. III. 378 + Zus).

"organizing form", which makes it self-producing, sentient, and able to commune with its natural environment (Gabriel 2011, 51; Ikäheimo 2017, 432; Wiehl 1979, 134; PR §1 Zus.). As opposed to inorganic things whose sole principle of change resides in external causes, the soul as an organizing form enables spirit to realize itself through different spiritual activities (Enz. III §390 Zus.). Manifested here is the expressivist kernel in Hegel's philosophy, and the notion that for anything alive to be *actual*, it must express itself in a particular, individual way (Gabriel 2011, 48). But Hegel's reference to the Aristotelian concept of *passive nous* and the metaphor "Schlaf des Geistes" make plain that the soul in its rudimentary form is only in *possession* of such a spiritual potential, rather than exercising it. As of yet, the soul has not actualized itself in any individual manner. At this first stage, the soul can virtually "be anything" between remaining pre-conscious or developing consciousness, which is why Hegel calls the first determination of the soul *abstract*.

1.2. The natural soul and sensation

Hegel's analysis of the "three stages of the soul" gradually traces the first steps on the way out of this abstract existence of pure potentiality, towards the soul becoming "… singularized as an individual subject" (Enz. III §395 quoted in Malabou 2009, 31). These three stages are called *the natural soul*, *the feeling soul*, and *the real soul* (Enz. III §390). As usual, Hegel divides each of these stages into three further subsections. For my purposes, it suffices to dive straight into the last subsection on the natural soul, on *sensation* [Empfindung].[15]

The German term provides us with some initial clues as to what Hegel thinks characterizes *sensations*. The word for sensation is "Empfindung". Hegel writes:

> In dem Fürsichsein der wachen Seele ist das Sein als ideelles Moment enthalten; sie *findet* so die Inhaltsbestimmtheiten ihrer schlafenden Natur, welche als in ihrer Substanz an sich in derselben sind, in sich selbst, und zwar für sich. Als Bestimmtheit ist dies Besondere von der Identität des Fürsichseins mit sich unterschieden und zugleich in dessen Einfachheit enthalten,– *Empfindung* (Enz. III §399)

The first thing to notice in this quote is the emphasis on the verb "findet", which is contained in "Empfindung". What is sensed when the soul senses is not something the soul is the author of; not something it has produced. Instead, the soul *finds* sense data that is given to it, and it does so in a non-inferential, passive manner (Enz. III §402). Hegel nonetheless states that everything sensed by the soul is "negated" by it and "posited" as something ideal ["als ideell gesetzt"] (Enz. III §399 Zus.), indicating that there are elements of spontaneity involved here. I return to the question of how we should interpret this statement below.

In accordance with most scientific conventions, Hegel operates with five sensory

[15] For a good account of the stages leading up to *sensation* in the *Anthropology,* see: (Laurentiis 2021, 31-129)

modalities: sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. When the soul has sensations of either of these sorts, it senses its sense data as something *singular* ["vereinzeltes"] (Enz. III §400 Zus.). This is Hegel's way of saying that the natural soul is incapable of recognizing its sense data as instantiations of universals. The soul does not see a red thing *as a red thing*, hear the sound of a nightingale *as the sound of a nightingale* or has a taste of salt *as salt*. It is even unaware of itself as having sensations of objects external to it in the first place (cf. Houlgate 2022, 3). All sensations appear and disappear as if for the first and last time. But although these sensations come and go, Hegel argues that the natural soul becomes *for itself* [für sich] through them:

> Durch das Empfinden ist somit die Seele dahin gekommen, daß das ihre Natur ausmachende Allgemeine in einer unmittelbaren Bestimmtheit für sie wird. Nur durch dies Fürsichwerden ist die Seele empfindend. (Enz. III §401 Zus).

One could object that this hardly amounts to any "being for oneself" at all. For what Hegel seems to be claiming is that the natural soul becomes "for itself" only insofar as it has singular sensations. The soul's *being for itself* is then completely tied to each immediate sensory input. It never transcends these, never reflects on them as something *other* than itself. Hence, at first blush, it might seem somewhat counter-intuitive to tie the natural soul's sentience to the capacity of "being for itself". But such an objection wrongly assumes that Hegel's notion of "being for itself" is equivalent to self-consciousness and reflexivity, when the only presupposition Hegel seems to operate with at this stage is that of *interiority*. When the natural soul has a sensation, it senses *qualia*. This is not the case, Hegel maintains, for inorganic stuff like water: While water can achieve accidental properties (such as artificial color) it does so without having a sensation of it. Water does not relate to the color as something "for itself" (Enz. III §401 Zus).

But if the natural soul becomes *for itself* in and through sensations, and these are only sensed as particulars, how does this come about? Hegel states that when the natural soul has a sensation of something, it *internalizes* the sense data (Enz. III §401). The course of this internalization [*Erinnerung*][16] varies depending on what kind of sensations we have in mind, but Hegel repeatedly claims that in all cases, the sense data must be embodied [*verleiblicht*] in the sensing soul in order for it to give rise to a particular sensation (Enz. III §401). As we will see in more detail, this means that the sentient soul organizes the sense data in such a way that the physiological embodiment and the sensation coincide.

[16] In the *PsG* Hegel uses "Erinnerung" in two different (yet related) ways; as both "internalization" and "remembrance" (in the *Psychology*).

1.2.3. Inner and outer sensation

Expounding on this, Hegel distinguishes between *inner* and *outer* sensations (Enz. III §401 Zus.). The main difference between these two types of sensations is etiological and boils down to whether the sense datum stems from sight, sounds, smells, touch, or taste of/from something in the outer world, or from mental activity (cf. DeVries 1988, 61). Hegel's distinction is thus more reminiscent of Hume's distinction between *original* and *secondary* (reflective) *impressions* (cf. 1978, 37) than Kant's distinction between *inner* and *outer sense* in the transcendental aesthetics (B37-B38).[17]

As *outer sensations*, Hegel counts those that were mentioned above, i.e., seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and sense of touch. To see and smell a lilac depends on there being an actual lilac nearby (regardless of whether the natural soul recognizes it as a lilac or not).

The preconditions of inner sensations are different. Hegel divides inner sensations into two categories. The first category comprises "self-centered" inner sensations, while the second covers inner sensations related to other-directed, "universal" or collective matters:

> Die inneren Empfindungen sind nun von *doppelter* Art: erstens solche, die meine in irgendeinem besonderen Verhältnisse oder Zustande befindliche unmittelbare *Einzelheit* betreffen; dahin gehören zum Beispiel Zorn, Rache, Neid, Scham, Reue; zweitens solche, die sich auf ein an und für sich *Allgemeines* - auf Recht, Sittlichkeit, Religion, auf das Schöne und Wahre beziehen (Enz. III §401 Zus).

There are two striking points in this passage. First, the division between the classes of inner sensations seems too clear cut, indeed undialectical, for a thinker like Hegel. How can shame and remorse be immediate? Are they not eminently *social emotions*, mediated by norms through and through? In the third chapter of this thesis on *practical spirit*, I show that Hegel indeed ends up including shame and remorse among the practical social feelings (what I call *social emotions*), whose content is grounded in a concrete ethical life (Enz. III §472 Zus.).

One way of answering these questions is to consider the second striking thing in the passage above. Hegel is here obviously drawing on mental capacities and factors he has not yet explained nor derived. Inner sensations of shame and regret, as well as of right and truth are supposed to be able to arise regardless of whether the contents of the sensation are physically present in my outer, immediate surroundings. This is mainly what distinguishes them from outer sensations. But such an ability implies some degree of spontaneity and self-consciousness, intelligence, recollection, imagination, and even situatedness in a social

[17] DeVries categorizes inner sensations as *emotions*, as opposed to *feelings* (1988, 62). While he is certainly right that shame, rage, and regret are all examples of what we – and Hegel – normally think of as emotions, I later argue that the *inner sensations of* shame, rage and regret are distinctive elements *within* these emotions.

sphere. Given Hegel's conception of the powers of the soul, the soul cannot be the only source of inner sensations.[18]

Hegel is aware that his approach may appear inconsistent but reminds us that the *Anthropology* only deals with inner sensations insofar as they are *embodied* [verleiblicht] and organized by the soul (Enz. III §401 Zus.; cf. DeVries 1988, 63). In other words, the focus here is not on the cognitively more advanced presuppositions of inner sensations – a judgment of value, as I later claim – but rather the structure of their *physiological arousal,* which unfolds and can be described in a fairly similar manner as the outer sensations.

In both outer and inner sensations, the sense datum is given to the soul*,* either through the sensory organ's encounter with sense data from the outside, or through imagination. Furthermore, in both inner and outer sensations, the internalization of the sense datum coincides with its embodiment within what Hegel calls our *sphere of sentience* [*Empfindungssphäre*] (Enz. III §401 Zus.). Hence, the outer sensation of a taste or a smell *is* the bodily arousal caused by the sense datum's connection with receptors in the sensory organs. Likewise, as Hegel's empirical example goes, the inner sensation of shame or rage *is* the sense data's physiological embodiment in the blood system, causing heartthrob – more intensely in rage than shame, but still in the same sphere of sentience (Enz. III §400 Zus.)

Already at this point, clues to how Hegel's theory of emotions will differ from *feeling theory* are becoming visible. The physiological inner sensation of a particular emotion – such as shame – follows from the emotive evaluation, not the other way around, as James argued (James 1983, 1065). Yet, this evaluation is not made by a "ghost in the machine". As embodied beings, we are always sensuously attuned to the world from our individual corporeal standpoint. Even the activity of thinking is accompanied by physiological inner sensations (Enz. III §400 Zus.). And inner sensations themselves do provide us with their own somatic feedback about whether something is pleasurable or not (Enz. III §408). Hegel, therefore, does not simply go in the opposite direction of James. The intricate relationship between our mental life and physiological condition constitutes a *system of inner sensation*, and Hegel suggests that it would be the task of a *psychic physiology* to study more closely how spiritual phenomena such as thinking and emotions are embodied as *affects* [als Affekte] (Enz. III §401). I will later consider the objection that Hegel puts too much emphasis on the physiological dimension when distinguishing between emotions (cf. Howard 2013, 72).

[18] For a clear account of why inner sensation depends on conceptual capacities: (McDowell 1996, 18-23)

1.2.4. Inner sensations and expression

Inner sensations differ from outer sensations in another respect. Due to its significance for my thesis, this difference should be mentioned right away, although it will forestall a few points that are treated at a later stage of the *PsG*. Ever since Darwin wrote his *Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals* (1872)*,* the relationship between emotions and expression has been at the center of the discourse on emotions. Hegel is often portrayed as an *expressivist* philosopher.[19] One of the key points in Hegel's expressivism is that the realization of a mental state – reflective or non-reflective – depends upon the subject somehow expressing it; making it external to itself. By "realization" I mean two things: On one level, being in a mental state as such; on a second level, grasping the meaning of that mental state. Following Taylor, we may say that Hegel reversed the conception of the mental as more primitive than action (1985, 90). Hence, *a mental state* is just as much a *mental act.* But note that external expression does not necessarily mean expression *to other subjects*: The crucial aspect is "self-revelation" (Ibid.), and we can surely manage to reveal our inner state to ourselves without other people being physically present. Nonetheless, there are certain mental states we can only realize and grasp the true meaning of by making them appear in the objective world. In the *PR* Hegel famously says that both criteria apply to *intentions* (PR §124+Zus.). In a different way, inner sensations may be brought to completion and be clarified through expression. Consider the example of being amused by a memory we have: When finding it unbearably funny, the muscular and respiratory sensation naturally gives rise to its outer expression, laughter, unless one is repressing it. Conversely, our laughter can also make us aware of the fact that we actually do find something funnier than we initially told ourselves – or others – that it was. The same holds for what Paul Ekman calls *body manipulators*, which refers to "… movements where one part of the body does something to another body part" (1980, 76), without any intended message, such as biting one's nails or playing with one's hair (Ibid.). In some instances, these movements may be said to make us aware that we are stressed or nervous.

The latter points do not vindicate James' formula that "we are sad because we cry". Hegel suggest that we can *only* become aware of our emotional state retroactively through

[19] The expressivist reading is often traced back to Taylor (cf. 1975; 1985). Pippin, Quante, Pinkard, and Brandom have later picked up on this reading but reappropriated it for their own "normative" notion of action as necessarily *intentional*. Testa (2021) has argued that theirs is a highly restrictive view of action, which renders *habitual* and *bodily* action instances of non-actions. Consequentially, we get a discontinuity between these modes of expression, which even comes close to rendering the habitual/bodily ones as non-expressive media (2021, 116-117). Without being able to substantiate the claim here, I think Testa's reading more than anything shows how to bridge the gap between Taylor's expressivism and that of the "normative" group, instead of discarding the latter altogether.

expression, but that it sometimes is necessary due to other factors, such as *denial* or *inattention.* Another point on which Hegel and James differ with regard to the relationship between inner sensation and expression is what we can call *affective release*. Whereas James argues for the intensifying effect of expression – "refuse to express a passion, and it dies" (James 1983, 1077) – Hegel believes that one of the functions of expressing inner sensations is to remove them [Wegschaffung] (Enz. III §401 Zus.). There are different ways of carrying out this expressive and cathartic release, some of which Hegel himself considers to be more complex and refined than others – i.e., linguistic utterances, art, and religious rituals (cf. PhG, 383) – but they all follow the logic of *embodiment*. For instance, in an extended discussion of this topic, crying and laughter are listed as examples of external expressions of the inner sensations of pain, sadness, and joy, which help us do away with them (Enz. III §401 Zus.). As Taylor argues, Hegel held that we gradually develop more advanced and refined ways of expressing our inner states (1985, 91). We will later see how this expressive enhancement through habit, socialization, and cultural and ethical codification is a recurring theme in *PsG.*

1.2.5. Sensation as the first ideal positing

We can now return to the meaning behind the formulation that the natural soul posits its sense datum "as something ideal" (Enz. III §401 Zus.). Hegel is not always consistent in his usage of the word "ideality". According to Gabriel, Hegel in the *Anthropology* uses the notion of ideality to refer to the fact that the soul "… is not yet differentiated from its environment" (2011, 51). This is only one side of the story. "Ideality" in this context should be understood as a negation of reality, which through this negation preserve bits of reality within it (cf. Enz. III §403). Considering our discussion so far, this is the most adequate description of the ideality at work in sensations. For in sensations the natural soul internalizes and organizes the sensory manifold according to its different sensory modalities. Although Hegel characterizes the sentience of the natural soul as "dull, mindless weavings of spirit" [dumpfe Webens des Geistes] (Enz. III §400), there is some degree of structure and ideality to the way it senses this manifold. The organ and sense of smell make the natural soul susceptible to different odors; vision makes it susceptible to different sights, and other parts of its natural make-up make it susceptible to inner sensations of, say, fear. As Hegel puts it, this is how the natural soul "asserts itself the manifold" [macht sich in der Mannigfaltigen geltend] (Enz. III §399 Zus.).

Hegel is nonetheless still maintaining that the natural, sentient soul is unable to grasp what is sensed as stemming from something outside itself. The soul is so absorbed in each passing sensation that it is unable to distinguish between new sensations and itself. Connected

to this latter point is the following concern: By virtue of its sensory organs, the natural soul is susceptible to a manifold of different sensations. Thus, it has the potential of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, and touching simultaneously. But according to Hegel, when the natural soul senses, each sensation displaces the other, such that it is unable to sense the manifold as an *integrated totality*. Instead, every particular sensation appears as a totality in its own right (Enz. III §402+Zus). With the emergence of *feeling* [Gefühl], this changes.

1.3. The feeling soul

When Hegel sets out to analyze the feelings of the soul, the section on the natural soul has come to a close. This means that *the feeling soul* [die fühlende Seele] no longer is completely determined by the particular, immediate natural qualities, changes, and sensations befalling it (Enz. III, §402 Zus.). The transition from sensations to feelings is therefore quite significant. Indeed, as Hegel writes, we have arrived at the "… middle-stage between immediate natural life and objective free consciousness" […die mittelstufe zwischen … unmittelbaren Naturleben und … objektiven, freien Bewusstsein] (Enz. III §40 Zus. t.m.). The distinctive feature of the feelings of the soul, as opposed to its sensations, is that the former enable the soul to relate itself to its different sensations as composing a unified totality. When the soul feels, its awareness is less directed towards particular sensations than towards the bodily condition as a whole – in Hegel's terminology: the soul's *total substantiality* (Enz. III §402). As Inwood accurately puts it: "the feeling soul differs from sensation in that it feels or 'glimpses' itself as a whole, not just individual states or 'accidents' of itself" (2007, 366).

While these points provide some clues about the transition from sensation to feeling within the *Anthropology*, we are still in need of some clarifications. For how, more precisely, should we understand the difference between sensations [Empfindungen] and feelings [Gefühle] in relation to the notion of emotions as cognitive values of judgment?

This question is crucial for the rest of this thesis, and the answer will gradually emerge as we inch forward in chapter 3. But to start approaching it, it is necessary to consider some philological difficulties pertaining to the sensation/feeling dichotomy. In *The Concept of Mind*, Ryle draws attention to the fact that we often report about sensations and feelings in the same way, using words like "pricking", "throb", "itching" and "glows" (2009, 70). This may indicate that sensations and feelings really are the same (i.e., James' position) (Ibid.). Hegel makes the same remark about the semantic ambiguity when discussing the feelings of the soul. But like Ryle, he too thinks that descriptions of feelings normally have a greater "metaphorical tinge" than descriptions of sensations, and that this factor reflects a real

difference between sensations and feelings. Borrowing Ryle's example, to say that we sense a "glow of warmth" is different from saying that we feel a "glow of pride" (Ibid.). The upshot is, Ryle argues, that reports about feelings are more connected to emotions than reports about sensations.

Although Hegel wrote in a different language than Ryle, I suggest that his distinction between sensation [Empfindung] and feeling [Gefühl] should be understood along similar lines. When Hegel uses the word "Gefühl" in the *PsG*, he is referring to the capacity for emotional evaluations. Yet, as I will emphasize, the capacity of Gefühl – as cognitive judgments of value – is not given by birth, but something we gradually acquire through habituation, socialization, and cognitive development. In other words, the type of Gefühl analyzed in the *Anthropology* will differ significantly from the Gefühl in the *Phenomenology* and the *Psychology*. Since the tendency among readers to neglect this fact is liable to engender misunderstandings, I spend time clarifying his tripartite model of emotions later on.

To illustrate the above-mentioned point about Hegel's distinction between Empfindung and Gefühl, it is helpful to consider a remark he makes when introducing the "feeling soul". Whereas he earlier spoke about inner *sensations* of right, the true, and similar universal categories, he now modifies his terminology. Normally, Hegel writes, one does not speak of "sensations" connected to these phenomena, but of feelings:

> Für Empfindung und Fühlen gibt der Sprachgebrauch eben nicht einen durchdringenden Unterschied an die Hand; doch sagt man etwa nicht wohl Empfindung des Rechts, Selbstempfindung u. dgl., sondern Gefühl des Rechts, Selbstgefühl; mit der Empfindung hängt die Empfindsamkeit zusammen; man kann daher dafür halten, daß die Empfindung mehr die Seite der Passivität, des *Findens,* d. h. der Unmittelbarkeit der Bestimmtheit im Fühlen, hervorhebt, das Gefühl zugleich mehr auf die Selbstischkeit, die darin ist, geht. (Enz. III §402)[20]

In this passage, Hegel suggests that there are two aspects of the soul's feeling. On the one hand, we have the sensation, in which the soul passively *finds* a particular bodily arousal. On the other hand, there is the feeling itself, which refers to the element of "selfness" involved.[21]

[20] Although Hegel makes it clear that "Empfindung" and "Gefühl" refers to different capacities, he tends to use them interchangeably, especially in those sections of the *PsG* not primarily devoted to an analysis of them. Consequently, some translations of the *PG*, like the Norwegian, uses the same rendering ("følelser") for both "Empfindung" and "Gefühl" (Johnsen 2013, 10). Such translations obfuscate a real difference in Hegel's terminology. But if the difference between sensations and feelings is so crucial for Hegel, why this inconsistency? In an article on the relationship between *Gefühl* and *Erinnerung* in *PsG*, Peperzak discusses this problematic, highlighting that it was first in the Berlin-Encyclopedia that Hegel started distinguishing between sensations and feelings, whereas in the earlier Heidelberg-edition, he does not (1979, 167). One might speculate on whether Hegel would have clarified this distinction in later editions, had he lived longer.

[21] Here, "Selbstischkeit" does not refer to "selfishness". As Inwood points out: "This connotation is, in Hegel's usage, suppressed, if not wholly excluded. Selbstischkeit refers to orientation towards oneself that contrasts not with orientation towards others, but with lacking a conception of oneself – and also of others." (2007, 365).

Indeed, as Hegel puts it in the following paragraph, the feeling is the *subjectivity* of sensations (Enz. III §403). In construing the relationship between the sensations and feelings of the soul in this manner, Hegel is not implying that the former capacity disappears into the latter. The distinction between sensation and feeling still holds. What Hegel is getting at with the notion of inner sensations is simply that the feeling of shame and right physiologically embody themselves in distinctive ways, and that the corresponding "feeling awareness" is of a different character than the sensation(s). Answering the question posed above, then, we may say that Hegel does distinguish between *inner sensations of right* and psychic *feelings of right*: the former refers to the passively unfolding physiological arousal, the latter refers to the soul's way of relating to the arousal.

Does not this way of framing the relationship between *Empfindung* and *Gefühl* make it seem as if Hegel is bound to defend the same idea as Descartes, James, and other proponents of the feeling theory; namely that the object of an emotion is the bodily movements?
Again, we must keep in mind that the *PsG* analyzes Gefühl across different levels. Although Hegel conceives of feeling as the first capacity enabling the soul to relate to itself as a unified totality of different sensations, this self-relation does not obtain through the soul's distinguishing itself from objects in the *outer* world. Hegel makes it clear that this self-relation belongs to the emergence of consciousness (Enz. III §404). Thus, the feeling soul does not perceive the outer world as composed of distinct objects separated from itself, nor as objects mediated by mental determinations (and hence as candidates for cognitive appraisals/evaluations). The feeling soul is fully enclosed in its inwardness, and the specific way the feeling soul comes to relate to itself, must therefore be from within. It does so by differentiating itself internally from the totality of its sensuous determinations (Enz. III §404). But this capacity, and the *self-possession* it furnishes, is not achieved at the blink of an eye. The capacity evolves gradually, and as usual, Hegel tracks this process across three stages: *The feeling soul in its immediacy*, *self-feeling*, and *habit*. I now examine these stages in turn.

1.3.1 The feeling soul in its immediacy

Hegel introduces this section (certainly the most esoteric and atypical in the *PsG*) by highlighting a dissonance pertaining to "the feeling soul in its immediacy": On the one hand, he asserts that the feeling soul at this stage must be regarded as a "monadic individual" (Enz. III §403). In line with Leibniz' formula "the monad does not have a window", this description means that the feeling soul is both ontologically individuated and experientially enclosed within itself. Given what we have gleaned from the last section, this comes as no surprise:

The part on the natural soul explicated the presuppositions of individuation (Enz. III §391-403), and with the subsequent transition from sensation to feeling, an inward turn has taken place whereby the soul has started to relate itself to (and minimally distinguish itself from) the totality of its bodily sensations, but not yet from the outer world. On the other hand, Hegel writes that the feeling soul at this first stage is *not* yet the subject of its own feelings. Instead, he characterizes the feeling soul as passive,[22] stating that it owes its degree of selfhood to something other than itself, which he dubs the feeling soul's *genius* (Enz. III §405).

To understand what Hegel is driving at here, we can consider his comparison between genius and *objective consciousness*. [23] Hegel's notion of objective consciousness is described as the ability to have and be guided by an objective *worldview* [Weltvorstellung], as well as "developed interests and inclinations" (Enz. III §405). The latter description makes it tempting to think of objective consciousness in terms of Freud's *reality principle*, whose purpose it is to guard us against potential harm and guide us toward what is beneficial (Cf. Freud 2006, 417).[24] Genius, by contrast, is portrayed by Hegel as an unconscious, instinctual power which makes the final decision [die letzte Bestimmung] on what to do in various situations (Enz. III §405; §407 Zus.). Hegel makes it clear that genius is closely related, if not identical, to the figure of the *heart* [das Herz]. The heart refers to the character and disposition [Gemüt] of an individual (Cf. VPR 130), which is revealed through the pattern of immediate "hunches" it has across different value-laden situations. Similarly, *genius* is that which affects our decisions and actions, not in line with norms or rules of rationality, but rather with what we may call our individual "gut feeling" (cf. Enz. III §405 Zus.).

When Hegel writes that *the feeling soul in its immediacy* is not yet the *subject* of its own feelings, his point is that all its feeling states are determined by operations that are "genius-like". But importantly, he argues that *genius* can, and often does, belong to another individual than oneself. The first and paradigmatic example of this co-affective phenomenon is the relationship between a mother and a fetus.[25] But it also, Hegel claims, takes place in adult human beings, such as between romantic partners, family members, friends, and in

[22] Hegel's usage of "passive" is relative. Like degrees of immediacy, there are always degrees of passivity.
[23] The term "objective consciousness" can perhaps be misleading, because this capacity – described in the Encyclopedia Phenomenology – is much less advanced than what Hegel has in mind here. Nonetheless, for the sake of simplicity, I will follow this usage.
[24] I will not pursue the overlaps between Freud's and Hegel's tripartite divisions of the mind. For a good overview (cf. Berthold-Bond 1995). My use of Freud's terms is purely heuristic. Thus, although Freud's notion of the *reality principle* can shed light on Hegel's notion of *objective consciousness*, I do not want to defend any claims that consciousness (Hegel) corresponds to ego (Freud), or the soul (Hegel) corresponds to the id (Freud). Such an endeavor would take me too far beyond the confines of this thesis.
[25] Hegel's analysis here is very much akin to how Freud describes the infant: "An infant at the breast does not as yet distinguish his ego from the external world as the source of the sensations flowing in upon him." (1962, 13)

hypnosis. Hegel draws on these examples to highlight the capacity displayed by both adult humans and animals to be affected by another individual to the extent that it becomes plausible to say that it is the other, and not myself, who is *the genius of my feelings.* In these cases, the feeling I have is not primarily my own, but the other's (Enz. III §405).[26]

Some of these phenomena are familiar to and appreciated by most of us, such as *empathy*.[27] Yet, Hegel claims that from the perspective of the average adult human being, "the feeling life in its immediacy" may appear as an "illness" if it develops into a lasting condition (Enz. III §406). Echoing what was said above, he points out that the conscious life of average adult human beings is determined by a range of objective structures outside themselves, pertaining to the natural environment and the institutions in the social world (Enz. III §406). Together, these structures and factors constitute what Hegel calls our *concrete* existence. According to Hegel, adult, self-conscious individuals in modern societies know this. And they are able to freely distinguish between their own commitments, projects, and aspirations, from these above-mentioned factors to a degree where the latter become *orientational* rather than *dominating* (Enz. III 406). In immediate feeling life, however, one relates to oneself and the world in an unmediated, unconscious manner. One's otherwise well-informed, self-conscious way of relating to and distinguishing oneself from the objective world is therefore suspended (Enz. III §406). Just as somatic illnesses occur when a malfunctioning organ or a system disturbs the bodily harmony, the pathological dimension of feeling life arises when the soul's genius appropriates and pervades all functions of spirit (Enz. III §406 Zus.).

