R2P and the pluralist vs. solidarist debate

An empirical analysis of the initial policies of the P5 on the Libyan and Syrian conflicts through the perspective of the English School

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Abstract

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a principle which states that the international community has a responsibility to protect populations from mass atrocities, was adopted by the United Nations at the 2005 United Nations World Summit. The humanitarian intervention in Libya in 2011 marked the first time the principle was implemented as a response by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and many thus believed that R2P had "come of age" and assuredly been assimilated as a fundamental principle in international relations. However, the conflict in Syria demonstrated the international community's inability to effectively respond to mass atrocities, as the UNSC was caught in a deadlock, in which two of the permanent member countries (P5), Russia and China, continuously vetoed draft resolutions. The main aim of this thesis was to evaluate the policies of the P5 countries of the UNSC through an evaluation of their statement at the UNSC meetings, and this thesis therefore consider eight meetings in which draft resolutions were voted upon.The thesis uses the perspective of the English School theory (ES), and its internal debate between pluralist and solidarist viewpoints found in ES institutions, in order to demonstrate the division between the P5 countries, and to answer the question: How do the P5's justifications for or against humanitarian intervention reflect their pluralist and solidarist values?

Key words: Responsibility to Protect, The United Nations Security Council, P5, The English School Theory, solidarism, pluralism, Middle East, North Africa, Syria, Libya, geopolitics

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Marit Ruus

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List of abbreviations and acronyms

9/11	Terrorist attack carried out by terrorist organization al-Qaeda against the United States on the 11th of September, 2001
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
ES	English School of International Relations
EU	European Union
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
HLP	High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IR	International Relations
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (also: IS, ISIL, and Daesh)
LAS	League of Arab States (also: Arab League)
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MDSD	Most Different System Design
MSSD	Most Similar System Design
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NTC	National Transitional Council in Libya (also: TNC)
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
OHCHR	Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
P5	The five permanent member countries of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, the UK, the US, and Russia)
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
UNSMIS	United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria
US	United States of America

1. Introduction

Following the events of the Arab Spring in early 2011, the civilian population in both Libya and Syria were met with a brutal response by their respective governments: The Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, declared war on the Libyan protesters, claiming they would be "hunted down door to door and executed" and his forces used systematic violent attacks against the civilian population (Zifcak 2012, pp. 60-61). In Syria, the forces of President Bashar al-Assad responded to the demonstrations by opening fire on the protestors, and as the violence escalated, the armed forces made use of heavy weapons against civilians, torture and massacres (Gifkins 2012, p. 378).

In relation to the Libyan crisis, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) responded with swift action, through the adoptions of Resolutions 1970 and 1973. In the latter of these resolutions, the UNSC authorised the use of "all necessary methods" in the protection of the Libyan civilian population (S/RES/1973, p. 3), which would eventually lead to the NATO-led military intervention and the overthrow of the Libyan regime. In 2012, the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) Ban Ki-moon claimed that the events in Libya had demonstrated the 'coming of age' of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a concept which aimed to create a framework for the international community's response to humanitarian atrocities (Morris 2013, p. 1265). However, taking action in relation to the conflict in Syria proved much more difficult. The UNSC experienced a protracted deadlock, caused by lack of consensus and multiple vetoes by Russia and China (Gifkins 2012, p. 384).

1.1 Purpose of thesis and research question

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the response by the UNSC through an empirical analysis of the initial policies of the permanent members of the UNSC (P5) on the Libyan and Syrian conflicts. The P5 consists of the countries: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), and the United States of America (US).
The thesis will look at the statements given by the P5 countries at eight UNSC meetings, all following the vote on a draft resolution relating to either Libya or Syria, and consequently investigate how the statements present the perspective of the P5 countries. This analysis will use the English School of International Relations (ES) in order to examine the concept of R2P and humanitarian intervention as expressed in the UNSC meetings, and will do so by

demonstrating the pluralist versus solidarist debate found in ES theory, and how this debate clarifies the various justifications for humanitarian intervention. The results from the comparison of the policies of the P5 countries will give clarity and insight into how the countries consider the role of the pluralist and solidarist institutions found in international society, and this thesis will therefore aim to answer:

> *What are the various viewpoints of the P5 countries in regards to R2P, and how do the P5's justifications for or against humanitarian intervention reflect their pluralist and solidarist values?*

The cases of Libya and Syria were chosen due to their close geographical proximity as both are Arab countries within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and both countries were pulled into the wave of protests and consequent armed rebellions of the Arab Spring. Nevertheless, this thesis has a focus on the comparison of the standpoint of the P5 countries, rather than a clear comparison of the Libya and Syria case. The two cases will be used in order to achieve breadth on the subject matter, and although some comparisons will be made, the comparative element is focused on the P5 countries.

1.2 Importance of thesis

Much of the literature on the role of the UNSC in the conflicts in Libya and Syria use the theoretical frameworks of realism, constructivism, or liberal institutionalism (see: the master theses of Hansen 2006; Lunde 2016; Yahya 2021; Yssen 2012), This thesis, however, considers the pluralist and solidarist institutions found in ES theory. One can draw parallels to the article by Tüzgen and Gök (2022) "Understanding the Policies of the BRICS Countries in R2P Cases: An English School Perspective", in which they examine this same theoretical framework. However, in contrast to this thesis, which looks at the P5 countries, Tüzgen and Gök (2022) investigate the statements by the members of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in order to determine their policies on R2P. The master thesis by Austgulen (2014), similarly uses the English school theory as a framework, but his thesis examines the military interventions in Georgia and Syria, and the Russian justifications for these.

The UNSC is one of the most influential global actors within international relations, and is often considered the voice of the international community (UNSC S/PV.6491, p. 3). As five of its members have the ability to veto, meaning to unilaterally stop an official action of the UNSC, it is of the utmost importance to understand the justifications used in order to defend such an action. One can merely look at the current ongoing debates on the role of the UNSC and the function of the veto following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in which Russia has the ability to veto any attempt to condemn their own actions, in order to illustrate the importance of further understanding how decisions come to be made within this principal organ of the UN.

1.3 Key aspects of the thesis

This thesis will only consider the initial phase of the UNSC response, namely in 2011 and 2012. This is thus a limitation of this thesis, as the conflicts in Libya and Syria was either reinvigorated through a new civil war, as is the case of Libya, or with a currently continuing and ongoing civil war, as is the case of Syria.

The statements used in the analysis are given during the UNSC meetings, and are thenceforth released as documents called 'meeting records' published by the United Nations (UN) Dag Hammarskjöld Library. There are two forms of meeting records produced by the UN, namely that of verbatim record and summary record. Verbatim records are, as the name suggests, direct recordings of full, first-person accounts. Summary records, on the other hand, are third-person condensed version of the meeting. This thesis will only use that of the full verbatim records. It is also worth noting that the UNSC have both formal and informal meetings. There does not exist any meeting records of the informal meetings, and this thesis will therefore only use material from the formal meetings. It is therefore apparent that there are a significant portion of informal meetings and discussions of which outsiders are not privy to, and can therefore limit the scope of this thesis.

Additionally, the agenda of several of the meetings used in this thesis also included that on other issues. As an example, several of the meetings related to Syria also included that of other situations in the Middle East, including that of Palestine, Yemen, Lebanon. In this thesis, only the part of the statements relating to Libya or Syria will be included in the analysis, and not the statements given by the representative as a whole.

This thesis accepts the assumption that diplomats, such as foreign ministers and ambassadors, are not considered individual people, but rather representatives of states. In the words of Wheeler (2002, pp. 22-23): "[States are] structures that constrain and enable those individuals who hold positions of responsibility in the state (…) It is individuals who sign treaties like the UN Charter, but this action does not bind them as individuals, it binds the states that they represent". This means that when discussing the statements given by the representatives of the P5 countries, although it is phrased as, for instance, "Mr. Churkin argued…", it is inherently inferred that the statement expresses the opinion of the Russian state, not on Mr. Churkin, the individual.

In the years following the invasion in Libya, there have been significant debate on the relative success of the mission in Libya (Zifcak 2012, p. 68). This is beyond the scope of this thesis, and will therefore not be discussed.

1.4 Structure of thesis

This thesis contains that of seven chapters. **Chapter 2** of this thesis starts by giving a brief overview of the road to R2P, by explaining both how and why it was created, and before examining the background of the crises in Libya and Syria, as well as the academic debate surrounding R2P. **Chapter 3** will then go on to consider the theoretical framework for the analysis, with particular emphasis on the English School of International Relations, and the two main factions of this theory, the pluralist and solidarist wings. **Chapter 4** will consider the methodological framework of this thesis, by illustrating why the choices of comparative case studies and use of textual analysis through qualitative content analysis, are the appropriate choices for this research problem. Subsequently, this chapter will give an indication of the limitations and weaknesses that become evident through the use of these methodological choices, such as validity, reliability, and biases. **Chapter 5** will describe statements by the P5 found in the meeting records of eight meetings of the UNSC, as well the quantitative results found using words frequency searches. **Chapter 6** will then go on to discuss the findings in the results. Additionally, possible further research will be suggested. Lastly, **Chapter 7** will include the concluding remarks of this thesis.

2. Background and literature review

2.1 The road to the Responsibility to Protect

In the 1990s a number of humanitarian tragedies shocked the world, including the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, in which 800 000 people were massacred in 100 days and the genocide in Srebrenica in 1995, in which more than 8000 Bosnian were massacred (Bellamy & Dunne 2016, p. 5; Cater & Malone 2016, p. 115; Thakur & Weiss 2009, p. 33). At the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1999 and again in 2000, Kofi Annan, the then-Secretary General of the UN (UNSG), made compelling pleas to the international community to find a common agreement in how these gruelling tragedies should be approached (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001, p. vii). As a response to this, the Government of Canada, along with a group of major foundations, established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000, whose report was eventually published in December of 2001. The aim of this report was to ask the question: "When, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coercive – and in particular military – action, against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other state?" (ICISS 2001, p. vii). The commission considered the concept of the so-called "right of humanitarian intervention", and in doing so, ICISS first introduced the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). This concept presented the idea that each nation state has the responsibility to protect its own citizens from what the report called "avoidable catastrophe", further specifying that as mass murder, rape, and/or starvation. The report further acknowledges that R2P considers the responsibility of the wider international community, when a state is unable, or in some cases unwilling to protect their own citizens. These two assumptions were characterized in the report as the two basic principles of R2P, and were presented in the report as follows:

> A. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself.
>
> B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.
>
> (ICISS 2001, p. xi)

Additionally, the report included a synopsis of the core principles of R2P, divided into four parts: Firstly, this included the aforementioned basic principles. Secondly, that of the foundation of R2P, which were drawn from the inherent obligation of sovereignty; the responsibility of the UNSC under Article 24 of the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security; certain obligations found in international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and national law; as well as the already existing practice of states, regional organizations, and the UNSC. Thirdly, the elements of R2P, which included the three main responsibilities, namely that of the responsibility to prevent conflict, the responsibility to act with appropriate measures, and the responsibility to rebuild societies after intervention. Lastly, the report considered the priorities of R2P, of which prevention was named as the single most important dimension of R2P (ICISS 2001, p. xi; Cater and Malone 2016, p. 120).

Following the release of the ICISS report on R2P it would take several years before the principle was officially adopted by a UN institution. Cater and Malone (2016, p. 121) credit the ill-timing of the release of the report, as the report was published only a few months following the tragic events of 9/11. They maintain that commissioners of ICISS were concerned that the public discourse following 9/11 would contribute to a merging of the distinct concepts of military intervention for civilian protection in a third state, and that of military intervention as self-defence as a reaction to a terrorist attack (Cater & Malone 2016, p. 121). This led to a delay in the responses to the report, and complicated the development of support of R2P amongst the UN member countries.

Nevertheless, the principle of R2P was often considered in reports. An example of this is in the report published by the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (HLP). R2P is specifically mentioned in the HLP report 'A More Secure World', which states:

> We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.
>
> (HLP 2004, p. 66)

Similarly, R2P was cited in early 2005, when Kofi Annan, the then-UNSG, published a report which aimed to guide the discussions among the member states of the UN leading up to the World Summit, which would be held the following September. In his report, Annan considered R2P in the section called 'Freedom to live in dignity', and here he urged world leaders to "embrace the 'responsibility to protect' as a basis for collective action against genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and agree to act on this responsibility" (Annan quoted in Cater & Malone 2016, p. 122).

The outcome of the United Nations World Summit in September of 2005, was the UNGA agreed upon document, 'The World Summit Outcome Document', in which R2P was first ratified by a UN institution (Cater & Malone 2016, p. 124). Although the scope of application of R2P in the ICISS report originally was much more wide, in the World Summit Outcome Document, the UNGA agreed upon four categories of atrocities of which R2P would relate, namely that of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. It was also decided that the action, which must be in accordance with the UN Charter, shall be through the UN Security Council. The paragraphs of the document specifically related to R2P are §138 - §140. These paragraphs read as follows:

> **138**. *Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes*, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. *The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility* and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

> **139**. *The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.* In this context, we are prepared to take *collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis* and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations

from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.

140. We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide

<div align="right">(United Nations General Assembly 2005, p. 30, emphasis added).</div>

Five aspects found in these paragraphs relating to R2P in the World Summit Outcome Document are worth noting. Firstly, as previously mentioned, the scope of the atrocities of which R2P relates is significantly narrower than when first considered in the report published by ICISS in 2001. Here it is specified to only relate to that of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Secondly, it is highlighted that it is first and foremost the responsibility of each individual state to protect its population from the aforementioned atrocities, which also entails the responsibility to prevent these crimes. Thirdly, it is specified that any action, including that of the use of force, can only be done with the authorization of the UNSC. Fourthly, the document maintains that any action will be done on a 'case-by-case basis'. Lastly, the document specifically states that the international community must first, and predominantly, use diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means, and rather on a case-by-case basis consider other measures, such as collective action, if these aforementioned measures are inadequate.

Following the UN World Summit in 2005, the principle of R2P was affirmed by the UNSC in 2006 in Resolution 1674, and again in 2009 in Resolution 1894 (Bellamy 2012, p. 12); as well as through the establishment of the Joint Office for the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect and the appointment of The first Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect was appointed by the UNSG in 2008 (United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect 2022).

The concept of R2P was further exemplified in the 2009 report "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect" by the then-UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon. In this report, the purpose was not to abandon the R2P-concept of the 2005 World Summit Document, but

rather turning the concept into a more easily implementable concept. Ban Ki-Moon himself stated in the report: "The task ahead is not to reinterpret or renegotiate the conclusions of the World Summit, but to find ways of implementing its decisions in a fully faithful and consistent manner" (United Nations Secretary General 2009, p. 4). In the report, the UNSG (2009, pp. 8-9) outlined a three-pillar system on which the concept of R2P rests:

   I.   Pillar 1: The protection responsibilities of the State
  II.   Pillar 2: International assistance and capacity-building
 III.   Pillar 3: Timely and decisive response

The first pillar, that of the protection responsibilities of the state, is evident already in the first sentence of paragraph 138 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, which states: "Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" (UNGA 2005, p. 30). This commitment has basis in already existing international laws and norms, dating back to the Westphalian treaty of 1648, which is often considered the birth of the modern state-system in Europe with sovereignty at its core (Osiander 2001, p. 260). In his report the UN Secretary General explicitly states: "The State, however, remains the bedrock of the responsibility to protect, the purpose of which is to build responsible sovereignty, not to undermine it; (…) The international community can at best play a supplemental role" (UNSG 2009, p. 10). The key phrase here given by the UNSG is that of 'responsible sovereignty', as this reaffirms the belief that a key aspect of sovereignty lies in a state's responsibility to protect its own population. He goes on to state:

> "Respect for human rights, therefore, is an essential element of responsible sovereignty (…) Member States may wish to review what more they could do, individually and collectively, to implement their obligations under human rights law and to cooperate with the United Nations human rights mechanisms"
>
> (UNSG 2009, p. 11).

Pillar II considers that of the international community's responsibility to assist a state in order to achieve its responsibility to protect. The basis of this pillar can be found in the latter half of paragraph 138 of the 2005 World Outcome Document, which states: "The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility

and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability", as well as the latter half of paragraph 139: "We also intend to commit ourselves (…) to helping States build capacity to protect their populations (…) and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out" (UNGA 2005, p. 30). In his report, the UNSG emphasises that this pillar is not relevant if the leaders of a state is determined to commit the crimes and violations relating to R2P, as it would then be pertinent to begin the work towards the so-called "timely and decisive" response. Pillar II will predominantly be relevant in the cases in which there is weak national political leadership, division or uncertainty in regards to protect its own population, there is a lack of capacity to protect its population, or there is an armed opposition that is either threatening or in fact carry out the atrocities relating to R2P (UNSG 2009, p. 15).

Pillar III presented by the UNSG, relates to the international community's responsibility to take 'timely and decisive action'. The first sentence of paragraph 139 makes it apparent that the main focus on this timely and decisive action should be that of "appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means". However, the second sentence goes on to state that non-peaceful methods may be invoked if two conditions are not met: (a) "should peaceful means be inadequate", and (b) "national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations" from the aforementioned atrocities relating to R2P. Although it is argued that no single pillar is more important than the other, and that the concept of R2P is equally dependant on all three (Bellamy 2012, p. 15), as Pillar III allow for military action, it is the pillar that is most widely contested, and heavily criticised in both political debates and in academic literature (Garwood-Gowers 2015, pp. 303-304). This thesis will also have its focal point on R2P's potential allowance for humanitarian intervention.

2. 2 The academic debate surrounding Responsibility to Protect

In their introduction in 'The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect', Alex Bellamy and Tim Dunne, identify four key points regarding R2P that one must keep in mind in order to understand the concept. Firstly, Bellamy and Dunne (2016, p. 8) argue that R2P is narrow in scope, but universal and enduring in its coverage. That is to say, there should never really be a question of whether or not R2P applies, as all states have a permanent and continuous responsibility to protect their own population from the four atrocity crimes of

genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. However, as it only relates to these four crimes that are mentioned in the World Summit Outcome Document from 2005, the scope of the concept is in fact quite narrow. Bellamy and Dunne (2016, p. 8) do indeed mention several threats to human lives of which R2P does *not* apply, such as armed conflict in general, natural disasters, diseases, or other non-democratic repressive measures, such as the denial of the civil rights of free speech, the right to non-discrimination, employment rights, constitutional rights or access to justice.

Secondly, Bellamy and Dunne (2016, p. 8) call attention to the fact that the states have a responsibility to protect all populations within their state, and not merely their own citizens. In fact, the wording in paragraphs 138-139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document specify populations, and not citizens. This is of particular importance in cases where the state does not protect specific members of the population, as they are not deemed citizens. Bellamy and Dunne (2016, p. 8) mention the case of the Muslim Rohingya in Myanmar as an example. Other relevant examples could be that of the Palestinian population in Israel or the Muslim Uighurs in China.

Thirdly, Bellamy and Dunne (2016, p. 8) emphasise the fact that R2P already has a firm core within well-established principles in existing international law. That is to say, the four atrocity crimes of which R2P concerns are all forbidden by international law. Additionally, the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document clearly states that any action of which R2P is implemented must be done through the UN Charter, and with the explicit authorization by the UN Security Council. In other words, R2P entire basis of implementation is founded in the existing international laws of the UN Charter.

Lastly, Bellamy and Dunne (2016, p. 8) highlights the preventative focus of R2P. According to the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, the responsibility outlined also entails the prevention of the four aforementioned crimes, including their incitement. That is to say, other measures, including that of military intervention, must only be considered when prevention fails. Paragraph 140 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document is particularly relevant to this aspect of R2P, as it indicates the support by the member states of the Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide. This mandate is tasked with early warning and assessment, and has four main assignments: (i) collecting existing information relating to violations of human rights that could potentially lead to genocide if not dealt with; (ii) to bring situations of

concern to the Secretary-General, and thus also to the Security Council; (iii) to make recommendations, through the Secretary-General, to the Security Council in regards to actions to counter or impede genocide; and lastly (iv) to communicate with the UN system in relation to activities for the prevention of genocide, as well as improve the competency of the UN system in regards to the management and analysis of information concerning genocide (Bellamy & Dunne 2016, pp. 8-9).

Ramesh Thakur (2013, p. 62) highlight three aspects of the current debate on R2P that he argues it is preliminary to understand the concept of R2P. Firstly, the use of external interventions were frequent also before R2P was formulated in the 2001 ICISS report, and similarly, the use of external intervention is not guaranteed, even following the adaption of R2P in the World Summit Outcome Document in 2005. Thakur (2013, p. 62) argues that the distinction is therefore not between *if* an intervention will occur, but rather *whether* an intervention will be ad hoc or rules-based, unilateral or multilateral, and divisive or consensual. In other words, R2P will aid in the creation of a framework on external intervention in which the intervention will be that of rules-based, multilateral and consensual interference.

