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A Least Expected Ally?

Past-*Communists and Ukraine's "European Choice"*

ABSTRACT Thirty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, some historical legacies of the communist system still influence individual political attitudes. This article explores how historical legacies influence individual political and geopolitical preferences in three Ukrainian cities. We focus on the effects of parental and individual CPSU membership over individual support for EU/NATO membership, on perceptions of the Soviet period for Ukraine, and on the perceived legitimacy of the 11 May 2014 "Donetsk People's Republic" independence referendum. Using survey data collected in Dnipro and Kharkiv in 2018, and in Mariupol in 2020, we show that (individual or parental) CPSU affiliation is positively correlated with pro-Western attitudes, indicating that many former members of the CPSU and their descendants have reoriented their geopolitical allegiances from East to West. Or, alternatively, that they are relatively politically adaptive and that their allegiance to communism wasn't fully solid in the first place.

KEYWORDS Ukraine, Communist Party, geopolitical preferences, Soviet Union, Donetsk People's Republic

INTRODUCTION

Much scholarship in the social sciences uses the "post-Soviet" or "post-socialist" qualifier when referring to the former state socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). While some observers may do so out of theoretically hollow routine, for most this habit signals the probable presence and relevance of a now relatively distant past under Communist Party rule, and indeed, studies of communist (-era) legacies on current social, economic, and political circumstances constitute a distinguished tradition in the literature. However, such legacy effects are notoriously difficult to pin down and demonstrate empirically (Kotkin & Beissinger, 2014), and there are relatively few studies that are able to support legacy arguments based on observable patterns of causality. These studies have shown, inter alia, that former members of CEE communist parties were more likely to start private businesses after the fall of the *ancien régime* (though not necessarily successful ones) (Ivlevs et al., 2020), that long-lasting exposure to communism in the past increases support for parties that favor redistributive policies (Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Dinas & Northmore-Ball, 2020), and that regions targeted for heavy industrial development under communism experienced the formation of local conditions that make the

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subsequent introduction of democracy and democratic decision-making more difficult (Lankina & Libman, 2019).

Communist regimes defined themselves as the antithesis of capitalism, presenting themselves as the ideological pinnacle of social progress. For the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the socialist mode of production deserved being emulated by—or imposed on—other countries, despite the obvious limitations of Soviet-style economics (see Kornai, 1992, for details). In a characteristically totalitarian manner, the blame for such failures was typically shifted to domestic counter-revolutionary forces (real or imaginary) and to malevolent Western states (Yablokov, 2018). Conspiracy theories and outright disinformation, as well as other so-called "active measures" (Rid, 2020) were used extensively in order to achieve this result. Ultimately, Soviet propaganda produced a polarized geopolitical narrative of the world, contrasting Soviet "best practices" against the misery, corruption, and moral bankruptcy of the West. Accordingly, it aimed to discourage any sympathy for the latter, while producing unrealistic expectations about the future Soviet land of equally shared milk and honey. And communists, both leaders and rank-and-file, were the ideological vanguard charged with leading the working masses to this future of peace, work, and joy. In this vein, devout former communists would be expected to look back at the fall of the Soviet Union with regret or nostalgia, while feeling resentment toward the market economy and any geopolitical reorientation toward the heir(s) of the Cold War capitalist nemesis.

Needless to say, the CPSU's storyline failed to convince everyone, and over time it lost its purchase among the wider society. With this in mind, it is plausible that at least some former party members will have lost their faith in communist geopolitical narratives, opening three additional possibilities: that the views of Communist (former) Party members may have converged with those prevalent within society at large, that former communists may have become even more critical because of their presumable deeper understanding of the system and of its failures, or that many communists were political chameleons rather than true believers in the cause. Indeed, the little literature on the role of former communists in CEE societies shows that communist elites were strikingly adaptive (Libman & Obydenkova, 2021, pp. 32–34), while, as a group, former Communist Party members did not behave like communists after communism (Ivlevs, Nikolova & Popova, 2020).

There is a floating assumption within CEE societies that people associated with the past regime are largely unable or unwilling to adapt to the post-1989/91 conditions, and that their geopolitical and foreign policy orientations are toward Moscow and away from the West. In some cases, communist successor parties did little to alter this impression. In Ukraine, for example, the current Communist Party, which enjoyed very much support during the 1990s (the party's presidential candidate Petro Symonenko reached the second round of the 1999 elections, raking in almost 40% of the votes), is highly ideologically conservative, with its geopolitical orientation very much "Eurasian."[1]

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1. The Communist Party of Ukraine was effectively banned from participating in elections in 2015 in accordance with the Law on the Condemnation of the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes in Ukraine and Prohibition of Propaganda and Their Symbols, No. 317-VIII, 9 April 2015 (https://bit.ly/3uYwbV0).

Leaving Symonenko's crumbling anachronistic political edifice aside, our article asks whether people with past individual ties to the CPSU really are as anti-Western as is frequently assumed. Our analysis will be informed by results obtained from public opinion surveys conducted in three major cities in the eastern half of Ukraine—Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Mariupol—in which tensions at least used to run high regarding Ukraine's "European Choice" (originally formulated in Verkhovna Rada, 2002). Different aspects of pro-Western orientation will be discussed by focusing on EU and NATO preferences, opinions on whether the Soviet period was positive for Ukraine and, for the case of Mariupol only, opinions on the legitimacy of the illegal 11 May 2014 referendum on the independence of the "Donetsk People's Republic," the neo-Soviet separatist statelet engineered by Russia that year against a background of civil unrest associated with the Euromaidan revolution in Kyiv.

Our main finding is that people with individual or parental ties to the CPSU are *more*, not less, pro-Western. This rather counterintuitive insight is significant on two accounts. First, it complements—and to some extent challenges—the literature on the individual or macro-level effects of CPSU membership in post-communist societies (Lankina, Libman & Obydenkova, 2016a; Letki, 2004; Libman & Obydenkova, 2021). Second, it makes a more general contribution to the literature on political and geopolitical attitudes in CEE, especially in the former Soviet Union, where Russia's presence is more conspicuous and contested. In doing so, it shows how Soviet politics still influence post-Soviet politics, not least when it comes to the issue of EU support and integration. Here, our results allow us to develop Loveless and Rohrschneider's (2011) argument that individual support for the EU in post-communist countries is influenced more by values and politics than by economics.

We now proceed by reviewing the literature on the associations between Communist Party (CP) membership and (geo)political attitudes, allowing us to distill our main research question and a set of two competing hypotheses. We then present the three Ukrainian case study cities, followed by a data and methods section, which also motivates the choice of variables studied in the empirical analysis. This allows us to move on to the results section, starting from a descriptive stage and ending in a multivariate setting. Informed by the findings of our article, the final section discusses its main conclusions and their significance in the light of the literature.

CP LINKS AND CURRENT (GEO)POLITICAL ATTITUDES

The literature on historical legacies studies "the persistence of institutions, policies, values, and practices which connect past and present phenomena" (Libman & Obydenkova, 2021, p. 18). A historical legacy argument presupposes the existence of a significant disruptive event, and is thus not applicable to societies with gradually evolving systems (Kotkin & Beissinger, 2014). Such disruptive events, which may be viewed as "critical junctures" (Capoccia, 2015) or "macrohistorical ruptures" (Kotkin & Beissinger, 2014, p. 8), include a wide range of major events, from severe economic depressions (e.g., the Greek crisis of 2011), through coups (e.g., the recent Myanmar military coup),

revolutionary regime change (e.g., the Tunisian Jasmine revolution in 2011), to decolonization. Beyond doubt, one of the 20th century's most important macrohistorical ruptures is the sudden collapse of the communist regimes in the Soviet Union (1991) and its satellite states. The events had epochal consequences for the political landscapes (democratization, sometimes), economies (economic depression), and geopolitical characteristics of the region's newly independent states. As such, the collapse of the socialist regimes provides a unique window of opportunity to study the influence of the historical legacies of the communist system for the societies of the successor states (Kotkin & Beissinger, 2014; Libman & Obydenkova, 2021).

CP members, and people who grew up in families with communists, are a "living" (if shrinking, for obvious demographic reasons) legacy of the communist period. This group has attracted the interest of scholars from the very early years of transition, when there was a debate between proponents of the political capitalism thesis, which purported that communists would "monetize" their political assets (e.g., by seizing control over former state property) (Staniszkis, 1990), and those who placed greater emphasis on cultural capital as the main driver of individual success post-1989 (Eyal et al., 1998). More recently, several authors have focused on the role that links to the former communist parties have on current political and economic practices and attitudes in post-communist societies. These links matter, as communist parties had a monopoly on power in the countries they ruled (Letki, 2004; Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2020), and, as such, these parties acted as spaces where individuals could participate within set boundaries in politics, and where they could develop their social networks (Letki, 2004).

Moreover, CPs functioned as sui generis elitist organizations: it was a privilege to join (an unwelcome one for some, e.g., Soviet composer Dmitriy Shostakovich; see Fairclough, 2019), and offered several social and economic advantages to their members (Rona-Tas & Guseva, 2001; Ivlevs, Nikolova & Popova, 2020; Libman & Obydenkova, 2021), the most notable of which possibly being the opportunity to travel, including to the West. In Estonia, for example, by 1991 27% of communists had visited the West and 54% the other socialist countries, as opposed to only 10% and 28%, respectively, among non-communists (Titma, Tooding & Tuma, 2004, p. 96). This means that communists have a history of greater exposure to the West than do non-communists; they were thus better equipped to assess the differences in living standards between the two sides of the iron curtain and, by extension, perhaps also the relative merit of the Soviet command economy under the patronage of the CP. For some, this will have widened the gap between officially and privately held assessments of the communist system.

