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Horizontal inequalities, political violence, and nonviolent conflict mobilization: A review of the literature

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Abstract

The association between horizontal inequalities (HIs) and civil war is well established. Yet, studies of HIs and civil war rarely specify why HIs should lead to conflict that is violent, organized, and large-scale, such as civil war. Collective mobilization outside conventional political channels could take many other forms, such as demonstrations, strikes, riots or communal conflicts. Recently, researchers have begun to investigate whether HIs increase the risk of nonviolent, less organized, and smaller-scale conflict. This article provides the first systematic review of the emerging quantitative literature on the impact of HIs on both violent and nonviolent conflict mobilization. We ask: Do HIs increase all mobilization outside conventional political channels, or do they shape what form of conflict breaks out? We supplement previous reviews of the literature on HIs and political violence with a systematic update for scholarly articles published in 2017–2022. This yielded 22 new articles. Furthermore, we identify 20 articles on HIs and nonviolent conflict published in 1996–2022. The review reveals that while there is robust evidence on the relationship between HIs and violent mobilization, the emerging evidence

on nonviolent conflict is inconsistent. We conclude by discussing potential reasons for this inconsistency.

KEYWORDS

armed conflict, civil war, horizontal inequality, nonviolent resistance, political violence, protest

1 | INTRODUCTION

In societies with large socioeconomic and political differences between cultural and ethnic groups, how do groups and individuals contest these disadvantages? What forms do conflicts over ethnic inequality take? There is growing consensus within peace and conflict research that systematic inequalities between culturally defined groups, or so-called "horizontal inequalities" (HIs) (Stewart, 2008) are associated with civil war and other forms of political violence (Cederman et al., 2013; Østby, 2008b). But until recently, studies of HIs have paid little empirical attention to alternative forms of mobilization, including nonviolent civil resistance and protests. This is curious, given how extensively scholars in the field borrow from research on social movements and contentious action when they describe the mechanisms that link inequality to civil war and other violence. Furthermore, the parallel emerging strand of conflict research investigating nonviolent mass mobilization and campaigns (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008) paid scant attention to HIs.

In the last few years, these two strands of research have begun to intersect. Certain studies of the causes of nonviolent mobilization include HIs as a predictor (e.g., Butcher & Svensson, 2016; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017). Moreover, HIs are included as predictors in a handful of studies that have launched the explicit agenda to study nonviolent and violent mobilization together (e.g., Bartusevičius & Gleditsch, 2019; Cunningham, 2013). The aim of this emerging literature is to disentangle the mechanisms that link inequalities to different forms of mobilization.

In this article, we raise a question that underpins these recent developments: do HIs breed primarily violent conflict or do they facilitate both violent and nonviolent conflict mobilization? The research question, and the two-pronged review approach we adopt to answer it, follow from a key insight in the emerging literature on tactical choice: to disentangle the causes of political violence and civil war from the broader causes of political mobilization, we must evaluate the evidence on violent and nonviolent manifestations of conflict together.

To address the research question, we conduct a systematic review of the econometric literature on horizontal inequality and conflict. Our literature search has two components. The first is a systematic update and extension of the extensive literature search on inequality and armed conflict that was conducted for the World Bank in January 2017 (Bahgat et al., 2017; Hillesund et al., 2018). This previous review included in total 47 articles on HIs and armed conflict. We use ISI Web of Science to update the search for articles on inequality and political violence indexed in January 2017–March 2022. This updated systematic review identifies 22 additional articles published in the period 2017–2022.

Second, we extend the review to nonviolent mobilization outside traditional political channels, by conducting a systematic search for articles on HIs and nonviolent mobilization. This returned a further 20 articles published between 1996 and 2022 (our search time window was for 1900–2022).

Our updated and extended literature search gives us a broad overview of the relevant articles that have been published on the link between HIs and various forms of violent and nonviolent mobilization. To answer our research question, we give particular attention to the articles that are best positioned to evaluate it. That is, studies that model violent and nonviolent outcomes together, and use group- and individual level research designs. We structure this discussion around two competing theoretical perspectives on HIs and tactics ("tactical violence" and "general mobilization") and evaluate the empirical evidence for and against each proposition.

Our review has certain scope conditions. It is restricted to quantitative journal articles where HI[1] is an independent variable and the dependent variable is some form of manifest conflict, that is, popular mobilization outside regular political channels. Furthermore, although HIs are not exclusive to ethnic groups (systematic inequalities may also exist between, e.g., religious groups, regional groups, migrants vs. non-migrants etc.), our review primarily identified studies of HIs between ethnic groups. This is not a restriction we imposed in our literature search, but rather a feature of existing research on HI and conflict.

Our review uncovers significant variation in the results from econometric analyses on HIs and conflict. The existing literature is not able to provide a definitive answer to the question of whether HIs breed specifically violent conflict (the "tactical violence" proposition) or facilitate all kinds of mobilization (the "general mobilization" proposition). On the one hand, the evidence for the association between inequalities and civil war and other violent mobilization is quite robust and comprehensive. The evidence for nonviolent conflict, on the other hand, is mixed. It remains so when we zoom in on the studies that we find best suited to disentangle the causes of violent mobilization from other mobilization.

Yet, these studies yield some important clues about potential reasons for the inconsistent findings. They indicate, first, that the association between inequality and (nonviolent) mobilization is heterogenous across key dimensions of the groups' context, such as regime type and particular triggering events. Second, the effect of HIs on nonviolent conflict mobilization appears to differ between maximalist and mature resistance campaigns (i.e., sustained protest activity with a "major and disruptive political objective, such as the ending of a current political regime, a foreign occupation, or secession"; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008) and smaller-scale events of protest. In other words, inequalities may motivate the outbreak of protest that later fail to scale up to full-blown campaigns. To disentangle the explanations, we need more studies on these topics. In the concluding sections, we discuss remaining knowledge gaps and potential avenues for future research.

The current article provides a comprehensive overview of the econometric research on ethnic inequalities and conflict, including nonviolent conflict mobilization. Our systematic review of this emerging field can advance research on inequality and conflict in important ways. Most importantly, we uncover substantial variation in empirical findings on whether and how inequality affects nonviolent mobilization. When we dissect key studies to expose potential explanations for the inconsistency, we set the stage for future research to dig further into the inconsistencies and begin to empirically disentangle alternative explanations. Our findings have broader implications as well. For policy makers who aim to reduce violent conflict by reducing the inequality between ethnic groups, we show that it is crucial to take the groups' context into account when determining which disadvantaged groups to give priority; because contextual factors like regime type help determine whether violent or nonviolent conflict is the more likely outcome of popular mobilization.

2 | THE CONSENSUS: HIs INCREASE THE RISK OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

To set the stage for the discussion of results from our systematic literature search, this section presents the key concepts and mechanisms in the horizontal inequality literature and the main empirical patterns uncovered by previous reviews.

2.1 | Key concepts

The concept of "horizontal inequalities" (HIs) was first coined by Frances Stewart (e.g., Stewart, 2000). Stewart (2008: 3) defines HIs as "inequalities in economic, social or political dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined groups." In other words, HIs are present when, for example, ethnic, or religious cleavages coincide with systematic socioeconomic divisions in society. There are two particularly important aspects pertaining to the concept of HIs. First, the original thinking about inequality has tended to place the individual at the center of concern, with measures of inequality typically relating to the ranking of individuals (or households) vertically within a country, or sometimes the globe. In the development literature such inter-individual inequality is typically referred to as vertical inequality (VI).

Measures of VI look at differences between all individuals in a society, whereas measures of horizontal inequality look instead at differences in income between identity groups, such as ethnic groups. Moreover, HIs are usually conceived of as inherently multidimensional, encompassing economic, social, and political dimensions, unlike measures of VI that concentrate exclusively on economic inequality (usually operationalized as income inequality or inequality in land distribution).

Although there is often some correlation between the two measures, they need not be related to each other. In practice, a country can have large income inequalities between groups (HIs), even though the overall (vertical) income inequality is rather low (Østby, 2013).

Although there are examples of various findings in the literature (see, e.g., Østby, 2013), most quantitative studies of VI and political violence do not find a statistically significant effect (e.g., Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). This "zero finding," combined with the fact that the share of ethnic inequality had been steadily rising after WW2 inspired researchers to look at inequality, ethnicity and political violence in concert.

2.2 | Mechanisms

The main explanations that scholars have relied on to link HIs to violent conflict revolve around identity, grievance, and opportunity. They draw on seminal works on relative deprivation from Gurr (1970; 1993) and HIs from Stewart (2002). HI scholars typically represent the conflict mobilization process in two stages. First, objective inequalities can lead to inter-subjectively perceived grievances among group members, provided that people identify with the group in question, compare its status to other groups, find their group disadvantaged[2], and consider this situation unjust (but changeable) (Cederman et al., 2013). Group leaders and entrepreneurs can facilitate this process, by shaping groups' narratives (collective action framing).

Second, group grievances pave the way for (violent) mobilization. This is in part because they provide motivation for group members to change the status quo. But group grievances also increase the opportunities for mobilization. The grievances in question are inextricably linked to groups that are salient to people's identity. They can therefore activate a range of group-related mechanisms, such as group solidarity, peer pressure, and preexisting social networks and institutions (Gates, 2002; Wood, 2003). This helps overcome the collective action dilemma, even in the absence of selective incentives of the material variety. This insight is central to the HIs argument. It sets the explanation apart from the traditional, much criticized, grievance explanations of mobilization and violence (Cederman et al., 2013).

It is not clear why these mechanisms should lead to organized violence in particular. The social movement literature that HI researchers draw on uses similar mechanisms to explain a wide variety of outcomes; including various nonviolent forms of mobilization (see, e.g., Tarrow, 2011). Yet, until recently the empirical focus in the econometric HI literature was on civil war.

2.3 | Insights from previous reviews

There is a comprehensive body of evidence on the association between HIs and civil war; that is, large-scale armed conflict between a government and an organized nonstate actor. For comprehensive reviews of this literature, see Bahgat et al. (2017), Hillesund et al. (2018), and Østby (2013). In short, the relationship has been established across levels of analysis (country, group, subnational region) and several types of inequality (political and socioeconomic) (Cederman et al., 2011, 2013; Østby, 2008b; Østby et al., 2011). The combination of economic and political group disadvantage seems to have the largest conflict potential. In fact, the association between economic inequality and civil conflict is driven primarily by politically excluded groups (Cederman et al., 2013, 2015).

The association between socioeconomic inequality and civil war holds across various approaches to measurement. Most notably, researchers find a positive association when they use survey data from the Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) to construct indices of HIs in asset ownership and education between the largest ethnic groups in developing countries (Østby, 2008b), as well as in studies that rely on geo-coded data on GDP (G-Econ, see Nordhaus, 2008) mapped to the settlement areas of politically relevant ethnic groups (Cederman et al., 2011, 2013). The association holds up in studies that supplement the latter measure with data on nightlight emissions and survey data in areas where the G-Econ data quality is low (Cederman et al., 2015). Studies of political HIs rely almost exclusively on measures from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset family, usually in the form of exclusion from the executive (sometimes active discrimination) among politically relevant ethnic groups; or, in country level studies, the share of the population that is excluded or discriminated.

The seminal theoretical work on HIs (Stewart, 2002), relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970, 1993) and conflict was not confined to full-blown civil war. It encompassed a broader category of collective political violence. More recently, many case-based studies have linked HIs to political violence short of civil war (Langer, 2005; Stewart, 2002, 2008). In line with this, scholars started calling for econometric studies that investigate different forms of political violence together, to distinguish the causes of civil war from those of other forms of (political) violence. The first studies of HIs to include political violence short of civil war found them associated with various forms of political violence, like terrorism (S.-W. Choi & Piazza, 2016; Piazza, 2012),

electoral violence (Fjelde & Höglund, 2016) and lethal social disorder (Østby, 2016). Analyses of communal conflict—violence between loosely organized ethnic and communal groups—pointed in somewhat different directions. They found a positive relationship with socioeconomic inequality (Fjelde & Østby, 2014; Mancini, 2008), but mixed results for political exclusion (Fjelde & Østby, 2014; Raleigh, 2014). Atiku-Abubakar and Shaw-Taylor (2003) found no effect of either political or economic differentials between ethnic groups.

It is not easy to make any causal inferences about how HIs impact violent conflict, but some notable efforts exist. A handful of studies employ fixed effects or instrumental variables (Lessmann, 2016; Mitra & Ray, 2014; Nepal et al., 2011). One of the most interesting examples is Wucherpfennig et al. (2016), who use a comparison between British and French colonial rule to instrument for political exclusion. Their results suggest that the relationship between exclusion and civil war is understated in "naïve" regression analyses and that grievances have been prematurely dismissed from conventional explanations of conflict. This said, horizontal inequality theorists rely on experimental evidence from social psychology to justify key assumptions about group comparisons and identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1981). Fundamentally, however, researchers cannot readily manipulate ethnic inequalities. In addition, it is notoriously difficult to find instruments for HIs that fulfill the exclusion criterion. Most of the variables that influence inequalities can be argued to plausibly influence conflict through other channels as well.