Secondly, Thakur (2013, p. 62) maintains that the debate surrounding R2P must never become a North-South issue. Thakur (2013, p. 63) argues that although there does exist the perception that non-Western societies oppose R2P, this is in fact not the case. He states that many non-Western countries have the historical tradition of reciprocal rights between a sovereign and its subjects, and he uses the example of Emperor Ashoka in 3rd-century BC in India, who inscribed the following: "this is my rule: government by the law, administration according to the law, gratification of my subjects under the law, and protection through the law", which draws clear links to the modern theory of social contract between a sovereign and its subjects (Thakur 2013, p. 63). Nevertheless, Thakur (2013, p. 62) does argue that there does exist potential that R2P could turn into a North-South issue, due to the persistent stubbornness of emerging states or in fact a form of calculated neglect of potential concerns by a declining West (Thakur 2013, p. 62).

Thirdly, Thakur (2013, p. 63) highlights the fact that the realities of R2P clearly indicate that any form of intervention through R2P is likely to be in developing countries. Thakur does not give any specific reasoning behind this statement, but rather focuses on how this should affect

the current ongoing debate surrounding R2P. He maintains that as a consequence of the previous assertion, it is the people in developing countries that will suffer of mass atrocities, if outsiders either refuse or are unwilling to help. Conversely, it will be the population of developing countries which will benefit if humanitarian interventions occur, and are completed responsibly. Thakur (2013, p. 63) therefore asserts that the debate surrounding R2P should be held firstly among the civil societies and governments of the developing countries, and secondly between developing and advanced countries. This is not the case of the current debate. Thakur (2013, p. 63) heavily critiques this, and illustrates the problematic nature of this through the example of high-profile roundtable following the intervention in Libya, in which all the five members were Western academics. No members came from developing countries, of which it is most likely a humanitarian intervention could occur. He maintains that although each of the members were in fact highly qualified, the optics of the roundtable as a collective were severely damaging to the debate surrounding R2P (Thakur 2013, p. 63).

Crossley (2018, p. 415) considers the question of "Is R2P still controversial?", and in answering this, she divides the epistemic community surrounding the debate of R2P into three distinct scopes, namely that of (1) the academic community, meaning that of the scholars that are considering and analysing mass atrocity prevention and intervention; (2) policymakers, that is to say the people working in governments and international organizations; and (3) members of the media, as well as humanitarian organizations and think tanks working with mass atrocity prevention (Crossley 2018, p. 416). It is worth noting that in her article Crossley (2018, p. 416) mainly focuses on the scholarly debate, and does therefore not go into detail in the discussion of whether R2P is still controversial in the two remaining spheres. In her article, Crossley (2018, pp. 421-430) consider four various critiques of R2P: (1) the post-colonial critique, (2) the pacifist critique, (3) the feminist critique, and (4) the pluralist critique.

The main aspect of the post-colonial critique against R2P is based around the fact that R2P can and will be used in order to justify foreign interference in domestic affairs (Crossley 2018, p. 420). In other words, using humanitarian reasoning for military action. This in turn leads to the facilitation of the worsening of the unequal international system. This is the argument used in the critique of R2P by Mahmood Mamdani (2010), in which he maintains that R2P is used in a ploy to strengthen Western domination in Africa (Crossley 2018, p. 421). Mamdani (2010, p. 54) illustrates this with the shift of language in regard to humanitarian

intervention. Mamdani (2010, p. 54) maintains that although the 'Westphalian coin' is still the effective currency in the international system, of which sovereignty and citizenship are the two sides of this coin, the new international humanitarian order does not acknowledge citizenship in the same manner. Rather, citizens are turned into so-called 'wards', of which they are no longer the bearer of rights, as they were as citizens, but as passive beneficiaries of an external 'responsibility to protect'. People are no longer active agents in their own liberation, rather, recipients of charity. Mamdani (2010, p. 55) claims: "Humanitarianism does not claim to reinforce agency, only to sustain bare life. If anything, its tendency is to promote dependency".

In a response to the post-colonial critique of R2P, the advocates for R2P promoted two counterarguments. Firstly, the fact that R2P was not exclusively a Western product, and therefore not really a North-South Issue. This argument was used by Thakur (2013), as previously described, in which he argues that the origins of R2P can in fact be traced back to India in the 3rd century BC. Secondly, the advocates for R2P highlights the increased importance of the regional organizations, in regards to conflict prevention and resolution. This can be seen in the significance of the regional organizations in the conflict in Libya, which will be further detailed in chapter 2.3 of this thesis.

The pacifist critique of R2P is based around the fact that the principle of R2P overemphasise the use of force. According to this critique R2P works against its own purpose, and rather than promoting peace and stability, it is in fact signalling a new form of 'militarism' (Crossley 2018, p. 421). This is the argument given by Mary Ellen O'Connell (2010) in her article "Responsibility to Peace: A critique of R2P" in which she demonstrates a pacifist critique of R2P through the lens of international law. O'Connell's (2010, pp. 46-48) main argument relies on the assumption that military intervention for humanitarian intervention does more harm than good, and she uses both the examples of UN-authorized interventions such as Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1992), Congo (1999), as well as unilateral interventions, such as the US-led unilateral intervention in Panama in order to illustrate this. O'Connell (2010, p. 47) claims that when reviewing military intervention for humanitarian purposes some academics argue that the failure of these interventions is caused by the lack of allocating the requisite resources. O'Connell (2010, p. 47) counters this argument by stating that it will always be inconceivable that states will ever commit to the immense and substantial amount of resources

that will be required to achieve a successful intervention, due to the financial burden any humanitarian intervention will cause on the external actors.

Another argument given by O'Connell (2010, p. 47) relates to the fundamental flaw in the concept of humanitarian intervention, which claims that it is considered acceptable to kill, injure and hurt some people, in order to maintain the human rights of others. According to O'Connell (2010, p. 48) this contradiction should lead to the belief that we must rid the world of war, rather than advocate for its acceptability. She states: "The advocacy for R2P supports the new acceptability of war, prodding those who would otherwise argue for peace and respect for law to do the opposite". In other words, by arguing for R2P, one is in fact arguing for further war.

The pacifist critique of R2P has not played a significant role in the academic debate, but has rather been utilised by policy makers. Crossley (2018, p. 427) argues that both secular society organizations, as well as a significant number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has made pacifist arguments against R2P. Many of these NGOs have their origin in civil society movements linked to anti-war campaigns, and much of their ideology is therefore intrinsically linked to pacifist arguments. Large and influential NGOs, such as Médecins Sans Frontières and International Committee of the Red Cross, are among those sceptical to R2P, which further illustrate the critical influence pacifists have on the wider policy community (Crossley 2018, p. 427).

The third critique presented by Crossley (2018, p. 421) is that of the feminist critique. She groups together that of the pacifist and the feminist critiques, arguing that the feminist critique of R2P comprises much of the of the same ideas as the pacifist critique. These 'anti-war feminists' argue that patriarchy, war and violence are essentially linked, and although they may have varying perspectives on war, the anti-war feminists consider war as connected to gender inequalities and gendered violence (Crossley 2018, p. 422). Therefore, similarly to that of the pacifists, the 'anti-war feminists' were cautious towards R2P, as part of its intention was to create a framework for utilising force as a policy option. Another feminist critique in regards to R2P considers its so-called 'androcentric quality', in which it was argued that R2P was "gender blind", and failed to consider the way in which war and violence often disproportionately affect the lives of women and girls (Crossley 2018, p. 422). The fact that

only one woman, Gisèle Côté-Harper, was a member of the ICISS, further symbolized this lack of focus on gender issues in regards to R2P.

However, the feminist critique of R2P has, according to Crossley (2018, p. 427), undergone something of a U-turn, as many feminists have started arguing that R2P could be used as a tool in supporting the rights of women. Examples of this is for instance the research which aims to consider the link between gender inequality and the likelihood of conflict, as well as incorporating feminist ideology into R2P debate. Eli Stamnes (quoted in Crossley 2018, p. 427) argues that using a gender perspective in the implementation of R2P should be mainstreamed, and she maintains that this could be done in two ways. Firstly, by identifying and follow up on women's experiences in conflicts that can lead to the atrocities related to R2P. Secondly, by highlighting women as active agents in the prevention of the R2P atrocities. This demonstrates how the feminist critique has shifted from focusing primarily on pacifist arguments, to allowing R2P to consolidate feminist agenda, and vice versa allowed feminist agenda within R2P advocacy.

The last critique presented by Crossley (2018, p. 422) is that of the pluralist critique. This critique emerged from the English School of International Relations, as one of the two main wings factions of the school, the other being that of the solidarist wing. The English School is the main theoretical framework utilised in this thesis, and the pluralist critique will therefore be examined in a later chapter of this thesis, chapter 3.1.2.

Another critique of R2P is based on the belief that R2P is a so-called 'moral hazard'. This term can be found in economics, in which one can find the argument that the precautions against risk (in this case: R2P) could, often inadvertently, lead to irresponsible risk-taking (Kuperman 2008, p. 50). In other words, the utilisation of the framework provided by R2P could lead to a worsening of the conflict or potential atrocity. The 'moral hazard' theory is based on the empirical claim that the majority of the R2P related atrocities are incited due to violent insurgencies against the government (Bellamy & Williams 2012, p. 542). Or as Kuperman (2008, p. 50) claims: "Most such violence occurs only when members of a vulnerable group acquire arms and challenge a state's authority, prompting the state to retaliate disproportionately". According to Bellamy and Williams (2012, p. 543) the promoters of the 'moral hazard' theory highlights two aspects of R2P which allows for the

aggravation of civilian suffering. Firstly, R2P will embolden vulnerable groups to launch *new* revolts in order to elicit a genocidal response. This statement is founded in four hypotheses:

> **Hypothesis 1:** Most genocidal violence is provoked by rebel groups.
> **Hypothesis 2:** R2P creates perverse incentives for rebel groups to engage in risky behaviour.
> **Hypothesis 3:** Groups that would otherwise be deterred from rebelling, rebel due to perverse incentives.
> **Hypothesis 4:** Governments are provoked to respond with genocidal violence.
>
> (Bellamy & Williams 2012, p. 543)

According to the advocates for the 'moral hazard' theory, these four hypotheses lead to the conclusion that R2P will cause genocidal violence that would otherwise not have occurred (Bellamy & Williams 2012, p. 543).

The second aspect of R2P which could lead to the exacerbation of civilian suffering, is that it allows for the rebels to *hold out* in potential peace negotiations, due to the belief that the intervention of a third-party can aid them in achieving better terms. This is similarly presented by Bellamy and Williams (2012, p. 543) through four hypotheses:

> **Hypothesis 1:** Genocidal violence is usually a response to armed rebellion and persists as long as the rebellion does.
> **Hypothesis 2:** Rebels cannot hope to prevail without third-party intervention.
> **Hypothesis 3:** R2P offers the prospect of military intervention by third parties.
> **Hypothesis 4:** This creates the perverse incentive for rebels to reject a negotiated compromise in the hope that genocidal violence will elicit third-party intervention that secures their objectives for them.
>
> (Bellamy & Williams 2012, p. 543)

These four hypotheses thus lead to the inference that R2P can lead to the prolonging of suffering and mass atrocities.

Nevertheless, there does exist some limitations to this theory. According to Bellamy and Williams (2012, p. 544) the research conducted by the advocates of this theory has only been considered in relation to a relatively limited number of cases, namely that of Bosnia, Darfur, Kosovo, and Rwanda. Additionally, Bellamy and Williams (2012, p. 546) highlight several

flaws in the assumptions made by the theory. Firstly, they consider the belief that most genocidal violence is launched by vulnerable groups, and that the existence of R2P will lead to an increase of *new* revolts. If one is to assume this to be the case, one can also assume that there should be an increase in the number of armed rebellions against governments. However, according to the statistical data presented by Bellamy and Williams (2012, p. 547) this does not seem to be the case. Their findings indicate that there has been a steady decline in all forms of armed rebellions against established rebellions between 1990 and 2008, and the first assumption of the 'moral hazard' theory is therefore inaccurate.

Furthermore, Bellamy and Williams (2012, p. 549) consider the second assumption of the 'moral hazard' theory, which claims that R2P will lead to the prolonging of the conflicts and of the atrocities. If this assumption is correct, it would indicate there should be an increased tendency for the revolts to intensify into armed conflict, in addition to the conflicts being longer in duration. Again, the statistical data presented by Bellamy and Williams (2012, p. 549) shows this not to be the case. Although there was a small increase in the portion of rebellions which escalated in the years 1990-1999, there was a more significant decrease in the years that followed. This corresponds to the creation of ICISS, and the development of R2P in the early 21st century. Similarly, when considering the length of the conflicts, Bellamy and Williams (2012, p. 550) considered the length of conflicts starting during the Cold War (1946 – 1989) against the conflicts starting after the Cold War (1990 – 2008), of which duration of the latter tended to last significantly less than the former. Therefore, the evidence presented by Bellamy and Williams (2012, p. 550) again contradict the assumptions of 'moral hazard' theory.

2.3 The case of Libya

Figure 1: Map of Libya (United Nations 2015)

2.3.1 The start of the Arab Spring and unrest in Libya

On the 17th of December 2010 Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, set himself on fire in a desperate attempt to protest, after Tunisian officials took away his only form of income, that of selling fruit and vegetables on the street of his hometown of Sidi Bouzid. The self-immolation achieved significant media attention, both domestically and internationally, and sparked several anti-government protests throughout Tunisia, and in early 2011 these anti-government demonstrations spread further through the other Middle-Eastern and North African (MENA) countries. These protests led to the ousting of the strongmen leaders in Tunisia and Egypt in the beginning of 2011, and the unrest in Libya began amid this regionwide discontent in mid-February of 2011. Similar protests were also occurring in countries such as Algeria, Bahrain, and Yemen (Boduszynski & Pickard 2013, p. 87), and

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Syria would soon follow. The 'Arab Spring', a series of anti-government uprisings and revolutions in the Arab World, was well underway.

In Libya, it began with initial protests in Benghazi on the 15th of February 2011, which quickly spread to nation-wide upheaval against the government of Muammar Gaddafi. Gaddafi responded with lethal force against the protesters, and by the 20th of February as many as 173 people had been killed (Adams 2016, p. 769). According to the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect over the following weeks an estimated 500-700 civilians were killed, as the government utilised the military against the civilian population and rebel forces (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 2021). Gaddafi's response to the unrest was brutal, and there was no doubt of the clarity of the threat of mass atrocities, as Gaddafi is said to have stated: "Officers have been deployed in all tribes and regions so that they can purify all decisions from these cockroaches," and continuing: "any Libyan who takes arms against Libya will be executed" (Gaddafi quoted in Bellamy 2011, p. 265). This clearly illustrates a frightening depiction of a leader who will show no hesitation to commit mass atrocities towards the civil population.

2.3.2 Initial United Nations involvement and Resolution 1970

On the 22nd of February 2011, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, called for the immediate cessation of the actions of the Libyan government and called for the international community to act, stating:

> The callousness with which Libyan authorities and their hired guns are reportedly shooting live rounds of ammunition at peaceful protestors is unconscionable. I am extremely worried that lives are being lost even as I speak (…); The international community must unite in condemnation of such acts and make unequivocal commitments to ensure justice is rendered to the thousands of victims of this repression
>
> (The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2011)

This sentiment was also echoed by UN Secretary-General Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Francis Deng, and Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, in a joint statement, in which they specifically utilised the concept of R2P in their wording, stating:

> We remind the national authorities in Libya, as well as in other countries facing largescale popular protests, that the heads of State and Government at the 2005 World Summit pledged to protect populations by preventing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, as well as their incitement.
>
> (United Nations Press Release 2011)

These statements clearly indicate how R2P informed the UN response to Libya, from the very start of the conflict.

On the 26th of February, less than two weeks after the initial Libyan protests, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1970, in which they demanded an immediate end to violence in Libya (Terry 2015, p. 164). In the resolution the UNSC expressed grave concern over the situation in Libya, and condemned the violence and force against civilians, as well as specifically using the wording of R2P stating: "[The UNSC,] *Recalling* the Libyan authorities' responsibility to protect its citizens" (UNSC S/RES/1970, p. 2). In addition, the UNSC referred the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC), imposed an arms embargo, as well as a travel ban and assets freeze for certain individuals involved in the violence in Libya (UNSC S/RES/1970, pp. 3-5).

2.3.3 Resolution 1973 and "all necessary means"

The measures outlined in Resolution 1970 were all coercive, but peaceful, but they did not have the desired effect, and the violence in Libya continued (Adams 2016, p. 770; Terry 2015, p. 164). On the 1st of March, Libya's membership on the Human Rights Council was suspended, and the anti-Gaddafi forces, calling themselves the (Interim) National Transitional Council (NTC), made the declaration that they were the sole legitimate representative of Libya (Terry 2015, p. 164). On the 12th of March the League of Arab States (LAS) called for a no-fly zone over Libya, taking particular note of "the crimes and violations being perpetrated by the Libyan authorities against the Libyan people, in particular the use of military aircrafts, mortars and heavy weaponry against the civilians" (Terry 2015, p. 164) in their reasoning. A few days following the LAS's call for a no-fly zone, Libyan television broadcasted the message that government forces were on their way to Benghazi, an opposition-controlled city, in order "to cleanse your city", and Gaddafi publicly stated that the

government forces would "show no mercy and no pity", and the threat of mass atrocities heightened (Adams 2016, p. 770).

As a consequence, the UNSC regathered in order to debate the protection of Libyan civilians, and on the 17th of March the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, in regards to the situation in Libya. The resolution passed with 10 votes in favour, none against, and with 5 abstentions. The abstentions were Brazil, China, Germany, India, and the Russian Federation.

In Resolution 1973, the UNSC deplored the failure of the Libyan authorities to comply with Resolution 1970 of a few weeks earlier, as well as specifically recalled paragraph 26 of that resolution in which the UNSC conveyed its preparation "to consider taking additional appropriate measures, as necessary, to facilitate and support the return of humanitarian agencies and make available humanitarian and related assistance in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" (UNSC S/RES/1973, p. 1). As a consequence, the UNSC imposed a no-fly zone over Libya, and upheld the arms embargo established in Resolution 1970 (UNSC S/RES/1973, pp. 4-5). However, the most notable and controversial outcome came in the paragraphs relating to the protection of civilians, in which the UNSC

> [a]uthorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to *take all necessary measures* (…) to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.
>
> (UNSC S/RES/1973, p. 3, emphasis added)

Adams (2016, p. 770) highlights the fact that it is quite notable that none of the members of the BRICS-countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), all of which were on the UN Security Council at the time, voted against the resolution, even though Resolution 1973 clearly authorizes proposed air strikes on another sovereign nation.

Following the passing of Resolution 1973, France, the UK, and the US initiated the implementation of the resolution and the use of force, initially through the no-fly zone, but later fortified by attacks on government forces (Terry 2015, p. 166; Zifcak 2012, p. 65). Although the three aforementioned countries commenced the operation, as many as 18

countries assembled to take part in the NATO-led coalition for the implementation of Resolution 1973. It is worth noting the NATO-led coalition was joined by a number of non-members, including that of four Arab countries, namely that of Jordan, Morocco, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (Adams 2016, p. 771; Terry 2015, p. 166).

With the aid of the NATO-led coalition, government forces were successfully withdrawn from Benghazi, but over the following months the Gaddafi-led forces persisted in committing mass atrocities (Adams 2016, p. 772). According to an investigation done by the UN Human Rights Council's (UNHRC) International Commission of Inquiry, the Gaddafi forces had committed "crimes against humanity and war crimes (…) [including] acts of murder, enforced disappearance, and torture (…) perpetrated within the context of a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population" (UNHRC quoted in Adams 2016, p. 772).

The campaign by the NATO-led forces would continue for months, and by the end of August 2011, anti-Gaddafi forces had entered Tripoli, the capital of Libya. In the following October the NTC had been acknowledged as the new government of Libya by over 100 states, and the NTC thereupon declared 'liberated' (Terry 2015, p. 166).

2.4 The case of Syria

Figure 2: Map of Syria (United Nations 2022)

Momani and Hakak (2016, p. 896) categorize the Syrian conflict into three phases: (i) the civilian uprising and armed insurgency (2011-2013); (ii) Hezbollah involvement and chemical attacks; (iii) ISIS involvement and presidential elections (2014-present). It is worth noting that their research is only up to 2016, as that is the year of publication of The Oxford Handbook of Responsibility to Protect. This research is therefore not up to date, and the 'present' referred to in their research is only that of 2016, and that the conflict in Syria unfortunately has progressed further and is continuing until this day. As this thesis has a focus on the initial UNSC response, or in the case of Syria, lack of response from 2011 and 2012, only the first of these phases will be considered in detail.