In the remainder of this section, we first review the main findings of the literature, focusing on the correlation of past CP membership with current political and economic circumstances, after which we turn to the main legacy effects that have been theorized as underlying these relations.

First, from a macro perspective, the successive works by Libman and Obydenkova (e.g., 2015, 2020, 2021) uncovered a relationship between CPSU membership in particular

regions and their post-Soviet political and economic trajectories. Specifically, Libman and Obydenkova's work on the historical legacies of communism in post-Soviet Russia shows that higher regional percentages of CPSU members during the later years of Soviet power predict lower levels of democratic development (Libman & Obydenkova, 2015), higher corruption (Obydenkova & Libman, 2015; Libman & Obydenkova, 2021), lower levels of regional inequality (Libman & Obydenkova, 2019), and stronger negative attitudes toward migrants (Libman & Obydenkova, 2020).

Second, at the individual level, multiple authors have focused on the nexus between past links with the CPSU and current economic and political conditions and attitudes. Both Gerber (2000) and Rona-Tas and Guseva (2001), for example, identify a link between former CPSU membership and higher salaries in early post-Soviet Russia. However, they differ in their interpretation of the causal links between variables: for Gerber (2000), the higher salaries among former Communist Party members can be traced back to the (unmeasurable) individual psychological characteristics that favored their admission to the party in the first place (ambition, assertiveness, etc.); Rona-Tas and Guseva (2001), on the other hand, dispute Gerber's (2000) results on methodological grounds while countering that the more plausible explanation lies in former communists' formal and informal institutional advantages inherited from the Soviet period, echoing the political capitalism interpretation (Staniszkis, 1990).

Recently, Ivlevs and colleagues explored the socioeconomic consequences of individual links with CPs in a study including multiple countries. Ivlevs and Hinks (2018) show that individual links with the CPSU strongly predict willingness to bribe public officials, supporting Libman and Obydenkova's (2021) findings at the regional level. Ivlevs, Nikolova, and Popova (2020) show that Communist Party links are positively correlated with entrepreneurship. With regard to the far-less-explored connections with political behavior, Letki (2004) reveals that past membership in a CP is positively correlated with political engagement, which the author attributes to "the skills and general interest in politics learned [especially by CP members] under non-democratic regimes" (Letki, 2004, p. 675).

So far, we may recognize two main arguments linking CP membership with current behaviors and attitudes: (1) CPs as promoters of clientelism and corrupt practice, and (2) CPs as generators and consolidators of social elites. These arguments refer to competing sets of results with their associated inferences about plausible causality.

The "factory of corruption and clientelism" argument is supported by works that show that individual links to communist parties, and regional percentages of CP membership, are negatively correlated to democratic, cosmopolitan, and free market outcomes. These works often point to the economy of favors and corruption among (and between) CP members to argue that past CP membership is associated with these behaviors today via a relatively straightforward continuity effect (Libman & Obydenkova, 2015; Lankina, Libman & Obydenkova, 2016b, p. 11; Ivlevs & Hinks, 2018). In this literature, the CPs are seen primarily as clientelist organizations whose members profited from the social and economic opportunities that came with CP membership.

The "social elite mill" argument rests on findings that show that individual links to CPs increase political engagement. For this reason, former party members are potentially among the driving forces of the democratization processes in post-communist Europe. Seen through this lens, the limited space for political participation that was available to CP members under communism had a positive impact on this group's future participation in democratic processes (Letki, 2004), while also giving it a political headstart in the society that emerged from the rubble of the multiple crises generated by the post-1989 macrohistorical rupture.

Summing up, our brief review of the literature shows that the individual trajectories of former CP members do not fit in a single theoretical mold. On the one hand, the literature indicates that, as a group, they tend to perform somewhat better economically than the population at large, despite earlier indications to the contrary (based on countries which have chosen clean break strategies, see Eyal et al., 1998). On the other, little is known (but much is assumed) about the group's ideological commitment post-1989, and on the extent to which this commitment may influence the current political and geopolitical attitudes. Even less is known about one of the contexts where the issue arguably matters the most: Ukraine. On this basis, we reiterate our research question, which is:

> *How do past members of the Communist Party, or people or who grew up with at least one parent in the CPSU, assess Ukraine's pivot to the West?*

Based on the literature reviewed above, we find support for a main hypothesis (H_1) and a counter-hypothesis (H_2). H_1 is that those with links to the CPSU are more likely to be against Ukrainian EU or NATO accession, to have a positive view of the Soviet past, and to perceive the 11 May 2014 illegal referendum on the independence of the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) as legitimate. While the expectation of a positive association between CP links and views of the Soviet past is rather straightforward, the associations between these links and geopolitical orientation are not self-evident, and it is possible to argue both for and against H_1 (implying support for the counter-hypothesis H_2 or for the null hypothesis H_0 that a CP background does not influence (geo)political preferences). The most straightforward expectation is that people with CP links would likely hold on to the CPSU view of the world, thus rejecting Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration. However, because communists were not always true believers, the opposite might be the case (H_2). This caution also applies to the hypotheses regarding the DPR referendum, even though the leading hypothesis is that greater support for the referendum should be expected among those with CP links.

At the time of the referendum, the DPR independence option represented the rejection of Ukraine's European Choice, together with an endorsement of greater integration with Russia, both key goals of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU), and members of the CPU were included among the referendum's organizers. Indeed, in an interview conducted by one of the authors, an organizer of the referendum, and CPU member, revealed that the DPR activists' expectation was the immediate

incorporation of the DPR into the Russian Federation and that the activists did not take the independent DPR project seriously in the first place. The counter-hypothesis (H_2), on the other hand, is that people with former CP links might view Euro-Atlantic integration more positively, be more critical of the Soviet past, and be less favorable to the DPR referendum, when compared to people who did not have such links. Such a counter-hypothesis rests on the proposition that people with former CP links might be more adaptive to current societal and political circumstances, and perhaps also better informed about the shortcomings of the demised communist system.

CASE STUDIES, DATA, AND METHODS

Case Study Sites

Located in the eastern central part of the country, Dnipro (pop. ca. 1 million) and Kharkiv (pop. ca. 1.4 million) rank among Ukraine's largest and most significant and diversified industrial and cultural centres. Both hosted unique strategic industries linked to the Soviet military-industrial complex and to nuclear power generation. These industries remain vital for the cities today, including the nuclear turbine-producing Turboatom in Kharkiv and Pivdenmash (Yuzhmash) in Dnipro, which is able to produce, among other things, intercontinental ballistic missiles and rocket engines. Both cities thus host(ed) a highly skilled elite of engineers and specialists. When the Euromaidan revolution unfolded in Kyiv, protests erupted in both cities, but they were particularly dangerous in Kharkiv, where a serious Russian-led attempt at creating a "Kharkov People's Republic" was derailed by Ukrainian special forces and by the city's own Euromaidan supporters. In Dnipro, on the other hand, the protests rapidly dissolved, and the city even started earning a reputation for Ukrainian civic nationalism, "a space in which identification with Ukraine was formulated in political, not language- or ethnicity-based, categories" (Portnov, 2015, p. 729). Nevertheless, according to a recent study (Gentile, 2020), this label, while being more appropriate for Dnipro than for Kharkiv, is misleading: both cities host significant non–pro-Western contingents, if not outright pro-Russian.[2]

Mariupol is, or rather was, a midsize port city (pop. ca. 450,000 in 2021) in the southeastern corner of Ukraine. Until the recent Russian full-scale attack on Ukraine, which started on 24 February 2022, the city's economy was dominated by two large steelworks (Ilich and Azovstal, both belonging to the Metinvest corporation headed by oligarch Rinat Akhmetov), making the city's prospects far more dependent on the success or failure of one sector when compared to our two other case study cities. Unlike Kharkiv and Dnipro, Mariupol was temporarily controlled by the DPR during the late spring months of 2014, and on 11 May the latter managed to organize a pseudo-referendum on the DPR's independence, achieving stratospheric levels of

2. However, with the 24 February 2022 large-scale Russian attack on Ukraine, this group has probably shrunk. For details on how the post-Euromaidan conflict played out in Kharkiv and Dnipro, see Nitsova (2021).

approval. Nevertheless, the DPR forces in Mariupol were soon defeated and forced to retreat. Since then, the city has been located near the military frontline, and it has been subject to multiple rocket attacks, most notably on 24 January 2015. Despite this, most of its population continued holding views that are incompatible with Kyiv's European vision for Ukraine. Currently (23 September 2022), Mariupol is occupied by Russian forces, who inflicted a humanitarian catastrophe of major proportions on the city, generating a huge flow of refugees in addition to many thousands of individuals having been killed or deported to Russia; as a result, it is estimated that about 100,000 residents remain in the city at the time of this writing.