There seems to be a general agreement that objective inequalities must be mediated through perceptions of grievance to inspire conflict and collective violence, as outlined in the mechanisms section above. Perceived group grievances are difficult to measure, but an emerging strand of the literature makes use of survey data to get at the mechanisms that underpin the macro- and meso association between inequality and violence. Two main conclusions emerge from this approach (reviewed in Bahgat et al., 2017). Overall, objective inequalities influence people's perceptions of inequality and grievance (Gurr, 1993; Holmquist, 2012), and grievances increase (support for) political violence (Kirwin & Cho, 2009; Miodownik & Nir, 2016; Must, 2016). These links are far from automatic, however (see, e.g., Langer & Smedts, 2013). The first step is subject to misperceptions and manipulation (Rustad, 2016). For the second step, from grievance to violence, the evidence is most consistent for grievance measures that let people evaluate the injustice of their situation (and blame the government), not just rate their groups' economic or political status relative to other groups (Miodownik & Nir, 2016). This is an interesting subfield and a potentially fruitful direction for the literature on HIs. For example, there is room for studies that test these relationships outside the African context, and studies of actual participation in violence would complement the studies of support for violence. In this review, however, our focus is objective inequality and overt conflict.

Finally, previous reviews identified a small number of studies on contextual factors that moderate the HI-armed conflict relationship (Hillesund et al., 2018). Notably, natural resource wealth increases the conflict potential of political exclusion (Asal et al., 2016; Hunziker & Cederman, 2017); while the effect of social HIs is strongest in inclusive electoral systems (Østby, 2008a). Below, we show that important progress has been made in this area in recent years.

The following sections present and discuss the articles we have identified in our systematic literature review. First, we outline the search methodology. Second, we sketch the most recent developments in the literature on horizontal inequality and violent mobilization (2017–2022). This includes studies of civil war, but also other forms of political violence. Third, we turn to our main research question and argument, which introduces nonviolent mobilization. We ask whether HIs

breed specifically violent conflict. Or do they facilitate all mobilization outside regular political channels, while other factors determine whether the conflict turns violent?

3 | METHOD

To evaluate whether HIs impact violent and nonviolent mobilization alike, we conduct a two-pronged systematic literature review. First, our review provides a systematic update and extension of a previous review of the quantitative literature on HIs and armed conflict which we together with a group of colleagues conducted for the World Bank in January 2017 (Bahgat et al., 2017; Hillesund et al., 2018). This review included 47 articles on HIs and armed conflict. In our current review we use ISI Web of Science to update the search to include articles on inequality and various forms of political violence indexed in January 2017–March 2022. This updated review identifies 22 additional articles published in the period 2017–2022.

Second, we extend the review to include studies on HIs and nonviolent mobilization outside conventional political channels. When it comes to studies on HIs and *nonviolent* conflict mobilization, we are not aware of any existing reviews of this strand of the literature. Hence, we considered the whole time-span from 1900 to March 2022. Yet we identified no more than 20 articles on HIs and nonviolent mobilization, of which the oldest was published in 1996 (see Table A3). Fifteen of the articles from the nonviolent conflict search cover both violent and nonviolent conflict. In sum, our full review covers 42 scholarly articles.

Appendix A describes the full search protocol for the two searches that form the basis of our systematic review. Most importantly, the main inclusion criteria were the following:

1. Time span:
   - Violence search: indexed January 1, 2017−March 24, 2022.
   - Nonviolence search: January 1, 1900−March 24, 2022
2. Language: English.
3. Format: Published article, review, early access.

Moreover, we only included articles with a quantitative/statistical research design; articles with some kind of political violence or nonviolent conflict mobilization (or support) as the dependent variable; and articles with some kind of horizontal (socio-economic or political) inequality between ethnic groups as independent variable. See Table A1 for the precise search strings and results. Finally, for the search on political violence, we only included articles where inequality between ethnic groups was a main predictor, not only a control variable.

4 | REVIEW FINDINGS

This section reviews the research we have identified though our systematic literature search, both when it comes to recent studies of the HI-violence nexus, studies on HIs and nonviolent mobilization, as well as studies that model both violent and nonviolent outcomes together. Regarding the latter two, our review reveals important inconsistencies in the empirical evidence. We then move on to discuss various possible explanations for these inconsistencies, paving the way for future research to disentangle the alternative explanations.

4.1 | Recent evidence on HIs and political violence: Consolidating the consensus and accounting for context

This section outlines the most recent evidence on HIs and violent mobilization (2017–2022), based on those articles we identified in our systematic search where political violence (in some form or other) is the dependent variable and HI a predictor. Articles that cover both violent and nonviolent forms of mobilization are reviewed in the following sections. Note, however, that their results for political violence broadly align with the findings described here. In general, our review of the recent literature confirms and strengthens the consensus we outline above: Inequalities between ethnic and cultural groups are positively associated with armed conflict and other political violence.

Among the 22 studies on HIs and political violence that were published in 2017–2022, six were conducted at the country-level, fourteen were conducted at the sub-national (meso-level), and two were conducted at the individual level (see Table A2). We only considered studies where HIs between identity groups was a main independent variable, excluding studies which only use HI as a control term.[3] The identified studies focus on a variety of political violence outcomes, including civil conflict (Bodea et al., 2017; Cingranelli et al., 2019; Das, 2019; Hillesund, 2019b; Lessmann & Steinkraus, 2019; Tollefsen, 2020), non-state conflict (Alcorta et al., 2018, 2020; Hillesund, 2019b; Rudolfsen, 2017) coups (Bodea et al., 2017; Houle & Bodea, 2017), other forms of social unrest, such as ethnic and other riots (Abbs, 2021; Bodea et al., 2017; Cingranelli et al., 2019; Mcdoom et al., 2019) and domestic terrorism (Cingranelli et al., 2019; Fleming et al., 2022; Hansen et al., 2020; Treistman, forthcoming), or a combination of these (Cao, Duan, Liu, Piazza, et al., 2018; Cao, Duan, Liu, & Wei, 2018; Hodler et al., 2020). Two studies focus on individuals' propensity to support the use of violence: Nanes (2021), on support for the use of anti-state violence in Iraq, and Treistman (forthcoming), on individual's support for terrorism. All the identified studies focus on HI between ethnic groups, often broadly defined to cover religious and racial as well as linguistically demarcated groups. Two exceptions are Das (2019) and Siroky et al. (2020), who focus on HIs between specifically religious groups.

The findings in the twenty-two studies serve to bolster the overall consensus that HIs breed many forms of political violence. Beyond this overarching conclusion, our updated review brings to light some additional nuances.

Sixteen of the studies focus on socioeconomic dimensions of HIs, spanning from education, income (including proxies for this, such as nightlight emissions), land, and household assets to access to natural resources and public services such as drinking water and toilet facilities. Ten studies focus on political HIs, most notably on political discrimination and exclusion of ethnic groups from state power. Moreover, a handful of the studies include both economic and political HIs (Alcorta et al., 2020; Cingranelli et al., 2019; Hillesund, 2019b; Rudolfsen, 2017; Tollefsen, 2020; Treistman, forthcoming). Notably, Hillesund (2019b) shows that economic inequalities are more likely to cause communal conflict than political exclusion, and that the relationship between economic inequality and communal conflict is driven by politically included groups. She argues that different types of ethnic group disadvantage relate to conflict through different mechanisms. More specifically, she holds that political exclusion is expected to promote the choice to target the central government rather than other ethnic groups, while economic disadvantages should increase the risk of both civil and communal conflicts. Her argument rests on two crucial differences between political and economic HIs: only the government has the authority to change the political distribution, while there can be many avenues to economic redistribution; and blame is

more straightforwardly assigned to the government for political than for economic disadvantages. Her statistical analysis of 155 politically relevant ethnic groups in Africa (1991−2009) provides support for both propositions. Hillesund (2019b) hence brings the existing literature forward by adding nuance to our understanding of what type of HIs (economic or political) impacts whom a group chooses to target (the central government vs. other ethnic groups).

The other studies that model several forms of political violence together generally support the conclusion the HIs breed violence. Bodea et al. (2017) find that political exclusion increases the risk of three types of political instability: civil war, coups, and riots. This approach arguably better captures lower levels of instability than work focusing on the survival of political institutions or leaders. Furthermore, it better identifies periods of social peace than studies solely focusing on civil wars or coups d'état. Cingranelli et al. (2019) find that countries with large, discriminated groups experience more violent protest and more deaths caused by civil war. They also find that countries where the poorest group fall far below the national average, or the richest group far above it, have a higher risk of civil war and violent protest. Interestingly, relative poverty is associated with an increase in the number of terrorist attacks, while relative wealth and political discrimination show the opposite relationship. Whereas previous research shows that the presence of HIs alone makes the onset and escalation of civil war more likely (e.g., Cederman et al., 2013), Cingranelli et al. (2019) is the first study to show that both HIs and violations of human rights each have an independent effect as drivers of internal conflict, even when controlling for the effects of the other.

Hodler et al. (2020) develop an ethnic stratification index that measures the extent to which the hierarchy in socio-economic positions follows ethnolinguistic lines. They show that stratification in towns and villages across 26 Africa countries is positively associated with violent conflict in the area, as well as perceptions of and exposure to crime. It is negatively associated with trust in relatives, neighbors, and other acquaintances.

Whereas most of the studies on HI and political violence link the discussion of mechanisms to group grievances stemming from relative deprivation, some studies bring in the importance of opportunities to mobilize, and how this can moderate the effect of grievances. These studies generally conclude that it is when grievances are combined with mobilization capacity that violent conflict is more likely to materialize (e.g., Siroky et al., 2020). For example, Rudolfsen (2017), in a study of 46 sub-Saharan African countries, finds that the combined effect of weak state capacity and economic marginalization increases the risk of non-state conflict. However, the interaction between political exclusion and weak state capacity is not statistically significant.

In terms of other contextual factors that may moderate the relationship between HI and political violence, some studies focus on the interaction between inter-group and intra-group inequalities. For example, Houle and Bodea (2017), in their study of coups in Africa, argue that the structure of HIs between ethnic groups produce conditions conducive to coups by increasing the motivation inside homogenous ethnic groups to back a coup and thus creating a potential source of support on which coup plotters can rely both during and after the coup. In line with this argument, they find that economic HI increases the likelihood that an ethnic group stages a coup only when intra-group inequality is low. Houle and Bodea (2017) are not the first to distinguish between inter-and intra-group inequalities, but they are the first to do so in a study exploring the impact on coups d'état. Since Houle and Bodea (2017) focuses on coups, their finding is not necessarily contradictory to the previous finding by Kuhn and Weidmann (2015) that greater economic intra-group inequality significantly increases the risk of civil conflict, especially in the presence of economic or political HIs. In sum, these studies demonstrate that future research need to carefully

unpack both the dimension of inequality (economic/political), the level of inequality (individual, group-based), as well as the type of political violence to fully grasp the HIs-political violence nexus.

Yet other studies consider the moderating effect of various institutions. For example, Cao, Duan, Liu, Piazza, et al. (2018), in a study of ethnic violence in China's Xinjiang region, argue that local religious institutions can decrease violence caused by local grievances. This, they hold, can happen in two ways: first, religious institutions provide local public goods; second, they provide an "information bridge" between the local population and the government, facilitating nonviolent management of potential discontent. In line with their argument that find a conflict-dampening effect of religious institutions whereby higher levels of interethnic inequality are associated with increased ethnic violence only in areas with low to medium levels of mosque density.

Ives and Breslawski (2021) find that violence is particularly likely where political exclusion is combined with a certain level of education. In other word, there is a positive interaction between political exclusion and the share of the population that have completed primary education or more, when comparing grid-cells. The authors argue that education increases group members' resources and desire to address grievances, while political exclusion decreases the opportunities for conventional politics and nonviolent protest. This makes violence the most viable strategy.

In sum, in addition to bolstering the evidence base for the general conclusion that HIs breed political violence, the recently published studies point to the importance of accounting for contextual factors that may moderate the relationship. Despite many interesting contributions, we have yet to grasp the full picture of how various political, social, and demographic factors impact the relationship between various forms of HIs and various forms of political violence.

4.2 | HIs and nonviolent mobilization: Mixed findings

In the second part of our systematic literature search, we identified a total of twenty articles where nonviolent conflict mobilization is a dependent variable and HIs a predictor. They span the country-, group-, and individual level of analysis; cover political and economic inequalities; and investigate various forms of nonviolent mobilization, from protests of all scales to maximalist and mature resistance campaigns, that is, sustained protest activity which aims to replace (parts of) the central government or has comparably maximalist goals.