2.4.1 Civilian uprising and armed insurgency

Inspired by the unrest in Tunisia and Egypt, the civilian uprising in Syria began in January of 2011 as a non-violent and peaceful opposition against the government of Syria and its president Bashar al-Assad. Initially the anti-government protests, which consisted of predominantly peaceful protestors, resulted from discontent in relation to problems surrounding the lack of freedom of speech, bureaucratic corruption, excessive use of martial

law, inequality, poverty, unemployment, an appeal for democracy, and a call for human rights to be respected (Momani & Hakak 2016, p. 896; Zifcak 2012, p. 73). However, in March of 2011, a large protest occurred in the city of Dar'a, following the arrest of a group of young students accused of painting anti-government graffiti. The students were detained by government intelligence agents, and were tortured during their arrest (Zifcak 2012, p. 73). During the ensuing protest the Syrian armed forces reacted with violence, and opened fire on the protesters. Following this, similar protests spread rapidly to other major Syrian cities, including Aleppo, Baniyas, Damascus, Homs, Jasim, and Latakia, and these nationwide protests brought hundreds of thousands of civilians together in demonstrations to appeal for better lives (Momani & Hakak 2016, p. 897). However, the president of Syria, Bashar al-Assad, condemned the protests, and in a statement given on the 30th of March, he alleged that Syria was the target of a grand conspiracy by imperialist forces, in which internal conspirators were recounting lies about the government (Zifcak 2012, p. 73). In contrast to the Libyan President Gadhafi who called for the "extermination of the rats" in protesting Benghazi, President Al-Assad repeatedly commented that the Syrian army in no way targeted civilians, but rather only known terrorists, and that the people of Syria still had the right to peaceful protests (Momani & Hakak 2016, p. 897). On the 16th of April, in an attempt to appease the public, Assad swore in a new government, lifted the state of emergency which had been in effect for nearly 50 years, abolished the High Security Court, offered citizenship to tens of thousands of Kurds, as well as formally recognizing the civilians' right to protest (Momani & Hakak 2016, p. 897; Zifcak 2012, p. 73). However, these attempts of appeasements were unsuccessful, and in the following week, on the 22nd of April, the largest demonstrations occurred throughout the country. During these protests and in the immediate aftermath, more than 100 civilians were killed by the Syrian army (Zifcak 2012, p. 73).

Following the horrid events of the protests on the 22nd of April, the brutal response by the government forces intensified. According to sources deemed accurate by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) the Syrian forces conducted mass and arbitrary arrests, employed torture on protesters, lawyers, journalists, human rights defenders and others, as well as using

> artillery fire against unarmed civilians, door-to-door arrest campaigns, the shooting of medical personnel who attempt to aid the wounded, raids against hospitals, clinics and mosques and the purposeful destruction of medical supplies and arrests of medical personnel

As a consequence, the UNSC met on the 27th of April, in order to debate the intensification of the situation in Syria. In the UNSC, Western countries, including France and the United Kingdom, appealed for action against President al-Assad and his government. However, Russia stood alongside Syria and supported the narrative that the Syrian army only targeted terrorists, and argued that it was the terrorists who were causing civilian deaths and the instability in the country (Momani & Hakak 2016, p. 897).

During these meetings, the UNSC pursued consensus on issuing a so-called Press Statement, on the situation in Syria, what is generally considered the weakest of UNSC output, but this effort failed, in part due to the rejection of the BRICS-countries (Brazil, Russia, China, India, and South Africa) (Gifkins 2012, p. 381). They maintained that the (at the time) ongoing operation in Libya had transformed from establishing a no-fly zone in Resolution 1973, to what had essentially become a challenge for regime change (Gifkins 2012, p. 381).

2.4.2 UNSC Draft Resolutions

In May of 2011, France, Germany, Portugal, and the UK aimed to achieve action by the UNSC, through a proposed draft resolution. This draft resolution was debated throughout June and July, but the draft was never put up to a vote due to the threat of veto by China and Russia (Gifkins 2012, p. 382). During this time, the European Union (EU) imposed an arms embargo on the Syrian regime, as well as a travel ban and assets freeze on senior regime officials (Plofchan 2014). On the 3rd of August, the UNSC made its first decision on the Syrian situation, five whole months after the conflict started, when they issued a Presidential Statement, in which they condemned "the widespread violations of human rights and the use of force against civilians by the Syrian authorities" (UNSC 2011, p. 1). Following the UNSC statement, several statements by key organisations and other countries followed, including that of a joint statement by the leaders of France, Germany, the US, and the UK, as well as statements from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and the LAS (Gifkins 2012, p. 382; Plofchan 2014). In the aforementioned joint statement by France, Germany, the US, and the UK, it was stated that the violence against the civilian population perpetrated by the Syrian army, had led to the loss of legitimacy for Assad's leadership, and it called for Assad to resign (Gifkins 2012, p. 383;

Plofchan 2014). According to Gifkins (2012, p. 383) this shifted the diplomatic terrain, as the call for the resignation of Assad was considered highly controversial, and consequently significantly influenced the ensuing debate on Syria.

In the following months, there were two draft resolutions circulated, one sponsored by Russia, the other by the UK (Gifkins 2012, p. 383). According to Gifkins (2012, p. 383) these two draft resolutions considered the conflict in significantly varying contexts: the Russian draft called on the Syrian authorities to implement the promised reforms, but the draft resolution did not include any threat of coercive methods if the Syrian regime failed. The draft resolution sponsored by the UK had wider support among the other UNSC members, and included an assets freeze for key figures within the Syrian government, in addition to an arms embargo. These measures were heavily debated, and in an attempt to appease Russia and China, these measures were removed. The draft resolution sponsored by the UK was put to a vote on the 4th of October 2011, but failed to be adopted due to the veto by Russia and China (Gifkins 2012, p. 383).

This deadlock in the UNSC continued in the following months, with an additional double veto by Russia and China on a draft resolution put forward on the 4th of February 2012. The same month the former Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, was appointed Joint Special Envoy in Syria by the UN and LAS, and following a period of negotiations in Syria, Annan outlined a six-point plan for the cessation of violence, which called for a Syrian-led political process (Gifkins 2012, p. 387). The UNSC followed the publishing of the six-point plan by issuing a Presidential Statement on the 21st of March, in which they expressed their full support for the plan (Gifkins 2012, p. 387). However, the negotiated deadline for a ceasefire passed, and the atrocities towards the civilian population continued. The UNSC thus adopted Resolution 2042, which called for an observer mission by UN military observers (Gifkins 2012, p. 388). This was the first resolution to be passed by the UNSC, more than a year after the conflict initially began. An additional resolution was passed a week later, that authorised the deployment of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) (Gifkins 2012, p. 388).

2.4.3 Chemical attacks, ISIS involvement and the ongoing crisis

By 2013, the conflict in Syria had escalated to a multi-faction civil war, in which the fighting occurred on numerous fronts and there were several external actors, including Hezbollah fighters in support of the Syrian regime (Momani & Hakak 2016, 899). Additionally, in June of 2013, the US government stated their suspicion that the Syrian government had used chemical weapons on its population, and by August of the same year, the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, condemned the Syrian government's "undeniable" use of chemical weapons (Momani & Hakak 2016, p. 900). By this point the UN estimated the death toll in Syria to have reached well over 100 000 (Momani & Hakak 2016, p. 900). By the spring of 2014, the conflict had escalated further, with the involvement of the self-appointed Islamic Caliphate known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also: ISIL, IS, and Daesh), and their barbaric and violent methods of operations lead to the further escalation of humanitarian atrocities (Momani & Hakak 2016, p. 901). The activity of ISIS spread to numerous other countries in the MENA region, including Lebanon, Iraq, and Libya, in addition to other countries experiencing the horror of cross-border terrorism (Momani & Hakak 2016, p. 900). Following the ISIS activity, the US and its allies created a coalition mission against ISIS in Iraq, with some attacks being carried out in Syrian territories, but as the US-led coalition's main focus was the liberation of ISIS-ruled territory, not much was considered in regards to the power-vacuum following the release of territories from ISIS-rule (Momani & Hakak 2016, p. 902). As the focus of this thesis is on the UNSC response in the early years of the Syrian conflict (2011 and 2012), no further detailing of the events from 2012 to present will be presented, as this is beyond the scope of this thesis.

3 Theoretical framework

This chapter will present the theoretical framework used for this thesis, namely that of the English School of International Relations. A discussion on the varying viewpoints of the pluralist and solidarist traditions, and how they relate to the principle of R2P, will follow.

3.1 The English School of International Relations

3.1.1 Origin and core assumptions

English School of International Relations (ES) has its origin in the creation of the 'British Committee on the Theory of International Politics' in 1959. The committee was created as a response to the American Committee, which consisted of prominent thinkers within the realist tradition, and the aim of the British Committee was to pursue a new analysis framework of international relations, contrasting that of realism (Dunne 1998, p. 90; Durmaz, Ra'ees & Ishtiaq 2019, p. 289). Some of the notable writers and contributors to this theory is that of Martin Wight, Herbert Butterfield, Charles Manning, Hedley Bull, and R.J. Vincent during its classical period (1950s-1980s), as well as Barry Buzan, Andrew Linklater, and Nicholas J. Wheeler, during its post-classical phase (1990 and onwards) (Dunne 2008, p. 267; Grader 1988, p. 30). It is worth noting that although the name 'English School' indicates that all of the leading contributors to the theory were English, this was in fact not the case. However, they were all predominantly based at British universities, most notably the London School of Economics (Dunne 2008, p. 267; Grader 1988, p. 30).

According to Tim Dunne (2008, p. 268) those who identify with the English School consider it as occupying that of the middle ground in international relations (IR) theory, often alongside constructivism. He goes on to argue that English School scholars are drawn to this theory as it allows for a combination of various theories and concepts, and thus avoids the "either/or" framing presented by realism vs. idealism (Dunne 2008, p. 268). He states: "In place of these dichotomies, the English School purports to offer an account of international relations that combines theory *and* history, morality *and* power, agency *and* structure" (Dunne 2008, p. 268).

The core element of ES theory is found in its three key concepts: international system, international society, and world society (Buzan 2004, pp. 6-7). According to ES these three

concepts form a complete and interlinked image of the IR universe, in which they occur in continuous co-existence and interplay (Buzan 2004, p. 10). Buzan (2004, p. 7) provides a succinct summary of the three concepts:

> *International system* (Hobbes/Machiavelli/realism) is about power politics amongst states, and puts the structure and process of international anarchy at the centre of IR theory. This position is broadly parallel to mainstream realism and neorealism (…) It is based on an ontology of states, and is generally approached with a positivist epistemology (…)
>
> *International society* (Grotius/rationalism) is about the institutionalisation of shared interest and identity amongst states, and puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules and institutions at the centre of IR theory. (…) In parallel with international system, it is also based on an ontology of states, but is generally approached with a constructivist epistemology (…)
>
> *World society* (Kant/revolutionism) takes individuals, non-state organisations and ultimately the global population as a whole as the focus of global societal identities and arrangements, and puts transcendence of the states-system at the centre of IR theory. Revolutionism is mostly about forms of universalist cosmopolitanism (…) It clearly does not rest on an ontology of states, but given the transnational element neither does it rest entirely on one of individuals.
>
> (Buzan 2004, p. 7)

The Hobbesian/realist tradition, meaning that of the international system, was the starting point for ES, and ES therefore accepted some of the corner stones of realist thinking, predominantly the belief of a state-centred perspective in which there is an anarchical structure in the international arena (Rønnfeldt 1999, p. 143). However, it is the Grotian tradition, that of international society, which is at the heart of ES analysis, and often considered the most important and most developed out of the three key concepts (Copeland 2003, p. 429). Within this tradition, academics argue that within the international arena, there is the ability to form an international society of states, which are bound together by shared norms, institutions, rules, and laws (Bellamy & McDonald 2004, p. 307). Hedley Bull, one of the most influential writers within ES defines international society thus:

> A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive

themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.

(Hedley Bull quoted in Dunne 1998, p. 10)

However, as Buzan (2004, p. 15) highlights, the term 'society' should not in itself be considered as something positive in the moral sense. Although the term often carries a positive connotation, the fact that one is a member of a society does not exempt one from acts of violence or immoral and unjust convictions within that society. As Buzan (2004, p. 15) argues:

> Many human societies have ritualised and institutionalised both intense violence (rituals of sacrifice, warrior cultures) and huge degrees of inequality (slavery; ethnic, religious, caste and gender discrimination). The English school has been admirably forthright about this, going so far as to classify war as an institution of Westphalian international society in Europe.
>
> (Buzan 2004, p. 15)

In contrast to the concepts of international system and international society, which both has an ontological standpoint focusing on states, the Kantian tradition, that of the world society, highlights that of non-state actors, such as individuals and non-state organisations, as the key actors (Copeland 2003, p. 429). The world society approach assumes that there is a common good, common end, or values that belong to all of humankind (Devlen, James & Özdamar 2005, p. 183). According to Buzan (2004, p. 27) the concept of world society is often considered the most problematic feature within the ES framework. This is partly due to the fact that the concept of world society is significantly less worked out, in contrast to the other two concepts, and there is little clarity as to what it in fact entails (Buzan 2004, p. 1). As argued by Buzan (2004, p. 27): "Transnationalism, cosmopolitanism and crusading universalist ideologies are implausibly crammed together in the world society segment".

Jackson (quoted in Buzan 2004, p. 8) considers the three concepts by viewing them as the varying values statespeople must manoeuvre in order to conduct foreign policy: the international system (realist) gives priority to national responsibilities, international society (rationalist) gives priority to international responsibilities, and world society (revolutionist) gives priority to humanitarian responsibilities.

3.1.2 Solidarism vs. pluralism

Within ES theory there are two distinct conceptions, which interpret the conduct and values of international society divergently: the pluralist tradition and the solidarist tradition. Both of these traditions agree that the state system is in fact a *society* of states of which there are common norms and values (Bellamy & McDonald 2004, p. 313). However, the two conceptions deviate in regards to the question of the nature of international society, in particular the extent of shared norms, rules and institutions within the anarchic system of states (Buzan 2004, p. 45). The differentiation between these two conceptions become increasingly apparent in the debate surrounding humanitarian intervention, and as a consequence in the debate surrounding R2P (Bellamy 2003b, p. 326; Tüzgen and Gök 2022, p. 2).

The pluralist position within ES became fully cemented through the works of Hedley Bull, one of the founding fathers of ES theory. He held a so-called "top-down" approach, with a decisively state-centric focus (Gallagher 2015, p. 50). In his study *The Anarchical Society*, he offers a viewpoint in which there occurs a trade-off between justice and order, of which he himself argues for the moral value of order, rather than that of the moral pursuit of justice (Gallagher 2015, p. 51). In other words, the pluralist standpoint leans towards that of the realist side of rationalism, in which they are state-centric and under the assumption that international law is positive law, meaning only made by states (Buzan 2004, p. 46). The pluralist position considers a minimalist conception of international society, in which society is founded on the idea of a plurality of actors (here: states) that are allowed to develop their own rules and ways of being, and the international society is limited to the "mutual interest in the continued existence of the units comprising the society" (Bellamy 2003b, pp. 323-324). In other words, the pluralist viewpoint is one in which the international society has its basis in the mutual recognition of the states' right to exist and prevail according to their own way of life, their own rules, and their own customs. Linklater (quoted in Bellamy 2003b, p. 323) states: "[The pluralist international society] establishes a legal and moral framework which allows national communities to promote their diverse ends with the minimal of outside interference". As a consequence, the pluralist position is based on the principles of non-intervention, equal sovereignty, and territorial integrity (Tüzgen & Gök 2022, p. 6). Additionally, pluralists work with the objective of maintaining the international society, as

this allows them to maintain their position as the principal actors within international relations (Rønnfeldt 1999, p. 145).

The solidarist position, on the other hand, leans more towards that of the Kantian side of rationalism, with a basis in cosmopolitan values (Buzan 2004, p. 47), and drawing on the 17th century work of Hugo Grotius, which emphasize the transnational bonds in international relations and assumes the existence of a universal standard of justice and morality (Rønnfeldt 1999, p. 146).

Linklater (1998, pp. 176-177) succinctly summarises the differences between the pluralist and solidarist position thus:

> A pluralist international society strikes a balance between the principle of state sovereignty and universal principles of order and peaceful coexistence. A solidarist international society endorses the principle of state sovereignty but strives to balance it with a commitment to universal moral principles which address the injustices suffered by the victims of human rights violations, whether these be solitary individuals, indigenous peoples, or ethnic and other minority groups.

The concepts of solidarism and pluralism are often seen as on a spectrum, in which each end of the spectrum is defined in terms of the values, norms and institutions shared (Buzan 2004, p. 154). The differences between the two concepts of pluralism and solidarism is presented in Figure 3, as taken by Rønnfeldt (1999, p. 144). The + shown in the solidarist conception column indicate that the solidarist conception includes the perspective presented by the pluralist column, but adds further.

Two conceptions of international society.

	Pluralist conception	Solidarist conception
Social agency	State	+ Individuals and non-state actors
Normative agenda	Morality of states, i.e. a concern for order and the principle of non-intervention	+ Cosmopolitan morality, i.e. a concern for justice and human rights
Institutions	Balance of power, diplomacy, Great Powers, war	+ Humanitarian intervention
Cooperation	Limited	Extensive

Figure 3: Table showing the difference between pluralism and solidarism (Source: Rønnfeldt 1999, p. 144)

3.1.3 Tension between ES institutions in light of the debate on pluralism vs. solidarism

According to Spandler (2015, p. 604), the concept of international institutions has been a core idea of ES for decades. He argues that this is due to the fact that the concept of institutions embodies one of the fundamental claims within ES, namely the fact that social order is possible in an international society, even within a system of anarchical states (Spandler 2015, p. 604). Buzan uses the definition provided by Patrick Hanks, in order to characterize institutions, in which he claims that within the specific sense of the word, an institution is "an organisation or establishment founded for a specific purpose", or in general terms, an institution is "an established custom, law, or relationship in a society or community" (Hanks quoted in Buzan 2004, p. 164). Buzan (2004, p. 164) goes on to argue that these to varying definition illustrates the difference found between ES and regime theory, as regime theory is more concerned with the former definition, whereas ES considers that of the latter. According to Buzan (2004, p. 165) Hedley Bull, one of the most prominent writers within ES, goes out of his way in order to emphasise that he does not consider intergovernmental organisations or administrative machinery as 'institutions'. Buzan (2004, p. 167) clearly distinguishes between the differences between the two forms of institutions described in the two aforementioned definitions, by claiming that the latter definition, of which ES is focused, can be called *primary institutions* and that of the former definition is *secondary institutions*. Additionally, Buzan (2004, p. 167) highlights two features of what one consider that of a primary institution: Firstly, that they are relatively fundamental and durable practices, which have evolved rather than been designed; and secondly, they are essentially made of actors and their patterns of legitimate activity in relation to each other (Buzan 2004, p. 167).

Buzan (2004, p. 161) argues that the concept of institutions is central to ES theory for three reasons. Firstly, institutions expand upon the substantive content of international society; secondly, institutions establish what English school scholars mean by the concept of 'order'; and thirdly, the ES understanding of institutions is one of the main aspects which differentiates it from the mainstream, rationalist, and neoliberal institutionalist study of international regimes (Buzan 2004, p. 161).

According to Buzan (2004, p. 167), the actual definition of what an international institution is, is not often considered in great detail by most ES scholars. Rather, it has been more common

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to list a selected few institutions that the author wish to focus on and that the author believes describes the essence of the aspect of international society which they wish to describe. This has led to several scholars creating various lists and classifying numerous varying institutions which are studied. However, Buzan (2004, p. 167) claims that although this has led to a shortcoming in the ES literature, it does not weaken ES's general position, predominantly due to the fact that the concept of primary institutions is not considered controversial within IR theory and among those who would rather focus on secondary institutions. Buzan (2004, pp. 167-176, in particular p. 174) attempts to create an extensive, though not exhaustive, list of what ES often considers primary institutions, based on the works of previous ES scholars. This thesis will utilise this list (Buzan 2004, p. 174), and focus on the ones related to the work of the UNSC and R2P, namely sovereignty, territorial integrity, international law, non-intervention, diplomacy, and human rights. The following two paragraphs contain a brief definitional description of the six institutions.