Data

We use survey data collected in Dnipro and Kharkiv in 2018, and in Mariupol in 2020 (n = 1,254, 1,258, and 1,251, respectively, aged 18+). The data were collected through personal interviews and anonymized by the Kyiv-based Center for Social Indicators (CSI), which shares its resources (i.e., people and equipment) with the reputed Kyiv International Institute of Sociology polling agency. Compliance with applicable personal data protection legislation was certified by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data. The main themes covered by the surveys relate to Ukraine's current political and geopolitical situation. The Dnipro and Kharkiv databases are almost identical, whereas the Mariupol database, while similar in its overall structure, includes a somewhat different set of opinion questions. Despite these differences, the variables used in this study are identical across all three databases, both in terms of question wording and available response options. The sampling method is described in greater detail in Gentile (2020). For our purposes here, it suffices to note that the sample relies on a household-based sampling frame, and that only one person was selected within each household using a modified version of the Kish (1949) table. While aiming to maximize representativeness vis-à-vis the adult population of the three cities, such a strategy inevitably leads to an over-representation of women and of the elderly, who are more likely to live alone in Ukraine, in addition to being more easily approachable (cf. Nemeth, 2004). For this reason, we report our results both unweighted and weighted (in accordance with the cities' known age-sex composition statistics). The response rates are 28% in Dnipro, 36% in Kharkiv, and 30% in Mariupol, and these figures take into account all forms of nonresponse.

Methods

We report separate logistic regressions for each city, facilitating comparison (see Appendix 1). However, as Mood (2010) explains, "it is problematic to compare LnOR or OR across samples, across groups within samples, or over time—even when we use models with the same independent variables" (p. 68). To overcome this problem, and following Mood (2010), we calculate the average marginal effects (AMEs) for the logistic models, which allow a more straightforward interpretation.

Our dependent variables—support for hypothetical EU/NATO accession, belief that the Soviet period was positive for Ukraine, and disagreement with the statement that the

11 May 2014 DPR referendum was legitimate—approach our underlying research question from different angles. The first variable dichotomizes the answers to the question "Do you think it would be good for Ukraine to join the EU and/or NATO?" Here, following previous coding by other authors (e.g., Ehin, 2001; Kentmen, 2008; and Berlinschi, 2019), support for either organization, or both, is coded as 1, and the rest, including don't know (DK) answers, as 0 (the logic for coding DKs as 0 is that they indicate a lack of explicit support). The "Soviet period was positive" and the "disagree that the DPR referendum was legitimate" variables both dichotomize answers on a four-option symmetric Likert scale (completely agree, rather agree, rather disagree, and completely disagree). The neutral category was intentionally omitted because it is not practically distinguishable from a DK answer. We chose logistic regression with recoded binary outcome variables, rather than linear regression on the original variables, because the response options, while arranged ordinally, are not equidistant.

For the Soviet period variable, we distinguish between confident agreement (completely agree = 1) and the rest of the answers rather than drawing the line at what would seem to be the natural cutting point between agreement and disagreement. This is because we want to single out those with unambiguously pro-Soviet views, as it is otherwise quite common among Ukrainians to see at least some value in the Soviet past (the country industrialized, all-encompassing schooling was introduced, etc.), a position that is not necessarily at odds with having a Western geopolitical orientation today. In fact, and expectedly, a model that dichotomizes this dependent variable between the categories of "rather disagree" and "rather agree" produces largely weaker results for the main independent variables, even statistically nonsignificant in the case of Dnipro.

For the referendum variable, we code any level of *dis*agreement as 1, otherwise 0. To simplify the interpretation, we consider answers that disagree with the referendum statement as equivalent to agreeing with the statement that the DPR referendum was *il*legitimate.

Our key independent variables are parental CP membership and personal past membership in the CP. The two variables are tested in separate models as doing so allows us to include two extra control variables (related to the education level of both parents) in the parental communism models, while leaving them out of the individual CPSU membership model, where including them arguably makes less sense.[3]

Based on the extant research on the determinants of foreign policy and geopolitical preferences in Ukraine, our models include demographic, socioeconomic, and sociocultural controls.

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3. In any case, the two variables have been tested in the same model and the main results of this article hold for both parental and individual CPSU membership with the exception of the effect of individual CPSU membership on EU/NATO support, which maintains the same direction but loses significance. These extra tables may be supplied upon request to the corresponding author.

Our demographic variables comprise age in three groups (18–39, 40–59, and 60+) and sex (male = 1). Both variables are standard controls in survey-based research on geopolitical and foreign policy preferences, and several studies show lower support for a Western geopolitical orientation among older age cohorts (O'Loughlin, 2001; Munro, 2007; Armandon, 2013).

Our socioeconomic variables are education (completed higher education = 1), material standard of living (good or excellent on a five-step Likert scale = 1, otherwise 0), and occupational status (managers and professionals = 1, otherwise 0). Socioeconomic status is known to correlate with pro-Western preferences not only in Ukraine (Munro, 2007; Torres-Adán, 2021a) but also in, for example, Russia (O'Loughlin & Talbot, 2005) and Moldova (Torres-Adán, 2021b). We also control for the respondents' parents' higher education in order to target potential social class reproduction effects.

The sociocultural controls include language usually spoken at home and the two supranational identifications as "Soviet" or "European," respectively. For the language usually spoken at home (or with friends and family for single-person households), "mostly Russian" is coded as 1, while the "else" category (0) includes not only Ukrainian but also both Russian and Ukrainian as well as Surzhyk and any other language. Soviet and European identification were measured using the answers to the question "Do you feel Ukrainian/Russian/Soviet/European?," which were dichotomized at their natural cutting points on a four-step Likert scale (clearly not, rather not, rather yes, clearly yes). The "feel Russian" and "feel Ukrainian" variables were tested, but for parsimony they were excluded from the models, as they are mostly nonsignificant when combined with the "feel Soviet" and "feel European" variables. Many studies on foreign policy and geopolitical preferences in Ukraine find a rather strong effect of language and self-reported national identification (e.g., Pirie, 1996; Kulyk, 2011; Pop-Eleches & Robertson, 2018), with Russian(s) typically being associated with weaker pro-Western (or pro-Ukraine) policy preferences.[4] In fact, supranational identifications, which are more seldom controlled for, appear to "cannibalize" on the effects of national identity (Gentile, 2020), while economic considerations such as regional trade patterns encourage pragmatic preferences among both Russians and Ukrainians (Beesley, 2020).

Finally, we control for self-reported knowledge of the English language, as this offers an indication of the respondents' potential direct exposure to the West, including to its information spaces. Indeed, a recent study based on a nationwide convenience (Facebook) sample finds that knowledge of at least some English is associated with greater EU support, although direct exposure to EU countries was found to be more important (Kovalska 2021). It is also plausible that an expected future English-language premium on the labor market might mean that those who do speak the language will also have greater appreciation of the opportunities presented by Ukraine's European Choice, particularly

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4. It is worth noting that there is an important literature that challenges essentializing notions of Ukraine's linguistic communities, particularly of the Russophone group, which is very diverse and for which linguistic identities are not at all clear-cut, especially since the Euromaidan (see, e.g., Kulyk, 2019, and Aliyev, 2019).

as a result of increased trade with the West. However, this premium has yet to jump from the world of expectations to that of the observable outcomes (Fabo, 2020).

RESULTS

We report our results in two stages. In the first stage we present the univariate descriptive statistics for our dependent variables (support for EU and/or NATO accession, belief that the Soviet period was "definitely positive" for Ukraine, and belief that the DPR referendum was illegitimate[5]), followed by a bivariate cross-tabulation against the independent variables (parental CPSU membership and individual CPSU membership). In the second stage, we verify our findings in a multivariate setting by reporting the differences in predicted probabilities between the maximum and minimum values of the independent variables.

Having (Had) Communist Parents Predicts Individual Pro-Western Inclinations

Table 1 reports the distribution of univariate frequencies in our dependent variables, both unweighted and weighted by age and sex, for each city. Overall, it is clear that the three cities' residents do not hold particularly "pro-West" views, with the partial exception of Dnipro, where almost half of the population would like to see Ukraine join the EU, NATO, or both organizations (the original variable—before dichotomization—shows that the EU is by far the most popular of the two). Of the three cities, Mariupol is the

TABLE 1.   Unweighted and Weighted (by Age and Sex) Distribution of Dependent Variables in Three Case Study Cities

	Unweighted, %	Weighted, %
Dnipro		
Supports either EU or NATO accession, or both (*n* = 1,252)	43.2	45.2
Believes that Soviet period was clearly positive for Ukraine (*n* = 1,258)	32.6	30.2
Kharkiv		
Supports either EU or NATO accession, or both (*n* = 1,253)	28.5	30.9
Believes that Soviet period was clearly positive for Ukraine (*n* = 1,252)	33.2	29.3
Mariupol		
Supports either EU or NATO accession, or both (*n* = 1,248)	20	24
Believes that Soviet period was clearly positive for Ukraine (*n* = 1,251)	49.4	41.7
Believes that DPR referendum was illegitimate (*n* = 1,251)	27.1	28

Source: Authors' survey material.

5. In fact, the dependent variable is "disagreement with the statement that the DPR referendum was legitimate," which is the same as saying that it was illegitimate.

one where Ukraine's European Choice seems to be facing its greatest challenge, particularly when considering that only a minority of little more than one quarter considers the DPR referendum as being illegitimate. We also note that the weighted statistics differ somewhat, particularly in the case of Mariupol, suggesting the necessity to conduct the analysis in both weighted and unweighted modes. In the remainder of the main text, we report our unweighted results because they are similar in substance to the weighted ones, which are instead reported in Appendix 2.