Importantly, the nonviolent mobilization studies differ in their treatment of violent conflict. Three studies do not distinguish between violent and nonviolent protest.[4] Two studies do not cover violent outcomes at all (Abbs, 2020; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017). Six studies model the determinants of violent and nonviolent mobilization in separate regression models, that is, treat them as independent outcomes (H. J. Choi & Kim, 2018; Gleditsch et al., 2021; Gurr, 1993; Jenkins & Wallace, 1996; Miodownik & Nir, 2016; Regan & Norton, 2005). Crucially, nine studies model the two together (Bartusevičius & Gleditsch, 2019; Basedau & Roy, 2020; Butcher & Svensson, 2016; Cunningham, 2013; Germann & Sambanis, 2021; Hillesund, 2015; Hillesund, 2022; Rørbæk, 2019; Thurber, 2018), to explicitly account for the dependence between them.

The latter distinction determines how well the studies speak to our research question. The studies that model the determinants of nonviolent mobilization independently (regardless of whether they include independent models of violence as well) speak indirectly to the choice between violent and nonviolent tactics. That is, by comparing the results from independent models of nonviolent mobilization to independent models of political violence, we get an indication as to whether HIs influence both outcomes or one outcome in particular. However, to properly answer the question of tactical choice, we need studies that model violent and nonviolent forms of

mobilization together. They are better placed to disentangle explanations of general mobilization from explanations of violent tactics, because they avoid reference outcomes ("zero categories") that conflate situations with no mobilization and situations with substantial mobilization of a different form than the one under study.

This section outlines the evidence from the eight articles that model the determinants of nonviolent mobilization independently,[5] before the next section turns to more explicit evaluation of the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on tactical choice, with particular attention to studies that model nonviolent and violent outcomes together.

We discuss the evidence for different forms of HI in turn. The most studied form of inequality in the literature on nonviolent mobilization is political group disadvantage. The empirical evidence is mixed. The two earliest studies defined and measured nonviolent protest and political disadvantages broadly, in the Minorities at Risk (MAR) tradition (Gurr, 1993; Regan & Norton, 2005). They found no evidence of an association, on the group or the country level, respectively.

More recent studies measure political inequality in the EPR tradition (Vogt et al., 2015), either as politically relevant groups' exclusion from executive power or the share of the population that is excluded from executive power or actively discriminated against. Two studies find positive relationships. Gleditsch et al. (2021) find that countries where at least one group is excluded from executive power are more likely experience nonviolent resistance campaigns. Miodownik and Nir (2016) use survey data from 13 African countries to show that the individual members of groups that are excluded from executive power are more likely to report participating in demonstrations than members of included groups.

Another two studies find heterogenous effects. In Choi and Kim (2018), the positive association between political exclusion (the share of a country's ethnic groups that is included in government) and nonviolent protest is driven by political systems with large minimum winning coalitions. This points to the importance of political opportunity structures. In Africa, Abbs (2020) finds a positive association between the presence of politically excluded groups in a given geographic location (grid cell) and organized, large-scale nonviolent protest events, but only in countries experiencing food price spikes. He argues such spikes can serve as more immediate triggering events, by bridging ethnic divisions.

Two studies evaluate economic inequality as an independent predictor of nonviolent mobilization. Both studies investigate protests of all scales, not just mature resistance campaigns, but their findings differ. Again, Gurr (1993) fails to detect a correlation on the group level, this time between broadly defined socioeconomic disadvantages and nonviolent protest. On the individual level, on the other hand, Miodownik and Nir (2016) find a positive relationship between groups' asset ownership (relative to the country average) and individual group members' participation in demonstrations across thirteen African countries.

Finally, two studies combine socioeconomic and political disadvantages into composite measures of disadvantage. The first shows that state discrimination is of little use for predicting countries' risk of maximalist and sustained nonviolent resistance campaigns (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017). The other indicates a positive effect on more individuals' propensity to protest, based on survey data from the US (Jenkins & Wallace, 1996). It proxies disadvantage with a dummy variable that flags Black American respondents.

Let us return briefly to the research question, before moving on to studies that model violent and nonviolent outcomes together. The evidence we have reviewed so far, from independent models of violent and nonviolent mobilization, is mixed. The answer to the research question seems to differ depending on the type of HI under study and the level of analysis employed. Overall, the studies suggest that exclusion from the executive influences mobilization in general, both violent and

nonviolent (but in some contexts more than others). More general political disadvantage, on the other hand, seems associated with violence only, not with nonviolent mobilization. The evidence is less consistent for economic inequalities. They appear to be associated with individuals' protest participation in the US and Africa, but group and country level studies find them associated only with violent outcomes.

4.3 | Evaluating violent and nonviolent outcomes together: Competing perspectives and inconsistent evidence

The call to study different forms of conflict and mobilization together, to distinguish the causes of particular types of conflict from those of general mobilization, is not restricted to violent mobilization. The logic extends to nonviolent mobilization. To disentangle the causes of political violence and civil war from the broader causes of political contestation and mobilization outside conventional political channels, we need to study violent and nonviolent manifestations of conflict together (Cunningham, 2013). This section therefore reviews the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence from studies that model the determinants of violent and nonviolent outcomes together in their empirical analysis, instead of treating them as independent outcomes. These studies are summarized in Table 1.

As shown in Table 1, the studies' empirical results and theoretical arguments appear to coalesce around two competing perspectives: either HIs increase all forms of mobilization or they favor violent forms of mobilization.

The earliest studies of inequalities and conflict tactics argued that HIs should increase all mobilization outside conventional channels; that is, for both violent and nonviolent forms of conflict (see, e.g., Cunningham, 2013). We label this the "general mobilization" perspective.

The proposition builds on an insight we outlined in the introduction: that researchers from different traditions invoke similar mechanisms to explain both violent and nonviolent forms of mobilization. Thus, on the face of it, there is little reason to expect that inequalities can explain when and why conflict mobilization takes a specific form. This insight is very relevant for research on HIs. When conflict researchers describe the mechanisms that underpin the HIs-civil war relationship, they borrow extensively from social movement theory and other research on nonviolent mobilization. The two traditions invoke similar mechanisms (such as collective action framing and pre-existing mobilizing structures) to explain a wide range of conflict outcomes: from civil war to nonviolent demonstrations and petitions (see reviews in Cederman et al., 2013; Tarrow, 2011). Yet, until recently, scant attention was paid to the need to study the different outcomes together. Moreover, the emerging field of research on nonviolent resistance campaigns paid little attention to grievance and inequality explanations. Only recently, studies of HIs and nonviolent mobilization have started to emerge; and a handful of studies have launched the explicit agenda to study the determinants of nonviolent and violent mobilization together, including HIs.

It is worth noting that the "general mobilization" proposition grew out of civil conflict research. It originated in studies where HIs was one of several determinants under study, which leaves limited room for in-depth theorizing.

Some of the independent analyses of violent and nonviolent mobilization that we outlined in the previous section align with this perspective. Several studies suggest that HIs can increase nonviolent conflict. Most notably when HIs take the form of exclusion from executive power (Abbs, 2020; H. J. Choi & Kim, 2018; Gleditsch et al., 2021; Miodownik & Nir, 2016), but also for socioeconomic indices and individuals' protest participation (Jenkins & Wallace, 1996; Miodownik &

TABLE 1 Studies that model violent and nonviolent outcomes together

Study	Findings	Level of analysis	Type of HI	Scale of nonviolent mobilization	Scope
Bartusevičius and Gleditsch (2019)	no mobilization	country	economic (disadvantage)	all scales (contested incompatibilies short of war)	global
	general mobilization	country	political (share discriminated)	all scales (contested incompatibilies short of war)	global
Rørbæk (2019)	tactical violence	country	political (share excluded)	large-scale (resistance campaigns)	global
Butcher and Svensson (2016)	tactical violence;	country	combined (state-led discrimination)	large-scale (resistance campaigns)	global
	general mobilization	country	combined (state-led discrimination)	large-scale (protest events)	Africa
Cunningham (2013)	general mobilization	group	economic (discrimination)	large-scale (resistance campaigns)	self-determination disputes (global)
	general mobilization	group	political (exclusion)	large-scale (resistance campaigns)	self-determination disputes (global)
Thurber (2018)	no mobilization	group	economic[a]	large-scale (resistance campaigns)	global
	tactical violence	group	political (exclusion)	large-scale (resistance campaigns)	global
Germann and Sambanis (2021)	tactical violence	group	political (exclusion)	all scales (extra-institutional & institutional nonviolent mobilization)	self-determination disputes (global)
Basedau and Roy (2020)	tactical violence	grid-cell	political (share excluded), in the absence of resource deposits	all scales (protest events)	Africa
Hillesund (2015)	tactical violence	individual	economic (disadvantage)	all scales (support for nonviolent resistance)	Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza
Hillesund (2022)	tactical violence	individual	economic (disadvantage)	all scales (participation in demonstrations)	Africa (25 countries)
	tactical non-violence	individual	political (exclusion), in the absence of economic disadvantage	all scales (participation in demonstrations)	Africa (25 countries)

[a]Thurber (2018) includes economic HI as a robustness test (control variable). It is not clear from the article text which economic HI measure from Cederman et al., 2011 is used.

Nir, 2016). Turning to violent outcomes, the finding that HIs increase violent conflict is almost unequivocal.

When we turn to the studies that model violent and nonviolent mobilization together (Table 1), three of the nine further support the "general mobilization" proposition. On the group level, Cunningham (2013)'s seminal study shows that in disputes over territory (self-determination), both civil war and nonviolent resistance campaigns are facilitated by socioeconomic discrimination and political exclusion. Cunningham (2013), and most other studies of tactical choice, rely on multinomial logistic regression models. Bartusevičius and Gleditsch (2019) model the road towards violent conflict as a two-stage process instead. The first stage is the decision to contest an incompatibility. The second stage is the escalation to violent civil conflict. The study uses on country-level data to show that in line with the "general mobilization" logic, political exclusion (the share of a country's population that belongs to groups that are excluded from executive power) matters only in the first stage of mobilization.[6] That is, it increases the risk that an incompatibility is contested outside regular political channels, but not its risk of militarization. Finally, the results from Butcher and Svensson (2016) indicate that among African countries, state-led discrimination is associated with both civil conflict and major protest events.[7]

An alternative perspective on HIs and conflict tactics has been gaining traction in recent years. It was put forward by scholars from the burgeoning nonviolent resistance literature. The main assumption is that disadvantaged ethnic groups will opt for violence rather than nonviolent tactics, because they are unlikely to succeed with nonviolent resistance. We call it the "tactical violence" perspective. For an in-depth discussion of this proposition, see Thurber (2018).

The "tactical violence" proposition hinges on the notion of leverage, which is a key concept in research on resistance campaigns' success. Violent movements aim to coerce a country's government through deaths and destruction. Nonviolent movements depend on a different technology of coercion, often labelled leverage. Leverage is the ability to make the support networks that a government relies on for its power, no matter how broad or narrow they are, put pressure on the government or withdraw their support completely (Schock, 2005: 144–145). To induce such loyalty shifts among elites, security forces or the broader population, nonviolent movements use various combinations of persuasion, disruption, and noncooperation.

The chance of succeeding with nonviolent means is higher for movements that mobilize more people, and mobilize across different identity groups (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). This is a challenge for movements that spring out of HIs. Their claims are often narrow and group centered. They may struggle to mobilize broad coalitions, which could make violence seem like the more viable tactical option. The reason is that it takes fewer people to gain coercive power over the government with deaths than with nonviolent noncooperation (Gleditsch et al., 2021).

Political group disadvantage, in particular, comes with limited political leverage (Thurber, 2018). Being excluded from executive power makes for few interpersonal ties with elites in state institutions and means groups do not benefit from ethnic solidarity. Politically excluded groups may also expect public opinion to be less likely to turn against government repression of their protests. Thus, proponents of the tactical violence perspective argue that politically excluded groups are particularly likely to opt for violence over nonviolent forms of mobilization.

Some of the independent analyses of violent and nonviolent conflict that we reviewed in the previous section suggest support for the "tactical" violence proposition. With the exception of exclusion from the executive, political disadvantages, more broadly defined, seem to be associated with violent but not nonviolent mobilization (Gurr, 1993; Regan & Norton, 2005). The same is the case for socioeconomic (Gurr, 1993) or combined disadvantages (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017), when they are measures on the group and country level, respectively.

Turning again to the studies we identified in our search that model violent and nonviolent mobilization together, seven of the nine provide further empirical support for the "tactical violence" perspective. Two country level studies show that political exclusion and discrimination are associated with violence, but not with nonviolent mobilization. Rørbæk (2019) finds that the larger the share of the population that is excluded from executive power, the higher is the risk that countries will experience violent, but not nonviolent, resistance campaigns. The aforementioned study from Butcher and Svensson (2016) indicates support for tactical violence when the authors extend the analysis beyond Africa and use another dependent variable, measuring sustained and maximalist resistance campaigns (violent and nonviolent) instead of "major protest events."