Sovereignty has its basis in the Westphalian tradition, and considers the right of all states to full independence in an anarchic system (Osiander 2001, p. 252). It is the idea that a state's authorities have "the capacity to determine conduct within the territory of a [state] without external legal constraint" (Humphrey 2007, p. 418). In other words: It is what gives a state the authority rule within their own country. As a consequence of this this definition, the institution of **territorial integrity**, also known as territoriality, goes hand in hand with sovereignty, as it considers the exclusive jurisdiction of a state within a territory (Donnelly 2014, p. 226). According to Buzan (2004, pp. 182-183) the institutions of sovereignty and territorial integrity together constitute the essence of the so-called "Westphalian state", and he states: "Sovereignty can in principle exist without being territorial, even though in practice that might be difficult to implement" (Buzan 2004, p. 182). **Non-intervention** is in many ways considered a derivative institution of that of sovereignty (Buzan 2004, p. 182), and it considers the fact that external actors (such as the UN or another state) have the authority to intervene in matters that are within the domestic jurisdiction of any state (United Nations Security Council 2022). The institution of **international law** considers the "universal community of laws and rules" found in the international system (Buzan 2004, p. 182). In the context of this thesis, the institution of international law is particularly apparent through the focus on the UN Charter, as this is considered the founding document and constitutive instrument of the UN, and which sets out the rights and obligations of the UN member states, as well as establishing the UN's principal organs and procedures (United Nations Academic

Impact 2022). All the aforementioned institutions (sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-intervention) can be found within the UN Charter. However, it is worth noting that there exists certain limitations to these institutions, that are agreed upon by the international community, including in the exceptions of self-defence found in Article 51 of the UN Charter, or enforcement decided upon by the UNSC, found in Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Amvane 2015, p. 283; Elden 2006, p. 13). The institution of **diplomacy** is in fact historically older than sovereignty, and Buzan (2004, p. 183) considers it to relate to the "messengers, conferences and congresses, diplomatic language, arbitration, and multilateralism" found in the anarchic society of states. In the context of this thesis, the institution of diplomacy relies predominantly on a state's focus on diplomatic dialogue in order determine solutions.

Human rights as an institution is considered controversial, as some ES scholars, particularly those within the pluralist tradition, would argue against instituting it as an actual institution, claiming it is merely a norm within international society (Buzan 2004, p. 171). Nevertheless, one could argue that with the implementation of human rights values through the affirmation of R2P in the adoption of the World Summit Outcome Document in 2005, its status as an institution was further solidified. The institution of human rights has its basis in the conception that within an international society one is able to reach concencus about substantive moral standards (Bellamy 2003b, p. 324). Additionally, this institution is based upon the cosmopolitan idea of the universal rights of individuals shared values (Buzan 2004, pp. 47-49).

Within ES analysis of international institutions there at times can occur a form of tension between the varying institutions. Buzan (2004, p. 250) argues that some are able to form a coherent, mutually supportive set, in which he uses the example of the self-styled "classical pluralist package" containing sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy, balance of power and international law. He claims: "They do not guarantee peace, but they complement each other comfortably and contain no necessary contradictions" (Buzan 2004, p. 185). However, some of these institutions are intrinsically in tension with these pluralist institutions, most notably the institution of human rights, which is considered a fundamental aspect of solidarist thinking (Buzan 2004, p. 149). This tension unquestionably occurs due to the fact that if the observance of human rights must be observed by those who do not share this value, in the short term, this can only develop through coercive means, such as humanitarian intervention (Buzan 2004, p. 150). This is clearly in conflict with the institutions of sovereignty,

territoriality, and diplomacy through peaceful dialogue. It is worth noting that the solidarist viewpoint builds on pluralist foundations initially, as they are considered to be on a pluralist-solidarist spectrum. However, as the solidarism increases, some of the key pluralist institutions are either dropped completely, or in some manner downgraded or transformed (Buzan 2004, p. 195). This will become apparent in the analysis within this thesis, as the solidarist viewpoints presented, often share the pluralist values, but have reduced their significance.

3.1.4 R2P and the debate between solidarism and pluralism

When describing the pluralist critique of humanitarian intervention, Wheeler (2002, p. 29) call attention to four objections often raised by both realist writers and pluralist writers. Firstly, Wheeler (2002, p. 29) discuss that of national interest, in which he states that humanitarian intervention will always disguise the pursuit of national self-interest, which will in turn lead to the manipulation and abuse by the intervening states. He draws upon the work of Thomas Franck and Nigel Rodley, who through looking at pre-1945 and post-1945 cases of potential humanitarian interventions, deduce that humanitarian intervention will be used by powerful states against weak states, stating: "very few, if any, instances has the right been asserted under circumstances that appear more humanitarian than self-interested and power seeking" (Franck & Rodley, quoted in Wheeler 2002, p. 30).

Secondly, Wheeler (2002, p. 30) identify the pluralist critique of actual interest versus fiscal loss and loss of soldiers' lives. In other words, if there does not exist an actual and crucial interest in the potential intervention, meaning that of a potential national self-interest, pluralists maintain that a state will not intervene due to potential monetary loss, and the loss of the lives of their own soldiers. This argument is based primarily on the notion that a state will not intervene due to humanitarian rationale, because they will always be influenced by that of the national self-interest, in this case potential economic loss or loss of lives if their own nationals.

Thirdly, Wheeler (2002, p. 30) highlights the pluralist focus on the problems of selectivity in humanitarian interventions. Pluralists maintain that when considering how, and when, humanitarian intervention has been applied in the past, one can determine how it will be enforced in the future. The argument made by pluralists is therefore that creating a legitimate

framework for humanitarian intervention will only lead to states applying the rules of this framework selectively. Wheeler (2002, p. 30) states: "The problem of selectivity arises when an agreed moral principle is at stake in more than one situation, but national interest dictates a divergence of response". In other words, pluralists would argue that although there exists a common framework of the application of humanitarian intervention, the actual execution will always differ due to the fact that national interest will vary between the varying cases.

Lastly, Wheeler (2002, p. 31) calls attention to the dilemma of loss of a state's own citizens versus that of strangers in a foreign state. Wheeler (2002, p. 30) maintains that this normative argument is based upon the claim that it is only our identity as national citizens that establish outlying limits of our moral obligations. Using the arguments of Bhikhu Parekh, Wheeler (2002, p. 31) indicates that, according to this argument, foreigners are not under any obligation to intervene, if they possess the ability to prevent or mitigate the troubles. According to Parekh (quoted in Wheeler 2002, p. 31) this is due to the fact that "citizens are the exclusive responsibility of their state, and their state is entirely their own business. Citizens should be morally concerned only with the activities of their own state, and the latter is responsible to and for its citizens alone".

Additionally, according to Bellamy (2003a, p. 3), pluralists argue that there is no agreement as to what constitutes a supreme humanitarian emergency, and as a consequence, whether or not an intervention is justified. He argues that pluralists will always maintain that any proposals for universal ethics or common standards for human rights will always be culturally biased, and that powerful nation states will predominantly be motivated by self-interest rather that humanitarian consideration, and therefore only act in response to humanitarian crises selectively (Bellamy 2003a, p. 3). It is worth noting that these realist/pluralist arguments are of course in direct contrast to that of the contents Pillars II and III of the doctrine of R2P, which clearly states that states have a responsibility for international assistance, and potential collective response in the case of such atrocities.

In contrast, the solidarist viewpoint shaped much of the creation of the principle of R2P, in which it is argued for an inversion of the sovereign-subject relationship, and that the principle of sovereignty is not unlimited and may in some cases be considered invalid in order to protect individuals (Rossi, 2016; Tüzgen and Gök 2022, p. 6). This can clearly be seen in the change in discourse which occurred in the early 21st century with the publication of the report

by ICISS, in which the principle of sovereignty was framed as 'sovereignty as responsibility' (Bellamy and McDonald 2004, p. 318).

Nevertheless, the solidarist position does not allow arbitrary intervention even with the justifications of humanitarian rights. Wheeler (2002, pp. 33-35) presents the solidarist theory of legitimate humanitarian, in which he presents four requirements, all based on the Grotian Just War tradition, that a potential intervention must meet in order for it to qualify as legitimate: just cause, last resort, proportionality, and high probability of achieving a positive humanitarian outcome. This solidarist position is clearly the framework used by ICISS in their forming of R2P, as they present six principles for a legitimate humanitarian intervention, of which four of them are identical to those presented by Wheeler (2002, p. 34). The additional two are those of right intention and right authority (ICISS 2001, p. xii). The following paragraphs will go into further detail as to what is meant by these principles.

Concerning the **just cause** threshold, ICISS (2001, p. xii) argue that as humanitarian intervention is such as an exceptional and extraordinary measure, it can only be warranted if there is, or likely to occur: "(A) large scale loss of life, (…) which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or (B) large scale 'ethnic cleansing' whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape". In regards to the **right authority** to authorize military intervention, the ICISS report clearly states that it is the UN Security Council that is best suited for this task, stating:

> There is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations Security Council to authorize military intervention for human protection purposes (…) Those calling for an intervention should formally request such authorization, or have the Council raise the matter on its own initiative, or have the Secretary-General raise it under Article 99 of the UN Charter.
>
> (ICISS 2001, p. xii)

It is worth noting, however, that even though the ICISS clearly states that the UNSC has the right authority to permit military intervention, the actual implementation of R2P is more complicated. The United Nations does not have its own military force, and will therefore need to delegate any military action. According to ICISS (2001, p. xii), the primary purpose,

meaning the **right intention**, for any military intervention, regardless of any other potential motives the intervening countries might have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. According to the report by ICISS, military intervention will only be appropriate if all other non-military options for the resolution of the crisis have been covered. There must be considerable basis for believing any lesser measures would not be sufficient (ICISS 2001, p. xii). In other words, it must be the **last resort**. Considering the principle of **proportionality**, ICISS (2001, p. xii) maintains that in order for the military intervention to be justified, the scale, duration, and intensity of the potential military intervention should be the absolute minimum of what is necessary to achieve the human rights objective. The report also highlights that there must be a **reasonable prospect for success** of the military intervention (ICISS 2001, p. xii). That is to say, the possible consequences of the military intervention cannot be worse than that of the potential consequences following inaction.

3.1.5 Critique of ES theory

According to Copeland (2003, pp. 433-436) realist critique of ES is predominantly focused on the ES belief that there is both an anarchic system and international society simultaneously, in which international societal norms and institutions promote greater cooperation. He argues that ES scholars consistently ignore the implications of anarchy within this society's ability to affect state behaviour, and in turn struggle to explain the fluctuations in the level of cooperation over time (Copeland 2003, pp. 433-436). He highlights two problems with this argument. Firstly, Copeland (2003, p. 435) maintains that states will be concerned that other states will cheat or manipulate the shared norms in order to gain benefits at their expense. Here he uses the example of Hitler's takeover of Austria and the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia, in which Hitler used the principle of self-determination for ethnic groups as his justification in order to launch the occupation. He goes on to argue that for realists such norms provide little or no restraining power if a state is determined upon going to war (Copeland 2003, p. 435). Secondly, Copeland (2003, p. 435) argues that ES scholars do not address the concern of 'relative gains', in which leaders will be concerned that cooperation will further the relative power of a potential adversary, and in turn (according to realists) reduce their level of economic and military cooperation. Copeland (2003, pp. 435-436) goes on to draw parallels between ES theory and neoliberal analysis, in regards to both of the theories' attention to international institutions as an expression of shared norms. He argues that neoliberal analysis uses that of meticulous game-theoretical arguments, in which

neoliberals are able to predict the role that institutions can play in limiting the uncertainty about an adversary's prior and future intentions (Copeland 2003, p. 436). Copeland (2003, p. 436) claim that ES does not present any similar causal arguments or analysis.

One of the leading writers within ES theory in its post-classical era, Buzan (2004, p. 15) maintains that ES theory is not in fact fully developed and consequently not without its problems, and he highlights five areas of weaknesses within the theory: levels, sectors, boundaries, normative conflicts and methodology. Let us consider them consecutively.

Firstly, much of the analysis within ES considers there to be only one relevant level, namely that of the global system. This is apparent in all the three concepts of ES theory, international system, international society, and world society. Buzan (2004, p. 16) argues:

> Since the modern international system is a closed one on a planetary scale, assumptions of universalism become assumptions of global scale, and vice versa (…) Discussion of modern international society is almost wholly rooted in the assumption of a single, global phenomenon. Individuals, and therefore world society, are also treated as a collective whole – in effect, humankind.

Buzan (2004, p. 18) maintains that there are certain limitations to this inherent bias to the global level, as it is more likely that international society will only reach that of the lowest common denominators when the span is to be global. This is in contrast to the increased likelihood of finding more solidarist progress if the level was subglobal or regional. According to Buzan (2004, p. 18), this is one of the leading causes for the focus on a more pessimistic and pluralist viewpoint found in early ES academic writing.

Secondly, Buzan (2004, p. 19) considers the limitations of missing sectors in the analysis, and here, he highlights the omission of not utilising the economic sector within ES analysis. Buzan (2004, pp. 19-20) claims that although ES scholars at times acknowledge the economic sector, very little detail has gone into actually following up or further elaborating their analysis. This oversight could partly be due to the ES focus on nation states as being the dominant factor in politics, which in turn leads to an emphasis on 'high politics' on security and diplomacy, of which the economic section is not considered as important (Buzan 2004, p. 20).

Thirdly, Buzan (2004, pp. 20-21) highlights the issues surrounding the boundaries of the concepts within ES. Here the main issue surrounds the weak development of the concept of world society, in which the boundary between international society and world society is somewhat blurred. Buzan (2004, p. 21) claims:

> The boundary between the solidarist side of international society and the evolutionary side of world society is both unclear and controversial. It is not at all obvious where solidarist international society ends, and world society begins.

Fourthly, Buzan (2004, p. 21) argues that there are two normative conflicts found within ES analysis, namely that of the dispute between the pluralist and solidarist conceptions of ES, and of the debate between states' rights (international society), and individual rights (world society). In practice, these two normative conflicts often converge into the same discussion.

Lastly, Buzan (2004, p. 22) highlights two methodological issues of ES: the lack of a continuous effort to construct a typology of international and world society; and the lack of clarity in regards to what is in fact entailed in the theoretical pluralism of which ES is based. In regards to the first of these methodical issues, Buzan (2004, p. 22) claims that one of the reasons for the lack of development of a typology of international societies is related to the other limitations mentioned, namely due to the primary focus on the single, global, modern international society, no or little consideration on the regional level, and a lack of development in regard to the economic system. Therefore, Buzan (2004, pp. 22-23) raises several questions that should be asked (and answered) in order to further construct a coherent typology of international societies:

> What is their scale in relation to the overall system in which they sit? How loosely or tightly are they bound together? Is the nature of what binds them more rational, contractual and constructed (society, Gesellschaft), or more emotional, identitybased and historical (community, Gemeinschaft), or some combination of these two? Are the organising principles based on the idea of political equality amongst the units (Westphalian), or political inequality amongst the units (suzerain), or functional differentiation among the units (medieval or neomedieval)?
>
> (Buzan 2004, pp. 22-23)

Additionally, in regards to the second of these methodological issues, there is incoherence of the ontological and epistemological differentiation within the three core concepts of ES. There is no question of whether or not there is an ontological and epistemological difference, but there does appear to be some unclarity about what that differentiation is. Buzan (2004, p. 23) claims that this is predominantly due to the varying approaches one chooses to take, in which he differentiates between the Wightian and structural approach. In the Wightian (based upon the works of Wight) approach, the focus is on 'the three Rs': realist, rationalist, and revolutionist, in which the realist proceed on the basis of inductively developed laws of human behaviour, the rationalist proceed from the base of the nature of social reality, and the revolutionist proceed from that of ethical and prescriptive imperatives. In contrast, if one considers a structural approach, the ontology of the international system and international society is one based on states, with world society based on that of non-state entities, such as individuals. Within the structural approach, there is also the belief that each of the core concepts are based on varying methodological approaches: international system with positivism, international society with hermeneutics and interpretivism, and world society with critical theory (Buzan 2004, p. 23). All of these varying approaches a writer can choose to use further leads to the confusion and incoherence within ES theory.

Another critique of ES theory, is presented by Linklater (2010, p. 10), in which he argues that one of the major issues with the theory is the fact that it is heavily entrenched in Western beliefs and within Western intellectual tradition. This dates back to the founding fathers of the theory, which were all Western-trained scholars, who rarely dedicated much attention to non-European communities, and whose work was written in a time when most Europeans considered themselves to belong to the only so-called "true civilization" (Linklater 2010, pp. 10-11). According to Linklater (2010, p. 11), although such assumptions are no longer as prominent in the West and they have certainly lost their legitimacy, they are still present and the academic world is yet at an early stage in the promotion of non-Western focal points.

4. Methodology

This chapter will present the methodological framework that was used in this thesis, as well as consider the potential limitations and bias that is evident in these methods.

4.1 Textual Analysis

4.1.1 Qualitative Content Analysis

This thesis utilises qualitative content analysis in order to analyse textual data. According to Halperin and Heath (2020, p. 318) content analysis is the systematic analysis of textual information. They categorize the wide array of varying texts that researchers can use into three classifications: (1) official documents, including (but not limited to) that of reports, administrative records, judicial decisions, and transcripts of speeches; (2) cultural documents, such as newspaper articles, magazines, TV-programmes, films, videos, art works, and photographs; and (3) personal documents, meaning texts such as letters, diary entries, and emails. As previously stated, this thesis will use texts relating to the first of these categories, namely that of official transcripts of political speeches.

Content analysis can be divided into either qualitative or quantitative analysis. Quantitative content analysis considers that of the manifest content of the text, meaning that of the easily observable content, often considering questions such as "How often does a word or phrase occur in a text?" or "How many times is a word used?" (Halperin & Heath 2020, p. 318). Qualitative content analysis, on the other hand, presume that one can go deeper than merely the surface level of the texts, alternatively one can 'read between the lines', and infer the meanings and motives found within the texts (Halperin & Heath 2020, p. 318). They state: "[Qualitative content analysis] is generally more sensitive to the context in which texts are produced, and better able to tell us about meanings, norms, values, motives, and purposes" (Halperin & Heath 2020, p. 318). It is this form of content analysis that is used within this thesis.

When defining the method of qualitative content analysis, Hsieh and Shannon (2005, p. 1286) identify three varying approaches to the method: (1) conventional content analysis, in which codes are defined during the data analysis, and the codes are derived from the data; (2) directed content analysis, in which in which codes are defined prior to and during the data

analysis, and the codes are derived from theory or relevant research findings; and (3) summative content analysis, in which key words are derived from interest of researchers or review of literature. This thesis followed that of the second category of qualitative content analysis, a directed approach.

When employing this method, researchers commence the process by using theory or former research, in order to identify key variables, also called codes, to be used in the analysis (Hsieh & Shannon 2005, p. 1281). This allows for a use of deductive approach to the analysis, as there is an already predetermined (by the researcher) process for the analysis. The following step of the process is to create a collection of data (here: the records of UNSC meetings relating to both Libya and Syria), before cataloguing and highlighting passages relating to the varying codes (Hsieh & Shannon 2005, p. 1282). This technique, called coding, is used in order to label the passages to indicate that they are examples of the same thematic idea (Halperin & Heath 2020, p. 323). Additionally, the directed content analysis approach allows for the refining of the key variables during the process of analysis, which thus creates the possible of inductive approach, creating new variables during the analysis (Hsieh & Shannon 2005, p. 1282).

One of the benefits of the directed content analysis approach is the ability to use rank order comparisons of the frequency of variables, in order to complement the qualitative research (Hsieh & Shannon 2005, p. 1282). This can include that of measuring the frequency of certain words or phrases, and determining which is more common. This will not be the main focus of the analysis, but will be utilised to supplement the analysis found in the qualitative content analysis.

4.2 Comparative Case Study

This thesis adopted a comparative case study approach, considering the cases of the crises following the Arab Spring in Libya and Syria. More specifically, the 'cases' chosen in this thesis is that of the negotiations within the UNSC in the months following the outbreak of these crises.

One of the issues surrounding the use of case studies is the fact that the concept of ´case study´ does not have a singular definition (Gerring 2004, p. 342). Indeed, one of the most

prominent academics within the area of methodological use of case studies, Gerring (2004, p. 342) maintains that the term itself is a so-called "definitional morass". Gerring (2004, p. 342) goes on to acknowledge five various definitional variations from previous research: (1) the method used is a qualitative, small-*N* study; (2) that the research is so-called "in the field", meaning it is namely ethnographic, clinical, and participant-observation; (3) process-tracing is a prominent feature in the research; (4) the research is based on and surrounds the characteristics of a single case; or (5) the research is based around a single phenomenon, instance or example. Gerring (2004, p. 342) maintains that the latter of these is the most common usage of these five. Gerring (2004, p. 342) therefore creates a substitute for these flawed definitions through his own definition:

> (…) the case study (…) [is] an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units. A unit connotes a spatially bounded phenomenon – e.g., a nation-state, revolution, party, election, or person – observed at a single point in time or over some delimited period of time.