Table 2 disaggregates the information contained in the previous table by parental communism status, and a clear pattern emerges: respondents whose both parents were CPSU members are more likely to support Ukraine's EU and/or NATO accession in all

TABLE 2. Distribution of Dependent Variables by Parental Communism Status

	Parental Communism Status	n	Ukraine should become member of EU/NATO (% yes in each group)	Considers Soviet period as "definitely positive" for Ukraine (% in each group)	Disagrees that DPR referendum was legitimate (% in each group)
Dnipro	No communist parents/DK	980	41.3	32.8	
	Communist mother	20	40	35	
	Communist father	104	50	40.4	N/A
	Both parents were communists	133	53.4	28.6	
	Total (incl. refusals)	1,258	43.3	33	
Kharkiv	No communist parents/DK	1,068	25.1	33.4	
	Communist mother	22	72.7	31.8	
	Communist father	82	53.7	41.5	N/A
	Both parents were communists	64	37.5	20.3	
	Total (incl. refusals)	1,254	28.5	33.2	
Mariupol	No communist parents/DK	940	15.2	51.9	24.2
	Communist mother	39	30.9	40.5	35.7
	Communist father	100	19	50.9	28.4
	Both parents were communists	145	46.5	36.1	40.3
	Total (incl. refusals)	1,251	19.8	49.5	26.9

Source: Authors' survey material.

TABLE 3. Distribution of Dependent Variables by Individual Former Communist Party Membership Status (Excludes Those Aged 21 and Under in 1991)

	Respondent CPSU Membership	Do you think that Ukraine should become a member of NATO/ EU? (% in each group)	Considers Soviet period as "definitely positive" for Ukraine (% in each group)	Disagrees that DPR referendum was legitimate (% in each group)
Dnipro 2018 (n = 718)	Not member	34.2	43.4	
	CPSU member	45.2	53.2	N/A
	Total	36.2	45.1	
Kharkiv 2018 (n = 717)	Not member	17.4	43.9	
	CPSU member	34.2	31.6	N/A
	Total	19.2	42.5	
Mariupol 2020 (n = 789)	Not member	12.1	66.9	22.4
	CPSU member	16	49.7	24.8
	Total	12.9	63.2	22.9

three cities. In most cases, a single communist parent appears to be enough too. A similar but weaker pattern exists for the (definitely positive) opinions on the Soviet past, which are generally more frequent among those who do not have a parental communist background than among those with "double-communist" backgrounds. In this case, having only one communist parent shows little association with the dependent variable.

Perhaps the most counterintuitive result in Table 2 is that having (had) CPSU member parents—even just one—is associated with belief in the lack of legitimacy of the DPR referendum. This is even more striking, considering that the DPR seeks to invoke legitimacy by relying on a pastiche of Soviet discourses, narratives, and heraldry, peppering them with more than a sprinkle of "White" Russian imperialism. A Soviet-era communist should, in theory, be attracted to this, but, of course, having communist parents is not the same as having yourself been a member of the CPSU. We must therefore turn to Table 3, where individual CPSU membership is brought into the picture, while those who were not of potentially communist age in 1991 must be temporarily dropped from the analysis.

Former CPSU members, it appears, also favor Ukrainian EU and/or NATO membership more than do non-members, with the difference being strongest in Kharkiv. In Dnipro, almost half of the former CPSU members have such pro-Western preferences, which is more than the average for the city including the younger (more pro-European) cohorts. Former CPSU members also see less value in the Soviet period in Kharkiv and Mariupol, but not in Dnipro. Perhaps this is explained by the fact that Dnipro(petrovsk) was a highly prioritized, and thus privileged, city during the years of Soviet power

(Zhuk, 2010), and living standards were certainly higher than those in Kharkiv or Mariupol, especially for CPSU members.

Summing up, our initial descriptive tour indicates that, in line with some of the premises of the historical legacies literature (e.g., that past CPSU membership stimulated political engagement post-1989; Letki, 2004) but contrary to recent developments studying the macro effects of CPSU party membership (e.g., Libman & Obydenkova, 2021), individual or parental affiliation with the CPSU is positively correlated with pro-Western attitudes. We now need to check whether these results are able to persist after relevant controls have been added.

Tables 4–6 show the differences in predicted probabilities between the maximum and minimum of the independent variables in the models based on parental CPSU

TABLE 4. Average Marginal Effects for Parental CPSU Membership Model: EU/NATO Preferences

Predictor	Dnipro		Kharkiv		Mariupol	
	Unweighted		Unweighted		Unweighted	
	Change	p Value	Change	p Value	Change	p Value
Age 40-59 (ref: 18-39)	−0.041	0.250	−0.046	0.135	0.025	0.372
Age 60+ (ref: 18-39)	−0.047	0.244	−0.061	0.085	−0.007	0.802
Male	0.002	0.935	0.028	0.245	0.015	0.435
Higher education (ref: other)	−0.003	0.934	0.091	0.001	−0.008	0.711
Good/excellent material standard of living (ref: other)	0.063	0.114	0.226	0.000	0.012	0.675
Occupation: Professional, manager, or supervisor (ref: else)	−0.009	0.776	−0.051	0.046	0.009	0.717
Russian language mostly spoken at home (ref: other)	−0.060	0.060	−0.114	0.006	−0.130	0.000
English language – can at least communicate (ref: cannot)	0.055	0.210	0.104	0.012	0.061	0.070
Higher education (mother) (ref: other)	0.064	0.121	0.062	0.058	−0.034	0.224
Higher education (father) (ref: other)	−0.010	0.804	−0.099	0.001	0.134	0.001
Communist parent(s) (ref: no communist parents)	**0.132**	**0.000**	**0.193**	**0.000**	**0.128**	**0.000**
Feels European (ref: does not)	0.312	0.000	0.258	0.000	0.267	0.000
Feels Soviet (ref: does not)	−0.203	0.000	−0.086	0.002	−0.220	0.000

Source: Authors' survey. The table shows the difference in predicted probabilities between the maximum and minimum values for the dichotomous variables. For variables with several categories, the table shows the difference in predicted probabilities between each of the categories and the reference category.

TABLE 5. Average Marginal Effects for Parental CPSU Membership Model: Perceptions of Soviet Period

Predictor	Dnipro		Kharkiv		Mariupol	
	Unweighted		Unweighted		Unweighted	
	Change	*p* Value	Change	*p* Value	Change	*p* Value
Age 40–59 (ref: 18–39)	0.083	0.015	0.101	0.005	0.316	0.000
Age 60+ (ref: 18–39)	0.287	0.000	0.100	0.008	0.400	0.000
Male	0.013	0.628	−0.030	0.263	0.011	0.684
Higher education (ref: other)	−0.024	0.410	0.018	0.537	−0.013	0.699
Good/excellent material standard of living (ref: other)	−0.089	0.024	−0.141	0.000	0.017	0.701
Occupation: Professional, manager, or supervisor (ref: else)	0.021	0.466	0.015	0.606	−0.015	0.682
Russian language mostly spoken at home (ref: other)	−0.028	0.345	−0.036	0.395	0.073	0.049
English language – can at least communicate (ref: cannot)	−0.026	0.556	−0.010	0.837	0.019	0.728
Higher education (mother) (ref: other)	−0.017	0.668	−0.190	0.000	−0.036	0.516
Higher education (father) (ref: other)	0.062	0.117	−0.020	0.575	0.068	0.169
Communist parent(s) (ref: no communist parents)	**−0.042**	**0.166**	**−0.021**	**0.576**	**−0.143**	**0.000**
Feels European (ref: does not)	−0.064	0.035	−0.192	0.000	−0.073	0.075
Feels Soviet (ref: does not)	0.232	0.000	0.169	0.000	0.294	0.000

Source: Authors' survey. The table shows the difference in predicted probabilities between the maximum and minimum values for the dichotomous variables. For variables with several categories, the table shows the difference in predicted probabilities between each of the categories and the reference category.

membership. Three variables consistently predict support for EU and/or NATO accession, or lack thereof (Table 4): parental communism and our two "feeling European and Soviet" controls, confirming our descriptive findings. The European and Soviet controls are powerful predictors, but they are also rather obvious, so we shall hereafter disregard them. In addition, we may note that knowledge of the English language is positively associated with EU/NATO support, whereas Russian spoken at home exerts an influence in the opposition direction, but not all of the latter associations are statistically significant. In Kharkiv, higher education and a good standard of living also predict a pro-Western geopolitical orientation, suggesting a social status effect that is perhaps self-interested (why change the status quo, which is the European Choice?), and which signals that the country's geopolitical orientation is more socially divisive in this city (see Gentile, 2020).

TABLE 6. Average Marginal Effects for Parental CPSU Membership Model: DPR Referendum

Predictor	Mariupol	
	Unweighted	
	Change	p Value
Age 40–59 (ref: 18–39)	0.083	0.013
Age 60+ (ref: 18–39)	0.099	0.005
Male	−0.012	0.629
Higher education (ref: other)	0.012	0.689
Good/excellent material standard of living (ref: other)	0.109	0.014
Occupation: Professional, manager, or supervisor (ref: else)	0.034	0.315
Russian language mostly spoken at home (ref: other)	−0.010	0.776
English language – can at least communicate (ref: cannot)	0.076	0.114
Higher education (mother) (ref: other)	−0.018	0.669
Higher education (father) (ref: other)	0.098	0.052
Communist parent(s) (ref: no communist parents)	**0.071**	**0.025**
Feels European (ref: does not)	0.129	0.001
Feels Soviet (ref: does not)	−0.214	0.000

Source: Authors' survey. The table shows the difference in predicted probabilities between the maximum and minimum values for the dichotomous variables. For variables with several categories, the table shows the difference in predicted probabilities between each of the categories and the reference category.