Basedau and Roy (2020) use data from Africa and a more disaggregated research design but reach similar conclusions: the larger the share of the population that is politically discriminated in a given location (grid cell), the higher the risk of a violent conflict event, but not of nonviolent protest. Their analysis points to an important contextual factor: it is primarily in the absence of natural resource deposits that political discrimination helps explain why violent rather than peaceful protest occurs.

The HIs explanation of conflict ultimately hinges on assumptions about identity groups and the individuals they are made up of. Therefore, group and individual level data are particularly well-suited for staying clear of ecological fallacies when we evaluate the competing perspectives.

Two group-level studies point towards tactical violence. Arguably, one of the most rigorous and well-designed tests of political exclusion and tactical violence comes from the study that first discussed the proposition in detail. Thurber (2018) uses data on ethnic groups around the world (1946–2006) to show that politically excluded groups initiate fewer nonviolent resistance campaigns (and probably more violent campaigns) than senior government partners and politically dominant groups.

Germann and Sambanis (2021) use a two-stage model for the onset and escalation of separatist disputes to show that groups' exclusion from executive power is associated with escalation to war more than with the initial emergence of separatist claims. This seems at odds with the finding from Bartusevičius and Gleditsch (2019)'s two-stage model discussed above, that here is an association with mobilization but not escalation. Germann & Sambanis' analysis comes with an important scope condition, however: since the analysis is restricted to territorial (separatist) claims, the results may not extend to disputes over the central government. As the authors acknowledge, exclusion could be more likely to motivate (nonviolent) efforts to gain inclusion in the central government than mobilization for secession.

Turning to economic inequalities, two individual level studies, which use survey data, find support for the tactical violence proposition. In the West Bank and Gaza, a larger difference between the average asset ownership in one's living area and the closest Israeli area outside the occupied territories makes for higher support for violence (over nonviolent methods of resistance) among Palestinian residents (Hillesund, 2015). Hillesund (2022) uses survey data from twenty-five African countries (Afrobarometer, round 5) to show that the further below the national average income (GDP per capita) one's group falls, the higher the participation in political violence; but not in nonviolence resistance.

Hillesund (2022) introduces an additional nuance: she argues that the interplay between political and economic disadvantages matters for conflict participation. In stark contrast to the positive interaction we know from studies of civil war, she finds a negative interaction for nonviolent mobilization. When economic disadvantages and political exclusion coincide, individual group members are particularly likely to resort to political violence but also to shy away from nonviolent demonstrations. Furthermore, the study finds some evidence that when political disadvantages

TABLE 2 Classification of studies that model violent and nonviolent outcomes together by research design

Type of HIs	Level	Nonviolence of various scales	Large-scale nonviolence only
Political HIs	C	Bartusevičius and Gleditsch (2019)	Rørbæk (2019)
	G	Germann & Sambanis (2021)[a]	Cunningham (2013)[a], Thurber (2018)
	I	Hillesund (2022)[b,c]	–
	grid	Basedau and Roy (2020)[b,c]	–
Economic HIs	C	Bartusevičius and Gleditsch (2019)	–
	G	–	Cunningham (2013)[a], Thurber (2018)
	I	Hillesund (2022)'	–
	grid	–	–
Combined HIs	C	Butcher and Svensson (2016)'	Butcher and Svensson (2016)
	G	–	–
	I	–	–
	grid	–	–

Studies in bold font find support for general mobilization; studies in grey do not support either proposition (tactical violence or general mobilization). Levels: C – country; G – group; I – individual; grid – grid-cell.

[a]Restricted to self-determination disputes.

[b] Less than global coverage.

[c] Conditional effect (interaction).

occur in the absence of economic disadvantage (i.e., when economically advantaged groups are excluded), they facilitate participation in nonviolent demonstrations, but not in political violence. The implications of these findings are discussed in the next section.

In sum, our systematic literature search has turned up ample evidence in support of both the competing propositions, across various research designs. Next, we discuss in more detail the studies we find best placed to answer our research question, and identify potential explanations of the empirical inconsistencies between them.

4.4 | Making sense of the evidence: Patterns and knowledge gaps

What should we make of all this? Do HIs increase all mobilization or create a preference for violent conflict? At first glance, the studies we have reviewed do not get us much closer to an answer. The overarching conclusions that come out of Table 2 are that various studies support both propositions and that the studies differ a lot in their research designs (measures of HIs and mobilization, scope etc.). The table underscores how new and immature the literature on HIs and the choice between nonviolent and nonviolent tactics is. Several cells are empty, and most cells contain only a single study. Beyond these broad conclusions, the classification of studies' results by central features of their research designs does not reveal any obvious patterns that fully account for the mixed results. Inspecting the studies in detail, however, allows us to draw five conclusions about the state of the literature. They each raise new questions and point to avenues for future research.

First, *the evidence on economic inequalities is too scattered to draw firm conclusions*. Only four of the studies that model violent and nonviolent outcomes together account for economic inequalities (Bartusevičius & Gleditsch, 2019; Cunningham, 2013; Hillesund, 2022; Thurber, 2018). Their

research designs vary across various dimensions, which makes it difficult to compare them in a systematic manner. Moreover, two of them treat economic inequalities as a control variable or a robustness test rather than a key explanatory variable (Bartusevičius & Gleditsch, 2019; Thurber, 2018). This leaves the relationship between economic inequalities and nonviolent mobilization severely undertheorized.[8] This omission is important, given that the "tactical violence" proposition revolves around limits on political forms of leverage, a logic which may not extend to the economic realm. Future research should be explicit about whether and how particular mechanisms link economic (as opposed to political) inequalities to nonviolent conflict. Empirically, our overview calls for group level studies of economic inequalities which account for groups' participation in both small- and large-scale mobilization, in disputes over government as well as territory (self-determination).

Second, *more studies on political inequalities support the tactical violence proposition than the general mobilization proposition* (four and two studies, respectively). Yet, it would be premature to conclude in favor of tactical violence on this basis. In a more detailed comparison of results and research design features, we find important nuances that concern the scale of mobilization and contextual factors, which the next two points elaborate on.

Third, *the scale of mobilization makes a difference*. Our choice to group studies by type of nonviolent mobilization (Table 2) springs out of an insight from the literature on political violence and civil war, where scholars have called for studies that capture political violence before it escalates to civil war. They argue that if we want to understand why (violent) conflict breaks out, our datasets need to account for challenges that failed in their infancy (Lewis, 2017). In extension of this, initial tactical choices could be more heterogenous than "maximalist" and mature campaigns. When studies of large-scale mobilization find no association between political inequalities and nonviolent resistance campaigns (Thurber, 2018), this could be because excluded groups fail to "scale up" their nonviolent conflict activity to full-blown campaigns, rather than a result of groups discarding nonviolent tactics at the outset.

Empirically, comparing of studies of resistance campaigns and studies with more comprehensive measures of protest yields different results depending on the level of analysis. On the country level, studies support the tactical violence proposition for large-scale resistance campaigns (Rørbæk, 2019) and general mobilization for more general protests (Bartusevičius & Gleditsch, 2019). On the group level, results are mixed on large-scale campaigns (Cunningham, 2013; Thurber, 2018) and suggest tactical violence for more general measures of protests (Germann & Sambanis, 2021). On the micro level, there are no studies of large-scale campaigns. Studies of more general protest find support for tactical violence on the grid-cell level (Basedau & Roy, 2020) and, interestingly, for tactical *non*violence on the individual level (Hillesund, 2022).

Certain studies should be given more weight than others when evaluating the empirical evidence. For large-scale campaigns, we find the research designs of Rørbæk (2019) and Thurber (2018) particularly convincing. Both support the "tactical violence" proposition. We give them extra weight because their scope is broader than that of Cunningham (2013), which is restricted to self-determination disputes.

For more comprehensive measures of nonviolent mobilization (protest), the studies with the most convincing research designs support general mobilization (Bartusevičius & Gleditsch, 2019; Butcher & Svensson, 2016). We give Butcher and Svensson (2016) particular weight because it is the only study that explicitly compare the determinants of resistance campaigns and general measure of protest. Their model for protest is restricted to Africa, due to data availability, but otherwise the models of different scales of mobilization are identical. While they find no association between state-led discrimination has on the mature and maximalist nonviolent campaigns in

the widely used NAVCO dataset (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008), they find an association with nonviolent protest events that are measured with less strict criteria for sustained activity over time and maximalist demands (i.e., a subset of event from the Social Conflict in Africa Database [SCAD]; Salehyan et al., 2012). The study has some limitations. Inequalities are included as a control variable only and measured with a combined political and economic discrimination measure. The research design in Bartusevičius and Gleditsch (2019) complements it, by encompassing various scales of mobilization, without begin restricted to African countries (or self-determination disputes), and including political discrimination as a separate explanatory variable. This study also supports the general mobilization proposition.

In sum, the studies with the most convincing research designs suggest that our concerns about scale and selection bias are borne out in research on inequalities and tactical choice. Political inequalities appear to facilitate both violent and nonviolent mobilization, but nonviolent events seem less likely than violent ones to escalate to full-blown resistance campaigns. It is important to note, however, that the studies with the broadest scope, which we highlight here, tend to operate on the country level. Thus, again, there is a need for (global coverage) group level studies of political inequalities, which account for conflicts of all scales and conflicts over government as well as territory.

At this point, readers should keep in mind a problem in the larger literature on nonviolent conflict, which is not specific to the study of HIs. Datasets that record protest rely heavily on news reporting, which comes with several potential biases. In particular, protests in high- and low-income countries may not have an equal probability of being picked up by the largely international and English-speaking news outlets that protest dataset typically rely on. In addition, (small-scale) protests in autocracies are likely to be underreported. Therefore, we may still not have a representative picture of the number of protests in the world. We expect this bias to be less pronounced in datasets on large-scale resistance, as large-scale movements are more likely to be picked up by international news outlets and campaign datasets tend to be validated by experts. Yet, there could be other biases in these datasets. In particular, large-scale violence may be more visible and draw more attention than large-scale *non*violence. While it is difficult to address these issues, finding better solutions is an important task for future data gathering endeavors.

Fourth, *the association between political horizontal inequality and tactics differs across economic and political contexts*. Two of the studies that model violent and nonviolent outcomes together also model potential interactions. They point to the importance of the economic context that groups operate in. Basedau and Roy (2020) find evidence of tactical violence in areas without resource deposits; Hillesund (2022) among groups that do not suffer economic disadvantages. Together, these studies suggest that economic leverage matters for the choice between violent and nonviolent tactics. Thurber (2018)'s focus is on political exclusion, which limits groups' political leverage and thus reduces the opportunity to succeed with nonviolent mass mobilization. While economic sources of leverage are largely overlooked in the literature, groups with such leverage should be better placed to succeed with nonviolent tactics, in the form of strikes and other economic disruption. They may therefore opt for nonviolent contention, even in the face of political exclusion.

Economic leverage can come from groups' geographic concentration, their size, or concentration in occupations that are particularly central to the economy and the day-to-day functioning of society. Therefore, nonviolent contention may be more of an option for disadvantaged (and other) groups that are large, geographically concentrated or make up much of the workforce in for example the transportation sector or waste management and cleaning.

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All else equal, socioeconomically disadvantaged groups will have less leverage than economically advantaged groups. The combination of political and economic disadvantage should therefore make nonviolent action particularly unfeasible. Politically disadvantaged groups who have a favorable socioeconomic position, on the other hand, may opt for nonviolent action in the hope that their economic leverage makes up for limited political influence. Hillesund (2022) finds support for such a negative interaction between economic and political inequality on the individual level, but we need group level studies of economic leverage as well.

The studies that model violent and nonviolent conflicts separately, but account for potential moderators, point to the importance of the broader political, institutional, and socioeconomic context. Political exclusion seems to increase nonviolent action in primarily democratic countries (i.e., with large winning coalitions) (Choi & Kim, 2018) and in the context food price shocks (Abbs, 2020). In systems with larger minimum winning coalitions, groups may find it is enough to use smaller-scale mobilization to publicize their grievances, in order to lay the foundations for electoral victory, while smaller minimum winning coalitions leave regular political channels rather useless (Choi & Kim, 2018). Food price spikes, on the other hand, may serve as focal points that enable local activists to widen their appeal across ethnic group lines (Abbs, 2020). Meanwhile, recent studies of violent mobilization suggest that inequalities are most clearly is associated with *violence* in areas where the population is at least somewhat educated (Ives & Breslawski, 2021); when inequality *within* groups is low (Houle & Bodea, 2017); and where there are few local religious institutions that can mitigate the violence (Cao, Duan, Liu, Piazza, et al., 2018). To better understand groups' tactical choices, each of these potential moderators should be tested in studies that model violent and nonviolent outcomes together.