Clearly, these are descriptions of some sort of regressive subversion of rationality. This regression can be triggered by hypnosis and lead to somnambulism (Enz. III §406), but it can also be triggered by emotive responses to encounters with intimate others. Likewise, it can be triggered by the death of a loved one, the breakdown of a community, or other political and religious events (Hegel refers to Cato's suicide after the defeat against Caesar (Enz. III §406)). When placed in such states of immediate feeling, Hegel argues that we are no longer guided by our intelligence, but rather by the instinctive, genius-like capacity discussed above. Although Hegel likens the condition when the genius takes possession of an individual with the fetus' dependency on the mother in the womb, the former differs from the latter in emerging from a division between spirit and the soul. For the child in the womb, there is only

[26] The fact that Hegel narrows these psychic, affective relationships to the more intimate spheres, echoes his outline of the family as a "feeling unit" [empfindende Einheit] in the *PR* (PR §158).
[27] By empathy – "Einfühlung" – I refer to the phenomenon in which the other person's emotional state becomes the center of one's orientation. This is Edith Stein's definition in *Zum Problem der Einfühlung* (Cf. 1917, 3).

oneness with the mother's genius. For the adult individual, on the other hand, oneness with genius is conceived as a regression *from* intelligent and socially integrated life; although, as I indicate at the end of chapter 3, the regression can also be instigated by them.

1.3.2. Self-feeling

In the foregoing section, I examined a category of psychic feeling Hegel claims one can undergo without being the proper subject of it, as well as some examples related to these states. According to Hegel's analysis, that kind of immediate feeling is characteristic of infants, but it can also occur in adult human beings. In the latter cases, it resembles a sick, unconscious, sleep-like condition, triggered by phenomena ranging from emotive encounters with intimate others, religious and political events, to hypnosis.

The next category of feeling Hegel introduces in the *Anthropology* is called *Selbstgefühl* – literally, *self-feeling*. In Germany, the philosophical notion of Selbstgefühl was developed by Fichte and Novalis, among others (Frank 2015, 8)[28] These figures were inspired by Kant, who discussed phenomena related to Selbstgefühl, but never used the term. Although their usage differs from one another, they all (Hegel included) took it to refer to a more rudimentary, bodily form of self-awareness than self-consciousness, originating in early childhood, but also belonging to animals (Cf. Wiehl 1979, 124). As Kant writes about the child: "Previously, it merely felt itself, now, it thinks itself" [Vorher fühlte es bloß sich selbst, jetzt denkt es sich selbst] (2000, 9 t.m.).

Hegel makes it clear that this category of feeling (contrary to immediate feeling) involves subjectivity:

> Die fühlende Totalität ist als Individualität wesentlich dies, sich in sich selbst zu unterscheiden und *zum Urteil in sich* zu erwachen, nach welchem sie *besondere* Gefühle hat und als *Subjekt* in Beziehung auf diese ihre Bestimmungen ist. Das Subjekt als solches setzt dieselben als *seine* Gefühle *in sich.* Es ist in diese *Besonderheit* der Empfindungen versenkt, und zugleich schließt es durch die Idealität des Besonderen sich darin mit sich als subjektivem Eins zusammen. Es ist auf diese Weise *Selbstgefühl* - und ist dies zugleich nur im *besonderen Gefühl* (Enz. III §407)

Hegel describes here how self-feeling arises from the subject becoming aware of a specific feeling as its own – *as belonging to itself*. This implies that any self-feeling depends upon the subject having a specific feeling, which differs from its self-feeling. For, as the wording indicates, *the self-feeling is itself a feeling*. To begin with, therefore, there are two sets of feelings involved in a self-feeling: i) a feeling or a sensation of any specific sort, such as a

[28] In his study *Selbstgefühl*, Manfred Frank traces the term back to the Stoic conception of *sensu sui* (2015, 28).

feeling of fear or sensation of an odor, and ii) the self-feeling.

Framed like this, self-feeling is a continuous background-awareness of myself that accompanies all the various feelings or sensations I have and provides me with the sense that it is *me* undergoing various feelings and sensations. To have a self-feeling is to feel myself as being present in the feelings and sensations I undergo. For Hegel, self-feeling does not disappear with the advent of self-consciousness, so it accompanies all my representations [Vorstellungen] and thoughts as well. This is evident in the fact that Hegel uses the term when discussing the lives of adult human beings, for instance, when saying that the self-feeling of adult human beings is grounded in an ethical life (cf. PR §147; §268).

We can compare this understanding of *self-feeling* with Damasio's similar notion of *background feelings*. According to Damasio, background feelings are the mild "feelings of life" or "sense of being" which continuously map our bodily state *between* emotions (1994, 150). They are qualitatively vaguer than "emotional feelings" such as rage or shame, and when we experience emotional feelings, these tend to replace or supersede, the background feeling (Ibid., 151). Beyond that, background feelings are most likely the kind of feeling we undergo most during our lifetime (Ibid.).

Although Hegel's description of self-feeling corresponds to Damasio's outline of *background feeling* with regard to its enduring, mild, vague, and holistic qualities, there seems to be one crucial difference between the two. In contrast to Damasio's account, Hegel's seems to put more emphasis on the necessary correlation between the self-feeling and the feeling. Of course, Damasio does not deny that we can have a background feeling while having other feelings, such as an itch. But it seems that Hegel, as opposed to Damasio, holds that our self-feeling is concurrent with and depends on other feelings. Indeed, as he puts it: "The self-feeling, sunk in the particularity of the feelings (simple sensations, like the desires, drives, passions, and their satisfactions), does not differ from them." [Das Selbstgefühl, in die Besonderheit der Gefühle (einfacher Empfindungen, wie der Begierden, Triebe, Leidenschaften und deren Befriedigungen) versenkt, ist ununterschieden von ihnen] (Enz. III §409 t.m.). This description of self-feeling echoes Hegel's account of the sentience of the natural soul. In both cases, the self-feeling, the particular feeling, as well as the sensory state and the sensory organ, more or less coincide. Instead of being superseded by occurring emotional feelings, which is the case with Damasio's background feelings, it seems as if Hegel holds that the self-feeling arises and sustains itself in it.

If this was Hegel's final word on self-feeling, his conception of it would, strictly speaking, be false. It seems to me that Damasio is right in implying that we are best suited to

report on the quality of our self-feeling when we do not undergo other feelings; be they emotional or not. In any case, to be "sunken" in their particularities does not seem like a good starting point from which to experience it, especially given that Hegel himself elsewhere argues that self-feeling enables us to feel the living *unity* of spirit (Enz. III §379). Neither does such a merely nominal form of self-feeling furnish self-possession, being present to oneself, and "having oneself at command", to speak with Rahel Jaeggi (2014, 37). The above outline is therefore only a snapshot of self-feeling at a pre-mature phase of our development. Hegel's final conception of self-feeling in average adult human beings is much closer to Damasio's notion of background feeling, and first becomes tangible after his discussion of habit [Gewohnheit]. Before advancing to that section, I shall examine a crucial part of Hegel's analysis of self-feeling – and indeed of the whole *PS* –: his analysis of madness. Here, we will see that Hegel actually held that self-feeling sunk in the particularity of feelings can give rise to emotional disorders.

1.3.3. Self-feeling and madness

Although Hegel's theory of madness in the *PsG* has received some attention since the publication of Berthold-Bond's seminal book (1995) on the topic (cf. Gabriel & Žižek 2009), it still belongs to the less explored regions of his thought. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to cover the details of Hegel's theory of madness. Yet, since it makes up such a crucial part of the *Anthropology*'s analysis of the feelings of the soul, and it will later help me elucidate his ideas about emotional disorders, it warrants a closer look.

Recall that Hegel traced the "illnesses" of intense emotional contagion, somnambulism, hypnosis, and other unconscious subjections, to a relationship between immediate feeling and objective consciousness (the reality principle), in which the former completely pervades and appropriates the cognitive functions of the latter. By drawing on determinations of reflection from the *Logic of essence*, he maintained that in such illnesses the relationship between an individual's immediate feeling and its objective consciousness is one of mere *difference,* which means that they are indifferent to and can blend in with one another (Enz. III §405; WL2; 47-55). While such a mental amalgamation does not prevent any interaction with the outer world*,* it renders the interaction immediate and *unconscious*.

How does madness [Verrücktheit] compare to such illnesses? In his main definition of madness in the *PsG*, Hegel describes it as a "… state of a mind which is shut up within itself, sunken into itself, whose peculiarity … consists in its being no longer in immediate contact with actuality but in having resolutely separated itself from it" ["eine *Verschlossenheit des*

Geistes, als ein *Insichversunkensein* … dessen *Eigentümlichkeit* … darin besteht, mit der Wirklichkeit nicht mehr in *unmittelbarem Zusammenhange* sich zu befinden, sondern sich von derselben *entschieden abgetrennt* zu haben"] (Enz. III §408 Zus. in Bond 1995, 40). Unlike the above-mentioned "illnesses", this state is provoked and characterized by a dysfunctional relationship between *self*-feeling and objective consciousness. In madness, the relationship between an individual's self-feeling and its objective consciousness (guided by the reality principle) is not one of mere difference, as in "illnesses", but of *contradiction* (Enz. III §408). The nature of this contradiction is that the aspect of the self-feeling the individual fixates on resists integration within a sound objective consciousness of reality. Thus, what distinguishes the states of the so-called "illnesses" and those of madness is the following: In "illness", the subject is in *immediate* and *unconscious* contact with reality. In madness, the subject consciously separates itself from reality and fixates on this separation.

Hegel holds that madness is both a physical and a mental phenomenon (Enz. III §408 Zus.). Therefore, he once again finds it necessary to draw on capacities he has not yet introduced in his analysis (Enz. III §408). Yet still, self-feeling is the capacity around which his explanation revolves. What precisely happens with self-feeling in states of madness?

Above, we saw that self-feeling in its initial, undeveloped form concurs with and is immersed in another particular feeling. Against this background, Hegel now claims that one thing which characterizes healthy, adult human beings with developed cognitive abilities, is that they manage to integrate their particular feelings within an ordered "fluid totality". This "fluid totality" refers to a harmonious interaction between our subjective interests and the objective web of knowledge, commitments, and norms we otherwise depend upon when engaging with other people and orienting ourselves in the world (Enz. III §408). By integrating, or appropriating, a feeling into this fluid totality, Hegel argues that the feeling is raised to "ideality" (Enz. III §408). I take this to mean that the particular feeling is made intelligible to me, that I recognize it as belonging to me, and that it is rendered so unobtrusive that my self-feeling can remain intact as something distinct from it. Having said that, the capacity for the rudimentary form of self-feeling does not disappear with the advent of higher cognitive capacities. Hence, there is still a possibility that one's self-feeling can become engrossed in particular feelings due to failed attempts at appropriating them into the fluid totality (In the third chapter of this thesis I argue that these particular feelings are usually of the emotive type – what Hegel calls "practical feelings"). According to Hegel, this is what makes us prone to madness (Enz. III §408). If one fails to appropriate a strong emotional feeling and becomes engrossed in a particularity of the (subjective) self-feeling, one is more

liable to fixate on the representation which elicited the unreconcilable self-feeling and adhere to it as if it were objectively true in opposition to "our objective consciousness". That does not mean that objective consciousness is completely suspended in madness. The mentally ill person consciously relates itself to two separate totalities at once: the fixated representation and objective reality. But since it is the fixated representation to which the individual's self-feeling is attached, this has the upper hand (Enz. III §408 Zus.).

The account above is a simplified one. Hegel identifies at least nine forms and degrees of mental illnesses (cf. Berthold-Bond 1995, 21). By today's standards, many of these neither qualify as madness, nor involve any fixation at all, such as *absent-mindedness* [Zerstreutheit] and *rambling mind* [Faselei] (Enz. III §408 Zus). Instead, they can be seen as different ways of getting stuck in particularities of a self-feeling due to failed appropriation, and as paradigm cases for failed emotional reactions. The mental states Hegel considers to be madness proper, such as melancholia and frenzy [Tollheit], are more connected to a fixation on a representation that contradicts objective consciousness (Enz. III §408 Zus.). In my view, Hegel's account of the genesis of these conditions is difficult to make sense of without his notion of practical feelings – emotions as judgments of value. Any elaborations will therefore have to wait until chapter 3, where I give an account of practical feelings.

As Berthold-Bond points out, Hegel's *Anthropology* provides an ontology of madness. For Hegel does indeed claim that madness is an actual stage in the development of spirit [Entwicklungsstufe] (Enz. III §408 Zus.). This notion is not meant to imply that all individuals must live through an episode of madness. Rather – and analogous to the relationship between will and crime in *PR* – madness is an extreme manifestation of a disposition in our being, namely our self-feeling. Throughout our spiritual development, madness is an *extreme* we must strive to overcome, but in most cases, this disposition only manifests itself through minor mistakes, errors, and foolishness (Enz. III §408 Zus.).

It is no accident that madness is examined alongside the emergence of self-feeling. Self-feeling is located at a threshold where the soul starts wresting itself from immediacy with its bodily feelings, sensations, and nature, towards becoming a self-conscious "I" that can take possession of itself [sich bemächtigen] (Enz. III §408 Zus.); or, once again borrowing Jaeggi's formula for non-alienated relation of appropriation, to "be present to itself" and "have itself at command" (2014, 37; 63). In other words, the soul stands at the threshold between immersion in particular aspects of its self-feeling and objective consciousness. It also stands in a tension between *being* its body and *having* its body (Ng 2018, 35); a tension between being fully surrendered to each feeling and sensation befalling the body and using it

for practical purposes. Using the body for practical purposes implies a degree of consistency. In Hegel's analysis, the soul's self-feeling alone cannot provide this. It needs to form habits.

1.4. "The mechanism of self-feeling": On habit, expressivity, and the actual soul

We have seen that self-feeling alone does not enable us to orient ourselves functionally in the world. The reason is that self-feeling in its original form is *inwardly* immersed in every one of its immediate fleeting feelings, so that it virtually becomes impossible for it to be attentive to anything external to the feelings. (The self-feeling has not yet been rendered a background emotion, in Damasio's sense). This apparent impasse brings Hegel to the discussion of habit [Gewohnheit]; arguably the turning point of the *Anthropology'*s discussion of Gefühl.

The primary function of habit is to counterbalance the above-mentioned imbalance between our self-feeling and feelings. Like J.J. Howard, I too believe Hegel sees habit formation as the first step towards making feelings emotive and that it contributes to facilitate personal ownership of our "inner world" (cf. 2014, 76). To this I will add that habit i) integrates feelings as part of our *emotional identity*, and (ii), that it is through habit that we become able to *express* our inner states to other people through culturally mediated signs.

Hegel's definition of habit is couched in his typical philosophical terminology: "Daß die Seele sich so zum abstrakten allgemeinen Sein macht und das Besondere der Gefühle (auch des Bewußtseins) zu einer nur seienden Bestimmung an ihr reduziert, ist die Gewohnheit." (Enz. III §410). The key claim in this passage is that habit acquisition involves drawing a distinction between myself and my feelings. When learning to do something out of habit, I must have an awareness that *I am* something other than the feelings I have. Hegel's idiosyncratic way of expressing this is that the soul makes itself into an "abstract universal being" and makes its feelings particular determinations of it. Although this may sound needlessly complicated, the point is straightforward and in line with our conventional understanding of habit. What it conveys is the ability to make feelings inconspicuous and less obtrusive. If every ensuing feeling completely takes hold of one's mental state, one would be paralyzed. It would also prevent one's self-feeling from coming to fruition as something other than the particular feeling; thus, making one unable to become aware of the content of one's feeling. Hence the definition of habits as the "mechanism of self-feeling" (Enz. III §410).

Hegel argues that habits both enable us to *take possession* of our feelings and *liberate* us from them (Enz. III §410). Importantly – as will become clear in my discussion of Hegel's treatment of Stoicism (3.2.5) – this "taking possession" and "liberation" [Befreiung] does not entail attempts at eliminating our feelings, acting as if they were not there, but a way of

relating to them which makes it possible for us to be open to further activity [weitere Tätigkeit und Beschäftigung] (Enz. III §410). But what, more precisely, characterizes this way of relating to our feelings? In what way does habit function as the "mechanism of self-feeling"?

It might be helpful to consider Hegel's characterization of habit as *second nature* [zweite Natur].[29] Habit is *nature* because we relate to what we have become accustomed to in a similar immediate manner as we relate to natural changes such as aging, being asleep and waking up (Enz. III §410). Furthermore, habit is *secondary* because it is *produced* by us. Habits are not naturally given in the same way as aging but are formed through repetition [Wiederholung] and practice [Übung] (Enz. III §410). In other words, the phenomena we get accustomed to through habit are *actively naturalized*.

1.4.1 The three types of habit

Hegel emphasizes that "[t]he form of habit encompasses all kinds and stages in the activity of spirit" ["Die Form der Gewohnheit umfaßt alle Arten und Stufen der Tätigkeit des Geistes"] (Enz. III. §410). Hence, habit is not only a subject matter of the *Anthropology* and a capacity of the soul but also of *Psychology* and what Hegel calls intelligent *memory* [Gedächtnis]. In the next chapters I draw out the implications this has for Hegel's cognitive view of emotions. For now, I focus on the three types of habit Hegel discusses in the *Anthropology*.

How can the soul effectuate a distinction between self-feeling and feeling and establish second nature on its own, considering its still purely affective, relatively limited, capacities? As Winfield shows, the answer is *repeated exposure to feelings* (2010, 11). At this point, repeated exposure does not alter the *content* of the soul's feeling (a content the soul is still blind to), but its *form.* What does the formal alteration consist in? Through repeated exposure, we become *indifferent* [gleichgültig] to certain sensations and feelings. This is the first type of habit, and it involves becoming more stubborn [Abhärtung] to outer sensations, such as temperatures, sounds, and tastes (Enz. III § 410). Hegel here also mentions habits that make our emotional dispositions [Gemüt] more able to cope with distress (Enz. III § 410).

The second form of habit Hegel examines is that of becoming *indifferent to satisfactions [gleichgültigkeit gegen die Befriedigung].* As Hegel sees it, the proper way of dulling natural needs is not through asceticism or repression, but to become *accustomed* to the satisfaction of one's needs. The reason for this is that the latter approach will help us integrate

[29] Inwood argues that the characterization of habits as second nature was coined by Montaigne (cf. 2007, 397). Yet, we also find it as early as Plutarch's "custom is almost a second nature" (Wood 1991, 437n)

and appropriate our needs and satisfactions as a moment in our development, instead of attempting to flee from or eliminate them (Enz. III §410).

Now, indifference to something – such as feelings and satisfactions – presupposes difference. Hence, the soul's indifference to feelings and satisfactions can only be achieved through a felt difference between itself and them. It is precisely this felt difference that arranges for the third kind of habit, which has its cognitive counterpart in memory, namely *habitual skill* [*Gewohnheit als Geschicklichkeit*] (Enz. III §410).[30]

In the *Anthropology's* analysis of habitual skill, Hegel is guided by the question of how we learn to do things with our bodies, such as walking or raising our hands. The first step in this direction is to differentiate between one's self-feeling, one's feelings, and one's body. The most adequate way of doing this, Hegel argues, is to start relating to one's body as something *external* to oneself, as when a child becomes aware of and objectifies its hands for the first time. From the perspective of the genesis of the feeling soul, this implies a "sundering" of its original immediacy with its body, making the body appear as the soul's limit [Schranke] (Enz. III §410). This, however, is not in itself sufficient for the formation of a habitual skill. The next and decisive step for the feeling soul in acquiring a habitual skill is "… to assert itself as subjective goal in the body" [als subjektiver Zweck *in* der Leiblichkeit geltend macht] (Enz III. §410). What is meant by this cryptic description is that the soul makes the body – with its limbs and organs – an *instrument* for its purposes.[31] Such a process can be quite laborious for the first time, as when a child learns to stand up and walk. Hegel's phenomenological assessment of such a case would be to say that the child must go through a process of differentiating between its self-feeling and its body. Further, it must feel that it is able to exercise a certain degree of control over its body and repeat the movements it is practicing. Upon the acquisition of the habitual skill, the child will no longer relate to its body, feelings, and sensations in the same way as when it started practicing and repeating its walking. Through habit formation, the immediacy between the child's self-feeling and its body has been re-established, albeit in a more advanced and differentiated way than initially.

When the soul has acquired these and similar forms of habits, Hegel argues that it *i)* has become a *subject* with its body as its *predicate*, and *ii)* has made its body a *sign of the soul* (Enz III. §411). In this study, the latter point is particularly important. What does Hegel mean by saying that the body has become the sign of the soul through habit? And how is this

[30] Inwood's translation is *dexterity* (2007, 132). This rendition can be misleading, since it indicates that we are starting to excel in a special activity, instead of acquiring motor skills like walking and standing up straight.
[31] Hegel is here drawing heavily on Aristotle. For a discussion of the overlaps, see (Ferrarin 2004, 278-284)

significant for his theory of emotions?

1.4.2 The body as sign of the soul: First signs of emotive interpretation and expression

I have already referred to the relation between embodiment [Verleiblichung] and expression of sensations and feelings in Hegel's philosophy. Hegel couples these ideas with his theory of *signs*, developed in the *PsG*-psychology (Enz. III §457-64). Like Saussure, Hegel assumes that all signs have a *content-side* and an *expressive side* (Cf. Saussure 2007, 66-67). The content-side is the material through which the meaning of the sign (or symbol) is expressed. The expressive side constitutes the meaning, or reference, of the sign or the symbol. What is unique about signs as opposed to symbols is their level of abstraction. Whereas the content-side of the symbol imitates what it refers to – like the hieroglyph or the onematepoeia – the relation between the content-side and the expressive side of the sign is more arbitrary (Enz. III §457-458). Indeed, the expressive meaning of the sign is something "alien" to its sensory material content. Moreover, when we perceive signs, it is the expressive meaning we perceive first and immediately, not the content or the material side (Enz. III §457 Zus.).

When Hegel asserts that habit formation makes the body a sign of the soul, he is implying that the body is the sign's content-side. The body, as a sign, does not express or refer to itself, but the sentient condition of the soul (Enz III. §411). In line with Hegel's notion of the sign, this expressive meaning (the state of the soul) must be mimetically detached from the content-side (the body). If not, it would be a symbol.

When the soul has made its body a sign of itself, Hegel claims that it establishes a unity between the *inner* and *outer* (Enz. III §411). Inwardness is the soul's feeling and self-feeling, and its bodily organs and limbs are its externality, expressing the state of the soul. Ultimately, habit formation will enable the soul to properly "feel itself and make itself felt" [sich fühlt und sich zu fühlen gibt] through the body (Enz. III §411). Habit formation therefore has an unmistakable *communicative* function. But a presupposition for being able to feel itself and make itself felt is that the body has become the "… soul's artwork, with *human* pathognomical and physiognomical expressions" (Enz. III §411). Having done so, Hegel argues, the soul has *actualized* itself (Ibid.). What does this mean? And crucially: Can it help illuminate the shortcomings of Howard's feeling-theoretical reading of Hegel?

Regarding the first question: The purpose of the soul, Hegel holds, is to become an *ideality relating to itself*. Recalling Gabriel's explanation of Hegel's notion of *ideality,* this term can also refer to the undifferentiated unity between the soul, its environment, and its bodily feelings (2011, 51). The ability to relate to this unity, however, implies a certain degree

of freedom *from* it. As Hegel sees it, one would not be able to stand in any self-relation if each input from one's environment or feelings takes complete hold of one's attention. But it is equally important not to attempt to detach oneself completely from one's environment and feelings. For Hegel, the purpose of the soul is to be able to combine its self-relating capacities with its unity with nature. The soul will then, as Hegel writes, be *actualized* and "with itself" [*beisich*]. This is the status quo in the last section of the *Anthropology*, on the actual soul [wirkliche Seele] (Enz. III §411-412).

Much of what Hegel says about the *actual soul* has already been anticipated. What we learn now is some specifics about different habits, especially regarding embodiment and expression of sensations and feelings. As we saw in the section on sensation, Hegel argued that all sensations must bring about a corresponding physiological embodiment and expression. A question that was left unanswered in that section, was whether all embodied expressions of *inner* sensations are naturally predetermined, or whether some are learned. This is not an insignificant question. For as shown in the introduction, interpreters like Howard found that Hegel's answer, with its alleged "positivistic" emphasis on physiological embodiment (arousal) as the factor that allows us to distinguish between emotions – e.g., boiling of the blood and blushing –, threatens to undermine his theory of emotions (2013, 80). Hegel's position is more nuanced than this. The last part of the *Anthropology* reveals that he will be more sensitive to social factors than Howard claims, and lay the foundation for a view that emphasizes the role of socially conditioned embodied expressions and value judgements for recognizing and distinguishing between emotions. Let us now consider how.

In the section on the actual soul, Hegel draws a distinction between *involuntary embodiments of inner sensations*, and *voluntary embodiments of inner sensations* (Enz. III §411 Zus.) Hegel sees embodied expressions like blushing, quivering, crying, and turning pale, as involuntary embodiments of inner sensations of, shame, fear, and sadness, although he allows some degree of freedom with regards to exactly how the embodiment is carried out (the pitch of the laughter, etc.) (Enz. III §411 Zus.). The involuntary character of these embodied expressions is explained with reference to the virtually universal correlation between the physiological arousal, its embodied expression, and the psychic emotion: the physiological feeling of a lump in my throat, quivering and turning pale, is almost invariantly embodied expressions of fear (Enz. III §411 Zus.). This justifies classifying them under their own category. According to Hegel, both humans and other animals have the capacity for involuntary embodiments and expressions (Enz. III §411 Zus.).