As for the case of EU/NATO support, having communist parents reduces the probability of having a clearly positive opinion of the Soviet past (Table 5), but this time only in Dnipro and Mariupol. Instead, a clear age effect emerges, especially in Mariupol, where the gap in living standards and, especially, security between the heydays of Soviet communism and today is likely (and rightly) perceived as largest, particularly among the oldest cohorts, who must rely on meager pensions for their survival.

Finally, Table 6 shows that parental communism predicts individual belief that the DPR referendum of 11 May 2014 was illegitimate. The effect is not strong, but it is nevertheless considerable and statistically significant. It is worth noting that while the "feel" variables and material standard of living behave as one would expect, age does not: after controlling for socioeconomic status and supranational identification, it appears that the older generations were less supportive of the DPR project than the younger ones, which contradicts the popular opinions circulating in Ukraine. Of course, older age correlates with (lower) social status, particularly with "Soviet" identification, but not completely, and all models have passed the multicollinearity test (VIF values) with good margin.

Summing up, the findings presented so far support our second hypothesis (H_2): that is, that having links to the CPSU is associated with pro-Western rather than with anti-Western geopolitical inclinations. All three indicators point in the same direction. However, having grown up with CPSU member parents is not enough to fully address our research question. For this reason, we now turn to our results based on individual past CPSU membership.

Having Been a CPSU Member Predicts Individual Pro-Western Inclinations

Tables 7–9 indicate that parental and individual CPSU membership behave in similar ways (as do the controls). Former communists are (1) more likely to be in favor of Ukraine acceding to the EU or NATO (Table 7) and (2) less likely to think that the

TABLE 7. Average Marginal Effects for Individual CPSU Membership Model: EU/NATO Preferences

	Dnipro		Kharkiv		Mariupol	
	Unweighted		Unweighted		Unweighted	
Predictor	Change	p Value	Change	p Value	Change	p Value
Age 40–59 (ref: 18–39)	−0.078	0.119	−0.037	0.384	0.068	0.009
Age 60+ (ref: 18–39)	−0.111	0.087	−0.063	0.264	0.044	0.268
Male	−0.006	0.836	0.022	0.366	0.010	0.631
Higher education (ref: other)	0.014	0.625	0.085	0.001	0.019	0.404
Good/excellent material standard of living (ref: other)	0.078	0.054	0.243	0.000	0.023	0.463
Occupation: Professional, manager, or supervisor (ref: else)	0.001	0.983	−0.056	0.031	0.017	0.508
Russian language mostly spoken at home (ref: other)	−0.053	0.102	−0.116	0.007	−0.160	0.000
English language – can at least communicate (ref: cannot)	0.062	0.156	0.095	0.023	0.103	0.006
Party membership: Not old enough (ref: old enough, not member)	−0.047	0.317	0.018	0.691	0.057	0.132
Party membership: CPSU member (ref: old enough, not member)	**0.105**	**0.023**	**0.110**	**0.042**	**0.076**	**0.024**
Feels European (ref: does not)	0.324	0.000	0.286	0.000	0.267	0.000
Feels Soviet (ref: does not)	−0.203	0.000	−0.061	0.034	−0.225	0.000

Source: Authors' survey. The table shows the difference in predicted probabilities between the maximum and minimum values for the dichotomous variables. For variables with several categories, the table shows the difference in predicted probabilities between each of the categories and the reference category.

TABLE 8.   Average Marginal Effects for the Individual CPSU Membership Model: Perceptions of Soviet Period

| | Dnipro | | Kharkiv | | Mariupol | |
| | Unweighted | | Unweighted | | Unweighted | |
Predictor	Change	p Value	Change	p Value	Change	p Value
Age 40–59 (ref: 18–39)	0.082	0.060	0.166	0.000	0.273	0.000
Age 60+ (ref: 18–39)	0.279	0.000	0.223	0.000	0.344	0.000
Male	0.013	0.614	−0.032	0.237	0.017	0.544
Higher education (ref: other)	−0.017	0.536	−0.053	0.058	−0.015	0.649
Good/excellent material standard of living (ref: other)	−0.092	0.018	−0.194	0.000	0.010	0.819
Occupation: Professional, manager, or supervisor (ref: else)	0.026	0.367	0.015	0.617	−0.009	0.797
Russian language mostly spoken at home (ref: other)	−0.026	0.366	−0.063	0.163	0.060	0.098
English language – can at least communicate (ref: cannot)	−0.032	0.473	−0.027	0.570	0.008	0.879
Party membership: Not old enough (ref: old enough, not member)	0.013	0.784	0.096	0.026	−0.078	0.114
Party membership: CPSU member (ref: old enough, not member)	**0.037**	**0.353**	**−0.094**	**0.021**	**−0.200**	**0.000**
Feels European (ref: does not)	−0.063	0.040	−0.214	0.000	−0.087	0.032
Feels Soviet (ref: does not)	0.237	0.000	0.202	0.000	0.301	0.000

Source: Authors' survey. The table shows the difference in predicted probabilities between the maximum and minimum values for the dichotomous variables. For variables with several categories, the table shows the difference in predicted probabilities between each of the categories and the reference category.

Soviet period was positive for Ukraine (except in Dnipro, Table 8). Moreover, there appear to be no significant differences in geopolitical attitudes between non-communists of potential communist age and those whose younger age precluded CPSU membership, except in Kharkiv, where the latter group is more impressed by the Soviet period than are the city's Soviet-grown non-communists.

These findings complement the ones revealed by the parental communism models, allowing us to conclude that CPSU links consistently predict pro-Western geopolitical orientations, thus confirming H$_2$. Of course, our findings do not allow generalization beyond the cases of the cities that they describe, but they are nevertheless largely consistent across three very diverse local contexts while being located within the single Ukrainian national context: Dnipro is the former elite industrial city, as well as a source

TABLE 9. Average Marginal Effects for Individual CPSU Membership Model: Disagree That DPR Referendum Was Legitimate

| | Mariupol | |
| | Unweighted | |
Predictor	Change	p Value
Age 40–59 (ref: 18–39)	0.115	0.000
Age 60+ (ref: 18–39)	0.175	0.000
Male	−0.013	0.607
Higher education (ref: other)	0.028	0.366
Good/excellent material standard of living (ref: other)	0.118	0.008
Occupation: Professional, manager, or supervisor (ref: else)	0.041	0.223
Russian language mostly spoken at home (ref: other)	−0.018	0.594
English language – can at least communicate (ref: cannot)	0.101	0.038
Party membership: Not old enough (ref: old enough, not member)	0.106	0.040
Party membership: CPSU member (ref: old enough, not member)	**0.047**	**0.215**
Feels European (ref: does not)	0.132	0.001
Feels Soviet (ref: does not)	−0.213	0.000

Source: Authors' survey. The table shows the difference in predicted probabilities between the maximum and minimum values for the dichotomous variables. For variables with several categories, the table shows the difference in predicted probabilities between each of the categories and the reference category.

of many of the USSR's and independent Ukraine's political elites. Kharkiv is also industrial, but with a much more limited "eliteness" when compared to Dnipro; instead, it is an established hub of Ukrainian national culture. Finally, Mariupol is characterized by its heavy industrial heritage of ferrous metallurgy.

CONCLUDING DISCUSSION

The results of our analysis contribute to the relatively scarce literature on individual effects of historical legacies, particularly to the literature on individual CPSU membership and political attitudes (Letki, 2004). Broadly speaking, we find an intriguing and somewhat counterintuitive legacy effect on geopolitical and political attitudes, and these are attitudes that matter for the future orientation of Ukraine and for the overall stability of the region. Specifically, we show that, in our three case study cities, individuals who were members of the CPSU, as well as the sons and daughters of former CPSU members, tend to exhibit stronger pro-Western geopolitical inclinations than do their neighbors without communist links. Individual communist links, in other words, increase our research population's probability of supporting Kyiv's European Choice, rather than the

alternatives preferred by Moscow, which focuses on Ukraine *not* integrating with the West (political apathy is acceptable for this purpose, but cynicism or explicit "pro-Eurasian" stances would be preferable). *Why* communist links predict pro-West stances is an entirely different matter that would require additional research, and identifying causality paths (for they are surely multiple) would require intense qualitative, experimental, and possibly longitudinal data.

We should recall that our results exist against the background of a majority that cannot be characterized as being explicitly pro-West, including people with both agnostic and explicitly pro-Russian views (Torres-Adán, 2021a). And we should also recall that the three case study cities do not represent the whole of Ukraine, where pro-Western opinions were generally more firmly established following the Euromaidan revolution, but a sample of strategically and economically important cities in the country's eastern half.

Focusing on individuals rather than on the macro-level allows us to paint a somewhat different picture to that of Libman and Obydenkova (2021), especially if pro-Western attitudes are interpreted as a sign of support for democracy—a connection that is likely but hardly self-evident. Being a former party member (or the son/daughter of one) is not associated with negative or retrograde positions (e.g., being against democratization, being more prone to corruption, and more anti-immigration); instead, it can have a certain "Westernizing" effect today, even when the share of communists in a region predicts lower levels of democracy and/or higher corruption (Libman & Obydenkova, 2015, 2021).