According to Zartman (2005, p. 3) the case study is the most common method used for analysing international negotiations. Similar to the definition provided by Gerring (2004, p. 342) Zartman (2005, p. 3) defines the concept of a 'case' as "the story of negotiations on a single conflict or problem, either as a single set of encounters or as a number of successive instances". The concept of 'cases' as used in this thesis follows this particular definition, as this thesis considers the so-called 'story' of the negotiations by looking at a number of encounters (here: UNSC meetings) related to conflicts of Libya and Syria. Zartman (2005, p. 7) goes on to argue that in order to analyse international negotiations, the single case study is somewhat limited, as its main purpose it to produce data on a single case, and it is significantly more beneficial to utilise that of comparative case study. He states:

> Things that happened once, however engrossing as a story, have no way of telling us whether they represent regularities or exceptions, (…) The only way to test and reinforce concepts' and theories' claims to normal regularity rather than exceptionality is to look at a number of cases, not just one, and the more the better.
>
> (Zartman 2005, p. 7)

Zartman (2005, p. 8) notes that it is important to consider that even though the use of more cases in comparative research is beneficial, one must acknowledge that with a greater number of cases, the research scope will be significantly increased and there can potentially occur a discord between the aim of the analysis and the amount of details provided. Although several examples of voluminous research that are arguably excellent are mentioned by Zartman (2005, p. 8), it became apparent early on in the planning of this thesis, that it would be too extensive to consider a large number of cases. Therefore, only the two cases chosen were ever considered.

According to Landman (2002, p. 904) the method of comparing case studies, particularly that of comparing countries, is divided into two types of system design: 'most similar system design' (MSSD) and 'most different system design' (MDSD). This thesis uses the approach of MSSD. When employing the MSSD the researcher chooses cases which are as similar as possible, save for the phenomenon that is to be studied (Anckar 2008, p. 389). In other words, the aim is to choose cases which are similar in a significant amount of characteristics, which will then be considered constant variables, and dissimilar in the outcome (Lijphart 1971, p. 687). The reasoning behind MSSD can be found in John Stuart Mill's 'System of Logic' in which he states:

> If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance save one in common, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon.
>
> (Mill quoted in Faure 1994, p. 310)

That is to say, by considering similar cases, with different outcomes, one achieves the ability to highlight variables which differ between the two, which can consequently be used to explain the chosen phenomenon. Landman (2002, p. 905) goes on to argue that MSSD is particularly useful for those interested in area studies, meaning that of research based on countries which are situated in a particular and common geopolitical setting. That is arguably the case within this thesis, as both Syria and Libya are countries of close proximity, both are Arab countries within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and both were swept up in armed rebellions during the Arab Spring of 2011.

MDSD, on the other hand, comprises of cases in which the outcome is the same, but in which the characteristics of the cases vary considerably (Landman 2002, p. 906). The differences between MSSD and MDSD can be found in Figure 3, taken from Landman (2002, p. 905). In the column describing MSSD, the cases all share the same basic characteristics (a, b, and c), and Country 1 and Country 2 share the key explanatory characteristic (x), whereas Country φ does not. As a consequence, Country φ does not have the outcome that is to be explained (y), whereas Country 1 and Country 2 do. In the column showing MDSD, all the countries have varying characteristics (a to i), but all share the same key explanatory characteristics, and as a consequence all share the same outcome (y).

Most Similar and Most Different Systems Design

| | MSSD | | | MDSD | | |
| | Method of Difference* | | | Method of Agreement* | | |
	Country 1	Country 2	Country φ	Country 1	Country 2	Country φ
	a	a	a	a	d	g
Features	b	b	b	b	e	h
	c	c	c	c	f	i
Key explanatory factor (s)	x	x	Not x	x	x	x
Outcome to be explained	y	y	Not y	y	y	y

Figure 4: Table showing the difference between MSSD and MDSD (Source: Landman 2002, p. 905)

4.3 Data Collection

The main form of data collected for this thesis is that of primary sources, through the official transcripts of UNSC meetings in relation to the conflicts in Libya and Syria. In order to assure that all relevant documents were acquired, *The Index of the Proceedings of the Security Council* was used. This is an annual bibliographic guide to the proceedings and documentation of the Security Council, and through its subject index, it allows for an exhaustive list of all relevant documents relating to each subject, with digital links to the full texts[1]. *The Index of the Proceedings of the Security Council* additionally creates an overview of each country's statements on a given subject. This was used as a quality control after coding, in order to assure that all statements were included. Due to the limited scope of this

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[1] The transcripts of these meetings can be found here: <https://www.un.org/en/library/page/index-proceedings-security-council>.

thesis, only 8 meetings will be considered in depth, which all consist of the transcripts of the meetings following a vote on a resolution. A more extensive study could consider going through a larger number of the transcripts in order to achieve more comprehensive and accurate results.

In addition to the primary sources, secondary sources, predominantly through the use of academic literature, has also been used. This was done with the intent of attaining a vast understanding of the context surrounding R2P, the conflicts of Libya and Syria, as well as the theoretical and methodological frameworks utilised in the analysis of this thesis.

4.4 Validity, reliability, and limitations

There are a number of various criteria used in order to assess the rigor of research, including that of validity and reliability (Gibbert, Ruigrok & Wicki 2008, p. 1466). According to Bryman (2012, p. 69), the question of how well the case study method handle the criteria of validity and reliability varies significantly, and relates predominantly to the extent each researcher feel they are applicable for the evaluation of case study analysis. In other words, to some researchers the criteria is utilised as a method for enhancing the analysis, whereas some barely mention it. Bryman (2012, p. 69) maintains that this is predominantly due to the point of orientation for the research, in which the researchers who present from a qualitative standpoint have a tendency to deemphasize these criteria, in contrast to those who are significantly influenced from the quantitative research method, who will give priority to these criteria. Conversely, Yazan (2015, p. 146) argues that this as a result of researchers varying epistemological commitments. He highlights the contrast between the positivist research tradition and the constructivist research tradition. He states:

> Positivistic research tradition aims at capturing or discovering an accurate or approximated knowledge about the case under scrutiny. However, constructivism puts forward the idea that there are multiple versions of knowledge since it is a product of a construction between "knower" and "known".
>
> (Yazan 2015, p. 146).

This thesis will take the positivist tradition as its influence, and will therefore consider the criteria of internal and external validity, and reliability.

4.4.1 Validity

Validity of research is divided threefold: (1) internal validity, (2) external validity, and (3) measurement validity (Bryman 2012, p. 47). The latter of these is predominantly related to quantitative research, and will therefore not be addressed in this thesis.

4.4.1.1 Internal validity

Internal validity considers mainly that of causality, namely asking the question of whether the causal relationship between the conclusion of the research and one or more variables, is reasonable and able to bear scrutiny (Bryman 2012, p. 47). Gibbert, Ruigrok and Wicki (2008, p. 1466) proposes three measures in order to enhance a study's internal validity. Firstly, researchers should formulate a 'clear research framework', which clearly illustrates a causal relationship, meaning that the variable 'x' causes the outcome 'y', and that 'y' was not spuriously caused by a third variable 'z'. The second measure proposed by Gibbert, Ruigrok and Wicki (2008, p. 1466) is the use of pattern matching, in which the researcher should compare empirical patterns with patterns already established in previous studies and different contexts. Thirdly, Gibbert, Ruigrok and Wicki (2008, p. 1466) argue that a researcher should use theory triangulation, in which findings are verified by adopting multiple perspectives.

4.4.1.2 External validity

External validity, on the other hand, relates to the question of whether the results of the analysis can be generalized beyond the initial scope of the study (Bryman 2012, p. 47). This is often considered one of the weaknesses of the case study, in contrast to the quantitative method, as single unit research often falls short in their representativeness (Bryman 2012, p. 69; Gerring 2004, p. 348).

According to Shenton (2004, p. 69) due to the fact that the findings of qualitative research are specific to only a small number of environments or individuals, it is near impossible to establish that the findings are applicable to other situations. Nevertheless, it is argued that the concept of generalizability should not be immediately rejected, as case study research does utilise an example (here: case) which is within a broader group (Shenton 2004, p. 69). Shenton (2004, p. 70) highlights the importance of contextualising information for the readers, as this will allow the reader the ability to accurately understand the subject, and allow the reader to make the transfer. He states:

> After perusing the description within the research report of the context in which the work was undertaken, readers must determine how far they can be confident in transferring to other situations the results and conclusions presented.
>
> (Shenton 2004, p. 70)

That is why, in order to increase this thesis' external validity, great emphasis was put on the context of the research, through emphasis on R2P, and the conflicts in Libya and Syria.

4.4.2 Reliability

Reliability is related to the question of whether results of a study are repeatable (Bryman 2012, p. 46). In the words of LeCompte and Goetz (1982, p. 35): "[Reliability] requires that a researcher using the same methods can obtain the same results as those of a prior study". In qualitative research this can prove to be quite difficult as it is impossible to 'freeze' a social setting and its circumstances (Bryman 2012, p. 390). However, in the case of this thesis, as the primary source used in this thesis is that of official transcripts of UNSC meetings, the reliability is enhanced. Additionally, Bryman (2012, p. 46) emphasises how the criteria of reliability of research is also linked to the clarity and consistency of conceptualisation used in a study, in order to aid in potential future replication. The conceptualization, theoretical framework, methodological framework, and context within this thesis is given in extensive details, which further enhances the reliability of this thesis.

4.4.3 Limitations

In addition to the issues surrounding validity and reliability, there are certain limitations of this thesis, which must be discussed.

Hsieh and Shannon (2005, p. 1283) argues that the directed approach to qualitative content analysis does present certain issues. They maintain that as the basis of the approach is the use of theory, a researcher will always observe the data with an already informed bias, and consequently, it is highly likely that the researcher is able to find supportive evidence rather than unsupportive (Hsieh & Shannon 2005, p. 1283). This form of bias is decidedly unavoidable, as knowledge and acquaintance on the theory is required in order to create a coding framework to be used.

However, the method chosen for this thesis, qualitative content analysis, does mitigate some form of bias often found in other qualitative research. Halperin and Heath (2020, p. 318) highlights the benefits of using textual data, as is done in this thesis, as it uses an unobtrusive method of data collection. This is not the case with research methods such as interviews, which is prone to the "interview effect", in which interviewees feel the need, either consciously or subconsciously, to give socially acceptable answers or the answers they expect the interviewer to desire (Halperin & Heath 2020, p. 318). Using textual data allows a researcher to be able to get information without in any way interfering in the answers given.

Lijphart (1971, p. 685) summarizes the weaknesses of the comparative case study method as: "many variables, small number of cases". He argues that the latter of these problems is common amongst all social science research, whereas the latter is distinct to the comparative method (Lijphart 1971, p. 685). As previously mentioned, using small-N analysis, such as case study, will limit the external validity and generalizability of the research (Bryman 2012, p. 69; Gerring 2004, p. 348).

One of the limitations of the case study approach highlighted by George and Bennett (2005, p. 22) is that of case selection bias. Similar to the issue of statistical researchers, selection bias occurs when occur when "cases or subjects are self-selected or when the researcher unwittingly selects cases that represent a truncated sample along the dependent variable of the relevant population of cases" (George & Bennett 2005, p. 23). In other words, a researcher must carefully consider the process in which he chooses cases, as the nature of qualitative study disallows the random choice of cases (Seawright and Gerring 2008, p. 295). Seawright and Gerring (2008, p. 295) highlight seven varying techniques a researcher can use in order to choose their cases: typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, influential, most similar, and most different. As previously stated, when choosing the cases for this thesis, the technique of most similar case design was used, and this consequently mitigated the presence of selection bias.

5. Results

The following two subchapters describe the statements by the P5 countries in relation to the conflicts in Libya and Syria. The use of cursive indicates the prominence of the ES institutions of sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-intervention, international law, diplomacy, and human rights. Chapter 5.3 contains the quantitative results found using the computer programme of NVivo™.

5.1 UNSC meetings in relation to Libya

5.1.1 Meeting S/PV.6491: Adopting Resolution 1970

On the 26th of February 2011, the UNSC convened in order to vote on draft resolution S/2011/95, presented by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, **France**, Gabon, Germany, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, South Africa, **the UK**, and **the US**[2]. The draft resolution was approved unanimously, and as a consequence adopted as Resolution 1970 (UNSC S/PV.6491, p. 2). The resolution called for an immediate end to the violence, urged the Libyan authorities to act with the utmost restraint, respect human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as imposed an arms embargo, a travel ban and an assets freeze for certain Libyan individuals linked to the Libyan regime (UNSC S/RES/1970).

The delegate from France, Mr. Gérard Araud, expressed his full support for the resolution, and used wording akin to that of R2P, when he argued for the demand of an immediate stop of the use of force against the civilian population, stating:

> *[C]rimes against humanity* may be being committed in Libya. (...) [Resolution 1970] (…)
> recalls *the responsibility of each State to protect its own population* and of *the international
> community to intervene when States fail in their duty.*
>
> (UNSC S/PV.6491, p. 5, emphasis added)

The UK, one of the presenters of the draft, introduced the draft because of their grave concern over the ongoing situation in Libya. The UK representative to the UNSC, Sir Mark Lyall Grant, said the following: "The violence we have seen and the incitement to further violence by Colonel Al-Qadhafi are totally unacceptable, and my Government has expressed its

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[2] P5 countries in bold

profound condemnation of them" (UNSC S/PV.6491, p. 2). He went on to argue that the passing of the resolution sent a powerful signal of the determination of the international community to stand with the people of Libya, and he highlighted the resolution's demand not only for the end to the violence, but also for the full respect of *human rights* and *international law* by the Libyan authorities (UNSC S/PV.6491, p. 2).

The US representative, Ms. Susan Rice, began her statement by claiming that when the atrocities occur, the international community "must speak with one voice", and she went on to argue that with the adoption of resolution 1970, the world had done so (UNSC S/PV.6491, p. 3). Although not mentioning R2P directly, Ms Rice highlighted a prominent aspect of the concept when she, quoting President Obama, argued that Gaddafi had lost his legitimacy to rule by using mass violence against his own people (UNSC S/PV.6491, p. 3). Additionally, Ms. Rice highlighted the emphasis on *human rights* and the responsibility of a state to protect its people, stating:

> The Security Council has acted today to support the Libyan people's *universal rights*. These rights are not negotiable. They cannot be denied. Libya's leaders will be held accountable for violating these rights and for failing to meet their *most basic responsibilities to their people*.
> (UNSC S/PV.6491, p. 3, emphasis added)

Likewise, Russia, through its representative Mr. Vitaly Churkin, supported the resolution due to their concern over the events taking place in Libya and they condemned the use of violence against peaceful demonstrators. However, Russia highlighted the need for restraint and observation of civil and human rights law. He stated:

> A settlement of the situation in Libya is possible only through political means (...) However, it does not enjoin sanctions, even indirect, for *forceful interference in Libya's affairs*, which could *make the situation worse*.
> (UNSC S/PV.6491, p. 4, emphasis added)

Similarly, China's representative, Mr. Li Baodong, expressed their concern over the situation in Libya in a short statement. He highlighted the urgency for securing the end of the violence and restoring stability and normal order as soon as possible. However, he emphasized the

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need for utilising peaceful means, such as dialogue, in addition to stressing the need for assuring the safety and interests of foreign nationals in Libya (UNSC S/PV.6491, p. 4).

5.1.2 Meeting S/PV.6498: Adopting Resolution 1973

On the 17th of March, the UNSC gathered in order to consider draft resolution S/2011/142, presented by **France**, Lebanon, **the UK** and **the US**. In contrast to Resolution 1970, which was passed unanimously, this draft resolution passed as Resolution 1973, with China and Russia abstaining from the vote[3]. In Resolution 1973, the UNSC condemned the Libyan authorities' failure to comply with Resolution 1970, upheld the arms embargo, assets freeze and travel ban agreed upon in Resolution 1970, and additionally, imposed further measures in connection to the situation in Libya, most notably the authorization of a no-fly zone. However, the most controversial aspect of the resolution was the phrasing used in regards to measures taken for the protection of the civilian population, which stated: " [The UNSC a]uthorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, *to take all necessary measures* (…) to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (S/RES/1973 (2011), p. 3).

France expressed their support for the resolution by first calling attention to the prominent role the Arab Spring was having in the fight for democracy. The French representative, Mr. Alain Juppé stating: "The world is experiencing one of the great revolutions that change the course of history. From North Africa to the Persian Gulf, the Arab people clamour to breathe the air of *liberty* and *democracy*" (UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 2, emphasis added). He went on to draw attention to the "murderous repression" led by Gaddafi against the people of Libya, and how despite the calls by the international community for the cessation of violence, the situation remained alarming with a continuous increase in the violence. He continued his argument by underscoring the urgency of the situation, in particular for those in Benghazi stating: "We do not have much time left. It is a matter of days, perhaps even hours" (UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 3). Additionally, Mr. Juppé called Gaddafi that of a 'warmonger' and he urged the international community not to abandon the civilian population to their fate, and as a

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[3] Three other non-permanent member countries also abstained from the vote, namely Brazil, Germany and India.

consequence give Gaddafi free rein to continue his brutal repression (UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 2). He ended his argument with the following powerful statement:

> If we are careful not to act too late, the Security Council will have the distinction of having ensured that in Libya *law* prevails over force, *democracy* over dictatorship and *freedom* over oppression.
>
> <div align="right">(UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 3, emphasis added)</div>

Sir Mark Lyall Grant, on behalf of the UK, expressed his support for the resolution, and began his statement by arguing that Gaddafi, due to his brutal repression of the civilian population, had lost his legitimacy as a ruler, and that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had become a "violent, *discredited* regime" (UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 4, emphasis added). Sir Grant, similar to the French statement, drew attention to the urgency of the situation in Benghazi. Additionally, the statement by the UK highlighted the influence of the LAS, by specifically underlining the LAS's appeal for a no-fly zone in the reasoning for implementing this measure (UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 4). Sir Grant ended his statement by emphasising the Libyan people's wants for human rights, stating: "The Libyan population wants the same rights and freedoms that people across the Middle East and North Africa are demanding and that are enshrined in the values of the United Nations Charter" (UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 4).

Similarly, the US representative, Ms. Rice, stated their support for the resolution. The US statement highlighted the Libyan's people desire for universal human rights, as their reasoning for the resolution, and emphasised that the purpose of the UNSC was indeed the protection of civilians, and that the future of Libya should be decided by the people of Libya (UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 5). Similar to the UK statement, the US emphasised the influence of the appeal by the LAS for a no-fly zone, in the inclusion of this measure in the (UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 5).

Contrarily, Russia abstained from voting on the resolution, claiming this was due to several reasons, predominantly due to the fact that several questions posed by the Russian delegation during the discussions on the draft resolutions had not been adequately answered. Mr. Churkin stated:

Those questions were concrete and legitimate and touched on how the no-fly zone would be enforced, what the rules of engagement would be and what limits on the use of force there would be. (...) Provisions were introduced into the text that could potentially open the door to large-scale military intervention.

(UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 8)

Mr. Churkin went on to argue that the proposers of this resolution's desire for methods involving force was "most unfortunate and regrettable", and that any use of force would lead to further destabilizing developments (UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 8). Mr. Churkin maintained that Russia remained convinced that if excessive force was used, then both the civilian population and the stability of the MENA region would suffer (UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 8). Nevertheless, the Russian statement did highlight that Russia advocates for the protection of the civilian population, rejects any force against the people of Libya, and demand the immediate cessation of the violence. Mr. Churkin maintained that as Russia was guided by "*the common humanitarian values* that we share with both the sponsors and other Council members, Russia did not prevent the adoption of this resolution" (UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 8, emphasis added).

In the statement by the Chinese delegate, Mr. Li Baodong, China expressed their concern for the continuing deterioration of the situation in Libya, and they support the UNSC adoption for "*appropriate and necessary action* to stabilize the situation in Libya as soon as possible and to halt acts of violence against civilians" (UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 10, emphasis added). However, Mr. Li Baodong emphasised China's reluctance for the use of force, stating: "China is always *against the use of force* in international relations" (UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 10, emphasis added). In addition, Mr. Li Baodong stated that China had always emphasized that the UNSC must act in accordance with the UN Charter, as well as resolve the crisis in Libya through peaceful means and follow the "the norms governing *international law*, respect the *sovereignty*, *independence*, unity and *territorial integrity* of Libya" (UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 10, emphasis added). Nevertheless, similar to that of the UK and the US, Mr. Li Baodong drew attention to the position of the LAS, and their appeal for a no-fly zone, as well as the so-called "special circumstances" in his reasoning for China's abstention of the vote on Resolution 1973, rather than utilising China's ability to veto (UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 10).