The evidence on inequalities and tactics comes with various scope conditions. These scope conditions can inform speculation about other potential moderators. Self-determination disputes may differ from disputes over government, and African countries from other countries, in ways that condition the inequalities-tactics relationship. Furthermore, we know little about how context conditions the association between economic inequalities and nonviolent mobilization, since all the studies of moderators measure political inequalities.

Fifth, *the diverging findings on the group level are likely due to a combination of effect heterogeneity across context and differences in the scale of mobilization that is captured.* Thurber (2018) and Cunningham (2013) find diverging results with research designs that rely on similar measures for nonviolent campaigns and political exclusion and similar modelling strategies. Given that Cunningham (2013)'s analysis is restricted to self-determination disputes, we think Thurber (2018)'s finding that excluded groups shy away from nonviolent resistance is driven by conflicts over the central government. The finding that groups tend to turn to violence disappears when Thurber restricts the analysis to conflicts over government, however. It seems to be driven by territorial (and colonial) disputes. In this context, Cunningham (2013)'s support for the general mobilization proposition is interesting. Arguably, the study's restriction to self-determination groups should work against the proposition. We expect groups in self-determination disputes to be particularly likely to mobilize within "their own" territory, that is, areas where they make up a large part of the population. Most of the time, nonviolent mobilization in an area inhabited by an opposition group should be less viable. It puts less pressure on the government to make concessions than nonviolent mobilization in central areas, because fewer of the people that the government relies on for its power are affected.[9] In spite of this, Cunningham (2013) finds that self-determination groups use nonviolent as well as violent tactics.

It may be that mobilization in democracies is driving the results in Cunningham (2013), while mobilization in autocracies drives the results in Thurber (2018). That is, studies of

self-determination groups may overrepresent groups in relatively democratic countries, whereas group in autocracies have more to gain from changing the central government. As argued above, nonviolent protest is often more in viable democratic contexts (i.e., with large minimum winning coalitions, see H. J. Choi & Kim, 2018).

There is another contradiction to contend with, however. Germann and Sambanis (2021) is restricted to self-determination disputes but finds *no* association between political exclusion and nonviolent mobilization. This study differs from the other group level studies in an important way, which could explain why its results differ from those of Cunningham (2013). Germann and Sambanis (2021)'s category of nonviolent mobilization includes not only nonviolent resistance campaigns, but also smaller-scale protest and mobilization within *conventional* political channels. The latter points to an interesting question for future research: do inequalities facilitate mobilization within conventional political channels, or primarily outside them? This extension of the call to study different manifestations of conflict together could be fruitfully combined with further study of the interaction between inequalities and regime type.

Our analysis points to many avenues for future research. Most importantly, to understand whether and when HIs facilitate different forms of conflict, we need more group level studies of HIs (including economic inequalities) that model different manifestations of conflict and mobilization together: large-scale and small-scale, over territory and government, within and outside conventional political channels. Second, we need more studies that investigate the political and economic context that disadvantaged groups operate within, and how it can influence their choice of tactics. We discuss these implications further in the next section.

5 | CONCLUSION

This article has provided a systematic review of recent developments in the econometric literature on HIs, conflict, and mobilization. From its inception, this literature has centered around civil war and violent mobilization. Yet, it borrows extensively from social movement theories and other explanations of nonviolent contentious action. This begs the question of whether HIs increase all mobilization outside conventional political channels, or whether it conditions what *forms* of conflict break out.

To evaluate where the research stands on this question, we have reviewed two ove strands of the peace and conflict literature: the extensive econometric literature on HIs and political violence in its various forms, and the emerging literature on HIs and nonviolent forms of mobilization.

There is a large and robust body of evidence on the association between HIs and violent mobilization. The most recent studies (2017–2022) that we identified in our systematic review largely bolster the previous consensus in this regard. Yet, they underscore the importance of unpacking both the types and measures of HIs and political violence, as well as accounting for various contextual factors.

The emerging evidence on nonviolent conflict is considerably less consistent. The econometric studies on the association between HIs and nonviolent mobilization that we identify in our review show mixed results. They find positive associations, negative associations, and no association.[10] This leaves us none the wiser about whether inequalities facilitate all forms of mobilization, or primarily violent ones. To evaluate these competing propositions, we pay particular attention to studies that model violent and nonviolent outcomes together, and those that that make use of group level data. Even the studies we find best suited to disentangle the causes of violent and other mobilization return different answers.

Yet, a close comparison of study designs and findings gave rise to several conclusion, which speak to the state of the literature: First and foremost, the evidence on economic inequalities is too scattered to draw firm conclusions. Moreover, while more studies on political inequalities support the tactical violence proposition (i.e., that HIs increase only violent mobilization) than the general mobilization proposition (i.e., that HIs increase all mobilization), it would be premature to conclude in favor of tactical violence on this basis. Importantly, the scale of mobilization makes a difference. The effect of HIs on nonviolent conflict mobilization differs between maximalist, mature resistance campaigns and smaller-scale events of protest. That is, political inequalities seem to motivate the outbreak of protests that fail to scale up to full-blown campaigns. Furthermore, the association between political inequality and tactics differs across economic and political contexts, such as regime type and groups' economic position, and changes in response to economic fluctuations.

5.1 | Avenues for future research

Despite the rich literature on HIs and various forms of mobilization there is still a lot of work to do. Our review demonstrates the need for future studies to dig further into the inconsistent empirical results, and to disentangle competing explanations for the diverging findings. The roads to this end can be expressed as two distinct but related research agendas:

First, we need more studies of HIs (and in particular economic HIs) that distinguish between different manifestations of conflict, yet model their determinants together. Such manifestations include violent and nonviolent forms of mobilization; large-scale and small-scale conflicts; disputes over government as well as territory; and mobilization within as well as outside conventional political channels. In our opinion, group-level studies are particularly well-suited for this purpose, since the phenomena under study are in essence group-based. However, group level studies should be complemented with individual-level investigations. Many assumptions in the literature of HIs and conflict ultimately hinge on individuals' attitudes, beliefs, and actions. This becomes particularly pronounced when we extend the scope of HI theories to conventional forms of political action. There is ample room for synthesis between conflict research on HIs, insights from the political behavior tradition, and political psychology. We still know little about which individuals *within* disadvantaged groups choose to act on their groups' disadvantage; and whom among them act within and outside conventional political channels.

Second, we need more studies that investigate the context that disadvantaged groups operate in. That is, how economic and political opportunity structures condition their choice between tactics. The studies we identify in this review point to several features of disadvantaged groups' opportunity structure, which can help explain why some of them turn to violence while others stick to peaceful means. Key among them are regime type, economic leverage, and sudden economic downturns. Other aspects of the economic and political context have received little or no attention. Future studies should identify and test such potential moderators. We think that group level investigations that model violent and nonviolent outcomes together offer the best starting point for these investigations. And again, future studies should account for economic as well as political inequalities. The link between economic inequalities and nonviolent conflict is undertheorized in general and, as far as we can tell, no study has investigated its moderators.

Beyond these overarching research agendas, our review points to several other themes that future studies could explore further. In particular, the question of escalation merits scholarly attention. To what extent do HIs contribute to the *outbreak* of small-scale violence and protest

versus their *escalation* to large-scale resistance campaigns or civil war? As discussed above, existing analyses give us little traction on this important question, either because they focus on large-scale mobilization or because they do not distinguish between small and large-scale conflict manifestations.

In a related vein, we need better theories and data on how the *state* responds to various forms of mobilization. State interventions at critical junctures can play a crucial role in conflict (de)escalation (Lindemann & Wimmer, 2018). State response could help us answer another related question: how do tactics change over time? That is, when groups resort to violent tactics, is this their initial choice or are they changing tactics because previous nonviolent resistance efforts failed or were met with fierce government repression? Notably, our literature search did not identify a single econometric study of HIs that accounts for tactical shifts over time and the evolving responses of the central government.

Most of the studies in our review investigate some form of ethnic inequality. Ethnicity is usually broadly defined in studies of HIs, to cover linguistic, religious, racial, and cultural differences that are politically and socially salient. Still, the HI account is not logically restricted to ethnic cleavages. Other strong identity groups may be equally important for mobilization. Moreover, identity markers of diverse types and strengths could give rise to different mobilization dynamics.

Finally, while our review focuses exclusively on quantitative studies, we acknowledge the value of and need for qualitative studies on the matter. Indeed, it was the qualitative case-based literature spearheaded by Frances Stewart emerging as a contrast to the reaction to the statistical rejection of the overall inequality-conflict link (e.g., Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003), which articulated the HI-conflict argument in the first place, before its generalizability was tested in quantitative studies. Today, when the systematic literature has largely reached a consensus on the link between HI and political violence, qualitative studies again may help explore the possible mechanisms which link the two variables (HIs and various forms of violent and nonviolent conflict) so that these again can be operationalized and systematically tested through quantitative designs. In order to fully grasp the HI-conflict nexus there is a need for both qualitative and quantitative contributions.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The search protocol and the overviews of all the included articles in our systematic review can be found in the appendix at the end of the article.

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NOTES
[1] We exclude articles that operationalize horizontal inequality in terms of purely geographical differences (e.g., between regions or grid-cells), without showing that the regions correspond to salient cultural differences.

[2] A similar argument can be made for group advantage, whereby group members see that their group is advantage, but perceive this advantage as unfairly threatened. The literature on group advantage is small, however, and the

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findings are mixed (e.g., Cederman et al. 2011, 2013, 2015). Most of the econometric contributions in the horizontal inequality tradition focus on group disadvantages, and thus group grievances rooted in perceptions of relative deprivation.

[3] In the search on nonviolence, we do not discard the studies where HI is a control variable, because this is a less developed field.

[4] These studies, which include violent and nonviolent mobilization without making an empirical distinction between them, we do not discuss them in detail, as they provide no leverage on our research question. That is, they tell us nothing about the choice between violent and nonviolent tactics. Looking at social conflict and unrest in general, they suggest it is positively associated with political exclusion and discrimination (Mähler & Pierskalla, 2015; Murshed, Badiuzzaman & Hasan, 2018), but not with socioeconomic inequality (Mueller, 2013).

[5] Notably, the six studies of these that also include independent models for violence generally support the consensus we discussed above: all except Miodownik and Nir (2016) find positive associations between HIs and violence. Gurr (1993) finds a positive association for political discrimination, but not for economic discrimination. Thus, their findings differ mainly in their models for nonviolence.

[6] In this study, economic inequality appears not to influence either stage of mobilization.

[7] Economic and political discrimination is combined in one dummy measure. 'Major protest events' are a subset of relatively large-scale and maximalist events from the Social Conflict in Africa Dataset (SCAD) (Salehyan et al., 2012). Note that in this study, discrimination serves as a control variable for the relationship between modernization (proportion of manufacturing to GDP) and nonviolent mobilization, rather than explanatory variable.

[8] Hillesund (2022) begins to remedy this gap by arguing that economic leverage can explain the interaction she finds between economic and political HIs. This argument is discussed in more detail below.

[9] The studies we reviewed above indicate potential exceptions to this mechanism, however: areas where the region in question is the home of important natural resource deposits (cf. Basedau & Roy, 2020) or has other characteristics that make for significant economic leverage (cf. Hillesund, 2022).

[10] One could speculate that there might be a publication bias in terms of a lower likelihood of getting published studies with zero findings. However, the fact that we have uncovered studies of all kinds of outcomes, if anything, suggests that this is perhaps not a significant concern.

[11] In the initial phases of the search, we tried adding additional terms for horizontal inequalities to our search strings. Terms like "fraternal inequalit*" and "inequ* between groups" did not return relevant results. Adding "horizontal political inequ*" and "horizontal economic inequ*" returned one relevant article, Bartusevičius & Gleditsch (2019), which would already be included in a later selection stage because we knew it from our previous work. Additional terms to capture nonviolent conflict, such as "nonviolen*" and "non-violen*", did not return any additional relevant results. Neither did "rebel", "insurgen*", "communal conflict", "*ethnic conflict", "terroris*", "contentious politic*", "contentious action", "civil resistance", "sit-in*", "strike*", "nonviolent tactic*" or "non-violent tactic*". Adding "social conflict*", "unrest", and "instability" returned a single relevant article: Hodler et al. (2020). We added this to the included literature on violence in the third stage of screening (see below).

[12] As discussed above, we count the studies that cover both violent and nonviolent mobilization as part of the nonviolence search (see Figure A2). They are not included here.

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APPENDIX A: SEARCH PROTOCOL FOR SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF QUANTITATIVE STUDIES OF HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES AND VIOLENT AND NONVIOLENT CONFLICT MOBILIZATION

Background

The searches we conducted for this article provide a systematic update and significant expansion of previous reviews of the literature on horizontal inequalities and political violence. First, we run

an updated search for horizontal inequalities and violent conflict for the period January 2017–March 2022. Second, we extend the search to studies of horizontal inequalities and nonviolent mobilization outside regular political channels.