How can the contrast between our findings and those of Libman and Obydenkova (2015, 2019, 2020, 2021) be explained? There are at least four plausible answers to this question. First, it could be that our implicit equiparation of pro-Western attitudes with support for democratic values does not necessarily hold in all contexts. Second, the Russian (where Libman and Obydenkova have conducted most of their work) and Ukrainian contexts might differ in ways that only a comparative (individual and macro effects) study can unveil. Third, these results could indicate that, while on an individual level former communists and their offspring are more pro-West than the average, a higher share of communists at the regional level would reduce regional levels of democracy and/ or increase corruption because of the intervening effect of regional clientelistic networks based on past CPSU membership. Last, it could simply be so that former communists are politically adaptive creatures, and that they know how to adjust to new political realities. Indeed, their joining the CP may have been out of perceived convenience, rather than conviction, in the first place.

To conclude, our article generates new questions that need an answer. One such question concerns the ideological differences between the various communist parties that emerged across post-Soviet Europe after the collapse of the USSR and the dissolution of the CPSU. If individuals who were members of the CPSU tend to be more pro-West nowadays, then why are post-independence communist parties often among the most vociferous anti-West actors in the political environments of post-Soviet Europe? Was there a replacement of the members of the CPs with new members, or do the CPs simply

unite the remaining "true believers"? These questions require future in-depth studies that are, ultimately, of great importance to the understanding of political processes in the former Soviet Union, including of the effect that historical legacies have on geopolitical orientations, democratization and, alas, on autocratization. After all, who would have expected that *past*-communists could have emerged as potential travel mates along Ukraine's tortuous path toward European integration, as allies of the country's European Choice? ∎

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TABLE A1.1. Results of Logistic Regression for Parental CPSU Membership Model: EU/NATO Preferences

	Dnipro		Kharkiv		Mariupol	
	Unweighted	Weighted	Unweighted	Weighted	Unweighted	Weighted
Age						
40–59 (ref: 18–39)	−0.208	−0.154	−0.300	−0.610**	0.243	0.280
	(0.180)	(0.205)	(0.198)	(0.220)	(0.277)	(0.328)
60+ (ref: 18–39)	−0.235	−0.221	−0.402	−0.833***	−0.0750	−0.0317
	(0.200)	(0.228)	(0.230)	(0.252)	(0.297)	(0.351)
Sex						
Male	0.0118	−0.0194	0.186	0.146	0.158	0.198
	(0.143)	(0.165)	(0.159)	(0.184)	(0.200)	(0.228)
Education						
Higher education (ref: other)	−0.0129	−0.104	0.607***	0.603**	−0.0856	−0.111
	(0.156)	(0.188)	(0.175)	(0.214)	(0.232)	(0.276)
Financial situation						
Good/excellent material standard of living (ref: other)	0.317	0.400	1.280***	1.208***	0.125	0.0133
	(0.198)	(0.219)	(0.186)	(0.226)	(0.293)	(0.332)
Occupation						
Professional, manager, or supervisor (ref: else)	−0.0442	0.0356	−0.356	−0.338	0.0913	0.144
	(0.155)	(0.182)	(0.183)	(0.204)	(0.249)	(0.292)
Most-used language at home						
Russian language mostly spoken at home (ref: other)	−0.305	−0.271	−0.712**	−0.528	−1.145***	−1.071***
	(0.161)	(0.187)	(0.240)	(0.289)	(0.232)	(0.258)
English language						
Can at least communicate (ref: cannot)	0.274	0.312	0.648**	0.622*	0.563*	0.615
	(0.215)	(0.239)	(0.241)	(0.299)	(0.282)	(0.320)
Parents' education						
Higher education (mother) (ref: other)	0.319	0.240	0.410	0.191	−0.375	−0.491
	(0.203)	(0.227)	(0.210)	(0.270)	(0.329)	(0.353)

(continued)

TABLE A1.1. (*continued*)

	Dnipro		Kharkiv		Mariupol	
	Unweighted	Weighted	Unweighted	Weighted	Unweighted	Weighted
Higher education (father) (ref: other)	−0.0497	−0.0562	−0.700**	−0.533*	1.142***	1.178***
	(0.201)	(0.218)	(0.214)	(0.269)	(0.306)	(0.336)
Communist parent(s) (ref: no communist parents)	**0.665***	**0.522***	**1.148***	**1.407***	**1.157***	**1.371***
	(0.175)	**(0.205)**	**(0.225)**	**(0.289)**	**(0.223)**	**(0.249)**
Geopolitical identities						
Feels European (ref: does not)	1.431***	1.442***	1.435***	1.267***	1.969***	1.782***
	(0.159)	(0.181)	(0.178)	(0.224)	(0.222)	(0.278)
Feels Soviet (ref: does not)	−0.988***	−1.015***	−0.585**	−0.435	−1.782***	−1.796***
	(0.157)	(0.178)	(0.194)	(0.251)	(0.235)	(0.283)
Constant	−0.166	−0.117	−0.960***	−0.877**	−0.666*	−0.755*
	(0.220)	(0.262)	(0.285)	(0.323)	(0.298)	(0.338)
N	1,084	1,084	1,143	1,143	1,095	1,095
pseudo R^2	0.159	0.161	0.235	0.216	0.350	0.339

Standard errors in parentheses: * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001.

TABLE A1.2. Results of Logistic Regression for Parental CPSU Membership Model: Perceptions of Soviet Period

	Dnipro		Kharkiv		Mariupol	
	Unweighted	Weighted	Unweighted	Weighted	Unweighted	Weighted
Age						
40–59 (ref: 18–39)	0.534*	0.452	0.569**	0.611**	1.622***	1.522***
	(0.228)	(0.256)	(0.204)	(0.234)	(0.290)	(0.308)
60+ (ref: 18–39)	1.543***	1.478***	0.564**	0.630**	2.013***	1.856***
	(0.231)	(0.253)	(0.212)	(0.241)	(0.293)	(0.310)
Sex						
Male	0.0753	0.0858	−0.167	−0.0438	0.0595	0.000245
	(0.155)	(0.176)	(0.149)	(0.175)	(0.147)	(0.164)
Education						
Higher education (ref: other)	−0.142	−0.184	0.102	0.0577	−0.0694	−0.184
	(0.172)	(0.199)	(0.166)	(0.183)	(0.179)	(0.200)

(continued)

TABLE A1.2. (*continued*)					
	Dnipro		Kharkiv		Mariupol	
	Unweighted	Weighted	Unweighted	Weighted	Unweighted	Weighted
Financial situation						
Good/excellent material standard of living (ref: other)	−0.544*	−0.409	−0.836***	−0.973***	0.0905	0.389
	(0.253)	(0.280)	(0.240)	(0.267)	(0.237)	(0.306)
Occupation						
Professional, manager, or supervisor (ref: else)	0.124	0.0276	0.0862	0.0341	−0.0803	−0.109
	(0.170)	(0.190)	(0.167)	(0.193)	(0.195)	(0.221)
Most-used language at home						
Russian language mostly spoken at home (ref: other)	−0.162	−0.155	−0.198	−0.0967	0.379*	0.210
	(0.171)	(0.199)	(0.230)	(0.253)	(0.190)	(0.231)
English language						
Can at least communicate (ref: cannot)	−0.155	−0.104	−0.0545	−0.0568	0.101	0.463
	(0.266)	(0.292)	(0.266)	(0.292)	(0.293)	(0.339)
Parents' education						
Higher education (mother) (ref: other)	−0.103	0.0244	−1.072***	−0.692**	−0.189	−0.159
	(0.241)	(0.283)	(0.220)	(0.250)	(0.288)	(0.305)
Higher education (father) (ref: other)	0.362	0.236	−0.113	−0.238	0.370	0.361
	(0.231)	(0.268)	(0.202)	(0.234)	(0.280)	(0.304)
Communist parent(s) (ref: no communist parents)	**−0.251**	**−0.140**	**−0.118**	**−0.0857**	**−0.732***	**−0.776***
	(0.185)	**(0.213)**	**(0.214)**	**(0.248)**	**(0.166)**	**(0.198)**
Geopolitical identities						
Feels European (ref: does not)	−0.383*	−0.534**	−1.154***	−1.045***	−0.376	−0.579*
	(0.185)	(0.203)	(0.219)	(0.250)	(0.207)	(0.235)
Feels Soviet (ref: does not)	1.222***	1.221***	0.897***	1.081***	1.391***	1.541***
	(0.159)	(0.180)	(0.163)	(0.189)	(0.195)	(0.237)
Constant	−1.917***	−1.764***	−0.722**	−1.020**	−2.689***	−2.490***
	(0.262)	(0.310)	(0.276)	(0.311)	(0.332)	(0.344)
N	1,088	1,088	1,143	1,143	1,098	1,098
pseudo R^2	0.190	0.186	0.175	0.181	0.196	0.244

Standard errors in parentheses: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

TABLE A1.3.   Results of Logistic Regression for Parental CPSU Membership Model: DPR Referendum