The *voluntarily* embodied expression of inner sensations, on the other hand, is a

distinctive human ability, referring to those embodiments and expressions which often vary across cultures, which we have learned through habit. The examples Hegel mentions range from nodding one's head as an embodied expression of approval, to making a long face as an embodied expression of surprise, and other grimaces as expressions of disgust (Enz. III §411 Zus.).[32] As I later show, linguistic utterances and even artistic creations – think about singing – can be counted among voluntary embodied expressions of inner sensations.

According to Hegel, these voluntary embodied expressions are very much like *signs*. As I read him, there can be no question that the expression of the above-mentioned emotions (e.g., sadness, joy, shame) can and normally do become mediated by signs, and hence, that the embodied expression of them achieves a voluntary aspect. The implications of this reading set my interpretation of Hegel's theory of emotion off from that of Howard's. Hegel did not hold involuntary, physiological embodiments to be the only and best way of discriminating between emotions, as Howard holds (2013, 80). The voluntary embodied expressions, and their development, are just as crucial for this task, especially from a third-person point of view. This is in line with Taylor's reading of Hegel's semiology:

> They [signs] make plain in public space how we feel, or how we stand with each other, or where things stand for us. It is a long slow process which makes us able to get things clearer in focus, describe them more exactly, and, above all, become more knowledgeable about ourselves. To do this requires that we develop finer and more discriminating media (1982, 91)

Hence, contrary to Howard's reading, in a situation where my friend shows up for dinner with a considerably paler and worn-out look in his face than normal, Hegel would opt for gesticulation or, at best, linguistic testimony as the most reliable indicator of his sadness (voluntary expression), not an inference from his facial color or a body-scan (involuntary embodied expression). As Hegel puts it after having noted how our voices become the object of habitual activity: "… in der Rede besitzt [man] das würdigste und geeignetste Mittel, sich auszudrücken" (Enz. III §411 Zus.).

All of this is stated in the last section of the *Anthropology*; a stage where the soul is said to be "actual" [Wirklich] (Enz. III §411). Does this mean that our self-feeling and emotions are *products* of habits and mediated by signs? Does Hegel's theory of emotions

[32] These examples are not the strongest ones if the goal is to argue for cross-cultural differences in emotional expression. Ekman, like Darwin, argues for a certain universality when it comes to emotions like surprise and disgust, and it has been suggested that *recognition* of expressions instead of the expressions themselves are more likely to vary cross-culturally (Hemert et al. 2007, 914). Following Ekman, it is reasonable to think that so-called *display-rules* – norms for emotional responses – vary culturally (1980, 87). Whether Hegel drew the right lines between voluntary/involuntary expressions is less important than the fact that he sees display-rules and grammar of emotional recognition as socially conditioned, and essential for identifying each other's emotional states.

commit itself to the view that human self-feeling and emotions are ultimately culturally determined? The answers to these questions will deliver a second blow to the feeling-theoretical reading of Hegel. But since Hegel analyzes feelings and emotions from different vantage points of the *PsG*, it is too early to give elaborate answers now. Nonetheless, the first step towards an answer is possible if we consider the function he attributes to habits *within* the progression of the *Anthropology*. I want to approach this by way of reflecting on a possible worry about Hegel's heavy emphasis on habits.

1.4.3. Bad habits? Closing words on indifference and the myth of the passions

While most people acknowledge the importance of habit in everyday life, one should not forget the negative connotations associated with it. Proust, the great habit-inquisitor, once wrote that "[w]e only really take cognizance of something which is new, something which abruptly introduces a change of tone that strikes our sensibility, something that habit has not yet replaced with its pale replicas" (2021, 121). The dulling, desensitizing effects of habit make us blind to novel impressions. As Proust formulates it elsewhere, it can also make us blind to our first nature (Proust in Beckett 1978, 11). Not only can ingrained habits have aesthetic consequences for our personal well-being and creativity. Some habits can also be thought to have ethical and political consequences, sustaining biases, and making us less susceptible to forms of injustices and suffering we otherwise would have recognized and promptly responded to.[33] Besides: Is not Hegel's emphasis on habitual indifference towards feelings an affirmation of the key ideas from the myth of the passions, namely that we should repress our feelings? Hegel is aware of some of these criticisms, and he partially agrees:

> "Von der Gewohnheit pflegt herabsetzend gesprochen und sie als Unlebendiges, Zufälliges und Partikuläres genommen zu werden. Ganz zufälliger Inhalt is allerdings der Form der Gewohnheit, wie jeder andere, fähig, und es ist die Gewohnheit des Lebens, welche den Tod herbeiführt oder, wenn ganz abstrakt, der Tod selbst ist" (Enz. III §410).
> "… die Gewohnheit macht das unsichtbar, worauf unsere ganze Existenz beruht" (PR §268 Zus.).

He is also aware that the process of developing habits involves certain restraints, making ourselves, in a certain sense, unfree. Yet, against the habit-critical sentiments found in Proust, he would retort that this criticism is premised on a one-sided, purely negative conception of freedom. If this notion of freedom was true, all human beings would be free if they followed every passing instinct (Enz. III §410 Zus.). Furthermore, the objection that habit as second nature shifts our attention away from our first nature, is based on a wholly misguided idea

[33] For a discussion of the relationship between habit, critical reflection, and ethical life, see Alejandra Novakovic's *Hegel on Second Nature in Ethical Life* (2017).

about our inner nature. To paraphrase Pippin, overcoming the immediacy of nature is not un-natural (2008, 52). So, while we should be aware of the potential pitfalls of habit, it is important to appreciate how essential habit is in our development:

> Aber zugleich ist sie [habit] der Existenz aller Geistigkeit im individuaellen Subjekte das Wesentlichste, damit das Subjekt als konkrete Unmittelbarkeit, als seelische Idealität sei, damit der Inhalt, religiöser, moralischer, usf., ihm als diesem Selbst, ihm als dieser Seele angehöre, weder ihm bloss an sich (als anlage), noch als vorübergehende Empfindung oder Vorstellung, noch als abstrakte, von Tun und Wirklichkeit abgeschiedene Innerlichkeit, sondern in seinsem Sein sei (Enz. III §410).

One should also keep in mind that Hegel starts discussing habit after the section on self-feeling and madness. This is no coincidence. For in that section, the soul remained fixed in a contradiction between being immersed in a particular feeling and becoming aware itself as something other than this particular feeling – in self-feeling. Hegel argued that all human beings must go through and overcome such a condition in their development, i.e., the condition where one stands at the threshold between merely *being* a body with certain feelings and sensations and *having* a body with certain feelings and sensations. Furthermore, the overcoming of this contradiction must be carried out in such a way that it re-establishes [Wiederherstellt] a certain harmony between the part of our being that has certain feelings, and the part of our being that feels itself as something *other* than these feelings. The main task of habit is to facilitate this re-establishment; making sure that the soul can become a "being-with-itself" (Enz. III §410 Zus.). Indeed, as Hegel writes: We call this being-with-oneself *habit*" [Dieser beisichselbersein nennen wir *Gewohnheit*] (Enz. III §410 Zus.).

How does Hegel think habits lay the foundation for further human emotional development? Does this analysis echo of the myth of the passions? Hegel does claim that habitual indifference both liberates us from, and allows us to take *possession* of, our bodies and our feelings. But this does not mean that we get rid of or suppress them. The point is that we get accustomed to our body and feelings in such a way that we can "move freely in them", be present to ourselves in them, and have ourselves at our command (Enz. III §410 Zus.). Thus, we are not overpowered when having bodily feelings and sensations but are able to relate to them as forming a pattern; as being our own. In short, habit creates the potential for *emotional identity*. Hegel's claim is that in order to do so, habit must have rendered our body and feelings into *signs* we feel and express ourselves through. In the next chapter, my focus will be on what happens when our feeling awareness is turned outwards; that is, when we not only feel our inner bodily states without a conscious relation to their elicitors, but cognitively respond to contents and representations that have become mediated by signs. Only then will we begin to see the contours of Hegel's cognitive evaluative view of emotions.

Chapter 2
Theoretical Spirit and the Cognitive Presuppositions of Emotions

2.0. Chapter introduction

The last chapter examined Hegel's analysis of the soul with an eye to how it tracks the development of human feelings. Like Aristotle, Hegel conceives of the soul as a power that makes living bodies self-producing according to what kind of being they are. The soul also enables us human beings to feel and feel ourselves through self-feeling; it establishes our second nature and enables us to relate to our body and feelings as signs, as well as express our feelings through involuntary and (pre-discursive) voluntary expressions. Yet still, in being pre-intentional and pre-conscious, the soul only feels itself without knowing what its feelings are responses to (Winfield 2009, 81). The present chapter analyzes Hegel's account of how we human beings develop feelings of something that is other than us but still mediated by our cognitive determinations. In short: I look at what happens when Gefühle are sublated by higher cognitive capacities such as attention, intuition, representation, memory, and language.

My aim is two-fold: First, to uncover how the operations of what Hegel calls *intelligence* allow us to appropriate our Gefühle, render them cognitive, and help us express them discursively in more discriminate and finer ways. I make the case that the *PsG* operates with three conceptions of Gefühl*,* among which the third can be categorized as cognitive judgments of value. The latter point is particularly important. There is an unfortunate tendency in the literature on Hegel to stick to the *Anthropology's* account of the "feeling soul", as if that were his final words on feelings (Cf. Redding 1999; Berthold-Bond 1995). This creates the false impression that Gefühle, for Hegel, are unconscious and forever will belong to a hidden, dark region of our being, strictly opposed to reason. The *PsG-Psychology* shows that Hegel is far from reiterating such claims, akin to the myth of the passions. I will borrow ideas from McDowell to drive home this point, and to contest Redding's interpretation of Hegel on the emotions. My analysis will set the stage for the following chapter, on Hegel's concept of the will and what he calls *praktische Gefühle*, or emotions proper.

2.1. On the relationship between the *Anthropology, Phenomenology*, and *Psychology*

The section between the *Anthropology* and *Psychology* is entitled *Phenomenology* and is a highly condensed and revised version of the three first sections of Hegel's 1807 work.[34] By

[34] According to Robert Williams, Hegel in the *PsG* made substantial revisions of the Phenomenology sections on recognition, shedding entirely new light on the *affirmative*, liberating, and ethically constitutive function of mutual recognition, instead of the more skeptical account given in the 1807-*PhG* (cf. 1997, 2; 69).

turning now to the *Psychology* part of the *PsG*, I am therefore deliberately breaking with the original structure of Hegel's exposition. I think I have good reasons for this: First, the *Phenomenology*-part refrains from explicitly thematizing Empfindung and Gefühl. A detailed reconstruction and discussion of it would therefore divert attention from my main subject. Secondly – and here I agree with Stanley Rosen (1974, 301-302) – it is difficult to detect a continuity between the *Phenomenology* and the *Psychology.* The insertion of the *Phenomenology* between the *Anthropology* and the *Psychology* seems artificial, as if Hegel's motivation was to attain a triadic structure. As Rosen suggests, the *Psychology* could just as well have followed from the *Anthropology* (Ibid., 302). Given the difficulties of explaining how the intentional consciousness discussed in the *Phenomenology* could take place without presupposing some of the mental capacities discussed in *Psychology,* such as attention and intuition, a more adequate solution for Hegel would have been to reintegrate certain parts of the *Phenomenology* within the *Psychology*.[35]

My third reason for leaving out a chronological close reading of the *Phenomenology* is somewhat related to the second. I believe the analysis of Hegel's theory of emotions will benefit from a parallel reading of key parts from the 1807 *Jena PhG,* together with the *Psychology*. Hegel never abandoned the conviction that the human condition is fundamentally characterized by contradictory, rupturing yearnings for unity with the world, despair and "infinite pain" (cf. Berthold-Bond 1995, 45-46). No other work of his contains so many rich examples of this condition and its various individual and world-historical manifestations than the Jena *PhG*, and they undoubtably inform our understanding of Hegel's theory of emotions, as both Pahl (2012) and Berthold-Bond (1995) has shown.

2.1.2. Short recapitulation of the Phenomenology: Desiring and intentional consciousness

Although I leave out a close reading of the *PsG-Phenomenology*, a brief recapitulation of the transition from the *PsG-Anthropology* to *Phenomenology* is in order.

A key point from the *Anthropology* was that the soul never relates itself to the manifold of its sensations and feelings as a unified *object* distinct from itself. And although the soul organizes, and renders self-producing, unique and individuated bodies (Hegel anticipates Merleau-Ponty and Strawson by asserting concrete individuated embodiment as a

[35] Winfield, on the other hand, emphasizes the necessary continuity between the three parts of the *PsG*. His main concern, however, is to argue that Hegel was right in presenting desiring pre-discursive consciousness that distinguishes between self and other as prior to linguistic intelligence (2009, 76-77). I think this is a convincing point, but it does not explain why attention, intuition, and representation should come after the *Phenomenology*.

prerequisite for unified experience (Winfield 2009, 66-67)), the soul does not relate to *itself* as an individuated "*I"*. According to Hegel, this is because the ability to relate to objects in the outer world belongs to *consciousness* [Bewußtsein]. To be conscious of something means to be intentionally conscious of something *as an object*, as distinct from other objects and from oneself (Enz. III §413). *Consciousness* comprises *sense certainty* [sinnliche Gewissheit], or the ability to have an immediate feeling of a particular object outside oneself; *perception* [Wahrnehmung], the ability to perceive an object as a combination between independent attributes and a universal; and finally *understanding* [Verstand], which enables us to determine the object as an appearance of a universal, hidden inner nature (Enz. III §418-422).

The ability to intentionally relate to oneself as an "I" emerges with *self-consciousness*. This is the topic of the second part of the *PsG-Phenomenology* – for my study the most interesting subsection of this part. Self-consciousness is the consciousness I have of myself *while* being conscious of an *object* (Enz. III §424). Hegel traces the development of self-consciousness through the famous dialectic of *desire*,[36] *life and death struggle, lord and bondsman*, and *mutual recognition*. Among other things, the progress through these stages establishes that it is only after becoming conscious of another subject's intentional consciousness that one can develop self-consciousness.

Despite the *PsG-Phenomenlogy's* lack of explicit thematization of Empfindung and Gefühl, the account of the emergence of self-consciousness does play a somewhat important role in Hegel's theory of emotions. Hegel demonstrates how we humans must go from relating to the world self-*feelingly*, maintaining our self-feeling by consuming the objects of our orectic other-directed desire, to self-*consciously* relating to the world through the consciousness of another person (Enz. III §426-436). Through this demonstration, it not only becomes clear that self-consciousness is necessarily mediated by consciousness of an Other, but also that a normatively structured *non-discursive intersubjectivity,* shared intentionality,[37] coevolves with self-consciousness *and* antecedes linguistic intelligence (Winfield 2009, 72-77). Thus, prior to the development of the latter capacity, humans must be able to interpret the intentionality of one another, and *eo ipso*, one another's emotional state, in a manner that enables mutual recognition. In other words, the self is constituted in an affective, normative relation to other subjects and the world. However, as I will argue below, this does not make

[36] I return to the question of what significance the difference between desire and its spiritual counterpart, *will,* has for Hegel's philosophy of emotion in the next chapter.
[37] According to the developmental psychologist Michael Tomasello (2021), this is the most decisive event in the human ontogeny.

the Gefühle of self-consciousness *cognitive* in Hegel's sense of the word.

In the final part of the *PsG-Phenomenology*, entitled *reason* [Vernunft], consciousness and self-consciousness are integrated, and "the I" bases itself on the assumption that reality reflects the structures of subjectivity – in short, that there is a unity between subject and object (Enz. III §438-439). This assumption forms the bridge over to the *Psychology*.

2.2. The project in the Psychology

Hegel's psychology is devoted to the study of *subjective spirit.* Subjective spirit is introduced as both the "truth" of the soul and consciousness, and their unity (Enz. III §440; §444). These formulations – typical of Hegel – express the conviction that subjective spirit integrates the capacities of the soul and of self-consciousness in such a way that they can achieve proper human functioning. While both the sentient capacities of the soul and the intentional capacities of consciousness are necessary constituents in human life, Hegel thinks that they are insufficient, equally one-sided, and in need of reconciliation on a higher level. For whereas the soul provides a pre-intentional, immediate, corporeal interaction with inner and outer nature, consciousness and self-consciousness establish a division between the I and external objects, where the I relates to objects as something alien (Enz. III §440 Zus. & WL2, 495). It seems, in other words, that soul and consciousness are opposed to each other. And they cannot, on their own, solve this opposition so as to bring about higher-order cognition.

This is where *subjective spirit* enters. The function of subjective spirit is to produce a unity that incorporates the differences between our immediate, inward, corporeal affectivity and our conscious intentionality (Cf. Ikäheimo 2017, 429). For Hegel, it is partly[38] through the exercise of the psychological capacities that are to be presented here that most adult human beings neither exist in a pure, undifferentiated unity between subject and object (like the psyche), nor as subjects alienated from the external world (like consciousness), but in a subject-object unity that incorporates the immanent differences between these two extremes.

Precisely how these psychological processes produce this unity can only be demonstrated by way of analyzing the capacities presented in the *Psychology*. But in a nutshell, the idea is that subjective spirit makes consciousness its object in the same way as consciousness related itself to the soul as its object (Enz. III §443). Since the *Phenomenology* ended with consciousness standing in a unity between the I and the object it is conscious of, the spiritual capacities Hegel is going to present therefore operate on sensuous content already

[38] I say "partly" here because Hegel thinks the exercise of these capacities implicitly presupposes objective and absolute spirit (cf. Enz. III §385 Zus.)

made conscious, and not on the raw, sensuous material of the soul (Enz. III §443). What spirit seeks to do with this content is to appropriate it even further – "to posit it as its own" [als das Seinige zu setzen] (Enz. III §443). Spirit will then relate itself to its mental states and content, such as its feelings, its representations, and eventually its thoughts, as having its own determinations; a spiritual meaning (Enz. III §442; cf. also WL2, 695).

2.2.1 On the sections of the Psychology and the unity of the theoretical and the practical

Hegel divides the section on subjective spirit into the following three parts: *theoretical spirit*, *the will* and *practical spirit*, and finally, *free spirit*. Given the aim of this thesis, my focus will be on the genesis of emotions as cognitive judgments of value in these parts. But before embarking on my analysis, I would like to draw attention to some fundamental premises in Hegel's discussion: the unity between the theoretical (intelligence) and the practical (will),[39] as well as between the *understanding* [Verstand] and the *heart* [das Herz].

According to Hegel, it is misguided to think that these capacities lead their own isolated existence (Enz. III §445; cf. PR §4 Zus.; PR §5). Hence, in most adult human beings, all forms of cognition are imbued with volition, feelings, and emotions, and conversely, all volition, feelings, and emotions are imbued with cognition (Enz. III §445). A "heartless understanding" and an "un-understanding heart", Hegel writes, only points to "bad, untrue existences" (Enz. III §445). Or, as Pahl puts it: "Rationality has emotional qualities in Hegel's account, while the emotionality at work in his philosophy has rational qualities. In the world of spirit, emotionality and rationality are entangled." (2013, 37). These points are important to keep in mind, as they attest that Hegel intends to present the capacities in this last part of *PsG* as not standing in any external, indifferent relationship to each other, but as interconnected.

2.3. Theoretical spirit: On intelligence

The part of the *Psychology* called theoretical spirit explicates the development of the capacities that lead up to and are involved in *cognition* [Erkennen]. Hegel frequently emphasizes how cognition epistemically differs from *certainty* [Gewissheit]. *Certainty* is Hegel's rather derogatory term for an attitude where one believes one has knowledge of *what* something is, although, in reality, the only thing one can ascertain is *that* something is. To *cognize* something is to go beyond how something immediately seems [Scheint], grasping

[39] This is a Fichtean heritage. As Fichte puts it in his Wissenschaftslehre: "Die Vernunft könne selbst nicht theoretisch sein, wenn sie nicht praktisch sei; es sei keine Intelligenz im Menschen möglich, wenn nicht ein praktisches Vermögen in ihm sei; die Möglichkei aller Vorstellung gründe sich auf das letztere" (1956, 182)

what it truly – that is conceptually – is. Hegel contends that *certainty* emerged with consciousness, and that cognition, true knowing, is a uniquely spiritual capacity, belonging to what he calls *intelligence* (Enz. III §445; 445 Zus.).

What is intelligence? Echoing paragraph 1.2, intelligence differs from the previous capacities in the *PsG* by being more self-conscious of how its own conceptual activity shapes the object of its intentionality (this interpretation is shared by many other Hegel-scholars (cf. Wienfield 2010 19; Houlgate 2016, 63). But in the first place, intelligence is also the capacity *enabling* us to spontaneously shape our relation to the content of our experience such that we can come to recognize how it is mediated by notional structures. The *PsG's* developmental account of intelligence renders possible the notion of experience McDowell defends in *Mind and World*, where the lines between passivity and spontaneity are not that clear-cut: "…a conception of experiences as states or occurrences that are passive [on the side of sensibility] but reflect conceptual capacities, capacities that belong to spontaneity" (1996, 23). Thus, while it is true that the *Psychology*-part on theoretical spirit attempts to outline the development of the capacities (intelligence) that make us able to *think* and *cognize* in a purely conceptual manner without relying on any concurrent intuitions (Forster 2011, 162), this is not everything there is to it.[40] The same capacities, I hold, also lay the cognitive foundations for human emotions. They too will be very much like "…states or occurrences that are passive but reflect conceptual capacities [that] belong to spontaneity" (McDowell 1996, 23).

2.4. Intuition

As in the sections on the soul and consciousness, the process of cognition begins with spirit "finding" a material [Stoff]. But unlike the previous section, spirit's manner of *finding* this material is neither completely determined by bodily movements or the biosphere, nor by an apparently alien object, as was the case with the soul and consciousness. At present, spirit is developing *intelligence*. In line with this, Hegel argues that what spirit finds is a material it has produced itself (Enz. III §445). It does so through *intuition* [Anschauung] (Enz. III §446).

In intuition, intelligence is said to stand in an immediate relation to the material it will cognize further. (Keep in mind that this immediacy is more advanced than the previous forms of immediacy). But, rather perplexingly, Hegel quickly adds that intuition depends upon two prior moments: *feeling* and *attention* [Aufmerksamkeit]. In other words, it is only *after* we have started to self-consciously relate attentively to our feelings that the possibility of

[40] Hence, the *Psychology* is not demonstrating how conceptual thinking – thinking thinking itself – unfolds. This is the task of the *Logic*.

intuition emerges. This raises some questions. What kind of feelings – Gefühle – are Hegel referring to here? Do they differ from those forms of Gefühle we have analyzed so far?

2.4.1. The three types of Gefühle

The type of Gefühle involved in intuition differs from the Gefühle presented in the *Anthropology* and *Phenomenology*. In an informative addition (Enz. III §446 Zus.), Hegel maps the three main kinds of Gefühle analyzed in the *PsG* as a whole. The first belongs, as we have seen, to the soul. The Gefühle of the soul are *pre-intentional*. When the soul feels, it is enclosed within its corporeality and its immediate unity with another person or its natural environment and does not have access to the content of its feeling. At least prior to the formation of habits, the soul does not relate to its feelings as something other than itself, stemming from the outside. Yet, the soul cannot be said to be completely indifferent to its feelings. Despite how unconscious they are, its feelings can, in a minimal sense, assume the form of what Taylor has called *imports*; something which is "a matter of non-indifference" to it (1982, 48). I have already remarked that most of what Hegel says about the feeling soul seems modelled on the early infant. In this regard, Martha Nussbaum's descriptions of the development of emotions in infants are illuminating and fully resonate with Hegel's account:

> "At first, an infant has no clear sense of the boundaries between self and other. It experiences mysterious transformations, and it does not yet trace them to a distinct external origin. We have the roots of the emotions already, in the inchoate sense that some processes of profound importance to one's being are arriving and departing in a way that eludes control. Emotions are recognitions of that importance coupled with a lack of full control. This means that they develop gradually, as the infant becomes more and more cognizant of the importance of the transformations to its being and of the fact that they arrive, so to speak, from the outside" (2001, 190).

According to Hegel, the awareness that the "felt transformations" (in Nussbaum's sense) are coming from the outside is what characterizes the second form of Gefühle. The development of this form of Gefühl coincides with the formation of the "I" and consciousness. In a certain sense, what we are dealing with here are nonetheless only human *proto-emotions*. True, thanks to the *understanding* [Verstand] consciousness does relate to its felt content as imports by subsuming a *particular content* under a *general content* it evaluates and responds emotively to. Yet, in contrast to the feeling of the soul, Hegel writes that conscious Gefühl has all of its "determinations of feelings" [Gefühlsbestimmungen] outside of itself, in a seemingly alien object, completely separated from the subject (Enz. III §446 Zus.). I take this to mean the following: The *conscious emotion* of, say, fear, arises from one's having an intentional awareness of a distinct object, say, a big machine. However, in a purely conscious emotion, Hegel seems to think that the subject is unable to grasp its active psychological

contribution to the experience. Like the phobic person, the subject *confuses the emotion with the object itself*; it believes that the emotion of fear is *identical* to the object. Hence, the subject does not recognize that its fear of the big machine is partially due to qualities in the object and partly due to its own evaluation, as the subject of the experience. It also fails to understand that similar emotive reactions (fear) can be tied to a range of different phenomena in the world: Big machines can be scary, but so can a thunderstorm too.[41]

In the third, spiritual form of Gefühl, which is now being analyzed *in its emergence*, as a constituent of intuitions, Hegel writes that we are simply dealing with an "abstract immediacy" (Enz. III §446). But despite this description, this abstract immediacy operates in a manner that combines the one-sidedness of the soul's feeling and the conscious feeling:

> Jetzt endlich drittens hat das Gefühl die Bedeutung, diejenige Form zu sein, welche der die Einheit und Wahrheit der *Seele* und des *Bewußtseins* bildende *Geist als solcher* zunächst sich gibt. In diesem ist der Inhalt des Gefühls von der zweifachen Einseitigkeit befreit, welche derselbe einerseits auf dem Standpunkt der Seele und andererseits auf dem des Bewußtseins hatte. Denn nun hat jener Inhalt die Bestimmung, an sich ebensowohl *objektiv* wie *subjektiv* zu sein, und die Tätigkeit des Geistes richtet sich jetzt nur darauf, ihn als Einheit des Subjektiven und des Objektiven zu setzen (Enz. III §446 Zus.)