For literature on horizontal inequalities and violent conflict published before 2017, which we summarize in the section on "The consensus," we rely on the comprehensive literature searches conducted by Bahgat et al. (2017), Hillesund (2019a), Hillesund et al. (2018), and Østby (2013). The search terms for horizontal inequalities and violent conflict that these studies used were similar to the terms we use in our systematic update (see our search strings below). They were supplemented with snowballing techniques. The most comprehensive review (Bahgat et al., 2017) covered 47 articles on HI and armed conflict.

We conducted our updated searches in ISI Web of Science. We used the 'topic' field tag to search across article abstracts, titles, and keywords (including keywords plus), restricting the document type to articles (including early access and review articles). For our search on civil war and other political violence, we looked at articles indexed in the period 2017-01-01–2022-03-24. For nonviolent mobilization, we looked at all article indexed in the period 1900-01-01–2022-03-24.

Scope

The main inclusion criteria for selecting potential candidates for the review were the following:

1. Time span:
   - Violence search: indexed January 1, 2017−March 24, 2022
   - Nonviolence search: January 1, 1900−March 24, 2022
2. Language: English
3. Format: Published article, review, early access

ISI search string

Table A1 provides an overview of our search terms, and the number of results each search returned.[11] In the next section, we describe the screening process. To avoid coding the same articles twice, we specified that articles in the violence search should not include our search terms for nonviolent conflict. For the search 2017–2022 period, 18 articles would show up in both searches if we did not restrict the violence search this way. As a result of the restriction, articles that cover *both* violent and nonviolent conflict are listed in the nonviolence search. In addition, a few articles on political violence turned up in the nonviolence search instead of the violence search. We excluded them from the list of articles on nonviolent mobilization but added them to the list of articles on violence in the third stage of screening (see below).

Screening and articles

In the screening phase, we looked at all abstracts and titles and discarded articles that did not meet the following criteria: (i) quantitative methods employed (or review article), (ii) horizontal inequality is an independent variable, (iii) some form of conflict (mobilization outside regular political channels) is a dependent variable, and (iv) the horizontal inequality under study has an ethnic component, broadly defined. The latter meant excluding studies of purely geographical inequality (such as inequality between regions or grid cells), unless they presented a convincing argument that the geographic difference correspond to ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other cultural differences. In the violence search, we also excluded studies where horizontal inequalities served as control variable rather than a main predictor (three studies). In the nonviolence search

TABLE A1 Search strings and results

Search name	Search string	1900-2022	22017-2022	After abstract screening	After full-text screening	Final selection
Inequalities & political violence	TS =((("horizontal inequ*") OR ("political* exclu*") OR ("*group inequ*") OR ("ethnic inequ*") OR ("exclu* from political power") OR ("exclu* from power") OR ("exclu* from executive power")) AND (("armed conflict*") OR ("civil war*") OR ("civil conflict*") OR ("violen*")) NOT (("nonviolent resistance") OR ("non-violent resistance") OR ("nonviolent conflict*") OR ("non-violent conflict*") OR ("nonviolent campaign*") OR ("non-violent campaign*") OR ("protest*") OR ("demonstration*")))	-	116	38	18	22
Inequalities & non-violent conflict	TS =((("horizontal inequ*") OR ("political* exclu*") OR ("*group inequ*") OR ("ethnic inequ*") OR ("exclu* from political power") OR ("exclu* from power") OR ("exclu* from executive power")) AND (("nonviolent resistance") OR ("non-violent resistance") OR ("nonviolent conflict*") OR ("non-violent conflict*") OR ("nonviolent campaign*") OR ("non-violent campaign*") OR ("protest*") OR ("demonstration*")))	60	–	26	11	20

we did not make this restriction, because this is a more recent and less developed literature, with considerably fewer contributions overall.

In the first stage of screening, the 176 *abstracts* (116 from the political violence search and 60 from the nonviolence search) were screened for eligibility according to the following *exclusion* criteria:

a. Abstracts which excluded the potential for a quantitative/statistical study
b. Abstracts which excluded the possibility of some kind of political violence/nonviolent conflict mobilization as the dependent variable
c. Articles which excluded the possibility of some kind of horizontal (socio-economic or political) inequality between ethnic groups as independent variable

By these criteria we ended up with 64 titles: 38 from the violence search and 26 from the nonviolence search. In the second stage of screening, the *full text articles* for these titles were screened for eligibility according to the following *inclusion* criteria:

a. Articles with quantitative/statistical methods
b. Articles with some kind of political violence/nonviolent conflict mobilization (or support) as the dependent variable
c. Articles with some kind of horizontal (socio-economic or political) inequality between ethnic groups as independent variable
d. For the search on political violence: Articles where inequality between ethnic groups was a main predictor, not only a control variable

By these criteria we ended up with 39 core titles: 18 from the violence search and 11 from the nonviolence search:

Political violence search:

1. Abbs, Luke (2021) The Language of the Unheard? Ethno-Political Exclusion and Ethnic Riots in Africa. *Journal of Global Security Studies* 6(2): ogaa021.
2. Alcorta, Ludovico; Jeroen Smits & Haley. J Swedlund (2018) Inequality and Ethnic Conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. *Social Forces* 97(2): 769–792.
3. Alcorta, Ludovico; Haley J. Swedlund & Jeroen Smits (2020) Discrimination and Ethnic Conflict: A Dyadic analysis of Politically-Excluded groups in sub-Saharan Africa. *International Interactions* 46(2): 251–273.
4. Bodea, C.; I. Elbadawi & C. Houle (2017) Do Civil Wars, Coups and Riots Have the Same Structural Determinants? *International Interactions* 43(3): 537–561.
5. Cao, Xun, Haiyan Duan, Chuyu Liu & Yingjie Wei (2018b) Local Religious Institutions and the Impact of Interethnic Inequality on Conflict. *International Studies Quarterly* 62(4): 765–781.
6. Das, Soham (2019) Ethnic Conflict in the Indian Subcontinent: Assessing the Impact of Multiple Cleavages. *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs* 6(3): 229–253.
7. Fleming, Christopher M, Matthew Manning, Hien-Thuc Pham & Margarita Vorsina (2022) Ethnic Economic Inequality and Fatalities from Terrorism. *Journal of interpersonal violence*, 37(11-12), NP9089-NP9114. https://doi.org/10.1177/0886260520976226.

8. Ghatak, Sambuddha (2018) The Role of Political Exclusion and State Capacity in Civil Conflict in South Asia. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 30(1): 74–96.

9. Hansen, Holley E.; Stephen C. Nemeth & Jacob A. Mauslein (2020) Ethnic Political Exclusion and Terrorism: Analyzing the Local Conditions for Violence. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 37(3): 280–300.

10. Hillesund, Solveig (2019b) Choosing Whom to Target: Horizontal Inequality and the Risk of Civil and Communal Violence. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63(2): 528–554.

11. Houle, Christian & Cristina Bodea (2017) Ethnic Inequality and Coups in sub-Saharan Africa. *Journal of Peace Research* 54(3): 382–396.

12. Lessmann, Christian & Arne Steinkraus (2019) The Geography of Natural Resources, Ethnic Inequality and Civil Conflicts. *European Journal of Political Economy* 59: 33–51.

13. McDoom, Omar Shahabudin, Celia Reyes, Christian Mina & Ronina Asis (2019) Inequality Between Whom? Patterns, Trends, and Implications of Horizontal Inequality in the Philippines. *Social Indicators Research* 145(3): 923–942.

14. Nanes, Matthew (2021) Linking Individual and Group Motives for Violent Conflict. *Research & Politics 8(4)*. https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680211061056.

15. Rudolfsen, Ida (2017) State Capacity, Inequality and Inter-Group Violence in sub-Saharan Africa: 1989−2011. *Civil Wars* 19(2): 118–145.

16. Siroky, David, Carolyn M Warner, Gabrielle Filip-Crawford, Anna Berlin & Steven L Neuberg (2020) Grievances and Rebellion: Comparing Relative Deprivation and Horizontal inequality. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 37(6): 694–715.

17. Tollefsen, Andreas Forø (2020) Experienced Poverty and Local Conflict Violence. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 37(3): 323–349.

18. Treistman, Jeffrey (forthcoming) Social Exclusion and Political Violence: Multilevel Analysis of the Justification of Terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.1052021.2007244.

Nonviolence search:

1. Abbs, Luke (2020) The Hunger Games: Food Prices, Ethnic Cleavages and Nonviolent Unrest in Africa. *Journal of Peace Research* 57(2): 281–296.

2. Basedau, Matthias & Vita Roy (2020) Sleep, Bark, or Bite: Do Natural Resources Make the Difference Regarding Peaceful or Violent Conflict? *International Area Studies Review* 23(1): 73–92.

3. Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher (2013) Understanding Strategic Choice: The Determinants of Civil War and Nonviolent Campaign in Self-Determination Disputes. *Journal of Peace Research* 50(3): 291–304.

4. Germann, Micha & Nicholas Sambanis (2021) Political Exclusion, Lost Autonomy, and Escalating Conflict over Self-Determination. *International Organization* 75(1): 178–203.

5. Hillesund, Solveig (2022) To Fight or Demonstrate? Micro Foundations of Inequality and Conflict. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 39(2): 166–190.

6. Hillesund, Solveig (2015) A Dangerous Discrepancy: Testing the Micro-Dynamics of Horizontal Inequality on Palestinian Support for Armed Resistance. *Journal of Peace Research* 52(1): 76–90.

7. Jenkins, J. Craig & Michael Wallace (1996) The Generalized Action Potential of Protest Movements: The New Class, Social Trends, and Political Exclusion Explanations. *Sociological Forum* 11(2): 183–207.

8. Mueller, Lisa (2013) Democratic Revolutionaries or Pocketbook Protesters? The Roots of the 2009–2010 Uprisings in Niger. *African Affairs* 112(448): 398–420.

9. Murshed, Syed Mansoob; Muhammad Badiuzzaman & Rashel Hasan (2018) Food Insecurity and Conflict Events in Africa. *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy* 24(2): 20180007.

10. Rørbæk, Lasse Lykke (2019) Ethnic Exclusion and Civil Resistance Campaigns: Opting for Nonviolent or Violent Tactics? *Terrorism and Political Violence* 31(3): 475–493.

11. Thurber, Ches (2018) Ethnic Barriers to Civil Resistance. *Journal of Global Security Studies* 3(3): 255–270.

We supplemented the searches in two ways:

a. Additional articles on nonviolent mobilization from the existing reviews we cite in the background section (primarily Hillesund, 2019a).

b. Addition articles on political violence that we identified though the nonviolence search, because we restricted the violence search to minimize the overlap between the two searches (see search strings above). One article from additional search on social conflict, see footnote above.

This added four articles to the list of articles on political violence:

19. Cao, Xun, Haiyan Duan, Chuyu Liu, James A Piazza & Yingjie Wei (2018a) Digging the "Ethnic Violence in China" Database: The Effects of Inter-Ethnic Inequality and Natural Resources Exploitation in Xinjiang. *China Review 18* (2):121-154.

20. Cingranelli, David, Skip Mark, Mark Gibney, Peter Haschke, Reed Wood & Daniel Arnon (2019) Human Rights Violations and Violent Internal Conflict. *Social Sciences* 8 (2): 41.

21. Hodler, Roland, Sorawoot Srisuma, Alberto Vesperoni & Noémie Zurlinden (2020) Measuring Ethnic Stratification and its Effect on Trust in Africa. *Journal of Development Economics* 146: 102475.

22. Ives, Brandon & Jori Breslawski (2021) Greed, Grievance, or Graduates? Why Do Men Rebel? *Journal of Peace Research*. https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433211014269.

It added nine articles to the list of articles on nonviolent mobilization:

12. Bartusevičius, Henrikas & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (2019) A Two-Stage Approach to Civil Conflict: Contested Incompatibilities and Armed Violence. *International Organization* 73 (1): 225–248.

13. Butcher, Charles & Isak Svensson (2016) Manufacturing Dissent: Modernization and the Onset of Major Nonviolent Resistance Campaigns. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60 (2): 311–339.

14. Chenoweth, Erica & Jay Ulfelder (2017) Can Structural Conditions Explain the Onset of Nonviolent Uprisings? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 (2): 298–324.

15. Choi, Hyun Jin & Dongsuk Kim (2018) Coup, Riot, War: How Political Institutions and Ethnic Politics Shape Alternative Forms of Political Violence. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 30 (4):718-739.

16. Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, Marianne Dahl, Scott Gates & Belen Gonzalez (2021) Accounting for Numbers: Group Characteristics and the Choice of Violent and Nonviolent Tactics. *Economics of Peace and Security Journal* 16 (1).

17. Gurr, Ted Robert (1993) Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict Since 1945. *International Political Science Review* 14 (2):161-201.