	Mariupol	
	Unweighted	Weighted
Age		
40–59 (ref: 18–39)	0.560*	0.631*
	(0.239)	(0.253)
60+ (ref: 18–39)	0.655**	0.814**
	(0.254)	(0.265)
Sex		
Male	−0.0748	−0.0845
	(0.155)	(0.180)
Education		
Higher education (ref: other)	0.0730	0.157
	(0.181)	(0.214)
Financial situation		
Good/excellent material standard of living (ref: other)	0.592**	0.709**
	(0.221)	(0.258)
Occupation		
Professional, manager, or supervisor (ref: else)	0.198	0.149
	(0.192)	(0.222)
Most-used language at home		
Russian language mostly spoken at home (ref: other)	−0.0567	0.179
	(0.197)	(0.217)
English language		
Can at least communicate (ref: cannot)	0.419	0.461
	(0.247)	(0.270)
Parents' education		
Higher education (mother) (ref: other)	−0.112	−0.0824
	(0.268)	(0.311)
Higher education (father) (ref: other)	0.534*	0.598
	(0.253)	(0.308)

(continued)

TABLE A1.3. *(continued)*

	Mariupol	
	Unweighted	Weighted
Communist parent(s) (ref: no communist parents)	**0.408***	**0.487****
	(0.175)	**(0.187)**
Geopolitical identities		
Feels European (ref: does not)	0.691***	0.709**
	(0.191)	(0.217)
Feels Soviet (ref: does not)	−1.124***	−1.219***
	(0.195)	(0.215)
Constant	−1.258***	−1.594***
	(0.265)	(0.277)
N	1,098	1,098
pseudo R^2	0.103	0.121

Standard errors in parentheses: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

TABLE A1.4. **Results of Logistic Regression for Individual CPSU Membership Model: EU/NATO Preferences**

	Dnipro		Kharkiv		Mariupol	
	Unweighted	Weighted	Unweighted	Weighted	Unweighted	Weighted
Age						
40–59 (ref: 18–39)	−0.381	−0.344	−0.233	−0.460	0.680*	0.729*
	(0.240)	(0.272)	(0.260)	(0.304)	(0.287)	(0.324)
60+ (ref: 18–39)	−0.546	−0.530	−0.403	−0.728	0.458	0.597
	(0.313)	(0.355)	(0.354)	(0.408)	(0.430)	(0.461)
Sex						
Male	−0.0300	−0.0466	0.144	0.140	0.0939	0.0744
	(0.145)	(0.165)	(0.158)	(0.185)	(0.194)	(0.220)
Education						
Higher education (ref: other)	0.0726	−0.0579	0.552***	0.532**	0.183	0.194
	(0.148)	(0.177)	(0.167)	(0.194)	(0.217)	(0.247)

(continued)

TABLE A1.4. (*continued*)					
	Dnipro		Kharkiv		Mariupol	
	Unweighted	Weighted	Unweighted	Weighted	Unweighted	Weighted
Financial situation						
Good/excellent material standard of living (ref: other)	0.385	0.467*	1.314***	1.186***	0.214	0.0293
	(0.196)	(0.220)	(0.182)	(0.221)	(0.282)	(0.319)
Occupation						
Professional, manager, or supervisor (ref: else)	0.00325	0.0595	−0.379*	−0.323	0.160	0.172
	(0.155)	(0.181)	(0.181)	(0.207)	(0.237)	(0.272)
Most-used language at home						
Russian language mostly spoken at home (ref: other)	−0.265	−0.246	−0.694**	−0.658*	−1.305***	−1.400***
	(0.161)	(0.187)	(0.240)	(0.283)	(0.219)	(0.258)
English language						
Can at least communicate (ref: cannot)	0.308	0.351	0.577*	0.502	0.845**	0.852**
	(0.214)	(0.239)	(0.238)	(0.292)	(0.269)	(0.293)
Party membership						
Not old enough (ref: old enough, not member)	**−0.248**	**−0.253**	**0.117**	**0.148**	**0.547**	**0.659**
	(0.255)	**(0.285)**	**(0.290)**	**(0.354)**	**(0.349)**	**(0.348)**
CPSU member (ref: old enough, not member)	**0.537***	**0.446**	**0.670***	**0.607**	**0.710***	**0.800****
	(0.237)	**(0.275)**	**(0.308)**	**(0.416)**	**(0.296)**	**(0.311)**
Geopolitical identities						
Feels European (ref: does not)	1.472***	1.461***	1.524***	1.363***	1.862***	1.628***
	(0.159)	(0.181)	(0.178)	(0.222)	(0.214)	(0.262)
Feels Soviet (ref: does not)	−0.984***	−1.002***	−0.399*	−0.174	−1.713***	−1.722***
	(0.158)	(0.179)	(0.189)	(0.239)	(0.231)	(0.280)
Constant	0.153	0.191	−1.054**	−0.943*	−0.931*	−0.886
	(0.332)	(0.388)	(0.393)	(0.465)	(0.452)	(0.475)
N	1,073	1,073	1,126	1,126	1,090	1,090
pseudo R^2	0.154	0.158	0.202	0.186	0.309	0.285

Standard errors in parentheses: * $p <0.05$, ** $p <0.01$, *** $p <0.001$.

TABLE A1.5. Results of Logistic Regression for Individual CPSU Membership Model: Perceptions of Soviet Period

	Dnipro		Kharkiv		Mariupol	
	Unweighted	Weighted	Unweighted	Weighted	Unweighted	Weighted
Age						
40–59 (ref: 18–39)	0.521	0.322	0.950***	0.962**	1.381***	1.284***
	(0.292)	(0.331)	(0.258)	(0.301)	(0.304)	(0.328)
60+ (ref: 18–39)	1.504***	1.255**	1.229***	1.185**	1.722***	1.527***
	(0.353)	(0.395)	(0.320)	(0.371)	(0.369)	(0.396)
Sex						
Male	0.0800	0.0690	−0.177	−0.0264	0.0897	0.0589
	(0.158)	(0.180)	(0.150)	(0.176)	(0.148)	(0.166)
Education						
Higher education (ref: other)	−0.101	−0.142	−0.293	−0.270	−0.0800	−0.212
	(0.163)	(0.190)	(0.155)	(0.180)	(0.175)	(0.205)
Financial situation						
Good/excellent material standard of living (ref: other)	−0.570*	−0.409	−1.181***	−1.213***	0.0542	0.355
	(0.253)	(0.276)	(0.253)	(0.275)	(0.238)	(0.313)
Occupation						
Professional, manager, or supervisor (ref: else)	0.155	0.0682	0.0831	0.0180	−0.0509	−0.102
	(0.171)	(0.189)	(0.166)	(0.194)	(0.197)	(0.228)
Most-used language at home						
Russian language mostly spoken at home (ref: other)	−0.156	−0.164	−0.340	−0.230	0.319	0.201
	(0.171)	(0.199)	(0.239)	(0.265)	(0.191)	(0.226)
English language						
Can at least communicate (ref: cannot)	−0.191	−0.157	−0.150	−0.0884	0.0437	0.404
	(0.269)	(0.292)	(0.267)	(0.296)	(0.288)	(0.341)
Party membership						
Not old enough (ref: old enough, not member)	**0.0769**	**−0.0316**	**0.551***	**0.511**	**−0.411**	**−0.484**
	(0.282)	**(0.316)**	**(0.262)**	**(0.314)**	**(0.248)**	**(0.268)**
CPSU member (ref: old enough, not member)	**0.218**	**0.493**	**−0.606***	**−0.575**	**−1.022*****	**−1.045*****
	(0.230)	**(0.259)**	**(0.284)**	**(0.322)**	**(0.193)**	**(0.225)**

(continued)

TABLE A1.5. (*continued*)

	Dnipro		Kharkiv		Mariupol	
	Unweighted	Weighted	Unweighted	Weighted	Unweighted	Weighted
Geopolitical identities						
Feels European (ref: does not)	−0.376*	−0.575**	−1.309***	−1.167***	−0.455*	−0.658**
	(0.186)	(0.201)	(0.230)	(0.268)	(0.209)	(0.242)
Feels Soviet (ref: does not)	1.253***	1.244***	1.052***	1.253***	1.439***	1.553***
	(0.160)	(0.179)	(0.165)	(0.202)	(0.198)	(0.240)
Constant	−1.973***	−1.655***	−1.344***	−1.586***	−2.301***	−2.074***
	(0.381)	(0.448)	(0.377)	(0.444)	(0.415)	(0.422)
N	1,077	1,077	1,126	1,126	1,093	1,093
pseudo R^2	0.195	0.195	0.164	0.176	0.204	0.248

Standard errors in parentheses: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

TABLE A1.6. Results of Logistic Regression for Individual CPSU Membership Model: DPR Referendum

	Mariupol	
	Unweighted	Weighted
Age		
40–59 (ref: 18–39)	0.879***	0.840**
	(0.253)	(0.280)
60+ (ref: 18–39)	1.239***	1.153**
	(0.362)	(0.389)
Sex		
Male	−0.0796	−0.107
	(0.155)	(0.179)
Education		
Higher education (ref: other)	0.162	0.284
	(0.176)	(0.204)
Financial situation		
Good/excellent material standard of living (ref: other)	0.632**	0.718**
	(0.221)	(0.255)

(continued)

TABLE A1.6. (*continued*)

	Mariupol	
	Unweighted	Weighted
Occupation		
Professional, manager, or supervisor (ref: else)	0.240	0.193
	(0.191)	(0.216)
Most-used language at home		
Russian language mostly spoken at home (ref: other)	−0.105	0.0407
	(0.194)	(0.218)
English language		
Can at least communicate (ref: cannot)	0.546*	0.606*
	(0.241)	(0.272)
Party membership		
Not old enough (ref: old enough, not member)	**0.607***	**0.352**
	(0.282)	**(0.312)**
CPSU member (ref: old enough, not member)	**0.289**	**0.222**
	(0.224)	**(0.237)**
Geopolitical identities		
Feels European (ref: does not)	0.699***	0.690**
	(0.190)	(0.222)
Feels Soviet (ref: does not)	−1.111***	−1.203***
	(0.196)	(0.217)
Constant	−1.780***	−1.747***
	(0.388)	(0.430)
N	1,093	1,093
pseudo R^2	0.098	0.109

Standard errors in parentheses: * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001.