5.1.3 Meeting S/PV.6620: Adopting Resolution 2009

On the 16th of September 2011, the UNSC reconvened in order to vote on draft resolution S/2011/580, submitted by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, **France**, Gabon, Germany, Lebanon, Portugal, **the UK**, and **the US**. The draft resolution aimed to ease, and in some cases lift, certain measures in connection with the situation in Syria, including the arms embargo and assets freeze presented in Resolution 1970. In addition, the draft resolution aimed to establish the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) which would assist the new Libyan government in their efforts to "restore public security and promote the rule of law (…) undertake inclusive political dialogue, promote national reconciliation, and embark upon the constitution-making and electoral process" (UNSC S/RES/2009, p. 3). The draft resolution was adopted unanimously as Resolution 2009.

Mr. Araud, on behalf of France, welcomed the adoption of the resolution, and claimed that it was an important step in the reintegration process for Libya into the "United Nations family" and an important step in establishing a democratic Libya (UNSC S/PV.6620, p. 3). Mr. Araud emphasised the role the UNSC already had played in this process through resolutions 1970 and 1973, and claimed that this resolution demonstrated the UNSC commitment to supporting the legitimate concerns of the Libyan people (UNSC S/PV.6620, p. 3).

Sir Grant, the delegate from the UK, began his statement by emphasising the bravery of the Libyan people, stating:

> The Libyan people have shown remarkable courage and perseverance over the past six months in standing up for their *rights* and creating the conditions under which they can decide their own future (…) in which the *fundamental rights* and *freedoms* of all will be promoted and protected.
>
> <div align="right">(UNSC S/PV.6620, p. 2, emphasis added)</div>

Sir Grant went on to argue that the unanimous adoption of the resolution would greatly aid the NTC in their work in creating a "prosperous and stable future for Libya" (UNSC S/PV.6620, p. 2). Sir Grant ended his statement with a reiteration of the bravery of the Libyan people, claiming that they have "sent a strong message to *repressive regimes* everywhere that the *legitimate demands* and *rights of people* cannot be ignored. People have *basic rights* to which they are entitled" (UNSC S/PV.6620, p. 2, emphasis added).

Similarly, the delegate from the US, Ms. Rice, expressed her support for the resolution and highlighted how the measures of the resolution, in particular the establishment of UNSMIL and the modifications of some of the sanctions, affirmed the UNSC's willingness to aid the Libyan people's effort to bring about democracy and restoration of order (UNSC S/PV.6620, p. 4). She ended her statement by highlighting the US's eagerness to aid the Libyan people further, claiming: "We stand fully ready to assist Libya's citizens in building a new society based on democracy, pluralism and *the rule of law*" (UNSC S/PV.6620, p. 4, emphasis added).

In their statement, Russia highlighted the fact that the Russian positive vote on the resolution was due to their policy of "addressing the issue of rebuilding post-war Libya exclusively under the auspices of the United Nations and the Security Council", and that the main task of UNSMIL would be to support the transition process through "political and *diplomatic* channels" (UNSC S/PV.6620, p. 3, emphasis added). However, in contrast to his Western colleagues, Mr. Churkin emphasised the problematic nature of the UNSC mandate's for conducting the operation in Libya, and how it had been "disregarded" and led to "air strikes that also targeted civilian facilities and killed civilians" (UNSC S/PV.6620, p. 4). Nevertheless, the Russian delegate ended his statement by underlining the necessity for a thorough investigation into all the facets of the human rights violations that had taken place in Libya, and he further emphasised how they had, according to him, been committed by "all parties to the conflict from its very outset" (UNSC S/PV.6620, p. 4).

In his statement on behalf of China, Mr. Li Baodong emphasised four principles which formed the basis for China's positive vote on the resolution:

> First, *stability* and *order* should be restored to the country as soon as possible, in the interests of Libya and the international community. Secondly, the aspirations and choices of the Libyan people must be respected. Libya's *sovereignty*, *independence*, *unity* and *territorial integrity* must be genuinely respected. (…) Thirdly, an *inclusive political process* should be launched as soon as possible. National reconciliation should be promoted (…) Fourthly, in assisting Libya in its reconstruction, the United Nations and the Security Council should play a leading role in accordance with the purposes and principles of the *United Nations Charter*.
>
> (UNSC S/PV.6620, p. 4, emphasis added).

5.1.5 Meeting S/PV.6644: Adopting Resolution 2017

On the 31st of October 2011, the UNSC met in order to vote on draft resolution S/2011/670, submitted by **France**, Nigeria, Portugal, Russia, **the UK**, and **the US**. The draft resolution consisted of measures to be taken in order to prevent the proliferation of all arms and related materiel in Libya, in particular that of man-portable surface-to-air missiles, and it emphasised how this proliferation of arms could fuel terrorist activities (UNSC S/RES/2017, p. 2). The draft was passed unanimously, and adopted as Resolution 2017.

Out of the P5 member countries, only the Russian delegate chose to give a statement. Mr. Pankin, the Russian representative, emphasised how the uncontrolled proliferation of arms would likely lead to the destabilisation of the entire MENA region (UNSC S/PV.6644, p. 2). In addition, Mr Pankin stressed that the main responsibility of the task of curbing the proliferation of weapons should fall on the shoulders of the Libyan authorities, but he also argued that it would require the support of the neighbours of Libya, and the international community as a whole (UNSC S/PV.6644, p. 2).

5.2 UNSC meetings in relation to Syria

5.2.1 Meeting S/PV.6627: Failure to adopt draft resolution S/2011/612

On the 4th of October 2011, the UNSC gathered in order to vote on draft resolution S/2011/612, submitted by **France**, Germany, Portugal and **the UK**. The proposed draft strongly condemned the human rights violations occurring in Syria, and requested an immediate end to all violence by "all sides" (UNSC S/2011/612, pp. 1-2). The draft recalled the Syrian government's "responsibility to protect its population", while also reaffirming the UNSC's strong commitment to the "sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Syria" (UNSC S/2011/612, p. 1). In addition, the draft resolution demanded that the Syrian authorities allowed the full exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Syrian population, and it called for an inclusive Syrian-led political process aimed at addressing the concern of the Syrian population, which should be "conducted in an environment free from violence, fear, intimidation, and extremism" (UNSC S/2011/612, p. 2). The draft resolution was not adopted, owing to the negative vote (veto) by China and Russia. France, the UK, and the US all voted in favour.

The French delegate, Mr. Araud, began his statement by expressing his severe disappointment of the failure to adopt the draft. He argued that the high total of casualties ("2700") and number of refugees ("10 000") since the beginning of March showed the terrible toll that some on the UNSC yet refused to condemn (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 2). Mr. Araud went on to stress how France had worked relentlessly since May of that year in order to bring about a clear and unified response by the UNSC, and in not being able to do so, has assumed their responsibilities at the national and European levels (the EU) in order to demand the end of violence against civilians in Syria (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 2). However, Mr. Araud argued that this was clearly not enough, as the Syrian regime had not responded to their demands, and that the UNSC, as the natural spokesperson for the international community, must respond (UNSC S/PV.6627, pp. 2-3). Mr. Araud argued that the use of the veto by China and Russia showed a clear disdain against the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people and a rejection of the Arab Spring's movement for freedom and democracy. He maintained that the attempt of appeasing Russia and China by modifying the text, such as the withdrawal of proposed sanctions, and their subsequent veto, illustrated the fact that their veto was a political choice, rather than a matter of language (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 3). Additionally, Mr. Araud maintained that the Syrian regime had lost its legitimacy by murdering their own people, and he emphasised the risk for potential further regional instability if the conflict continued (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 3). He ended his statement by paying tribute to the courage of the men and women of Syria who continue their call for freedom and fundamental rights (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 3).

Similarly, the UK expressed their deep disappointment of the decision of Russia and China to block the adoption of the draft resolution. Sir Grant, the UK representative, argued that a UNSC response was long overdue, as the situation in Syria was continuously deteriorating, in which the Syrian government used disproportionate force against the population of Syria, and whose action "may amount to crimes against humanity" (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 7). In a similar manner as the French statement, Sir Grant highlighted the intense negotiations that had preceded the vote, and how there had been a continued attempt to meet the concerns of the minority of the members:

> We removed the sanctions. Still, it was unacceptable to the minority. We called on all

sides to reject violence and extremism. Still it was unacceptable. We removed any sense that sanctions would automatically follow in 30 days if the regime failed to comply, and still it was unacceptable. By including reference to Article 41 of the United Nations Charter we made it clear that any further steps would be non-military in nature. Still it was unacceptable.

(UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 7).

He argued that the proposed draft resolution had not contained anything which any member countries should feel the need to oppose, and though he did not express it as explicitly as the French delegate, it is clear the UK believed the choice to veto was a political choice, rather than due to the contents of the draft (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 7).

In their statement, the US expressed their outrage of the failure of the UNSC to adopt this draft resolution, and consequently failed to address the "urgent moral challenge and a growing threat to regional peace and security" (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 8). Ms. Rice, similar to the statements by the UK and France, expressed the belief that it is past time for a UNSC response, specifying the desire for "tough, targeted sanctions and an arms embargo on the Assad regime" (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 8). She highlights how the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights have stated that the Syrian regime's violence, torture, and persecution against peaceful protesters may amount to crimes against humanity, and how the veto by China and Russia clearly show their lack of support for the Syrians' fight for democracy and universal rights, stating: "Yet today, the courageous people of Syria can now see clearly who on this Council supports their yearning for *liberty* and *universal human rights*, and who does not" (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 8, emphasis added). Using wording comparable to that of the principle of R2P, Ms. Rice clearly states how the failure to adopt the draft resolution, the UNSC lost an opportunity to assume their "*responsibilities* to the Syrian people" (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 9, emphasis added).

Conversely, Russia agreed with the argument by France and the UK, that the failure to adopt the draft resolution was not due to the wording used, but rather a conflict in their political approaches (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 3). Here, Mr. Churkin drew attention to the draft circulated by the Russian and Chinese delegation, in which the focal point was that of:

Respect for the *national sovereignty* and *territorial integrity* of Syria as well as *the principle of non-intervention*, including military, in its affairs; the principle of the unity of the Syrian

people; *refraining from confrontation*; and inviting all to an *even-handed and comprehensive dialogue* aimed at achieving civil peace and national agreement by reforming the socioeconomic and political life of the country.

(UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 3, emphasis added)

Mr. Churkin argued that the draft resolution on which they actually voted during the meeting, was based on a different philosophy, the so-called "philosophy of confrontation" (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 3). He goes on to argue that the Russians proposals for wording on the non-acceptability of foreign military intervention was not taken into consideration, and how the events of Libya, which did include military intervention, led to the Russian need for caution, stating: "The situation in Syria cannot be considered in the Council separately from the Libyan experience" (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 4). In addition, Mr. Churkin highlighted the draft resolution's weak wording in regards to the opposition and the lack of an appeal towards them to distance themselves from extremism, and he argued that the continuation of the crisis in Syria was not solely due to actions of the Syrian government, stating:

> [T]he radical opposition no longer hides its extremist bent and is relying on terrorist tactics, hoping for foreign sponsors and acting outside of the law. Armed groups supported by smuggling and other illegal activities are providing supplies, taking over land, and killing and perpetrating atrocities against people who comply with the law enforcement authorities.
>
> (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 4).

Even so, it is worth noting that the Russian delegation did state their belief that the violence in Syria was unacceptable and that they condemn the harmful repression the peaceful protests (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 4).

The Chinese delegate, Mr. Li Baodong, shared this concern for the development of the situation in Syria, and called for restraint and cessation of violence by "the various parties in Syria" (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 5). Similar to that of the Russian statement, Mr. Li Baodong emphasised their respect for "Syria's *sovereignty*, *independence*, and *territorial integrity*", and stated that any UNSC action must be in compliance with "the Charter of the United Nations and the principle of *non-interference* in the internal affairs of States" (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 5, emphasis added). Additionally, complementary to the statement by Russia, Mr. Li Baodong reiterated China's support for resolving the crisis through *political dialogue*,

and that the draft resolution on which they voted merely had a focus on exerting pressure on Syria, particularly through the threat of sanctions, and that this would only lead to deterioration of the conflict (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 5)

5.2.2 Meeting S/PV.6711: Failure to adopt draft resolution S/2012/77

On the 4th of February, the UNSC met in order to vote on draft resolution S/2012/77, submitted by Bahrain, Colombia, Egypt, **France**, Germany, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, **the UK**, and **the US**. The proposed draft expressed grave concern over the ongoing situation in Syria, condemned the continued gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms for the Syrian population, regardless of the perpetrators of that violence, stating: "[The UNSC] demands that all parties all parties in Syria, including armed groups, immediately stop all violence or reprisals, including attacks against State institutions" (UNSC S/2012/77, p. 2). The draft resolution further demanded that the Syrian government "cease all violence and protect its citizens (…) and guarantee the freedom of peaceful demonstrations" (UNSC S/2012/77, p. 2). In addition, the draft called for a Syrian-led political process addressing the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people, and it fully supported the facilitation of a Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, plural political system (UNSC S/2012/77, p. 2). In contrast to the former draft resolution (S/2011/612), this draft resolution highlights the efforts and proposals of the LAS, and the UNSC consequent support for these measures. The draft resolution failed to be adopted, with China and Russia vetoing the draft. All other countries voted in favour.

The French delegate, Mr. Araud, expressed his great sadness and concern over the double veto by Russia and China, claiming: "This is a sad day for the Council; it is a sad day for the Syrians; and it is sad day for all the friends of *democracy*" (UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 3). Mr. Araud highlighted the UNSC's lack of response over the course of the ten months of the conflict, as the only response given was a presidential statement in August of the previous year, and he then went on to claim that the only logical conclusion to this lack of UNSC action was due to the systematic obstruction by Russia and China (UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 3). Mr. Araud continued his argument by addressing the accusation that the proposers of this draft were seeking regime change and preparing for a military intervention. Mr. Araud undeniably rejected these accusations, stating:

That is patently false. We have fully answered those concerns. In this Chamber three days ago, our Ministers confirmed that there was no question of imposing a political regime on Syria. On that point and on the issue of armed intervention, the draft resolution was crystal clear. How much time have we squandered responding to these debating points?

(UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 4)

The delegate from the UK, Sir Grant, similarly expressed his disappointment with the use of the veto by Russia and China, claiming he was "appalled by [their] decision" (UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 6). He argued that over the course of the last 10 months, the Syrian population had "demanded their *universal rights*, and (…) the Syrian regime responded by violently repressing and killing its own people" (UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 6, emphasis added), and that the inaction by the UNSC had allowed the death toll to continue to rise. Sir Grant emphasised the efforts taken by the promoters of the draft in order to consider the concerns by Russia and China and thus achieve a consensus:

> Yet some Council members argued that the draft resolution imposed regime change. It said no such thing. But in an attempt to reach consensus, we provided further assurances in the text. The same minority argued that the text could somehow be used to authorize military intervention. It did no such thing. It was a Chapter VI resolution. But in an attempt to reach consensus, we provided further assurances in the text. The same minority argued that very modest language expressing concern about weapons was somehow tantamount to an arms embargo. It was not. But we took it out. They said that mere mention of Arab League sanctions was tantamount to United Nations sanctions. It was not. But we took it out in an effort to reach consensus.

(UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 7)

Sir Grant argued that the fact that Russia and China still chose to exercise their right to a veto, even though (according to Sir Grant) the draft did not contain anything that should have triggered a veto, illustrates that Russia and China have "turned their backs on the Arab world", and in turn chosen to support that of a tyranny.

Ms. Rice, the US representative, expressed her disgust with the choice by Russia and China to veto this draft resolution, and as a consequence "continue to prevent us from fulfilling our sole purpose here, which is to address an ever-deepening crisis in Syria and a *growing threat*

to regional peace and security" (UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 5, emphasis added). She maintained that the UNSC had been "held hostage" by Russia and China, and that they merely stood behind their own interests and with empty arguments (UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 5). She too highlights the effort made by the promoters of the draft resolution in order to achieve consensus, and the consequent reduction of the demands in the draft resolution due to the arguments made by Russia and China. She claimed that the US wanted "to impose tough, targeted sanctions and an arms embargo", but due to the concessions made within the draft, this was not included, and she believed that any attempts at achieving common ground were not considered adequately by Russia and China (UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 5). Echoing her statement on the previous resolution draft (S/2011/612 at meeting S/PV.6627), she claims:

> Once again, the courageous people of Syria can clearly see who on this Council supports their yearning for *liberty* and *universal rights* and who does not. And during this season of change, the people of the Middle East can now see clearly which nations have chosen to ignore their calls for *democracy* and instead to prop up desperate dictators.
>
> (UNSC S/PV.6711, pp. 5-6, emphasis added)

Mr. Churkin, the delegate from Russia, began his statement calling for the end of the violence and bloodshed in Syria. Further the Russian delegate emphasised the Russian ongoing focus on dialogue with both Syria and its neighbours, in an attempt to alleviate the violence, as he believed that some in the international community had undermined the possibility of a political settlement with Syria by "calling for regime change, encouraging the opposition towards power, indulging in provocation and nurturing the armed struggle" (UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 9). Mr. Churkin went on to argue that the draft resolution did not adequately represent the reality of the situation in Syria, claiming that the opposition groups in Syria had ties with and supported extremist groups, and he argued that the draft resolution should call for the Syrian opposition should distance themselves from such groups (UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 9).

Mr. Li Baodong, the representative from China, called for all parties in Syria to end the violence in order to restore order and stability, and to respect the Syrian people's demand for reform (UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 9). Mr. Li Baodong claimed that the international community should give assistance with this endeavour, but emphasised that even so, undue pressure on the Syrian government would not alleviate the situation, and he further highlighted that "the

sovereignty, *independence* and *territorial integrity* of Syria should be fully respected" and that any action by the UNSC should "help promote political *dialogue* and diffuse disputes, and help maintain peace and *stability* in the Middle East region" (UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 9, emphasis added).

5.2.3 Meeting S/PV.6751: Adopting Resolution 2042

On the 14th of Aril 2012, the UNSC gathered in order to vote on draft resolution S/2012/219, submitted by Colombia, **France**, Germany, Morocco, Portugal, **the UK**, and **the US**. The draft resolution condemned the widespread violation of human rights by both the Syrian government and other armed groups, and expressed the intention of establishing a UN-supervised observer mission which would monitor the "cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties" (UNSC S/RES/2042 (2012), p. 2). The resolution draft also reaffirmed the UNSC's commitment to "the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter" (UNSC S/RES/2042, p. 1). The resolution draft was adopted unanimously as Resolution 2042.

Mr. Araud, on behalf of France, welcomed the adoption of the resolution, claiming it to be a belated ability for the UNSC to speak with one voice on the conflict in Syria, and he expressed his hope that this would lead to a turning point in the conflict in Syria (UNSC S/PV.6751, p. 6). However, Mr. Araud emphasised that if Syria's government did not fulfil their commitments to the Joint Special Envoy of the UN and the LAS, then it would "the *responsibility* of all members of the Council to consider the measures that should be taken", clearly leaving the door open for further measures to be taken in the future (UNSC S/PV.6751, p. 6). In contrast to the wording of the resolution, which emphasised the condemnation of the violence carried out by "all parties", the statement by Mr. Araud laid the accountability predominantly on the shoulders of the Syrian regime, stating: "We will judge the Syrian regime by its acts and nothing else" (UNSC S/PV.6751, p. 6).

Similarly, the UK representative, Sir Grant, welcomed the adoption of the resolution, and asserted his regret that it came more than a full year since the conflict began (UNSC S/PV.6751, p. 2). Likewise to the statement made by his French colleague, Sir Grant focused his remarks on the efforts that must be made by the Syrian regime in order to end the conflict,

but additionally, he maintained that the opposition must refrain from the use of violence also (UNSC S/PV.6751, p. 2).

Ms. Rice, speaking on behalf of the US, also emphasised the efforts that must be made by the Syrian regime in order for the cessation of violence to occur, claiming: "The Syrian Government must meet all of its commitments, not only the bare minimum. It must do so now. The suffering of the Syrian people has gone on far too long" (UNSC S/PV.6751, p. 9). In regards to the Syrian opposition, Ms. Rice focused on how they had (according to her) largely refrained from responding to the increased aggression by the Syrian regime, predominantly only due to self-defence, and how they had "honourably sought to extend the fragile calm" (UNSC S/PV.6751, p. 9).