18. Miodownik, Dan & Lilach Nir (2016) Receptivity to Violence in Ethnically Divided Societies: A Micro-Level Mechanism of Perceived Horizontal Inequalities. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 39 (1):22-45.

19. Mähler, Annegret & Jan H Pierskalla (2015) Indigenous Identity, Natural Resources, and Contentious Politics in Bolivia: A Disaggregated Conflict Analysis, 2000–2011. *Comparative Political Studies* 48 (3):301-332.

20. Regan, Patrick M. & Daniel Norton (2005) Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (3):319-336.

After this final stage, our literature review included a total of 42 articles: 22 on political violence and 20 on nonviolent mobilization. Tables A2 and A3 contain a systematic overview of all the studies. Figures A1 and A2 illustrate the screening process.

TABLE A2 Overview of articles on HI and political violence, published 2017–March 2022

Study	Spatio-temporal coverage; unit of analysis	Dependent variable(s)(violent/non-violent conflict)	Main independent variable(s)(type/measurement of horizontal inequalities)	Main finding(s)
Country-level studies				
Bodea et al. (2017)	149 countries, 1950–2007; country-year	Civil war onset (UCDP, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/;), COW, Sarkees & Wayman, 2010), coups (Marshall & Marshall, 2014; Powell & Thyne, 2011), and riots (violent clashes with 100+ citizens; A. S. Banks, 2011)	Share of population excluded from executive power; size of governing coalition (the population size of the groups in government); downgrading (at least one group excluded in past 3 years) (all from EPR, https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/).	Political exclusion increases the risk of all three outcomes: civil war, coups, and violent riots. Coalition size and recent exclusion may also increase coups. The number of included groups may increase the risk of civil war.
Cingranelli et al. (2019)	150 countries, 1990–2005; country-year	Onset and escalation of violent protest (Clark & Regan, 2016), domestic terrorist attacks (START, 2016), and civil war battle deaths (UCDP ACD, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/)	GDP per capita of the country's poorest group compared to average and the corresponding ratio for the wealthiest group; the size of the country's largest discriminated group (Buhaug et al., 2014)	The size of the largest discrimination group increases the number of violent protests and deaths from civil war and decreases risk of terror attacks. It does not increase the risk that such violence occurs. Relative poverty increases the risk of civil war and violent protest, and the number of terror attacks. Relative wealth also increases the risk of civil war and violent protest, but decreases the number of terrorist attacks. (Estimates zero-inflated negative binomial models.)
Fleming et al. (2022)	Global, 130 countries, 2001–2018; country-period	Domestic terrorism, (Global Terrorism Database – GTD: https://start.umd.edu/gtd/)	Income inequality across ethnic groups (Alesina & Perotti, 1996)	Higher degrees of ethnic inequality lead to higher numbers of terrorist attacks and a higher number of people killed or injured.

(Continues)

TABLE A2 (Continued)

Study	Spatio-temporal coverage; unit of analysis	Dependent variable(s)(violent/non-violent conflict)	Main independent variable(s)(type/measurement of horizontal inequalities)	Main finding(s)
Ghatak (2018)	Seven countries in South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Afghanistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka), 1970–2007; country-year	Domestic terrorism; civil war (Global Terrorism Database - GTD, UCDP: https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/)	Exclusion from state power (EPR): https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/)	Strong states (not weak) experience more domestic terrorism when discrimination is present. The likelihood of civil war declines in a stable state in the presence of politically excluded populations. Weak states will experience more civil war than others in the presence of discrimination
Rudolfsen (2017)	SSA, 1989–2011; country-year	Non-state conflict incidence (UCDP, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/)	Political excluded groups as share of population, largest excluded group as share of population (Afrobarometer: https://www.afrobarometer.org/)	The combined effect of weak state capacity and economic marginalization increases the risk of non-state conflict. However, there is no significant effect of the interaction between political exclusion and weak state capacity.
Siroky et al. (2020)	100 countries; 75 random dyads	Dyadic groups conflict (Global Group Relations Project data: Expert interviews)	RD; HI between ethnic and religious groups with regard to food, water, and land (expert interviews own data)	Grievances in the form of relative deprivation increase the probability that groups engage in conflict, and to a lesser extent in the form of horizontal inequalities (it is when perceived grievances are combined with mobilization capacity that violent conflict is more likely to materialize)

(Continues)

TABLE A2 (Continued)

Study	Spatio-temporal coverage; unit of analysis	Dependent variable(s)(violent/non-violent conflict)	Main independent variable(s)(type/measurement of horizontal inequalities)	Main finding(s)
Subnational (meso-level) studies				
Abbs (2021)	47 African states, 1990–2008; grid-cells	Ethnic riots (recoding of SCAD) (Salehyan et al., 2012)	Political discrimination, shifts in ethnic representation (EPR, https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/)	Ethnic riots are more likely to occur in discriminated group areas, in locations where a group has recently lost political representation and where such groups live in proximity of politically dominant groups.
Alcorta et al. (2018)	29 African countries, 1990–2014; 1548 dyads of ethnic groups	Ethnic conflict (UCDP) (Dyadic Dataset v.1–2015, UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset v. 2.5–2015, and UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset v 1.4–2015. https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/)	Educational and asset inequalities between ethnic groups (DDW) (www.globaldatalab.org)	Educational inequalities are positively associated with conflict incidence, while this is not the case for economic and demographic inequalities
Alcorta et al. (2020)	28 SSA countries, 1990–2013; ethnic group dyad-year	Ethnic conflict (UCDP) (Dyadic Dataset v.1–2015, UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset v. 2.5–2015, and UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset v 1.4–2015. https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/)	Political discrimination (EPR, (https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/); Educational and asset inequalities between ethnic groups (DDW) (www.globaldatalab.org);	Discriminated groups are responsible for most of the association between political exclusion and conflict. Groups that face active, intentional, and targeted discrimination by the state are significantly more likely to be involved in conflict than excluded groups who do not face this explicit form of discrimination. Discriminated groups who also experience economic inequalities are less likely to engage in conflict, whilst an increased presence of elites within discriminated groups can precipitate the chances of conflict

TABLE A2 (Continued)

Study	Spatio-temporal coverage; unit of analysis	Dependent variable(s)(violent/non-violent conflict)	Main independent variable(s)(type/measurement of horizontal inequalities)	Main finding(s)
Cao, Duan, Liu, Piazza, et al. (2018)	China, 100 counties in Xinjiang, 1996–2005; county-year	Original data collected: Political violence (bombing, assassinations, arson, riot, armed attacks) committed by an ethnic minority with a political motivation (including planned attacks that were prevented)	The share of the largest ethnic group each area that have completed lower secondary school, compared to the share among Han Chinese	Horizontal inequality in education is positively associated with the occurrence of political violence. (Data paper with empirical demonstration.)
Cao, Duan, Liu, & Wei (2018)	China, 1996–2005; 100 counties in Xinjiang	The Ethnic Violence in China (the Xinjiang Region) event dataset	Socioeconomic HI: Share that has finished lower secondary school in largest ethnic group in prefecture (not always Uyghurs) compared to Han Chinese	A higher level of interethnic inequality is associated with increased ethnic violence only in areas with low and medium levels of mosque density.
Das (2019)	Indian sub-Continent, 1947–2013; 60 ethnic groups	Violent conflict with battle deaths (UCDP, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/)	Economic disadvantage (MAR, https://cidcm.umd.edu/research/all-minorities-risk-project)	Groups facing economic disadvantage and groups affected by reinforcing cleavages of religious and economic marginalization, and religious, economic, and lingual marginalization have engaged in active violence
Hansen et al. (2020)	Global, 191 countries, 1991–2009; grid cell-years	Domestic terrorism (Global Terrorism Database – GTD, https://start.umd.edu/gtd/)	Ethnic group status (dominance, exclusion) (EPR, https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/)	Positive and significant effect of political exclusion on terrorism; mainly in wealthy and densely populated grid cells and democratic countries
Hillesund (2019b)	Africa, 1991–2009; 155 politically relevant groups	Civil violence; communal violence (UCDP, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/)	Economic HI (group income vs. country average; triangulating G-Econ, nightlights, survey data; Cederman et al., 2015) political exclusion (EPR, https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/)	Political exclusion promotes the choice to target the central government rather than other ethnic groups, while economic disadvantages should increase the risk of both civil and communal conflicts

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TABLE A2 (Continued)

Study	Spatio-temporal coverage; unit of analysis	Dependent variable(s)(violent/non-violent conflict)	Main independent variable(s)(type/measurement of horizontal inequalities)	Main finding(s)
Hodler et al. (2020)	26 ethnically diverse African countries, 2011–2013 cross-section (Round 3 of the Afrobarometer survey); town/village level	At least one violent conflict event (ACLED, https://acleddata.com/) within 10 km of the village/town center in the 3 years after the Afrobarometer survey (dummy; https://www.afrobarometer.org/data/)	Ethnic stratification index: the extent to which an area's hierarchy in socio-economic positions follows ethnolinguistic lines; based on Afrobarometer surveys (https://www.afrobarometer.org/data/)	Ethnic stratification at the level of towns and villages is positively associated with nearby conflict, as well as exposure to and perceptions of crime. It is negatively related to trust in relatives, neighbors, and other acquaintances.
Houle and Bodea (2017)	32 SSA countries, 1960–2005; 141 ethnic groups	Coup (dependent variable takes the value 1 if a member of an ethnic group has staged a coup within a given year)	Economic (asset) HI between ethnic groups (Afrobarometer, https://www.afrobarometer.org/data/; DHS, https://dhsprogram.com/)	Between-ethnic-group inequality (BGI) increases the likelihood that an ethnic group stages a coup only when within-ethnic-group inequality (WGI) is low
Ives and Breslawski (2021)	Africa and Central America, 1990–2013; PRIO grid cells	At least one violent conflict event occurred in grid cell (in either civil or nonstate conflict) (dummy)	At least one ethnic group that is excluded from executive power inhabits the grid cell (GEO-EPR, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/) (dummy)	There is a positive interaction between education (the share in a GRID cell that has completed primary school) and political exclusion.
Lessmann and Steinkraus (2019)	I73 countries, 2000–2012; 1370 ethnicities	Conflict onset; incidence (UCDP, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/).	Resource endowment inequality across ethnic groups (Gini index) (GREG; night.-light intensity within ethnic homeland to proxy ethnic income inequality + mining data)	A heterogeneous resource distribution across ethnic groups increases the probability of the onset of civil war

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TABLE A2 (Continued)

Study	Spatio-temporal coverage; unit of analysis	Dependent variable(s)(violent/non-violent conflict)	Main independent variable(s)(type/measurement of horizontal inequalities)	Main finding(s)
Mcdoom et al. (2019)	Philippines, 2010–2013; 17 regions, 85 provinces, 1491 municipalities	Social/political instability (Philippines Office of Civil Defense)	Economic HI between ethnic groups (schooling, literacy, access to drinking water, access to sanitary and toilet facilities, access to electricity) (2000 and 2010 Philippines Population and Housing Censuses)	Positive significant association between horizontal inequalities and socio-political instability at the subnational level
Tollefsen (2020)	35 African states, 2005–2012; district-years	Count of civil conflict events (UCDP GED, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/)	Excluded group (ethnic group always treated unfairly by gov) (Afrobarometer, https://www.afrobarometer.org/data/); poverty in region relative to national average	Local levels of poverty increase local conflict activity, but mainly so in areas with weak institutions and group grievances. Levels of unemployment (opportunity cost) do not appear to matter.
Individual-level studies				
Nanes (2021)	Iraq, 2016; 800 Baghdadi residents	Individual's propensities for anti-state violence (original survey)	Self-reported satisfaction with (relative) economic situation (original survey)	Minority Sunnis who are economically dissatisfied are more willing to consider violence than similarly aggrieved Shias: Group inequality and individual deprivation are each necessary but not sufficient to fully explain individuals' propensities for anti-state violence
Treistman (forthcoming)	46 countries, 2017–2020, 40,000 individuals	Support for terrorism (World Values Surveys – WVS: https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp)	Social exclusion within a state (the denial of services or the ability to participate in government institutions based on group identity)	Positive relationship between levels of social exclusion and individual support for terrorism. little evidence that equitable public spending helps to reduce levels of support for terrorism

TABLE A3 Overview of articles on HI and nonviolent mobilization, published 1900–March 2022; including all the studies that encompass both violent and nonviolent outcomes