This quote demonstrates that Hegel indeed believes that the "theoretical feeling" involved in intuitions contains the seeds of a uniquely spiritual form of feeling. Indeed, the quote contains the first rough outline in the *PsG* of human *emotional* comportment to the world: The description above that spirit "posits" the content of its feelings as a unity of the *subjective* and the *objective* is a foundational idea in Hegel's cognitive evaluative view of emotions. The evaluative and volitional details of this view must wait for the next chapter, where I deal with practical spirit, the part of the *PsG* in which Hegel's account of emotion culminates. But as a preliminary, it should be noted that the kind of Gefühl Hegel is driving at in the quote above refers to a mental capacity whose *formal characteristics* are the following: i) A recognition of its own subjective contribution to the very objective *content* it responds to, but ii) in a way that is nonetheless immediate and hence iii) epistemically limited with regards to what aspects of the content it discloses. This skeletal summary is meant as scene-setting. Now it remains to be seen how Hegel's account of the activity and development of intelligence substantiates it.

2.4.2 From attentiveness in Gefühl to intuition

As noted, Hegel takes *attention* [Aufmerksamkeit] to be the second ingredient in intuitions.

[41] In an article on the historical development of the concept of emotion, John Deigh, drawing on James, argues that identifying emotions with specific objects was a tendency in some early empiricist approaches to emotion (cf. 2010, 19). Like the feelings of the *Phenomenology's* self-consciousness, this view does not recognize how the subject contributes to the emotional response.

Attention is first introduced as "spirit's abstract identical direction in feelings and all of its further determinations" [die abstrakte *identische* Richtung des Geistes im Gefühle wie in allen anderen seiner weiteren Bestimmungen] (Enz. III §448). The meaning of this somewhat technical definition is that attention discriminatorily directs our awareness towards a specific content in the manifold given through an initial outer sensation or feeling.[42] Since attention is retroactively operating on a sensation or a feeling, one must imagine that attentiveness takes place within a subject who has just either seen, heard, smelled, tasted, or touched something outside of itself, or responded to an import in an evaluative way, and consequentially is currently undergoing an *inner* bodily sensation – which is only one part of the Gefühl as a whole (Enz. III §448 +Zus.). Due to the scope of this thesis, I shall focus on the retroactive attentiveness to the bodily feeling following the (proto-)emotive response.

Through attention's selective directedness in the inner feeling, an *abstract identity* relation between one's attention and the object of one's attentiveness arises (Enz. III §448). The reason why Hegel labels this identity relation "abstract", is that intelligence has not yet become conscious of how it has set up a difference between its own attention and the object of its attention. This subject-object difference is still merely *implicit* in the identity relation between the two relata. In reality, it is operative in all forms of attention, as a "diremption" of the initial immediate way we find ourselves having a certain feeling (Enz. III §448).

How does this "diremption" unfold? On the one hand, when I am attentive to something, I must detach myself from the immediacy of the inner feeling. Echoing the analysis of habit, this detachment is said to involve relating to the inner feeling as something *other* than myself. On the other hand, in the very process of detaching myself from the inner feeling, Hegel argues that I simultaneously relate to it *as my own* (Enz. III §448). In line with his notion of *unity in self-relation*, it is through this very detachment that I can say that the feeling belongs to me; that I am united with it and can be attentively absorbed in its content.

According to Hegel, this process of *detaching myself from* and *restoring* the inner feeling makes me become properly *acquainted* with what I am currently feeling (Enz. III §448 Zus.). Now, if this means that Gefühle by themselves never will be able to provide me with information about something as a clear and distinct object, it could have significant ramifications for Hegel's theory of emotions. Is it not an indication that they never do cognitive-evaluative work themselves, and depend upon the retroactive operations of attention and higher-order cognition? Hegel seems to be claiming just that:

[42] This section is full of fluctuating and incoherent use of *Empfindung* and *Gefühl*. See my comments in fn.20.

> Ohne dieselbe [Aufmerksamkeit] ist daher kein Auffassen des Objektes möglich; erst durch sie wird der Geist in der Sache gegenwärtig, erhält derselbe zwar noch nicht *Erkenntnis* — denn dazu gehört eine weitere Entwicklung des Geistes -, aber durch *Kenntnis* von der Sache (Enz. III §448)

Attention is needed, this quote states, in order for us to familiarize ourselves with an object, i.e., the object that excited the bodily feeling. Indeed, one could say that Hegel's claim is even stronger than this. For does not "Auffassen des Objekts" mean "to take notice of the object"?

Such a reading would be misguided. For one thing, the ability to merely "take notice of an object" was developed with intentional consciousness, which is also why conscious proto-emotions were said to have their determinations in an object outside of themselves. And the *Phenomenology*-part of *PsG* does not mention attention at all. What is really at stake in this part of the *PsG* is the development of theoretical spirit; of cognizing and thinking. To "familiarize oneself with" or comprehend an object in order to get to know it is therefore more adequate descriptions of what Hegel thinks attention makes possible. In other words, Hegel's final saying on emotions will *not* be that we are forever unwittingly exposed to them before we are retroactively attentive to and discloses the content we are responding to. Such a claim would commit Hegel to a bold feeling theory, where the object of an emotion is one's bodily feeling, not a belief about some state of affairs in the world. Rather, from a developmental point of view, attention can enable us to cognitively alter our relation to the content we are responding emotively to, learn more of, and even theorize about them: "So it was X that provoked the feeling!"; "why did X awake such a feeling in me?"; "should I expect X to excite the same feelings again"? As we shall see later, it is not attention, as an isolated capacity, that enables us to respond emotively to objects in the way Hegel thinks is peculiar to humans. For, again, when he started the section on attention, such an emotional response has already taken place and the subject is undergoing inner bodily feelings.

This reading is backed up by the *PsG's* emphasis on the volitional aspects of attention. According to Hegel, none of us are born with automatic attentiveness. Being attentive to something is demanding and can even be regarded as the first step of education [Bildung] (Enz. III §448 Zus.). The very act of directing my attention towards an object other than myself is a matter of *will* – more specifically, my will to abstain from asserting myself in the encounter with the object, which allows me to devote myself fully to it and let the object speak for itself [zu Worte kommen lassen] (Enz. III §448 Zus.). To demand this kind of attention from the emotions is a tall order. But that does not mean that emotions are blind. Again, what Hegel has in mind here is a subject who has already responded to something

(emotively), is consequentially experiencing an inner feeling, and is trying to further cognize its content. We still do not know how the emotive, cognitive evaluation unfolds.

Now, as already pointed out, Hegel argues that from a developmental perspective, the combination between our indeterminate inner feelings and attention gives rise to *intuitions*. Where is the exact line between attention and intuition to be drawn? What are intuitions?

When elaborating on his understanding of intuition in the discussion on attention, Hegel asserts that the intellect's intuition of an inner feeling makes it assume a more determinate form than in attention. This is because the main work of intuitions is to spatiotemporally organize the content of an experience (Enz. III §488 Zus.). Hegel argues that it is ultimately through such an act of structuring my inner feelings spatiotemporally that their content can be experienced as an object *external* to me (Enz. III §448). In other words: The subject has already responded to something in a way that has given rise to an inner feeling. Now, through intuition, the subject is about to externalize the content of the inner feeling and make it appear as an object to be theoretically scrutinized. For Hegel, this does not mean that the *content* of the inner feeling is transformed through intuition. The alteration is *formal*. It takes place on the side of the subject and affects *my relation* to the inner feeling: the inner feeling goes from being something purely internal and immediate, to something external, which I can be attentively absorbed in (Enz. III §448 Zus.).

To get our heads around what Hegel means by intuition, it might help to contrast it with Kant's notion of it (cf. B37-B73). First, Hegel disagrees with Kant that time and space are only *transcendental* forms of intuition. Instead, time and space are also forms pertaining to and organizing the actual world itself (Enz. III §448 Zus.). Secondly, while time and space exist independently of us, we human beings must also actively use these categories self-consciously in our *cognition* of the world. As Houlgate notes, whereas Hegel thinks intuitions stem from "subjective activity", Kant sees them as receptive (2016, 64).

Before advancing, I want to examine closer how Hegel believes that attending to and intuiting inner feelings alters our relation to them. As noted in chapter 1, "inner sensation" is Hegel's term for bodily feelings of an emotion excited by my inner mental activity, not through sensing something present outside myself, as in outer sensation. (Inner sensations spring from cognitive capacities Hegel has not yet accounted for). And in the same manner as in that chapter, we now learn that certain violent inner sensations in their raw form tend to overpower us completely and paralyze our ability to redirect our actions (Enz. III §448 Zus.). But this influence is outbalanced when we manage to intuit the inner sensation. How?

Consider – as Hegel does – the example of sorrow.[43] In its most intense, immediate form, there is no distance between me and this inner sensation. The sorrow is omnipresent. By *intuiting* the inner sensation of sorrow, however, I gain distance from it. For, as we saw, to intuit something is to intuit it as organized according to spatiotemporal categories. And while the use of spatiotemporal categories in itself does not guarantee a great degree of distance from the inner sensation of the sorrow, Hegel thinks it allows me to *externalize* it, give it a more discernable form, and make it appear as something *confronting* me and something passing (Enz. III §448 Zus.). Through this operation, I can start reflecting on the aspects of my sorrow and try to grasp what content triggered the emotion and its inner sensation.

It is not by accident that Hegel chooses Goethe's writing of *Werther* as his example of intuiting sorrow in this manner. Hegel is convinced that educated people "…can feel deeper than uneducated ones" [der Gebildete fühlt … tiefer als der Ungebildete…] (Enz. III §448 Zus.), and more easily detach themselves from their feelings. According to Hegel, Goethe's writing of this novel can partly be understood as a mode of intuiting his heartsickness for the sake of *relieving* [erleichtern] himself from it (Enz. III §448 Zus.). Through intuiting his inner sensation in writing, Goethe could furthermore express it and convey it to other people. These descriptions do not imply that intuition is the sole ingredient in the creation of an artwork, neither in Goethe's nor anyone else's works; (a key objection in Hegel's critique of romanticism (Cf. Enz. III §449 Zus.)). The point it is important to emphasize here is that Hegel links expression, detachment, and cognition of inner sensations and feelings with the process of being relieved from and start to cognize them.[44]

2.5. Representation

Above we saw that intuitions were based on the content derived from sensations and Gefühle. Hegel now claims that intuitions in turn function as the content of *representations* [Vorstellungen]. Since Aristotle, the assumption that beliefs and representations are essential components in emotions, and something enabling us to distinguish between them, has been central to the cognitive tradition (Lyons 1980, 33). Hegel follows Aristotle and the cognitive

[43] I follow Michael Inwood in translating "Gefühl der Schmerz" to "sorrow" (2007, 179). Hegel juxtaposes "Schmerz" with "Freude" (joy) (Enz. III §448 Zus.), but he nonetheless draws on Goethe's *Leiden des Jungen Werthers* and, arguably, Schiller's *Ode an die Freude* to make his point.

[44] What about the counterpart of sorrow, namely joy? We would certainly hesitate to claim that Schiller wrote *Ode to Joy* to release himself from an inner sensation of joy. Rather, we would say something in the direction that Schiller, when writing the poem, "enriched" his inner sensation; uncovered its different aspects and its internal connections with other meaningful elements in the world. The upshot of this train of thought is that intuiting inner sensations can both provide us with *relief* from and *enrich* them. Hegel's argument also entails that intuiting our inner sensations can contribute to both relief and enrichment at the same time.

tradition on this point. To see how, we must now turn to the next part of the *Psychology*.

In typical Hegelian fashion, representation is not a capacity given at the outset, but something the individual must develop and learn to master through different consecutive stages. These are *recollection* [Erinnerung], *imagination* [Einbildungskraft], and *memory* [Gedächtnis].

2.5.1. Recollection

Hegel defines representation in general as "recollected intuition" [erinnerte Anschauung] (Enz. III §451). *Recollection* is the first stage of representation, and this definition emphasizes that the transition from intuition to representation is a transition from first being attentive to something as something external to oneself, to internalizing this intuition in one's mind. As such, Hegel argues that representation stands at the transition between intelligence finding itself determined from the outside and being free and self-determining; the latter of which is the case when we think conceptually (Enz. III §451). Yet still, although Hegel sees representation as an indispensable capacity in the lives of human beings, he nonetheless regards it with a certain suspicion, and frequently warns against absolutizing this capacity over and against conceptual thinking. For not only does representation qua "recollected intuition" represent an inward turn, in the sense that when one represents something for oneself, one is enclosed within one's subjectivity. Most representations are also said to be directly determined by the immediacy of my intuitions, emotions, feelings, and sensations, and Hegel, therefore, claims that they are encumbered by individual contingencies (Enz. III §451). To borrow a helpful phrase from Gabriel, representations lack *non-perceptual generality*, which is demanded by conceptual thinking (2020, 329). However, as Forster observes, Hegel is not going to say that thinking can do without sensuous and perceptual content *tout court*, but that we can (and should) think certain thoughts without having a specific coinciding intuition or image in our minds (2011, 162). These points are important to note, as they will crop up again in Hegel's *formalism-charge* against the emotions.

How does the recollection-stage of representation unfold? When we first internalize an intuition, Hegel states that we place the "content of the feeling" [inhalt des Gefühls] within our mental "universal" space and time by making it an *image* [ein Bild] (Enz. III §452). When transforming an intuition into an image, we first remove the object of our intuition from its immediate context, and abstract from its particular features. Hence, although Hegel believes that images have sensuous content, he nonetheless holds that they have a greater degree of non-perceptual generality than the concrete objects of our intuition. The mental image I have

of a chair is more based on the universal, general features of a chair than the various particular features of the actual chairs I have intuited.

These mental images are stored in our subconsciousness. Although Hegel prefers the term "the unconscious" over "subconsciousness", he frequently speaks about our "nocturnal pit" [nächtliche Schacht], where our images "slumber" in a state of pure potentiality (Enz. III §453).[45] Now in itself, recollection is not able to *freely* bring the images to consciousness again. It can only *involuntarily* do so, through what Hegel calls *real recollection.* In real recollection, the images can be awakened in us by chance; by an *intuition* of something outside of oneself one has previously intuited, and which triggers an association that makes one subsume the intuition under a similar image (Enz. III §454). This process of real recollection is famously illustrated by Proust's depictions of *involuntary remembrance,* and as we will later see, it is one of the many capacities that can be operative in an emotion.

When discussing the relationship between intuition and recollection, Hegel offers an instructive demonstration of his developmental procedure. The more often a child has similar external intuitions, the more its images will gain vitality and presence [lebendigkeit und gegenwärtigkeit] (Enz. III §454 Zus.). During this process, the child will gradually feel less desire to have external intuitions, beginning to occupy itself more with mental images. But such an activity is impossible without the ability to freely bring images out of "the unconscious pit" to mind. This brings us to the development of *imagination* [Einbildungskraft], the second stage of representation.

2.5.2. Imagination

The first stage of imagination is called *reproductive imagination* [Reproduktive Einbildungskraft]. With reproductive imagination, intelligence freely brings images to awareness, and it has therefore gained a certain power over the images (Enz. III §455). Reproductive imagination does this voluntarily, by internally reproducing images, and this is what distinguishes it from the *involuntary, real recollection* (Enz. III §455 Zus.). Hence, in reproductive imagination, intelligence does not need any corresponding external object spatially or temporally nearby to trigger the mental image.[46] Reproductive imagination is thus

[45] Hegel's notion of the *unconscious* is more akin to Freud's notion of the *pre-conscious* than the *unconscious*. Having said that, the *Anthropology's* account of madness does leave open the possibility that repressed (and in the psychoanalytic sense: *unconscious*) content can operate in what Hegel calls the "unconscious dark pit".
[46] This definition of reproductive imagination seems to be modelled on Kant's *reproduktive Einbildungskraft* (cf. B152). However, whereas Kant talks about how this capacity is subject to empirical laws – and therefore finds it irrelevant to transcendental philosophy – Hegel denies reproductive imagination any lawfulness, talking about *patterns* instead (Enz. III §455).

a necessary component of *inner sensations*, as discussed in chapter 1.

Although reproductive imagination is voluntary, it operates according to certain *patterns*. This is evident from Hegel's discussion of *associative imagination.* Associative imagination is what determines the succession of particular images in my mind, by relating them to each other in a meaningful way (Enz. III §455 Zus; §456). This operation replaces the *objective* bond the images may have to one another, such as the original spatial or temporal connection between the objects of the images, with a *subjective* one. For instance, although I usually see smoke after a fire has been lit, or my house is spatially located right next to a park, associative imagination can bring these images into a successive relationship with other objectively more distant images. The capacity for associative imagination is therefore what allows us to mentally dissolve objective relationships between things and establish new ones.

While the sequence of and relation between images in our associative imagination is a result of our "playful" contingent will, they are not the product of a frictionless activity of a ghost in a machine. Crucially (since this is a point I later use against him), Hegel claims that the link between the succession of images can be directly affected and established by our emotional moods [Gemütsbestimmungen] (Enz. III §455). Emotional moods are thus among the *patterns* of imagination mentioned above. Hence, a sad mood tends to create a "sad relation" [traurige Beziehung] between the images, and a cheerful mood tends to create a "cheerful relation" [heitere Beziehung] (Enz. III §455). If introspection does not suffice to testify to this phenomenon, there are numerous works of art exemplifying it (think about Celan's poems or Munch's paintings). I interpret Hegel's descriptions of imagination here as an affirmative statement on the emotional structure and genesis of representations and other mental contents. Nonetheless, as the *PsG* inches forward, he soon finds it philosophically necessary to abandon such explanations. We start seeing indications that he is going in this direction in his account of *fantasy* [Phantasie], the last stage of imagination.

2.5.3. Fantasy, discursive intellect, and language

According to Hegel, fantasy – "our inner workshop" – is more *creative* than associative imagination because it relies less on the sensuous material we have passively received from the outer world (Enz. III §457). There are nonetheless differences in degree among the kinds of fantasy he investigates, pertaining to their dependence on sensuous particulars. In the first kind of fantasy, images are combined with each other to form what is called *universal representations*. As the wording indicates, these are representations of universal features particular things have *in common*. In contrast to images, which may have a one-to-one

particular correspondent in the world, it is impossible to point to something particular that corresponds to a universal representation. I may have a representation of the genus "plant", but in no cases can I refer to *the plant as such* (Enz. III §456 Zus.). The representation of a plant does not have a one-to-one correspondence in the outer world and is a result of our generalizing activity. The same goes for what Hegel calls *abstract representations*, which also comprise ethical categories (Enz. III §456 Zus.). They too are based on common features between particulars, such as unjust people or actions, kind, dignified, or virtuous ones.

Fantasy is a decisive step in the development of cognition. Thanks to fantasy, we can start relating to a content we – to a greater extent than previously – have produced ourselves and not received. Therefore, when we relate to products of our fantasy, we are to some degree "self-intuiting" (Enz. III §457). Yet, Hegel makes it clear that a great deal of our fantasizing activity is directly determined by the particular deliverances from the external world. Hence, they also to a great degree lack non-perceptual generality. This lack mostly applies to what he calls *symbolic fantasy.* In *symbolic fantasy*, our minds pick a specific sensory content that helps us express a specific representation (Enz. III §458). According to Hegel, there is a close proximity between a symbol's material side and what it means. Although this way of putting it makes Hegel's notion of the symbol sound like the equivalent of Peirce's *icon,* they are not the same. As an example of a symbolic product of our fantasy, Hegel mentions how an eagle is used to express the God Jupiter's strength (Enz. III §457 Zus.). This example shows that the gap between a symbol's material side and what it symbolizes is too big for it to be labelled an icon in Peirce's sense, where there is a greater degree of similarity between the material side and the meaning-side (Atkin 2022). The Hegelian counterpart of Peirce's icon would rather be images, where the similarity between the material side and the meaning is clearly detectable. Having said that, the choice of an eagle as a symbol of strength is not arbitrary, Hegel maintains, because real eagles usually display this feature (Enz. III §457 Zus.). For that reason, he argues that symbolic fantasy is still very much determined by real, sensuous content, and hence is neither self-determining, nor non-perceptually general. Consequentially, when we make or intuit symbols we are only "relatively free" (Enz. III §457 Zus.).

This "relative freedom" changes with the second form of fantasy*: sign-making fantasy*. Hegel is unequivocal in how he regards our ability to use and produce signs: "Das Zeichen muß für etwas Großes erklärt werden" (Enz. III §457 Zus.). The "greatness of the sign" lies in the fact that a sign is a representation whose meaning is liberated, abstracted from, its sensuous content-side. With the sign, then, we are beginning to arrive at *non-perceptual generality*.

Signs thus provide us with a certain freedom regarding how to express things (Enz. III §457 Zus.). Hegel claims our fantasy has produced a sign when it has created a representation where the sensuous content is "alien" to its meaning (Enz. III §457 Zus.). When we encounter a sign outside of ourselves, like a flag, we do – at least before we have become accustomed to the sign – initially intuit its material content-side. But this material does not get to *represent itself*, because the *meaning* we have learnt to associate with it emerges at the forefront of our intuition, while the concrete, sensuous content falls in the background (Enz. III §458). Therefore, Hegel argues that after having become accustomed to a sign we start to intuit the sign's meaning more or less immediately (Enz. III §458). His description of the sign is telling: "Das Zeichen ist irgendeine unmittelbare Anschauung, die einen ganz anderen Inhalt vorstellt, als den sie für sich hat; – die *Pyramide*, in welche eine fremde Seele versetzt und aufbewahrt ist." (Enz. III §458). Hence, the production of signs and the encounter with signs is not equally bound to the external appearance of objects as recollection or imagination is.

As indicated, Hegel stresses the importance of *learning* in the acquisition of signs. The use and production of signs is an eminently *social practice*, even more so than the use of symbols. This is especially evident in the case of *language*[47] – "das Dasein des Geistes" (PhG, 489) – which Hegel conceives of as the most advanced form of sign-use. Most adults who hear a phonetic string of sounds, or see words on a piece of paper, immediately hear or read the *meaning* of what is uttered or written. Hence, unless the linguistic utterance is an onomatopoeia or the sign a hieroglyph, its "arbitrariness" and non-perceptuality necessitate a great deal of learning and embeddedness in a social sphere for us to be able to establish the link between the material side of the sign and its meaning (Enz. III §459-460).

Our ability to immediately perceive and use the meaning of linguistic words in this way is an important element in Hegel's expressivism. For, one function of these signs is, as he puts it, to be the "fulfilled externalization of the self-announcing inwardness" [die erfüllte Äußerung der sich kundgebenden Innerlichkeit] (Enz. III §459). Thanks to linguistic signs, I can thus convey my emotions in what he calls the *realm* of representations [Reiche des Vorstellens], and not just through physical gestures or sounds where it is a more involuntary and immediate relationship between the physical expression and my mental state (Enz. III §459). But why should this qualification make language the apest medium to express our inner mental states through? Given how Hegel always gives primacy to self-determination and spontaneity, one obvious point is the *creativity* of language. But the fact is also – Hegel

[47] The scope of this thesis does not allow me to examine all the details of Hegel's comprehensive theory of language. Only the aspects which have implications for his theory of emotions must be covered.

thinks – that the rise of intelligence creates an infinite amount of possible complex content and inner states that can *only* be conveyed properly to others within the limitless and abstract medium of language. To put it differently: When we become able to respond properly to meaning(s) in experience that is detached from its material (signs), the ideal way of expressing our response is through a similarly abstract medium. So, again, in Hegel's view, language is a medium in which the relation between the meaning we seek to convey and the form we are trying to convey it through is symmetrical (Enz. III §411 Zus.). I take this claim to be just another instance where Hegel's view of emotions resists Howard's reading. Given Hegel's emphasis on emotive expression, his claim that language is "the existence of spirit" – which means that it shapes all kinds of mental activity – and that language is historically and socio-culturally variable, it is simply wrong to ascribe to him the view that emotions are purely natural kinds, discernable only through their physiological embodiment.[48]

Hegel considers the process of learning to read and write in a language to be a crucial educational instrument, not only because we learn to communicate with others, but also because it prepares the transition from representation to *memory* [Gedächtnis], and eventually thinking [denken]. The reason is that by getting accustomed to using linguistic signs like this, we learn to become less directly dependent on and conditioned by sensuous material from the outer world in our mental activity (Enz. III §459 Zus.). But why does Hegel regard memory as such a form of mental activity? And why does it stand in such a close relation to thinking?

2.5.3. Memory

The previous section on fantasy culminated in intelligence's ability to produce and use linguistic signs[49] as representations of intuitions. Hegel now claims that the connection we first draw between a representative word and a thing is *external* to us: the connection between the word and the thing has yet to be properly remembered and learnt. The general function of memory is thus to *internalize* the connection between word and thing. In this regard, *memory* does the same with names as *recollection* does with external intuitions (Enz. III §461). The

[48] Michael Forster has argued that the development of Hegel's theory of language can be read as a series of appropriations and deviations from Herder's philosophy of language. Herder espoused the view that thought is intrinsically bounded by language, that concepts depend on sensations, as well as the view that there is a deep "linguistic-intellectual" heterogeneity from one historical epoch and sociocultural community, to the other (2011, 149). According to Forster, Hegel held a less relativistic, and more *assimilative,* view of language than Herder's in the period between 1807-1827, but he returned to it in the period between 1827-1831 (i.e., in the period when he wrote and lectured on the present edition of the *Enzyklopädie*) (Ibid.). Hegel's final take on language is therefore in the same tradition as the *Sapir-Whorf-hypothesis*, according to which language shapes one's perception, and linguistic difference means different ways of perceiving across culture (Ibid., 117).

[49] Hegel uses "Wort" and "Name" interchangeably in this section.

only difference is that memory internalizes something more *non-perceptually general* and self-produced than the external sensuous and concrete intuitions of recollection.