Mr. Churkin, the delegate from Russia, also emphasised the suffering of the Syrian people and the destructive consequences that had and could continue to occur, not only in Syria, but also in regards to the regional peace and stability (UNSC S/PV.6751, p. 3). Nevertheless, Mr. Churkin stressed Russia's continued call for inclusive dialogue conducted by the Syrians, and the non-use of force, by all parties involved. He argued: "Based on respect for Syria's *sovereignty*, we have cautioned against destructive attempts at *external interference* and against imposing any kind of illusory fixes" (UNSC S/PV.6751, p. 3, emphasis added). In contrast to the wording used by his American colleague, Mr. Churkin specifically called for the armed opposition to refrain from violence, in addition to the Syrian government (UNSC S/PV.6751, p. 3).

China, through their statement made by Mr. Li Baodong, began by emphasising China's consistent belief that "the *independence*, *sovereignty*, unity and *territorial integrity* of Syria and the choice and will of the Syrian people should be respected [and that t]he Syrian crisis should be resolved in a just, peaceful and proper manner through *political dialogue.*" (UNSC S/PV.6751, p. 4, emphasis added). In regards to the perpetrators of the violence in Syria, Mr. Li Baodong urged "all parties, including the Syrian Government and the opposition factions" to refrain from any violence (UNSC S/PV.6751, p. 4).

5.2.4 Meeting S/PV.6756: Adopting Resolution 2043

On the 21ˢᵗ of April 2012, the UNSC convened in order to vote on draft resolution S/2012/245, submitted by **China**, Colombia, **France**, Germany, Morocco, Pakistan, Portugal, and **Russia**. The purpose of the draft was the establishment of United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), which would monitor the cessation of armed violence in Syria and support the implementation of the Syrian government's proposed commitments for ending the atrocities (UNSC S/2012/245, p. 2). The draft reaffirmed the UNSC's strong commitment to "the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter" (UNSC S/2012/245, p. 1). Additionally, the draft condemned the widespread violations of human rights, committed by both the Syrian government, but also armed groups (UNSC S/2012/245, p. 1). The draft resolution was passed unanimously, and adopted into Resolution 2043.

Mr. Araud, on behalf of France, welcomed the unanimous adoption of the resolution, but emphasised that even so, the situation in Syria remained grave, as the Syrian regime continuously refused to meet its commitments (UNSC S/PV.6756, p. 3). Mr. Araud highlighted that the Syrian government had not changed "their lethal behaviour", even with the deployment of the observer mission provided in Resolution 2042, and that the humanitarian urgency in Syria was greater than ever: "[T]he regime is continuing its *bloody repression* of demonstrations, to carry out torture, arbitrary arrests, forced disappearances and sexual violence" (UNSC S/PV.6756, p. 3, emphasis added). Based on this, Mr. Araud claimed France considered the positive vote for the resolution to be "a risk", but that they believed the deployment of UNSMIS could be a last opportunity for peace, and certainly one they could not miss (UNSC S/PV.6756, p. 3).

Complementary to his French colleague, the UK representative, Sir Grant, emphasised the disappointment with the lack of attempt by the Syrian regime to cease the violence and end the crisis, following the deployment of the observer mission in Resolution 2042 (UNSC S/PV.6756, p. 6). Sir Grant argues that rather than any legitimate attempt by the Syrian authorities to end the crisis, the UNSC have observed the complete opposite, claiming that the Syrian authorities have continued to "use heavy weapons (…) in violation of its commitments to the United Nations. It has restricted the advance team's freedom of movement, in a flagrant effort to hide the truth about its shameful acts of brutality and destruction" (UNSC

S/PV.6756, p. 6). Sir Grant ended his statement by calling for "robust sanctions" if the Syrian government failed to meet their commitments or in any way hindered the work of UNSMIS (UNSC S/PV.6756, p. 6).

Ms. Rice, on behalf of the US, also welcomed the adoption of the resolution, but underlined the risks that would follow for UNSMIS, in particular due to the Syrian authorities' "long record of broken promises, deceit and disregard for the most basic standards of humanity" (UNSC S/PV.6756, p. 10). She went on to argue that the only way in which one could bring an end to the "murderous rampage" by the Syrian authorities, would be the continuous and intensified pressure on the Syrian regime (UNSC S/PV.6756, p. 10). Ms. Rice, similar to her other Western colleagues, stressed the lack of action taken by the Syrian government to end the violence, following the adoption of resolution 2042 the week prior, claiming: "the regime has unleashed yet another wave of *horrific violence* against its own people, resulting in the death of scores of Syrians daily" (UNSC S/PV.6756, p. 10, emphasis added). She ended her statement with a clear warning to the Syrian authorities: "[L]et there be no doubt: we, our allies and others in this body are planning and preparing for those actions that will be required of all of us if the Al-Assad regime persists in the *slaughter* of the Syrian people" (UNSC S/PV.6756, p. 10, emphasis added).

In contrast to the representatives from France, the UK, and the US, Mr. Churkin, the delegate from Russia, focused on the role of all parties in the Syrian conflict, not just that of the Syrian authorities. He stated:

> The resolution establishes clear parameters of responsibility for all Syrian parties on the cessation of violence and on the need to cooperate with United Nations observers (…) We call upon all Syrian parties — both the authorities and the opposition — to refrain from violence.
>
> (UNSC S/PV.6756, p. 2)

Additionally, Mr. Churkin stressed the negative effects of any external players involved in the Syrian conflict, and he claimed that any "external influence imposed by us could risk exacerbating the crisis" (UNSC S/PV.6756, p. 2). This is noticeably in contrast to the statements given by his Western colleagues, in particular that of the UK and the US, who clearly advocate for further external pressure.

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China's representative, Mr. Li Baodong, began his statement by reiterating China's stance that "Syria's *independence*, *sovereignty*, unity and *territorial integrity* — as well as the choice and will of the Syrian people — should be respected", in addition to China's support for "a just, peaceful and proper settlement of the Syrian crisis through political *dialogue*" (UNSC S/PV.6756, p. 8, emphasis added). Similar to the Russian statement, Mr. Li Baodong urged all parties involved in the conflict, both the Syrian authorities and any armed opposition, to cooperate fully with UNSMIS (UNSC S/PV.6756, p. 8).

5.3 A selection of quantitative results using NVivo

NVivo 12™, a qualitative data analysis computer software package, was able to quickly determine the frequency of words and phrases found in the statements. All meeting records pertaining to the situations in Libya and Syria from the years 2011 and 2012 were added to the program, not merely the few selected for detailed analysis in the preceding sections. A full list of these meetings can be found in chapter 8.2 of the bibliography. Following this, all statements by the P5 countries were organized and coded, in order to easily determine the frequency of words used related to the six institutions found in ES theory: The pluralist institutions of diplomacy, international law, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention, and the solidarist institution of human rights. This included the use of stemmed words. The list of the accompanying words can be found in Table 1. Additional files depicting the results of the text frequency searches in NVivo 12™ can be stated upon request.

ES institutions with accompanying words

Institution	Phrases and words
Diplomacy	Diplomacy, dialogue, political solution, diplomatic, mediation, consensus
International law	International law, charter
Sovereignty	Sovereignty, self determination
Territorial integrity	Territorial integrity, territory, territoriality, border, boundaries
Non-intervention	Non-intervention, non-force, stability, reconciliation
Human rights	Human rights, humanitarian rights, universal rights, fundamental rights, repression, genocide, torture, brutality, humanity, morality, legitimate concerns

Table 1: ES institutions and accompanying words

5.3.1 Diplomacy

	Libya	Syria	TOTAL
France	3	10	13
UK	0	9	9
US	1	8	9
Russia	3	33	36
China	4	47	51

Table 2: Frequency of words related to diplomacy

Graph 1: Frequency of words related to diplomacy

5.3.2 International law

	Libya	Syria	TOTAL
France	0	6	6
UK	34	31	65
US	59	29	88
Russia	37	42	79
China	21	44	65

Table 3: Frequency of words related to international law

Graph 2: Frequency of words related to international law

5.3.3 Sovereignty

	Libya	Syria	TOTAL
France	0	5	5
UK	0	2	2
US	0	2	2
Russia	2	2	4
China	4	11	15

Table 4: Frequency of words related to sovereignty

Graph 3: Frequency of words related to sovereignty

5.3.4 Territorial integrity

	Libya	Syria	TOTAL
France	6	7	13
UK	3	12	15
US	6	10	16
Russia	8	5	13
China	8	17	25

Table 5: Frequency of words related to territorial integrity

Graph 4: Frequency of words related to territorial integrity

5.3.5 Non-intervention

	Libya	Syria	TOTAL
France	4	10	14
UK	2	8	10
US	2	1	3
Russia	6	4	10
China	10	18	28

Table 6: Frequency of words related to non-intervention

Graph 5: Frequency of words related to non-intervention

5.3.6 Human rights

	Libya	Syria	TOTAL
France	38	56	94
UK	31	45	76
US	35	58	93
Russia	21	4	25
China	4	1	5

Table 7: Frequency of words related to human rights

Graph 6: Frequency of words related to human rights

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6. Discussion

The statements by the P5 in the UNSC meetings illustrates a clear division of their viewpoints, in which Russia and China use almost exclusively that of pluralist arguments, whereas France, the UK, and the US use predominantly that of solidarist arguments.

6.1 France, the UK, and the US and solidarism

6.1.1 Solidarist values presented in the P5 statements

The contrast between the two cases of Libya and Syria become evident in the focus on the institution of humanitarian rights in the statements by the P5. In the case of Libya, all of the P5 countries, to some extent, highlight the mass atrocities occurring and their concern for the people of Libya. In meeting S/PV.6491, both the UK and US delegates highlighted the respect for "human rights" (UNSC S/PV.6491, p. 2) and "universal rights" (UNSC S/PV.6491, p. 3), respectively, and the French delegate emphasised the fact that crimes against humanity may have taken place in Libya (UNSC S/PV.6491, p. 5). Similarly, both the Russian and Chinese delegates express their concern over the situation in Libya, and condemn the use of violence on peaceful protestors (UNSC S/PV.6491, p. 4). Similar statements occur at the following meetings, such as meeting S/PV.6491, in which all of the P5 countries expressed their concern over the deteriorating situation in Libya, and issued their request for the cessation of the use of force against the civilian population. It is worth noting, however, that the countries varied in their overarching focus. The Western countries focused predominantly on the aforementioned humanitarian issues, whereas the focus in the statements by Russia and China were that of the pluralist values. This will be further detailed in chapter 6.2. Nevertheless, all P5 countries did to some extent specify the need for action due to humanitarian concerns in Libya. This was not the case in Syria.

In the case of Syria, the Western countries highlight the need for humanitarian action by using phrases and words related to the institution of human right. At meeting UNSC S/PV.6627, they emphasise the Syrian's people "legitimate concerns" for freedom and democracy, the Syrians "yearning for liberty and universal rights", the need to end the violence against the Syrian population, and the ever increasing number of deaths in relation to the conflict (France at UNSC S/PV.6627, pp. 2-3; UK at UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 7; US at UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 8). Similar phrases were used at the following meetings, such as "it is sad day for all the friends

of democracy" (France at UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 3), [The Syrian people] demanded their universal rights, and (…) the Syrian regime responded by violently repressing and killing its own people" (UK at UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 6), and "the people of the Middle East can now see clearly which nations have chosen to ignore their calls for democracy" (US at UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 6).

Russia and China make little or no mention of the values of humanitarian rights in their statements on the conflict in Syria. In meeting S/PV.6627, China only call for the end of violence by "the various parties" (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 5), but make no further mention of humanitarian values, and Russia only briefly state that the violence in Syria is unacceptable and that they condemn the harmful repression the peaceful protests (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 4). Additionally, similar to the Chinese statement, the Russian delegate maintain that this violence is not the cause of merely the Syrian authorities, but also that of the armed opposition (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 4).

This also becomes apparent through the quantitative results presented in Table 7. The frequency of words used by the P5 countries in relation to the institution of human rights show a clear division between the countries. The Western countries have relatively similar high frequency of words: France has the highest frequency of words used (94), with the US and the UK following close behind (93 and 76, respectively). Russia and China, on the other hand, are significantly further behind. Russia (25) has approximately 25% of the amount of words as France, and China has as little as 5% (5). It is also worth noting that the clear majority of the words used by Russia and China in relation to humanitarian rights are used in the case of Libya, at approximately 80%. This clearly indicates that although Russia and China did to some extent use solidarist arguments, these were undoubtedly only focused on the crisis in Libya, and their arguments in relation to the crisis in Syria shifted to a significantly larger emphasis on pluralist values. These pluralist values will be further detailed in chapter 6.2. With respect to the frequency of words presented in Table 7, one can see the instances of words is relatively higher than that of the other institutions. This can be explained by the fact that more words were used in relation to the institution of human rights, and as a consequence, more instances were presented. However, this cannot explain the considerable discrepancy between the Western countries and Russia and China, as the same words were used in all searches.

6.1.2 Solidarist arguments in light of the six principles of legitimate humanitarian intervention

As stated in chapter 3.1.4, the solidarists do not consider all humanitarian intervention to be legitimate, and presents six principles that must be addressed, namely that of just cause, right authority, right intention, last resort, proportionality, and reasonable prospect for success. This is also present in the solidarists arguments presented by the Western countries.

The first principle for a legitimate humanitarian intervention presented by solidarists, namely the just cause principle, argues that a humanitarian intervention is only legitimate if there is, or significant potential to occur, "(A) large scale loss of life, (…) which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or (B) large scale 'ethnic cleansing' whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape" (ICISS 2001, p. xii). In the case of Libya, this is presented in the descriptions of the brutal regime of Gaddafi, using phrases such as "violence" (UK and US at UNSC S/PV.6491, p. 2 and p. 3, respectively), "crimes against humanity" (France at UNSC S/PV.6491, p. 5), "murderous repression" (France at (UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 2), and describing Gaddafi as a "warmonger" (France at UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 2). The just cause principle is also apparent when the countries argue that there is an urgent need for action: All three of the Western member states of the P5 claimed the threat of mass atrocities in Benghazi showed cause for imminent action. The French delegate stated: "We do not have much time left. It is a matter of days, perhaps even hours" (UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 3). This is one of the arguments presented by Bellamy (2011, p. 265) in his explanation as to why the intervention in Libya took place, in contrast to that of Syria. Bellamy (2011, p. 265) emphasize the extraordinary clarity of the actual threat of mass atrocities. As previously mentioned, quotes given by Gaddafi in which he uses words such as "cockroaches" in order to describe the civilian population, as well as clearly stating: "any Libyan who takes arms against Libya will be executed" (Gaddafi quoted in Bellamy 2011, p. 265), clearly indicate Gaddafi's willingness to use violence and deadly force towards his own population. This is in high contrast to the more common technique used by regimes in which they try to hide their violent actions, through denying the commission of the violent crimes or maintaining that the victims were not civilians (Bellamy 2011, p. 266). The just cause principle indicates that there either must be, or likely to occur, a large-scale loss of life which is the product of state action. These statements by Gaddafi

clearly indicate that there is a significant likelihood of large-scale loss of life due to deliberate actions by the state authorities, and these statements could therefore be used, and in fact was, by the P5 countries in order to justify the cause for an intervention.

Similarly, the just cause principle is presented by the Western P5 countries in relation to the conflict in Syria, through the emphasis on the brutal regime of Assad: At meeting UNSC S/PV.6627, the French delegate emphasised how the Syrian authorities were murdering their own population, leading to a large number of casualties (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 3), and both the UK and the US delegates argued the Syrian authorities' actions, namely that of violence, torture, and persecution against peaceful protesters, may amount to "crimes against humanity" (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 7; UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 9).

The second principle for a legitimate humanitarian intervention, that of the right authority principle, indicates that any military intervention for humanitarian purposes must be authorised solely by the UNSC. In relation to the Libyan and Syrian conflict, this becomes apparent in the arguments used by the Western countries, such as at meeting S/PV.6491, when the US representative argues that the international community must speak with one voice, and with the passing of Resolution 1970, it has (UNSC S/PV.6491, p. 3), and the UK delegate claiming that the adoption of Resolution 1970 shows a clear signal of the determination of the international community. Similarly, the US argued that the main purpose of the UNSC is that of protection of civilians (UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 4), and in relation to the failure to adopt a resolution on the Syrian conflict, the US stated that the UNSC had failed in their "responsibilities to the Syrian people" (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 9). Likewise, France claimed it was "the responsibility of all members of the Council to consider the measures that should be taken" (UNSC S/PV.6751, p. 6). This shows a clear belief that any action by the UNSC (here: the passing of a resolution) illustrates an action by the international community, and the UNSC is therefore seen as the ultimate authority for the international community.

The third principle presented by solidarists in order to consider a military intervention for humanitarian purposes legitimate, is that of the right intention principle, which argues that the intention of a humanitarian intervention *must* be done in order to halt human suffering. This principle can be seen in the arguments made by the Western countries in relation to both Libya and Syria. Considering the Libyan crisis, all of their statements include references to the increasing violence and atrocities against the Libyan population, such as the references to

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potential "crimes against humanity" (France at UNSC S/PV.6491, p. 5), "murderous repression" by the Gaddafi-forces UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 2), and the "repressive regime" (UK at UNSC S/PV.6620, p. 2"). Similarly, this can be seen in their statements on Syria, in which there are references about potential "crimes against humanity" (UK at UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 7; US at UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 9), references to violence and torture (US at UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 9), the killing of the civilian population (UK at UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 6), and the "bloody repression of demonstrations, (…) torture, arbitrary arrests, forced disappearances and sexual violence" (France at UNSC S/PV.6756, p. 3).

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in addition to the arguments that UNSC action should be to halt human suffering, the Western countries do make mention of their belief that the actions by the Libyan and Syrian authorities had led to the Gaddafi and Assad, respectively, to have lost their legitimacy as leaders. In the case of Libya, the Western P5 countries claim that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had become "a violent, discredited regime" (UK at UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 4), and as a consequence Gaddafi had lost his legitimacy as a ruler (US at UNSC S/PV.6491, p. 3). In relation to Syria, France maintained the Syrian regime had lost their legitimacy by murdering their own population (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 3), and the US stated their planning and preparation for "those actions that will be required of all of us if the Al-Assad regime persists in the slaughter of the Syrian people" (UNSC S/PV.6756, p. 10), thus insinuating a severe response, possibly as far as regime change. This implies that although the overall aim of the UNSC action was in order to halt the suffering of the Libyan population, the Western P5 countries, through their statements, discredited the Libyan and Syrian leaders, and thus arguably encouraged regime change. It is worth noting, that in their statements they claim that the resolutions presented do not in any way argue for regime change (France at UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 4; UK at UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 7). Nevertheless, the Western countries' focus on loss of legitimacy for the leaders of Libya and Syria, and the actual regime change occurring following the NATO intervention in 2011, allowed Russia and China to use this argument in their discussions on draft resolutions and in their reasoning for vetoing resolutions (Russia at UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 9). There was therefore a flaw in the Western P5 countries' argument for the right intention of any UNSC action.

The fourth principle, that of the humanitarian intervention must be the last resort, is evident the Libyan case, in the fact that the first form of action by the UNSC was that of assets freeze, arms embargo, and travel ban presented in Resolution 1970. However, as became apparent in

the weeks following the adoption of that resolution, further action was necessary as the Libyan authorities made no efforts to cease the violence, rather, they escalated the situation further, and as previously mentioned, Gaddafi made legitimate threats for extreme human suffering in his statements, which the P5 countries then referenced in their statements (France at UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 3; UK at UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 4). This argument of the short time frame, due to the imminent threat of violence, is also presented by Bellamy (2011, p. 266), in his explanation for the exceptional nature of the situation in Libya. He claims that, prior to the crisis, Libya did not pose any significant threat of mass atrocities, according to various risk-assessment frameworks, and in a report given by *CrisisWatch*, a global conflict tracker, on the 1st of February 2011, Libya was not even mentioned (Bellamy 2011, p. 266). When the rebel forces made rapid advances, including against the stronghold of Benghazi, the retribution promised by Gaddafi became imminent. This in turn made a rapid response by the UNSC crucial. Bellamy (2011, p. 266) states:

> (…) Qaddafi's forces and their promised retribution, left little time to try either the new round of mediation proposed by Russia or the more graduated response preferred by some UN officials. The Council's first resolution on Libya, Resolution 1970, bundled together a variety of punitive measures when slower-moving events might have facilitated a more graduated approach to coercive inducement.

In other words, due to the rapid chain of events during February and March of 2011, the UNSC had little choice in whether they should act with further measures than those presented in Resolution 1970.