Study	Spatio-temporal coverage; unit of analysis	Dependent variable(s)(violent/non-violent conflict)	Main independent variable(s)(type/measurement of horizontal inequalities)	Main finding(s)
Country-level studies				
Bartusevičius and Gleditsch (2019)	Global, 1946–2008; country-year	Civil conflict (all contested incompatibilities) (stage 1, CONIAS, https://conias.com/); civil war (stage 2, UCDP, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/)	Share of the population that is politically discriminated; GDP per capita of the country's poorest group compared to average and the corresponding ratio for the wealthiest group (Buhaug et al., 2014).	Political group discrimination affects the onset of contested incompatibilities, but not their militarization (i.e., their escalation to armed civil war). Economic HI affects neither. (Estimates two-stage models, 2PM and Heckman.)
Butcher and Svensson (2016)	Global, 1960–2006 & Africa 1990–2009; country-year	Violent vs. nonviolent campaigns (NAVCO, https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/navco) civil conflict (UCDP, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/) vs. and large-scale nonviolent conflict events (SCAD; Salehyan et al., 2012)	State-led economic or political discrimination (combined in one dummy variable; MAR, http://www.mar.umd.edu/)	Discrimination increases the risk of violent campaigns and decreases the risk of nonviolent campaigns (NAVCO). When using other measures (SCAD/UCDP), discrimination increases both violent and nonviolent conflict (SCAD/UCDP). (Estimated using multinomial logit models with discrimination as control variable.)
Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017)	Global, 1981–2013; country-years	Episodes of large-scale and maximalist nonviolent contention (Major episodes of contention, MEC).	State-led economic or political discrimination (combined in one dummy variable; MAR, http://www.mar.umd.edu/); salient elite ethnicity (unclear source)	Group discrimination does not help us predict nonviolent contention. There is some evidence that salient elite ethnicity does. (Estimated using prediction methods; changes in AUC score)

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TABLE A3 (Continued)

Study	Spatio-temporal coverage; unit of analysis	Dependent variable(s)(violent/non-violent conflict)	Main independent variable(s)(type/measurement of horizontal inequalities)	Main finding(s)
H. J. Choi and Kim (2018)	Global, 1946–2010/2013; country-year, group-year	Ethnic civil conflict (UCDP, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/; mapped to EPR groups, ACD2EPR, https://growup.ethz.ch/); coups; riots, protests (100+ participants; A. Banks & Wilson, 2015)	Coalition size (share of ethnic groups included in government; EPR, https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/)	Interacts exclusion (coalition size) with the size of the minimum winning coalition (MWC), by looking at four potential constellations (types of coalitions): small MWCs combined with ethnically exclusive governments (exclusive coalitions) mainly increase the risk of civil war; small MWCs combined with ethnically inclusive governments (oversized coalitions) increase the risk of coups (and protest); large MWCs and ethnic exclusion (undersized coalitions) increase the risk of riots and protest; large MWCs and ethnic inclusion is associated with peace. (Group level analysis for civil wars, country level for the other outcomes.)
Gleditsch et al. (2021)	Global; country-year	Onset of violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns (NAVCO, https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/navco; UCDP, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/)	At least one group excluded from political power (EPR, https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/)	Exclusion is positively associated with all conflict outcomes: nonviolent campaign onset and incidence, onset of ethnic and other civil wars. (Modelled with exclusion as a control variable.)
Murshed et al. (2018)[a]	40 African countries, 2000–2005; country-year	Conflict events (ACLED, https://acleddata.com/)	Share of ethno-politically relevant population that is excluded from executive power; share that is powerless; share that is discriminated (EPR, https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/)	Political exclusion is positively associated with social unrest. The association is driven by powerless, rather than discriminated, groups. (Does not distinguish between violent and nonviolent forms of conflict. The main explanatory variable is food price volatility, HI variables are mainly controls.)

(Continues)

TABLE A3 (Continued)

Study	Spatio-temporal coverage; unit of analysis	Dependent variable(s)(violent/non-violent conflict)	Main independent variable(s)(type/measurement of horizontal inequalities)	Main finding(s)
Regan and Norton (2005)	Global, 1979–1997; country-year	Group participation in rebellion (including civil war); group participation nonviolent protest (ordinal variable, MAR, http://www.mar.umd.edu/)	Political discrimination index (ordinal variable, MAR, http://www.mar.umd.edu/)	Political discrimination is positively associated with rebellion and civil war, but not with nonviolent protest.
Rørbæk (2019)	Global, 1950–2006; country-year	Onset of violent vs. nonviolent resistance campaign (NAVCO, https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/navco)	Share of population excluded from executive power (EPR, https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/)	Political exclusion is positively associated with violent campaign onset but not with nonviolent campaigns. Mediation analysis shows that almost half of the effect of exclusion on violent campaign onset is mediated by the latent level of violent repression in a country. (Estimated with multinomial logistic regression.)

Subnational (meso-level) studies

Study	Spatio-temporal coverage; unit of analysis	Dependent variable(s)(violent/non-violent conflict)	Main independent variable(s)(type/measurement of horizontal inequalities)	Main finding(s)
Abbs (2020)	41 African countries, 1990–2008; PRIO Grid cell-years	Occurrence of conflict events that are nonviolent, organized, target the government, and have 1000+ participants (SCAD; Salehyan et al., 2012) (dummy)	Politically excluded group(s) inhabit the GRID cell (dummy) (GeoEPR, https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/)	There is a positive interaction between political exclusion and food price spikes.

(Continues)

TABLE A3 (Continued)

Study	Spatio-temporal coverage; unit of analysis	Dependent variable(s)(violent/non-violent conflict)	Main independent variable(s)(type/measurement of horizontal inequalities)	Main finding(s)
Basedau and Roy (2020)	Africa, 1990–2013; PRIO grid cell-year	Onset of violent conflict event (UCDP-GED, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/) vs. nonviolent conflict event (SCAD; Salehyan et al., 2012) vs. neither in the grid cell	Share of groups in a cell that are politically discriminated (GeoEPR, https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/); political monopoly	Positive interaction Resources deposits (diamonds, oil, gas) increase violent (and nonviolent) conflict, but only in areas without politically included (monopoly) groups. Both political discrimination and monopoly (plus democracy, geography, transborder kin) are key in explaining why violent and not peaceful protest emerges in the absence of resource deposits. Argues that the effect of monopoly on violence disappears with natural resources because of cooptation. (Estimates multinomial logistic regression models.)
Cunningham (2013)	Global, 1960–2005; group-year	Ongoing civil war (1,000+ deaths, UCDP, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/) vs. nonviolent campaign (NAVCO, https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/navco)	Economic discrimination index (MAR, http://www.mar.umd.edu/); exclusion from executive power (EPR, https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/)	Political exclusion and economic discrimination increase the risk of both violent and nonviolent separatist struggles in self-determination disputes. (Estimated with multinomial logistic regression.)
Germann and Sambanis (2021)	Global, 1945–2012; group-year	Separatist claims (both extra-institutional protest and institutional mobilization) (stage 1); separatist civil war (stage 2) (SDM dataset, https://michagermann.github.io/data/sdm/)	Exclusion from executive power (EPR, https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/)	Political exclusion is associated with escalation to war, but less so with the emergence of separatist claims. (Two-stage approach.)

TABLE A3 (Continued)

Study	Spatio-temporal coverage; unit of analysis	Dependent variable(s)(violent/non-violent conflict)	Main independent variable(s)(type/measurement of horizontal inequalities)	Main finding(s)
Gurr (1993)	Global, 1970s and 1980s cross-sections; group	Group participation in rebellion in the 1980s; group participation nonviolent protest in the 1980 (ordinal variable, MAR, http://www.mar.umd.edu/)	Economic differentials and discrimination index; political differentials and discrimination index (ordinal variable, MAR, http://www.mar.umd.edu/)	Political differentials are positively associated with rebellion in the 1980s, while the association for political discrimination is negative. All horizontal inequality variables are positively associated with group grievance, as expressed by group leaders.
Mähler and Pierskalla (2015)[a]	Bolivia, 2000–2011; province-years	Number of social conflict events in the province (original data)	Share of province population that is represented in the national executive (EPR, https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/)	In Bolivia, higher levels of political inclusion are associated with fewer social conflict events. (Does not distinguish between violent and nonviolent forms of conflict. HI is a control variable in this study.)
Thurber (2018)	Global, 1946–2006; group-year	Onset of violent vs. nonviolent resistance campaign (NAVCO, https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/navco, mapped to EPR groups)	Exclusion from executive power (EPR, https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/); economic HI as robustness test	Politically excluded groups initiate fewer nonviolent campaigns (and possibly more violent campaigns) than senior government partners and politically dominant groups. Junior partners initiate few campaigns. (Estimated with multinomial logistic regression.)

(Continues)

TABLE A3 (Continued)

Study	Spatio-temporal coverage; unit of analysis	Dependent variable(s)(violent/non-violent conflict)	Main independent variable(s)(type/measurement of horizontal inequalities)	Main finding(s)
Individual-level studies				
Hillesund (2015)	West Bank and Gaza, 2011; group & individual	Support for rocket attacks vs. support for nonviolent resistance (Fafo AIS survey data)	Difference in asset ownership and education, comparing each Palestinian governorate to the closest Israel subdistrict (Israeli Bureau of Statistics); political rights and freedoms (self-evaluated, Fafo survey)	Larger group disadvantages in asset ownership and less favorable evaluations of the political rights situation are both associated with higher support for violent over nonviolent resistance. The results for education are not statistically significant. (Estimated using multinomial logistic regression.)
Hillesund (2022)	25 African countries, 2011–2013 (cross-section, Round 5 of Afrobarometer survey); group & individual	Self-reported participation in demonstrations vs. political violence (Afrobarometer, Round 5, https://www.afrobarometer.org/data/)	Economic group disadvantage (triangulating G-Econ, nightlights, survey data; Cederman et al., 2015); exclusion from executive power (EPR, https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/); interaction term	Economic disadvantages are positively associated with participation in political violence short of civil war. And when economic disadvantages coincide with political exclusion, people steer actively away from demonstrations. There is some evidence that in the absence of economic disadvantage, political disadvantage is associated with higher participation in demonstrations.

(Continues)

TABLE A3 (Continued)

Study	Spatio-temporal coverage; unit of analysis	Dependent variable(s)(violent/non-violent conflict)	Main independent variable(s)(type/measurement of horizontal inequalities)	Main finding(s)
Jenkins and Wallace (1996)	US, 1973–74 cross-section; individual	Protest potential (expressed willingness to take part); protest repertoire (is it combined with conventional politics); protest support	African and Asian American dummies (capture political exclusion indirectly)	African Americans display a consistently strong generalized action potential. They are more likely to be willing to protest, using civil disobedience or violence. This is driven by people who do not combine contentious action with conventional participation. African Americans also tend to support all active protest groups (students, women, "Blacks," Revolutionary groups). The results for Hispanics are inconsistent, arguably because they are a small and heterogenous group in the survey.
Miodownik and Nir (2016)	13 SSA countries, 2005–2006 (cross-section, Round 3 of Afrobarometer survey); group and individual	Support for violence; self-reported participation in demonstrations (Afrobarometer Round 3, https:// www.afrobarometer.org/data/)	Groups' exclusion from executive power (EPR, https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/); groups' asset ownership compared to country average; perceptions of disadvantage and unfair treatment (Afrobarometer R3, https://www. afrobarometer.org/data/);	Political exclusion is positively associated with demonstrations, but not with support for violence. Economic advantage is negatively associated demonstrations, but not with violence. Perceptions can amplify the association between exclusion and support for violence and alter the readiness of included groups to dissent.
Mueller (2013)[a]	Niger (40 Niamey neighbor-hoods), 2011; individual	Self-reported participation in protest (original survey data)	Perception of that ones' ethnic group is worse off than other groups in terms of living conditions (original survey data)	In the Niamey neighborhoods under study, there is no statistically significant association between perceived group disadvantage in living conditions and participation in protest. (Does not distinguish between violent and nonviolent forms of conflict.)

[a]Studies that do not distinguish between violent and nonviolent outcomes.

FIGURE A1 Quorum flowchart for studies on horizontal inequalities and political violence published 2017–March 2022[12]

| Potentially relevant studies identified and screened for retrieval (n=116) | → | Studies excluded from review based on the abstract (n=78) |

↓

| Potentially appropriate studies for review. Studies evaluated in detail to determine relevance for inclusion criteria (n=38) | → | Studies excluded from review based on the full text (n=20) |

↓

| Studies that met the eligibility criteria (n=18) |

↓

| Included studies (n=22) | ← | Eligible political violence studies identified in nonviolence search (n=3), or with addition social conflict terms (n=1) |

FIGURE A2 Quorum flowchart for studies on horizontal inequalities and nonviolent mobilization, published 1900–March 2022

| Potentially relevant studies identified and screened for retrieval (n=60) | → | Studies excluded from review based on the abstract (n=34) |

↓

| Potentially appropriate studies for review. Studies evaluated in detail to determine relevance for inclusion criteria (n=26) | → | Studies excluded from review based on the full text (n=15) |

↓

| Studies that met the eligibility criteria (n=11) |

↓

Included studies (n=20)
1) Nonviolence only (n=2)
2) Violence & non-violence covered (n=18)
- Modelled independently (n=6)
- Modelled together (n=9)
- No distinction made (n=3)

← | Studies added from previous searches (n=9) |