Hegel calls the first form of memory *name-retaining memory* [Namen behaltenden Gedächtnis] (Enz. III §461). In achieving the capacity for *name-retaining memory*, we go from relating to the connection between a name/word and thing as a *particular* connection, to a *universal* one. Hence, I learn that a name/word not only applies to this particular thing or phenomenon, but all things or phenomena of *this* sort. The words "friend" and "pain" are not only applicable to my friend P whenever he, for instance, squeezes his eyes, opens his mouth, and cries "that hurt!". They are applicable to everything qualifying as a friend for me and for others, and every emotion of pain or manifest pain-behavior.

Name-retaining memory transitions into what Hegel calls *reproductive memory*. Reproductive memory enables me to understand a word in my mind independently of images and intuitions. As Hegel puts it: "Der Name ist so die Sache, wie sie im Reiche der Vorstellung vorhanden ist und Gültigkeit hat" (Enz. III §462). Hence, when being presented with the word "candle", I do not need the assistance of a concurrent mental image or intuition related to it. Instead, I understand what the word means through its relationship with other words (Enz. III §463). This is how the meaning of the word is *reproduced* in my mind when the name is uttered or presented.

Against this background, Hegel claims that we think in words [es ist im Namen, daß wir denken] (Enz. III §462). The manner in which we do so is fundamentally expressive. To think something, I must relate to what I am thinking as something external to me. But simultaneously, this externality is something my intelligence has actively *made external* in my mind. Thus, the external thought, mediated by the name, is also something internal. In order to illustrate what is involved in this *internal-externality* of thought, Hegel refers to what happens in the articulation of a word. When articulating a word, the string of sound is externalized, put out into the world, but it simultaneously carries a meaning I have intended to express (Enz. III §462 Zus.). This expressive linguistic externalization is not only a necessary condition of speech but of all thinking. When thinking, the thought is mine since it is a product of my intentions, but still, in its articulation, it becomes something different from me.

The last form of memory, leading over to thinking, is called *mechanical memory*. As commentators have pointed out, this is one of the most challenging parts of the *Psychology* (cf. Magrí 2016b, 83; deVries 1988, 157). According to Hegel, the function of mechanical memory – or *rote memorization* – is to *sublate* the distinction between a word and its meaning (Enz. III §563). After having mechanically memorized words and learnt their meaning, their

meaning *disappears*, Hegel writes (Enz. III 462 Zus.). This point obviously runs counter to our intuitions about what it means to master a language. What is Hegel suggesting here?

Like habit-acquisition, rote memorization involves *repetition*, in this case, of words. Hegel's example of a mechanized memorization is when we recite something we know by heart. In these cases, we simply cannot dwell consciously on the *meaning* of what we say. If we start doing this, the recitation will come to a halt (Enz. §463 Zus.). Regardless of the validity of this claim, the example of rote memorization is meant to illustrate how we gradually learn to fluently use language in our everyday lives. The claim that the "meaning" of words disappears when we have mechanically memorized and grown accustomed to them refers to the fact that we are not *explicitly* conscious of or focused on the syntactical, semantic, and pragmatic rules we follow. This is a controversial claim, and it would take me too far to discuss it at length here. But consider experiences from learning a foreign language. A German word I might have heard numerous times is uttered to me, and I must concentrate to remember what it means. Or I might want to construct a sentence in German and need to consult the correct grammatical rules first. Hegel's point is precisely that it is this *experienced distinction* between words, meaning, and rules which is sublated in mechanical memory.

According to Elisa Megrí, mechanical memory is the "enabling mechanism of thought", since intelligence has created a "mental space" where it is possible to think without being conditioned by "… external and contingent factors, including the language one uses" (2016b, 83). To this we should also add that not only our language, but images and intuitions as well are among what Hegel regards as the meaning which has disappeared after mechanic memory, and which makes philosophical thinking possible (DeVries 1988, 161).

2.6. From thinking to practical spirit

Since the aim of this part of the thesis is to reconstruct how Gefühle becomes cognizant in the *Psychology*, I will not dwell on the intricate details of Hegel's analysis of thinking. For my purposes here, Hegel's concept of thinking is relevant because it transitions into an analysis of *practical spirit*, where the evaluative and volitional aspects Gefühle are laid out.

Like all forms of mental states, thinking *subjectivity* must have an *object* to which it relates itself. Following the transition from mechanical memory, thinking subjectivity can now relate to objects with *non-perceptual generality*, i.e., without the need for a concurrent contingent, personal, and sensuous factor, such as intuitions images (Enz. III §465; Forster 2011, 162). According to Hegel, what intelligence as thinking subjectivity is relating itself to are *universal thought determinations* it has spontaneously produced itself. As in the *Logic of*

the Concept, this process unfolds through the self-diremption of the *concept* in judgment, wherein the universal determines itself as *individual* and the individual as *particular*, before it unites with itself in the *syllogism* (Enz. III §467). Leaving the details of this topic aside for now, the important thing to note is that on this level of pure thinking, we are dealing with a *subject-object* identity, since pure thought is exclusively relating itself to thought-determinations (Enz. III §565). From the perspective of Hegel's system, such an activity is not a mere self-communing of a mind thinking about its transcendental conditions cut off from a noumenal reality "out there". As Hegel puts it, thinking is, at this point, ready to cognize itself as the "nature of the thing", as "identical with being" (Enz. III §465 Zus.). This is the task of *Wissenchaft der Logik*, or "logic as metaphysics".

Without going further into the relationship between the *Logic* and *PsG*, it is nonetheless clear that on this point, as Ferrarin notes, theoretical spirit has "… negated the difference between itself and givenness, between a priori form and empirically given content" (2007, 325). Intelligence's insight that it is the determining factor of its content, that it is "free in it" and has "taken possession of it", initiates the transition to the *will*. Indeed, Hegel labels thinking *the substance of the will* and proclaims that thought is a precondition of it (Enz. III 468 + Zus.). And as mentioned, he warns against separating theoretical from practical spirit, and vice versa. How does he conceive of the relationship between the two?

Following Ferrarin's account, Hegel holds that with the formation of intelligence, spirit knows that the content it has produced has a certain degree of objectivity. Thus, spirit knows for itself that it can think a content which is not merely subjective in the sense of being encumbered with details only the individual has privileged access to, but which can also be transparent and valid for everyone (Ibid.). This allegedly objective content has not yet been *actualized* in the section on theoretical spirit. The content is still internal, "das allerindividuelleste", as Iring Fetscher puts it (1970, 189). To become truly actual, spirit must express and translate its objective content into the outer world through *action* [Handlung]. Only through such an objectivation can subjective spirit actualize itself; can our inner emotional life, mediated by intelligence's cognitive determinations, be transported into public space, and become properly objective.

Although Hegel examines theoretical spirit and practical spirit separately, he does not think they can or do lead a separate existence in the lives well-functioning human individuals. Indeed, many of the stages in theoretical spirit, such as *attention* and *Gefühl*, involve volitional capacities, though it is not explicitly stated (Ferrarin 2007, 327). According to my interpretation of how Hegel demonstrates the unity between the theoretical and the practical

in the *PsG*, the (next) part on practical spirit renders explicit the volitional capacities which have been implicitly at work in the part on theoretical spirit, so that in the end, it becomes clear how the actualization of thinking in fact relies on the will, and how the actualization of the will relies on thinking. When this intrinsically *mutual* relationship is established, Hegel's cognitive/evaluative understanding of emotions will emerge more clearly. Before turning to practical spirit and the evaluative/volitional aspects of emotions, I now give a short account of the cognitive ones. In order to do so, I will borrow some ideas from John McDowell.

2.6. Hegel with McDowell against Redding: Gefühle as cognitions

The major claim in McDowell's *Mind and World* is that our conceptual capacities are *passively made operative in* sensibility (1996, 36). Or, as he puts it elsewhere: "Even though experience is passive, it draws into operation capacities that genuinely belong to spontaneity" (Ibid., 13). McDowell counts as "conceptual" those capacities we use when we are thinking about our thinking's own rationality (Ibid., 47). Furthermore, following Wilfrid Sellars, these conceptual capacities are said to enable us to place a mental state or a belief within the *logical space of reasons*. Within the logical space of reasons, these states and beliefs count as *epistemic facts,* the existence of which we can potentially justify for others in virtue of its *inferential role*, meaning that it entails certain other contents, and is incompatible with others (Cf. Sellars 1997, 76; Brandom 1997, 153).

McDowell advances these claims to dodge both epistemological *coherentism*, in which a claim about reality is true if it coheres with the rest of our beliefs, and the *Myth of the Given*, in which one appeals to extra-conceptual "bare presences" that can impose rational constraints on our judgments (1996, 24). For McDowell, the unattractiveness of *coherentism* is that it severs the relation between our experience and reality and makes truth a "frictionless spinning in the void" (Ibid., 11). The unattractiveness of the *Myth of the Given* is that it is, *ex hypothesi*, impossible to identify just what it is that poses rational constraints on our judgments in the first place (Ibid., 24). As indicated, McDowell's solution is to reframe the distinction between *receptivity* and *sensibility* on the one side, and *spontaneity* and *conceptual judgments* on the other, such that even the most "passive" experience is saddled with conceptuality and spontaneity. Thanks to the "unboundedness of the conceptual", we get our rational constraints without falling into the traps of the *Myth of the Given* or *coherentism*.

Granted, McDowell might have a somewhat different understanding of the "conceptual" than Hegel. At the very least, his understanding of the conceptual is couched in a less sweeping language, and with less emphasis on how it differs from *representations* (Enz.

I §164). Nonetheless, there are similarities between McDowell's above-mentioned definition of the "conceptual" and Hegel's description of the role of the concept in *cognition* in the *Logic* (Cf. Enz. I §226). More importantly, it is not difficult to see how McDowell's arguments can shed light on what implications Hegel's account of the development of intelligence has for his theory of emotions. If my interpretation is correct, Hegel will have to hold that following the advent of intelligence, conceptual capacities are made operative in a *Gefühl,* e.g., an embarrassment, to such a degree that its particular content, e.g., "this misspelling", is placed within a logical space of reasons, in which it has a certain inferential role. To anticipate: In a given situation, being embarrassed entails some *evaluative content*, and is incompatible with others, like that connected to pridefulness. What Houlgate says of Hegel's understanding of *sensations* in the following quote can thus equally well be said of Gefühle: "According to Hegel, therefore, we never have unconceptualized sensations (at least when we are no longer very young children)" (2022, 4). I provide details of the conceptuality operative in Gefühle in the next chapter. What is crucial now is that we start appreciating how conceptual work is not something being done *to* the Gefühle*,* but *within them*.

The difference between these two notions is not insignificant. In the *Logic of Affect*, Paul Redding argues that Hegel vows for the first option, namely that cognitive work is being *done to* and not *within* feelings in every instance of them, describing this work as a form of retroactive *semantic bootstrapping* (a modernization of *Aufhebung*) (1991, 150-158). This allows Redding to attribute the claim to Hegel that feelings are "blind" (Ibid., 131).

It is important to stress again that Redding does aim to present Hegel as having a more sympathetic attitude towards feelings than one usually would expect of "the great foe of immediacy" (Sellars). He does so along the same line as I did in the introduction, namely, by arguing that the more disparaging of Hegel's comments about feelings should be seen as attacks on the romantic construal of them as being excluded from the rest of our cognitive capacities (Ibid., 134). Nonetheless, Redding's analysis ultimately betrays his own goal of reinvigorating Hegel as a compelling thinker of the emotions.

As indicated, the point on which my reading diverges from Redding's has to do with whether cognitive and conceptual work occurs *within* Gefühle or *on* and hence *after* they have occurred. This makes all the difference. For in the first instance, cognitive Gefühle can provide us with rational constraints without sliding into the *Myth of the Given*, while in the second case, they only provide us with blind presences, and the whole burden of interpretation and conceptualization falls on an intelligence operating on sentient deliverances that, being non-conceptual, provide us with no rational constraints at all. Redding's reading of Hegel

therefore not only makes him fall victim to the *Myth of the Given*, but two other streams mentioned in the introduction: *feeling theory* and the *Myth of the Passions*.

First, the only plausible way of accounting for evaluative *emotions* within the framework Redding has set up is to regard them, like Descartes and James, as a retroactive awareness of a bodily arousal. This view is in itself utterly unconvincing. For what it implies is that the *object* of an emotion's intentionality is one's bodily arousal, and not one's prior beliefs (whether about the state of affairs in the world or memories and imaginations) (Power & Dalgleish 2008, 24). But how are we then to explain what elicited the bodily arousal in the first place, if what Gefühle receives are only blind deliverances of pure givenness? And how could we justify the tendency most of us have – including Hegel – to judge (positively or negatively) each other's emotional behavior if our emotions are merely responses to bodily arousals? Second, Redding's Hegel would only help vindicate the *Myth of the Passions,* as few people would be content with having emotions involuntarily stemming from "blind feelings". The next step is to call for clearheaded, cold-blooded intelligent aid and control. Hence, we get the dualisms that pave the way for the denigration of emotions.

It is true that we can see where Redding's interpretation is coming from, based on what I have gleaned from the *Anthropology* (the only chapter Redding's analysis of Hegel refers to), and the theoretical spirit part of the *PsG*. The Gefühle in the *Anthropology* are indeed blind and non-representational. And there has not been a lot of information in the present chapter about the cognitive operations active *within* Gefühle; indeed, cognition only seems to have been operating *on them*. But here we must remind ourselves that Hegel's presentation in the *Anthropology*, the *Phenomenology* and *theoretical spirit*, is developmental – an account of how cognition arises from and in parallel with Gefühle – and thus, that none of them can be read as Hegel's final saying on emotions. His final saying on emotions in the *PsG* appears in the next part of the *Psychology*, on *practical spirit*, and it is there that we get a picture of how emotions actually unfold after the development of intelligence. My claim is that the account in this section comes closer to McDowell's descriptions of the actualization of conceptual operations in sensibility, and the notion that conceptual and cognitive work happens *in* the emotions rather than *on* them – or from above, as Redding will have it.

Another thing worth mentioning is that Redding is confident that his interpretation shows that Hegel manages to bridge the gap between nature and spirit (1991, 132). For if every content we relate to in our minds is bound to a prior immediate, indeterminate corporeal feeling that has been actively placed and rendered determinate within the *logical space of reasons,* mental activity cannot be done by a "ghost in a machine". But this is not the only

way to bridge the gap between nature and spirit. Neither is it the preferable one, since it postulates a constant reliance on non-conceptual givenness from outside our space of reasons.

A more viable approach which also is more truthful to the account of Hegel I have been opting for is once again to follow McDowell's example in *Mind and World* and recall the notion of *second nature*. As McDowell notes, very much like Hegel, our second nature is not just a product of a natural potentiality, but also of our specific upbringing and *Bildung* (1996, 88). Hence, the way our conceptual and spontaneous capacities – such as understanding and sign-use – are activated *in* a particular Gefühl cannot be exhaustively described by employing a pure "natural-law vocabulary".[50] Yet, nature is not wholly ruled out of the picture. Humans are born with the potential for second nature, which is actualized through habits, upbringing and *Bildung,* and makes our second nature appear as first nature (Cf. PR §151). Against this background, it is understandable that interpreters label Hegel a *weak monist,* for whom nature and spirit are *logically distinguishable* but not *ontologically separable* (cf. DeVries 1988, 41-49; Pinkard 2012, 27). By wedding the cognitive conceptual capacities that are made operative in Gefühle to habit and Bildung in this way, we retain their naturalness without losing their normative and social significance, while also avoiding the skeptical pitfalls of the myth of the given.

If there were any doubts about Hegel's own emphasis on habits, the intrinsic simultaneity between sensibility and conceptuality, Gefühl and intelligence, consider the following passage where Houlgate quotes from the *PsG* (Enz. III §410):

> Whenever we open our eyes, we do, indeed, "see" objects. Yet such "seeing" is not mere visual sensation, but the "concrete habit which *immediately* unites in one simple act the many determinations of sensation, consciousness, intuition, understanding, etc." (2022, 4 e.m.).

The following chapter shows how such an *immediate* unification – "in one simple act" – of the determinations of sensations, consciousness, recollection of signs, and representations, assumes a volitional and evaluative character in a capacity Hegel calls *praktische Gefühle,* which is his term for emotions.

[50] Alice Crary has criticized McDowell for claiming that the behavior of animals, despite them having conceptual capacities, can be satisfactorily explained with a purely biological vocabulary (2016, 104-108). And indeed, McDowell's Gadamer-inspired claim that animals exist in an *environment*, while humans also exist in a *world*, can be read as an echo of his statements about *second nature* cited above (Ibid., 108fn). For Crary, McDowell's thus contributes to situate animals "outside ethics", implying that they do not have any observable *moral* characteristics (Ibid., 11-12). Without settling the question of whether Hegel himself would ascribe what Crary calls *primitive conceptuality* to animals here, I want to emphasize that what I have discussed so far, and will discuss in the next chapter, can be helpful for elucidating such notions as primitive conceptuality.

Chapter 3
Practical spirit: The Volitional Presuppositions of Human Emotionality and Affective Agency

3.0. Recapitulation and chapter introduction

Last chapter examined the development of cognitive capacities that enable human beings to form and be receptive to conceptually mediated content of *non-perceptual generality*, to form beliefs based on it, and express these beliefs as well as our stance on them in that very same medium. What we are starting to see the outlines of is a non-dualist ("weak monist") developmental vision of the embodied mind, where cognition and Gefühle will mutually affect each other in the experience and expression of emotions. Yet there are still substantial elements missing in my account of Hegel's philosophy of emotion: *i)* What is it to respond *emotively* to something? *ii)* How is this response connected to motivation and action?

Through a reading of the practical spirit section of *PsG*, the present chapter provides a reconstruction of Hegel' answer to i) and ii), arguing that he understands emotions as evaluative judgments, as motivating, and inherently connected to free action. These points add up to what I, in the last part of this chapter, will dub *affective agency*. I also draw attention to problems in Hegel's argumentation, pertaining what I call his *formalism charge*, his tendency to understate how emotions are constitutive of its content, and to *optionalize emotions* in volitional evaluations. Throughout, I will be concerned with the question of whether some of Hegel's claims make him an advocate of the *Myth of the Passions* or not.

3.1. What is practical spirit? Notes on Hegel's concept of freedom

To understand Hegel's discussion of emotions in the part on *practical spirit*, a few words about the aim and context of this section of the *PsG* are needed. Hegel's overarching aim is to demonstrate the psychological, enabling conditions for free human action [Handlung]. For Hegel, as for most philosophers, action presupposes *will*.[51] The will is a distinctively human form of volition. As hinted at in the last section, the will differs from desire in being *a form of thinking* that translates itself into external existence (cf. PR §4 Zus.). With "thinking", Hegel does not refer to an activity taking place in a mysterious noumenal realm. Thinking is always embodied; and a way of relating oneself to a specific content which is mediated by

[51] Another account of practical spirit – the will – occurs in the *PR,* which falls under the heading of objective spirit. Given the numerous overlaps between the practical spirit part of the *PsG* and the introduction and morality section of *PR*, I read these sections in tandem, although it breaks with the original chronology of Hegel's system. All these parts deal with subjective conditions of individual freedom, so this does not betray Hegel's point.

conceptual, objective thought-determinations. This conceptually mediated content can provide practical *reasons* for whether to act in this or that way, as well as a rudimentary pre-conception of what I am doing if I act in this or that way (the latter constituting the agent's *intention* [Absicht]) (PR §119). As opposed to desire, the will does not aim to annihilate an alien object, but to find pleasure in realizing its intentions (Winfield 2012, 209; PR §121).

In a famous quote from *PR*, Hegel claims that freedom is as essential to the will as weight is for physical bodies (PR §4 Zus.). Hence, there can be no will, in the proper sense, without freedom. Thus, Hegel certainly agrees with most philosophers in the view that free actions – for them to qualify as such – are executed *voluntarily*. And as his notion of the *right of intention* from the *PR* suggests, the answer to the question of whether an action is voluntary or not, and thus what kind of actions one is responsible for, hinges on whether the agent knew what consequences ("universal qualities") were implied in the action carried out (PR §120).

Yet, Hegel's theory of freedom is not preoccupied with giving or looking for causal explanations. Indeed, a thought-provoking feature of Hegel's understanding of freedom is his conviction that causal explanations are irrelevant for deciding whether an action was free or not. As Pippin explains:

> … being free does not involve any causality at all (…) This has partly to do with Hegel's own theory of mechanical causality (that the content of causes "continue" into their effects), but the essential point is that an external cause cannot be said simply to act on a purposeful being and produce an effect because any such possible result depends on the proximate cause being as he says "taken in" and "transformed," its causal power the result of the way it is *understood* and, in human beings, whether such a possibility is counted as a reason to act or not. (2009, 38)

We have already seen some instances of such transforming appropriations of affective causes in the previous chapters (e.g., how sensations are intuited, how intuitions are recollected; imagination, and sign-making fantasy), and we will encounter additional ones. But Hegel's conviction that organisms resist mechanistic explanations because they produce their own effects is not the sole reason why he holds that too much focus on causality is ill-advised.[52] And in one sense, Pippin's quote can provoke misunderstandings if read in isolation, for Hegel is not straightforwardly denying natural causality any role in explaining how we freely commit ourselves to certain norms. Hegel does not believe, like Kant, that substance and subject are mutually exclusive terms (cf. Pinkard 2012, 100). Neither does he regard freedom and external influence as incompatible. Quite the opposite, the underlying aim of Hegel's practical philosophy is to logically reconcile the two (Yeomans 2011, 4). This aim is reflected

[52] The full version of this argument can be found in the part on the objectivity of the concept in the *Logic* (WL2 402-462). For a good commentary see: (Ng 2020, 219-233).

in a formula many commentators regard as the central one in Hegel's practical philosophy, namely *being with oneself* [bei sich sein] (Wood 1990, 45; Pinkard 2012, 18). When Hegel presents this formula in the introduction to *PR,* it initially seems saddled with Kantian/Fichtean assumptions about the will's complete independence from external influence (Cf. PR §23). And indeed, the will is equipped with what Hegel in the *PR* calls *formal freedom*, or the ability to abstract and detach itself from emotions, drives, and other external influences, in order to become pure and undetermined (PR §5). But as Wood notes, Hegel regards attempts to live in accordance with this kind of independence and purity as a self-defeating flight (1990, 45), which the criticism of stoicism and morality in *PhG* makes clear. Therefore, Hegel reconceptualizes Kant and Fichte's understanding of freedom, claiming that being with oneself is being with oneself *in an other* [beisichselbstsein in einem Andern] (1990, 45-46). "The other" designates things that are not abstractly identical to me but nonetheless play an important role in my life, be it other persons, institutions, values, and norms, or, importantly, my drives and emotions. But what does it mean to be with oneself in such things? Limiting ourselves to drives and emotions, and once again borrowing Jaeggi's notion of a non-alienated relation of appropriation, it means to experience them as neither so alien nor so intrusive that we fail to be present to ourselves in them, or have ourselves on command, in accordance with the greater concerns in our life. I later return to what Hegel sees as the proper form of such concerns.

In any case, the weightiest reasons why Hegel shifts the focus away from causal explanations lies in his *social-expressivist* grounding of freedom and agency. It will be helpful to start unpacking what this means before turning to the last section of *PsG*.

Hegel's recurring claim that the will is a form of thinking translating itself into external existence means, quite literally, that the full realization and meaning of the will *is the resulting action* and how it ends up being interpreted (recognized or misrecognized) by myself and fellow human beings in a rational ethical life (Cf. Pippin 2009). The action represents a translation of an intention from "the night of possibility" [Nacht der Möglichkeit] into "the day of the present" [Tag der Gegenwart] (PhG, 299). We know from the chapter on *self-observing reason* in the *PhG* how committed Hegel was to this idea. In that chapter, Hegel criticized psychology, physiognomy, and phrenology; sciences that in different ways sought to grasp the inner realm of human beings through investigating external signs pertaining to humans as a *thing*, such as looks, the physical structure of skulls, or brain fibers (PhG, 244). Without getting bogged down in the details of this critique –, which arguably applies to modern neuropsychology as well (cf. MacIntyre 1972) – Hegel ends up arguing that

"… the *true* being of the human being is its deed; in it is its individuality *actual"* [Das *wahre Sein* des Menschen ist vielmehr *seine Tat*; in ihr ist die Individualität *wirklich*"] (PhG, 242).

Importantly, this not only holds for second or third-person knowledge about "other minds", but also my first-person knowledge of myself: "…The individual cannot know what it is, unless it makes itself actual through *doing"* ["Das Individuum kann daher nicht wissen, was es ist, ehe es sich durch das Tun zur Wirklichkeit gebracht hat."] (PhG, 297). For Hegel, the dialectic between externalization [Entäußerung], or "Entfremdung", of my intention,[53] and recollection [Erinnerung], relating the deed back to myself, is constitutive of self-conscious human activity. This relationship between externalization and recollection is central in Hegel's critique of *conscience* (PR §136-141; PhG, 464-495)*,* and what Pahl dubs the *trope of the feeling heart,* which accentuates the privacy and interiority of emotions (2013, 19).

Thus, on the subjective, or psychological, side of the issue, what Hegel is most interested in is not so much the causal execution of the deed itself, as whether the individual can come to *recognize*, or understand, her deed as an expression of her purpose [Vorsatz], intention [Absicht], and ultimately her character (Cf. Pinkard 2012, 99). Importantly, this evaluative relation towards one's deed is not possible to achieve within a private space of reasons. There is no such thing as a private space of reasons. Although I can carry out a deed – translate my will into the external world – and so realize it, in solitude, my retroactive evaluation of the deed hinges on a whole range of social factors and cultural mediations.

These social factors are outlined in the part on ethical life [Sittlichkeit] in the *PR*, and objective spirit part of the *PG*. In these sections, Hegel spells out the social preconditions of freedom. *True freedom* [die *wahre* Freiheit], also labelled absolute freedom [absolute Freiheit] is social; my own freedom depends on the freedom of others. Only as a bearer of rights, embedded in norm-governed social spheres and institutions that facilitate for recognitive relationships and social participation, can the individual's will have *i)* a universal content – like the "collective good" – and not merely idiosyncratic, self-centered ones, *ii)* actualize itself through actions that express individual commitments to this universal content in a way that others can understand and assess (Enz. III §469), and *iii)* be able to recognize an action as an expression of its purpose and intention (Cf. Neuhouser 2000, 14).