In the case of Syria, the last resort principle is shown in the actual wording of the draft resolutions. That is to say, none of the draft resolutions consider coercive methods, either through sanctions or military intervention, even though the Western countries argue for their inclusion (UK at UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 7, UNSC S/PV.6756, p. 6 and UNSC S/PV.6756, p. 6; US at UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 8 and UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 5). Rather, the focus of the draft resolution is on the condemnation of the violence and a call for the Syrian authorities to implement a Syrian-led political process addressing the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people (S/2011/612; S/2011/612). The establishment of the observer mission UNSMIS is also evidence of the Western P5 countries desire for other peaceful action prior to any coercive methods (S/RES/2043).

The fifth principle for a legitimate humanitarian intervention, that of proportionality, maintain that the scale, duration, and intensity of the potential military intervention should be the absolute minimum. In the case of the Libyan conflict, Resolution 1973 called for the use of "all necessary measures" in the protection of civilians (S/RES/1973, p. 3), a phrase which is considered a so-called "trigger formula", authorizing the use of force by land, air, and/or sea (Simonsen 2016, p. 258). Simonsen (2016, p. 258) argues that this gave the intervening forces a wide range of relatively vague measures that could be utilised, but which did not include "a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory", as this was specifically ruled out. The principle of proportionality, however, did create certain limitations on the intervening forces, as the harm of the use of force had to be in direct comparison to the protection of civilians. Simonsen (2016, p. 258) goes on to claim that, in hindsight, one can consider the use of force in Libya was too far-reaching in both time and effect. However, as previously stated, at the time of the adoption of Resolution 1973, the P5 countries considered the threat of further violence on the civilian population by Libyan forces to be definite and imminent, and they therefore maintained that the use of force was proportional to the actual threat (Simonsen 2016, p. 258).

In relation to the conflict in Syria, the question on proportionality of a response to the conflict originates in the debate between the P5 countries on the issue of the actual blame of the violence. The Western P5 countries argue that the fault is as the hand of Assad and his regime, whereas Russia and China argue that the cause of the violence is due to both the Syrian government and armed opposition groups. Russia and China argued that the draft resolutions and arguments presented by the Western P5 countries would "[call] for regime change, [encourage] the opposition towards power, [indulge] in provocation and [nurture] the armed struggle" (Russia at UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 9). According to Russia and China, if the UNSC were to respond with coercive, military measures, that intervention, and the regime change they believe will follow, would not be a proportionate response to the conflict. The Western P5 countries, on the other hand, argued that the fault for the mass atrocities were due predominantly because of the actions of the Syrian regime (France at UNSC S/PV.6751, p. 6; US at UNSC S/PV.6751, p. 9), and that targeted action against the Syrian authorities would therefore be a proportionate response. It is worth noting that the Western P5 countries make no argument for the proportionality of a potential intervention in Syria. This is undoubtably due to the fact that they initially attempt to achieve peaceful action first.

The last of the principles for a legitimate humanitarian intervention is the problem related to reasonable prospect for success, which clearly indicate that for an intervention to be legitimate, the consequences of embarking upon the intervention must not be worse than if there is no action at all. This is arguable one of the most difficult of the principles to measure, as one must consider a variety of factors in order to determine the likelihood of success. In relation to Libya, Simonsen (2016, p. 258) highlights how, during the initial phase of the intervention, there were several aspects of the conflict which allowed for less risk of collateral damage to the civilian population, and thus indicated a reasonable prospect for success. This included the fact that the potential targets were easily identifiable, and the geographical and military factors were favourable to the intervening troops as the Gaddafi forces often operated in flat, desert-like landscape on the outskirts of civilian areas (Simonsen 2016, p. 258).

Similar to the situation in Libya, the principle for a reasonable prospect for success in the case of Syria is difficult to measure. Nonetheless, there are certain aspects of the situation in Syria which gives an indication for a greater complicated conflict than the one in Libya. One of these features, is the fact that the early conflict in Syria had a significant sectarian element, in which President Assad, along with the majority of his forces, belong to the Alawite minority group, which is a Shia Islamic sect. However, the majority of the Syrian population are Sunni Muslims (Gifkins 2012, p. 379). This meant that there were significantly higher probability of sectarian violence breaking out due to a military intervention in Syria, rather than in Libya (Zifcak 2012, p. 85). Zifcak (2012, p. 85) goes on to mention the tribal differences found in Libya, but he argues that the establishment of the NTC illustrated the reasonable prospect that this could be overcome through the formation of a so-called "unity government".

It is worth noting that during 2011 and 2012, the conflict was predominantly related to the Syrian regime and some opposition groups, and there, arguably, would have been a higher reasonable prospect for success than is present now. As previously mentioned, the situation has escalated greatly, and has intensified to include foreign fighters, with the involvement of Hezbollah fighters and the militant Islamist group of ISIS. The continuing conflict in Syria has thus been further complicated over the years, which decreases the reasonable prospect for success.

6.2 Russia and China and pluralism

6.2.1 The "classical pluralist package"

As Buzan (2004, p. 250) claims, some of the institutions found in ES can be presented as a coherent, mutually supportive set, in which the various institutions complement each other. As previously stated in chapter 3.1.3, the pluralist institutions of sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-intervention, international law, and diplomacy are examples of such a set, which Buzan (2004, p. 250) calls the "pluralist package". These institutions are all focused on pluralist values, as they build a framework in which states can "promote their diverse ends with the minimal of outside interference" (Linklater quoted in Bellamy 2003b, p. 323).

Sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention

The institutions of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention are clearly presented in the statements of Russia and China. In regards to the conflict in Libya, Russia argued against any "forceful interference in Libya's affairs" (UNSC S/PV.6491, p. 4), and they claimed that Resolution 1973's inclusion of forceful methods was "most unfortunate and regrettable" (UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 8), and they therefore explained their abstention on the vote by maintaining that the methods using force would only lead to a further destabilization in the region (UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 8). China, similarly, is very explicit in their emphasis on the institutions of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention: At meeting S/PV.6498, China claimed that they were "always against the use of force in international relations" (UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 10), and that they "respect the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Libya" (UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 10). This latter phrase was repeated at multiple meetings, both in relation to Libya and Syria (UNSC S/PV.6620, p. 4; UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 5; UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 9; UNSC S/PV.6751, p. 4; S/PV.6756, p. 8). This repetition is a clear rhetorical device, used in order to create particular emphasis on these institutions. Russia, likewise used similar phrasing at multiple meetings, in particular in the case of Syria, for instance: "Respect for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria as well as the principle of non-intervention, including military, in its affairs; refraining from confrontation" (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 3) and "Based on respect for Syria's sovereignty, we have cautioned against destructive attempts at external interference and against imposing any kind of illusory fixes" (UNSC S/PV.6751, p. 3). Additionally, in Russia's statement in regards to resolution 2017, they argue that the main responsibilities for curbing the proliferation of weapons in Libya, should in fact fall on the shoulders of the Libyan

authorities. In other words, the Russian statement clearly follows the pluralist values of minimal interference by the international society in regards to domestic affairs. Nevertheless, pluralist do yet consider the international society to have some say, however minimal, which can be further illustrated by the Russian delegate's claim that the curbing of proliferation of arms would require the aid of Libya's neighbours and the international community.

Russia and China's emphasis on the institutions of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention can also be seen in Graphs 3-5, as there is a notable difference between the frequency of the words used by Russia and China, in comparison to the Western P5 countries. The high frequency is particularly noticeable in the case of the Chinese statements. This could be explained by the simplicity and repetition found in their statements. The graphs also indicate that there is an increase in the references to the institutions of sovereignty, territoriality, and non-intervention in regards to the case of Syria. One of the reasons for this can be found in the statements by Russia and China, in which they reference the events in Libya as the explicit reason for their hesitance towards any UNSC action in Syria. As the Libyan conflict escalated first, the UNSC responded with the involvement of NATO forces, and, arguably, NATO went beyond the boundaries of their initial objective of Resolution 1973, that of aiding the civilian population and the actual results became a regime change in Libya (Zifcak 2012, p. 65). This, as a consequence, made Russia and China quite sceptical of any UNSC action in Syria, as their commitment to the principle of sovereignty meant they could not abide by the aim of regime change (Zifcak 2012, p. 87). Russia claims: "The situation in Syria cannot be considered in the Council separately from the Libyan experience" (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 4), and in a later meeting Russia argue that the Western countries are "calling for regime change, encouraging the opposition towards power, indulging in provocation and nurturing the armed struggle" (UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 9).

Diplomacy
In meeting S/PV.6491, when the Russian delegate explained Russia's vote on Resolution 1970, Russia argued that they believed that a solution in Libya could only occur through "political means" (UNSC S/PV.6491, p. 4), and following the intervention in Libya, in their argument for their positive vote on Resolution 2009, Russia argued that this was due to the desire to re-build post-war Libya exclusively under the patronage and aid of the UNSC, which would be done through "diplomatic channels" (UNSC S/PV.6620, p. 3). This emphasis on diplomacy was also clear in their statements on Syria, in which Russia argued for the need for

"even-handed and comprehensive dialogue aimed at achieving civil peace and national agreement" (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 3), as well as highlighting Russia's ongoing efforts of dialogue with Syria and its neighbours (UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 9) and a continuous call by Russia for inclusive dialogue conducted by the Syrians (UNSC S/PV.6751, p. 3). Similarly, the Chinese delegate emphasised the need for using peaceful means, such as dialogue, in order to regain order in Libya (UNSC S/PV.6491, p. 4) and the call for an "inclusive political process" (UNSC S/PV.6620, p. 4). This emphasis on dialogue continued in their statements on Syria: The Chinese delegate reiterated China's support for resolving the crisis through political dialogue (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 5), and argued that the UNSC should "help promote political dialogue and diffuse disputes" (UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 9) and that "Syrian crisis should be resolved in a just, peaceful and proper manner through political dialogue." (UNSC S/PV.6751, p. 4).

In addition, Graph 1 clearly show the difference between the Western P5 countries and Russia and China. It is worth noting that in regards to the conflict in Libya, Table 2 illustrate how Russia and China are relatively alike with the Western P5 countries. However, in the conflict in Syria the frequency of words is significantly higher. This exemplifies how the pluralist institution of diplomacy lost its significance and was downgraded by the Western P5 countries in the case of Syria, as they would rather focus on solidarist values, whereas the significance of the pluralist institutions was amplified by Russia and China. Said more succinctly: Russia and China would not let solidarist values weaken their pluralist position in the case of Syria.

International law:

All of the P5 countries, with the notable exception of France, show a similar focus on the pluralist institution of international law, both in relation to the crises in Libya and Syria. In the case of Libya, the UK argue that the Libyan authorities must show the full respect for both international law and human rights (UNSC S/PV.6491, p. 2), the US emphasised their willingness to aid Libya in building a society based on "the rule of law" (UNSC S/PV.6620, p. 4), and China called for the need to resolve the crisis in Libya through "the norms governing international law" and that the UNSC must act in accordance with the UN Charter (UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 10). Similar statements were made by China in relation to the Syrian conflict (UNSC S/PV.6627, p. 5). Graph 2 illustrate similar results: The UK, the US, Russia and China all use phrases related to the institution of international law. The UK use these words a relatively equal amount in both Libya and Syria and the US use the words at a higher

frequency in relation to Libya. On the other hand, Russia and China both use the phrases more in relation to Syria. This could demonstrate that although the pluralist institution of international law is considered important to both the UK and the US, its value is to some extent downgraded in relation to Syria. This could be explained by the Western P5 countries' focus on solidarist values, which reduces the significance of the pluralist values. That could also be considered the reason why the focus on international law is so low for France, however it does not explain the discrepancy between France and the two other Western P5 countries. This warrants further research, and is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Additionally, as previously mentioned in chapter 3.1.2, the pluralist standpoint is one that focuses on the moral value of order in the international system, rather than the moral pursuit of justice (Gallagher 2015, p. 51). This can be seen in the statements by China, in which they clearly emphasise the importance of maintaining, or more likely, regaining order and stability: At meeting S/PV.6491 and meeting S/PV.6620, China claimed that the violence in Libya must end in order to restore the stability and order as soon as possible (UNSC S/PV.6491, p. 4; UNSC S/PV.6620, p. 4). Similar viewpoints are expressed in relation to the situation in Syria, in which China call for the end of violence so that there could be a restoring of order and stability in Syria (UNSC S/PV.6711, p. 9).

It is worth noting, however, that the Western countries also indicate an emphasis on order, yet their focus is somewhat different than Russia and China. An example of this is a statement by the US delegate in which she affirmed the UNSC willingness to aid in the restoration of both democracy and stability (UNSC S/PV.6620, p. 4). There is therefore an emphasis on both the pluralist value of order, as well as the pluralist pursuit of justice, through her emphasis on the need for democracy.

6.2.2 The statements by the P5 countries in light of the pluralist critique of humanitarian intervention

The first pluralist critique presented by Wheeler (2002, p. 29) is that of the role national interest can play in a state's encouragement for or against a humanitarian intervention. Adams (2016, p. 769) emphasise the fact that outside Libya, Gaddafi had no major international allies who could persuade and pressure him to regulate his violent responses. In other words, within the region he was quite isolated with neighbouring states who were quite reluctant to form ties

with the Libyan regime (Zifcak 2012, p. 86). Syria, on the other hand, had close political, economic, and personal ties to several countries, including Russia (Zifcak 2012, p 85; p. 90). This allowed for the influence of self-interest in playing a role in the lack of response in regards to Syria, as Russia was undoubtedly hesitant to present any argument against their ally. Zifcak (2012, p. 85) additionally argue that Syria was an important trading partner and strategic ally to many of the countries within LAS. LAS was influential in arguing for the implementation of the no-fly-zone in Libya, an argument referenced by several of the P5 countries when arguing for this measure (UK at UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 4; US at UNSC S/PV.6498, p. 5). Bellamy (2011, p. 266) considers the involvement of LAS, as well as the OIC and GCC, as a "diplomatic gamechanger", and he goes on to state that without the support of these organizations, it is highly likely that China and Russia would have vetoed Resolution 1973. However, in relation to the Syrian conflict, LAS, similar to Russia, was hesitant to react. The UNSC therefore lost the ability to use LAS as an argument for coercive methods, as they had done in Libya. It is therefore not only the national self-interest of the member countries of the UNSC which complicate the advocation for coercive measures, but also its allies, in the case of Syria, or lack of allies, in the case of Libya, in the MENA region.

Zifcak (2012, p. 90) additionally considers the role the geographical location of Syria played in the lack of response to the conflict, particularly in relation to its neighbouring country Israel. Israel and Syria have a long history of contestation, notably the Golan Heights, and Zifcak (2012, p. 90) argues that it could become a distinct possibility that a Western-led intervention could be perceived in Syria as a strategic advantage to Israel, and as a consequence lead to a reaction against Israel by the Syrian army. These destabilizing and negative effects are particular to the Syrian situation, and could therefore not be comparable to the situation in Libya.

Returning to the pluralist critique of humanitarian intervention presented by Wheeler (2002, p. 30), pluralists argue that creating a framework for legitimate humanitarian intervention will lead to intervening states applying it selectively. As has been shown, this is plainly the case, as there is a discrepancy within the implementation of R2P in the cases of Libya and Syria. The framework created for R2P clearly allows for this selectivity, as the UNSC is considered the chosen authority to decide on any military intervention, and the construction of the UNSC include the right to veto for the P5 countries.

Another critique of humanitarian interventions by pluralists is presented by Bellamy (2003a, p. 3) in which he maintains that pluralists believe that there is no agreement as to what constitutes a so-called "supreme humanitarian emergency". On one hand, the adoption of R2P by the UNGA do show that this is not in fact entirely accurate, as the UNGA agreed upon four criteria for mass atrocities that could legitimise a humanitarian intervention, namely genocide war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (UNGA 2005, p. 30). However, in the initial phase of the conflict in Syria, there were disagreements about whether or not the situation in Syria even needed to be addressed by the UNSC. At meeting S/PV.6572, on the 30th of June 2011, several months into the conflict, the UNSC met in order to vote on a resolution relating to the conflict between Syria and Israel. During this meeting, the Western P5 countries discussed the humanitarian atrocities taking place in Syria (France at UNSC S/PV.6572, p. 4; UK at UNSC S/PV.6572, p. 2; US at UNSC S/PV.6572, p. 3). On the other hand, the Russian and Chinese argued that the ongoing situation in Syria was not considered relevant as it considered the domestic affairs of Syria: Russia argued: "Syria is not on the agenda of the Security Council because it does not pose a threat to international peace and security" (UNSC S/PV.6572, p. 5), and similarly, China maintained: "The events in Syria are an internal affair of that Country" (UNSC S/PV.6572, p. 5). This meeting clearly indicates that there is still disagreements about what a "supreme humanitarian emergency" entails.

6.3 Possible further research

This thesis used only the statements by the P5 countries found in the discussions in plenary. However, there exists a vast archive of additional statements found in the UN Dag Hammarskjöld Library, including letters, note verbale, and presidential statements related to the conflicts, in addition to statements given externally of the UNSC, such as interviews or press conferences by the national leaders. Further research could utilise these sources in order to achieve wider knowledge and increased scope of analysis. Further research could also include a more extensive quantitative analysis in order to examine the changes over time in the P5's emphasis of the various ES institution. This could also lead to a further understanding of France's lack of focus on international law in their statements.

7. Conclusion

This thesis considered the two crises in Libya and Syria, and by analysing the statements made by the P5 at UNSC meetings aimed to answer the question of:

> *What are the various viewpoints of the P5 countries in regards to R2P, and how do the P5's justifications for or against humanitarian intervention reflect their pluralist and solidarist values?*

This was done by first evaluating the principle of R2P, and how it came to be, as well as the academic debate surrounding the principle, before describing the background to the conflicts in Libya and Syria. Following this, the theoretical framework of English School was presented, as well as the debate found within the theory between the pluralist and solidarist viewpoints. Subsequently, the institutions of ES were presented, namely that of sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-intervention, diplomacy, international law, and human rights. A discussion on the tension that can occur between these institutions, due to the pluralist focus in the first five and the solidarist focus in the last, followed.

Thereupon, the results of the analysis were presented by examining the statements by the P5 countries, and emphasising whenever the institutions are expressed, in addition to presenting quantitative results of the words frequency of phrases relating to the six institutions. This analysis indicated a significant divergence in values between the P5 countries, in which there were a clear distinction between the Western P5 countries and Russia and China. The solidarist arguments presented by France, the US and the UK were consequently presented through the lens of the solidarists six principles for legitimate humanitarian intervention. Subsequently, the pluralist arguments of Russia and China were examined by considering the pluralist critique of humanitarian intervention.

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S/PV.6498 (17 Mar. 2011)
S/PV.6505 (24 Mar. 2011)
S/PV.6507 (28 Mar. 2011)
S/PV.6509 (4 Apr. 2011)
S/PV.6527 (3 May 2011)
S/PV.6528 (4 May 2011)
S/PV.6530 (9 May 2011)

S/PV.6541 (31 May 2011)

S/PV.6555 (15 June 2011)

S/PV.6595 (28 July 2011)

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S/PV.6709 (26 Jan. 2012)

S/PV.6728 (29 Feb. 2012)

S/PV.6731 (7 Mar. 2012)

S/PV.6733 (12 Mar. 2012)

S/PV.6768 (10 May 2012)

S/PV.6772 (16 May 2012)

S/PV.6807 (18 July 2012)

S/PV.6832 (12 Sept. 2012)

S/PV.6855 (7 Nov. 2012)

S/PV.6857 (8 Nov. 2012)

S/PV.6881 (7 Dec. 2012)

Syria

2011:

S/PV.6598 (3 Aug. 2011)

S/PV.6627 (4 Oct. 2011)

S/PV.6636 (24 Oct. 2011)

S/PV.6692 (20 Dec. 2011)

2012:

S/PV.6751 (14 Apr. 2012)

S/PV.6756 (21 Apr. 2012)

S/PV.6757 (23 Apr. 2012)

S/PV.6757(Resumption 1) (23 Apr. 2012)

S/PV.6803 (10 July 2012)

S/PV.6810 (19 July 2012)

S/PV.6812 (20 July 2012)

S/PV.6816 (25 July 2012)

S/PV.6816(Resumption1) (25 July 2012)

S/PV.6821 (9 Aug. 2012)

S/PV.6824 (22 Aug. 2012)

S/PV.6826 (30 Aug. 2012)

S/PV.6835 (17 Sept. 2012)

S/PV.6847 (15 Oct. 2012)

S/PV.6847(Resumption 1) (15 Oct. 2012)

S/PV.6871 (27 Nov. 2012)

S/PV.6894 (19 Dec. 2012)

<u>Other:</u>

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S/RES 1973 (2011)

S/RES/2009 (2011)

S/RES/2016 (2011)

S/RES/2017 (2011)

<u>Syria</u>:
S/RES/2042 (2012)
S/RES/2043 (2012)

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