TABLE A2.1. Average Marginal Effects for Parental CPSU Membership Model: EU/NATO Preferences. Weighted.

| | Dnipro | | Kharkiv | | Mariupol | |
| | Weighted | | Weighted | | Weighted | |
Predictor	Change	p Value	Change	p Value	Change	p Value
Age 40–59 (ref: 18–39)	−0.031	0.455	−0.103	0.006	0.032	0.385
Age 60+ (ref: 18–39)	−0.044	0.338	−0.136	0.001	−0.003	0.928
Male	−0.004	0.906	0.023	0.429	0.022	0.386
Higher education (ref: other)	−0.021	0.578	0.096	0.005	−0.012	0.683
Good/excellent material standard of living (ref: other)	0.081	0.073	0.222	0.000	0.002	0.968
Occupation: Professional, manager, or supervisor (ref: else)	0.007	0.845	−0.053	0.089	0.016	0.627
Russian language mostly spoken at home (ref: other)	−0.054	0.150	−0.089	0.081	−0.138	0.000
English language – can at least communicate (ref: cannot)	0.062	0.198	0.106	0.051	0.076	0.079
Higher education (mother) (ref: other)	0.048	0.295	0.031	0.483	−0.052	0.136
Higher education (father) (ref: other)	−0.011	0.795	−0.082	0.040	0.156	0.002
Communist parent(s) (ref: no communist parents)	**0.104**	**0.010**	**0.254**	**0.000**	**0.178**	**0.000**
Feels European (ref: does not)	0.315	0.000	0.235	0.000	0.258	0.000
Feels Soviet (ref: does not)	−0.210	0.000	−0.068	0.077	−0.234	0.000

TABLE A2.2. Average Marginal Effects for Parental CPSU Membership Model: Perceptions of Soviet Period. Weighted.

| | Dnipro | | Kharkiv | | Mariupol | |
| | Weighted | | Weighted | | Weighted | |
Predictor	Change	p Value	Change	p Value	Change	p Value
Age 40–59 (ref: 18–39)	0.071	0.069	0.103	0.009	0.284	0.000
Age 60+ (ref: 18–39)	0.277	0.000	0.106	0.010	0.354	0.000

(continued)

TABLE A2.2. (*continued*)

Predictor	Dnipro		Kharkiv		Mariupol	
	Weighted		Weighted		Weighted	
	Change	*p* Value	Change	*p* Value	Change	*p* Value
Male	0.014	0.627	−0.007	0.803	0.000	0.999
Higher education (ref: other)	−0.030	0.353	0.010	0.752	−0.032	0.360
Good/excellent material standard of living (ref: other)	−0.065	0.129	−0.150	0.000	0.066	0.200
Occupation: Professional, manager or supervisor (ref: else)	0.005	0.885	0.006	0.860	−0.019	0.623
Russian language mostly spoken at home (ref: other)	−0.026	0.441	−0.016	0.705	0.036	0.363
English language – can at least communicate (ref: cannot)	−0.017	0.720	−0.009	0.845	0.077	0.156
Higher education (mother) (ref: other)	0.004	0.931	−0.115	0.004	−0.028	0.604
Higher education (father) (ref: other)	0.039	0.380	−0.039	0.307	0.061	0.227
Communist parent(s) (ref: no communist parents)	**−0.023**	**0.507**	**−0.014**	**0.727**	**−0.135**	**0.000**
Feels European (ref: does not)	−0.086	0.007	−0.162	0.000	−0.103	0.015
Feels Soviet (ref: does not)	0.228	0.000	0.198	0.000	0.307	0.000

TABLE A2.3.   AMEs Parental Membership. DPR Referendum. Weighted.

Predictor	Mariupol	
	Weighted	
	Change	*p* Value
Age 40–59 (ref: 18–39)	0.096	0.010
Age 60+ (ref: 18–39)	0.128	0.001
Male	−0.014	0.637
Higher education (ref: other)	0.027	0.470
Good/excellent material standard of living (ref: other)	0.132	0.012
Occupation: Professional, manager, or supervisor (ref: else)	0.025	0.509
Russian language mostly spoken at home (ref: other)	0.029	0.399
English language – can at least communicate (ref: cannot)	0.083	0.110

(continued)

TABLE A2.3. (*continued*)

Predictor	Mariupol	
	Weighted	
	Change	p Value
Higher education (mother) (ref: other)	−0.014	0.788
Higher education (father) (ref: other)	0.110	0.074
Communist parent(s) (ref: no communist parents)	**0.086**	**0.012**
Feels European (ref: does not)	0.132	0.002
Feels Soviet (ref: does not)	−0.221	0.000

TABLE A2.4. Average Marginal Effects for Individual CPSU Membership Model: EU/NATO Preferences. Weighted.

Predictor	Dnipro		Kharkiv		Mariupol	
	Weighted		Weighted		Weighted	
	Change	p Value	Change	p Value	Change	p Value
Age 40–59 (ref: 18–39)	−0.070	0.212	−0.081	0.142	0.087	0.015
Age 60+ (ref: 18–39)	−0.108	0.141	−0.122	0.079	0.070	0.181
Male	−0.009	0.777	0.023	0.452	0.009	0.736
Higher education (ref: other)	−0.011	0.742	0.088	0.006	0.024	0.438
Good/excellent material standard of living (ref: other)	0.095	0.037	0.228	0.000	0.004	0.927
Occupation: Professional, manager, or supervisor (ref: else)	0.012	0.742	−0.052	0.108	0.022	0.533
Russian language mostly spoken at home (ref: other)	−0.049	0.190	−0.117	0.028	−0.202	0.000
English language – can at least communicate (ref: cannot)	0.071	0.148	0.088	0.104	0.120	0.009
Party membership: Not old enough (ref: old enough, not member)	−0.049	0.363	0.024	0.678	0.079	0.062
Party membership: CPSU member (ref: old enough, not member)	**0.087**	**0.103**	**0.106**	**0.171**	**0.099**	**0.017**
Feels European (ref: does not)	0.321	0.000	0.266	0.000	0.253	0.000
Feels Soviet (ref: does not)	−0.208	0.000	−0.029	0.464	−0.243	0.000

TABLE A2.5. Average Marginal Effects for Individual CPSU Membership Model: Perceptions of Soviet Period. Weighted.

Predictor	Dnipro		Kharkiv		Mariupol	
	Weighted		Weighted		Weighted	
	Change	p Value	Change	p Value	Change	p Value
Age 40–59 (ref: 18–39)	0.051	0.320	0.161	0.001	0.240	0.000
Age 60+ (ref: 18–39)	0.231	0.002	0.205	0.001	0.290	0.000
Male	0.011	0.702	−0.004	0.880	0.010	0.721
Higher education (ref: other)	−0.023	0.453	−0.045	0.135	−0.036	0.305
Good/excellent material standard of living (ref: other)	−0.064	0.123	−0.181	0.000	0.060	0.256
Occupation: Professional, manager, or supervisor (ref: else)	0.011	0.718	0.003	0.926	−0.017	0.656
Russian language mostly spoken at home (ref: other)	−0.027	0.415	−0.039	0.395	0.035	0.373
English language – can at least communicate (ref: cannot)	−0.025	0.585	−0.015	0.763	0.067	0.222
Party membership: Not old enough (ref: old enough, not member)	−0.005	0.921	0.082	0.083	−0.086	0.089
Party membership: CPSU member (ref: old enough, not member)	**0.085**	**0.070**	**−0.080**	**0.055**	**−0.186**	**0.000**
Feels European (ref: does not)	−0.091	0.003	−0.178	0.000	−0.115	0.007
Feels Soviet (ref: does not)	0.230	0.000	0.232	0.000	0.307	0.000

TABLE A2.6. Average Marginal Effects for Individual CPSU Membership Model. DPR Referendum. Weighted.

Predictor	Mariupol	
	Weighted	
	Change	p Value
Age 40–59 (ref. 18–39)	0.124	0.001
Age 60+ (ref: 18–39)	0.180	0.001
Male	0.056	0.218

(continued)

	Mariupol	
	Weighted	
Predictor	Change	p Value
Higher education (ref: others)	−0.018	0.548
Good/excellent material standard of living (ref: other)	0.050	0.172
Occupation: Professional, manager, or supervisor (ref: else)	0.136	0.010
Russian language mostly spoken at home (ref: other)	0.034	0.382
English language – can at least communicate (ref: cannot)	0.007	0.851
Age Three Categories	0.114	0.040
Party membership: Not old enough (ref: old enough, not member)	0.060	0.261
Party membership: CPSU member (ref: old enough, not member)	**0.037**	**0.359**
Feels European (ref: does not)	0.130	0.004
Feels Soviet (ref: does not)	−0.222	0.000

TABLE A2.6. (*continued*)