This whole dynamic is emotive through and through. But importantly, it cannot be

[53] In an interesting discussion in *Der junge Hegel*, Lukács draws attention to the similarities between the usage of Entäusserung and Entfremdung, arguing that Hegel's understanding of these terms is drawn from political and juridical concepts of alienation of freedom and property upon entering a contract (1948, 613). Similarly, to "Entäusser" oneself is to renounce the power to privately define the meaning of my emotions and intentions.

understood along a strict causal pattern. The intricate, socially mediated knowledge and commitments of an agent expressed in actions are not like any other causal events, such as a stone falling off a roof (Cf. Taylor 1985b). But as should have become clear, Hegel's social theory of agency and freedom does not shun away from analyzing the various subjective capacities that make it possible for us to commit ourselves practically and volitionally to a "universal content" and express these commitments through actions. The *PsG* section on practical spirit fleshes out these capacities. The development of the will towards this end runs through the following three stages: *practical feeling* [praktische Gefühl], *urge* and [Triebe und die Willkür], *happiness* [Glückseligkeit], and *free spirit* [freie Geist]. Also in this chapter, spirit begins in *relative passivity* and *immediacy*, before gradually ushering towards activity and convergence between form and content, where ultimately, the form itself provides its own content (Cf. Ferrarin 2007, 326; Hösle 1987b, 410, Fetscher 1970, 195).

3.2 Practical feelings: Hegel concept of emotion

As I have anticipated many times in this thesis, practical feeling is the key concept in Hegel's philosophy of emotions. Indeed, insofar as we subscribe to the cognitive/evaluative view that sees emotions as cognitive evaluative judgments of a conceptualized content, such as a representational belief, and hold that emotions are themselves *felt* and expressed, I will argue that practical feeling *is* Hegel's concept of an emotion.

To understand Hegel's account of *practical feelings*, we must see how it fits into his characterization of practical spirit. Practical spirit is Hegel's general term for describing our self-conscious, conceptually mediated, *normative* way of relating to the world. His favored word for this normative attitude is simply *ought* [soll] (Enz. III §472). Rather than being indifferent to and unmoved by the state of the world, we actively care for it, holding that "this there ought to be the case" while "that there ought not to be the case". In Hegel's view, the normative directedness of practical spirit is founded on a relationship between an individual's aims on the one side, and states of affairs in the world, on the other (Enz. III §472). The most basic way of being directed towards the world in this normative, evaluative manner is *practical feelings,* or what Hegel also calls *feeling will*. There are three main classes of *practical feelings*, and Hegel presents them in the order of their level of complexity.

Before turning my attention to the types of practical feelings, I need to make a terminological clarification. Hegel's discussion of practical feelings, and their *ought*, implies that *values* are essential to them. Yet, Hegel does not provide any definition of value here, nor does he explicitly say anything about the matter. So, what do I mean by value? As Moyar has

shown, Hegel's *PR* offers an original axiology, comprising at least seven different types of value (2021, 9-10). Accounting for all of these would lead me too far away from my main concern.[54] But drawing on Moyar's outline of Hegel's axiology, and Nussbaum's descriptions of the general features of emotional values, I hold that for something to be a value partaking in a practical feeling, it must be judged as having an importance for the subject's own *flourishing*, or its exercise of a specie-specific potential (Nussbaum 2001, 4). These values are to a certain degree what Moyar calls *agent-relative*, in the sense that they are connected to one's personal interests affecting how we act. But for Hegel, values are not valuable because we happen to value or care for them. Rather, we value them because we have some reason to believe it is good or rational to value them (Moyar 2021, 15). Whether the emotive value judgment is in fact good and appropriate comes down to whether one has freedom as one's ultimate purpose and concern; a key part of *affective agency*, which I develop later. It is also connected to what Moyar calls *living value,* which refers to a system of just social institutions sustaining our values (2021, 9-10). If my interpretation is correct, the following account demonstrates that practical feelings are emotive judgments about such values.

3.2.1 Pleasure and displeasure

As mentioned above, Hegel presents three main types of practical feelings. In the first case, the practical feeling, or the feeling will, stems from an individual subject making a comparison between what it "finds" and what it naturally needs [Der *fühlende* Wille ist daher das Vergleichen seines von außen kommenden, unmittelbaren Bestimmtseins mit seinem durch seine eigene Natur gesetzten Bestimmtsein] (Enz. III 472 Zus.). If what it finds to be the case does not correspond with what it naturally needs, it feels *displeasure*. If what it finds to be the case corresponds to what physiologically or naturally ought to be the case, it has a feeling of *pleasure*. Hegel thinks the feelings of pleasure and displeasure are the most basic forms of practical feelings, hardly emotive at all, without any "rich intentionality or cognitive content", as Nussbaum would say (2011, 60). From a logical point of view, this is because the relation between what I feel and what I will in practical feelings of pleasure or displeasure borders on an *abstract identity*, without any internal differences. Hegel believes that it lies in the nature of practical spirit to be self-determining and make judgments [Urteile] that sunder

[54] Moyar lists *instrumental* and *subjective* or *agent-relative values* based on the practical or personal interests of an individual; value as the *medium of equivalence* between different things; *universal* and *infinite values* that are moral in character or refer to the intrinsic, inalienable value of the individual and its freedom; the value pertaining to *the goodness of a functional unity* – a thing or organism functioning well –; and finally *living value*, referring to the system of *just* social institutions that contain all values (2021, 9-10).

its immediate identity with the world and its body (Enz. III 472 Zus.). And to be properly self-determining, there must be some degree of *difference* between what I feel and what I will (although the feeling and the will are in an identity-relation). This, arguably, is not the case when I feel thirsty, and want to quench the thirst.

Not only are pleasure and displeasure *basic* Gefühle, but they are also superficial [oberflächlich]. Adult human beings, Hegel claims, tend to do and value various activities in which our pleasure or displeasure plays a subordinate role, and seem utterly negligible. Speaking with Frankfurt (1971), this is because we tend to have *higher-order volitions,* volitions about our volitions (e.g., *wanting to want* to reach the mountain top) that trump the *first-order volitions* (e.g., break off the trip because of physical unease). Hegel nonetheless goes on to list two additional forms of practical feelings that he conceives of as neither basic nor superficial in the above senses (Enz. III § 472 Zus.). These forms are properly emotive.

3.2.2. Cognitive emotions

The first kind comprises those practical feelings whose content is derived from an *intuition* or from *representations*, be they universal representations, images, or signs (cf. section 2.2 in the last chapter). In a formulation I will criticize in just a moment, Hegel claims that their *content* therefore springs from other sources than an emotion ["Alle diese Gefühle haben keinen ihnen immanenten, zu ihrer eigentümlichen Natur gehörenden Inhalt; derselbe kommt in sie von außen."] (Enz. III §472 Zus.). This content is accessed by the *practical feeling* (the emotion), which evaluates the content's agreeability with the subject's volition. From that evaluation, a new bodily feeling ensues.

There are different ways to make sense of how such a cognitive evaluation unfolds. Based on Hegel's own account, I think the following formalized model can be of some help, although I should stress that it only serves heuristic purposes, and is not intended to capture the process itself, which is undoubtedly more unified and difficult to analytically piece up:

REAL RECOLLECTION / *REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION* / *ASSOCIATIVE IMAGINATION*/*REAL RECOLLECTION OF SIGN* / *REPRODUCTIVELY MEMORIZED SIGN* → EMOTION → NEW FEELING

As this slightly simplified and mechanistic model suggests, the emotion can stem from a *real recollection*, whereby we intuit something outside ourselves that reawakens a resembling belief in our minds. If this belief is judged as good or bad, followed by a bodily feeling and a certain action tendency, we are dealing with an emotion. Alternatively, such an evaluation can also be caused by an image reproduced by our imagination. We can either evaluate a mental

image of a real intuition we have had (say, of a previous embarrassment) or simply an image we have made up through our *associative imagination* (mental images of a future encounter with someone). Clearly, it is these imaginative operations Hegel has in mind when speaking of inner sensations (Enz. III §401 Zus.), as they do not spring from any object in our present external environment. But what kind of work are the emotions doing in all the above cases?

Drawing on McDowell, I have already argued that Hegel in the *Psychology* commits himself to the view that conceptuality is made operative *in* an emotion, such that its content is judged in a cognitive and evaluative way. Hence, it is not only the *real recollection, reproductive* -or *associative imagination* that do cognitive work, but the emotion as well. To understand how, we must first consider Hegel's quite complicated notion of *judgment*.

As mentioned earlier, most proponents of the cognitive/evaluative tradition treat emotions as *judgments* of value. Hegel seems to do the same. Not only is the transition from the first to the second class of practical feelings described as a transition from superficial judgments [Urteil] to more complex ones (Enz. III §472 Zus.). The *practical ought* expressed in practical feelings is even defined as a *real judgment* [reelles Urteil]. This definition indicates that we are dealing with a kind of normative judgment (Enz. III §473).

What complicates the matter is that the notion of judgment plays an extremely wide-ranging role in Hegel's system. Hegel subscribes to the classical view that the logical form of a judgment consists of a *subject* and a *predicate*, united by the copula "is", as in the judgment "this action is good" (Enz. I §171). But that is not to say that there is an abstract identity between the two parts. Inspired by Hölderlin (Pippin 2019, 144fn.), Hegel often plays on the etymology of the German word "Urteil", which can be understood as an "original division" of what was once united (Enz. I §166). The dialectical point is that all judgments express division and unity between subject (this action) and predicate (goodness) at the same time: The action *is* good, but in order to make the judgment that it is so, we must logically operate as if the subject and the predicate are different things – we must divide in order to unite. Now the complicating part resides in the fact that Hegel argues that this division is the self-division of the *concept,* which consists of three moments, namely *the universal*, *the particular*, and *the individual* (Enz. I §166). The concept is not only something human subjects make use of in thinking – say, when subsuming something individual under a universal – but also something that inheres in the beings in the world. Basing himself on this assumption, Hegel (in)famously declares that "every thing is a judgment", meaning that all things both have an individuality that partake as a particular in a universal, such as a genus, which they – at least living things – can develop in accordance with (Enz. I §167). Considering the ontological direction Hegel's

notion of judgment seems to go in, it might be hard to imagine how it can explain what goes on in practical feelings.[55]

Although Hegel stresses the objectivity of judgments vis-á-vis the belief that they are mere projections of a finite mind onto a finite world of appearances, we must remember that he does so in order to separate them from what he calls mere *propositions*. Logically speaking, propositions are sentences in which the predicate does not express anything universal about the subject, such as "Caesar went to the senate in 51 BC" (Enz. I § 167). In such cases, the proposition, although perfectly grammatical, does not reflect the moments of the concept (Cf. Winfield 2012, 232). And as Pippin notes, this means that merely stating that something is such and such, does not make it a judgment, even though the proposition – or the *propositional attitude* – might be correct (1989, 239). Judgments do not necessarily aim at *correctness*, but *truthfulness,* and for Hegel, truthfulness is intrinsically connected to something living up to or in accordance with its concept – what that thing truly *is* and should be (Cf. Enz. I §172).[56] In other words, there is a great deal of normativity involved in judgments. For that reason, Hegel argues that those who truly know what it is to judge, are able to make judgments about the beauty of artworks or the goodness of actions, and not merely such things as the temperature of an oven or the color of a wall (Enz. I §171 Zus.).

It is precisely this normative aspect of judgments that is relevant for our understanding of Hegel's notion of practical feelings, or emotions qua cognitive judgments of value. For given that practical feelings are cognitive and give rise to the volitional *ought* we have been discussing, they must concern themselves with the way something fundamentally *is* and is supposed to be. Following the advent of intelligence (where judgment is shortly discussed (cf. Enz. III §467)) judgments seem like the best candidate for explaining the logical structure of such practical feelings, for they (unlike the understanding) relate to a thing's *concept,* which, again, is inherently normative. But as indicated above, Hegel operates with four kinds of judgments, ascribing to them varying degrees of adequacy for knowing. Without giving an in-depth discussion of each kind of judgment, I claim that Hegel's notion of *judgments of reflection* [Reflexionsurteile] can capture the logic of practical feelings.

[55] It should be mentioned that the *Logic*, where Hegel's most detailed account of the four classes of judgment appears, is not describing the psychological capacity to make judgments, but the purely logical structure of judgments as such. This fact, however, does not imply that his account is unable to shed light on our ability to make judgments. Indeed, the *Logic* draws on many examples from our own judging activity to illustrate the different kinds of judgments and the relationship between them.

[56] As one of Hegel's examples goes, it might be correct that a body is ill, but the content of that judgment cannot be "true", since the concept of a body is life, and illness is life-deteriorating (Enz. I §172 Zus.).

According to Hegel, judgments of reflection are judgments in which a subject is judged to possess a certain quality only in relation to something other than itself (Enz. I §174). As opposed to so-called *qualitative judgments* like "the rose is red", in which the predicate holds immediately and inheres in the subject in and for itself, the predicate in a judgment of reflection only has a *relative value*. Typical predicates in a judgment of reflection are therefore "dangerous", "useful" or "curative" (Enz. I §174). To exemplify, a weapon can only be judged as dangerous in relation to something other than itself, such as a living body. Hegel maintains that these are the kind of judgments we mostly make use of in argumentation (Enz. I §174 Zus.). Judgments of reflection are also *subsumptive* in nature, in the sense that the universal predicate is not understood as something inherent in the subject itself, but only in relation to something else, which calls for the specific subsumption (WL2, 328).

In what way do practical feelings – emotions – follow the logic of reflective judgments? With the help of Lyons, we can say that practical feelings relate to a *particular*[57] *content* and a *formal content*. Say that I experience an emotion of *hope*. In such an emotion, the particular content can be a mental image depicting me, someone I care for, or a cause I care for, accomplishing something in the future. From a logical point of view, the subject of the judgment therefore takes the form of something *individual*. This mental image is then subsumed under a *formal content* – an *evaluative category –,* which is reserved for those things that have not yet happened and that I long for: the formal constituents of *hope* (Cf. Lyons 1980, 99-114). In this case, the evaluative constituents for something to count as hope function as the universal predicate in the judgment. Notice therefore that most emotive judgments of value follow the logic of what Hegel calls *immediate* reflective judgments, which expresses that "this individual (representation) is universal (something to be hoped for)"; a process where "this individual" is transformed into a *particular* through being subsumed under the universal. This is because it identifies an individual content as one among other instances of a universal: what one *generally* hopes for (Winfield 2012, 244). The latter *quality – "something to be hoped for"* – is a value the thing does not have in itself, but in relation to something else; in this case my own flourishing, or that of those I care or hope for.

It might seem counterintuitive to rely so heavily on judgments of *reflection*, given Hegel's critique of the *Reflexionsphilosophie* of Kant (as well as Fichte and Jacobi) (cf. GW, 301-333). But one should remember that Hegel believed that his own notion of judgment of

[57] The term *particular content* can be confusing, given Hegel's distinction between particularity and individuality. Lyons usage is loose, but I assume that the reader will understand how it is applicable in this case.

reflection went beyond Kant's[58] in one important respect. As Pippin reminds us, Hegel did not frame judgments of reflection as an *external* process in which we are "*given* a particular and find a universal" (2019, 292 e.m.). That would make him slide into the myth of the given, as discussed in the last chapter. According to Pippin, Hegel's solution is to claim that:

> For any reflective judgment, the "ascending" search for a universal cannot begin unless the particular is already determinate enough (and that must mean conceptually determinate) for the "search" to have a determinate direction, or, really, any direction. And any subsuming, determining judgment cannot "apply" the concept unless the particular has already been apprehended in a way that "called for" the relevant concept, unless a moment of reflecting judgment has already occurred. The two moments are inseparable, and this is the model we need at the logical level if there is to be a mediated immediacy. (Pippin 2019, 209)

These descriptions are in line with the claims I made above about the way in which conceptuality – shaped by second nature and *Bildung* – is operative within emotions, such that the manner in which we subsume a particular content under an evaluative category, already takes place within a *logical space of reason*. To be sure, Hegel did not portray the judgment of reflection as an adequate form of philosophical thinking, because it does not grasp the immanent relationship between the components of the concept. This is why his *Logic* moves on to other forms of judgments and to the syllogism. But this position only makes a case for a certain division of labor and is not necessarily to the detriment of practical feelings. Although Hegel sometimes suggests that we can have an emotional experience of truth (Enz. III §401 Zus.; PhG, 585), it sounds reasonable not to demand of the emotions that they must be present in and guide us through all our pursuits.

If we now turn our attention to the *practical feelings* Hegel lists as belonging to the second class, we see that they all follow the patterns described above. Some of these practical feelings he does not bother to define – such as hope [Hoffnung], anxiety [Angst], and pain[59] – but he does so with the following ones:

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[58] The power of judgment most central to Kant's *Kritik der Urteilskraft* is *the reflective power of judgment* [der reflektierenden Urteilskraft], which is directly tied to aesthetic judgments. According to Kant, the reflective judgment is a judgment in which only a particular representation is given, and we have to find a possible concept under which to subsume it. *The determining judgment [das bestimmende Urteil]*, on the other hand, moves in the opposite direction, i.e., from a universal concept to something empirically given (Kant 1957, 188).

[59] *Pain* is usually held to be less reflective and cognitive than displeasure (cf. Nussbaum 2001, 64). I think the simple answer to why Hegel introduces *pain* as a second-order form of emotion is that he believes we can experience emotional pain based on certain representations, images, and intuitions, which, for him, would make it more complex than displeasure. Yet, in the *Logic*, Hegel argues that pain belongs to every living being, and that it is the concrete, actual existence of contradiction (WL2, 481). There, pain is also described as the first "internal rupture of the living being": "From pain begin the need and the impulse that constitute the transition by which the individual in being for itself the negation of itself also becomes for itself an identity, an identity which is as the negation of that negation" (ibid.) It is tempting to argue that Hegel's somewhat counterintuitive classification of pain in the *PsG* stems from the significance he ascribes to pain in the *PhG*.

> Die Freude besteht in dem Gefühl des einzelnen Zustimmens meines An-und-für-sich-Bestimmtseins zu einer einzelnen Begebenheit, einer Sache oder Person. Die Zufriedenheit dagegen ist mehr eine *dauernde, ruhige* Zustimmung ohne Intensität. In der Heiterkeit zeigt sich ein lebhafteres Zustimmen. Die Furcht ist das Gefühl meines Selbstes und zugleich eines mein Selbstgefühl zu zerstören drohenden Übels. Im Schrecken empfinde ich die *plötzliche* Nichtübereinstimmung eines Äußerlichen mit meinem positiven Selbstgefühl (Enz. III §472 Zus.).

In this quote, we are starting to see how far away Hegel is from reducing the essential components of emotions to physiological arousals. We also see, pace Howard's reading, how far away he is from arguing that it is physiological arousals that enables us to distinguish between them. For what Hegel does in nearly all these definitions (as well as those that follow in the third class of practical feelings) is to explain the necessary logical structure of the formal/evaluative category a given judgment must reflect for it to qualify as that emotion. For instance, in order to experience joy, it is necessary to cognitively subsume a thing, event, or a person, under a category telling us that it agrees with something I self-consciously will. Thus, although there are certain formal and logical limits as to what it is for something to evaluatively count as joyful for me, there is also a great amount of freedom involved as to what *particular content* we can evaluatively judge as joyful. This is where socialization, second nature, our historical situatedness, and Moyar's notion of living value, kicks in.[60]

3.2.2.1 Going through the taxonomy

It might be helpful to look further into the different practical feelings Hegel lists in the passage above and see how they differ from the first class of practical feelings. For starters, the self-conscious volitional aspect of the second class of practical feelings, couched in Hegel's formulation "an in-and-for-itself determinatedness" (Enz. III §472 Zus.), provides another reason for why joy is a more cognitive and conceptually advanced emotion than mere pleasure (first, basic class). In other words, it seems that Hegel is asserting that all emotions in the second class, in addition to responding to intuitions and representations, can also make use of more conceptually elaborated evaluative categories than the previous ones, due to their

[60] Again, I will not venture into cultural anthropology and discuss whether emotions and emotional expression differ cross-culturally, or whether they are nearly universally similar, as Darwin held (Ekman 1980, 78). It is enough for my purposes to suggest that human emotions, for Hegel, are social, in the sense that *what* we tend to respond emotionally to, how we express the response, and describe the emotion, are conditioned by norms, values, and upbringing, and that this does not exclude the possibility of cross-cultural emotional differences. In any case, some classic examples of culturally specific ("untranslatable") emotions are the Japanese "Amae" – a feeling arising from a judgment that a request one gives is inappropriate but still likely to be acceded to – the Indian "Layja", and the Ifaluk "Fago" (Niyya, Ellsworth, Yamaguchi 2006, 279-280). For an empirical study of "Amae" in Japanese and U.S. citizens see (Ibid.). This study leans in the direction that "… the universality versus cultural specificity of emotions is not an either/or question, but a matter of degree. Some emotions may be salient and easily accessible in all cultures, while others are not, but people may have the ability to experience all kinds of emotions, even if some of them are less emphasized or hypocognized in their culture" (Ibid., 290).

logical structure. Hence, in joy, I simultaneously feel that my representation or intuition agrees with *a higher-order volition*. One way to illustrate the difference between the two classes of practical feelings is to once again draw on the example from the hiking trip, where joy and displeasure occur at once: I am on a hiking trip with my friends, and my legs are aching. Reaching the mountain top, I am filled with sudden joy over our accomplishment. The unpleasant aching does not stop, or turn into pleasure, but the sudden joy occurs all the same.

The difference between the first and- second class of practical feelings can also be clarified if we consider Hegel's definition of contentment [Zufriedenheit]. Contentment is a more "relaxed" and "enduring" kind of joy (Enz. III §472 Zus.). Therefore, one might say that contentment stems from having intuitions or representations about our current situation that are evaluated as agreeing with our higher order long-term aspirations and will. On the other hand, long-lasting pleasure or displeasure does not stem from such evaluations of intuitions or representations but is able to occur without them.

With *fear*, an interesting element is added to the picture. Hegel rather convolutedly states that fear is a combination of my self-feeling and a feeling of some evil that threatens to destroy my self-feeling (Enz. III §472 Zus.). What does the usage of "self-feeling" indicate here? This is a pertinent question. For Hegel has already made it clear that the emotions we are dealing with in the *Psychology* are *spiritual* and not soul-like or conscious-like (cf. 2.4.1.). Yet now he is referring to a capacity belonging to the soul. Moreover, Hegel only mentions self-feeling as a component in the negative emotions of fear and horror, and not in those of joy and contentment. This indicates that he attaches a specific meaning to negative emotions.

Like the other practical feelings in the second class, fear is an evaluation based on a representation or an intuition. In fear, I judge that an *evil* threatens an essential part of me: my self-feeling, the feeling of being present in my feelings, and moving freely in them. Now, as we saw, our self-feeling is altered after the acquisition of habits, since habits establish what Hegel calls our second nature (cf. section 1.4). Through habits, my body is made into a sign and an instrument I feel myself through, functionally orient myself in the world through, express myself through, and, not the least – as Hegel puts it in the section on *recognition* in the *Phenomenology* – starts entering into relationships with other people through (Enz. III §431). So, in its *basic* form, self-feeling is a feeling of *natural* personal identity; a feeling that I am alive as this biological body. But following the acquisition of habits, my self-feeling is inextricably bound to my second nature; those cultivated patterns providing my various activities with meaning and stability. The upshot of this is that the object of fear is evaluated as threatening my *habitual way* of being present to myself in my feelings and in my body. The

loss of this is what I fear for. Consequentially, fear might also stem from an evaluation that an essential part of my second nature – that which stabilizes my self-feeling –, such as important persons in my life or the functioning of an institution I rely on, is at risk.

3.2.3. The third class of practical feelings: Social emotions

Having now covered the second class of emotions, we finally arrive at the third one. In this third class, the content of the emotion belongs to the sphere of right, morality, ethics, and religion, all of which are said to "have their source in thinking" (Enz. III §472 Zus.). In the *PR,* Hegel claims that the difference between a will relating to *right* and a will relating to *morality* is that the former occupies itself with *prohibitions* and thus stands in a negative relationship to other people's will, while the latter concerns itself with how the world should be and stands in a positive relation to the will of other's (PR §112 Zus.). One may therefore expect Hegel to elaborate on emotions connected to right or morality, as examples of this final class of emotions. Yet he only defines shame [Scham] and remorse [Reue], which are said to be ethical (*Sittlich*). While shame and remorse are similar to each other, Hegel defines them differently. The former is "a moderate form of anger towards oneself", stemming from a "reaction to a contradiction between how I appear and what I should and want to be,– that is, a defense of my inner against my inappropriate appearance" [ein bescheidener Zorn des Menschen über sich selber, denn sie enthält eine Reaktion gegen den Widerspruch meiner Erscheinung mit dem, was ich sein soll und sein will,– also eine Verteidigung meines Inneren gegen meine unangemessene Erscheinung.] (Enz. III §401 Zus. t.m.). Quite similarly, remorse is defined as "…a feeling of a non-agreeability between what I do, my duty, or an advantage I have, in any case with a determination in and for itself" [Reue ist das Gefühl der Nichtübereinstimmung meines Tuns mit meiner Pflicht oder auch nur mit meinem Vorteil, in jedem Falle also mit etwas An-und-für-sich-Bestimmtem] (Enz. III §472 Zus. t.n.).

Hegel does not specify how the social content enters our practical feeling will. But again, I find it reasonable to frame it along the same lines as I did with the second class (cf. 3.2): A particular content is cognitively evaluated by being subsumed under a conceptually mediated evaluative category, in line with the logic of judgments of reflection. Hence, in shame or remorse, the interplay between the evaluative category and the particular content must follow the structure laid out in the definitions Hegel gave above.

How should we interpret the formulation that the particular content has "thinking as its source"? It should not be understood as a statement that the activity of pure thinking directly triggers shame or remorse. What the formulation refers to is that the content of the third class

of practical feelings to a larger degree than the previous classes must be mediated by non-perceptually general determinations, belonging to thinking, which makes it more objective, universal, and necessary (Cf. Enz. I §2). The third class of practical feelings can thus be said to unfold along a similar pattern as the one (heuristically) formalized above, only now with the exception that the content *must* be a sign and have a conceptually necessary structure:

REAL RECOLLECTION OF SIGN / REPRODUCTIVELY MEMORIZED SIGN/ → EMOTION → FEELING

First, why does the content need to be expressed through a sign? Hegel's claim seems to be that the meaning of a recollected or memorized ethical content (value) exceeds the material through which it expresses itself. Thus, the meaning of the particular content of one's ethical remorse, grounded as it is in customs and a concrete *Sittlichkeit*, is so complex that images or symbols cannot encompass it. This is why the content must present itself to us as a *sign.* Furthermore, the meaning of ethical remorse, Hegel seems to argue, does not come from purely contingent factors, but has a conceptual structure whose rational necessity can be demonstrated in what Hegel calls "thinking-over" [nachdenken] (Cf. Enz. I §2). Particular value-content about the morally good or bad, about rights, or religious matters, are simply more objective than the particular content of one's joy, one's fear(s), one's contentment, and hopes. All of these points are grounded in Hegel's account of objective spirit and *Sittlichkeit* in *PoG* and *PR,* which I do not have space to discuss here. But it is important to emphasize that for Hegel, the particular content of joy or fear (the second class), does not need to be structured with the same degree of necessity, nor necessarily experienced with the same degree of non-perceptual generality, as the ethical content.

3.2.4. The physiology of practical feelings

Although I have previously argued against Howard's feeling-theoretical reading, Hegel does of course connect emotions – like joy, fear, shame, remorse, or anger – to bodily feelings and physiological arousals. In other words, he is not claiming that it is sufficient to simply make a value judgment, in cold blood so to speak, in order to fear that one's self-feeling is in danger. While it is certainly possible to state that one is in danger as a mere matter of fact, this does not constitute an emotion. The emotion is felt, usually expressed, and (as we shall see later) acted upon. In order to see this, we must first remember that the bodily, neurophysiological capacities of the soul do not disappear with the advent of intelligence, but function together with it in the *psychical-physiological* manner Hegel discussed in the *Anthropology*. Hegel

thinks that shame[61] – like anger – physiologically embodies itself in the blood system, causing blushing. Fear and terror make us "shrink into ourselves", causing our blood to drop from our cheeks, and making us turn pale and tremble (Enz. III §400 Zus.). And since joy usually stems from a sudden break with the preceding bodily feelings, Hegel even claims that the bodily feeling of joy can even be dangerous for our organism (Enz. III §399 Zus.). In the *Encyclopedia Logic's* discussion of *Quality*, which describes a thought-determination of *Being* that entirely pervades the latter, Hegel also mentions fear and jealousy as mental states where spirit's whole "being-there" *is* the physiological arousal (Enz. I §90 Zus.).

The list could go on. What is important to note is that for Hegel, all cognitive evaluations are usually accompanied by physiological arousals. They are not, however, *reducible* to these physiological arousals, nor can they be distinguished from one another by reference to them. Rather, the cognitive evaluations need to be explained with reference to the socially and historically malleable interplay between our formal evaluative categories and their particular value-content. Interpreters like Howard, who reads Hegel as denying socio-historical factors any role in the constitution of emotions, should thus be reminded of the claim that habit and second nature are operative across all the stages of spirit (Enz. III § 410), and that every age has its own *mode of feeling*, as it says in the *Aesthetics* (VÄIII 246). Although physiological feelings are key elements in emotions, both in that they accompany them and that one would hesitate to claim that someone really finds something to be funny, sad, or dangerous if they do not feel the sensation associated with these emotions, we are justified in reading Hegel as arguing that habits and second nature influence how – and sometimes even *whether* – we cognitively evaluate certain particular contents.

Since the capacities of the soul are continuously present at every stage of spirit, we must also keep in mind that what Hegel said about the empathic disposition we have to feel another person's feelings (Enz. III §405-406) can be activated through emotive evaluative judgments. We have good reasons to believe that Hegel would have grouped such empathic feelings – where the other person becomes our affective center of orientation – under social emotions (cf. PR §213). To be sure, Hegel did not precisely regard the most violent instances of such empathy in the most positive light, describing the state we enter into when another person's emotional state completely takes control of our own as an *illness* (Enz. III §406).

[61] Despite this often-violent physical feeling, Hegel remarks that shame is a uniquely human emotion demonstrating our *detachment* from nature: Had we not been detached from nature we would never experience shame and feel the need to cover ourselves with clothes. Hegel even argues that the physical need for clothing is less important than the ethical need for clothing, grounded in the emotion of shame (Enz. I §24ZIII).

Yet, these claims appear less extreme when put in relation to the notion of *being with oneself in an other*, and the notion of affective agency, which I will sketch below.

3.2.5. Practical feelings as exposure to incompleteness

In addition to the physiology of practical feelings, we should also pay attention to the existential factors involved in the judgments they make. According to Nussbaum, not only is it in the nature of emotions to appraise things that are important for our flourishing. It is also in their nature to value things that are out of our control. In other words, emotions expose us to our own vulnerability and incompleteness in relation to the world (2001, 19).

Given Hegel's emphasis on the underlying *ought* in all practical feelings, we might say that he operates with the same criteria as Nussbaum. For how could a complete and self-sufficient being truly experience such an *ought* in the first place? True, as I showed above, we can be *content* with our current state and wish for its continuation. But why would a self-sufficient and complete being *wish* for such a thing? Would it not be a sign of uncertainty, and contradict the alleged self-sufficiency? Had we been complete and self-sufficient beings, which Hegel denies,[62] there would be no room for either negative or positive emotions, since these presuppose emotional fluctuation. And emotional fluctuation is unthinkable for a completely self-sufficient being. Hence, the fact that we are finite and needy makes us susceptible to practical feelings, and practical feelings expose us to this fact.[63]

3.2.5 Another mythologist of the passions? Reflections on Hegel's formalism charge

Above, I quoted a passage where Hegel claimed that the content of an emotion "comes to" the emotion externally. This idea poses one of the most serious threats to Hegel's philosophy of emotions. Not only is it implausible, but it also promotes a rather negative view of the emotions, by setting up a dualism between emotion and reason along the lines of *the myth of the passions*. In what follows, I puzzle together what Hegel might mean by the above-mentioned claim, what the consequences of this view are, and ask whether it is possible to counter his arguments with resources from the *PsG* itself. After having done so, I move on to the last part of this chapter and this thesis, on emotions and agency.

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[62] As Hegel shows in his *Logic*, there is a deep connection between the *Being-logical* categories of self-sufficiency, and indifference. According to Michael Theunissen (1980-25-37) and Arash Abazari (2020, 21), Hegel's *Wesenslogik* can be read as a critique of these terms.

[63] Readers will recognize the similarity between these reflections and Kojéve's reading of Hegel, with its emphasis on *desire* as the motor behind human development. As mentioned, desire belongs to the earlier stage of self-consciousness, where the I stands opposed to and desires objects and subjects in an apparently alien world. Desire does not disappear with the advent of theoretical and practical spirit but is sublated into the will. I leave it an open question whether Kojéve's reading would have benefitted from taking this into consideration.

A good starting point is to reassess Hegel's view of practical feelings in terms of what he says about their *form* and *content. The form* of a practical feeling is its unique intentionality or mode of disclosure, which I have dealt with above by looking at its cognitive evaluative operations and exposure to incompleteness. *The particular content* of the practical feeling is what it responds to. Besides what I have already said about the form of practical feelings, Hegel also characterizes them as "simple determinate affections". [Die Form des Gefühls ist, daß es zwar eine bestimmte Affektion, aber diese Bestimmtheit einfach ist".] (Enz. III §447). It is easy to misunderstand this description. "Simple determinate affection" does not mean that the form of a practical feeling rules out possibilities of so-called mixed emotions, where the subject's emotion is positive and negative at the same time. What Hegel is saying should rather be coupled with his claim that in practical feelings, we are closest, sometimes *myopically* so, to the content of our intentionality (Enz. III §447 Zus.). Hence, there are no other ways of coming closer to any content than in an emotion. Hegel also denies that the emotions themselves allow us to *choose* what to be emotively directed towards; an idea Sartre entertained when he defined emotions as *magical behavior* (Cf. Sartre 2013, 42). Due to this inability, emotions are (again *in themselves*) random [zufällig], in the sense that we cannot control when, and even what, we respond emotively to (Enz. III §447). As stated in the introduction, this latter point is connected to what I call Hegel's *formalism charge*. According to the formalism charge, the emotional evaluations themselves do not provide any criteria of what they can respond to, because they do not participate in the generation of their content. Therefore, as Inwood comments: "One might feel that stealing is right. Hence, a feeling as such does not validate the content of the feeling. ([Hegel] makes the same criticism of appeals to conscience" (Inwood 1992, 105).

Now, on the content-side, Hegel thinks that the intentionality of emotions may have the "most true" and "dignified" content (Enz. III §447). Hence, an emotion can provide us with a certain *access* to various ethical, scientific, and religious phenomena, as we have just seen. Nonetheless, this access is in itself *limited*, and a form/content discrepancy is at hand. The emotion does not allow us to decide what aspects of these particular contents we will be affected by, nor will our emotive evaluation of them manage to match their complexity in the same way as philosophical thinking (Enz. III §447Z). The emotion is neither able to present us with nor validate the whole phenomenon in its truth, but only certain aspects of it. Hegel even argues that emotions tend to disclose these phenomena in a self-centered way (Enz. III 471). Hence, when I experience an emotive response to an ethically loaded phenomenon, I

will certainly experience the phenomenon, but alone, this experience will be permeated by private interests. Echoing a passage from the preface to the *PhG* (cf. PhG, 51), Hegel writes:

> Wenn ein Mensch sich über etwas nicht auf die Natur und den Begriff der Sache oder wenigstens auf Gründe, die Verstandesallgemeinheit, sondern auf sein Gefühl beruft, so ist nichts anderes zu tun, als ihn stehenzulassen, weil er sich dadurch der Gemeinschaft der Vernünftigkeit verweigert, sich in seine isolierte Subjektivität, die Partikularität, einschließt. (Enz. III §447)

These reflections do not seem to paint a very flattering picture of our emotions. The notion that they are unfree, that they present us with partial, self-centered aspects of various contents, and that individuals who refer to their emotions when justifying a specific action or stance instead of the *reasons* pertaining to the concept of the thing, are simply withdrawing from mutual understanding into a private language, and should be left on their own, clearly resonates with the traditional disdain towards emotions in philosophy.

Yet, it is important not to jump to the conclusion and deem Hegel an enemy of the emotions. For again, the manner in which we relate to a content emotively can be more "dignified" and "comprehensive" [gediegender und umfassender] than when we relate to a content from the one-sided perspective of the understanding, which separates between things and threats them as unreconcilable opposites (Enz III §447). Thus, Hegel is not going to suggest that one simply substitutes relating to the world through one's emotions with a detached, and purely intellectual attitude. This is impossible in the lives of human animals (cf. VA1, 135). Instead, as we have seen, it is necessary to discard the artificial dualisms between the understanding and emotions that such views are premised on (Enz. III §471). I think the quote above is primarily levelled against those sentimentalist and romantic philosophers who insist that some unique, inner private moral qualities of our emotions are lost or perverted upon the development of reason – when they are mediated by higher cognitive capacities and social factors (cf. Enz. III §447). This is precisely the standpoint Hegel is criticizing in his treatment of *the law of the heart* (PhG, 275-283).

In any case, admitting that emotions have myopic qualities, irrational and self-centered tendencies, and a relative passivity with regard to what and how they respond to the things in the world, does not render them *invaluable*. Quite the opposite, these qualities make our experience of the world dynamic; creating upheavals in the landscape of our minds, exposing us to our finitude and incompleteness, all of which are key elements in our human condition (Nussbaum 2001). A strength of the *PsG* is that it shows how emotions have these unique qualities, without making them non-cognitive and isolated from intelligence or socialization.

Although I believe these above-mentioned points on the form of practical feelings are

important in redeeming Hegel as a positive thinker of the emotions, the underlying problem is the above-mentioned claim that emotions do not contribute to the content they evaluate, and that the content comes to the emotions from a source outside of it; most prominently, thinking (Enz. III 472Z). The reason is that he mobilizes it in an argument that emotional responses to certain value-contents are *optionable*; that the content does not need to be taken up emotively to be experienced in a practical way. Thus, ethical and religious contents that usually give rise to the third form of practical feeling, as well as the content which usually gives rise to joy and pain, must not be emotively evaluated to be properly experienced (Enz. III §472 Zus.).

With regard to ethical content, Hegel backs up his claim by referring to instances where one feels remorse over an objectively good action (Enz. III §472 Zus.). He also maintains that it is possible "not to give way to" an emotion when deciding to carry out an ethical deed. The same amounts for the content which usually gives rise to pain and joy. It is perfectly possible, Hegel claims, to learn that some content is in accordance with my will, or conversely, a content telling me that I am suffering a misfortune, without indulging in the related emotion. An alternative way of relating to the content is to calmly consider the content through my representations of it. It is even a sign of good character not to succumb to one's emotions in these cases, since the form of emotions only makes me focus on the fact that it is *me* and not anyone else experiencing it (Enz. III §472 Zus.).

These claims are perplexing. For one thing, Hegel frequently criticized Kantian deontology for its conviction that it is possible to act out of duty for duty's sake. And a crucial point in the *Psychology's* account of the will is precisely that the will cannot be pure in the Kantian sense of being independent of practical feelings or impulses. Rather, practical feelings and impulses are "… the starting point of action and of reason's practical self-determination…" (Ferrarin 2009, 340). A way of resolving this issue is to refer to Hegel's emphasis on not "indulging in" [sich hinzugeben] or "giving way to" [anheimfallen] one's emotions in encounters with the given content (Enz. III §472. Zus.). Taking into consideration that there are other aspects involved in an action than emotions – as I show below – I believe this nuance saves him from what would otherwise have been a troublesome inconsistency.

But these points do not explain the rather odd notion that some content that usually gives rise to either pain or joy does not need to be *emotively evaluated* as pain and joy in order for the subject to practically perceive that content. Say that the particular content is that a close family member of mine has died. There might be cases where one can cold-bloodedly relate oneself to that content without emotionally evaluating it at all, like Mersault in Camus' *The Stranger*. Hegel is not denying that. But the problem with Mersault is that he is entirely

indifferent to the death of his mother (as well as the prospect of his own execution). In other words, he fails to evaluate the discordance between the import of the particular content and his will; indeed, he fails to have any adequate practical will at all (Cf. Taylor 1985, 28).[64]

We have more than literary accounts to back up these claims. As Damasio has demonstrated in a series of studies, patients suffering from damage in sites of the brain leading to reduced emotion and feeling can cause severe impairment to decision-making abilities. Even though the patients Damasio studies – such as Phineas Gage, or his own patient "Elliot" – have had many of their intellectual abilities intact, they fail to lead well-functioning social lives and make short-term and long-term decisions. And the reason is found in their pathological disaffection and flat emotions. These findings demonstrate that "reduction in emotion may constitute an equally important source of irrational behavior" (1994, 53).

If Hegel settles on the claim that the failure to respond properly to particular value-contents of pain or sorrow is not due to the lack of emotive evaluation of these intuitions or representations, but *bad cognition*, his philosophy of emotions will run into explanatory problems and internal inconsistencies. First, these claims come close to a *ghost in the machine hypothesis*, which is impossible for Hegel to entertain, given the developmental trajectory in the *PsG* from embodiment to cognition. Second, it becomes difficult to hold each other responsible for our *emotional reactions* – something we quite often do – if the emotions themselves do not have any criteria for what particular content to subsume under an evaluative category (Cf. De Sousa 1980). As an alternative, we would have to hold each other accountable for *bad thinking* in our emotional responses, which is something quite different. Similarly, how can we talk even talk about healthy and robust emotional response patterns in contrast to the less beneficent ones, just like Hegel did in his discussion of the various forms of mental illnesses in the *Anthropology*, if everything is up to unaffected thinking?

Let us pause for a few paragraphs at the example of the Stoic in the *PhG*. The stoic's active *denigration* of the significance of events in the external world and his emotional responses are part of an attempt to *desensitize* the arousals of his practical feelings. The goal is ultimate *ataraxia*, becoming an unaffected spectator to whom "these perishable things" simply do not matter, and becoming purely self-identical: the personhood of the Stoic is not determined by anything other than himself (PhG, 157-159).[65]

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[64] This also holds for lack of affectivity in moral judgments of another person's suffering. Cf. Vetlesen 1994.
[65] The historical backdrop for Hegel's discussion of late roman Stoicism is the downfall of the Greek form of ethical life and the rise of the Roman Empire. This development inaugurated a shift from a form of life in which individuals saw themselves at one with the prevailing mores and customs of the city-state they inhabited and the social roles they were attributed, towards a form of life in which the individual qua legal subject – what Hegel

Following Jaeggi, we may say that this loss of "affective attachment" to the world (our personal entanglements, our projects) is a loss of meaningful identification with and relation to it. In turn, this loss results in a loss of self; a radical self-alienation (2016, 134). Or, keeping with the vocabulary already presented, it is a loss of *self-feeling*, of emotional identity. These points are not only implied in the *PhG*-discussion of Stoicism, but also in the vision of the Self outlined in the *Anthropology* and *PsG-Phenomenology*. In my analysis of these sections, we saw how the Self is *constituted* in an affective, normative relation to other subjects and the world. And in the introduction to this chapter, I touched on how the will realizes itself through externalization. The socially interpreted consequences of the action "recoils" back on the subject, casting new light on its original intention, and so the "circle of action" and the intersubjective formation of the Self goes on (cf. PhG, 297). Without having an affective attachment to these things, the formation of the Self is undermined. Hegel also mentions *the boredom* of the Stoic (PhG, 159). And is not boredom, as Jaeggi argues, the ultimate mood in which we are unable to properly pay attention to or care for something, like those personal entanglements and projects that make us who we are (2016, 144)? The upshot is that full emotional indifference undermines the subject's self-feeling, the subject's being *with itself in the other*. Hegel's critique of stoicism anticipated what Camus and Damasio articulated some hundred years after him. But is the *PsG* then objecting against his formerly held views?

Circling back to the *PsG*, what Hegel is critical of is both the idea that the emotions are the only way we can relate practically to any given value-content, and that relating to a content exclusively in this way is the most adequate for our practical agency. As we shall see, Hegel backs up these claims by arguing that practical feeling is the initial mode among others of formally relating practically to a particular content. I advance to these other modes in a moment. But to anticipate, these factors will not remove the initial worry about the claim that emotions do not contribute to the content they evaluate, that this content does no not "belong to their nature" but rather comes to them from the "outside".

One way to solve this issue could be to nuance what it means that the content does not "belong to the *nature*" of the emotions. Instead of saying that a particular content X – say, a cinematic representation of someone suffering – is devoid of any internal emotional import or traces thereof, we can interpret Hegel as arguing that the representation is conceptually

calls the abstract universal personality – takes precedence (VPG, 339). Individuals no longer identified themselves with the "real universal" of the ethical life they inhabit, but rather, as opposed to this, their legally protected private interests. Hegel's discussion of Stoicism (and to a certain degree unhappy consciousness) can be read as a critique of calls for *emotional self-management* instead of tackling the social causes of the issues.

structured by other cognitive capacities than the emotions, and that this conceptual structure provides the representation with a valence we otherwise would not have been able to respond emotionally to. A similar view is presented elsewhere (cf. Enz. I §3). And indeed, at some point he claims that truthful feeling belongs to someone who has "… gained consciousness of particular differences, essential relations, true determinations, and receives this rectified content in its feeling" [der sich das bewußtsein von bestimmten Unterschieden, wesentlichen Verhältnissen, Wahrhaften Bestimmungen usf. Erworben [hat] und bei dem dieser berichtigte Stoff es ist, der in sein Gefühl tritt, d.i., diese Form erhält (Enz. III §447 m.t.). Does the appropriateness of emotional responses only hinge on one's grasp of conceptual structures?

Like Solomon, I hold that there is an inseparability between cognitive emotions and their objects, and that a notion of such an inseparability allow us to solve the problems at hand, because it retains the idea that there are certain contents – emotive ones – that we must evaluate emotionally in order to respond to it properly (1977, 177). Now, the proposed interpretation in the last paragraph does not sufficiently account for such an inseparability, because it still seems to operate with the assumption of a capacity *outside* of the emotions. Does Hegel have to commit himself to such a view in order to stay consistent? My answer is that he does not. In the *Anthropology*, Hegel writes the following:

> Alles ist in der Empfindung und […] alles, was im geistigen Bewußtsein und in der Vernunft hervortritt, hat seine Quelle und Ursprung in derselben; denn Quelle und Ursprung heißt nicht anderes als die erste, unmittelbare weise, in der etwas erscheint. Es genüge nicht [sagt man], daß Grundsätze, Religion usf. nur im Kopfe seien, sie mussen im Herzen, in der Empfindung sein (Enz. III §400)

In this passage, Hegel is explicitly stating that the particular contents he later claimed belong to a source outside of practical feelings – that is, to representation or thinking – spring from the same source, namely sensations and "the heart"; the latter of which is his catch-all term for emotionality. And indeed, did we not see in the last chapter that intuitions and representations are etiologically connected to sentience and feelings; that sentience and feelings provide intelligence with a content it works upon and transforms into a content we subsequentially can evaluate in a cognitive way? Moreover, did we not also see how Hegel argued that our imagination is determined by our moods? These points make up what Gabriel has interpreted as Hegel's notion of the *pathological structure of representation* (2011, 48-60). And in my view, this notion allows us to draw the conclusion that while the interplay between intelligence and social factors all play a great role in engendering the particular contents we relate to in our minds, Gefühle also partakes in this genesis. It makes no sense to exclude any of these capacities from the process. Commenting on Adorno's negative

dialectics, J.M. Bernstein once wrote that "identitarian thought holds fast to the result, and eliminates its formation" (2001, 308). Perhaps this is one instance where the urge toward identity between form and content in Hegel's philosophy goes too far for its own good.

Hegel holds that we always perceive the world conceptually. In our everyday lives, when we are not doing *Logic,* we relate to the world through our *representations* of it (Cf. Enz. I §3-4). Some of these representations can now, on the present account, be understood as more emotionally *laden* than others, because our feelings have been more invested in their genesis. Examples abound, from representations of suffering, joy, love, hope, fear and anxiety, remorse, disgust, and shame. My main point against Hegel here is that in those cases, the content itself can call for specific emotional evaluations, in the manner outlined above.

To sum up my discussion of what I think *should* have been Hegel's conclusions about the form and content of emotions had he remained consistent with his own developmental account of human mindedness, we now see that emotions have their very own way of relating to conceptualized content. In emotions, conceptual capacities are put into operation by subsuming a particular content under an evaluative category. This is a cognitive operation that often leads to physiological arousals. When we experience an emotion, the emotion does not immediately enable us to philosophically *know* the complexity of the content we evaluate. Rather, the emotion responds to a limited set of aspects of the content that have a certain normative salience for our flourishing as dependent beings. Since the particular contents of such normative salience are the product of an interplay between our sensuous, affective, and intelligent capacities, as well as habituation and our second nature, they often *call for* a certain emotional response. We can, and often do, respond wrongly, but saying that we can dispense with emotional responses to such value-contents altogether and still be able to perceive it practically, is misguided. I believe all these claims are compatible with Hegel's insistence that the true reason of the heart and the will [die wirkliche Vernunftigkeit des Herzens und Willens] is realized in the universality of intelligence, and not the emotion in isolation. In our emotions, thoughts, and volitions, there is *one reason* (Enz. III §471 Zus.), but it resists being reduced to any particular capacity that can lead its own isolated existence.

3.3. Drive, inclination, passion, and arbitrary choice [Willkür]

We have seen that for Hegel, the function of practical feelings – emotions – is to subsume a particular content under an evaluative category and judge whether the content is in accordance with our flourishing. This emotional comparison was shown to be the first manifestation of what Hegel calls "the practical ought". But according to Hegel, *the practical*

will of human beings is fundamentally predisposed towards going beyond the confinements of being determined in this way from the outside, to become self-determining (Enz. III §473 +Zus.). (Yet, we should remember that we are not purely passively determined when experiencing an emotion. The passivity is *relative* and draws into operation spontaneous conceptual capacities). We do not content ourselves with merely evaluating whether something is in accordance with our will or not but seek to bring forth this accordance through *action*. In other words, most emotions have *action-tendencies*. Human animals desire to translate their will into external reality, not merely pickle on it in their minds.

The first manifestations of this practical predisposition are the *inclinations* [Neigung] and the *drives* [Trieb]. Hegel does not bother to define the difference between the two. Following Ryle, I think it is reasonable to assume that inclinations do not suddenly occur, or happen, in the same way as drives do. Rather, they are like general, long-term propensities towards wanting certain things in a certain way (2009, 93).

However, Hegel is of the view that drives and inclinations are similar to practical feelings with regard to their proximity to inner and outer nature, and the above-mentioned discrepancy between their form and content (Enz. III §474). The difference between practical feelings, drives, and inclinations is that the latter base themselves on evaluations made by the practical feeling and seek to *satisfy* its "ought". Hence, whereas a practical feeling experiences shame, my drive or inclination will be directed toward getting rid of it. According to Hegel, we do so by taking an *interest* in and pursuing some aspect of the particular content against others (Enz. III §475). By doing so, we have to a greater degree than in practical feelings integrated our initial emotive determination into a moment of self-determination.[66]

In addition to our drives and inclinations, there are the *passions* [Leidenschaften]. Insofar as drives and inclinations are not mediated by a higher-order volition – connected to one's personality and projects – they will be random, stand in an external relationship to and conflict with each other. Passion is one's ability to bind and restrict oneself to one set of predictable particular volitional drives and inclinations, by investing all of one's *interests* into something, be that a cause, a concern, or a project (Enz. III §474). Hegel was less positive towards the passions than its counterpart *pathos*, arguing that the former tends to be self-centered while the latter is inextricably linked to ethical causes (Pahl 2013, 50). Nonetheless,

[66] Hegel again reminds us how drives and inclinations differ from self-conscious desire as analyzed in the *Phenomenology*. In desire, we are not aware of the identity between subject and object and do not experience that which is desired as an instantiation of a universal. Conversely, in drives and inclinations, we experience the object under its universal, and as mediated by intuitions, representations, or signs (Enz. III §473 Zus.).

he tends to use the two terms synonymously, and on numerous occasions celebrates the role of passions in human life and history. Building on Goethe's "der Meister zeigt sich in der Beschränkung" and repeating a famous proclamation from the *Philosophy of History* (VPG, 38), Hegel states the following, lambasting the "moral hypocrisy" of critics of the passions: "Es ist nichts Großes ohne Leidenschaft vollbracht worden, noch kann es ohne solche vollbracht werden. Es ist nur eine tote, ja zu oft heuchlerische Moralität, welche gegen die Form der Leidenschaft als solche loszieht" (Enz. III §474).

Against this background, Hegel raises what he considers to be a common question about the rational and irrational – as well as the good and evil – elements in our drives, inclinations, and passions (Enz. III §474). In line with his expressivism, Hegel argues that the *rational* core of our drives, inclinations, and passions, is that we, in attempting to satisfy them, are directed toward translating something subjective into something objective. To satisfy one's drives, inclinations and passions is therefore a sublation of subjectivity through the activity of the subject itself (Enz. III §474; §475). And for Hegel, this process of sublating one's subjectivity by making it objective – externalizing it, – is the only way a subject can "become one with itself". Through our drives, inclinations, and passions we thus contribute to make our interests known to ourselves and others. The latter point is, as Hegel sees it, a crucial step toward making them accessible for other subject's assessments of whether they are good, bad, rational, or irrational. But since the recognitive procedure that can secure the validity of these assessments nonetheless depends on social norms and the institutions in ethical life, he claims that the question of whether our passions, inclinations, and drives are good or bad can only be properly solved within the *PoG* or *PR* (Enz. III §474).

It is also important to note that Hegel holds that the drives and passions are key factors in all our purposes and the realization of them through action: "Aber Trieb und Leidenschaft ist nichts anderes als die Lebendigkeit des Subjekts, nach welcher es selbst in seinem Zwecke und dessen Ausführung ist" (Enz. III §474). Contrary to (Hegel's reading of) Kant, the maxims of our actions cannot, therefore, be chosen or acted upon, without any of these forces:

> Selbst im reinsten rechtlichen, sittlichen und religiösen Willen, der nur seinen *Begriff,* die *Freiheit,* zu seinem Inhalte hat, liegt zugleich die Vereinzelung zu einem *Diesen,* zu einem *Natürlichen.* Dies Moment der *Einzelheit* muß in der Ausführung auch der objektivsten Zwecke seine Befriedigung erhalten; ich als dieses Individuum will und soll in der Ausführung des Zwecks nicht zugrunde gehen. Dies ist mein *Interesse.* Dasselbe darf mit der *Selbstsucht* nicht verwechselt werden; denn diese zieht ihren besonderen Inhalt dem objektiven Inhalte vor. (Enz. III §475 Zus.)

Hegel here reveals a key principle in his social philosophy – based on his *Logic of the Concept* –, namely that regardless of how universal the content of our purposeful action is, the

individual and its particularities cannot be "swallowed" by it. Our individuality, particular needs, emotions, interests, and aspirations must be maintained within the *universal*. But Hegel's emphasis on the importance that the individual and particular features are maintained and not suppressed in relation to universal purposes should not turn our attention away from his framing of the insufficiencies of drives, inclinations, and passions, when they are separated from or *opposed to* the universal. We have already touched on Hegel's argument for this, such as the notion that they, in themselves, are relatively unfree (Enz. III §474). But Hegel does not hold that the insufficiencies are gone as soon as the will detaches itself from immediate inclinations, drives, and passions. This is evident in his discussion of *arbitrary choice* [Willkür], or what he often calls *reflective will* (PR §20)

Arbitrary choice is a key idea in Kant's notion of freedom (PR §15). While Hegel regards the capacity for arbitrary choice as a psychological enabling condition of freedom, he is critical of one-sided focus on it. As the wording indicates, arbitrary choice is the ability to choose what drive one wants to act on. Thus, arbitrary choice is a presupposition of passions. We make an arbitrary choice by taking a *reflective stance* towards our often-conflicting drives and decide on which one we identify with and will act on (Enz. III §476; Wood 1990, 59).

Although we are therefore somehow freed from the immediate pull of each ensuing drive and inclination, we are still bound to our immediate drives and inclinations, since they are ultimately what we base our arbitrary choices on. In arbitrary choice, we are not motivated by anything else than the variety of drives and inclinations we come to have (Enz. III §478). This gives rise to a contradiction, which must be resolved. First, the relationship between form and content is still dissonant because the arbitrary will considers itself to be universal and free, but nonetheless realizes itself through transitory particular contents. Secondly, if we were to base our whole life on incessant arbitrary choices between different drives and inclinations, this whole process becomes rather pointless, without any greater cause or end (Enz. III § 478). The insight following this experienced contradiction facilitates the transition to the next stage of the practical will, where each satisfaction of a particular drive is understood in relation to a *universal good*. Hegel describes this universal good as the "truth" of the particular drives. Its first form is *happiness* [Glückseligkeit]. As we shall see, Hegel frames it as intrinsically connected to *freedom* (Cf. Enz. III §478).

3.4. Happiness as the highest good? Hegel's critique of hedonism

Hegel's dense account of the relationship between happiness and freedom in the closing paragraphs of *PsG* is meant to forge the link between emotion, drives, inclinations, passion,

and subjective freedom. Above, I indicated how Hegel derived "the principle of happiness" from the subject's arbitrary choice of what particular drives to follow: Humans are not doomed to live in an unending spurious chase after episodic satisfactions. Instead, we can come to the insight that we feel the particular things we feel, wish for the things we wish for, and do the particular things we do, because we regard them as compatible with a conception of the highest universal good. Hegel launches *happiness* as the first candidate for the highest good. As Wood points out, happiness is here simply represented as the "… maximum attainable satisfaction of empirical … desires" (Wood 1990, 64).[67] Such a representation of happiness corresponds to a notion of flourishing that is (at least) more explicit and articulated than previously in the part on practical spirit.

Now, Hegel thinks that having a universal conception of happiness fundamentally affects our emotions, will, and action, because it makes us liable to *sacrifice* particular drives for the sake of attaining the happiness, or flourishing, we have chosen as our universal purpose [Zweck]. Either one particular drive can be sacrificed [aufgeopfert] for another one that is more compatible with that universal representation of happiness, or one can adjust a drive – partially or wholly – to this universal purpose (Enz. III §479). Once again, Hegel emphasizes the educational aspect involved here: Learning to adapt one's will to a universal purpose is indispensable for *Bildung* and the formation of thought's universality (PR §20).

Although directing one's drives toward a representation of happiness is crucial in the development of subjective spirit, Hegel criticizes those regarding it as the only viable moral psychological purpose of our will – as that for the sake of which we evaluate as we do, will as we do, and act as we do. His objection is conceptual. As Wood explains, Hegel believes that the highest good must take the form of a *true universal*, which is self-sufficient and self-determining (1990, 64). That is, it cannot be a representation of a collection of different drives but must be a *true universal* engendering all particular content, and not the other way around (Ibid.). Now, when the agent acts from a conception of happiness, she does *believe* that her content is universal. But it is not universal in the *true* (Hegelian) sense, because it is only an aggregate of particular ends without any inherent connection (Ibid.). Since it is our practical feelings and drives that have the final word in the choice of what we conceive of as *universal happiness*, and which establishes the external connection between the aggregated content in this conception, our will is overdetermined by what Hegel would call an *abstract universal*. That is a shaky and unreliable purpose to direct our will toward (Enz. III §479).

[67] Wood does not seem to distinguish between Hegel's concept of Begierde (desire) and Trieb (drive).

These points are connected to another issue in Hegel's critique of this hedonistic approach. As Wood points out, any conception of a universal needs a "measure" with which we can judge whether it satisfies its universality or not (1990, 64). Happiness does not provide us with any such measure. If there is one invariable feature of all conceptions of happiness, it is pleasure, Hegel argues. But a universal notion *pleasure,* he continues*,* is contradictory, since what each person holds to be pleasurable varies greatly (PR §20 Zus.).

Secondly, the representation of happiness – understood as a universal collection of all our desires – as the ultimate purpose in life, takes the form of a perennial *ought* (Enz. III §480). This claim echoes Hegel's *Sollenskritik* of Kant's notion of the highest good in the doctrine of the practical postulates, but it can also be read as a statement on the impossibility of achieving anything like an enduring state of a universal happiness – or flourishing – whose conception is founded on pleasure. What, then, does Hegel suggest as the true universal, self-sufficient substitute for happiness as the highest good?

3.5. Freedom and Affective Agency

Once again exploiting Brandom's locution, Hegel's strategy is to render explicit something which has been implicit in the chapter on practical spirit all along: Namely, that humans have an inherent drive towards freedom, and that the underlying universal purpose for which we act, our true conception of happiness and flourishing, is to be self-determining, to be free. We see here how Hegel derives freedom as the highest good – the true universal – from his discussion of happiness and arbitrary choice. For what these instances illustrate, is that the preceding attempts at choosing what to direct our will towards, are ultimately dependent on freedom. Freedom is that which makes it possible for me to act from a conception of happiness. Because it conditions any articulated notion of happiness, freedom must be the highest good. And, as Pinkard comments, the notion of freedom as the highest good differs from the notion of happiness as the highest good in another sense, since "[the] final end of freedom can be sufficiently harmonized with others also holding this final end" (2012, 173). But rather than directing his argument against happiness *per se*, like Ikäheimo claims Hegel is doing (2017, 444), his critique is aimed at a notion of happiness or flourishing that does not have its ground and ultimate purpose in freedom.

These points sound vaguely Kantian. And indeed, at the stage of freedom, the subjective *will* is said to *will itself* – the will has now self-consciously made itself its own object and purpose (Enz. III §481; PR §27). But this operation is less formal than it appears. As noted, Hegel sees individual freedom as being dependent on the freedom of others and on

participation in a concrete ethical life composed of norm-governed institutions that lay the foundation for mutual recognition (Fetscher 1970, 204; Neuhouser 2000, 14). Hence, the will willing itself must recognize the importance of these supra-individual factors and will their existence or improvement. To unpack all the details involved here is beyond the scope of this thesis, as they are part of objective spirit. It is nonetheless crucial to point out, since it has ramifications for the relationship between emotions and freedom I will discuss in a moment.

As we saw earlier, Hegel holds that it is nonsensical to speak of an unfree will (PR §4 Zus.). If you remove freedom, there is no will, only desire. This insight has been building up throughout subjective spirit's development in the *Psychology* but has only become evident now. The will has understood that it is in its nature to be free and has made this the underlying purpose of its actions. As a result, the discrepancy between form and content in the *PsG* has been solved: the will is just as universal as what it wills. But where do we fit in the sentient, emotional factors in this picture? In the introductory paragraphs of this chapter, it was noted that the will can only be with itself *in an other*, and that emotions or drives can count as such an "other". Drawing on Jaeggi's account of a non-alienated self-relation of appropriation, I then suggested that to be with oneself in one's emotions means to relate to them in a manner in which their "otherness" is not so immense as to be invasive or disturbing, so that we fail to be present to ourselves in them, or have ourselves on command, in accordance with the greater concerns in our life. How are these points tied to freedom?

Let us consider how Hegel draws on the vocabulary from the *Logic of the Concept* to explain the free will. Logically, the free will can be said to be composed of the three moments corresponding to those of the concept: *the universal*, *the particular*, and the *individual*. First of all, the universal is now, as we have seen, the underlying, ultimate purpose of our will: *freedom*. Secondly, the particular is the drive, which we adjust towards the universal through arbitrary choice. Finally, the arbitrary choice, which chooses to adjust its drives toward freedom, corresponds to the moment of individuality (cf. Enz. III §480-81; PR §21-28).

Within this conceptual constellation, the practical feelings – emotions – are now (re)located within what Hegel calls the *particular*, since, as we have seen, they lead directly to drives. When the will has itself as its own purpose and has emerged as a true universal generating its own content in line with the logic outlined above, this must mean that *what* we experience when we have a "truthful" or "righteous" emotion (to use Hegel's own terms) must be grounded in and be compatible with freedom as my representation of the highest good and human flourishing. Again, this conception of freedom cannot not simply be subjective, or based on my private convictions. Since one's freedom depends upon the

freedom of others within norm-governed institutions in an ethical life, a true conception of freedom as the highest good must affirmatively take these concrete factors into consideration.

Bringing this back to the notion that a practical feeling bases itself on a comparison between one's will and a particular value-content giving rise to an *ought*, the idea now is that a truthful emotion springs from a concern about one's own – and, by implication – *other people's freedom*. The interplay between our evaluative categories and particular contents will then be such that we subsume and interpret particular contents with continued or future freedom as our ultimate concern. In such a case, it is not only the emotion, nor the drive or happiness, but also freedom as our ultimate concern, that determine the character of our emotions, and function as its horizon. Conversely, untrue, inappropriate, and (in the long run) damaging emotions are formed independently and cut off from true freedom as an ultimate concern. In innocent cases, such emotions can be self-centered, irrational, and give rise to the hypocritical behavior Hegel describes in his criticism of conscience, in which one knows what is truly (universally and collectively) good, sticks to a particular drive that is opposed to it, but nonetheless gives the impression that one is doing what is good (PR §140). In the worst cases, one might get stuck in a particular interior self-feeling one is unable to integrate in a well-functioning life with other people. As Hegel argued in the *Anthropology*, a possible long term-consequence of this is mental illness (Enz. III §408 Zus.).

The preceding reflections bring us to what I call Hegel's notion of *affective agency*. On a general level, "affective agency" suggests that agency *as such* involves affectivity: Without being affected by something other than ourselves, we would not have anything we could exercise our agency in relation to. There would be no grounds for *being with oneself in an other*. This sense of affective agency is certainly an important part of what I have been arguing for in this thesis, but it does not quite get to the heart of the matter. Affective agency is a special kind of agency towards the content of one's emotions, in which one continually has current or future collective freedom as the ultimate concern – horizon – shaping one's emotional life, in such a way that one can also be present to oneself in one's emotions, be able to move freely in them, and have oneself at one's command. In Hegel's philosophy, such freedom is not *abstract*, but *concrete*. It will eventually pass from the *subjective* to the *objective* realm, where the agent-relative values are seen as grounded in what Moyar called the *living value* of social institutions. It is a freedom that can only be realized in relationships across different institutional recognitive spheres; to one's family, group of friends, to people in civil society, and even to the formations of politics. Thus, the ultimate purpose shaping one's emotional life in affective agency includes a concern about the freedom of others.

Neuhouser precisely claims that for Hegel, "…individuals can be brought to will and work freely for the collective good of the social groups to which they belong, insofar as doing so is at the same time a way of giving expression to a particular identity that they take to be central to who they are" (2000, 13). And as the social pathologist he was, Hegel knew how objective, institutional structures (elements of our second nature) contribute to create tensions where *affective agency* is unattainable. His discussion of *the rabble* in *PR* serves as a good example of such a phenomenon. Hegel sees the rabble as a necessary by-product of the individualistic, competitive structure in civil society, and he refers to them as a group of unemployed people living at the "lowest level of subsistence" (PR §244 Zus.). The rabble has lost "…that feeling of right, integrity, and honor which comes from supporting oneself by one's own activity and work" [Verluste des Gefühls des Rechts, der Rechtlichkeit und der Ehre, durch eigene Tätigkeit und Arbeit zu bestehen] (PR §244). As Ruda points out, Hegel also describes the rabble as lacking habits (2011, 75). Against this background, Ruda ushers into a timely discussion about the *Anthropology*, mentioning its definition of habit as "a mechanism of self-feeling" (Ibid., 77). Ruda shows, among other things, that Hegel sees the impairment of such a mechanism as following from lack of proper work, which ends up permeating all other activities of the rabble, crushing what Hegel calls their *ethical disposition* [Sittliche Gesinnung] and their possibility to perform activities directed towards the universal good in an ethical life (Ibid., 79). Following Honneth, we can also correlate the rabble's loss of honor, the impairment of habits and ethical disposition, with a lack of solidarity and recognition (Cf. Honneth 2014, 182). And recall Hegel's emphasis on emotional expression and the importance of externalizing one's intentions in the world for intersubjective scrutiny, as a vehicle for self-knowledge (cf. section 3.1.): If a group of people repeatedly experiences not having their emotions or intentions properly recognized by others, the likelihood is high that their self-feeling, habits, ethical disposition, and affective agency, will suffer.

The ethical disposition is related to Hegel's notion of *trust.* As Houlgate argues, trust for Hegel has both an emotional and a theoretical component: One not only needs to know, but *feel*, that the ethical laws and institutions of the state are geared towards preserving both one's "substantial" and "particular" interests, making sure that basic human needs are met, and that one can pursue one's projects (2016, 113; PR §147; §268). All these points center around Hegel's notion of practical feeling, in which the emotive and the cognitive are intertwined. But another thing that should be clear is that Hegel's solution to contemporary problems similar to those described, is not to refer individuals back to themselves. The place to start is to mitigate the social structures causing the emotional disorders.

Conclusion

At least since the publication of Adorno's *Drei Studien zu Hegel* (1963), the idea that in order to continue to think *with* a dialectical philosopher like Hegel one must think *against* him, has gained currency and given rise to insightful studies on a wide range of topics (cf. Hösle 1987; Abazari 2020, Ruda 2011). Such approaches do not need to be hermeneutically suspicious. An alternative approach is to base oneself on a subject-matter the philosopher in question has treated with great care and acuteness but nonetheless failed to recognize the significance of. The reconstructive work can proceed by re-integrating this subject-matter within the whole it figures in and see whether it has more to offer than the philosopher originally thought. This is what I have sought to do with Hegel's treatment of Gefühle in the *PsG.*

My study of the developmental account of mindedness in the *PsG* has shown that Hegel sees *cognitive judgments of value* as the essential component in emotions, and as what enables us to distinguish between them. This is evident from Hegel's analysis of *praktische Gefühle* in the last section of the *Psychology* in the *PsG*, covered in chapter 3. Hence, if we want to discern what kind of emotion a person is undergoing, we need information about the person's value-laden belief about something she believes *ought* or *ought not* to be the case. Hegel thought the most reliable indicator of that is found in voluntary expressions, a subspecies of action mediated by signs. In order to tease out the type of cognition at work here, I exploited McDowell's descriptions of how conceptual capacities are made operative in sensibility, and argued that Hegel claims the same applies for the cognitive work of emotions in adult human beings. Elaborating on this, I showed how the capacities Hegel thinks are involved in emotions, such as *recollection*, *imagination*, *discursive intellect,* and reflective judgment, can be made compatible with Lyon's idea that emotions subsume a *particular content* under a *general content* or *evaluative category*. Hegel's account of the *evaluative* nature of human emotions was also shown to have a close affinity to Nussbaum's idea that emotions expose us to our vulnerability and incompleteness in relation to the world, as well as her idea that emotional values are things of importance for our *flourishing*.

As an anti-dualist, Hegel holds that emotions lead to inner sensations in certain parts of our body; depending on the emotion we have. I have not focused on his attempts at charting these "psycho-physiological" interconnections, since the evidence he provides is cursory and outdated. The part of Hegel's analysis of the psycho-physiological link between emotions and sensations that I have concerned myself more with – especially in chapter 1 –, is his account of how bodily arousals can take hold of and overpower our self-feeling. For

Hegel, this can arise from strong emotive responses, and, in the worst cases, form a pattern leading to mental illnesses. I have also concerned myself with the ability Hegel thinks humans have to retroactively *intuit* and express inner sensations and the emotions they arise from in a manner that can alleviate or enrich them. When it comes to expressions, we can do this in two ways: *involuntarily*, through gestures or bodily expressions common among most humans, like crying and laughing; and *voluntarily*, through learnt gestures, linguistic utterances, or art.

The main task of this thesis has been to give an account of Hegel's philosophy of emotions which shows how it breaks with so-called *feeling theory.* Historically, the most prominent proponents of *feeling theory* are Descartes and James, who held that emotions are a certain kind of awareness of bodily arousals caused by a non-emotive perception (inner or outer). This view commits itself to replace a *belief* as the object of an emotion, with a *bodily arousal*. I claimed that this replacement is wrong-headed since it begs the question as to *why* the bodily arousal (say the rapid heartbeat when we see the person we are in love with) could arise in the first place. The problem with feeling theories is not that they make emotions blind *per se* (they do not) but that they rob them of any actuating role in the emotive process and place them at the mercy of a blind feeling the agent has little to no control over. In chapter 2, I argued that these implications are related to what Solomon dubbed the *myth of the passions.* This myth is premised on a strict dualism between reason and emotions and portrays the latter as irrational invasive forces that are to be curbed by the coolheaded rationality of the former.

While I am confident that my interpretation of Hegel avoids both the pitfalls of *feeling theory* and the *myth of the passions*, I showed that there are Hegel-scholars who have gone in the opposite direction. In this regard, chapters 1 and 3 countered Howard's claim that Hegel reduces emotions to patterns of physiological arousals, with the objection that the *PsG'*s analysis of the emotionally constitutive function of habit, socialization, and emphasis on cognitive evaluations, shows that Hegel is far from carrying out the reductions Howard blames him of. Furthermore, I claimed (in chapter 2) that Redding's interpretation of Hegel as saying that Gefühle are blind until they have been "semantically boot-strapped" by our cognitive capacities, misses how cognition and conceptuality operate *in*, not *on* Gefühle.

Considering some of Hegel's unfavorable comments about *Gefühle*, the task of highlighting his more positive view on them has posed many challenges. This was especially the case with regard to his *formalism-charge,* his notion that *Gefühle* does not contribute to the production of its content, and his notion that we can respond properly to a content of a *Gefühl* just as well without emotional attachment. Faced with these claims, I demonstrated how Hegel's own account of human mindedness in the *PsG* can be mobilized against them.

More precisely, I argued that the whole developmental trajectory in the *PsG* can be read as a demonstration of how such content is partially generated through the entanglement between Gefühle, consciousness, intelligence, and will, in which none are more superficial than the other. Consequentially, the possibility exists that there are some contents calling for an emotional response; content that will not be properly perceived by the agent without her being emotionally affected by it. Indeed, Hegel's discussion of different pathologies can be read as supporting these claims. I am aware that my reading can seem to run counter to standard intuitions about Hegel's descriptions of the concept's self-determining power, but I nonetheless hold that my argument can be made compatible with the structure of his system.

The last chapter showed how emotions, in Hegel's account, have *action tendencies*. While this claim implies some predictability regarding what kind of actions certain emotions tend to lead to, it is crucial not to overstate it. For Hegel, emotions are not only compatible with freedom. Although having emotions does not imply that one is free, being free *presupposes* emotions. Without the evaluative work of emotions, we would not be motivated to act in the first place. Yet, Hegel maintains a *positive* view of freedom. To make emotions compatible with freedom, and hence *truthful*, I argued that the evaluative work of a subject's emotions must be mediated by the subject's higher-order volition to maintain its freedom. Since Hegel is convinced that one's own freedom depends on the freedom of others, a *truthful* emotion must be other-directed. While these claims can make Hegel sound overly Kantian, one must remember that he grounds his notion of freedom in a vision of norm-governed institutions of modern ethical life that secures mutual recognition. Due to the scope of this thesis, I have not had the opportunity to pursue this thread any further, but I will now sketch some topics related to it that might be interesting for future studies.

In this thesis, I have mentioned how Hegel may be said to offer an *appropriation view of the emotions*, in which one's stable emotional identity depends on one's "being accessible to oneself in one's emotions" and "having oneself at command". I have borrowed these phrases from Jaeggi's *Entfremdung*, a book I, like Frederick Neuhouser (in Jaeggi 2014, xi), think has Hegelian leanings. Like Jaeggi, Hegel was aware of how relations of appropriation – "being accessible to oneself in one's emotions", "having oneself at command"– can be disturbed by deficiencies in our social reality and hence impede the possibilities of leading free lives together. As mentioned, we see this in Hegel's treatment of *stoicism*, *the law of the heart*, and *morality*. Commentators tend to interpret his discussion of these figures of consciousness as part of a broader critique of "interiority" (Cf. Pahl 2013). I think his discussion also forcefully demonstrates how stoicism, the law of the heart, and morality, are

failed attempts at emotional appropriation, triggered by *social pathologies*. Taking these points into consideration, an interesting research project would be to investigate how this thesis' groundwork on Hegel's philosophy of emotion can shed light on elements in his social philosophy, particularly his critique of the law of the heart, morality, and ethics of conscience.

As mentioned, a central concept in Hegel's *PR* is the *ethical disposition*, which is closely related to his notion of *trust.* What one's ethical disposition is directed towards, what one trusts, is that the ethical laws and the institutions of the state will preserve both one's "substantial" and "particular" interests (PR §268). In other words, the trustful ethical disposition must recognize that these institutions have an *interest* in ensuring that the basic human needs I share with other people are met, and that I can follow my personal goals. According to Brandom, trust is "not a matter of how subjects feel, but an ontological matter of normative structures" (2019, 503). But Houlgate, as shown, argues that Hegel conceives of trust as having both an emotional and a theoretical dimension (2016, 113). It would be interesting to look into these disagreements about Hegel's notion of trust, and trust in general, based on what I have said about Hegel's philosophy of emotions in this thesis.

My thesis can also shed new light on three additional areas: First, as noted in chapter 2, McDowell's work has inspired and been criticized by philosophers seeking to situate animals "inside ethics" (Crary 2016). Hegel discusses differences and similarities between humans and animals in the *PN* and *PsG*. A future study can assess how Hegel's views on the relationship between emotions and conceptuality can deepen our understanding of how he sees the relationship between humans and animals and whether his work contains resources for projects like that of Crary's. Secondly, although Hegel in his lectures on *Aesthetics* warns against approaching art with a focus on the aesthetic *experience* instead of the subject matter itself, he spends considerable time in the introduction on Gefühle, intuitions, and the like (cf. VA1, 52-64). Some have even read out a Hegelian notion of *aesthetic experience* from his descriptions of art forms like the *symbolic* (Bübner 1990). Drawing on the account of emotions in this thesis, new insights into Hegel's *Aesthetics* can be gained. Finally, although the *PhG* was meant as an introduction to his system, it contains a wealth of insights into the relationship between *experience* and *learning.* Commentators have noted that Hegel incorporates affects into the dialectic of the *PhG.* Bloch, for instance, claimed that each new experience the figure of consciousness makes in the *PhG* are *affect-insights* [Affekteinsichten] (1959, 81). A study of these affect-insights in Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Erfahrung* can offer perspectives on the emotions accounted for in this thesis and broaden our understanding of what role this capacity plays in learning.

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